

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 32

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 146

[SECRET]

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVYTO INQUIRE INTO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ON
PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

24 July 1944

[1]

COURT OF INQUIRY

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PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

3

a]

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[A (1)]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 13 July 1944.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

Encls:

(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.

(B) Copy of examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.

1. A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president and of Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, Retired, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy, Retired, as additional members, and of Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, as judge advocate, is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 10 a. m., on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

2. The attention of the court is particularly invited to sections 734 and 735, Naval Courts and Boards. The judge advocate is authorized

to summon such witnesses believed to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the subject matter and whose attendance can be had without interruption to or interference with the war effort, and to obtain all document relating to the said attack that may be required for introduction into evidence.

3. Orders for travel of witnesses must be approved by the convening authority prior to the issuance thereof.

4. The court will thoroughly inquire into the matter hereby submitted to it and will include in its findings a full statement of the facts it may deem to be established. The court will further give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred, will specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had.

[A (2)] 5. The court will be held with closed doors.

6. The Chief of Naval Personnel is hereby directed to furnish the necessary clerical assistance for the purpose of assisting the judge advocate in recording the proceedings of this court of inquiry.

FORRESTAL.

[B]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., 24 July 1944.

To: Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. N. R.

Sub: Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate.

Ref: (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944.

1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of inquiry, ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to assist the judge advocate during the inquiry set forth in reference (a).

FORRESTAL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 24 July 1944.

First Endorsement

From: President, Court of Inquiry.

To: Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, USNR.

1. Reported.

Orin G. Murfin,
ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, USN (Ret).

[C]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., July 15, 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.

Subj: Orders as counsel to assist judge advocate.

Ref: (a) Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, convened by SecNav, 13 July 1944.

1. You are hereby directed to report to the president of the court of inquiry ordered to convene at the Navy Department, as counsel to assist the judge advocate, during the inquiry set forth in reference (a).

RALPH A. BARD,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

First Endorsement

15 July 1944

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR.

1. Reported this date.

ORIN G. MURFIN,
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, USN (Ret),
President Court of Inquiry.

[D]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, 22 September, 1944.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate of Court of Inquiry to inquire into attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Sub: Request for Attendance of Witnesses before Court of Inquiry Convened by SecNav Precept 13 July 1944.

Ref: (a) Ltr. from Judge Advocate, Court of Inquiry, dtd. 21 September 1944.

1. The Secretary of the Navy has determined that the attendance of the following officers as witnesses before the Court of Inquiry convened by my precept of 13 July 1944, cannot now be made available for attendance on the Court without interruption to or interference with the war effort.

Rear Admiral T. S. WILKINSON, USN.

Captain A. H. McCOLLUM, USN.

FORRESTAL.

[E]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 30 August 1944.

Pers-3215-amf
Jacket No.
16977

To: Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy.

Via: Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Retired, President, Court of Inquiry.

Subject: Appointment for temporary service.

Reference:

(a) Act of Congress approved July 24, 1941 (U. S. Code (Supp. 1), Title 34, Secs. 350-350j).

(b) Section 5, Act of Congress approved June 30, 1942 (Public No. 639—77th Congress).

1. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), the President of the United States hereby appoints you a

Captain

In the Navy for temporary service, to rank from the 10th day of June, 1943.

2. By reference (b), this appointment, unless expressly declined, is regarded for all purposes as having been accepted on the date of this letter, without formal acceptance or oath of office. The date of rank stated in this appointment is for the purpose only of establishing your order of precedence.

3. Acknowledgement of receipt is requested.

For the President:

S/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy.

Registered No. 13. The lowest number of same date takes rank

S/ F. J. SCHUYLER,
Registrar.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 2 September 1944.

First Endorsement

From: Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN, Retired, President, Court of Inquiry.

To: Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy.

1. Delivered, with congratulations.

S/ ORIN G. MURFIN.

A True Copy. Attest:

HAROLD BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, JULY 24, 1944.

[1]

FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:10 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate.

The judge advocate read orders from the convening authority, originals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel to assist the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Powers and Lieutenant Whittington took seat as such.

The judge advocate introduced Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve; Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve; and Charles O. Manahan, yeoman third class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporters.

The court was cleared and the judge advocate read the precept, original prefixed hereto, marked "A".

All matters preliminary to the inquiry having been determined and the court having declared that pursuant to the instructions contained in the precept it would sit with closed doors, the court was opened.

Each member, the judge advocate, and the reporters were duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The court was cleared.

The court was opened.

The court then, at 11:45 a. m., adjourned subject to the call of the president.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, JULY 31, 1944.

[2]

Second Day

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy, (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy, (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporters.

The judge advocate introduced Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, was duly sworn as reporter. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporters, withdrew.

The record of proceedings of the first day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, European waters.

2. Q. What duties of major importance have been assigned to you since attaining flag rank?

A. Chief of Bureau of Ordnance; Commander of Division of Cruisers, Battle Force; Commander Cruisers, Battle Force; Chief of Naval Operations; and present duty.

3. Q. During what period of time was your tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations?

A. 1 August 1939 to March 25, 1942. I will check that. That's right.

[3] 4. Q. On 7 December 1941, what was the echelon of the strategic, tactical, and administrative command, between the Navy Department and the 14th Naval District?

A. Strategically, I would say there was none. Administratively, it was largely direct between the Department and the 14th Naval District. Tactically, any relations we had were through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, who was also Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and through him to the District Commandant.

5. Q. Then am I to understand that the chain of tactical command was the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, theoretically. Practically, I would say it would be very largely between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the District. I have not been able to check any bearing of that with War Plans, but that, I believe, would be generally accepted.

6. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were Chief of Naval Operations during the period from August 1, 1939, to March 25, 1942. What is the name of the officer who was in command of the U. S. Fleet on 7 December 1941?

A. Admiral Kimmel.

7. Q. What is the name of the officer who had command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941?

A. Admiral Kimmel.

8. Q. Could you tell us the full name of Admiral Kimmel?

A. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. I don't know what the "E" stands for.

9. Q. That is sufficient. Can you tell the court the name of the officer who was assigned the duties of commandant, 14th Naval District, on 7 December 1941?

A. Admiral Claude Bloch.

10. Q. Did any event of national importance occur on 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. Without elaborating your answer, please state what this event was.

A. A surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.

12. Q. At the time of this event was the United States in a state of war with any other nation?

A. No.

13. Q. When had the United States last been in a state of war?

A. 1918.

[4] The judge advocate stated that he did not desire further to examine this witness at this time. The court not desiring further to examine this witness at this time, the judge advocate requested that the court be cleared.

The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret); and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), were called before the court.

The court stated as follows:

The judge advocate of the court has made a request that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret); and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), be named as interested parties in this inquiry for the reason that the scope of the inquiry would appear to cover an extensive field; there would also appear to be many complicated details of evidence; much time at this critical period of the war effort could be saved if it does not become necessary to read long extracts of testimony already before

the court and to recall witnesses for cross-examination who may have returned to their duties in combat areas and other important war work; that the evidence before the court is that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), were in the key positions of the echelon of naval command between the Navy Department and the 14th Naval District at the time, the Japanese made an armed attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and therefore have a direct interest in the proceedings of this court.

The court informed Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret); and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), that they had been named as interested parties.

The court informed each of the interested parties of his rights.

Each of the interested parties examined the precept and stated that he did not object to any member of the court.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), with the permission of the court, introduced Charles B. Rugg, Esquire, civilian; Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy (Ret); and Lieutenant (junior grade) Edward B. Hanify, U. S. Naval Reserve, as his counsel, and stated that he would also have as counsel Admiral Harry A. Yarnell, U. S. Navy (Ret), and Commander W. C. Chambliss, U. S. Naval Reserve, neither of whom was in attendance at this session.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, with the permission of the court, introduced Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy (Ret), and Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, as his counsel.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), with the permission of the court, introduced Rear Admiral C. J. Rowcliff, U. S. Navy, and Captain Fred A. Ironside, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, as his counsel.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), with the permission of the court, made the following statement (reading:)

The fact that I have been named an interested party comes as a surprise, particularly in view of the published findings of an investigation made on the spot, within a few weeks of December 7, 1941.

I am much concerned because of the baneful implications and presumptions which may be attached to the term "interested party".

I have had no reason to suppose that it was incumbent upon me to preserve evidence or to keep unimpaired my recollection of the details and circumstances surrounding and prior to December 7th. Nor have I had reason over this intervening time, even if I could, to keep those details and circumstances precisely separated from what they subconsciously may appear to have been, in order to be able to recapture and reconstruct them as they were.

I desire to be helpful to the court and to expedite its business, but I feel sure that you appreciate the difficulties which now confront me as an "interested party."

I have been informed only very recently that I would be an "Interested party" and I have had scant time to prepare myself, if indeed, reconstruction of the facts, full and uncolored, is possible of human accomplishment at this time.

While I have no desire to burden the court with legal technicalities, I feel confident that the court does not expect me to waive any rights that I have.

So that the record may be clear in this respect, I wish it understood and I understand that I am not waiving any of my rights, whatever they are or may be.

The witness who was on the stand prior to the clearing and opening of the court, resumed his seat as witness.

[6] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

14. Q. Admiral Stark, you have testified as to the chain of the administrative, tactical, and strategical command which is between the Navy Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Do I understand strategical and tactical are different from military command?

A. No, I would say not.

15. Q. Then in substance your answer was that the chain of military command was from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet and thence to the Commandant, 14th Naval District?

A. Yes.

16. Q. And the chain of administrative command—may I inquire exactly what you mean by that?

A. I was thinking largely of the civilian employees and the bearing of furnishing the 14th Naval District its personnel, and so forth.

17. Q. Mr. President, I have here General Order 142, date January 10, 1941, which is a statement of the status of the 5th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Naval Districts. I merely want to state that in General Order 142, January 10, 1941, which was in effect on 7 December 1941, that the status of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District is clearly defined; and I wonder if I might ask Admiral Stark to read this order and ask him if this wasn't the chain of Command he is endeavoring to establish by the questions propounded.

With the court's permission, the question was withdrawn.

The interested party, Admiral Claude Charles Bloch, U. S. Navy, made the following motion: "Inasmuch as it appears that the chain of command and responsibilities are fixed in documents, I move to strike out that testimony on the ground that the documents themselves are the best evidence of what that authority is. Number two, on the further ground that the questions put by the judge advocate themselves presuppose an answer to the very question at issue here as to what the command was. I mean, they were conclusions in themselves, and I think it would make for time to strike out that testimony and stick with the documents—and I make such a motion."

The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The court announced that the motion was not sustained.

18. Q. Admiral Stark, there is in existence General Order Number 142, Navy Department, dated 10 January 1941, defining [7] the status of the Commandants of the 5th, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Naval Districts. This order was in effect on December 7, 1941, and prior thereto. Are you familiar with this order?

A. Generally, but I have had no time to go into the details. If it is the same order that was in existence, generally, yes. I would like to refreshen on the order if I may be cross-examined.

19. Q. According to this Order, and I read: "The Commandants of the Tenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts, the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Ber-

muda, and the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far as pertains to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, are hereby assigned a dual status as follows: (a) As Commandants of their respective Naval Districts, operating under the orders of the Navy Department. (b) As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of a Senior Officer Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief." Is this the command relation that you described in the previous questions propounded by the judge advocate of the court of inquiry?

A. It is.

20. Q. Admiral Stark, I have in my hand U. S. Navy Regulations 1920, corrected in so far as I am able to ascertain, to date. Articles 1480 and following, and including 1486—these I interpret to be the regulations governing the business of the naval districts as prescribed in the first part of the General Order, just referred to in paragraph (2), which says that the Commandants of their respective naval districts operate under the orders of the Navy Department. Are these regulations, governing the naval districts, given in the articles of the Navy Regulations above quoted, the orders of the Navy Department in regard to the duties of the Commandant?

A. They are.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold E. Stark, U. S. Navy:

21. Q. Admiral, referring to your answer to the judge advocate's questions which have been read and which have been subject to cross-examination by Admiral Bloch: Did you feel that you fully understood the language of the judge advocate's questions in which he brought in the words in the official orders and regulations such as "strategic", "tactical", and so on?

A. The question was not too clear and I gave the best general answer to it that I could. The regulations and general orders are specific and I think the best answer to the judge advocate's question.

[8] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

22. Q. In the provisions of General Order No. 142 and the Navy Regulations that have been cited, the only instructions dealing with the chain of command and the responsibilities of the command of the 14th Naval District, were there not certain directives in the war plans issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, and in the joint action of the Army and the Navy?

A. In answering the original question, I stated that they might be affected by the war plans and that I have not had an opportunity to look over them to answer your question. My recollection is that they may have been somewhat modified by war plans or special letters and which I would like an opportunity to check up on to answer your question.

23. Q. As a matter of fact, might not the provisions of these publications have vitally changed the provisions of General Order 142 in the Navy Regulations?

A. If you mean, would it have been possible to have issued such instructions, it would. Whether or not anything that was issued did, I would like an opportunity to check up.

24. Q. Well, then, you cannot give a complete answer to this question until you have further refreshed your memory?

A. That is correct.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: If I may state, I have been pretty busy on the other side. I was not told why I was called to Washington, did not know definitely until I arrived what I was coming here for, obtained counsel only this morning, have had no chance to refresh on testimony which has been given and other documents which have been made available to other interested parties, and I should like time to check up and prepare myself to answer the questions which I feel will probably be asked me.

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.

The judge advocate requested the court to take judicial notice of General Order 142, 143, and 170, and stated that they would be maintained in the custody of the judge advocate and would be available for ready reference by the interested parties or the court if and when required, and the court stated that it would take judicial notice thereof.

[9] General Orders Nos. 142, 143, and 170 were submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, they were received in evidence and marked "EXHIBITS 1, 2 and 3," respectively, copy appended.

One of counsel for the judge advocate was called as a witness by the judge advocate, was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station?

A. Robert D. Powers, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve, counsel for the judge advocate of this court.

2. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also known as WPL-46? If so, produce it.

A. I am; here it is.

The official copy of Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow Number 5, also known as WPL-46, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, requested the judge advocate to state whether these documents were being offered in evidence, or were being offered for identification only.

The judge advocate replied that they were being offered for identification only for the purpose of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom that might become pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 4," for reference.

3. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five, also known as WP Pacific 46? If so, will you produce it?

A. I am; here it is.

The official copy of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five, also known as WP Pac-46 was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

[10] There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 5", for reference.

4. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, document number FTP155? If so, please produce it.

A. I am; here it is.

The official copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, document number FTP155, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts, therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 6", for reference.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, requested information as to whether FTP155 was corrected up to December 7, 1941, or as of what date.

5. Q. Will you answer the question?

A. The copy shows that all changes have been made up to and including 26 July, 1944.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated that that leaves the document in a condition that it can't be identified as it was on the 7th of December, 1941, because there have been numerous pages taken out and new pages put in.

The witness requested permission to correct his last answer. The witness stated as follows: The answer which I gave to the last question was incorrect. This document is corrected up to and including July 14, 1941; the date of July 26, 1944, which I gave, being the date upon which it was corrected. In other words, that is the entry of the man who made the correction, that he made it on July 26, 1944.

Examined by the court:

6. Q. Is the judge advocate prepared to submit a copy of that publication in effect on December 7, 1941?

A. I have been assured by the registrar of this document that it stands corrected as in effect on December 7, 1941, as I have handed it to the judge advocate.

Examined by the judge advocate:

7. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of the 14th Naval District Plan O-4, called the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also sometimes known as JCD-42? If so, please produce it.

A. I am; here it is.

[17] 8. Q. Is this the plan that was in effect on 7 December, 1941?

A. It is.

The official copy of 14th Naval District Plan O-4, called the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, also known as JCD-42, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 7", for reference.

9. Q. Are you the legal custodian of an official copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter Number 2CL-41 (Revised), subject, Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas?

A. I am; here it is.

The official copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter Number 2CL-41 (Revised), subject, Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 8", for reference.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Block, U. S. Navy:

10. Q. As assistant to the judge advocate, will you certify that all the documents which have just been listed will lie as they were in effect on 7 December, 1941?

A. I do, sir.

The interested parties, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

The court then, at 11:45 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[12] Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry, and their counsel.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance in order to familiarize himself with the subject matter of the inquiry.

The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), joined in the request for continuance.

The judge advocate stated that he was ready to proceed but that he considered the request for continuance reasonable and did not object thereto.

The court announced that the request of the interested parties for a continuance would be granted and that the next meeting of the court would be held at 10 a. m., August 7, 1944.

With the permission of the court, Rear Admirad Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: I should like to have what I am about to say put on the record, if it is pertinent to put it on. I have been branded throughout this country as the one responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. I feel that this investigation should go far enough to disclose all the facts in connection with the matter and that witnesses from the Army, from the State Department, or from any other federal department ought to be called before this court in order to establish the facts that are necessary. It will be a long time before I am afforded any other opportunity to refute the statements made in the report of the Roberts Commission. People may die who can make statements before this court sufficient to establish the facts and to refute the utterly false and misleading statements made throughout the Roberts Commission.

The court stated: The court assures you that we will make every effort to obtain any witness that you may care to call for the primary purpose of establishing all the facts as demanded by the precept.

The court then, at 2:20 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August 7, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944.

[13]

THIRD DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate,
and his counsel.Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
reporter.Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and
his counsel.Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), inter-
ested party, and his counsel.Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party,
and his counsel.The record of the proceedings of the second day of the inquiry was
read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

With the permission of the court, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S.
Navy, introduced Lieutenant D. W. Richmond, U. S. Naval Reserve,
and Lieutenant R. L. Tedrow, U. S. Naval Reserve, as additional
counsel for himself as interested party.The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Ret.), stated that it was his understanding that the judge advo-
cate had requested access to certain secret files in the Navy Depart-
ment, to which he also would like to have access, and that as yet the
matter had not been acted upon.The judge advocate replied that he had written the Secretary of
the Navy, setting forth the request of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy (Ret) that he have access to said documents, but
that up to a half hour before the court convened it had not been acted
upon by the Secretary of the Navy. The judge advocate further
stated that he did not consider the said documents immediately neces-
sary to the proceedings of the court.[14] Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a witness for the
judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, with the
permission of the court, made the following statement prior to his

examination: Before my examination begins, before my further examination proceeds, I wish to state that although there has been a week's adjournment, I have not been able to devote all of it to preparation. Considerable of my intervening time has been necessarily employed on the duties of my present station. It is difficult to throw back over two and one-half years and testify about many things. I have not been able to study over the full field which may be opened. I can testify as to broad matters of policy and plans, though I may have to ask for further time to refresh my memory. I suggest where evidence as to matters of lesser degree is sought, it can be better obtained from those of my subordinates who were in OpNav in 1941 and consequently more familiar with detail, or from custodians of records and documents in the department's files. I also wish to say that I am appearing as the first witness before this court, having been declared to be an interested party before any other testimony was taken. I make no particular point of that unusual sequence and shall strive to answer questions so far as my memory serves, fully and without reserve.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. During the period of two or three months preceding December 7, 1941, who were your principal advisers, assistants, or aides in the Navy Department?

A. My assistants and advisers at that time were the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; Head of War Plans; Head of Office of Naval Intelligence; the Districts; Central Division; Ship Movements; Ship Maintenance; Fleet Training; Commander Wellborn, my Flag Secretary. Those are the principal ones that I recall at the moment.

2. Q. What is the name of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll.

3. Q. Will you state in general the principal duties of this officer?

A. Admiral Ingersoll's principal duties as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations were to advise me in a general way, and for me to keep him in touch with all matters of general importance. He took off my shoulders many matters of detail which he settled himself. Matters of major importance, matters regarding policy, matters regarding talks and so forth with other departments of the government were considered by me, though he was largely acquainted with them, and I accepted such letters. Many dispatches which we sent [15] over together he released after I had cleared them. In general, he was a very close assistant.

4. Q. Did the major problems arising in the Pacific Fleet in the 14th Naval District come within his view?

A. They did.

5. Q. Who was your Chief of War Plans?

A. Admiral Kelly Turner.

6. Q. Will you tell the court in general what the principal duties of Admiral Turner were?

A. Admiral Turner, as head of the War Plans Division, was charged with the drawing up of plans for the use of the Fleet in war. He worked very closely with Army War Plans. He kept in very close touch with the dispositions made in connection with War Plans. I think that may cover the broad outline of it.

7. Q. Did you ordinarily call Admiral Turner in for conferences on your principal military problems?

A. I think there is no exaggeration to state that we were in what might be called constant conference on important military problems. I saw him not only daily—frequently a number of times daily.

8. Q. Did he have anything to do with making estimates of the situations as matters progressed?

A. Yes, a great deal to do, because of his position.

9. Q. Would you say that he was familiar with the military problems and policies in the Pacific Area, so far as the Chief of Naval Operations had anything to do with these plans and was concerned?

A. I would say he was thoroughly familiar with them. We discussed them together with all their aspects, and it was a matter of his constant concern and that of his Division.

10. Q. What is the name of the officer who was in charge of the General Division?

A. Captain Schuirmann.

11. Q. What were the principal duties that he performed in relation to your office as Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Captain Schuirmann was the officer particularly charged with the liaison with the State Department. Central Division handled matters of outlying possessions, but one of his principal duties, if not the most important duty, was his connection with the State Department.

12. Q. Did you consider him as an adviser or a liaison officer, or an aide—or exactly in what capacity would you [16] state he performed his duties?

A. He was certainly a liaison officer with the State Department. Many matters I asked him to take up with the State Department. He obtained information on many matters from the State Department, and naturally I asked his opinions to that extent, and to that extent his advice on problems where it was required.

13. Q. What were the names of some of your principal aides?

A. Commander Wellborn was my Flag Secretary. My Flag Lieutenant was Lieutenant Smedberg.

14. Q. Will you tell the court whether they acted in an advisory, administrative, or in what capacity?

A. Lieutenant Smedberg acted largely in the capacity of regular Flag Lieutenant's duties; Commander Wellborn as Flag Secretary. Most matters concerning the Department which come to the Chief of Naval Operations Office or Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Office, go over his desk. He was probably as familiar as anyone with correspondence which I handled and which Admiral Ingersoll handled. He brought me mail to sign, and he frequently was responsible for diverting mail for Admiral Ingersoll's signature, which Admiral Ingersoll of course would sign or send back to me, as he saw fit; but his liaison with me was very close.

15. Q. Do you know a Captain John L. McCrae?

A. Yes, John L. McCrae to all intention and purposes also served as an aide.

16. Q. Did you ever have him appointed in any special capacity?

A. Yes. I felt the need for a capable officer to follow up matters for me which I did not have the time to follow up, but which I more or less continuously checked. For example, a letter might come in affecting several bureaus. I would have McCrae follow up the action of the bureaus, and he was check-up and follow-up officer. In addi-

tion, he sat in on a great many conferences which I had, to keep him generally familiar with a good many matters.

17. Q. Adverting to problems that may have arisen in the Pacific area, did he ever perform any special duties in connection therewith?

A. He did. I sent Captain McCrae—I do not recall just the date, sometime in 1941—with two sets of War Plans, which I was anxious for more personal touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific than I could get by simply mailing them. He first went to the Hawaiian Islands, left a copy of these with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, with the request that while he was on his way to the Asiatic and back, Commander-in-Chief would have opportunity to study these plans, and [17] McCrae could pick up any suggestions or comments and bring them back to me. In the Asiatic he delivered the plans to Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic, remained there in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic on these plans, and brought back to me his reaction. Likewise, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, when he stopped on his return. I might add that Captain McCrae, of course, was made familiar with these plans before he left, in order that he might perform his duty more effectively.

18. Q. Who was your Director or Naval Intelligence?

A. I had three directors of Naval Intelligence.

19. Q. I would like the one for the period of three or four months preceding December 7?

A. At that time Captain Wilkinson was Director of Naval Intelligence.

20. Q. What were his principal duties as related to the function of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. His principal duty was collecting and dissemination of information, and of course keeping me informed of what was regarded as important and pertinent.

21. Q. What was the general nature of information that he furnished you?

A. Well, it was broad in scope. For example, such matters as he became cognizant of in connection with the war in Europe, not only with regard to what he might obtain from his attachés in operational matters, but a great deal also in technical matters.

22. Q. Were you kept currently informed?

A. Yes, I feel that I was.

23. Q. What method did he employ in transmitting this information to you?

A. Usually by word of mouth. Sometimes by memorandum.

24. Q. What was your estimate of the efficiency of the Office of Naval Intelligence in keeping you informed of international and military developments in the Pacific area for the three months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. My estimate was that he gave me the best obtainable. I might say in that regard, if you refer to what we knew as to what military measures, particularly construction and so forth, were going on in Japan, the data could not be considered accurate. It had to be surmised. Someone once remarked, "The accurate information stopped outside the three-mile limit." I may add also that the British had no more information in regard to that than we did.

25. Q. I refer principally, Admiral, to information on political developments in the Orient, and military information [18] on disposition of possible enemy ships and matters of that nature.

A. In regard to the political situation they made estimates from time to time from what they had. I think they were reasonably good at the time. As far as disposition of the enemy forces, I would have to go back to the records to check their accuracy. The dispositions were supplemented by information received from the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, Commander-in-Chief in the Asiatic. The political developments, I would also have to check back my memorandum to really check their accuracy. I couldn't recall accurately at the moment how much they corroborated with other information that we had.

26. Q. I only wanted a general statement, Admiral, and I am satisfied with what you have given. Did you have any direct dealings with the State Department?

A. Yes, I did.

27. Q. Will you state to the court the details as to the manner in which you may have conducted any business of the Navy Department with the State Department?

A. My direct dealings with the State Department were on meetings which took place approximately weekly with the Under-Secretary of State. I had many conferences with Mr. Hull, in addition. Mr. Hull frequently called me by telephone, and in the latter part of '41, while negotiations were going on, he was particularly anxious that we were kept fully informed. It was not unusual for him to call me up about 6:00 o'clock in the evening and report any matters of the day's developments which he thought might be of interest to the Navy Department.

28. Q. Did you have any dealings with the War Department?

A. Yes.

29. Q. With what officers did you ordinarily transact your business?

A. Well, primarily with General Marshall, but I saw the War Plans Division of the War Department occasionally. I saw the Secretary of War occasionally, particularly where matters of priorities and so forth were concerned.

30. Q. Did you consult with him as to military matters in the Pacific area, also?

A. With General Marshall?

31. With General Marshall.

A. Yes.

32. Q. Could you give the court any idea of the frequency of these conferences? In other words, were they a weekly affair, monthly, or—?

A. The Joint Board met weekly, but in addition to that, [19] I was in very frequent communication with General Marshall. We worked very closely together, by telephone, or when the matter was too secret for telephone, by running over to his office, and he to mine.

33. Q. Did your duties as Chief of Naval Operations require any consultations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy?

A. They did.

34. Q. Were these consultations daily, weekly, monthly, or how would you characterize them?

A. I would certainly characterize them as frequent, not only by personal visits, which were very frequent, but also by telephone, sometimes maybe two or three times in a day, frequently on matters of informatory interest, of great length, at the end of the day.

35. Q. Was the subject of our military problems in the Pacific a part of these discussions?

A. Very decidedly so.

36. Q. I show you, sir, a document which has been marked for identification "EXHIBIT 4." Do you recognize this document?

A. I do, as Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy, WPL-46.

37. Q. Was the document in effect on December 7, 1941?

A. The document had been promulgated. I might say that it was in effect, but had not been executed.

38. Q. On what date had it been promulgated?

A. 26 May 1941.

Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Number 5, U. S. Navy, WPL-46, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received.

39. Q. Please refer to this document and read to the court such portions as show how it was to be put in effect.

A. (Reading:)

Upon receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with this plan in its entirety, including acts of war:

"EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5"

40. Q. When might mobilization be directed?

A. (Reading:)

The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

[20] 41. Q. What provision was made for executing the plan in part?

A. (Reading:)

Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nation that is to be considered the enemy, the tasks to be executed or accepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or additional tasks thereof.

42. Q. Was the major task of the Pacific Fleet assigned in this War Plan?

A. (Reading:)

The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II), will be organized into task forces as follows:

- a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
- b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
- c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.

The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA.

a. TASK.

Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions:

b. TASK.

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk:

c. TASK.

Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy:

d. TASK.

Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east:

[21] e. TASK.

Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. TASK.

Defend Guam in category "F";

g. TASK.

Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

h. TASK.

Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. TASK.

Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. TASK.

Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require.

k. TASK.

Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

43. Q. Had a copy of this War Plan been issued the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. It had.

44. Q. Had this War Plan, "EXHIBIT 4", been placed in effect, either in full or in part prior to December 7, 1941?

A. It had not been executed.

45. Q. When did Admiral Kimmel assume command of the Pacific Fleet?

A. In February, '41. I do not recall the exact date.

[22] 46. Q. What was the theater of operations of the Pacific Fleet during the year 1941?

A. Central Pacific.

47. Q. Where did the fleet normally base?

A. The fleet normally bases in West Coast ports. Generally speaking I would say, in answer to your question, Southern California.

48. Q. Do you recall if a directive had been issued basing the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

A. I do not recall a specific directive. In 1939, shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations, I established what might be termed a Cruiser Force in the Hawaiian Islands. After the spring maneuvers in 1940, the fleet was based in the Hawaiian Islands.

49. Q. Will you tell the court what were the broad underlying considerations for basing the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. If the court will permit me, I should like to read from a letter which I wrote Admiral Richardson, a reply to a question of his which in effect was, "Why am I here?" That reply, which is well-backed and which I gave as a considered answer, I think, would be the best thing I could give for the record.

There being no objection, with the court's permission, the witness continued: This letter is dated 27 May 1941. The second paragraph states: (Reading:)

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

The next paragraph starts:

Answer. You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought that the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she (Japan) has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

That paragraph is on page one. Now going over to page two, I again quote:

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental result, regardless, such as solving the logistics problems involved, including not only supplies from the United States, but their [23] handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

Training, as you might do under war conditions.

c. Familiarity of task forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa, general area, in so far as practicable.

d. Closer liaison with the Army in the common defense of the Hawaiian Area than has ever previously been exhibited between the Army and Navy.

e. Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

f. Security of the Fleet at anchor.

g. Accenting the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base, but that will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

50. Q. Do you remember if there ever had been any official protest made by anyone in the naval service to you regarding basing the Pacific Fleet in that area?

A. I recall no what might be called official protest. I do have letters from Admiral Richardson in which he—personal letters—in which he advised a return of the Fleet to the Pacific Coast; and I am perfectly willing, if the court so desires, to place these letters on the record.

51. Q. Could you tell the court, Admiral, in very general terms, about how many units of each of the following types there were with the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Kimmel took over command in February, 1941? The categories are, first, battleships.

A. That is a matter of detail. It can be taken accurately from the records.

52. Q. I am asking generally.

A. And I would prefer it be from the record. I made out a memorandum on it, the accuracy of which I would not vouch for, and it should be checked with the record, but if the court would like to have it, I will give it. I think the record for matters of that sort is the best evidence.

53. Q. About how many patrol planes were assigned to the Hawaiian Area at that time, in February 1941?

A. I would have to check that from the record.

[24] 54. Q. During the year 1941, were any naval units detached from the Pacific Fleet?

A. There were. That also is a matter of record. There was a detachment sent to the Atlantic.

55. Q. Do you remember the reasons for the detachment of this unit?

A. The movement conformed in general to dispositions required by WPL-46. Now there is a matter which I would like to give the court off the record. I strongly question the advisability of putting it in the record, but I have no objection to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and all hands having it. I would like to make it off the record and then get your opinion.

The judge advocate requested that the statement be made by the witness, and that the court direct that it not be included as a permanent part of the record, but be made in the form of an exhibit which could be placed in the secret files of the Navy Department for reference to by any person with authority to look at the record.

The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he objected to such procedure with regard to the statement which might be made by the witness, and that he preferred that the entire proceedings be made a matter of record.

The judge advocate replied.

The witness added these words to his answer: "I may add that I think making this matter public would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States."

The interested party, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), replied.

[25] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The court was cleared.

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The court announced that it would hear the answer to the question and then make its decision.

56. Q. Will you answer the question, please, Admiral?

A. My first answer—my answer in part, to the question, was that the movement was in general conformance with WPL-46. My second part of the answer involves a matter of timing. The movement was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations at that particular time because I was given orders for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic which, in my opinion, and in that of my advisers, required this force to be in the Atlantic to insure its success.

The court announced that the answer would go in the record.

57. Q. What, in your opinion, was the adequacy of the Pacific Fleet during the period October to December, 1941, to carry out WPL-46?

A. In general, it was considered adequate for the tasks outlined. Obviously—I will let the answer stand; that is, it was considered generally adequate for the tasks outlined. The disposition was drawn up to be realistic.

58. Q. Does that complete your answer, sir?

A. Yes.

59. Q. I show you, sir, a copy of a letter duly authenticated under official seal of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941. Can you identify this?

A. Yes. I identify this as a letter signed by Col. Knox of January 24, 1941, then Secretary of the Navy, to Col. Stimson, then Secretary of War.

The copy of a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 9".

60. Q. Will you read the letter, please?

A. This is a letter dated January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

The witness read Exhibit 9.

[26] 61. Q. Admiral, do you know who prepared this letter for the Secretary of the Navy's signature?

A. The original draft was prepared in War Plans. We worked on it several days. When I say "we", I mean Admiral Turner (then Captain Turner), Admiral Ingersoll, and myself. We finally rounded it up in the form in which it has just been read.

62. Q. Did this letter represent the view of the Chief of Naval Operations on the question of military defenses of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base on the date of the letter, January 24, 1941?

A. It did. It didn't go into complete details but it covered, in our opinion, the main points which were in our minds which we believed were generally accepted main points and we decided to put them before the Army.

63. Q. Admiral, in order to make this whole letter more clear to the court, I will ask you to refer to Exhibit 9 and state what dangers were envisaged, in the order of their importance, as set out in this letter.

A. The order of importance as set out is: (1) Air bombing attack; (2) Air torpedo plane attack; (3) Sabotage; (4) Submarine attack; (5) Mining; (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

64. Q. What views did the Navy Department express as regards the then existing defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against the forms of attack set out in Paragraphs 1 and 2?

A. With regard to 1 and 2, the solution of which the letter stated was considered to be of primary importance, the following paragraphs particularly apply. Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and a minimum at two. Attacks may be launched from a striking force of carriers and

their supporting vessels. The countermeasures to be considered are: (A) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched; (B) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives; (C) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire; (D) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; (E) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrage. The operations set forth in (A), namely, location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched, are largely functions of the Fleet but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war. Is that part of your question?

[27] 65. Q. Yes. On Page 3 of the letter contained in Exhibit 9, please read into the record the proposals of the Secretary of the Navy to remedy the problems as set out in this letter.

A. The Secretary of the Navy offered the following proposals: (1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii; that the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrage, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defense of Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for effective cooperation of naval and military aircraft operations and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire against surprise aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree to the appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor; that joint exercises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist. He requested that concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementation of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, be met by the highest cooperation from the War Department.

66. Q. Admiral, I show you an official document entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", which has been marked "EXHIBIT 6" for identification. If you recognize this document, state as what you identify it?

A. I identify it as Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, sometimes referred to as FTP155. It is a confidential document.

The document entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received.

67. Q. On Page 5, for the record will you read to the court Paragraphs 8 and 9?

A. (Reading:)

8. Methods of coordination.—

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by one of the following methods:

a. Mutual cooperation.

b. The exercise of unity of command.

9. Determination of the method of coordination.

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.

b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

[28] (1) When ordered by the President; or

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

68. Q. What method of coordination was in effect in the 14th Naval District on December 7, 1941?

A. The method of coordination in effect at that time was one of mutual coordination, except that I would say the method for coordination of the air effort was one of, if not outright unity of command, that it very closely approached it, and one which I thought was so splendid that I sent it to the commanders-in-chief of our principal fleets and to all district commandants. It was the best thing I had seen and I highly concurred in it. If the court would like to have the two principal paragraphs of that document I would be glad to insert them in the record at this time.

69. Q. Is that from this book?

A. No, I took them out of a paper. Shall I go ahead with them?

70. Q. Yes.

A. (Reading:)

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides"—I am reading from a document which gives me two paragraphs sent to me by Admiral Kimmel, which paragraphs are taken out of an agreement which was previously arrived at in the Hawaiian Islands. The date of this memorandum of Admiral Kimmel to me is 4 June, 1941. The date of the document from which these extracts are quoted, as I recall, is sometime in March, 1941. I quote:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps, assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded, the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships, and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, requested that the document from which the witness was reading be better identified.

The memorandum dated 4 June 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, was submitted to each of the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry [29] before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 10", for reference, description appended.

The judge advocate stated that the documents to which the memorandum referred would be later offered in evidence.

71. Q. Will you read the rest of the memorandum, Admiral?

A. The third paragraph is: (Reading) "The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are

held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt that they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use. There are about 140 light Army planes (fighter and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing airplanes now—"now" being as of 4 June 1941—"in the Islands. These are in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt that these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so. There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands." Signed, "H. E. Kimmel." Copies of this were sent to General Marshall, Admiral King, and Admiral Towers—Admiral King then being in the Atlantic and Admiral Towers being Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department.

72. Q. Had this method of coordination of aircraft actually been put in effect?

A. It was put in effect in March, 1941. As I noted, correspondence or papers from which this extract was made were forwarded to the commanders-in-chief of the three principal fleets—the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic—and to the commandants, as I recall, of all districts.

73. Q. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, give any thought to putting in effect the exercise of unity of command for the whole Hawaiian area?

A. Much thought had been given to the proposition of unity of command. We had not arrived at a satisfactory solution or decision to put it into effect so far as the Navy Department was concerned at that time.

74. Q. Am I to infer that you had discussions with the Army chief of staff, or other higher authorities, in this study?

A. You are to infer that. It had been the subject of many conversations with the chief of staff of the Army. I may state with reference to the amphibious operation which was referred to in the testimony a little while back, that operations of that nature which we were considering, we anticipated having unity of command for them.

[30] 75. Q. Will you read into the record, Article 25 on Page 27 of Exhibit 6?

A. Article 25, Page 27, FTP155, reads as follows (reading):

25. Purpose of coastal frontier defense.

a. The purpose of a joint organization and measures for coastal frontier defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
- (2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
- (3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;
- (4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.

76. Q. Will you read into the record Article 26 on Page 28, paragraphs a. to e., both inclusive?

A. I quote (reading) :

a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective co-ordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors.

b. Coastal frontier defense is the organization of the forces and matériel of the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

c. The naval district is a military and administrative command ashore established for the purpose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities outside the Navy Department proper, and for the further purpose of centralizing under one command within the district and the waters thereof :

(1) For military coordination, all naval activities ; and

(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific exceptions. The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal zones. The limits of the naval districts are laid down in the Navy Regulations. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the direct [31] representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.

d. Naval local defense forces consist of naval forces, including Coast Guard and Lighthouse Service, afloat and ashore, attached to a naval district and under the command of the commandant of the district. These forces are not a part of the Fleet.

e. A naval base is a center from which men-of-war can operate and be maintained.

77. Q. On Page 31, will you read into the record Paragraphs o. to v., both inclusive?

A. I quote (reading) :

o. The outer harbor area is the war area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries.

p. The harbor channel area is the water area which lies between the outer harbor area and the inner harbor area, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

q. The inner harbor area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor.

r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a defensive sea area.

s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore patrol.

t. An escort force is a part of the naval local defense forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

u. A coastal force is a naval force which may be organized to operate within the coastal zone to meet a specific situation in which naval local defense forces are inadequate to carry out the Navy's functions in coastal frontier defense.

v. A harbor defense is an administrative and tactical Army command, comprising the armament and accessories, including anti-aircraft armament, controlled mines and supporting aircraft, with the personnel for manning, provided for the defense of a harbor or other water area. Harbor defenses exist to provide on the outbreak of war an effective seaward defense of important strategic points, such as large centers of population, important commercial centers, navy yards, coaling or fueling stations, locks and dams ; to deny the

enemy entrance to or occupation of a harbor or other waters which might serve as a base for land or naval operations, or both; and to keep the enemy at such distance from the entrance to a waterway that our naval forces may debouch therefrom and take up a battle formation with the least hostile interference.

[32] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

78. Q. Will you read into the record paragraph "z" on page 32 of Exhibit 6?

A. [Reading:]

The aircraft warning service is a communication and an intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft and to alert Air Corps units and Antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes and of the necessary communications.

79. Q. I ask you to turn to page 13 and read Article 19, paragraphs a, b, and c.

A. [Reading:]

a. Attacks against our coastal frontiers may be classified as follows: (1) Major operations, i. e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and (2) Minor operations, i. e., raids against shipping or shore objectives.

b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory.

c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are: (1) To provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct defense of the coast. (2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor defenses.

80. Q. What, in general, comprised the Hawaiian coastal frontier?

A. It is shown in chart WPL 46. Subject to the correction of my testimony, in general, it comprises a zone around the Hawaiian Islands, including Midway, Palmyra, Johnson, and Kingston reef, and, to the best of my recollection, Wake. The boundary, as I recall, is some 500 miles outside the Hawaiian Islands group.

81. Q. Will you turn to page 14 and read Article 19-d in its entirety?

A. (Reading:)

In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain—

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

[33] (2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

(4) Controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(5) A system of underwater listening posts.

(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol.

(7) Fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine barges.

(8) Additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation.

82. Q. Adverting to paragraph 1, which you have just read, Admiral, which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain

"guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations." Do you know whether the Army had lived up, in general, to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. The Army had the defenses mentioned installed. I would not care to say that they were sufficient. In a general way, I knew and had been told by the Chief of Staff of the Army that subject to a complete breakdown in training, he was sending what he could to the Hawaiian Islands. That does not mean that "what he could" was sufficient, and without reference to the record, I could not state what was there, and there are those whose testimony would be much more direct than mine on that point; but I did know from frequent conversation with Marshall that he stated he was doing the best he could. He was up against it, to a considerable degree.

83. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (2), which you read a few moments ago and which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces." Do you know, in a general way, whether the Army had lived up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I know, in a general way, that the Army had increased their air units out there to a considerable degree. This also was a matter of frequent conversation between General Marshall and me, and as I recall—and my recollection may be faulty—the Army had something over 200 planes in Hawaii at that time. Just how many of them were fighters and what were bombers and so forth I could not state.

[34] 84. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (3), which you have just read and which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy." Do you know whether the Army had lived up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I knew that the Army—again from conversations with General Marshall, some of which I recollect with great clarity, because of an amusing incident not necessary to put on the record—was making great endeavor to get a warning system for the island of Oahu, and thought it was such that when installed and properly manned it should have been a very effective system—at least, so far as we could make it with the equipment developed up to that time. As regards getting the information from that warning system properly distributed to those to whom it was essential to make proper use of the information, that will have to come from people out there. I could look up and read what there was available, but I do not recollect clearly, after a lapse of time, just what this was.

85. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (4), which you have just read and which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance," do you know whether the Army had lived up to its commitments in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I did not concern myself so much with the mining situation as I did with the material in your immediately preceding questions, be-

cause of the fact that, in general, the Hawaiian area hasn't good mineable waters, and the details of that I do not have.

86. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (5), which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "a system of underwater listening posts," do you know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived up to its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Again my previous answer would largely apply. I considered it more of a local affair and do not recall anything particular with respect thereto.

87. Q. Adverting to paragraph d (6), which states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol," do you know whether, in a general way, the Army had lived up to its commitments prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Again my general answer applies. Beach defenses are something with which I am very familiar, so far as German installations are concerned, which are largely local affairs, and there again I do not have any recollection.

[35] 88. Q. Paragraph d (7) states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine barrages." Do you know whether, in a general way, the Army lived up to its commitments prior to December 7, 1941?

A. My previous answer applies.

89. Q. Paragraph d (8) states that the Army will provide and operate or maintain "additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation." Do you know, in a general way, whether the Army had lived up to this commitment prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Can you tell me just what was intended by that question?

90. Q. Other than that set out in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", I don't know.

A. Well, I don't either.

91. Q. Adverting to paragraph g, which I shall read: "In carrying out these functions the Navy will: (1) provide and operate— (a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast. Do you know, in a general way, whether the Navy had lived up to its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?"

A. If by that question is meant that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, or, if you would like to put it, the District Commander, had the patrol planes which I would like to have had him have for the business in question, he did not. I had made a distribution from what was available to me and which I considered the best I could do and, as I recall, based on the provisions of WPL 46. I would like to reserve the right to correct that statement if my memory is faulty. I might add I was moving Heaven and earth for increasing our patrol planes, not only for the Pacific but for problems which I envisaged elsewhere, particularly also in the Atlantic.

92. Q. I quote from paragraph g (b): "The Navy will provide and operate a communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt ex-

change of information or instructions with the Army." Can you state whether or not, in your estimation, the Navy had lived up to its commitment in a reasonable manner prior to December 7, 1941?

A. There again I feel I am not competent to give any detailed information. I had absolute confidence in our people in the Hawaiian Islands. I still have confidence in them. I knew they were drilling and working on these subjects, and I left it to them. I consider that the conditions existing with regard to your question could be much better testified to by them.

[36] 93. Q. In order to save time, Admiral, with respect to the provisions of paragraph g (d), would your answer be the same as to inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater obstructions other than beach defenses?

A. Generally, yes. In regard to mines and going back to when I was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, I made mines one of my particular subjects of study with regard to outlying possessions, the Hawaiian groups and the Philippines; and my recollection is that they all had more mines than they could use. I cannot, however, state that those mines were 100%, nor do I know just what their condition was. That testimony can be obtained from more competent witnesses or from the record of the department.

94. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (e), which states that the Navy will provide and operate "underwater listening posts for naval use where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts." Have you any knowledge whether the Navy adequately lived up to this commitment prior to December 7, 1941?

A. That, too, I put in the local class, and I think better testimony could be had from people who were charged with it on the spot. I might add that we were doing all we could to develop this type of listening in the way of buoys and so forth. Just what the situation was in Hawaii I do not recollect.

95. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (f), which states that the Navy will provide and operate "through the Lighthouse Service, when turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation, and to change them as necessary." Was this commitment lived up to by the Navy prior to December 7, 1941?

A. We took over the Coast Guard and, along with it, the Lighthouse Service, and as regards to how they lived up to their commitments, in that respect again it is a local affair. I do not know. I assume they lived up to it, and if they had not been doing it, they would have been required to.

96. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (g), which states that the Navy will provide and operate "an information system through the Coast Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses and light vessels." Do you know whether this commitment was lived up to prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I do not have a clear remembrance on that subject.

97. Q. Adverting to paragraph g (h) which states that the Navy will provide and operate "necessary mine-sweeping vessels." Was this commitment lived up to prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I believe it was.

[37] 98. Q. Paragraph g (2) states that the Navy will provide and maintain "such fixed underwater obstructions as are component

parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance." Was this commitment lived up to prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Again my previous remark applies about Hawaiian waters generally not being subject to mining on a large scale. I do not recall just what was done. I had no apprehension from that standpoint.

99. Q. Paragraph g (3) states that the Navy will "operate gates through nets." Was this commitment lived up to by the Navy prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I believe it was.

100. Q. Paragraph g (4) states that the Navy will "conduct shipping through channels in mine fields or obstructions." Was this commitment lived up to prior to December 7, 1941?

A. To the best of my recollection, it was.

The court then, at 12:25 p. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

101. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 6 before this court, which is "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", and ask you to read from Section 3, Article 30, sub-paragraph "d".

A. Before reading that, may I refer to my last question? I made a pencil note when I had passed a previous question on the strength of forces and their sufficiency. This question again refers to coastal zones. I would like to state, in answer to a previous question, that in my opinion there were not sufficient forces for the coastal work in the Hawaiian Islands. To remedy this defect and as a compromise, of course, it would be necessary to draw on the Pacific Fleet, and to that extent the Pacific Fleet would be just so much under the original qualification. I wanted to get that into the record. [38] Section 3 refers to the categories of defense and requirements and means to be provided. (Reading) "Category D—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an anti-aircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force."

102. Q. On December 7, 1941, do you know what category of defense was in effect on the island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?

A. The article just read was the article prescribed for Oahu.

103. Q. Do you know when it had been put in effect?

A. Well, it was stated in WPL 46. As I recall that, a category "D" was the category prescribed, which means a category toward which one works. I would say it was in effect at that time.

104. Q. Do you know what plans were in effect on and before December 7, 1941, for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force for long-range reconnaissance in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?

A. Can you define to me just what you mean by the General Headquarters airplanes?

105. Q. I mean by General Headquarters aircraft, the General Headquarters aircraft that are referred to in Article 31, sub-paragraph "d", which you have just read.

A. I will speak from recollection on that. My remembrance is that the GHQ Air Force is the air force which is handled directly from Washington and which may be sent from one location to another to augment or strengthen a local area, but I'm not sure of this and would have to refresh on it. That is my remembrance. There have been some recent articles about the GHQ, and I am not certain as to just what is meant, but I think it is a mobile force subject to direct orders from the War Department.

106. Q. Admiral, I refer you again to Exhibit 6 and ask you to read from Chapter 2, Article 9.

A. The heading of the article is

DETERMINATION OF THE METHOD OF COORDINATION

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.

[39] b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

(1) When ordered by the President; or

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

107. Q. Could you, as Chief of Naval Operations, with mutual agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army have placed unity of command in effect in Hawaii?

A. We could arrange for such, and subject to the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, put it into effect. Paragraph 2 states, "When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy."

108. Q. Adverting to paragraph 9b (3), which states, "When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command." Could Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General of the 9th Corps Area, have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?

A. They could had they agreed to do so.

109. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph, which I have just read, could Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in mutual agreement with the Commander of the 9th Corps Area, have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii?

A. I couldn't answer that question 100%.

110. Q. I will correct the last two questions to read, instead of Commander of the 9th Corps Area, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. I don't know whether he could have done it independent of Admiral Kimmel's O. K. As I understand it, he was a task force under the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. My guess would be that he could, but I would hesitate to say so, not knowing their relationships with regard to such matters.

111. Q. Admiral, I again refer you to Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46 and has been introduced in evidence before this court for the purpose of reading such extracts as may be pertinent to the record. I ask you to read therefrom a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated July 1, 1941.

A. (Reading:): "Navy Department, Office of the Chief of [40] Naval Operations, Washington. Op-12B-McC/(SC)A16-(R-5) Serial 071912, Secret, July 1, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Distribution List for WPL 46.

Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.

Reference: (a) GO No. 142.

(b) GO No. 143.

(c) WPL-46.

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established.

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, Appendix I, WPL-46.

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended.

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense Forces.

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:

Commandant, 3rd Naval District—Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier;

Commandant, 6th Naval District—Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier;

Commandant, 10th Naval District—Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier;

Commandant, 15th Naval District—Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier;

[41] Commandant, 12th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Frontier;

Commandant, 13th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Frontier;

Commandant, 14th Naval District—Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier;

Commandant, 16th Naval District—Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the commanders thereof, is assigned a *RESTRICTED* classification. The limits of the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a *SECRET* classification. Correspondence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: May there be read into the record so much of the War Plan as was put in effect? It is this very directive, to wit: Chapter 2, Part 3, Section 4.

112. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 4, Part 3, Section 4, and ask you to read into the record Articles 3241, 3242, and 3245, sub-paragraphs "a" and "b".

A. (Reading)

Section 4. Command Relations.

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply:

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows:

[42] 1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.

3245a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

[43] 113. Q. Admiral, in addition to official or written or printed instructions, regulations, war plans, joint agreements, and orders which have been introduced as exhibits before this court, had you, as Chief of Naval Operations, issued either orally or by personal letters any instructions to the Commander-in-Chief from time to time during the period of six months preceding December 7, 1941?

A. I carried on with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet personal correspondence, which is a good deal of a Navy custom, but to the best of my recollection, orders were given through official correspondence or dispatch, and my personal correspondence was informative and for the purpose of background and explanation.

114. Q. The judge advocate understands, then, from your answer that none of these personal letters modified or changed the official written or printed instructions, war plans, directives, orders, or joint agreements?

A. To the best of my belief, they did not modify any official orders. There may have been amplification of official orders—correspondence of mutual interest to both of us—but I do not recall modifying any official order by an unofficial letter.

115. Q. Do you have a record of such letters in case they are required before this court?

A. Yes, I do.

116. Q. Do you remember the approximate date of the executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States?

A. It was in the early summer, as I recall. I think in July, 1941.

117. Q. Can you recall if the Navy Department had been consulted as to its ability to keep in step with this international move?

A. My remembrance of that event is that while we knew of it, we were not particularly consulted, it being a matter the ramifications of which the department had no organization to study. It was more economic than otherwise, and as I recall, it was put in effect without asking us whether we objected or not. The outstanding thing in my memory as regards my stand so far as the Navy Department is concerned, with reference to pressure on Japan, was in reference to petroleum—was in reference to oil. I made it known to the State Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japan's oil were shut off, she would go to war. I do not mean necessarily with us, but I mean if her economic life had been choked and throttled by inability to get to oil, she would go somewhere and take it, and I stated if I were a Jap, I would. I did state in that connection that unless we were prepared for war—I do not mean prepared in the sense of complete readiness for war, but unless we were ready to [44] accept a war risk, we should not take measures which would cut oil down to the Japanese below that needed for what might be called their normal peace time needs for their industry and their ships. I never waived one inch on that stand.

118. Q. Do you recall any military or diplomatic action by Japan between the date of the executive order, July 26, 1941, and October 16, 1941, which caused you to believe that war between the United States and Japan was becoming more imminent than it had been as of the time of the freezing of Japanese assets?

A. I note that in your question you used the term "war between the United States and Japan." I would like to invite attention to the fact that in my previous answer I indicated that while Japan might make an aggressive movement under certain circumstances, it need not be confined to the United States or might not even include the United States. The situation in the Far East during that particular period I do not recall. Sometimes it was a little bit brighter, and sometimes it dropped, but on the date you mentioned, October 16, I recall that a cabinet change took place in Japan, which, in my opinion, indicated that relations with the United States were no better and perhaps indicated a more aggressive attitude by Japan. I include as possible objects of this aggressive attitude, the N. E. I., Britain, China, and the United States.

119. Q. Did you write any letters, notes, or memoranda to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, between July 26, 1941, and October 16, 1941, setting forth the views of the Navy Department on the probability of war between the United States and Japan?

A. May I refer to my letters to Admiral Kimmel?

120. Q. I just want to know whether you did, as a general proposition?

A. I am not sure between those dates. I corresponded with Admiral Kimmel whenever I thought it would be helpful to him or helpful to us, but I have to check between those dates. That was when?

121. Q. July 26, 1941, and October 16, 1941?

A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel on August 2, I think. I will be perfectly glad to have Admiral Kimmel check that letter, if he has a copy of it, so as to agree with me that the letter has no particular bearing on the subject under discussion. On August 21 I again wrote Admiral Kimmel, which again, I would say, does not bear on the particular question of our relations with Japan. It is more personnel and material. I wrote again on August 23. This is a long letter—21 pages—the bulk of it being devoted to specific answers to material questions which Admiral Kimmel had asked me. There is some discussion of Russian war matters, but I think of no particular enlightenment on the question. I have [45] no objection to placing this letter in the file if desired. I again wrote on the 29th of August. There are matters of material and ships. There is also a paragraph in that letter regarding a visit to me from Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador.

[46] Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

A letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading such extracts into the record as might be pertinent to the inquiry.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), suggested that the entire letter should be entered as an exhibit, rather than reading extracts therefrom.

The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered in evidence, but that only such extracts as he considered pertinent to the inquiry would be read by the witness in response to the questions of the judge advocate.

The letter dated August 28, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 11," for reference, description appended.

122. Q. Please read from Exhibit 11, the matter relating to the visit of Admiral Nomura.

A. I will read from the letter extracts, not confining myself to that one paragraph. (Reading:)

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them, but just what they are going to do, I don't know.

Another paragraph. (Reading:)

I told one of their statesmen this morning I felt another move such as the one in Thailand would go a long way toward destroying for the American public what good will still remains. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them. I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia.

123. Q. Do you have something in the letter of August 23, 1941?

A. Yes.

[47] A letter dated August 23, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry, to be marked "EXHIBIT 12."

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he suggested that the entire letter be entered in the record as an exhibit, rather than that extracts therefrom be read.

The judge advocate replied that the entire letter had been offered in evidence, but that he was asking the witness to read only such extracts as were considered by the judge advocate to be pertinent to the inquiry.

The witness stated that he withdrew his answer regarding the letter of August 23, 1941.

The judge advocate, with the permission of the court, withdrew the proposed Exhibit 12, and a letter dated September 23, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as might be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 12", for reference, description appended.

124. Q. Will you read from the exhibit extracts which are responsive to the question?

A. (Reading:)

Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope. There is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before, but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have talked with Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty well informed, and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he suggested again that the entire letter be read, rather than extracts therefrom.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not consider it necessary to read the entire letter.

[48] The court announced that only the pertinent extracts of the letters just read by the witness would be read into the record at this time.

The witness continued his answer, as follows: I have covered up until 16 October, I think. I will check these letters more carefully to see if there is anything more in there which throws useful light.

125. Q. Sir, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, of the Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, date time group 162203. If you recognize this document, please state as what you identify it.

A. I identify it as the dispatch from the Navy Department, from the Chief of Naval Operations, to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941; date time group 162203, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked "EXHIBIT 13."

126. Q. Please read this document to the court.

The witness read "EXHIBIT 13" to the court.

127. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that the dispatch was released by Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Did you authorize the release?

A. I did. That was not an unusual procedure, because we went over these dispatches. Final form might have a number of interlineations in my own handwriting, the note, "HRS O. K." Thereafter they would be turned over, probably to Admiral Ingersoll, by my Flag Secretary, and he would release it, knowing that he had my full approval.

128. Q. In this dispatch there is noted what appear to be interlineations or changes in the original wording of the dispatch. In whose handwriting are those changes made?

A. It looks like—I can't identify it. It is too illegible.

129. Q. What special circumstances prompted your sending this dispatch on 16 October 1941 to your Commanders-in-Chief?

A. The special event prompting it was the event which the dispatch related; namely, the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, which the dispatch states, which did in our opinion create a grave situation.

[49] 130. Q. Was the resignation of the Japanese cabinet then the principal information upon which you sent this dispatch?

A. I would say it precipitated the dispatch. There may have been other things in the back of our heads at that time that made the dispatch advisable. I do not recall just what else we had in mind. The event was the primary reason for the dispatch.

131. Q. Will you read the next to the last sentence of this dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan.

132. Q. State what deployments were contemplated by the Chief of Naval Operations in this directive?

A. We had general thought on the security, of course, of the ships in port and at sea, and of the Islands; and I may say that Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, reported what he had done, and I placed an O. K. on it. It seemed to us that it was very satisfactory. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel reported what he had done in official correspondence I do not recall. I know that he

did in personal correspondence, and in personal correspondence I O. K.'d it. I have an extract here from that letter—from Admiral Kimmel's letter—which I O. K.'d.

A letter from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, dated October 22, 1941, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 14" for reference, description appended.

The witness read the following extracts from "EXHIBIT 14":

Am in receipt of your dispatches the change in the Japanese cabinet. We made the following dispositions:

Continued to maintain the patrol of the two submarines at Midway.

Dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway.

Dispatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Dispatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores.

[50] The CURTIS arrives at WAKE on 21 October with gas, lube oil, and bombs.

Prepared to send 6 patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the 6 at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Dispatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye with the ships making a health cruise on 12 hours' notice after 20 October.

Had submarine prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put additional security measures in effect in the areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when she is going for an overhaul to Puget Sound, and deferred final decision until that time.

133. Q. I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a secret dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific and other addressees, dated 24 November 1941, date time group 242005. If you recognize this, please state as what you identify it.

A. Yes, I recognize this dispatch as dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, CinCAsiatic, Com11, Com12, Com13, Com15, under date of November 24, 1941.

The copy of the dispatch, secret, duly authenticated under official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and other addressees, dated 24 November 1941, date time group 242005, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 15".

134. Q. Please read the document to the court.

The witness read the document, Exhibit 15, to the court.

135. Q. Admiral, did you authorize the release of this dispatch?

A. I did.

136. Q. What special circumstances prompted you sending it?

A. The special circumstances are embodied in the dispatch—primarily, that it looked less and less as though favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan would be forthcoming. It had been over a month since I had sent war [51] information to the fleet, and in my opinion the situation was deteriorating. In addition, the Japs

were moving forces into Formosa, and to the southward. You will note if you leave out the words in that dispatch "in any direction", that it would read, "a surprise, aggressive movement, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility". I remarked that while that phrase "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility" did not exclude an attack in another direction, but I thought it ought to be included, and I personally wrote into the dispatch the words "in any direction", which I intended would convey to the recipient that it might come in any direction, and particularly did I have the Hawaiian Islands in thought, and so remarked when I wrote it.

[52] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

137. Q. Why did you specifically mention the Philippines and Guam, and specifically leave out the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Because the weight of evidence, by movements of which we were cognizant at that time, showed a southern movement into Formosa and on to the southern. We knew that; is was definite, and the ~~(dispatch)~~ information came in that way. ~~(Now that, in itself, did not include the Hawaiian Islands; it didn't include them because it was not mentioned, and feeling that we should be on guard of the possibility of an attack coming from any direction, I wrote those words into that dispatch myself. I remember it very distinctly.)~~

[Notation in margin] "See correction page 323."

Examined by the judge advocate:

138. Q. Do you consider that this dispatch, Exhibit 15, conveyed the full import of the international developments as you knew them on November 24, 1941?

A. It was a very condensed picture. I didn't pass, for example, ~~(on mentioning)~~ or mention the details of the movements other than to indicate them because, as I recall, they were known to both the commander-in-chief, Atlantic, Asiatic and the commander-in-chief, Pacific. I thought it was a reasonably accurate picture as I saw it. You will note that I used the word "possibility". I didn't use a stronger term.

139. Q. In order to make clear for the record I shall ask you, what movements of Japanese naval and military forces did you refer to in this dispatch?

A. I would have to refresh from the records on that. They were, as I recall, expeditionary forces, the details of which are a matter of record.

140. Q. You speak of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction. What did you mean by this term "surprise, aggressive movement"?

A. The Japanese had announced no intention as to where this movement would strike. Obviously, from her past history, what she did was likely to be a surprise. It could hardly be assumed to be other than for aggressive purposes and we assumed that it was to be a surprise, aggressive movement. As I recall, my own thoughts were that its most probable objective was the Kra Peninsula, which subsequently turned out to be one of the objectives.

141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now before the court?

A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures regarding which testimony has been given, which I considered appropriate. I considered that if in his judgment, with what he had been doing in the course of the month, he thought any additional tightening up as necessary [53] he would do it. I was trying to acquaint him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possibility of a surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same way in the Far East; I sent no specific instructions. It was not my general habit to do so.

142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote: "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility". Was your information at the time such as would have warranted your using language indicating that the aggressive movement was stronger than a possibility?

A. I didn't feel—I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time. Admiral Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficult problems, of training. He was making a so-called health cruise which I had initiated. As I recall, they were originated with Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I was not yet ready to interrupt. I didn't feel at that time that he ~~was ready~~ needed to start using everything he had on a war basis, and the word "possibility" was used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better, and if anything, deteriorating.

143. Q. Did you have any other information from any source regarding Japan which prompted the sending of this dispatch, Exhibit 15?

A. That is a broad question.

144. Q. That prompted your sending the dispatch, that is.

A. Not that I recall. Certainly the main-spring was the thought that the negotiations were deteriorating. I might state that Mr. Hull sometimes thought they might go through; sometimes he was pessimistic. He didn't give up hope until the last. He was striving as hard as he could. He knew how I felt about it; he knew how General Marshall felt about it; and even though the chances were slender, he held on to whatever chance there was in the hope of arriving at a solution with the Japs which would prevent, or at least delay, war with Japan.

145. Admiral, in both your dispatches of October 16, 1941, and November 24, 1941, you speak of a possible attack on the United States, or territory belonging thereto.

A. Yes.

146. Q. Do you recall whether you felt at the time an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility on this later date, November 24, 1941?

A. Yes, I thought it was a possibility. That was the reason that I wrote the words "in any direction". I don't know that they were necessary as regards a possibility. But having used the words "Philippines or Guam", I thought it very desirable to convey, so far as I could, the fact that the possibility was that the Jap would strike anywhere, if he struck.

[54] 147. Q. I note that Exhibit 15 was released by Admiral Ingersoll. Does this bear your authorization?

A. Yes.

148. Q. After directing the release of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, did you amplify it by any letters or notes or memorandum to the commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. Which one is that? November 24th?

149. Q. That is November 24th, yes.

A. Yes, I did. Yes, I have the letter of the 25th.

A letter dated November 25, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 16".

150. Q. Will you please read the letter, Exhibit 16?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 16.

151. Q. Were there any other communications from you to Admiral Kimmel?

A. The letter of the 25th of November is the last copy of a letter to Admiral Kimmel of which I have record and think there was no other letter.

152. Q. Admiral, I hand you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and other addressees, dated November 27, 1941, date time group 273337. Do you identify this document as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

153. Q. Do you identify it as a dispatch released from your office?

A. Yes.

The certified, photostatic copy of secret dispatch dated November 27, 1941, date time group 273337, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 17".

154. Q. Please read the dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 17.

[55] 155. Q. It is noted that this dispatch, Exhibit 17, bears a date three days later than Exhibit 15, which is your dispatch of November 24, 1941. What additional information had you received between November 24 and November 27, 1941, that prompted your sending Exhibit 17?

A. Negotiations with Japan had come to an impasse; they were stopped. The long months of endeavor to arrive at a solution had brought us nowhere except a complete inability to agree. The situation looked very critical. It looked like a certain break was to occur. If you want me to amplify that, I can.

156. Q. The answer is yours, sir.

A. I have answered it, with the additional information which prompted it. I may say with regard to that dispatch that, as you can readily imagine, I pondered a great deal over the expression "this is a war warning", with my principal advisers, and with Col. Knox. We went into the picture as we saw it, and we thought there was grave danger of Japan striking somewhere and we wanted the outlying

stations to know and we used language which we thought was strong enough to indicate to them that Japan was going to strike.

157. Q. It is noted that in two previous dispatches, namely, the one of October 16, 1941, and the one of November 24, 1941, the dispatch expresses Japanese aggressive actions being a possibility. In this dispatch of November 27, 1941, you characterize the Japanese aggressive action as being expected. Was this a deliberate choice of words?

A. It was. As I have previously testified, we had not gone stronger than "possibility" in previous dispatches. This is the first dispatch where I definitely indicated war as likely to take place at any time, and as I stated, we pondered almost an entire forenoon on that phrase, whether it was strong enough, whether it would convey what we felt, whether it was too strong. We felt that we must be prepared.

158. Q. Did you consider war between the Japanese and the United States more imminent on the 27th of November than you did on the 24th of November, 1941?

A. Yes.

159. Q. I note that the dispatch of November 27, 1941, fails to mention Guam as a possible objective of the Japanese attack, as did the dispatch of November 24, 1941. Did you intentionally omit Guam from this dispatch of November 27, 1941, as a possible objective?

A. Not as I recall. We expected Guam to be attacked and fall almost immediately. I do not recall just why it wasn't included. I attach no serious importance to the omission.

[56] 160. Q. Your dispatch of November 24, 1941, indicated the possibility of a Japanese aggressive movement in any direction. It is noted in the dispatch of November 27, 1941, that certain Japanese possible actions are indicated but you omitted the words "in any direction" from your dispatch of November 27, 1941. Was this done advisedly?

A. I do not recall. We had previously stated "in any direction", and there was nothing to indicate that that still did not hold. I reiterated what seemed to us as the most probable objectives in this dispatch from the definite information we had, where the blow might come. We couldn't forecast. Previously having put in "in any direction", I think it still held.

161. Q. What was your information of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan on November 27, 1941, as contrasted with your information on November 24, 1941?

A. They were still under way on November 24th. As long as we could keep them going, there was some hope. I might add, we were struggling to keep them going. On November 27th, they ceased.

162. Q. In your dispatch of October 16, 1941, you directed the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet to take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments that will not constitute provocative action. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you directed addressees to execute an appropriate defense deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Now, what additional dispositions of the forces assigned the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet were intended by this last directive that were different from the deployments that you had ordered in your dispatch of October 16, 1941, which was more than a month previous?

A. Keeping in mind the words "war warning", you asked me what I anticipated as a result of the dispatch. I would assume full security measures, not only for ships in port but for ships at sea; measures regarding the safety of Pearl Harbor; anti-submarine measures; distant reconnaissance; and that the Army would do its utmost to carry out its obligations to protect Pearl Harbor, certainly including a condition of readiness of its aircraft and the full manning of such devices as it had for locating trouble coming in from the sea, with watches to insure any information they got would be sent to those who needed to have it; and that they should be fully alive to the possibility of war, and that watches would be placed on such a basis.

163. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you set out as a possible objective of the Japanese, the Philippines. I do not see any other reference to United States territory or objectives. Did you intentionally omit any reference to any other United States territorial objectives?

A. I mentioned the Philippines because of the primary objectives, other than Guam perhaps, I considered the Philippines one of their most likely objectives for the [57] reason that if Japan were going to make an attack to the southern—and to which the evidence all pointed—the Philippines lay squarely on her flank and called for a major attack on her part to take them, in my opinion. Whether she would or not, I could not tell, but with our continually increasing our strength on the Philippines, with our continuing our support of China, with our employing continued increasing economic pressure against her, our relations were not good and we stood, in a measure, so far as her work to the southern, as a thorn in her side continually getting stronger. Roughly and briefly, those are some of the reasons, plus the material evidence at hand which was available to both the commander-in-chief, Pacific, and the commander-in-chief, Asiatic, which indicated that the Philippines was a probable and logical point of attack and surprise.

164. Q. The point I am trying to make, Admiral, is that in previous dispatches, namely those of October 16, 1941, and November 24, 1941, other objectives of United States territory were mentioned, and in the one of November 27, 1941, you have omitted them all with the exception of the Philippines. Had you considered that this might confuse an addressee of other messages as to possible Japanese objectives?

A. Did you go back to 24 November?

With the court's permission, the judge advocate withdrew the question.

The court then, at 4:05 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 8, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1944.

[58]

FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the third day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, Page 58-A, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[59] The court was cleared.

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The court announced that it would hear the statement of the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.).

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), continued his statement as follows: On 28 July representation was made to the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry that the dispatches which were the basis of this testimony should be introduced before the court. On August 1, my counsel, with a copy of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy dated December 7, 1943, called on the Director of Naval Communications with the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry and requested permission to see the confidential files. This permission was refused on the ground that the Director of Naval Communications would not release them without a statement as to individual numbers and contents, which was impossible to supply; whereupon my counsel called on the Director of Naval Intelligence and went with the Director of Naval Intelligence to the

Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Horne, who stated that a letter should be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the release of these dispatches. A letter was written by the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry on 1 August, and delivered to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, who was designated by Admiral Horne as the proper officer to process the request. On Friday, 4 August, upon inquiry of the Judge Advocate General, informal information was given that the letter had been misplaced in the office of the Secretary of the Navy. On 8 August, yesterday, the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry informed me that the letter had been returned to him with the request that the classification be changed from SECRET to TOP SECRET. Both the judge advocate and my counsel have done all within their power to have this information available to the court. My counsel feel it imperative that this information be available before the conclusion of the cross-examination of Admiral Stark.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), requested permission of the court to add other data which he had obtained from the testimony given before Admiral Hart.

The court announced that such permission was not granted.

The judge advocate made the following reply: The factual situation with regard to requests for permission to examine the records of the Navy Department are correct—that in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request, the judge advocate did submit on 1 August an official letter to the Secretary of the Navy in which he requested that the information desired by Admiral Kimmel be made available to the judge [60] advocate. This was done for the reason that the Acting Director of Naval Communications declined to permit access to the files of the Director of Naval Communications without first being informed specifically of the dispatches or correspondence that was desired. The judge advocate has checked up daily since that time with the office of the Judge Advocate General, who was designated by the Chief of Naval Operations to process his request for this information, and it was not until this morning at about 0900 that the letter came back from the Secretary of the Navy. The judge advocate immediately sat down and wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he requested, in conformance with the Secretary's directive, that the files of the Director of Naval Communications be made available to Captain R. A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, for the purpose of obtaining the information which the interested party, Admiral Kimmel, requested. I sent Lieutenant (junior grade) Spavor, of my office, to the Chief of Naval Operations office with that letter just before entering the court this morning.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Monday, August 7, 1941, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

With the permission of the court, the witness made the following statement prior to his further examination:

I request to lay before the court some considerations concerning my personal letters.

I corresponded with several officers in high places and the general purpose was informatory—keeping in touch. I myself wrote frankly and since the letters were confidentially personal I paid little attention to discretion.

I don't desire to hold back from those personal letters anything whatever which is really pertinent to this Inquiry. There is contained in them, however, some passages which certainly should not be disclosed. There are passages concerning foreign nations, other than Japan, and perhaps foreign officials, which are not pertinent to this Inquiry. On the other hand, certain disclosures could easily become very inimical to the country's future interest.

It is of course for the court to judge how those letters are to be used. If they are to become a part of the court's records, I can't too strongly urge that those passages be deleted. In fact, I must go farther and ask that I myself be absolved from all responsibility if those deletions are not made. I am responsible for having written them, representing what I thought at the time, but I can't share the responsibility for their disclosure.

One thing more: The letters contain a few criticisms [61] of individuals and of non-naval organizations which, also, are not pertinent to this Inquiry. I request, as a matter of personal privilege, that those passages also be deleted from any letters which may be made a part of the court's records.

I request a ruling at the court's earliest convenience.

(The foregoing statement was read by the witness.)

The judge advocate stated that the method suggested in the statement of the witness was in accordance with the policy of the judge advocate to introduce only such parts of letters as might pertain to the subject matter of the Inquiry.

The court made the following statement: If the letters referred to are introduced in accordance with the statement of the judge advocate, that is, only pertinent parts are read into the record—pertinent to this investigation—then if any other parts are desired by anybody, then the court will at that time decide whether or not they will be allowed in the record.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, inquired of the court as to whether or not the complete letters would in any way be attached to the record.

The court announced that this question would be decided as it came before the court in the instances involved.

Examined by the judge advocate:

165. Q. At the time of releasing the dispatch of 27 November 1941, which is "EXHIBIT 17" before this court, had you considered any further action, such as mobilization?

A. I considered the Navy at that time practically mobilized. As I recall, we had not a ship left on the Navy's list which could be useful which had not been placed in commission. To all intents and purposes, I believe we were fully mobilized.

166. Q. Did you consider any further action such as affecting unity of command in the Hawaiian area?

A. I don't recall whether or not at that particular time we went over the question of unity of command in the Hawaiian area. I have already testified to that subject in general terms.

167. Q. Were you familiar with the information that was being made public, in the newspapers and radio broadcasts about 27 November 1941, relative to the progress of negotiations with the Japanese diplomatic officers then in Washington?

A. Generally—

168. Q. What was this information?

A. Generally, I did not listen to all the broadcasts [62] nor read all the papers—and on your next question, "What was the information?"—I don't recall and would have to refreshen on reading the

papers at that time, of those dates. I would say the best evidence would be to introduce the papers. I was relying primarily on information which I had from sources available to me, and which I considered responsible information.

169. Q. Do I understand that it is your desire to state to the court now that you have no present recollection of what information was being given to the public by newspapers and broadcasts on the subject of the progress of negotiations with the Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington?

A. After going on three years, I certainly would hesitate to state categorically what was then being written and said in the newspapers.

170. Q. In your dispatch of 27 November 1941, you employed the words, "Negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have stopped." Did these words express the factual situation as you knew it at that time?

A. They did.

171. Q. Can you state what action you expected the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of your dispatch of 27 November 1941?

A. Very briefly, I expected fully readiness measures ashore and afloat, distant reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures. I assumed that all measures with the Army, particularly those which had been previously agreed upon for emergency, would be implemented, and which are a matter of record. I think those could be recited without reference to hindsight.

172. Q. Did you require the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to make any report to you of the action that he had taken in response to your dispatch of 27 November 1941?

A. I did not. He was on the spot and had detail beyond what was available to me. I had every confidence in him, and I left the matter entirely to him, after giving him a war warning, and informing him that an aggressive move by Japan was expected in the next few days.

173. Q. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, dated 26 November 1941, date time group 270038. If you recognize this dispatch, please state as what you identify it.

A. Yes, I identify it as a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The photostatic copy of the dispatch, duly authenticated under official seal, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 26, [63] 1941, date time group 270038, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked "EXHIBIT 18."

174. Q. Please read the dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, "EXHIBIT 18."

175. Q. Adverting to "EXHIBIT 18" which has just been read, in executing the directive to station twenty-five pursuit planes at Wake, what means of transporting these planes to that area was indicated in the dispatch?

A. The dispatch was not a directive of execution. It distinctly puts up a proposition and states, "Provided you consider it feasible

and desirable." And furthermore, it requests that after conference with the Commanding General, the Department be advised.

176. Q. What surface units would you estimate would be required to escort the carrier on such a mission, if she were sent under the conditions as you knew them at that time?

A. I should say cruisers and destroyers.

177. Q. What prompted the directive to transfer these pursuit plants to Wake at this time?

A. This was one of many subjects under constant study with a view to strengthening our position in the Central Pacific, covering forces in those areas, strengthening Hawaii. It had been in the mill, as I recall, some days, and it was more or less of a routine procedure which was going on.

178. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in substance, "The situation indicates a Japanese surprise aggressive movement in any direction." Did you at the time of releasing this dispatch of 26 November 1941, consider that the carrier and escorting force were running any hazards to themselves in carrying out a movement to deliver planes to Wake?

A. Again I would point out that the movement was not directed. We were asking CinCPac's advice. Were it to be made, the usual hazards of war would be accepted, if war were suddenly to arrive. As regards the dispatch of the 24th, I again invite attention to the fact that we said such a movement was a possibility.

179. Q. Does that complete your answer?

A. Yes.

[64] 180. Q. At the time of releasing this dispatch of 26 November, 1941, had it occurred to you that this action of the Commander-in-Chief in sending a carrier to Wake might or might not influence his views of the imminence of an outbreak of war?

A. May I ask if you mean by that, the mere fact that I brought it up might indicate that it would influence previous messages in which I had indicated an outbreak of war? I don't just understand the question. I repeat, he was not directed to do it. The arrangement which could be made was made known to him, in an area which, of course, was vital to him. We told him what could be done. We asked his advice as to whether or not it should be done, after conference with his Army opposite.

181. Q. I shall rephrase the question. At the time of releasing this dispatch of 26 November 1941, had it occurred to you that the suggestion in your dispatch of 26 November 1941, relative to sending a carrier to Wake, might or might not influence the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific's estimate of the imminence of an outbreak of war?

A. To the best of my recollection that did not cross my mind.

182. Q. In your dispatch of 24 November 1941, you stated in substance, "The situation indicates, in our opinion, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction." I ask you with relation to your dispatch of 26 November 1941, in which you suggested sending a carrier to Wake with her escort, would this carrier and her escort, under the circumstances as you knew them, be running any extraordinary hazard?

A. I wouldn't say so. The task force would have been a fast one, ostensibly on guard against surprise, and then and ever since then there are matters besides safety to be considered. We figured that if

anything these movements were more or less in conformance with strengthening against the danger threatening in that area.

183. Q. In your directive of 26—in your suggestion of 26 November 1941, relative to sending these planes to Wake, it is noted that no limitation of time is prescribed for delivering the planes. What were your intentions with regard to the urgency of the delivery at this time?

A. I again—I would invite attention to the fact that there was not a directive to send these planes to Wake.

At the direction of the judge advocate, the question was repeated by the reporter.

A. We were endeavoring to strengthen covering forces in the area. I do not recall just what time element we had in mind, if any was, except that we were ready to go ahead if the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific advised us to that effect, which advice we requested of him.

[65] 184. Q. Had you formed any estimate of the time that would be required for the carrier to execute the task of delivering planes to Wake and the task force returning within supporting distance of the United States Pacific Fleet, if and when your suggestions were executed?

A. I do not recall the estimate. One may have been made. I simply do not recall that feature of it.

185. Q. Did you ever cancel or modify the suggestion to send planes to Wake?

A. I do not recall that we did. A search of the files might disclose something, but the cancellation of this particular message I do not recall. I also do not recall receiving a reply regarding the message.

186. Q. Can you remember whether the suggested task was ever carried out?

A. To the best of my recollection the task was not carried out, so far as Wake is concerned.

187. Q. I will ask you again, Admiral, remembering your suggestion in the dispatch of 26 November, 1941, to send a carrier with planes to Wake as still being something to be done, and that on the next day, 27 November 1941, you dispatched the message which contained the phrase, "This is a war warning"—did you consider this situation as you set out in your dispatch of 27 November as having any weight on the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet's evaluation of the information of the imminence of a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not recall feeling that the message asking for his advice about sending this increase to Wake would influence any interpretation of my message of the 27th.

188. Q. I show you a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, date time group 290110. If you recognize this, please state as what you identify it.

A. Yes, I recognize the dispatch as one from the Chief of Naval Operations to Pacific Naval Northern Coastal Frontier, to the Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier, and info to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and ComPanama Naval Coastal Area.

[66] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, dated 28 November, 1941, date time group 290110, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 19," copy appended.

189. Q. Please read the dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 19.

190. Q. Did this dispatch relate entirely to matters coming under the cognizance of the War Department?

A. Well, it is a directive from the War Department to their people, but in directing them to take reconnaissance and other measures, it obviously affects our operations and this message was repeated to our people in order that they might know what the Army had sent, and what they directed.

191. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 19, contains the following words: "To all practical purposes negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only barest possibilities that Japanese government might come back and offer to continue." Did you intend these words to convey to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet any information about the progress of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese at that time?

A. I was merely repeating a dispatch to him for information which had been sent by the Army. I did not intend to convey that. I gave them the Army's thought and I think the statement in the dispatch that hostile action was possible at any moment would convey, certainly, imminence of such. However, I repeat, I sent it as a matter of information to C-in-C, Pacific, telling him what the Army had sent out.

192. Q. What is the time group on this dispatch, Exhibit 19?

A. 290110.

193. Q. What is the time group on the dispatch of 27 November, 1941, Exhibit 17?

A. 272337.

194. Q. Approximately how much difference in time is there between sending the dispatch of 29 November, and the one of 27 November, 1941?

A. About 26 hours.

[67] 195. Q. In your message of November 24, 1941, you used the words "chance of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful." In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you stated, "Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have stopped." In this message of November 28, 1941, which you have characterized as being of an informatory nature, you quote the War Department's dispatch, "To all practical purposes, negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only barest possibilities that Japanese government might come back and offer to continue." Do you consider this last information, which appears to be the War Department's estimate as to the possibility of continuing negotiations with Japan, to be more, or less optimistic than your own where you used the words in your message of November 27, 1941, "Negotiations have stopped"?

A. I would consider the terms "barest possibilities" as being barest optimistic portent over the message that I had sent that "negotiations have stopped". But that message did not modify my message, nor did I modify my message. I sent it for information of CinCPac, and I also sent to the addressees the information which you have quoted, along with the direction which it contains to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as they deemed necessary, et cetera. I didn't consider it modified my message. To the best of my recollection, that did not enter my head.

196. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; and other addressees, date time group 031850. If you recognize this document, please state as what you identify it.

A. I identify it as a message from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, Com14 and Com16.

The photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a message dated December 3, 1941, from OpNav to Cominch, Asiatic, Pacific, and other addressees, date time group 031850, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 20", copy appended.

197. Q. Please read this dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 20.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), suggested that the dispatch be read as it appears and not as it was sent; that a portion of the message was crossed out which appears on the formal exhibit.

[68] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that this was a matter for cross-examination.

The judge advocate replied that the exhibit as introduced in evidence is a certified copy of a dispatch that was transmitted from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees; it has been certified as such by the acting director of Naval Communications, and that the dispatch was being offered as it stands.

The court announced that it would accept the dispatch, Exhibit 20, in evidence as it was read, for the time being.

198. Q. It is noted that the officer releasing this dispatch is T. S. Wilkinson. Did he do so by your authority?

A. I do not recall.

199. Q. It is noted that the last sentence as it appears in the photostatic copy has a line run through it. Can you state of your own knowledge whether or not this line was omitted from the dispatch as it was released?

A. No, I cannot from my own personal knowledge.

200. Q. Did you have any information as to whether the directive in this dispatch applied to all codes and ciphers, or only to certain ones?

A. No, I do not recall that. The message is broad, but I do not recall.

201. Q. What was the usual disposition of outdated or compromised codes and ciphers?

A. Destruction; and usually by burning.

202. Q. From the information you had were there any circumstances that led you to believe that this particular directive for code and cipher destruction might not be a routine matter?

A. Coupling the incident with other information at hand, I considered that their destruction of codes and secret documents at that time was one of the most telling and confirmatory things that had happened; supporting our previous dispatches. It made a very deep impression on me when I learned of it.

203. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in-Chief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your estimate of the progress of United States-Japanese negotiations as you interpreted them based on all the information you had at the time?

A. Yes.

204. Q. Did the information which you sent to the Commander-in-Chief between October 16, 1941 and December 6, 1941, express your estimate of the probable objectives of a Japanese attack as you evaluated the information you had at the time?

A. Yes, very briefly.

[69] 205. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy of a dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, with information copies to CinCAF, CinCPac, Com14, Com16, date time group 042017. If you recognize this document, please state as what you identify it.

A. I recognize it as a dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, info, C-in-C, Pacific; C-in-C, Asiatic, Com14 and Com16, released by Admiral Ingersoll.

The photostatic copy of dispatch from OpNav to Naval Station, Guam, with information copies to CinCAF, CinCPac, Com14 and Com16, date time group 042017, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge-advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 21", copy appended.

206. Q. Please read this dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 21.

207. Q. It is noted that this dispatch is released by Admiral Ingersoll. Was that done with your authority?

A. Yes.

208. Q. Adverting to your dispatch of December 3, 1941, which is Exhibit 20 before this court, had you received any new information that warranted your sending this dispatch of December, 1941, to Guam, with a directive for the disposal of secret and confidential matter?

A. Not that I recall.

209. Q. Can you recall whether or not your estimate of the situation at this time included an attack on Guam as a possibility?

A. Yes, we always considered a nattack on Guam a possibility. Also, in Guam there was danger of sabotage. The position was outlying and exposed.

210. Q. It is noted that the commandant of the 14th Naval District is not made an action addressee on this dispatch of 4 December 1941, to the Naval Station, Guam. Was there any reason for omitting the Commandant, 14th Naval District, as an action addressee?

A. We thought it unnecessary to send such a message to Com14. We thought it would be left to his discretion. We felt that he was in no such dangerous situation as was Guam.

211. Q. I show you, sir, a photostatic copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch dated December 6, 1941, from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, date time group 061743. If you recognize this, please state as what you identify it.

A. It is a message from OpNav to C-in-C, Pacific; info C-in-C, Asiatic.

[70] The photostatis copy of dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated December 6, 1941, date time group 061743, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 22", copy appended.

212. Q. Please read the dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 22.

213. Q. It is noted that Exhibit 22 has been released by Admiral Ingersoll. Was this done with your authority?

A. To the best of my recollection, it was.

214. Q. At the time you released this dispatch, Exhibit 22, did you have any additional information on the imminence of an attack by the Japanese that you did not have on December 4, 1941, at the time of sending the dispatch to Guam?

A. Not that I recall.

215. Q. By "the outlying Pacific Islands" in Exhibit 22, what places did the you mean to be included?

A. Generally those under CinCPac's cognizance outside the immediate Hawaiian group.

216. Q. Was the Philippine area intended in the words "Outlying Pacific Islands"?

A. No.

217. Q. Why did you not issue a directive for the destruction of the codes and ciphers in the outlying islands at the same time you sent your dispatch to Guam to do this on December 4, 1941?

A. I do not recall just the reason. I could make a supposition in my answer. So far as my direct memory as to just why we didn't do it at exactly the same time, I don't recall.

The court then, at 11:20 a. m., took a recess until 11:30 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[71] Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

218. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 20, which is the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 3, 1941, from which you have testified that the message was released by T. S. Wilkinson. Do you desire to correct that statement?

A. The message bears Admiral Ingersoll's initials showing his release.

219. Q. Is that then to be considered a release by you?

A. It is a release by Admiral Ingersoll.

220. Q. On either the 6th or 7th of December, 1941, did you receive any further information than you have testified to on diplomatic developments with the Japanese government?

A. On Sunday forenoon, the 7th, there was information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to call on the Secretary of State at exactly 1300. I was talking over this information with Captain Schuirman when General Marshall called me asking me if I had it. I told him "yes," and he asked me what I thought about sending it on to the Hawaiian Islands. To the best of my memory, my first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already and of such a character that I rather questioned sending this information. I hung up the 'phone and I think within a minute, if not within 30 seconds, I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar significance to the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at exactly 1300, and that I would go along with his hunch that it might be a good thing to send that information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications were such that he could get it out in the very minimum of time because I knew our communications were efficient and rapid when we wanted to push them very quickly. He replied that he felt that he could get it out just as quickly as I could. I told him to go ahead and be sure and embody in his dispatch to inform our people, that is, the Army's naval opposite.

221. Q. 1300 Washington time is what time in Honolulu?

A. 0730.

222. Q. At the time of receiving this information from both General Marshall and the sources in the Navy Department, did you form any personal estimate of the significance of the hour 1300?

A. We didn't know. We thought that there might be something, and in view of this "might," that we ought not to take the chance and that it would be better to send the message than not to send it. That was the reason it was sent.

[72] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

223. Q. Do you recall if there was any other information that you received other than the fact that the Japanese were presenting certain information at 1:00 p. m.?

A. I recall no other information.

224. Q. During the period from October 16, 1941, to December 7, 1941, what was your estimate at that time of the reliability of the information being furnished you concerning Japanese diplomatic and military matters?

A. The information was quite reliable.

225. Q. Do you know who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet on December 7, 1941?

A. Admiral Yamamoto, as I recall.

226. Q. Did you have any knowledge of his military characteristics?

A. I would be guessing if I were to testify on that at this time. I do not recall any particular thoughts that influenced me in anything I did by the characteristics of Yamamoto.

227. Q. I refer to Exhibit 15, which is the dispatch from OpNav dated 24 November 1941, and which states in substance that "in our opinion a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility." Did you estimate at this time that an attack on Pearl Harbor was one of these possibilities?

A. Yes.

228. Q. Did you form any estimate of the manner in which this attack might be made?

A. We wrote down our estimate of that form in the letter which Secretary Knox signed in January, and we had had no reason to alter the form expressed therein by the intervening time.

229. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 9, which is the letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, will you read therefrom the dangers envisaged in the order of their importance?

A. (Reading)

"(1) air bombing attack; (2) air torpedo plane attack; (3) sabotage; (4) submarine attack; (5) mining; (6) bombardment by gun fire."

[73] 230. Q. When and by what means did you first learn of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my remembrance, by a dispatch received from Pearl Harbor on the 7th.

231. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 9, which is the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, did the Secretary of War reply to this letter?

A. He did.

232. Q. In this letter of January 24, 1941, an air torpedo plane attack was placed No. 2 in the list of dangers envisaged. Assuming that an air torpedo attack was imminent, what do you consider the relative merits of the safety of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor as contrasted with a similar attack on the Fleet at sea?

A. I would consider that the danger to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would be greater than it would be against the Fleet at sea.

233. Q. Can you remember if there was any information during the period from November 27, 1941, to December 7, 1941, on the geographical location of the major units of the Japanese Fleet? I mean by major units, battleships and carriers.

A. I recall that there was conflicting information regarding the presence of the units which you mention. Our naval people in Pearl Harbor had made one diagnosis. Our people at Manila had made another. They didn't agree. Each knew the conclusions the other had reached. As I recall, the information from one indicated strength in the Mandates and the information from the other did not. As I further recall, the information which indicated strength in the Mandates came from the Pearl Harbor estimate. I may ask to correct my testimony on that later, but that is the best of my remembrance.

234. Q. Do you remember what the estimate of the Chief of Naval Operations was on these same matters?

A. We had both estimates, and I do not recall to which one, if either, we gave the greater weight. CNO, CincPac, and CincAsiatic all had the same information, as I recall.

235. Q. During the year 1941 did you know whether or not the Bureau of Ordnance had expressed any opinion on the practicability of launching torpedoes from aircraft on water of the depth to be found in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, the Bureau did express an opinion on that subject and later modified the opinion, which opinions can be obtained from the Bureau's letters if desired.

236. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was supplied this information?

A. Yes, as I recall, we sent those letters to CincPac.

[74] 237. Q. Can you recall, Admiral, whether on December 7, 1941, there was a protected Fleet anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my remembrance, there was not, if you are referring to the immediate Hawaiian area.

238. Q. Assuming that schedule operations provided for ships to be at the island of Oahu, in your opinion, would these ships be safer inside Pearl Harbor or safer anchored outside Pearl Harbor?

A. I would say if they were anchored or, in other words, immobile, they would be safer inside than outside.

239. Q. Since you were Chief of Naval Operations, I am assuming that during the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, you had some information on the attitude of the people of the United States toward a war with Japan, had you not?

A. Yes, very conflicting views, I would say.

240. Q. Would you like to state briefly and in general what your information was on this subject?

A. No, I would not.

241. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, had you, as Chief of Naval Operations, made any estimate of what might be the reactions of the people of the United States to a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies or on Thailand?

A. That, too, would have been very difficult. It would have certainly created some reactions in certain quarters very different from those in others. I would not forecast what, if any, wave of opinion such an attack might have caused.

242. Q. Independently of the information upon which you based your dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to matters concerning impending Japanese action between October 16, 1941, and December 7 of the same year, what was your own estimate in regard to Japanese intentions to attack the United States?

A. My own estimate in the later period was that we had irreconcilable differences which sooner or later were bound to lead to war. I might add that opinion had been smoldering over a considerable period of time.

243. Q. What was your own estimate of Japanese intentions to attack the United States at the time you sent your last message concerning the destruction of codes on or about December 6, 1941?

A. I thought the probability was very strong that she would strike.

[75] 244. Q. Did you make an estimate of the locality in which she would most probably strike?

A. Yes, I thought she was more likely to strike in the Philippines than elsewhere, so far as United States territory is concerned. I also

felt that Guam would probably fall shortly after hostilities commenced.

245. Q. As contrasted with mere intention, what was your estimate of Japan's capacity to make a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base at the time she did?

A. We always recognized a surprise attack as a possibility. Do you mean by that, actually make a surprise attack or to attempt it?

246. Q. Her capacity to make the attack.

A. We knew, of course, that they had the force to attempt such an attack. We had often envisaged such an attempt and means to repel it. I also assumed that there was certainly some chance, if not a good chance, of getting some advance warning of such an attack by alerting measures available to minimize the surprise or to intercept such an attack or to reduce its effectiveness or even to break it up. I am referring particularly to air attack.

247. Q. Admiral, we have asked you the duties of all your principal aides as Chief of Naval Operations, but I have neglected to ask you what your assigned duties were at the time you held that office.

A. Chief of Naval Operations?

248. Q. Yes, office of Chief of Naval Operations. Will you enumerate, to the best of your ability, what those duties are?

A. They are in the regulations, and the principal part of them is summed up in the very first sentences on that. If you have a copy of the regulations, they could be introduced into the record.

249. Q. The court may take judicial notice of Navy Regulations. Anything else besides Navy Regulations?

A. I think that covers it.

250. Q. Is there anything in statute law which you remember, describing the duties of Chief of Naval Operations other than those incorporated in Navy Regulations?

A. There may be. I will have to check that.

251. Q. Between November 25, 1941, which is also the date of Exhibit 16, a letter addressed by you to Admiral Kimmel, and December 7, 1941, did you send any further letters, dispatches, or memoranda to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, giving him any information on diplomatic or [76] military developments with the Japanese Government?

A. What is the date of my last letter?

252. Q. November 25.

A. I don't recall any. I have none on file. ~~Admiral Kimmel might supplement my memory upon that.~~

[Notation in margin:] See correction page 324.

253. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to look back to the attack on Pearl Harbor (and consider therewith the attitude of the people of the United States resulting from this attack. How would you characterize the decision of the Japanese Government in this action?

A. I thought the Japanese Government made the greatest mistake they possibly could have made when they attacked Pearl Harbor, and I may add that I told Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, that if they did, we would break them before we got through, regardless of how long it took.

[Notation in margin:] See correction page 324.

At the request of the judge advocate, the court was cleared.

The court was opened, and all parties to the inquiry entered.

254. Q. Admiral, in response to a previous question of the judge advocate in which he asked you to enumerate your duties as Chief of Naval Operations, your reply, in substance, was that they were set forth generally in Navy Regulations. The court has taken judicial notice of Navy Regulations. I therefore shall ask you to read the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, as set out in Article 392.

A. (Reading):

(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years. He is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned.

(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. [77] To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.

(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary when serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy.

The court announced that it would take a recess until 2:00 p. m. The interested party, Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., requested that the court adjourn until 2:00 p. m., August 9, 1944, in order that he might have additional time to review his files dealing with the subject matter of the inquiry, so that he might be prepared to answer questions propounded in cross-examination. This interested party further stated that he had been recalled from foreign duty recently and that as the events which are the subject of the inquiry occurred almost three years ago, he desired an opportunity to fully refresh his memory. The court announced that it would adjourn until 10 a. m. August 9, 1944.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. August 9, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944.

[78]

FIFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the fourth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday, August 8, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

255. Q. Admiral Stark, I hand you Exhibit 4, which is Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Number 5, for the purpose of reading certain articles into the record. Will you please read articles 0101, 0102, and 0104?

(A. (Reading:)

This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the [79] Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

This plan provides for the initial organization, a composition of forces, and tasks for the Naval Establishments in a Rainbow No. 5 War.

256. Q. Article 0102, which you have just read, states that this plan was based upon the report of the U. S.-British Staff conversations and gives the short title ABC-1. What is ABC-1?

A. ABC-1 was American, British, Canadian conversations and the results thereof.

257. Q. Who approved the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow 5?

A. It was approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the President.

258. Q. Will you please read the concept of war as laid down in the Joint Basic War Plan Rainbow 5, which you will find in appendix 1, section 4, and it is necessary to read only articles 10 and 13, subparagraphs a, d, and e, on page 5, appendix 1?

A. (Reading:)

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraphs 13(h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941.

10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese [80] intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet Offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

(e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theaters.

259. Q. From what you read then, Admiral Stark, the decisive theater was considered to be in the Atlantic and the European area, and the principal United States military effort was to be exerted in that area, and the operation of other forces would be cut in such manner as to facilitate that effort; is that correct?

A. It is.

260. Q. Will you read that part of Joint Plan, Rainbow 5, pertaining to the Navy tasks in the Far East and in the Pacific area? That is section VII of the Appendix, Articles 35 and 36 only.

A. (Reading:)

35. *Navy tasks.*

a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and [81] by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.

261. Q. 36?

A. (Reading:)

36. Navy Forces.

a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

262. Q. Admiral Stark, since the Joint Army and Navy Basic Rainbow 5 was, as you have stated, approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy and by the President, was that plan then the binding directive on you in the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow 5?

A. It was.

263. Q. You have previously testified regarding the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet in that Navy Basic Plan. Were the tasks which you assigned in that Plan, and those in the Joint Army and Navy Plan, consistent?

A. They were. They were practically identical.

264. Q. I show you a letter. Can you identify it?

A. Yes.

265. Q. Will you state what it is, please?

A. I identify it as a letter from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 1 May 1941, Subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

The letter, file number S-A16-3/A7-3(3) ND14 (0410), dated May 1, 1941, Subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations, was submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 23," for reference, description appended.

[82] 266. Q. Will you identify Enclosure (C) of this letter?

A. Enclosure (C) of this letter is an enclosure dated 31 March 1941, is an addendum to Naval Base Defense Air Force, Operation Plan Number A-1-41, on a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area, and is signed by Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander Naval Air Base, Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Two, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Defense Force.

267. Q. Admiral, will you read from that, Appendix C, Article 3, sub-paragraphs a. and b?

A. (Reading:)

Article 3. Possible enemy action.

a. A declaration of war might be proceeded by;

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

(2) A surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

(3) A combination of these two.

b. It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

268. Q. Do you recall having read what you have just quoted, or, in fact, the entire estimate at any time during the spring or early summer of 1941?

A. I could not say definitely that I read this particular letter. I am under the impression that I did, or that I knew about it. It is contained in that file, which was forwarded by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. It contains the paragraph to which I have previously testified, and which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet showed me in his memorandum of June 4, and after which I sent a considerable portion of this file out to the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic, and to all Naval Districts. It is approximately three years since then, and to state whether I read the particular enclosure I could not definitely state.

269. Q. In connection with the difficulty in remembering, do you recall it from the standpoint of having had any reaction as regards it in measures which you had previously taken?

A. The reaction I got on this file was one of considerable satisfaction, because it is along the line of the letter signed by the Secretary of the Navy of January 24.

[83] Examined by the court:

270. Q. What year?

A. '41.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy (continued):

271. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter. Can you identify it?

A. Yes, this is a letter dated 7 February 1941, on the subject of Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, in reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941.

The letter from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 7, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 24".

272. Q. Please read the letter.

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 24.

273. Q. Admiral, do you recall any other urging of the War Department, formal or otherwise, between the date of that letter and 7 December 1941, on that point?

A. The matter of anti-aircraft defense and of planes to Hawaii for defense was a subject of frequent conversations between myself and General Marshall, and my offers were to transport them whenever and as quickly as they could be made ready. There might have been some particular time when we couldn't have transported, but in general we stood ready to get out to the Hawaiian Islands anything which the Army could make available in that connection.

274. Q. When you sent your war warning dispatch of 27 November, 1941, which is Exhibit 17, did you know that the Chief of Staff, Army, had sent a similar dispatch to Commanding General Hawaiian Department?

A. I did, and the dispatch so states.

275. Q. What steps did you expect the Hawaiian Department to take upon their receipt of this dispatch from the Chief of Staff?

A. I expected the Army to utilize its warning system to the utmost, with all accessories thereto, in the way of communications. I expected them to make ready a maximum [84] number of planes possible. I expected them to man their anti-aircraft defense, both fixed—I expected them to man their batteries, both fixed and mobile. I expected them to implement arrangements which they had with the Navy in joint agreements. I expected them to take some sabotage measures. In other words, I expected them to assume a maximum state of readiness in defense of Pearl Harbor. The defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor was an Army responsibility. That base was vital to the prosecution of a war in the Pacific. That was common knowledge, also that we were rushing as fast as possible everything we could to make that base more useful. It made no difference, so far as the Army's responsibility for the defense of that base was concerned, whether the Fleet was all at sea, or all in harbor, or any part thereof. It made no difference whether the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet was in Pearl Harbor or whether he was at sea. In particular, I would have expected the Army to have ready their pursuit planes, some of them certainly in instant readiness, and full alertness with regard to others, to man these pursuit planes in the earliest possible time in emergency. These were the principal or certainly the primary weapon of defense against an air attack coming in from the sea.

276. Q. Admiral, were the measures by which the Battle of Britain was won and the repeated German attempts to win the war by means of bombing defeated—matters of technical and general knowledge—known to the Navy Department, and, in so far as you know, to the War Department, in early 1941?

A. To a very considerable extent they were to the Navy Department, and I am not familiar with how many observers, operational, technical, and otherwise, the Army employed in this connection.

277. Q. Admiral, in your testimony of yesterday you stated that, in answer to a question, that you considered that there was greater danger to the ships in the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area while in port than at sea. When you said that, did you envisage the conditions that were found to actually obtain on 7 December, or those which you have stated you expected to obtain?

A. I was thinking of the conditions which did obtain.

278. Q. Admiral, your dispatch of 28 November, which is Exhibit 19, and was sent to the Commanders of the Pacific Coastal Frontiers—what was your purpose in fully quoting an Army dispatch?

A. I quoted the Army's dispatch to our people that they might know the information and the instructions their Army opposites in their area had.

[85] 279. Q. What else did your dispatch contain?

A. It also contained a directive to our people to be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they applied to Japan and in case of hostilities. The entire dispatch, therefore, was mostly informatory and contained a directive.

280. Q. On what basis was CinCPac an informatory addressee?

A. He was made an informatory addressee that he might know that this information and this directive had been given to the Pacific Coastal Frontiers, which automatically came under him in case of hostilities with Japan.

281. Q. Admiral, the extract from WPL-46 which you have read this morning mentioned tasks or commitments in connection with the defense of Guam. What, in late November 1941, was the actual situation as regard to the possibility of holding Guam, and what was really expected in case Japan went to war with us?

A. We had little or no hope of holding Guam in case of war with Japan, at that time.

282. Q. In your testimony of yesterday you stated you thought the information which had been placed before you concerning Japan, in the period 16 October to 7 December was quite reliable. What variety of information were you referring to?

A. I was referring to political information.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

283. Q. When Admiral Kimmel was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet about 1 February, 1941, did you have and express any opinion about his selection?

A. I strongly recommended his appointment. He was my choice, my recommendation. I do not mean by that, that he was not recommended by others. He was.

284. Q. After 7 December '41, did you cause a note to be inserted in Admiral Kimmel's fitness report?

A. Yes.

[86] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

285. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I identify this as a report of fitness on Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, from the period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941.

The fitness report on Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from the period 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941, was submitted to each of the other interested parties, to the judge advocate, and to the court, and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, the document was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 25", for reference, description appended.

286. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 9, Admiral Stark?

A. (Reading:)

No. 9: Has the work of this officer been reported on either in a commendatory way or adversely during the period of this report? The answer: (Reading) Has been reported on adversely by the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, December 7, 1941. (Copy of report attached.)

287. Q. Please read the answer to Question No. 14?

288. A. (Reading:)

No. 14. Is this officer professionally qualified to perform ALL the duties of his grade? The answer: (reading) I have always considered Admiral Kimmel an outstanding officer in ability, integrity, and character. I still do.

288. Q. Admiral J. O. Richardson was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet from approximately one year prior to Admiral Kimmel's appointment, was he not?

A. He was.

289. Q. And during Admiral Richardson's command, the Fleet sailed from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in March or April of 1940, did it not?

A. That is right.

290. When the Fleet went to Pearl Harbor from the West Coast on that occasion, did you have any thought or plan that the Fleet would stay at Pearl Harbor longer than was necessary to carry out the maneuvers that were immediately planned for it?

A. Just when that thought developed, I would hesitate to say. I couldn't answer specifically "yes".

[87] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from documents he had in his possession.

The court granted the permission.

291. Q. When the Fleet sailed from the West Coast to Hawaiian waters in the spring of 1940, Admiral Stark, did you have any thought or plan that it would continue in Hawaiian waters longer than for the execution of the maneuvers currently planned?

A. The question is very broad as to whether or not I had any thought on the subject. To the best of my recollection no decision had been reached at that time but I do not recall; and I do not recall of any particular discussion at that time.

292. Q. Do I understand that it is your present recollection that when the Fleet sailed from the West Coast, probably in March of 1940, for Hawaiian waters, that the Navy Department as personified by the Chief of Naval Operations, had concluded the intention of keeping the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time?

A. To the best of my recollection, we had not come to such a conclusion when the Fleet sailed.

293. Q. Had Admiral Richardson been advised of the possibility of his remaining indefinitely at Pearl Harbor when he sailed?

A. Not that I recall, and I would have to search any correspondence I may have to see if that answer should be changed.

294. Q. When was the decision made to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor after the conclusion of the spring maneuvers of 1940?

A. The decision was made in early May to retain it there for the time being.

295. Q. What do you mean by "the time being", Admiral?

A. Well, to continue it there. To the best of my remembrance, there was no decision made at that time, for example, to keep it there for the period which it was kept there.

296. Q. Well, is it fair to say that the immediate return was postponed with no definite conclusion reached as to when, if ever, it should return?

A. The decision was reached at that time to keep it there for a short period.

297. Q. And what do you mean by "a short period"?

A. I mean a couple of weeks.

298. Q. And at the conclusion of that couple of weeks, what decision was reached?

[88] The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from documents he had in his possession.

The court granted the permission.

A. The decision was reached to continue the Fleet in Hawaii again for the time being. To the best of my recollection we didn't then, and for some time afterwards, decide that the Fleet was going to remain there continuously. The question came up from time to time with the result that the Fleet was kept there.

299. Q. At some time was there a definitive decision reached that the Pacific Fleet should be kept more or less permanently based at Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, in effect, it was kept there. When we state "permanently", which would mean regardless of all else, I could not say "yes" to that. Under the conditions which then existed we did keep it there. Had they been considerably altered, we might have changed our decision.

300. Q. At some time during the late summer or fall of 1940, did Admiral Richardson make either one or two official visits to Washington?

A. He did.

301. Q. And during one or both of those visits, did you have conversations with him relative to continuing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. That question was undoubtedly one which we talked about.

302. Q. And do you recall that Admiral Richardson protested with strength and vigor the continued maintenance of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor under the then existing conditions?

A. I recall his desire to bring the Fleet back to the Coast.

303. Q. Did he advance any reasons to you for that desire?

A. Yes, he supported them with reasons.

304. Q. Do you recall what the reasons were, as stated to you?

The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from documents he had in his possession.

The court granted the permission.

A. I can give you some of the reasons.

305. Q. Can you state generally your present recollection?

A. I recall one reason which Admiral Richardson gave which was in connection with morale, namely, that the fleet [89] on the Pacific Coast would have better opportunity for recreation, visits with

their families. I am not sure, but as I recall the question of re-enlistments was brought up in that same connection, but as to any material reason which he might have given, I do not recall specifically at the moment.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, suggested that this line of questioning is based upon events that are a long distance back and requested that the documents be introduced in evidence.

306. Q. You understood, Admiral Stark, that in these questions I have been referring to basing the whole Pacific Fleet, rather than any particular section of it, at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, I understand that.

307. Q. Do you recall whether Admiral Richardson based his protest on the fact that he considered the Fleet was not secure at Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not recall that, no, nor any official communication to that effect.

308. Q. Do you recall whether one of the factors behind Admiral Richardson's protest was that strategically and logistically, war operations could not be conducted, either actually or in training, from Pearl Harbor because of inadequate train then attached to the Fleet?

A. I remember a discussion of inadequate train came up and we were endeavoring to meet the needs of the Fleet to make Pearl Harbor suitable for some of these purposes, if not all of them.

309. Q. Yesterday you read from a letter dated, I think, in May of 1940, to Admiral Richardson, in which you discussed some of the factors for maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

A. Right.

310. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I identify it as a copy of a letter from me to Admiral Richardson dated 27 May, 1940.

The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, to Admiral J. O. Richardson, U. S. Navy, dated May 27, 1940, was submitted to the judge advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 26", for reference, description appended.

[90] Q. I should like to read two of the paragraphs, Admiral Stark (reading):

Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask, "Suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it?" My answer to that is, "I don't know", and I think there is no one on God's green earth that can tell. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter. I would point out one thing, and that is that even if the decision here were for the United States to take no decisive action, if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. The above, I think, will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest

assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have been asked the question, and also like you, I have been unable to get the answer.

There is stated in that letter, in substance, that one of the reasons for maintaining the entire Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was because of the deterrent effect on the Japanese, or the anticipated deterrent effect on the Japanese from going into the Netherlands East Indies; is that correct?

A. Yes.

312. Q. At that time, as Chief of Naval Operations, was it your opinion that the Pacific Fleet was strong enough and adequately equipped with train and repair facilities to be a genuine and realistic threat to the Japanese on that basis?

A. Well, they certainly were a threat.

313. Q. A genuine and realistic threat, I said, Admiral.

A. Asking that from the standpoint of the Japanese, I certainly would say that it would have been taken into consideration very seriously. It was a considerable fleet and if the question means whether it would have stopped them going down as a surprise, if they intended to do so, I would say the chances are it wouldn't. But it did have the chance of serving as a deterrent by its presence.

314. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?

A. Major movements and major dispositions of the Fleet were taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, who made the final decision.

[91] 315. Q. Was it your decision to keep the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?

A. I have answered the question that the decision to keep it there, which was effected, was that of the Commander-in-Chief.

Examined by the court:

316. Q. Commander-in-Chief of what?

A. Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued):

317. Q. To a non-military man, that means the President of the United States?

A. Yes; I mean by that the President of the United States:

318. Q. Do you recall any other factors in addition to those stated in Exhibit 26, the letter of 27 May, 1941, that influenced the decision to keep the entire Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?

The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from documents he had in his possession.

The court granted the permission.

The court then, at 11:40 a. m., took a recess until 11:50 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (Ret.) (continued):

319. Q. Admiral Richardson did not agree with your estimate of the readiness of the Pacific Fleet as stated in your letter of 27 May 1941, Exhibit 26, did he, Admiral Stark?

A. Did not agree with what?

320. Q. Your estimate and evaluation of the readiness of the Fleet to accomplish some of the purposes which were among the factors for basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

A. I would say that Admiral Richardson could testify to that better than I could.

[92] 321. Q. I ask you if you can identify the document which I now hand you, Admiral Stark?

A. This letter is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, Subject, War Plans, status and readiness of in view of current international situation.

322. Q. You received that letter as Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I haven't read it. I certainly assume that I did.

The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 October 1940, was submitted to the judge advocate, each of the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 27".

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

323. Q. Will you read the letter, Admiral Stark?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 27.

The court then, at 12:15 p. m., took a recess until 2:15 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[93] Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross-examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (Continued):

324. Q. Admiral Stark, would you like to make any comments on Exhibit 27, which was read just before adjournment?

A. Yes, I would be glad to say that I think it a very good letter. I was delighted to receive it. I was in accord with most of what it had to say, particularly with regard to war plans, and the very reasons which he gave in his criticism of the situation at that time were some of the causes of the development of Rainbow 5. For example, I would like to read Admiral Richardson's paragraph 10, in which he says:

The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;

(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);

(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

(d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:

(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;

[94] (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;

(4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

I should also like to read from page 19, Appendix 1, of Exhibit 4, the Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5. Recalling the four provisions which Admiral Richardson recommended, the following are what Rainbow 5 prescribes:

(Reading:)

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

In another part of Admiral Richardson's letter appears this paragraph: "It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment."

Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, to which I have just referred, among its tasks requires the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to prepare the following plans: "A plan for the execution of Task B of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 armed troops, in addition to forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and assuming that the task will be executed under 180 M, which is six months.

325. Q. Was one of the other factors supporting the retention of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the fall of 1940 a proposed plan to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas by means of the maintenance of a patrol line west from Honolulu to the Philippines and south from Samoa to Singapore?

A. Not that I recall at that time.

[95] 326. Q. Was there under discussion a program to maintain a life force line in those directions for the purpose of controlling commercial traffic to Japan?

A. Not at that time that I recall.

326a. Q. Was there at any time?

A. The war plan which has been put in evidence speaks about interrupting Japan's commerce.

327. Q. Do you recall a discussion with Admiral Richardson when he was in Washington in the fall of 1940 relative to such a patrol line?

A. No, I don't recall it.

328. Q. You recall no discussions with Admiral Richardson about that subject matter?

A. Not about establishing a line at that time to stop Japan's—

329. Q. To stop or control?

A. To stop or control Japan's traffic. We may have discussed matters of the future in connection with war plans as to what we would do and how we would do it, but I don't recall the conversations at this time.

330. Q. I will ask you to read a letter from Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and see if your memory is refreshed.

A. I had forgotten this particular paper and don't particularly recall it at this time.

331. Q. Do I understand you have no recollection of a discussion with Admiral Richardson over the proposition I outlined in my earlier question?

A. I would say that I have forgotten that completely.

332. Q. After reading the letter, you say that your memory is not adequately refreshed to testify concerning that?

A. That's correct.

333. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it, Admiral Stark?

A. Yes, I can identify this document as a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 7 January 1941, on the subject of the situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet a surprise attack.

[96] The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 28", copy appended.

334. Q. Was this letter, Exhibit 28, the basis and initiating thought in the preparation of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, previously introduced in evidence, dated January 24, 1941?

A. I couldn't say whether it was the basis, but it is in some respects along the same line. It may have been. I don't recall. Where I said, "It may have been," it may have influenced; I don't remember.

335. Q. I ask you if you can identify this as a photostatic copy of a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 10 February 1941?

A. Yes, I can identify this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, dated 10 February 1941.

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 29", copy appended.

336. Q. I ask you if you can identify this as a photostatic copy of a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to you dated 18 February 1941?

A. I recognize this letter as one from Admiral Kimmel to me, dated 18 February 1941.

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 30", copy appended.

[97] 337. Q. After the receipt of this letter from Admiral Kimmel did you make an effort to ascertain who was responsible for the transmission of secret information? It was between O. N. I. and Operations.

A. I unquestionably did. I don't recall just the action taken.

338. Q. Did you understand from this postscript which I have just read that the Commander-in-Chief requested to be currently and promptly advised as to information of a secret character?

A. Which would be of use to him, yes.

339. Q. What did you understand was included in information of a secret character, as used in the letter?

A. Well, I would understand that technical matters, which would be of assistance to the Pacific Fleet, should be sent; also operational matters or other matters which would be of use and of interest to him. When I say "technical", if we received word of some particular method of mine-sweeping or of some particular mines that ought to be used, that information certainly might be of some future use to him. When I say "operational", we had many observers in England sending in data as to how they operated, and if I found something that might be of use to him, I would consider that it ought to go to him. There are many subjects of which these two are just samples.

340. Q. Did you understand it to include all information relative to diplomatic and international developments affecting the Pacific Area?

A. I would not say all matters. We aimed to keep the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific acquainted with these subjects, so far as we thought he would have a vital interest, but to have sent him a mass of everything that came in without evaluation, which we were more or less prepared to do, it might have been more of a hindrance than help to him.

341. Q. The only reason you would not send him information in that category was that you felt it too trivial to be worthy of his attention?

A. Well, I wouldn't send him that which I thought to be trivial of his attention.

342. Q. Did you send him anything which you did not consider trivial affecting international and political developments in the Pacific area?

A. It was my aim to keep Admiral Kimmel abreast of worthwhile developments.

[98] 343. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now hand you as a photostatic copy of a letter which you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 25 February 1941, enclosing copies of two memoranda

to the President, one dated 11 February 1941 and the other February 5, 1941. I shall call attention only to the first memorandum to the President.

A. I identify this as a letter to Admiral Kimmel from me dated 25 February 1941.

The letter was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was received in evidence and marked "EXHIBIT 31", copy appended.

344. Q. When you said, Admiral, in that memorandum to the President that the Pacific Fleet is now weaker in tonnage and aircraft, did you mean the entire U. S. Fleet in the Pacific, minus the Asiatic, or only that portion of it which was based at Pearl Harbor?

A. My recollection is that I was referring to that which was under command of Admiral Kimmel, but I may have taken the other into consideration. I don't recall.

345. Q. At that time how much weaker was the U. S. Pacific Fleet under Admiral Kimmel than the Japanese Fleet?

A. That can be obtained from the record.

346. Q. Have you any general knowledge on it?

A. I had general knowledge of it, but numbers, tonnages, etc., are a matter of record.

347. Q. At that time had any portion of the Pacific Fleet which was based at Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Richardson took it to Pearl Harbor in March, 1940, been diverted to the Atlantic?

A. I would have to check the record on that. The record can be checked on that.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[99] 348. Q. Would that be tedious for you to do before tomorrow or would it be practicable?

A. The answer to the question is that the CINCINNATI and MILWAUKEE were transferred between the dates you mentioned.

349. Q. And those were the only diversions from the Pacific Fleet from March of 1940 until 11 February '41?

A. Those are the only diversions of which I have access to the record here at this time, and I think they are accurate.

350. Q. Isn't it a matter of fact that up to 11 February 1941, there had been no substantial change in the strength of the Pacific Fleet from the time that it went to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Richardson in the spring of 1940?

A. I think that is correct.

351. Q. And yet, with no substantial change, you considered in February 1940 that the Pacific Fleet was weaker than the Japanese Fleet?

A. That's right.

352. Q. In February '41?

A. Yes.

353. Q. You say that it remains a constant, serious, and real threat to the Japanese Fleet in the memorandum?

A. That's right.

354. Q. Did you mean by that that the strength of the U. S. Pacific Fleet was such that it was only a threat and that it did not possess the power to initiate a frontal offensive against the Japanese Fleet in February of 1941?

A. Yes.

355. Q. In May of 1941, there was diverted under your orders, from the Pacific Fleet, a substantial quota of vessels, was there not?

A. In May, 1941?

356. Q. Yes. That would have been in connection with the amphibious operation to which you made reference yesterday, in the Atlantic.

A. I would have to refer to the record as to just when it was made. The information that I have shows transit through the Canal in June. I think your statement is probably correct.

357. Q. What was the strength of that diversion in June of 1941?

A. To the best of my recollection, three battleships, four cruisers, the YORKTOWN, at approximately that date.

[100] 358. Q. That is a carrier?

A. Carrier. And a squadron of destroyers.

359. Q. Now how many destroyers would be in a squadron?

A. I think there were nine in that squadron. I would have to check the record.

360. Q. How much did that diversion to the Atlantic reduce the striking force or the fighting value of the Pacific Fleet as compared with what it was before that diversion?

A. It reduced it by just so much as was detached.

361. Q. Were there any transports diverted at about that time?

A. My answer is that it is not sufficiently clear in my memory to give an answer.

362. Q. Now you say the diversion of this force of three battleships, four cruisers, and a carrier and squadron of destroyers reduced the striking force or the fighting value by—what was the phrase you used?

A. By just so much as was detached or transferred.

363. Q. What is the square rule about fighting forces or striking power of a fleet?

A. What is that, may I ask you?

The question was repeated.

A. Well, the greater the strength, the greater its striking power, but it should be borne in mind in connection with these transfers that they were laid down in accordance with plans which had been approved and which had been promulgated, and that it left the Fleet with forces which were in these plans to accomplish certain tasks. The forces transferred were in accordance with the previous directive, Rainbow. V.

364. Q. Was the comparative number of vessels diverted in June of 1941, consisting of three battleships, four cruisers, and accompanying escorts, approximately a quarter of the forces of the Pacific Fleet originally there at Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, we had twelve battleships. A quarter of twelve would be three; we had nine left. So far as the battleships were concerned, that would be true. As I recall, we had four carriers. We took one. That would be a quarter. As far as the destroyers, speaking from recollection, we had approximately fifty, according to my recollection. If we took nine, it would be approximately 20%.

365. Q. And four cruisers?

A. As I recall, we had about fourteen cruisers out [101] there. That is recollection, and if we took four, it would be approximately 25%, maybe a little over.

366. Q. This is it fair to say that this diversion of three battleships, four cruisers, nine destroyers, and one carrier, constituted approximately 25% of the Pacific Fleet as it originally moved to Hawaii under Admiral Richardson?

A. No, I wouldn't say that. That statement, according to my recollection, is true except as regards destroyers and submarines.

367. Q. It was 20% of the destroyers instead of 25?

A. Approximately.

368. Q. Slightly more than 25% of the cruisers?

A. Yes.

369. Q. I kind of balanced those differences.

A. Yes.

370. Q. No submarines were diverted to the Atlantic?

A. Not that I recollect.

371. Q. At any time?

A. I don't want to guess on that question and I don't recall clearly.

372. Q. Admiral Kimmel advises that no submarines were transferred to the Atlantic.

A. Yes.

373. Q. Now how would you evaluate by fractions the force which you have described as passing through the Canal in June in relation to the force moving out to Pearl Harbor under Admiral Richardson? I suggested a quarter. You felt that I was a little extravagant in my estimate.

A. You mean would I evaluate it as a 20% reduction?

374. Q. Yes, or a 25% reduction.

A. I think the figures in the record speak for themselves.

375. Q. They speak for themselves except for the submarine factor. No submarines were moved. How do you evaluate the submarine force in the Pacific as part of the whole?

A. You mean as part of the whole Pacific Fleet?

376. Q. That's right.

A. I never evaluate in that way.

377. Q. What I am getting at is, what fraction of the Pacific Fleet was diverted in June of 1941 to the Atlantic? [102]

A. The composition of the Fleet, I believe, is in the record in previous testimony. The detachments are, approximately, in the record. The figures as to what remained are in the record. If one started to evaluate, you can't evaluate by numbers alone. You have got to evaluate by types.

378. Q. With exception of the submarines, it was practically 25%?

A. With reference to number alone?

379. Q. Yes.

A. To the best of my recollection that would be a fair estimate.

380. Q. Now would you explain what is the application of the square rule to the diversion of a fraction of a fleet, in its fighting force?

A. I don't know what you mean.

381. Q. That means nothing—that phrase?

A. No, it doesn't to me, sorry.

382. Q. Is there any section or paragraph of WPL-46, Admiral Stark, where the term "War Warning" is used?

A. Not that I recall.

383. Q. Has the term any more significance in naval parlance than in ordinary speech?

A. Well, to me it was a very glaring phrase—to me and to those of us who went over that dispatch.

384. Q. Has it any more significance than it has in ordinary speech?

A. I would say used as it was, that it did.

385. Q. The phrase "mobilize" does have a very definite meaning under WPL-46, does it not?

A. Yes.

386. Q. Is it not accurate to say that there is a regularly established procedure for putting the Navy on a war basis under Rainbow 5, and that that procedure is to issue orders to mobilize or to execute WPL-46 in whole or in part?

A. It is so far as directing execution in total or in part. I don't recall for the moment with regard to the mobilization, but I may state, and I think it is repetition, that we were practically mobilized at that time. I had nothing else left to mobilize, as I recall.

387. Q. You never at any time prior to December 7 sent out any orders to mobilize under WPL-46?

A. No.

388. Q. Did you ever keep any record of your conversations [103] with the President, during the year 1941?

A. No, I did not.

389. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, 1941, you omitted the phrase, "in any direction", which you used to characterize a surprise aggressive move by Japan in the dispatch of November 24, did you not?

A. Yes. Let me check that. I will make sure. Yes, I did omit it. I did not put it in.

390. Q. In your dispatch of November 27, you particularized the description of objectives of a Japanese amphibious expedition as the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo, did you not?

A. I stated in that dispatch that the number and the equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicated—repeat "indicated"—an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

391. Q. In this respect, then, your dispatch of November 27 restricted the geographical area from "any direction" to specific areas, did it not?

A. I do not consider that it restricted it to the areas mentioned. I stated that the organization of the Naval task forces indicated certain objectives, but the fact that I didn't mention others does not

necessarily exclude them, particularly in view of the preceding dispatch to which you have referred. I make mention in that connection, if I may, with reference to the previous dispatch to which you referred, in which the phrase, "in any direction", was used, that that message, in addition to being sent to CinCAF and CinCPac was also sent to Com11, Com12, Com13, and Com15. I meant to invite attention to it at the time we were talking about it, but it slipped my mind. In other words, I not only wanted, as I then mentioned, to put forth the thought that Hawaii might be an objective, but that the attack might come anywhere, on the Canal, or the whole coast.

392. Q. Well, will you agree, Admiral Stark, that the addressee of such dispatches as those of November 24 and November 27 could reasonably conclude that your last-stated expectation of the direction of the Japanese movement, in your dispatch of November 27, was designed to be more precise than the directions indicated in your dispatch of November 24?

A. The dispatch of the 24th mentioned the Philippines or Guam as a possibility, and stated that it might be in any direction. The dispatch of the 27th stated that the information we had indicated an amphibious expedition to the southward, including the Philippines, and it was confirmatory. It was not intended to limit the previous notice of the addressees in the November 24 dispatch—that they were immune. It simply showed the information that we had.

Frank L. Middleston, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[104] 393. Q. The question was, whether you did not agree that the addressee of these two dispatches could, and probably did, reasonably conclude that the last dispatch was much more precise in the direction indicated than the earlier message.

A. I am perfectly willing, and have tried to answer the question as to what the dispatch meant to me, namely, as to what information we had indicating where it might fall, but it was far from my mind as to making that exclusive. We had data indicating these points; lack of data regarding other points didn't necessarily mean that they could not be attacked. And in the previous dispatch, the words "in any direction" were put in there to show that while we were giving what we had, that we did consider that it might come anywhere, even so far to the eastward as the United States.

394. Q. And in your mind the message of the 27th did not limit or change the breadth or the scope indicated in the message of the 24th?

A. No, it did not.

395. Q. At the time of your dispatch of November 24th, you testified in your direct testimony, Admiral Stark, that the words "in any direction" expressed your thought that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility.

A. That is right. And to broaden that, I have just brought up the question showing where that dispatch was addressed.

396. Q. Now, if you thought that Pearl Harbor was a possibility as a point of attack, there was no reason why, in your dispatch to Admiral Kimmel, you couldn't have said so explicitly, was there?

A. No, there was no reason why I could not have.

397. Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you consider an attack on Pearl Harbor as no more than a possibility, even on November 27th?

A. I considered it as a possibility.

398. Q. But a rather remote possibility?

A. Well, I went between "remote possibility" and "probability". It is a little difficult to differentiate. I considered it a possibility.

399. Q. You did not consider it a probability?

A. No, I didn't consider it a probability? If I had thought it was a probability I might have mentioned it. I thought it a possibility.

400. Q. If you had thought that Pearl Harbor was a probability on November 27th, you would have doubtless included that in the specific mention of the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo?

A. No, I don't know that I would have. We were giving a war warning that Japan might strike. We gave the best [105] information we had indicating points which might be struck. We didn't exclude anything else, and the fact that other places were possibilities was intended to stand.

401. Q. My question was, If you had conceived Pearl Harbor to be a probable point of attack, you would have included it specifically in your message of November 27?

A. If I had had information that indicated that Pearl Harbor was a point of attack, I certainly should have included it.

402. Q. I think you testified in your direct examination, Admiral Stark, that after the dispatch of November 24th, you did not intend Admiral Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue his health cruises for all-out security measures?

A. I think it was with reference to the dispatch of October 16th that I mentioned that.

The court then, at 4:05 p. m., took a recess until 4:10 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued):

403. Q. I refer you to Page 52 of the record of Monday, August 7, 1944, question No. 141, which reads:

141. Q. What action did you expect the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet to take on the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 15, now before the court?

A. It was largely informatory. He had previously taken measures regarding which testimony has been given, which I considered appropriate. I considered that if in his judgment, with what he had been doing in the course of the month, he thought any additional tightening up was necessary he would do it. I was trying to acquaint him with the picture as I saw it and that there was a possibility of a surprise attack. I left that to his good judgment. And the same way in the Far East; I sent no specific instructions. It was not my general habit to do so.

[106] 142. Q. The language of the dispatch is, and I quote: "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility." Was your information at the time such as would have warranted your using language indicating that the aggressive movement was stronger than a possibility?

A. I didn't feel—I wasn't ready to go to an all-out at that time. Admiral Kimmel was confronted with problems, and very difficult problems, of training. He was making a so-called health cruise which I had initiated. As I recall, they were originated with Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, which I was not yet ready to interrupt. I didn't feel at that time that he was ready needed to start using everything we had on a war basis, and the word "possibility" was used advisedly, though I knew the situation was certainly no better, and if anything, deteriorating.

A. You are referring to the dispatch of November 24th, now?

404. Q. I will repeat my question. After November 24th, you have already testified, have you not, that you did not intend Admiral Kimmel to interrupt his training or discontinue health cruises for all-out security measures?

A. I wrote Admiral Kimmel after the dispatch of October 14th—

405. Q. No, no; November 24th.

A. I was thinking of the dispatch of October 17 with reference to your question, but I am willing to let it stand for the 24th.

406. Q. And yet, after the dispatch of November 27th, you have testified you expected Admiral Kimmel to institute full security measures?

A. That is right.

407. Q. At the time you sent both dispatches, however, in your own mind an attack on the Hawaiian area was a possibility and not a probability; is that correct?

A. Yes, except that the war warning message certainly gave a picture of very much more gravity than anything else, anything previous which had been sent.

408. Q. But you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor a possibility at the time you sent the message on November 24?

A. Yes, that is right.

409. Q. And you considered it only a possibility when you sent your message of November 27th?

A. I considered war far more probable on the sending of the message of the 27th, and to that extent was more likely to happen.

[107] 410. Q. But you have been very definite, Admiral, that on the 27th you considered an attack on Pearl Harbor only a possibility as distinguished from a probability.

A. Yes.

411. Q. You so testified before the Roberts Commission.

A. Yes. I don't recall about the Roberts Commission but I say "yes" to that.

412. Q. And you so testify now?

A. Yes.

413. Q. After the dispatch of November 24th, did you have a conference with the President and Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State?

A. After November 24th? I did.

414. Q. That is referred to in the postscript of your letter of November 25th, which was introduced as an exhibit yesterday, or the day before.

A. Yes; that is right.

415. Q. Do you recall when that conference was?

A. No, I don't. I think it was shortly after—it was probably the 25th, or very close to it, as I recall. The postscript is not dated.

416. Q. In Exhibit 16, this letter of November 25th, you state in

the postscript, "I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today." Now, the letter is dated the 25th. Do you recall whether you held it more than one day?

A. No, I do not recall. I think it was just about the time the letter was written, but I don't recall. It may have been the next morning; it may have been that afternoon. I don't remember. I have no means of remembering.

417. Q. That postscript represented your very recent and probably extremely accurate impression of the conference, did it not?

A. Yes.

418. Q. Did your estimate of the situation, namely, that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility and not a probability, remain the same after the conference as it had been when you sent the dispatch of November 24th?

A. I don't recall that I changed my opinion any. I stated in the—that is in the record, isn't it, that postscript?

419. Q. Yes, that was read in the record before.

A. I gave the thought of the President and Mr. Hull in it, and I gave the thought with regard to Russia in it.

[108] 420. Q. But your own mental reaction with respect to the over-all situation did undergo some change prior to the 27th of November?

A. Yes. On the 27th of November when negotiations ceased, that made, in my opinion, quite a difference in the whole set-up. It brought it to a head.

421. Q. As I understand it, the basic factor of your personally having a more alarming view in the interval between November 24 and November 27, was the fact that negotiations between our Secretary of State and Admiral Nomura had ceased?

A. That is right.

422. Q. You knew, did you not, that on November 26th the United States had given Japan a note which stated certain basic proposals for Japanese-American relations? That note is now printed on Page 768 of Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1941?

A. I don't know whether I did or not, but if you will read the note it may refresh my memory.

The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from Volume 2 of Foreign Relations, 1931-1941.

The court granted the permission.

423. Q. My inquiry was, Did you know if such was a fact?

A. I don't recall ever having seen that note.

424. Q. The question is whether or not you knew, on November 26th, that the United States had given Japan a note which stated certain basic proposals for Japanese-American relations. I am not asking whether you knew the precise contents of it.

A. No, I don't remember that note. I do recollect a conference in the White House at which were present, Mr. Hull, the Japanese Ambassador, and myself, when certain items were discussed looking toward peace. I do not recall the date of that meeting.

425. Q. I think that was quite a bit earlier.

A. But I remember rather distinctly some of the President's proposals. But this document which you have given me, I do not recall ever having seen that.

426. Q. That wasn't the question. Did you know that a document, a message, a note, was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on the 26th of November?

A. I do not recall such, no.

427. Q. Where did you get your information that diplomatic relations had broken off? Bear in mind that a note looking forward to peaceful relations had been handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on the day before you sent your message of November 27th.

A. Yes. Where did I get the information that negotiations had been broken off?

[109] 428. Q. Yes.

A. To the best of my recollection and belief, I got it from Mr. Hull.

429. Q. At that time did Mr. Hull tell you that he had handed a note the day before, on the 26th, to the Japanese Ambassador?

A. Not that I recollect.

430. Q. You learned nothing from the State Department to indicate that any proposal that might have been made on November 27 was not intended in good faith by the Secretary of State and that it at least was not possible of acceptance?

A. On the 26th?

431. Q. Yes.

A. I don't recall the note which you asked me to read, of having seen it or having heard anything about it. As to whether or not it was made in good faith, you would have to ask the State Department. Sometimes things are made for the record in the hopes that they will get through as a last hope.

432. Q. As I understand it, you leave it that although on November 27 you were advised by the Secretary of State that negotiations had broken off, you never were advised that on the 26th a note had been handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador?

A. I do not recall it, and I have so stated. I haven't the slightest recollection of that note.

The court then, at 4:32 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m., August 10, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 1944.

[110]

SIXTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman, first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the fifth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The judge advocate stated that during the proceedings of the fourth day of the inquiry he had requested the court to take judicial notice of Navy Regulations and particularly called attention to Article 392, regarding the Chief of Naval Operations. The judge advocate further stated that at this time he desired to call the court's attention further to Article 433 of Navy Regulations, which more particularly sets forth the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Wednesday, August 9, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) (continued:)

433. Q. I show you a document, Admiral Stark, apparently a [111] photostatic copy of a letter that you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 22 March 1941, and ask you if you may identify it?

A. I do, as a letter to Admiral Kimmel, from me, dated 22 March.

A letter dated March 22, 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-

mel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 32," for reference, description appended.

434. Q. Will you read the last paragraph on page five?

A. (Reading:)

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent to despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

435. Q. I show you a letter from Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May 1941, and ask you if you can identify it. I propose to offer it for the purpose of reading portions thereof.

A. I recognize it as a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 26 May, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by Admiral Kimmel.

A letter dated May 26, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 33," for reference, description appended.

[112] 436. Q. Will you read, Admiral Stark, paragraphs seven and eight of Exhibit 33?

A. (Reading:)

7. INFORMATION.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending

ing eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

8. PUBLIC OPINION.

As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the [113] newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported, or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he reserved the right to read further from Exhibit 33 at such time as he, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), might be a witness before the court of inquiry.

437. Q. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he visited Washington officially in June of 1941, did he not, Admiral Stark?

A. Yes, that's right. Whether he sent it on before that I don't recall, but I do recall our having gone over it during his visit.

438. Q. And the subject matter of the important paragraphs were discussed between you and him?

A. Yes.

439. Q. June of 1941, here in Washington?

A. That's right.

440. Q. And those were official discussions?

A. Yes, discussions on that letter between him and me.

441. Q. Now, do you recall what the discussion was relative to paragraph 7, which was the first of the two paragraphs that you read?

A. Which was about—do you wish me to comment on that paragraph?

442. Q. Yes, will you state to the court what that discussion was?

A. The discussion covered many things as regard policy. There are some definite questions which Admiral Kimmel would like to have answered, which I would like to have answered—which were never answered until war was declared. For example, [114] and I think these specific things were asked: What would we do if Japan attacked Russia? What would we do if Japan attacked the N. E. I.? What would we do if Japan attacked Britain? What would we do if she attacked any combination of these? He asked those questions, and as I recall, in one letter I stated to Admiral Kimmel that so far as I knew, nobody on God's green earth could answer them. It was impossible to get an answer. In fact, I don't think anybody knew. Those were definite guides which he simply would like to have had. They simply were not available. Now as regards current events, I kept Admiral Kimmel acquainted with them as I knew them, generally speaking by personal letter. It may have been official letters

at times, but it certainly was my aim to give him the picture pretty much as I had it. This paragraph states that he was "not even sure of what force would be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks." My recollection is that I wrote Admiral Kimmel at one period that I did not intend to detach any further forces from his command and that his command would stand practically as outlined in Rainbow 5, which was definite, and which was based on a world estimate. Admiral Kimmel did not have all the forces he would like to have had for an open Pacific campaign, but for what was assigned we gave him what we thought he needed. I might call attention to the fact that there just were not enough forces available to the Associated Powers to wage war all-out in all oceans. We simply didn't have it. Bearing this in mind, and of the tasks possibly ahead, we gave to him what we thought would meet his task he was assigned to do. He said, "This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty." It was disturbing to us. Nobody knew what was going to happen. He states that it created "a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations." I only reply to that, that we gave him a directive, we gave him forces which we thought, with all the other problems we were confronted with, were the best suited to the situation.

443. Q. What do you mean by "gave him a directive"?

A. In WPL-46.

444. Q. On the part that you have commented on, Admiral Stark, did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 relative to the withdrawal from the Pacific Fleet of another battleship division?

A. (Yes), we discussed every question which was facing them.

445. Q. There was then imminent the question of a withdrawal of an additional battleship division from the Pacific Fleet, [115] was there not?

A. I don't recall anything but one division.

446. Q. Do you recall any discussion concerning the withdrawal of an additional division at that time?

A. There may have been. I don't recall it. I do recall, whether it was then or later, telling him that I didn't expect to withdraw anything further.

447. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel in June of 1941 that at that time, approximately, within a day or two previous to the conversation, that you had been told by the Secretary of the Navy that the President had directed the withdrawal of another battleship division with accompanying support, from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet?

A. No, I do not.

448. Q. Do you recall telling Admiral Kimmel, in connection with the possible discussion of that character, that you had protested to Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, to such a movement, and the matter had been held over for a day or two; and that during that interval you met Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, on the street, and he had asked you in peremptory tones whether you had already started the movement of that division of battleships from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

A. I recall talking about Colonel Stimson, either then or later, in relation to some movement. I think it was with reference to the movement which we talked about yesterday, the movement to the Philippines. At the moment I do not recall specifically another battleship division under discussion. There may have been talk of further withdrawals. They were not made; and I remember telling him in my opinion they wouldn't be made.

449. Q. Would it refresh your recollection to have recalled to you the fact that Admiral Kimmel later told you that he had taken the matter up with the President and that he had been able to persuade the President that it was an unwise move?

A. No, I just don't remember the incident. I know that we didn't send anything. There were many things that came up in the course of conversation—the whole world over—but I do not recall the particular incident to which you refer.

450. Q. Now will you continue your comment on paragraph numbered 7?

A. Admiral Kimmel states, in the first sentence of the following paragraph, that "the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement." As regards that, I would say that I did the best I could.

[116] 451. Q. Did you inaugurate any different or better method after and as a result of that letter from Admiral Kimmel, and conversation about it?

A. Only to keep him informed as well as I could. As with regard to the O. N. I. information, I might say the O. N. I. papers have, usually in the margin, notations as to whom the information has been sent. I believe it was Admiral Ingersoll's custom to look at that. Commander Wellborn's papers were brought to me. I invariably checked it. I still do, to see whether those who should have the information received it, and if not, to see that they got it; and as regards what I knew myself, I kept him, as I say, acquainted the best I could. I wrote him frequently. He goes on to state that, "This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for an intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions." If there is one thing which I have been immune from, it has been the issuance of categorical instructions—and leaving to those, particularly at a distance, what to do after I give them such information as I have.

452. Q. Have you any comments on the last sentence of the last paragraph of 7?

A. About being guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions? I just covered that. You mean the next paragraph?

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), entered.

453. Q. Yes.

A. (Reading:)

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

I was in complete concurrence with him on that, and that was one of my objectives.

454. Q. You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet should be, in so far as you were able, immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred, and by the quickest secure means available?

A. Yes. The other paragraph which has been referred to is, "The current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. [117] To back into a war, unsupported, or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A lefthanded, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution." I was told that I was the first person in the United States to take this tack in talking with responsible bodies and over the radio. I could elaborate a good deal on that as to what I said and when I said it, but world preparedness was a thing that stressed completely—not just getting appropriations and money and slapping our hands and say, "Well, let somebody else do it." As for telling our people what the conditions were we were in, I became Chief of Naval Operations in the Fall of 1939, late summer. Congress met in 1940, in January. I went up, I think, almost the day they met. I was on the stand with the House Naval Committee, as I recall, nine consecutive days. I was told by many people in Congress that no man ever took such a grilling. Those were morning and afternoon sessions. I laid out our whole picture with regard to the Pacific. It got much publicity and hit headlines. That was not what I was seeking. I was asking for a 25% increase in the strength of the Navy, pointing out our weaknesses in every respect. It was a searching analysis of our condition. I thought the request would carry through because of its modesty, although it involved a considerable sum of money. It was based, not only on our needs, but on the capacity of our yards, as they then existed, to take up this construction. I got 11½%, which started the program. I may say that I went back in June and asked for what is generally known as a 70% increase. It was about a 73% increase, involving a great deal of money. I may say that Congress was then scared. France had fallen. What I had striven hours and hours for in the earlier meetings, I got almost in a matter of minutes, by telling them that it was impossible to confront the situation which we might face with what we had. Now, as regard to personnel, which has been mentioned here frequently, I

went before the Congressional Committees, and I was told, particularly by the House Naval Appropriations Committee, that no man had ever talked to them as I did. I portrayed what I considered a very critical situation. The Fleet was 85% manned. I said it should be a minimum of 115%, particularly with the increases that were coming. They cut what I asked for. Struggling for personnel was one of the toughest things I had. Admiral Kimmel, I think, may recall some of those matters, as he was a budget officer at that time. When they said that they had never had [118] the personnel situation jammed down their throats as I jammed it down, I invited their attention to the remarks of some previous chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation, showing how much of it was on the record, if I recall, Andrews being one of them.

455. Q. Did you agree with Admiral Kimmel's statement of policy set forth in paragraph 8, Exhibit 33?

A. Yes, I did.

456. Q. One other question about the last paragraph, preceding paragraph 8: after you had agreed with Admiral Kimmel that you would immediately inform him of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available, did you do so between then and 7 December '41?

A. To the best of my conscience I did, perhaps not always by the quickest means but what I considered sufficiently quick means, sometimes by personal letter, sometimes when I thought it was critical, by dispatch.

457. Q. You are now conscious of no important development of which Admiral Kimmel was not advised as it occurred by the quickest secure means then available?

A. I have searched my brain, my conscience, my heart, and everything I have got, since Pearl Harbor started, to see wherein I was derelict or wherein I might have omitted something. There is only one thought—that doesn't mean that I am right—in my mind there is only one thought that I regretted. What the effect would have been, I don't know—and that was the dispatch which was sent by the Army on the morning of December 7, that I had not paralleled it with my own system, or that I had not telephoned it. I may be reminded, before this investigation is over, of other things where I may realize that there was something more I could have done, but that is the one conscious realization I remember and regret, that I have had.

458. Q. You considered the letter, Exhibit 33, so good, did you not, Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its receipt, among important officers in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, it was our general custom to do that, and I mimeographed this, sent it to all hands who were concerned, followed it up, and as I recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office.

459. Q. There was no written and specific, categorical reply to that letter, Exhibit 33?

A. No, when Admiral Kimmel left I asked him, as I recall, in view of all our conversations and what I had made [119] available to him, the picture as I saw it and the disposition of ships and personnel, if he had been sitting where I was, would he give us a fairly clean

bill of health. As I recall, he smiled and said he would, which was a matter of great satisfaction to me.

460. Q. I ask you whether you can identify this document, which I now hand you, as a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to you under date of 26 July 1941, for the purpose of reading portions therefrom into the record.

A. Yes, I do identify it as a letter from Admiral Kimmel to me, dated 26 July 1941?

A letter dated July 26, 1941, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 34" for reference, description appended.

[120] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

461. Q. I will read, Admiral Stark, certain portions of this letter, Exhibit 34: (Reading:)

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:—

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis [121] war may give us more time.

That portion of the letter that I have just read, Admiral Stark, indicated to you, did it not, that Admiral Kimmel was keenly alert as to not only the military, but also the international developments, and was implementing the over-all general request in his letter of 26 May, Exhibit 33, to keep himself fully advised as to developments in that field?

A. Yes.

462. Q. I ask you if you can identify what I now hand you as a letter from yourself to Admiral Kimmel dated 22 August, 1941, enclosing a long draft of a letter dated 19 August 1941?

A. Yes. I recognize this as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, 22 August 1941. I recognize the enclosure.

The letter from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, dated 22 August, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, each of the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose only of hereafter reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry before the court.

There being no objection it was so received and marked "Exhibit 35" for reference, description appended.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, suggested that the entire letter be used in the interest of saving time in the future.

The interested party, Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) requested information as to whether all the exhibits introduced before the court would be appended to the record in their entirety.

The judge advocate requested a recess.

The court then, at 11:05 a. m., took a recess until 11:35 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[122] The judge advocate made the following statement: There appears to be some confusion in the minds of the interested parties, and also in the minds of the court, as to the exact procedure the judge advocate proposes to follow in writing up this record of proceedings in its final form. This question arises out of certain letters which are considered by interested parties to be their own private property. Initially, I would like to point out that when these documents are offered in evidence they are required to be offered in evidence as a whole. At such time, having been offered in evidence as a whole, these documents become the property of the convening authority. The next point that I would like to make is the system that the judge advocate proposes to follow in appending these exhibits to the actual record of proceedings itself. For example, we will take Exhibit 34, which has been offered in evidence before the court. Only certain extracts have been read to the court. The judge advocate proposes in such cases to append to the record the extracts as read, or set them out in the record as they were read, which ever seems to be the more appropriate. But in the event that the matter is appended to the record and not copied into the record the extracts as read will be the appended matter and will bear the exhibit number, and a full description of the document from which the extracts were made will be attached as a description, and the place where the complete document is filed for future reference will also be set out. In the event that the extracts are copied directly into the record in response to a

question put, obviously it is not necessary to again attach the same matter as an exhibit, but a description of the exhibit will be appended marked with the same number as a description, and its disposition put on this page in a manner similar to that which I have just described.

The court made the following statement: The court, in brief, would like to ask if its understanding, which is as follows, is correct: The procedure in Courts and Boards shows in places the introduction of such things as a ship's log. Extracts from the log are read and then the record will show that that extract is appended to the record with an exhibit number. Your method is practically the same thing with the exception that where counsel has it read directly into the record it will, of course, not be necessary to again copy it and attach it as an exhibit, but that the letter from which the reading was made will be described so that it can be perfectly identified so that we will know where it is filed, and that will then become the exhibit number which you have previously given.

The judge advocate replied that that was correct.

[123] The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) requested information as to whether or not at the time a document is marked as an exhibit, at that point of time the entire document becomes beholden to the court for all purposes and whether the court becomes the final repository for each such document in toto.

The judge advocate replied that he would follow in all cases the procedure as he had just outlined it.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, requested information as to how that affected the proposition that certain passages in his personal letters not be made a matter of record.

The court replied that a letter which Admiral Stark may have written to Admiral Kimmel was also the property of Admiral Kimmel and could be introduced by Admiral Kimmel as a part of the record.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated as follows: It was not our intention to advance such a proposition, but what we asked was that by agreement, those parts which we considered to be inimical to the public interests, if they were disclosed, would be left out of the record. We are not asking the court to rule, as a matter of law, in opposition to Admiral Kimmel's position if he wishes to introduce them. What we wished to make plain was that we consider some small parts of those letters inimical to the public interests and it was not our intention to take the responsibility for their disclosure. If someone else wishes to take that responsibility that is up to them. But if we could agree at this time that those letters simply be copied again, leaving out these rather important sentences, which are small in number, and use those exhibits as re-copied, that would be the proposition to be put.

The court replied that it could not agree to have a letter rewritten with parts left out, and attached to the record; that the only thing that could be done would be to describe the letter in the exhibit and state that they are secret papers and should not be available to anybody but the convening authority.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, requested clarification as to whether the record was clear that he (Admiral Stark) refused to take the responsibility for having any of these passages made public.

The court replied that it was entirely up to the convening authority; that if it is so described in the record and specified to that effect, the convening authority was then the one responsible.

[124] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, requested that when any of these letters are considered inimical to the public interest, he simply make a statement to that effect to be noted in the record and noted on the description of the exhibit.

The court made the following statement: I shall direct the judge advocate now, that when that point is raised, when any of those letters comes up where secrecy is involved, that he will specify on the exhibit so that the convening authority thoroughly understands that it is a secret document and involves state secrets that should not be made public.

The judge advocate replied that he would do it not only on the record but on the exhibit itself when it is placed in the file.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (continued):

463. Q. Admiral will you please read pages 1 to 11 of Exhibit 35?

The witness read pages 1 to 11, both inclusive, of Exhibit 35, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 35-A".

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[125] Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross-examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret.) (continued):

With the permission of the court, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), made the following statement: I have today been informed that certain vital, pertinent data physically available now in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations are to be denied this court. These data are among that which the judge advocate of this court has endeavored to obtain at my request. Their availability was approved by the Secretary of the Navy. They are now being denied this court by order of the Acting Secretary of the Navy. Without these data it is impossible for this court to develop the full story of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. What the motives are prompting the denial of these data to the court, guarded as it is by the security of its secret proceedings, I can only surmise, but I can state unequivocally that the result of this denial is to render impotent this court in its effort to find the truth of the matter, which constitutes the burden of its precept. Without a full and fair disclosure of all known and available evidence, this inquiry is futile. Against such evasion of the clear mandate of Congress and the demands of simple justice, I most solemnly protest.

The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate has proceeded diligently through the proper channels of the Navy Department to secure

the documents requested by the interested party, Rear Admiral Kimmel. His request for that information is still in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy (I believe the Director of Naval Communications). To date, he has had no answer to that letter. He therefore cannot tell the court whether or not the request has been acceded to or denied until he receives a reply to that letter.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) stated: The information I have given the court was supplied to me by Admiral King this forenoon.

[126] The court stated: The court has nothing to do with the collection of evidence. That is in the judge advocate's hands.

The interested party, Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) stated: I suggest most respectfully that it might be appropriate for the court to take up this matter with the convening authority to determine whether this development permits it to comply with its precept. The situation I have described affects very materially the adequate cross-examination of the witness now testifying, Admiral Stark.

The court then, at 2:35 p. m., took a recess until 2:40 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The court stated (addressing the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.)) : On what do you base your assumption that the request has been refused?

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) stated: I base my assumption that it has been refused on a conversation I had with Admiral King, who stated that he would recommend that it be not made available, and he was sure that the Acting Secretary would approve it. May I make a further statement? These data are vital to me and my counsel for the examination of the witness now on the stand. We have been waiting since the 1st of August, when this request was submitted by the judge advocate of this court at my request, attempting to get this data. One of my counsel, Captain Lavender, inspected this data by permission of the Secretary of the Navy and designated the parts that he wished to have produced before this court. My information is that it will now be denied. If the court deems it necessary to have further evidence than that which I have given, I suggest that Admiral King be called before this court to testify on this point. It is a point which can be readily established; it should be established now.

The court stated: The court will await the action of the Secretary of the Navy on the official request for those papers. If it is denied, then, we will be better able to act. In the meantime, the judge advocate should make every effort to obtain a reply to that letter.

[127] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated: I fear that there will be further delays. The witness has stated to the court as an apparently approved statement that he expects to leave for London the latter part of this week

or early next week. That is the primary reason for my insistence on an answer in regard to these data at this time.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: If I may say so, I do not recall having stated that I was going to leave at the end of this week. I hope to finish, if possible, with what Admiral Kimmel wants of me, but I do not think I can stay much beyond this week.

The court stated (addressing Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy): The interested party, it is assumed, understands that he will remain an interested party whether or not he is here and that his interest will continue if he leaves.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: I do understand that. That is why it was rather a surprise to me when I was brought over here, in the first place. I had no knowledge of it. I was told to come here for a short time and get back. My interest will be left in the hands of counsel.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated: May I give the basis of my statement that I understand Admiral Stark is returning to London? In a letter signed by Admiral King, dated 29 July 1944, there is a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Personnel, which was supplied to me by the Chief of Naval Personnel: (Reading) "Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll are being made available immediately for witnesses. It is assumed that their presence will be required only for a limited period. Neither of these two admirals, or any other officer on active service on important duty, can be brought to Washington for an indefinite period without interfering with the war effort.

The court stated: We will proceed with the testimony of this witness.

464. Q. When you wrote Exhibit 35, Admiral Stark, on the date of 22 August 1941, you had just returned to Washington from a so-called Atlantic Charter conference in the North Atlantic, had you not?

A. That is right.

465. Q. There were present at that conference, among others, the President and Mr. Churchill?

A. Yes.

[128] 466. Q. You stated in your letter: "Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times, but now I think we at last have something fairly definite—maybe." Did you tell Admiral Kimmel what "something fairly definite" was?

A. In the rest of my letter I gave him such information of that conference. I did not state what was in full swing in the Atlantic, as I recall. The letter covers some of the points of that conference.

467. Q. Did some of the fairly definite things have reference to the Pacific?

A. The discussion was broad. It may have included the Pacific, but as I recall, not a great deal. Russia was mentioned, I believe, with regard to some aid, but so far as any commitment of what we might do in case Japan attacked Russia or the British or the N. E. I., I do not recall.

468. Q. By that do you mean that no such commitments were made or that currently you have no memory of them?

A. To the best of my belief, and so far as I know, no commitments were made.

469. Q. Did you think that you did know of any commitments which were made at that Atlantic conference?

A. Up to the moment of your question, I thought I did, but there were conversations at which I was not present, where I have no idea of what might have been said. I was given no understanding of any commitments made regarding what I have just testified to.

470. Q. On the 27th of January, 1942, Mr. Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons, which I quote: "On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been fulfilled by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting front."

The court stated: From what are you reading?

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) stated: The speech of Mr. Churchill to the House of Commons.

This question was objected to by the judge advocate and by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, on the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

[129] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), replied.

The court announced that the objection was sustained.

471. Q. At any time between the date of the Atlantic Conference and December 7 were you advised of any commitments made by the United States to Britain in the eventuality of war breaking out in the Pacific between Japan and Britain?

A. Absolutely none.

472. Q. Do you recall receiving a dispatch, probably on 7 December 1941, from Admiral Hart bearing a Greenwich time date of December 7, which I am advised by those more familiar with astronomical time than I, means December 6 in Manila, the substance of which was, "Cinc-Asiatic reports to OpNav that he has learned from Singapore that the United States had assured Britain armed support under several eventualities. I have received no corresponding instructions from you," copy of that dispatch having been sent to Admiral Kimmel for information?

A. Yes, I have some remembrance of that dispatch.

473. Q. At that that time did you know of any assurances that Britain would receive armed support from the United States under any eventuality?

A. No.

474. Q. Did you understand at any time prior to the receipt of that message that the United States had given Britain assurance that it would come to its armed support if Japan attacked Britain in the Pacific?

A. I did not, nor did I understand it after receipt of the dispatch.

475. Q. If any such commitment had been made by a higher authority than you, you had no information concerning it?

A. None whatsoever.

476. Q. I ask if you can identify this, Admiral, as a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to you under date of 12 September 1941, which I

would like to offer in evidence for the purpose of reading portions into the record.

A. Yes. I note it is unsigned, but I recall it.

The letter of 12 September 1941 from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

[130] There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 36" or reference, description appended.

477. Q. Will you read from it?

A. (Reading:)

Dear "Betty",

We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noticed that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for *surface* raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

478. Q. That will be enough of that letter. Did you write Admiral Kimmel under date of 23 September 1941 in response to the letter which you just read, Exhibit 36?

A. Yes.

[131] 479. Q. The document I show you is the letter which you wrote to him under that date?

A. Yes, it is a letter to Kimmel from me, dated 23 September 1941.

The letter of 23 September 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked "EXHIBIT 37".

480. Q. Will you please read this exhibit?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 37.

481. Q. You intended by the second postscript, which you have just read, Admiral, to indicate to Admiral Kimmel that you would keep him fully and promptly informed as to all diplomatic developments which you learned, at least from the Secretary of State?

A. That's right.

482. Q. Can you identify the document I now hand you as a letter you wrote Admiral Kimmel under date of 17 October 1941?

A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter from me to Admiral Kimmel, dated 17 October 1941.

The letter of 17 October 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 38" for reference, description appended.

483. Q. Will you read the first three paragraphs of that letter?

A. (Reading:)

Dear Kimmel: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

484. Q. Enclosed with that letter was a copy of a memorandum under the date of 17 October 1941, signed by R. E. Schuirmann, and addressed to C.N.O. Will you read the last paragraph in the enclosed paragraph?

A. (Reading:)

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

485. Q. In your dispatch of 16 October you stated:

In either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

In Exhibit 15, your dispatch of November 24, you state:

The situation, coupled with statements of the Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces, indicates, in our opinion, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam as a possibility.

A. That is November 24?

486. Q. Yes. Did you use the word "possibility" in your message of November 24 in the same sense in which you used it in your message of October 16, as interpreted in your letter of October 17?

A. What you are asking me, as I understand it, is if the letter which I wrote following the dispatch of October 16 qualified the dispatch of November 24? I would say the correspondence and the dispatch of October 16 and the letter of October 17 stand as an entity.

487. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of October 16, you wrote Admiral Kimmel that you personally did not believe that the Japs were going to sail into us?

A. I did.

488. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of November 24, did you use it in the same connotation?

A. I still was not convinced that it was more than a possibility, and, as I have already testified, after reading [133] the dispatch of October 16, I wanted to make sure that Admiral Kimmel, so far as I was concerned, was not to read into that dispatch that he was to stop his training or his cruises to the coast.

489. Q. When you used "possibility" in your dispatch of October 16, you told him in your letter that you personally did not mean by that any individual thought that the Japanese were going to sail into us?

A. I stated at that time that I did not believe the Japs were going to sail into us; that is right.

490. Q. Although the word in the dispatch referring to that thought was "possibility"?

A. Yes.

491. Q. When you used the word "possibility" in your dispatch of November 24, did you use it in the same sense in which you used it in the dispatch of October 16, namely, that you did not personally expect a surprise aggressive move or attack on the Philippines or Guam?

A. Well, I stated it as a possibility. I still considered it only a possibility.

492. Q. When you used "possibility" on October 16, you said that although it was a possibility in the sense that anything might be a possibility, you personally did not believe anything would happen?

A. Yes.

493. Q. Did you use the word "possibility" in your dispatch of November 24 with the same connotation?

A. In the message of November 24 I still maintained it was a possibility, and I was not convinced at that time that the Japs were going to sail into us from the evidence I had.

494. Q. That was when?

A. The message of the 24th which you are questioning me about, but there was that possibility. I had thought they might, and in any case, I sent the message, to be on guard. I made it a possibility because I felt that was what it was. If I had felt that it had been a strong probability, I would have stated so.

[134] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

495. Q. Do I understand that you used the word "possibility" in the same sense on November 24th as you did on October 16th?

A. Generally speaking. I qualified it in the message of the 16th, and I also wrote regarding the message of the 24th, but it was a possi-

bility. The word "possibility", as far as I am concerned, stands in these dispatches.

496. Q. But when you used "possibility" in October, you frankly stated to Admiral Kimmel that you didn't expect the possibility to eventuate?

A. I said I didn't expect Japan to sail into us at that time. I didn't say that it wouldn't eventuate.

497. Q. The wording of the message was: "Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers", and you wrote and said as you used the word in that message you personally did not believe the Japanese were going to sail into us.

A. At that time; that is right.

498. Q. Now, when you used "possibility" in your dispatch of November 24, did you personally believe that the Japanese were not going to sail into the Philippines and Guam?

A. I thought there was a possibility of it. I don't know how differently to express it.

499. Q. Did you think there was any more possibility of the Japanese sailing into the Philippines and Guam on November 24th than you thought on October 16th there was a possibility of Japan attacking Britain and the United States?

A. Well, we had further evidence about the movements of forces, again indicating that possibility; and the negotiations certainly were getting no better, and in fact, looked less likely of favorable outcome, and the two circumstances combined caused me to reiterate that possibility and keep it in front of Admiral Kimmel.

500. Q. Then do I gather that on November 24th you did feel there was more of a possibility of an attack by Japan on the Philippines and Guam than you felt on October 16th there was a possibility of an attack on the United States and Britain?

A. Well, I thought it sufficient to again warn Admiral Kimmel.

[135] 501. Q. Yes, I understand that, but did you think there was more possibility on November 24th than you did on October 16th?

A. Generally speaking, I would say "yes", that we had more evidence.

502. Q. Then why didn't you use words that would clearly indicate that change of thought on your part, Admiral Stark?

A. I gave him the evidence I had, and I gave him my interpretation of it.

503. Q. In your letter of November 25th, you mean?

A. In the dispatch of 24 November.

504. Q. But you used the same words relative to the possibility of an attack that you used in October when you said that you personally didn't believe that it would happen?

A. Yes, and I added in the dispatch of November 24th, "in any direction", as well as including an attack on the Philippines or Guam.

The judge advocate objected to the line of questioning on the ground that it was hazing the witness.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) stated that he would not pursue this line of questioning further.

505. Q. I show you that which appears to be a letter from yourself to Admiral Kimmel dated November 14, 1941, enclosing a memorandum

from yourself and General Marshall to the President. Do you identify that as a letter that you wrote, with the enclosure?

A. I do.

The letter of November 14, 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) enclosing a memorandum to the President, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 39" for reference, description appended.

[136] 506. Q. Will you read, Admiral Stark, the fourth paragraph of the letter, the letter beginning "Dear Mustapha"?

A. (Reading): "Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

507. Q. I show you a document which is attached to the letter entitled "Memorandum for the President". Can you identify this document?

A. Yes. This is a Memorandum for the President from the War and Navy Departments, Washington, dated November 5, 1941.

The memorandum from the War and Navy Departments, Washington, dated November 5, 1941, Serial 0130012, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 39 (A)."

508. Q. Will you read the memorandum, Admiral Stark?

The witness read the memorandum. Exhibit 39 (A).

509. Q. In the memorandum of November 5th, you and General Marshall jointly stated to the President that military action against Japan should be undertaken—this is under (b) on Page 4—only in one or more of the following eventualities, No. 1 of which is, "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies". At the time you made that recommendation to the President in conjunction with General Marshall, were you aware of any agreement or understanding between the United States and Britain by which this country had agreed to do that?

A. No.

510. Q. Was this recommendation in the memorandum of November 5th the original initiation of that thought so far as you know?

A. That point had been discussed, as I recall, as to just what its effect would be if concluded at this time. I don't recall it having been set down before.

511. Q. What do you mean by "set down"?

A. I mean that it was formulated into a definite proposition.

[137] 512. Q. How long had that problem been under discussion? You said it had been discussed before November 5th.

A. Well, I couldn't recall that. We discussed that entire Far Eastern situation for a matter of months.

513. Q. Had it been discussed as far back as August of 1941?

A. I couldn't recall.

514. Q. With whom were these discussions to which you have made reference?

A. The War Plans discussed them. I don't remember ever having discussed them with the British.

515. Q. There had been conversations with the British, not only in the North Atlantic in August, but earlier in 1941 in Washington. Was that called the Chiefs-of-Staff conference, of Staff conferences?

A. Yes.

516. Q. On either of those occasions, do you recall any discussion of what the United States would do if Japan attacked either the Netherlands or Britain in the Pacific?

A. Not so far as giving the slightest commitment, and as regards this particular point I do not recall any definite proposition on this until we formulated it here.

517. Q. Do you recall how long the matter had been under discussion between you and General Marshall?

A. No. Mr. Hull's request brought this thing to its present form. I couldn't recall the time of that.

518. Q. What was Mr. Hull's request?

A. Whether we volunteered this to Mr. Hull, or—

519. Q. This memorandum is to the President.

A. I will take that back regarding Mr. Hull.

520. Q. Had there been any discussion with the President about this point prior to the memorandum?

A. Yes. I don't know about this memorandum as it stands but there were many discussions with the President about the Far Eastern situation.

521. Q. I know, but the possibility of your firm recommendation contained in (b) (1) on Page 4—

A. You mean, had there been any discussion on that particular line before this was formed?

522. Q. Yes.

A. I do not recall.

523. Q. This was sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 14th of November, some nine days after it was dated, and at that time you stated that you were not informed whether your advice would be followed or not?

A. Right.

[138] 524. Q. Did you ever get any advice as to that?

A. Not to my recollection.

525. Q. You stated yesterday afternoon that the new information which you got which prompted the dispatch of November 27th, advised that the Japanese-United States negotiations were about to be stopped?

A. I said they had ceased.

526. Q. Had ceased. Do you recall when—and by “when” I mean in the morning or afternoon of November 27th—you got that information?

A. It would be during the working day. I would hesitate to say whether it was morning or afternoon.

527. Q. Well, now, does the symbol on this Exhibit 17 assist you in locating that at all, 272337?

A. Yes. From that it would appear that it might have been in the late afternoon, but I couldn't say that it was. I don't remember just what time of day that message was cleared. It is a priority dispatch.

528. Q. Do these symbols, 272337, refer to Greenwich Mean Time, or Eastern War Time?

A. I think that was GMT. I'm not sure.

529. Q. That fact will be ascertained?

A. Yes, I shall be glad to find that out. May I add that when you asked me what time of day, the question was whether you had intended asking me what time we first considered it, or when we cleared it.

530. Q. What time of day, Admiral, did you learn about the cessation of negotiations?

A. What time of day we decided on it?

531. Q. No, the question was, What time of day you learned about the cessation of negotiations, when the Secretary informed you?

A. Of course, it was prior to the sending of this dispatch, but I don't recall just what time of day it was.

532. Q. Now, do you recall how you learned that; from whom you got the information?

A. No. Whether it came direct from Mr. Hull, or whether it came through Captain Schuirmann, or just how it came, I do not recall.

533. Q. If it came direct from Mr. Hull, would it have come by telephone, or would you have gone up to the State Department?

A. It might have come either way. He frequently telephoned me.

[139] 534. Q. Since yesterday, did you go over the note that was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on the 26th of November. We had some conversation about that yesterday afternoon.

A. No, except that I went over it when you handed it to me.

535. Q. I didn't hand it to you.

A. You gave it to me, pointed it out, and asked me if I had seen it.

536. Q. And you still have no memory of either having seen or heard of that note or the fact that a note had been handed to the Japanese Ambassador the day before your message was dispatched on November 27th?

A. No, I have no recollection of that long note.

537. Q. Until I mentioned it yesterday, you had no recollection of it?

A. Correct.

538. Q. Did you attend a conference with the President at the White House with Admiral Nomura between the 27th of November and December 7th?

A. Between what?

539. Q. Between November 27th and December 7th?

A. I don't recall but I might be able to find out if I can find the record of my visits to the White House. If I did it should be in the record which was kept in the CNO office. I recall being in the White House with the President and Mr. Hull and Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador.

540. Q. Well, you followed the international situation very closely, as indicated by this joint memorandum that you and General Marshall

submitted on the 5th of November, particularly with reference to the Far Eastern situation?

A. Particularly with reference to the Japanese situation, yes.

541. Q. Again, doesn't it appear to you that you must have heard of the substance of this message on November 26th at or about the time it was sent?

A. No, I didn't. The message that I started to tell you about yesterday, and which you interrupted and said that was an earlier message, from which I assumed you had a record of my visits and knew something of what had been discussed.

542. Q. I have no such record.

A. I am sorry. We had a conference in the White House—and I give you this only from recollection; it should not be taken as strictly accurate but I am perfectly [140] willing to give you my recollection of what transpired. And I might mention, the State Department officials could probably give you exact information. There was a proposition made, in effect, to the Japanese Ambassador by which the President, so far as he was possibly able, would see that the Japanese were guaranteed rice from the south—I have forgotten whether it was Indo-China, or not—but that he would undertake to see that she got rice. Whether other raw materials were included, I do not recall at the moment—provided she would stop where she was and, as I recall, send no more troops into Indo-China, and hold the status quo at least for the time being. I rather hesitate to testify to that because it is not clear. The matter was later made a record of to be sent. It was a fair offer showing the President's desire to maintain peace and get Japan to stop further building up in the south, and if she did, he was willing—he couldn't guarantee it, but so far as he was able as President of the United States—to guarantee her certain things. I recall Admiral Nomura stating that one of the things they were going south for was to insure their food supply. That was about this time, I would say.

543. Q. Might it have been the preparation of this very message of November 26 about which I am speaking?

A. Well, the message you showed me goes way, way beyond the subject of the conversation that afternoon; it covered a very large field which was not discussed at that time. It sort of opened up and hashed over the whole subject.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[141] 544. Q. Was the information you received relative to the cessation of negotiations, that there would be no more talks between Admiral Nomura or the Japanese?

A. At that time?

545. Q. Yes.

A. Oh, no, we were endeavoring to continue.

546. Q. I am talking about November 27 now.

A. My information as of November 27 was to the effect that the conversations had ceased.

547. Q. There was no more talk?

A. That is what it meant to me.

548. Q. There were no more formal conferences?

A. Yes.

549. Q. Well now you know that there were more conferences; you knew that at the time, didn't you?

A. Well, the official discussions which had been taking place were—at least I was so informed—terminated. They had not been able to agree on a solution.

550. Q. What I am getting at is, just what, in the way of talks, if any, may have occurred after that?

A. Except the one at 1300 on 7 December, I do not recall. I was told that the negotiations had failed, that they were over.

551. Q. Was it the negotiations had failed, or the negotiations had ceased?

A. They had ceased.

552. Q. Well, you knew then that there were further conversations after November 27, and you knew that fact from reading the public press, in addition to what official information you may have had, didn't you?

A. I just don't recall after that what was said and what wasn't said.

553. Q. In Volume II of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931-1941," on page 772, there appears a memorandum of conversation on December 1 between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Kurusu and the Secretary of the State. State whether or not that refreshes your recollection as to your knowledge at that time, either officially or from the newspapers, that the negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese representatives in this country were continuing after November 27?

A. You give it from the record. I can only assume that it took place. What I am stating is that the thing, so far as we were concerned, spelled failure on the 27th, or at least that we had no hope of a favorable solution.

[142] 554. Q. But the message you sent to Admiral Kimmel said nothing about failure of negotiations. It merely said that negotiations with Japan, looking to a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased. Now I am directing your attention, Admiral Stark, to whether you knew that negotiations in fact were continuing, however phantom they may have been.

A. I assume by ceasing, that they had failed. I will stand on the message as it was sent, that the negotiations with Japan, "looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased."

555. Q. Well, did you mean when you used that word "ceased" to convey the impression to Admiral Kimmel that there would be no more negotiations in fact, or that in spirit and in theory they had become spent, and nothing more in reality could be accomplished, November 27 had been dissipated somewhat?

A. The message meant to me that all the efforts which had been spent looking toward stabilization had ceased, and the conversations were over, and I stated that an aggressive move was expected. It mean't to me, failure.

556. Q. And if Admiral Kimmel saw in the public press on the days following the receipt of this message that there were continued negotiations, continued conversations, continued meetings between Admiral Nomura and Secretary of State, did you think that he would

have the reasonable impression that the basis of your message of November 27 had been dissipated somewhat?

A. I would have thought that if he was in doubt, after receiving both a war warning—and saying, “an aggressive move by Japan is expected”—that if he was worried by the message as to what it meant, he might have asked me for a clarification.

557. Q. Well, do you agree that there is some doubt in view of possible continuation of negotiations, as to how the message might have been reasonably interpreted by Admiral Kimmel?

A. The message of the 27th?

558. Q. Yes.

A. Well, you are asking me how Admiral Kimmel interpreted it.

559. Q. I am asking you how you might assume that Admiral Kimmel reasonably could have interpreted it?

A. I can tell you what I had in mind when I sent it.

560. Q. Please do.

A. I think I have already testified to it, but anyway, (Reading): “This is a war warning.” To me that was about as strong as I could make it. It was followed by the [143] statement that “an aggressive move by Japan is expected.” The words, “war warning,” coupled with the expectation within the next few days of a (war warning) looked to me definite that Japan was going to make an aggressive move and strike somewhere. I further stated, giving him what information we had as to where we thought her set-up, as we knew it, indicated.

561. Q. Well, you now know the true facts to be that on November 26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which Japan had not rejected on November 27? You know now, do you not, that so far as negotiations were concerned, the status was that on November 26, the United States had made a proposition to Japan which Japan had not rejected, and which had been transmitted to Tokio for deliberation?

A. Yes, from what you have shown me in the book.

562. Q. Did that situation constitute an end of negotiations?

A. You mean the sending of that dispatch?

563. Q. The handing of this message to the Japanese Government; did that situation as I have stated, indicate to you negotiations with Japan had ceased?

A. I am confused.

564. Q. So far as the negotiations with Japan were concerned their status on November 26 and on November 27 was that the United States had made a proposition to Japan, embodied in the note of November 26, which Japan had not rejected and which ostensibly had been submitted to Tokio for deliberations. I now ask you whether that situation constituted a cessation of negotiations as stated in your message of November 27?

A. Well, until the answer was received or rejected—I suppose it might be questioned whether or not it was to be a sign-off or “here is the last thing”—knowing that it couldn’t be accepted. As to that, I don’t know.

565. Q. From your reading of the note yesterday, Admiral, would you term this note of November 26 an ultimatum?

A. Reading that, I would not say that it would be considered an ultimatum.

566. Q. In the sense of which you used "ultimatum" in your memorandum to the President of November 5?

A. No.

The court then, at 4:27 p. m., adjourned until 10 a.m., August 11, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944.

[144]

SEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10 a.m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Bieseimeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the sixth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the Inquiry were present.

The judge advocate asked the court to take judicial knowledge of "Communication Instructions 1939", as in effect on December 7, 1941, calling particular attention to paragraph 935 a., and c.

At the direction of the court, paragraph 935 a., and c., of "Communication Instructions 1939", were read by the judge advocate.

With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: I have been informed that the judge advocate of this court has received a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, denying to this court, and to the judge advocate, and to me, certain data which is on file in the Navy Department. If it be true that he has received this letter, denying to this court this data, I wish to [145] state that this data is essential to the establishment of the facts in connection with this case, and I am respectfully suggesting to the court that if the data is of such a highly secret nature that it cannot be presented to this court, that full consideration be given by the court to taking steps whereby they, the members of the court, can inspect this data. I also respectfully request the letter received by the judge advocate of the court be made a part of the record of proceedings of this court, the letter on this subject, I mean.

The judge advocate replied: Admiral Kimmel, under date of 1 August 1944, made a request upon the judge advocate that he be supplied with certain documents on file in the Navy Department, relating to a subject matter which the judge advocate does not consider it necessary for him to set out in his reply. The judge advocate on the same day wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, setting out the general subject matter of the dispatches that he had been requested to obtain for the interested party, Admiral Kimmel. The judge advocate was informed by the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 2 August 1944, that "it appears that Admiral Kimmel had not been made available to have copies of certain dispatches which could be construed as warnings of hostilities. The Secretary of the Navy's orders in this matter are set out in enclosure (A), which you will please show to those concerned." Enclosure (A) was a letter from Admiral Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of 27 December 1943, in which Admiral Kimmel had requested that the Navy Department make available to him certain documents and letters in its possession. Accordingly, in response to the Secretary of the Navy's directive, the judge advocate prepared two letters under date of 9 August 1944, in which he made a request on the Secretary of the Navy that he be supplied with certain documents, the file numbers of which he set out in these two letters. The Secretary of the Navy replied under date of 10 August 1944, that the material requested "cannot be furnished as it is not in the public interest to introduce this type of material in evidence before the court of inquiry of which you are judge advocate." The file number of this letter is, Secret, serial number 01662416, dated 10 August 1944.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated: I respectfully request that all of the correspondence on this subject which the judge advocate has just read be made a part of the record of this court.

The court stated: With reference to that last request, it will be pertinent, at such time as you call your own witnesses, to introduce those documents as a part of the record if you wish. It is at present the province of the judge advocate as to whether he wishes to make it a part of the [146] record or not.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated: I don't wish to be too insistent in this matter, and I don't want to be in any sense disrespectful, but I think I must emphasize the fact that this data which I have requested is essential for proper examination of the witness now on the stand, Admiral Stark, that what I have requested is to show affirmatively in the record that I have exhausted every means at my command to accomplish the introduction of this data at this time.

The court stated: The court might state for all practical purposes the letter is now in the record because the judge advocate just read it. As to whether or not it will be appended is entirely a question as to whether the judge advocate wishes to do it now, or you do it later. The court has taken notice of the statement of the interested party, Admiral Kimmel, and that is now a matter of record. The court will now proceed with such testimony as is available.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated: Just a suggestion—that the decision made by the

Secretary is now an accomplished fact. It has been decided that this data is denied this court.

The judge advocate stated: Denied you, sir. There wasn't any request for it by the court.

The court stated: It isn't the option of the court to make requests for any documents, except that if the court is not satisfied at the end of the introduction of evidence by the judge advocate and the interested parties—if the court at that time wants any further information—it is up to it to decide at that time.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated: I most respectfully insist on my wording, "it is denied this court", because it is denied to me, and because it is denied to the judge advocate of the court. Denial to me and to the judge advocate is not nearly as important in my mind as denial to this court, in order to arrive at a proper verdict; and that is the burden of every statement I have made on this subject. I would respectfully like to be informed of the decision of the court as to how they will proceed in this matter. The counsel has called my attention to the paraphrase of the data. The Secretary of the Navy, under August 10, 1944, states that "the material requested, as it is not in the public interest to introduce such material before the court of which you are judge advocate." Before the court.

The judge advocate stated: The judge advocate would like to advise the court, in his capacity as legal adviser [147] to them, that, in response to Admiral Kimmel's request that they view this evidence themselves in the files of the Navy Department, it would be highly irregular and illegal for the reason that it does not permit of usual cross-examination by other interested parties or the judge advocate, and the court would be receiving the information from a source not set forth in the record.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated: I admit that extraordinary conditions require extraordinary procedures.

The court announced that it would proceed with the Inquiry.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Thursday, August 10, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), asked the court to take judicial notice of the note, so-called, about which there was testimony on the sixth day of the inquiry, dated November 26, 1941, that was handed by the Secretary of State to the accredited representatives of the Japanese Government, which appears in an official printed document, "Foreign Relations of the United States", 1931-1941, Volume 2.

The court announced that it would accede to the request.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), (Continued).

567. Q. One consequence of your testimony yesterday, Admiral Stark, relative to your lack of knowledge of the note of November 26, would be, of course, that so far as you know, Admiral Kimmel was not advised of the delivering of that note, at least prior to December 7, 1941?

A. So far as I know, he was not.

568. Q. In your dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of November 27, '41, you state that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. What did you mean by the phrase, "next few days"?

A. Well, I meant the next few days. I meant that it might be expected at any time.

569. Q. Well, would twenty days be a few days, the next few days?

A. No, my thought was that it was imminent, and that it might happen in the next few days.

[148] 570. Q. That would be something less than ten days?

A. I would like to stand on the phrase "the next few days." I think to attempt to define it as three days, a week, or ten days, would be very futile.

571. Q. Did you intend to connote imminence of the possibility of action?

A. I did.

572. Q. Have you any recollection, Admiral Stark, whether publicly in the press and on the radio there was carried news, between November 27 and December 7, of the ostensible resumption of negotiations or the continuation of negotiations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington?

A. I do not recall such at this time.

573. Q. Have you no recollection of it one way or the other?

A. No, I simply don't recall that. It is nearly three years ago, and for me to testify as to what the press carried at that time would be difficult. I have testified as to what I knew from official conversations.

574. Q. The primary basis of the message of November 27, as disclosed in the message, was that negotiations, I quote, "negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased"—was it not?

A. That's right.

575. Q. And you have no recollection whether the public, available information subsequent to the sending of that dispatch indicated that the assumption of the dispatch had ceased to be effective?

A. I have stated that I do not recollect what the press carried at that time. I can't go back on that statement. I think it stands for itself.

576. Q. You have read "Peace and War"?

A. I have read about two paragraphs in "Peace and War". I have not read the document.

577. Q. Are you familiar with that portion of "Peace and War" which indicates that negotiations, genuine or apparent, between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador, were continued between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941?

A. I am familiar with one paragraph in "Peace and War", which I would like to read if it is permissible, and which I think would be very clarifying to the line of questioning.

It was pointed out by the judge advocate that the [149] book, "Peace and War", was a public document issued by the State Department, of which the court had taken judicial notice.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated, with the permission of the court, and for clarification, that "Peace and War" was a condensation of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931-1941", of which the court had taken judicial notice.

The witness continued his answer (reading) :

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquests by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

578. Q. In the paragraph beyond the paragraph that you read, Admiral Stark, there appears the sentence, "Secretary Hull conferred with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1"?

A. That's right.

579. Q. That now at least indicates to you that negotiations were in progress on December 1, 1941?

A. That indicates that he was conferring with them; it does not indicate to me that the extract which I read, and which states, "there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force" had been affected.

580. Q. Of course you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that Secretary Hull had advised you that there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan, and I quote from the statement that you read?

A. I gave Admiral Kimmel my message of 27 November, and I stated in it that a similar warning is being sent by the War Department. I repeated that warning of the War Department in which the War Department stated—when I say "repeated" it to Admiral Kimmel, I mean I made him an info addressee—of the message of the 29th which has been before this court: "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility [150] that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action is unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment." That was the War Department's independent estimate, so far as their size-up of the negotiations situation.

581. Q. But you did not advise Admiral Kimmel that, "there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan"?

A. I stated that, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected." I think the message is plain, and the forecast made therein was borne out.

582. Q. But you now know that negotiations with Japan in fact continued, either genuinely or in phantom fashion, on December 1?

A. From what you have shown me in official documents from the State Department, I know that conversations took place, but I do not think, after reading these, that it changed the reasons from which my dispatch of November 27 was drawn, namely: "That negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days", which, I repeat, is very much in line with the extract I read from "Peace and War", previously referred to.

[151] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

583. Q. On November 27th, had you been furnished with a copy of the message that General Marshall sent General Short?

A. I stated in my message of November 27th that a similar warning is being sent by the War Department. I knew it was being sent. I felt that General Marshall, who had the same facts that I had, was in accord. Whether or not I had seen it at that time I do not recall. I saw it subsequently.

584. Q. You certainly saw it not later than November 29th when the copy was dispatched to—

A. I repeated it for action to certain addressees, and info to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

585. Q. Did you inquire of General Marshall subsequent to November 27th whether he had heard from General Short in response to the request in his message, of the action taken by the Army in Hawaii?

A. Not that I recall.

586. Q. General Marshall did not tell you that the alert assumed by the Army was an anti-sabotage alert?

A. I do not recollect that. I have no recollection of it until it was brought to my attention considerably later.

587. Q. Do you identify a document I hand you, Admiral, as a dispatch sent by you to Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I identify it as a document from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral Ingersoll, bearing time group 270040, November 26, 1941.

The dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, released by Admiral Ingersoll, date time group 270040, dated November 26, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 40".

588. Q. Will you read the dispatch, Admiral?

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 40.

[152] 589. Q. Now, Admiral, this proposed relief in whole or in part of garrisons at Midway and Wake, did it not?

A. The message reads, "Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable." It goes on to state, "Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advanced bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament." It is offering to make available infantry battalions now on station and looking forward to helping in case of advanced bases which he might occupy.

590. Q. You testified a day or so earlier that among the defensive measures that you anticipated, Admiral Kimmel would inaugurate as a result of your dispatch of November 27, were anti-submarine measures, did you not?

A. I believe I did, yes.

591. Q. Did you ever modify, cancel, or recall the instructions that you gave Admiral Kimmel in your letter of 23 September which was introduced in evidence yesterday, Exhibit 37, which was the answer to Admiral Kimmel's request for authority to bomb submarines?

A. Not that I recall.

592. Q. Then the statement in the letter of September 23rd, and I quote, "The existing orders, that is, not to bomb suspected submarines in defensive sea areas, are appropriate," still stood, unqualified, until December 7th?

A. Considerable has gone over the dam since 23 September when I invited attention to the Navy Regulations regarding instances in the Pacific, and I mentioned what was being done elsewhere. In view of the warning he had just received, I think he could have exercised his own judgment as to what latitude to take.

593. Q. Which communication from you to Kimmel subsequent to September 23rd qualified the injunction relative to not bombing submarines?

A. Well, the war warning, I would say, certainly would give the picture of things, if not the previous warning. And as I recall, Admiral Kimmel had written me, or had notified me that he would bomb under certain circumstances, and I took no exception to it.

594. Q. That was after the first of December?

A. I have forgotten just what the date of that information was.

595. Q. Referring to Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War of 24 January, 1941?

A. Yes.

[153] 596. Q. The counter-measures to possible Japanese attack enumerated are (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched. At any time prior to December 7th, Admiral Stark, did you authorize Admiral Kimmel to engage enemy carriers before an attack could be launched?

A. No.

597. Q. In fact, in the Army message which you incorporated as your own on the 29th of November and sent to Admiral Kimmel for information, it is said, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." When you sent the Army message to Admiral Kimmel you intended him to be governed by that injunction therein, did you not?

A. He was an info addressee on that dispatch. If your question implies that had carriers appeared in the proximity of Hawaii after his war warning and that he was not to do anything about it, I wouldn't be prepared to go that far; I would have left it to his judgment. I had told him in the dispatch, in my own dispatch, that an attack was expected. The appearance of carriers in position to attack Oahu would, in my opinion, have justified his attacking them and I would have stood back of him if he had. I would have considered such appearance practically an overt act.

598. Q. By the Army message, the action was further restricted by the caution, and I quote, "But these measures"—referring to reconnaissance—"should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent". You intended Admiral Kimmel to be restricted by that caution and injunction, did you not?

A. No, I wouldn't say that I did. He was not an action addressee. I can sum up the whole thing by saying that with the warning, I left it up to Admiral Kimmel with regard to such matters. There is judgment required there which can't be specifically set out.

599. Q. Well, what effect did you intend this clause in the Army message which you sent Admiral Kimmel to have on him?

A. I repeated it for information, particularly for information, and I particularly sent it as a directive showing that we had given the coastal frontiers this information and directed the commanding officers thereof that in case of hostilities they should be prepared to carry out their tasks, as they came under Admiral Kimmel in case of hostilities.

[154] 600. Q. Well, there can't be any doubt but what the two phrases in the Army message which I have just read had the effect of minimizing an all-out effort on Admiral Kimmel's part, can there?

A. Knowing Admiral Kimmel as I do I would not have expected him to minimize his own judgment in accordance with the directive that the dispatch sent him for action, which I sent him on November 27th. The message you are now referring to, namely, the repeated one from Marshall, was addressed for action to the Pacific Naval Northern Coastal Frontier and the Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier showing them the tenseness of the situation, showing them what their Army opposites had, and directing them to carry out WPL-46 in case of hostilities, and I wanted Admiral Kimmel to know that they had received such direction as they came under him. It was not in any way intended to modify anything I had said on the 27th. I should like to add to that answer, or to invite attention to what has already been brought forth, that when Admiral Kimmel issued orders to bomb submarines and made me an info addressee, I took no exception to it and that wasn't qualified by whether the submarines struck first, or not.

601. Q. I will read to you, Admiral Stark, Paragraph IV of Exhibit 23, sub-paragraph (a): "Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits." Did you send Admiral Kimmel any intelligence which indicated that a surface raid on Pearl Harbor was probable within rather narrow time limits?

A. No intelligence to that effect.

[155] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

602. Q. Both the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Communications were under you as Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes.

603. Q. The Office of Naval Intelligence collected all the intelligence which the Navy Department had concerning everything, particularly the Japanese and Pacific Ocean situation?

A. Generally speaking, but there were occasional outside sources available to us. I collected some myself, for example, from the State

Department and our so-called Central Division. Generally speaking, they were the central agency for such work.

604. Q. During the fall of 1941 was all important Japanese intelligence brought to your attention?

A. I assume that what was important was brought to my attention. I could not say definitely, but the question of importance might even be decided by subordinates who were responsible for dissemination. Intelligence was responsible for collection and dissemination. It was their job, but certainly if they had something which they deemed of real importance for me to know, it was up to them to bring it to my attention.

605. Q. Had you issued any informal instructions to the Office of Naval Intelligence about advising you personally on Japanese Intelligence during the fall of 1941?

A. I recall no special instructions. That was their job.

606. Q. To whom, other than you, as a routine matter, was intelligence distributed concerning the Japanese situation in the fall of 1941?

A. I would say, generally, to War Plans and to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. They worked, of course, closely with Communications. Are you referring to just within the Navy Department?

607. Q. No, to the entire list of agencies.

A. Of course, they disseminated it to people outside the Navy Department like Hawaii, the Far East, and the Commanders-in-Chief not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic. They sent a great deal to London.

608. Q. Were there any other routine distributees in Washington other than those you enumerated in the Navy Department?

A. It was up to the Officer in Charge of the Central [156] Division to keep the State Department informed of information which would be of use to them. There was an exchange going on there all the time. There was an exchange of information between F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence on certain matters. There would be an exchange between the Treasury if it was pertinent, but on routine matters, I would say, the State Department was the distributee.

609. Q. Were there routine distributions of important intelligence concerning the Japanese situation to the White House?

A. I would not say routine, but we certainly gave the White House any information which we thought was of worthwhile interest. The White House's primary collection of that would be from the State Department, but if either War or Navy or anybody else got vital information, I assume it would go to the White House.

610. Q. That distribution would take effect on important matters without your personal direction in a particular instance?

A. No, I would not say so. If your question means that the White House is marked on information copies as a distributing point, to the best of my recollection it was not. I might say that the White House aide at times attended conferences, but the White House was not a regular distributee.

611. Q. Do I understand that the White House would not receive any particular item of intelligence without your specific direction?

A. No, I would not say that. The Naval Aide to the President

might have picked up something, but, generally, if there was something of interest to the White House, I would note it or Intelligence would note it. We aimed to give them everything of importance, of course.

612. Q. Either the Director of Naval Intelligence or the head of C. N. O. had authority to send to the White House anything they felt was of importance?

A. Yes. There was no denial of any such thing. If they thought anything should go to the White House, they would tell me, and it would probably go.

613. Q. Who was the head of Naval Intelligence during the Fall of 1941?

A. I think at the time you refer to Captain Wilkinson was director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

614. Q. Was there a section known as the Far Eastern Section?

A. Yes.

[157] 615. Q. Was that the Central Division to which you refer?

A. No, the Central Division is a separate division.

616. Q. Who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in the fall of 1941?

A. I would have to refresh my memory on that. I think it was McCallum, but I'm not certain. If that answer is incorrect, I will change it in the record.

617. Q. You testified, in substance, that the basis of the dispatch to Admiral Kimmel on October 16, 1941, was the fall of the Japanese Cabinet but that there might have been other background factors prompting the sending of that dispatch. Do you recall what those other background factors were?

A. Not specifically. What might be termed deterioration of relations. They were certainly getting no better. My letters show that, some of which have been referred to.

618. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 15 October 1941 you received an unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia?

A. At the moment, I don't recall that.

619. Q. That would have been of important enough character to have been called to your attention, if such intelligence report had been received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, would it not?

A. If Intelligence has a document of sufficient importance, it would have.

620. Q. I am asking you if information of that character was of sufficient importance?

A. It would depend on the value they put on it. They might have regarded it as poor or good information. From the source from which they got it, they might have considered it not worthwhile. I could not say whether they would have sent it.

621. Q. You have no recollection of hearing about that about the 16th of October?

A. I do not recall.

622. Q. Do you recall in the month of October, 1941, receiving intelligence reports that Japanese consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe?

A. I do have some recollection of that.

623. Q. When did that information come, before or after the 15th of October?

A. I could not say.

[158] 624. Q. That was brought to your attention?

A. As I recall, that was. I have some remembrance of that.

625. Q. Was that information forwarded to Admiral Kimmel?

A. I don't recall.

626. Q. You have no recollection?

A. No, it may have been sent out automatically. ~~it is plain to you, it should be~~ I was not the forwarding agency for Admiral Kimmel. It was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. I could not possibly go over everything that was sent out, and many things they undoubtedly sent out which I did not see.

[Notation in margin:] See correction page 324.

627. Q. There were some things that were of such grave importance that you personally saw to their transmission to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Well, I would check anything of grave importance—that I considered of grave importance, and certainly if it were of interest to him, it would have been my first thought to get it to him.

628. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 4 November 1941, you received intelligence information that the internal situation in Japan, both politically and economically, since the American embargo had become so desperate that the Japanese Government had concluded that it was necessary to distract popular attention, either by foreign war or by a diplomatic victory?

A. Yes, I recall that.

629. Q. That was called to your attention?

A. I recall that incident.

630. Q. Do you recall whether that information was forwarded to the White House?

A. I couldn't say definitely that it was. That is all material three years old. I assume the White House had it.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, objected to the line of questioning on the ground that it was immaterial and that the information could be obtained directly from other people.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), replied.

The court announced that the objection was overruled.

[159] 631. Q. Do you recall any discussions at the White House concerning that information?

A. The discussions in the White House were broad and wide and continuous on the entire Japanese situation.

632. Q. Do you recall whether you yourself forwarded that information to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, not at the moment.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 159-A through 162, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[163] The court then, at 12:40 p. m., took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. Harold R. Stark, Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under cross-examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret.), (Continued):

With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) made the following statement: May it please the court: Admiral Kimmel has stated to the court the necessity of obtaining certain documents now in the possession of the Navy Department which are absolutely essential as evidence if a thorough and impartial investigation of all the facts in the Pearl Harbor affair is to be made. In Paragraph Two of the Precept of the Secretary of the Navy, appointing this court, there is the statement that the judge advocate is authorized "to obtain all documents relating to the said attack that may be required for introduction into evidence. This morning, a letter was read from the Secretary of the Navy to the judge advocate of this court denying the availability of certain evidence on the ground that it was contrary to the public-interest. Obviously, as Admiral Kimmel pointed out, the court will be unable to arrive at any correct conclusions unless these documents are admitted. They are absolutely essential if Admiral Kimmel is to make a full presentation of the evidence in the matter regarding which he is an interested party. For two and one-half years, due to the report of the Roberts Commission, he has been pilloried by the press and the Congress and before the people of this country. It is now time that the true facts in this matter be brought out, and that Admiral Kimmel have a full opportunity to exonerate himself of the unsupported charges that were made against him in the report of the Roberts Commission. May I take the liberty of pointing out to the court the importance, not only to the interested parties but to the Navy and to the people of this nation, that this court make its hearings and findings as full and complete a report of all the circumstances which are within its power to develop. I can imagine the widespread unfavorable repercussions on the Navy if it subsequently develops that this has not been done. It is obvious that in due time the proceedings [164] of this court, and all of the evidence it might have secured will be a matter of open record, available to the public. May I recommend to the court the following procedure: First, that the court itself endeavor to secure from the Secretary of the Navy the documents which have now been denied; second, that the proceedings of this court be considered as of a secrecy that now governs in the case of the documents to which Admiral Kimmel has been denied access. This would enable the Secretary of the Navy to hold the proceedings of this court in the same degree of secrecy as that of the documents. It is inevitable that as soon as the public interests permit the documents which are now being withheld will become public property. When that time comes, I feel that the whole Naval Service will feel the effects of the public disapprobation which will

undoubtedly arise if this court is not furnished all evidence that is now available to arrive at just and proper findings.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, page 164-A, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[165] 673. Q. Do you recall any discussion with anyone concerning the sending of additional messages or dispatches to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, I do not.

674. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, 1941?

A. No, I do not.

675. Q. Do you recall ever having declined to approve the sending of a dispatch concerning intelligence information during that week to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No.

676. And I assume that you have no recollection of any conversation with Admiral Wilkinson to that effect?

A. With whom?

677. Q. Captain Wilkinson.

A. Captain Wilkinson? No, I do not.

678. Q. What was the incident that prompted the sending of the message of December 4th by you to Admiral Kimmel relative to Guam, something to do with the disposition of United States codes on Guam?

A. We considered war to be imminent, as noted in our previous dispatches. We knew that Guam was practically defenseless and we wanted to make certain that confidential publications which might be useful to the enemy did not fall into the enemy's hands in case Guam were captured. Guam was sort of a step-child of the Navy Department. It was under, as I recall, the 14th Naval District for matters of construction that were going on.

679. Q. When the message was sent on 4 December to Guam, or relative to Guam, did you consider war imminent?

A. Yes. We were looking for Japan to strike any day. We didn't know where.

680. Q. Did you consider war imminent, Admiral?

A. Yes.

681. Q. You never advised Admiral Kimmel in so many words that war was imminent?

A. Well, I thought I had; I had intended to.

682. Q. The words "imminence of war" were not included in any of Admiral Kimmel's dispatches, were they?

A. Well, I think the equivalent was. The dispatch stated that this was a war warning and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days, and from the best indications we had it would be the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo—that being after a message which indicated she might strike in any direction.

[166] 683. Q. Between 27 November and 4 December, do you recall any intelligence information that you had received changing your conception of the situation as it was on the 27th of November?

A. To me, one of the most telling pieces of information that we had that confirmed our suspicions and that gave me the distinct impression that war was possible, that war was probable, was the information that the Japs here and in London had orders to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once, and also to burn all other important confidential and secret documents. That message was a beacon light to me at that time and it still is. I considered it extremely important.

684. Q. That message was sent with no priority, Admiral Stark. I refer to Exhibit 21, which is a photostatic copy of the original.

A. There is no priority indicated on this dispatch.

685. Q. That means that it went deferred, or routine?

A. Yes, unless some other personal direction was concerned. By the record it would mean that it was sent routine. I should like to correct my testimony because I was given the wrong dispatch. The dispatch to which I referred is marked "priority".

686. Q. What is the date of that dispatch, Admiral Stark?

A. The date of that dispatch is 031850, and it has a priority rating.

687. Except for the intelligence that you received relative to the destruction of Japanese codes as you have stated, did you receive any other intelligence indicating more probability of war between Japan and the United States between November 27th and December 6th?

A. To the best of my remembrance, I received nothing indicating more probability than the messages to which I have referred.

688. Q. Do you recall two occasions on either the 4th or 5th of December when Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCallum came to your office to confer about intelligence relative to the Pacific and Japanese situation that you considered of such import that you called a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Noyes?

A. No, I don't recall.

689. Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941?

A. No.

690. Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine day, the time in the afternoon or evening?

A. No, I do not.

[167] 691. Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday evening, 6 December?

A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remembrance is—I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall clearly.

692. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever you were, between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence information brought by an officer messenger?

A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort on that evening.

693. Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Commander Kramer stationed in Naval Communications or ONI?

A. Yes, there was.

694. Q. You knew him?

A. Yes; he used to deliver messages in the office.

695. Q. Do you recall whether he delivered a message at your home?

A. I haven't the slightest recollection of any message bearing on this, or any other subject, being given to me between the time I left

the office and the distinct recollection next morning of my talking over with Captain Schuirmann the dispatch to which reference has already been made, namely, the dispatch which the Army sent.

696. Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone any information of intelligence that had been received by the Navy Department on Saturday night?

A. No. I say I don't recall. I don't want to make it stronger than that. My remembrance is that I did not; that I had nothing until that message next morning.

697. Q. Do you recall what time you came to the office on Sunday, 7 December?

A. It was in the forenoon. I don't recall what time. Probably rather late in the forenoon but I do not recall the hour.

698. Q. Were you in your office by 0800 Sunday morning, 7 December?

A. No, I was not, and I don't recall what hour I did get there. I say I was not; I don't recall. I would be very much surprised if I had been there.

699. Q. Do you recall receiving by telephone or officer messenger any intelligence information at your home Sunday morning?

A. No.

[168] 700. Q. Before you came to the Navy Department?

A. No, I do not.

701. Q. Is your recollection rather clear that you did not receive any message at home that Sunday morning?

A. My recollection is that I did not but I couldn't say 100 per cent. I just don't recall having received anything from the time I left Saturday night until the message Sunday morning.

702. Q. Do you recall any telephone conversations on Saturday night with either Secretary Knox or Captain Wilkinson?

A. No. My remembrance is rather distinct that I didn't have, but it is going on three years and I haven't the slightest recollection of any such conversations.

703. Q. But the events of Saturday and Sunday, or at least Sunday, were tremendously important?

A. Yes; the events of Sunday were.

704. Q. What is your best recollection as to the time that you arrived at the Navy Department Sunday morning?

A. I don't know. It may have been around—I don't recollect but it may have been around half past ten, or 11:00. It may have been earlier. I don't recollect the hour but my Sunday morning arrivals were rather late, generally.

705. Q. Will you tell the court in as detailed manner as you can recall all that you did when you arrived at your office on Sunday morning?

A. The one point that I remember about that Sunday morning, and which I have already testified to, is the message which the Army sent.

706. Q. Didn't you have any intelligence information yourself of the Navy Department brought to your attention before you talked to General Marshall?

A. Not that I recall.

[Notation in margin:] See correction p. 324.

707. Q. Did General Marshall call you, or did you call him?

A. He called me.

708. Q. Do you recall what he told you?

A. Yes. He asked me if I had seen the message. I said, "I have it in front of me."

709. Q. What message?

A. He brought up the subject of information which required the Japanese Ambassador to see Mr. Hull at exactly 1300. It stressed the exact time; told him, as I recall, not to be late. The thing that stands out was the [169] exact time. And General Marshall, as I have testified, said there might be something in that and asked me if I didn't think it would be a good thing to send it on. Shall I go on and repeat the testimony?

710. Q. No. Before General Marshall called you, did you have information concerning the events that were to happen at 1300, December 7th?

A. As I recall, I had similar information about that same time. I have forgotten for the moment whether it was in the form of a dispatch, or what it was.

711. Q. What was the substance of the information that you had before General Marshall called?

A. It was the 1300 appointment of the Japanese Ambassador with the Secretary of State.

712. Q. At that time did you have any information as to the nature of the appointment between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State at 1:00 o'clock?

A. I do not recall that I knew what it was about except that he was to see him exactly at that time.

713. Q. You have no memory as to whether the subject of the discussion between the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Hull was the subject of the information which you had?

A. No; I don't recall. Of course, this is in the light of hindsight—I may be in error—but I thought it was a reply to Mr. Hull on something. I just don't know. I know that he had this appointment with Mr. Hull at that time. Obviously, it was on something with reference to relations between the two countries.

714. Q. Well, we now all know, and we knew Monday morning, that the Japanese Ambassador delivered a note closing relations between Japan and the United States?

A. That is right.

715. Q. Did you have any information that a note of that character was to be delivered at 1:00 o'clock.

A. No, I did not.

716. Q. Do you recall who gave you the information that you did receive about the 1:00 o'clock appointment; who in your department?

A. No; I don't recall just how that came in.

717. Q. Have you any recollection that anyone in the Navy Department suggested to you that 1:00 o'clock Washington time was approximately sunrise in Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila?

A. I don't recall about the sunrise in Pearl Harbor. I knew about what time it would be in Pearl Harbor.

[170] 718. Q. Well, do you recall anyone suggesting it to you, either by note or orally?

A. No. Captain Schuirmann and I talked that over and we discussed the time element, and of course it was apparent that we needed speed to get that message through if it could possibly be gotten through in time.

719. Q. Do you recall anyone other than Captain Schuirmann with whom you were talking about that at that time?

A. No; I recall only Captain Schuirmann.

720. Q. Do you have any recollection of the suggestion having been made to you that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I don't recall that.

721. Q. How long after you had the information in the Navy Department was it before General Marshall telephoned you?

A. There again, I don't recall just what time I got down. I simply recall that when he called I was talking that message over with Captain Schuirmann. It was on my desk at that time. I cannot recall the time.

722. Q. Do you have any recollection when the information about which you were talking with Captain Schuirmann was received in the Navy Department?

A. No.

723. Q. You have no recollection of making any inquiries as to when that was received in the Navy Department?

A. No, I haven't.

724. Q. After you talked with General Marshall, did you telephone anyone else concerning that subject matter?

A. I do not recall telephoning anyone else.

725. Q. Do you recall talking about it with Colonel Knox?

A. I don't recall it.

726. Q. Do you know whether Colonel Knox was in conference with the Secretary of State and Secretary of War at 10:00 o'clock on that morning?

A. No, I do not remember that. Of course, I remember the events very clearly later on, talking with Colonel Knox late that evening. It was my wont to keep him informed of anything of this sort which was important, but whether or not I telephoned, I can't recall. I am rather under the impression that I did, but I couldn't say so.

727. Q. Do you recall talking with Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCallum on that Sunday morning?

A. No, I do not.

[171] 728. Q. Do you recall telephoning the White House after you had had your talk with Captain Schuirmann, or while you were talking with him?

A. No. I have no clear recollection of telephoning anyone.

729. Q. What did you do after you had talked with General Marshall?

A. I went on about my routine work, knowing that the dispatch was on its way.

730. Q. You stayed at the Department, then, through the day?

A. Yes; and most of the night.

731. Q. But you didn't go home after 11:00 or 11:30, whenever you talked to General Marshall, until you had word of the attack?

A. No, I didn't go home.

732. Q. And except for the message that was sent via the Army, you did not communicate with Admiral Kimmel on Saturday or Sunday?

A. You mean prior to 1300?

733. Q. Prior to 1300?

A. No, I did not.

734. Q. Do I understand that General Marshall read the dispatch that he proposed and did send, over the telephone to you?

A. Well, my recollection is that he did. I am not sure. I knew what he was going to send.

735. Q. But you didn't have any copy of it when you were talking to him?

A. No. He wrote it out, as I recall, in his own hand and read it to me. What we were wondering was, if by any chance that particular hour and the clearness with which it was set forth, the preciseness, might possibly mean a strike and, as I have testified, after having said "We have sent so much; I don't know that we could send much more," I thought, well, there might be something to it; let's not take the chance. I called him back, I think within 30 seconds, almost as soon as I hung up the 'phone, and asked him to go ahead and send it, and that I would be glad to put it over our system if he didn't feel that his was just as rapid as could be made.

736. Q. Have you a copy of the dispatch that General Marshall sent?

A. Yes, I have it in front of me.

[172] 737. Q. Would you read that in the record, please?

A. I say I have the dispatch; I have a dispatch which is marked "paraphrased". I would be glad to read it if you would like to have it.

The judge advocate stated that he had made a written request to the Secretary of War for a duly certified copy of this dispatch, but that it had not yet arrived.

738. Q. I should like to have you read it.

A. I would like to add to my previous testimony, if I didn't put it in in the first place, that I asked Marshall to make sure that our people were informed; that had gotten to be more or less a habit of ours.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he had no assurance as to the exactness of the paraphrased dispatch but that there was no objection to reading it into the record.

739. Q. Would you read the paraphrased dispatch, please?

A. This message is a paraphrase of a message sent from the War Department to the C. G., Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941. It starts out with:

5297. Japanese are presenting at one p. m., Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

740. Q. Well, that would indicate that at least General Marshall had intelligence of something more than the requested appointment at 1:00 o'clock?

A. Yes.

741. Q. Did you have anything additional?

A. I don't recall just what that information we had was. What stands out in my memory clearly is the 1:00 o'clock time.

742. Q. And you have no recollection that the 1:00 o'clock appointment was for the delivery of an ultimatum?

A. Not other than is contained in this dispatch.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) stated that he had no further questions of this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

743. Q. Admiral Stark, from January, say, of 1941, down to December 7th, the Chief of Naval Operations did receive certain communications and letters from Pearl Harbor about conditions there; isn't that the fact?

A. Yes.

[173] 744. Q. Now, Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 24 have been introduced and read in full, this being the exchange of correspondence in January between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Prior to that time, Exhibit 28 was received in the Navy Department; is that not correct?

A. Yes.

745. Q. Now, Admiral, may I ask you to read this document, Exhibit 28?

The witness read the document, Exhibit 28, copy appended.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[174] 746. Q. By the way, if you know, was consideration given to that letter at the time the letter was written from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War in January?

A. Well, there is a similarity there that would certainly suggest that it was.

747. Q. But you can't recall?

A. No, the subject was one of conversations. This sets forth many needs.

748. Q. So you may have that before you, I desire to ask just a couple of questions about it, sir. Admiral Bloch was a Rear Admiral at the time this letter was written, do you recall?

A. He was.

749. Q. Now Admiral, in paragraph 2 there is the statement that—paragraph 2 of Admiral Bloch's letter—there is a statement about the necessity for large planes. Specifically, the statement: "It is my opinion that neither numbers or types are satisfactory for the purposes indicated." Admiral, were any such plans sent to the Fourteenth Naval District, or caused to be sent to them, prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, plans were sent out there, as I recall. I don't remember as to numbers and types.

750. Q. To the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. No, I am glad you brought that question up because when I read the letter I got the impression that this does not take into account the air forces which we had there, which was under an air officer, not directly under Admiral Bloch.

751. Q. Are you referring to Rear Admiral Bellinger?

A. Yes.

752. Q. My question was only, if you knew, were any planes of this character, to wit: the large planes—sent or caused to be sent to the Fourteenth Naval District prior to December 7?

A. As distinct from the Air Command?

753. Q. Yes.

A. I do not recollect that any were sent directly to be under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. That was a local arrangement out there.

754. Q. Yes, Admiral. At the foot of that same page there is a discussion of new fighters, and there were 185 projected for Hawaii at that time. Now do you recall whether or not any such planes were sent or caused to be sent to the Fourteenth Naval District prior to December 7?

A. Not to the Fourteenth Naval District.

[175] 755. Q. Yes, sir. On the following page—.

A. Those are Army planes.

756. Q. Yes, in connection with the statement that "I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian Area," I ask you, Admiral, if you know—were these guns sent or caused to be sent prior to December 7, to Hawaii?

A. There were some guns sent to the Hawaiian Area. It being an Army obligation, I have forgotten the number.

757. Q. Would it be anything like 500?

A. I don't recall. My reaction is that it was considerably short of that, but I couldn't say positively.

758. Q. In paragraph 3, Admiral, the statement there is in connection with patrol vessels and aircraft in connection with patrol vessels. Were there sent or caused to be sent to the 14th Naval District any further patrol vessels prior to December 7, if you recall?

A. I'd have to check the record.

759. Q. You have no recollection of it now, sir?

A. My recollection is that some vessels were sent or offered. I know they were short.

760. Q. Well, that would also cover the vessels needed for mine-sweeping, Admiral, too. I take it that they would be short, too, to your recollection, as you recall?

A. To my recollection, all districts were short of what we thought was necessary.

761. Q. Admiral, I'd like to show you this paper and ask you if you recognize it as a communication of 7 May 1941, from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, I recognize it as a letter of 7 May from Commandant, 14th Naval District, to Chief of Naval Operations.

The letter from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 7, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 41."

762. Q. Will you please read it.

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 41.

763. Q. Admiral, I hand you a paper and ask you if you [176] recognize it as a letter dated May 20, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I do.

The letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated May 20, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 42."

764. Q. Will you be good enough, Admiral, to read it.

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 42.

765. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize it as a letter of June 23, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet?

A. I do.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated June 23, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 43."

766. Q. Please read it, Admiral.

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 43.

767. Q. I will show you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize it as a report dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I do, 15 August.

The report, dated August 15, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Chief of Naval Operations, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 44" for reference, description appended.

[177] 768. Q. Please read, Admiral, from page 20 of the report, starting with "remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made," through to the end of subparagraph (2).

A. (Reading:)

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other requirements of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard to such forces is as follows:

(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.

(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program.

(3) Insufficient Army anti-aircraft guns actually available.

769. Q. I hand you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize it as a communication in August, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. I do.

The communication of August, 1941 (date obscure), from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 45."

770. Q. Will you please read it.

The witness read the communication, Exhibit 45.

771. Q. I show you a paper, Admiral, and ask you if you recognize it as an endorsement, together with the basic from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the basic being of 17 October 1941?

A. I do.

[178] Basic letter dated October 17, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, with endorsement thereon, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 46".

771. (a) Q. Will you read the letter, please?

A. The witness read the letter, Exhibit 46.

[179] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdraw.

772. Q. I show you a paper dated November 25, 1941, and ask you if you recognize it as being from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I do.

The letter of November 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 47" for reference, description appended.

773. Q. Will you read paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of that letter?

A. (Reading:)

1. The request of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. A previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his war plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his

responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

5. The augmentation of the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

[180] (a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately owned vessels for the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of underwater detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned these vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is progressing slowly, and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May, 1942. Eight of these, due for completion in May, 1942, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is indefinite due to the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command the Coast Guard of the Fourteenth Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the following are equipped with depth charges and underwater detection gear: TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when available, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. Two of these are due for completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

774. Q. In connection with WPL-46, the judge advocate and your own counsel have had you read certain portions of it. In some of that reading there was mention made of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. Now, is it correct to say that so far as Hawaii was concerned there never did exist any naval coastal forces other than those four old destroyers and four old mine-sweepers up until December 7, 1941?

A. I guess that is right.

775. Q. Of course, they did not have the aircraft?

A. That is right.

776. Q. They did not have any PC vessels or PT boats?

A. No, the PC's were not yet available.

[181] 777. Q. Admiral, in connection with your testimony about the November 27 message, am I accurate in saying that you considered the Navy to be mobilized at that time?

A. No order had been given for mobilization. I stated that the Navy was practically mobilized. We had put in everything from the oldest submarines and destroyers and tankers—practically everything we had, including even old boats built by Ford in the preceding war—Eagle boats. I had to accept the responsibility for their turning over. We were in a desperate situation for craft in all districts.

778. Q. When you use mobilization that way, you did not mean us to understand mobilization in the very technical and precise military sense, such as "M" day?

A. That is correct; I did not mean that.

779. Q. "M" day carries with it a particular and definitive meaning throughout the naval establishment, isn't that so?

A. Yes.

780. Q. A mobilization or partial mobilization definitely establishes an "M" day, isn't that true?

A. Well, you can establish "M" day or mobilization day any time you would like to.

781. Q. Isn't "M" day the time for execution of certain supporting plans, for instance, frontier defense plans and coast defense plans? They go into effect on "M" day, isn't that correct?

A. There are certain measures to be taken on "M" day.

782. Q. Which you would say go automatically into effect on "M" day?

A. Yes.

783. Q. In WPL-46, which is exhibit 4, I shall direct your attention to these provisions on page 7: (Reading:)

0221. The preliminary period of strained relations of a certain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. 0223. This plan may be executed in part by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy. The tasks to be executed are accepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or the additional tasks thereof.

Now, those provisions, Admiral, were established for a certain purpose, that is, to establish an "M" day and to prevent surprise under this plan?

A. If it were thought expedient to do so.

[182] 784. Q. Those provisions, of course, came to the eye of every holder of WPL-46 and were to know to all commands that had that document?

A. Yes, sir.

785. Q. Am I correct in this? There isn't any definition in WPL-46, or any of its predecessor plans, going back to Rainbow 1, as to war warning or what was to be done?

A. Not that I recall that it was specifically laid down. I would say it would be regarded as unnecessary.

786. Q. At any rate, it is not in the document?

A. No.

787. Q. That would be true for the phrase "defensive deployment"? That is not used in the document either?

A. No, I do not think it is defined. I think it has a rather definite meaning to an officer who would receive it.

788. Q. As far as the plan is concerned, that is not there, as you recall?

A. No, I think not.

789. Q. Would you say, during the period from October 16 to December 7, that this country had strained relations with Japan?

A. Well, it all depends upon your definition. The relations certainly were not what could be desired.

790. Q. What I am trying to ascertain is whether the conditions which existed between October 16 and November 30 were strained in the sense mentioned in WPL-46?

A. In the sense of ordering mobilization?

791. Q. In the sense that the words were used in WPL-46?

A. Well, it is a matter of degree. I would hesitate to say. We did not mobilize, but conditions certainly were strained toward the finish.

792. Q. Now, Admiral, am I correct that the establishment of mobilization or partial mobilization by the Navy Department under such circumstances as provided in WPL-46 would have been clearly understood by the entire service?

A. I don't know that it would have meant much more than what we were doing, depending on how you would look at it. It would have been rather difficult to order and explain such a set-up. Politically, for us to have mobilized might have precipitated what we were trying to avoid. European nations mobilize frequently, as we know. Sometimes it is a drill; sometimes it is a cover to war. For us to have ordered mobilization at that time would have been a very difficult thing to do, I think.

[183] 793. Q. But, Admiral, would you make the same answer in connection with a partial mobilization, as contemplated by WPL-46?

A. I think it would have been very difficult to have explained it and put into effect. Everything we had was in commission. We had sent messages as to the seriousness of the situation, but to have sent word out to mobilize probably would have meant to the country and to Japan a preliminary declaration of intention to go to war. I think it would have been a very difficult thing to have done.

794. Q. That would also have applied if it were a partial mobilization, contemplated by WPL-46, in your opinion?

A. More or less, yes.

795. Q. Well, in any event that procedure which was provided in WPL-46 for the establishment of the doing of certain things prior to hostile acts was not used in the dispatches of October 16 or November 24 or November 27?

A. No, it was not. Again I repeat, we were practically mobilized. We had a full convoy system going in the Atlantic, so that there would be no rupture. What we had was manned in the Pacific, extremely short as it was and of which I was very consciously cognizant. I do not see where it would have availed us much, and I would say it would have been inadvisable from many standpoints.

796. Q. I believe your counsel identified Exhibit 7, but it has not been offered in evidence, and I should like to ask you whether you recognize this document, Exhibit 7, as being the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Area, effective 11 April 1941?

A. Yes, I recognize it.

797. Q. I want you to read from page 8, paragraph C-2, this being the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District.

A. (Reading:)

M-day is the first day of mobilization, and it is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-day, as ordered by the War and Navy departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

798. Q. The procedure there indicated, Admiral, in JCD-42 was not used in the messages up to November 30?

A. I would say there was nothing whatever to prevent the authorities on the spot from taking any readiness measures [184] which they thought their directives may have given them, but for us to have declared it would very likely have been construed as an overt act—to publicly declare mobilization.

799. Q. I take it that on or before December 7, 1941, the Navy Department did not use any of the established procedures to place in full or partial effect WPL-46 or JCD-42, or any other war plan, nor did they direct full or partial mobilization under either of those plans, isn't that a fact?

A. In the message of November 27 appropriate defensive deployment was ordered to be executed. It stated that it was preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, but the answer to your question is that we did not specifically order any mobilization, but we did indicate. I would like to add one thing with reference to the lack of air. The record should show that while the 14th Naval District of itself had no aircraft, the Fleet did have patrol craft under its command stationed in Oahu.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

800. Q. Do you remember who was the Naval Aide to the President on or about December 1, 1941?

A. Captain John McCrea.

801. Q. In Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 28 November 1941, there appears the sentence, "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." This is the message which repeated General Marshall's message for information of CincPac. To clear up a situation, do you feel that you are in a position to state what an overt act on the part of the Japanese might be?

A. An attack on us or on any of our craft anywhere.

802. Q. Are you prepared to say that the presence of a Japanese force, consisting of carriers and escorts, within, say, a thousand miles of the Hawaiian Islands would be an overt act?

A. That certainly is one hypothetical question. I think if I were out there and saw them, I would keep them under surveillance and probably tell them to stand off when I thought the time had come.

803. Q. Do you know if the intelligence bulletins which you mentioned in your testimony this morning and which I understand were prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence were forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as a matter of routine?

A. Yes.

The court then, at 4:20 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m. August 12, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944.

[185]

EIGHTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the seventh day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

With the permission of the court, the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, introduced Commander W. R. Smedberg, U. S. Navy, as additional counsel.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Friday, August 11, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

804. Q. I hand you Exhibit 7, which is known as JCD-42, and is the Joint Local Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District. On page 8, paragraph C, (2), what do you find as regards putting that plan in effect by action of local authorities?

A. It may be put in as mutually agreed upon by the local commanders.

805. Q. Admiral, you have given some testimony about the relative strengths of the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Navy. Other than numerical comparisons, what other factors must enter in order to make any such comparison of forces really useful?

A. Geography was a primary factor—bases. It has been [186] estimated, for example, that to carry the war to the Far East and to

the Japanese homeland, that we should be two to three times as strong as she is, in Navy. I repeat, bases and geography are important factors.

806. Q. I hand you Exhibit 35, which is your personal note to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet of 22 August 1941. A portion of that has been read in court. About what percentage of it was read by your own counsel?

A. Approximately half.

807. Q. What was the subject of the rest of the letter?

A. Largely technical, and training.

808. Q. Did the rest of the letter have much to do with materiel deficiencies?

A. It did.

809. Q. What was your purpose, Admiral, in going into such long detail on such subjects in your informal letter to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. The letter was in reply to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, and I was anxious that he have from me a detailed reply so far as information was available.

810. Q. Admiral, during 1941, did you receive from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, or from any other authoritative sources, any expressions of opinion that the effect of the long-continued stay of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was adverse in any respect?

A. On the contrary, I received word from the Commander-in-Chief that morale was good, that gunnery was better than it had any right to be, and in fact was very good by any standards. Also, I might add that the facilities for supporting the Fleet were becoming increasingly good.

811. Q. Were your official dispatches of 16 October and 24 November—Exhibits 13 and 15, respectively—your own personal drafting, and if they were not, what did they represent as they were actually drafted?

A. They represented a consensus of opinion of myself and my most trusted advisers. As finally drafted they had my O. K., and of course I stood completely responsible for them.

812. Q. Referring to your considerable testimony concerning the phraseology of the several dispatches, those two and also [187] the one of 27 November, which is Exhibit 17, most of all of which testimony that you have given concerning them being properly confined to the Hawaiian area alone—those dispatches had several addressees, did they not?

A. They did.

813. Q. Look at your dispatch of 16 October. To whom was it addressed?

A. CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCSIT, CINCPAC.

814. Q. Look at the one of 24 November, Exhibit 15. To whom was it addressed?

A. CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM11, COM12, COM13, SPENAVO, London, and CINCLANT.

815. Q. Look at your dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 17. To whom was it addressed?

A. To CINCSIT, CINCPAC, info to CINCLANT, and SPENAVO, London.

816. Q. Admiral, at any time, and particularly during the ten days which elapsed between 27 November and 7 December, did you receive from any of those addressees any request whatever for clarification of any of those three dispatches?

A. No.

The judge advocate stated that he did not wish to examine the witness further.

Examined by the court:

817. Q. Admiral, referring to your testimony concerning unity of command in the Hawaiian area, you stated that this was under discussion between the Navy Department and the War Department, and that no decision had been arrived at up to December 7, 1941; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

818. Q. What prevented a decision on this appointment being reached?

A. We were never able to come to a satisfactory agreement. May I make that answer—we had not arrived at a solution.

819. Q. Will you state in general the position of the two departments on this subject during the discussions?

A. The discussions, as I recall, were general in character about unity of command in general. We had not gotten very far with it and had reached no conclusions.

820. Q. What was the stumbling block preventing such conclusion, if any?

A. Well, I think it might be said they may not have been pushed as hard as they might have been. We simply [188] hadn't followed through with it.

821. Q. What was your personal attitude and your recommendation with reference to unity of command in the Hawaiian area?

A. As I stated, the discussion of unity of command, I think, prior to Pearl Harbor, was more of a general nature on unity of command in general. We discussed it specifically on projects which might be take place, such as amphibious operations for example, and arrived at definite conclusions, but with regard to Pearl Harbor, canal, and other places, we had not pushed those discussions. I do not recall anything specific with regard to Pearl Harbor—with regard to the Hawaiian Islands. The discussion was general.

At the direction of the court, the question was repeated.

A. (Continued.) I won't add anything to it. I do not recall specific recommendations with regard to the Hawaiian Islands.

822. Q. Does the court understand that you do not at this time remember your attitude or recommendations that you may have made on this question?

A. My remembrance is that, except for definite operations which we discussed, such as amphibious operations where we had come to definite unity of command, the discussions as regards outlying bases was general in nature and we didn't really get down to business on it.

823. Q. Admiral, your answer is still the same. I am talking about you.

A. I grant the answer is not definite, but as I recall, the conversations were general, and as to my specific recommendation regarding Pearl Harbor, I don't recall making any specific recommendations

regarding the Hawaiian Islands. We were operating, as has been testified, under mutual cooperation.

824. Q. Then the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor Naval Station lay with the Army or with the Navy?

A. It lay with the Army.

825. Q. Was there ever any opinion on the part of either Army or Navy that part or all of this responsibility rested with the Navy?

A. No, not that I ever heard of.

826. Q. Referring to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy to base the fleet in the Hawaiian area, did you recommend such action?

A. Originally, and—yes.

827. Q. Referring to your testimony with reference to you [189] and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, not having thoroughly information or directives as to action to be taken in case Japan attacked England or Russia, or Dutch East Indies, or a combination of these, who had the responsibility for formulating policies in this respect?

A. Well, in the last analysis it would rest with the White House.

828. A. It has been testified that the assigned mobilization stations of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were in the several ports of the Pacific Coast—the mobilization stations.

A. Yes.

829. Q. It has also been testified to that one of the reasons for moving these battleships to the Hawaiian area in May, 1940, was that their presence there—of the vessels of the Fleet—would act as a deterrent on Japan. As matters progressed during the autumn of 1941, and particularly at the time of your war warning message, was any consideration given to the return of these battleships to their assigned mobilization stations?

A. Not at that time.

830. Q. When on November 27, 1941, you issued a war warning and stated that the negotiations had ceased, did you still consider that the presence of United States battleships in Hawaiian waters would have a deterrent effect upon Japan?

A. I would consider that withdrawing them might have had the opposite effect.

831. Q. On December 7 and just previous thereto, were the ships of the fleet allocated or based in accordance with your views and recommendations?

A. Yes.

832. Q. With your knowledge of what the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was doing regarding training of the Fleet, and in view of the critical situation existing in November 1941, did you ever give any orders to assume a condition of readiness, even though it meant that this would have curtailed the training?

A. I gave no specific orders, but the dispatches contained all that I gave in that connection.

833. Q. Referring to your testimony that no designation of M Day was made because of the effect it might have on Japan, who was responsible for not designating an M Day?

A. I assumed that responsibility in that I didn't recommend it.

834. Q. On November 27, 1941, was not the situation sufficiently critical to have justified you in conferring with the Commander-in-

Chief of the Pacific by phone, giving him [190] a full picture of the situation and checking up as to what he had done, even at the risk of jeopardizing the security of communications?

A. I didn't consider it. I thought my dispatch gave him the warning which I felt he should have, and briefly, such information as it was based on.

835. Q. Did you make use, during this critical period, of the telephone for communicating to the Hawaiian area?

A. I did not prior to December 7, and then only after Japan had struck.

836. Q. Had any conflict of opinion, or lack of cooperation between Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and the Army Commander of Hawaii come to your notice prior to 7 December 1941?

A. Not that I recall.

837. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you consider that your contact with the State Department was full and complete, and that you received from them all essential information regarding conditions in the Pacific?

A. I felt that I was receiving, certainly, sufficient to acquaint me with the picture. I could not say I received all.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, entered, as reporter. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[191] 838. Q. From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, did you continue to receive this information?

A. I recall receiving no information which in any way altered what I had sent on November 27th, at which time I stated that negotiations had ceased. I recall nothing which would change the dispatch.

839. Q. Admiral, in comparing the strength of the Pacific Fleet as of the autumn of 1941 with that of the Japanese Navy at the same time, did not the fact that Japan had been engaged in hostilities for some time previously and was therefore presumably war minded and geared for war enter as a factor favorable to Japan?—

A. Yes.

840. Q. When, in your opinion, or from your knowledge, was it first conceived that the United States might have to engage in hostilities in both the Atlantic and the Pacific contrary to the existing policy, which policy had existed for some years prior to the outbreak of war in Germany?

A. In 1939, I definitely thought so. On the Hill in 1940, on the record, I stated that in my opinion there was in the making another world conflagration. I told the Senate Committee that there certainly was the possibility of our coming in; that if we came in there certainly was no doubt as to which side we would come in with, and that in my opinion we should be prepared to depend only on ourselves and we should build accordingly. My first letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, which I think he has introduced—perhaps not but that is immaterial—gave the thought that we might some day have a surprise attack by Japan. I didn't see how we could avoid it and I endeavored to carry that tone consistently through every action I took. It certainly animated everything that I was doing here in the Department. Much has been said about the small boat program, district craft. It was one of the worst headaches I had. It was difficult

to get through. We were terribly delayed in construction, particularly due to engines after it was started. But I felt certain we were headed for collision and I think I made that certainty of thought known. The Department was animated by it.

841. Q. In the period subsequent to 1939, did you notice from your contacts with the Congress of the United States any change in the attitude which had become fixed to the effect that there was no need for an increase in the Naval strength?

A. Well, I could only judge them by their acts. The real change in the sentiment of Congress came when France fell.

842. Q. That was in 1940, was it not?

A. That was in June, as I recall, 1940.

[192] 843. Q. You stated, Admiral Stark, that originally you recommended that the Pacific Fleet be based on Hawaii. Did you, during the latter part of 1941, or any time prior thereto, recommend a continuance of basing this fleet on Hawaii?

A. Not during the latter part. I originally recommended, when they went out there, not having in mind originally retaining them right through. Once they were there, there was frequent discussion regarding keeping them there. It was a close question and the decision was always the same, to keep them there. Later on we had just settled into it.

844. Q. Was it in accordance with War Plans that in event of a critical situation in the Pacific, vis-a-vis Japan or any other nation, that the battleships of the Pacific Fleet would be based in Hawaii?

A. I do not recall any such provision.

The court announced that it had no further questions of this witness.

Recross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy (continued):

845. Q. Admiral, your war warning dispatch, Exhibit 17: What are the three most essential, vital phrases of that dispatch?

A. I would say, first, that this dispatch is to be considered a war warning; second, that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days; third, execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory of carrying out the tasks in WPL-46.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he had no further questions of this witness.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

846. Q. On Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, did you consider using the telephone for conference with Admiral Kimmel?

A. No. I have already testified that I did not.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he had no further questions of this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should [193] be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated as follows: In the question which I believe was asked as to whether the Army was responsible in part or in whole for the defense of Pearl Harbor, I stated the Army was responsible, and the Army was. There were certain responsibilities which I assume the Navy had of a minor nature in cooperation with the Army, but in my opinion it was the Army's responsibility. I don't want to weaken my answer at all but I assume that certain arrangements were made which it was up to us to carry out when the Army took that responsibility, which was hers.

Questioned by the court:

847. Q. Admiral, the court has a few more questions to ask in order that one of your answers may be cleared up. You have stated that the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor rested with the Army; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

848. Q. Was Pearl Harbor considered a first-class Naval base?

A. Yes, I would say it was.

849. Q. What was the responsibility of the Fleet with reference to the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. The Fleet primarily was in no way responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It was supposed to be completely foot-free and their presence or absence, in my opinion, neither lessened nor changed in any way the Army's responsibility.

850. Q. In line with that answer, what was the responsibility of the 14th Naval District for the defense of Pearl Harbor, generally?

A. Generally, it was a task force of the Fleet. The responsibilities, I would say, were subsidiary.

851. Q. To what?

A. To the Army's primary responsibility regarding such local arrangements as might be made. This, in my opinion, in no way lessened the Army's responsibility.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

[194] The court stated as follows: I think it would be proper if I would restate what I have said before; that the court is finished with you as a witness for the time being; that you will take your seat as an interested party, subject to further call as a witness for such examination or re-examination as may be desired by the court or any parties to the inquiry.

The witness ~~was duly warned~~ and resumed his seat as an interested party.

[Initialed in margin:] H. B.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following statement: May it please the court: I am under orders to return to my command post without delay, and must do so as soon as I can verify my testimony. I am therefore unable to resume my status as an interested party before this court at this time. My counsel

will remain to represent me as best they may and I assume that they will have all the same rights as though I were actually present. My absence from the court's proceeding is beyond my control. I am obliged to state that I waive no rights whatsoever in consequence thereof.

The court then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirman, Assistant Chief, Combat Intelligence; and additional duties of Director of Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. Director of Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. Will you explain in detail what these duties were?

A. They are a variety of duties, some of which were specified which included Liaison with the State Department, and other duties not under the cognizance of any other division of Naval Operations.

[195] 4. Q. Can you state what duties you performed directly with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Directly with the Chief of Naval Operations, the principal duty was liaison with the State Department.

5. Q. In performing those duties that brought you in contact with the State Department, what was the routine for carrying them out?

A. The liaison duties with the State Department were conducted by personal visits with those handling matters of mutual concern in both departments, by telephone and through a so-called liaison committee which was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations, which consisted of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and Under Secretary of State. I accompanied the Chief of Naval Operations to these meetings in order to make notes so that on my return I could implement any action decided upon.

6. Q. What was the division of the State Department that conducted matters pertaining to Asiatic countries?

A. The Far Eastern Division.

7. Q. What officers in the State Department did you usually contact in the performance of your duties in connection with Far Eastern affairs?

A. Generally Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Joseph Ballantine, and a number of others; and Secretary Hull, and on occasion, Under Secretary Welles direct.

8. Q. Did you keep any file of conferences with officials of the State Department, either official or private?

A. In regard to the liaison meetings, prior to about the middle of May, 1941, I kept a resume of the meetings which was, I believe, kept by the Liaison Division of the State Department, and after the middle of May a stenographer was present to record these meetings. In addition to the matters on the record, there were certain matters discussed

off the record, and on occasions I did make a memorandum of the proceedings after returning from the State Department. However, I do not believe that there was a complete record of these meetings and I do not know of any complete record of the meetings which were held from time to time with Secretary Hull or a record of the conversations with Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and others. All records that I know of are in the Central Division of the Navy Department. I have none in my own possession.

9. Q. Adverting to this liaison committee that you speak of: Did I understand you to say that there were probably minutes kept by this committee?

A. Yes. This committee, however, was mainly occupied with matters other than those pertaining to the Far East, although on occasions, especially when Mr. Hull was [196] absent from the city, or incapacitated, matters concerning the Far East were discussed.

10. Q. Could you tell the court where it could probably find the minutes of these meetings?

A. I believe those that are in the Navy Department are in the files of the Central Division.

11. Q. Would you think that there are probably minutes also filed in the State Department?

A. Yes.

12. Q. Do you consider that you were present at most of the conferences in the State Department of major importance when matters dealing with the Navy Department were being discussed?

A. Generally so, yes, but they were high-level conferences which occurred, I believe, between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, and probably Admiral Stark and General Marshall, at which I was not present. Undoubtedly there were meetings at the White House on matters concerning the Far East, none of which I attended.

13. Q. Did you have access to intelligence information of the Navy Department?

A. Yes.

14. Q. What was the system of keeping your currently informed on matters of Naval Intelligence?

A. I do not believe there was any set system; none that I can remember. I generally got the information from various people in Naval Intelligence, or picked it up from—

15. Q. What I am trying to find out, Admiral, is whether or not you had to go around and search for this information yourself, or was there some system whereby at stated intervals, or when anything important occurred, persons responsible in the Naval Intelligence Division sought you out and delivered the information to you?

A. I believe that they either telephoned it or somebody dropped in and told me things which were of particular importance. In addition, the Secretary of the Navy had, for some time preceding Pearl Harbor, had a practically daily round up in his office at 9:00 o'clock where the general war situation was presented much the same as it is now presented in Room 3621, where the military situation was discussed and the Japanese troops movements were discussed, et cetera.

16. Q. Do you feel that you attended most of these conferences, or not?

A. The morning conferences?

17. Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

[197] 18. Q. What contact did you have with the Navy War Plans Division?

A. My contact with the Navy War Plans Division was generally to keep them informed of what was going on in the State Department, and on occasions when proposals were under discussion or various courses of action were being considered in the State Department, to inform the War Plans Division and obtain their reactions.

[198] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve; reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

19. Q. Admiral, that tells what information you gave the War Plans Division. What I would like to know is, did the War Plans Division keep you currently informed on its estimates of the situation, especially with regard to the Japanese situation?

A. There was no regular system. What I learned as to the War Plans estimate situation, I believe I learned at meetings, such as the one described this morning and such meetings as I attended in Admiral Stark's office, which were occasional, at which members of the War Plans Division were present and listening to them express their views.

20. Q. Who was the officer in War Plans Division who generally attended these conferences that you speak of?

A. Generally, Captain Turner was present, and if he were too busy to attend, some alternate was present.

21. Q. Can you recall who his principal alternates were?

A. No.

22. Q. Do you know, from your attending these conferences and hearing the discussions, whether or not the War Plans Division kept a current estimate of the situation, so far as the Japanese situation was concerned?

A. I believe they did.

23. Q. Commencing with the Executive Order which was issued in the latter part of July, 1941, the subject matter of which dealt with freezing Japanese assets in the United States, do you know, from your many contacts, what the repercussions were in Japan as a result of the issuance of this order?

A. None other than there was a bitter press campaign in the Japanese press against the United States.

24. Q. In your capacity as the Director of the Central Division and because of your many contacts with the Chief of Naval Operations in these morning conferences which you have discussed, do you feel that the Chief of Naval Operations was supplied currently with information on developments in Japan about this time?

A. I believe he was.

25. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what the current Navy Department estimate was of the effect of this order on United States-Japanese relations?

A. I know of no specific estimate having been made. There may have been one. Naturally, the Navy Department knew the freezing order was not helpful to United States-Japanese relations.

[199] 26. Q. I show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, which deals with matters of security and defenses in the Pearl Harbor area. I will ask you to glance at this letter and state whether or not you have any recollection that the general subject matter of this letter was brought to the knowledge of the State Department?

A. Insofar as I know, it was never brought to the attention of the State Department, and I did not see the letter until after December 7, 1941.

27. Q. From your liaison duties with the State Department, do you or do you not feel that the State Department was kept reasonably well informed on the Navy Department's estimate of the situation, so far as developments with the Japanese Government were concerned?

A. I think that they were reasonably well informed, yes.

28. Q. And do you have any idea of whether the State Department was informed currently on matters relating to the capacity of the U. S. Navy to cope with the situations as they were developing?

A. It is difficult to answer that question, because when you state the Navy Department, I do not know who was speaking on behalf of the Navy Department. I imagine Secretary Knox would be the one to express the point of view of the Navy Department.

29. Q. As liaison officer, did you transmit any such information to the State Department that you can remember?

A. I cannot remember specifically, but I attempted to keep them informed, naturally, on how we viewed the various steps that were being taken, and on occasions we were asked specifically to obtain the views of other people, including the War Plans Division.

30. Q. I show you Exhibit 13, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of October 16, 1941. I ask you to look at the dispatch and tell the court if you remember having seen the draft of the dispatch prior to its transmission or prior to its being released by the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I don't remember having seen it prior to transmission to the Chief of Naval Operations. I may have.

31. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the source of information on which this dispatch was based?

A. No. I imagine it is an estimate of taking into consideration what was known as to the character of the members of the new Japanese cabinet.

32. Q. Do you know in what office of the Chief of Naval Operations this dispatch was prepared?

A. No. I presume it was prepared in the War Plans Division.

[200] 33. Q. Were you present at any discussion of this dispatch before it was released?

A. Not that I remember.

34. Q. From your liaison duties in the State Department, can you recall any expression of opinion by the officials with whom you dealt over there as to what their views on this cabinet shift were?

A. As I remember, there were varying views of the members of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department concerning the exact significance of this shift in the cabinet. I believe the con-

census of opinion was that this shift did not tend to put in power a cabinet which was committed to closer relations with the United States but that it did not necessarily mean that a cabinet was coming into power which was committed to either getting in agreement with the United States or going to war.

35. Q. Would you say, then, Admiral, that the State Department's views were different in that respect from those expressed by the Chief of Naval Operations in his dispatch?

A. I believe that the Navy Department's view of the meaning of the shift in cabinet was that it was an indication of a more serious situation than the State Department viewed.

36. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of November 24, 1941, and ask you to refresh your memory. Do you know if the State Department had any information that this dispatch had been sent?

A. No, I do not know.

37. Q. So far as you can remember, you had nothing to do, in your duties as liaison officer, with acquainting the State Department of the fact that this dispatch had been sent?

A. No.

38. Q. Do you know, from your contacts with officials in the State Department, whether or not they did have information of this dispatch having been sent?

A. I cannot remember, but I believe at this date that this reflected the State Department's views.

39. Q. Adverting to the first sentence of this dispatch, which I read: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful." Do you know, from your discussions with officials in the State Department, whether or not they expressed this view or some other?

A. They expressed that view.

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941. Did you in the performance of your duties as liaison officer acquaint the State Department with the fact that this message had been sent by the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. About the 1st of December I informed Mr. Hull that [201] a war warning had been sent. I did not clear the message with the State Department and did not, so far as I can remember, inform them on the 27th, the 28th, and the 29th of November that this message had been sent. The occasion when I informed the State Department, as I remember, was on the Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday preceding Pearl Harbor. Mr. Hull 'phoned me and stated something to this effect: "I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of me, but I have done everything I can with these Japs, and they are liable to break loose and bite anyone." On this occasion I assured him that a war warning had been sent. I did not see the war warning as worded, although I had knowledge that such message had been sent some time later.

41. Q. In your contacts with officials in the State Department did you obtain any information as to the views of that department on this clause, which I quote: "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased"?

A. I can't remember any specific conversation, but I believe that was Mr. Hull's belief that, so far as any effective negotiations or hope of successful outcome of any other negotiations was concerned—that they had ceased.

42. Q. Did you in your duties as liaison officer communicate any such information as you have just stated to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I believe I did.

43. Q. I again quote from Exhibit 17: "An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." Can you tell me, Admiral, whether or not that estimate of the situation was one held by the State Department?

A. I cannot remember what the view was held by the State Department, but I believe they were informed of Japanese troop movements, etc., and that they held the view that an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected. Whether they believed it was an aggressive move against the United States or not, I cannot say.

44. Q. Do you recall having attended any conferences with relation to the subject matter of this dispatch prior to its release by the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. No.

45. Q. Can you tell the court when you first became acquainted with the fact that this dispatch had been sent?

A. I believe I knew that such a dispatch had been sent on the day of its dispatch, but I did not see the dispatch prior to its release.

[202] 46. Q. With reference to the estimate of the situation which I have just read: "An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," do you know whether or not that was the estimate of any division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Undoubtedly, the estimates made by the War Plans Division.

47. Q. Do you know, from your attendance at any conferences, whether or not this was the view of the Chief of Naval Operations at that time?

A. I believe it was, yes.

48. Q. Upon what do you base that belief, Admiral?

A. There were numerous conferences, etc., at which the situation was discussed, and, undoubtedly, such a message would not be released without the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations.

49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 3, 1941. Do you have any knowledge of the source of the information contained in this dispatch relative to the instructions that were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular offices with reference to the destruction of their codes and ciphers and the burning of all confidential and secret documents?

A. No, I do not know the source of the information.

50. Q. Do you know whether or not about December 3, 1941, the State Department had been informed of the subject matter of Exhibit 20, which you have just read?

A. I cannot state positively, but I am pretty sure that they were informed of the contents of that message.

51. Q. Can you remember whether or not you had any discussions yourself with the officials in the State Department on the subject matter set out in this dispatch?

A. I cannot remember specifically, but I do remember in the week or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor I was at the State Department, sometimes as often as three times a day, and such a matter would be given to them verbally, and we did make every attempt to keep them fully informed of any such development, so that I am sure they were informed.

52. Q. Did you yourself attach any significance to the directive contained in this dispatch relative to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts, and if you did, what was it?

A. That war was increasingly close.

53. Q. About this time of December 3, 1941, and during these discussions can you recall having heard any officials in the State Department in a responsible position with whom [203] you were dealing express any opinion as to the state of the negotiations between the United States and the Japanese Government, which had been going on for some time previous?

A. Yes, Mr. Hull in the latter part of November and the first few days of December several times expressed himself as believing that the outcome of the negotiations was to be unsuccessful and that the negotiations were nearing an end and deadlock.

54. Q. Can you remember, from any conversations you had with these officials of importance in the State Department at that time, whether they stated their views that negotiations had stopped or ceased entirely?

A. Not that I remember that they had completely ceased, although I believe their general feeling was that any hope of successful negotiations had ceased.

55. Q. Are you trying to state to this court that while there may have been some discussions, it was the view of the State Department that the end must inevitably be that they would not be successful?

A. That is correct.

56. Q. Can you recall if you did or did not keep the Chief of Naval Operations informed on these matters currently as they transpired?

A. I kept him informed currently as the negotiations were going forth, and on return from various meetings from the State Department, I either sent in a memorandum to him as to what occurred or reported favorably to him what had transpired.

57. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 4 December 1941. Can you recall whether or not officials in the State Department knew about the direction to the naval station at Guam to destroy all secret and confidential papers and certain other classified matter?

A. I am pretty sure that I would have informed the State Department of the contents of that message. I cannot specifically remember, because there were so many meetings and so many contacts, but I do remember that we tried to keep them informed as to what we were doing.

58. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the subject matter in this dispatch prior to its having been released for transmission?

A. No. I did know that such a message was being sent.

59. Q. Do you know of any special situation which existed on December 4, 1941, that might have caused such a directive to the naval station at Guam to destroy its secret and confidential publications?

A. No, I don't know the exact estimate that was based on, but I presume that about this time Japanese planes were flying over Guam, against which we were protesting, and we had [204] various troop movements, and there may be other information which led the Director of Naval Intelligence to send this message.

60. Q. As you can recall the situation existing between November 27, 1941, and December 6 of the same year, can you state whether or not this information was that imminence of war was more critical on the 6th of December than it had been on the 27th of November?

A. As I remember the situation, the Navy Department believed that a break with Japan—at least, a rupture of relations was drawing increasingly close with the passage of time.

61. Q. Do I interpret your answer correctly, Admiral, by saying that relations between the Japanese and the United States had become worse between November 27 and December 6, 1941?

A. Either that they had become worse, or, at least, the Navy Department and State Department believed that they had become worse.

62. Q. There is evidence before this court that on the morning of December 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations received information concerning a directive to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was to present what amounted to an ultimatum at one o'clock Washington time. Did you have any knowledge of this subject matter on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. I knew that they were to present a note at one o'clock to the Secretary of State.

63. Q. Did you have information before it was presented as to what might be contained in the note?

The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the question on the ground that it would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court directed the witness to answer the question.

A. The general tenor, yes.

64. Q. Can you recall whether or not the tenor of that information was to the effect that the Japanese diplomats would present the matter in the nature of an ultimatum at one o'clock Washington time on December 7, 1941?

A. As subsequently proved by the public note, it was an ultimatum or in the nature of an ultimatum.

65. Q. What I am trying to find out, Admiral, is just exactly what your information was which was contained in this note that the Japanese Ambassador was to deliver at one o'clock?

[205] The witness stated that he hesitated to answer the question on the ground that it would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The judge advocate replied.

The court stated that the witness's claim for privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

66. Q. Can you recall any contact with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, on the morning of December 7, 1941, with relation to any information which was in the Navy Department deal-

ing with negotiations between the Japanese Government and the United States?

A. Yes, I was in Admiral Stark's office on the morning of December 7. I had received information that the Japanese Ambassadors, Kurusu and Nomura, had requested an appointment with the Secretary of State for one o'clock, I believe, at which time they were to present a reply to our note of November 26; and while there General Marshall 'phoned Admiral Stark, and as I remember it, although I did not listen in, but to one end of the conversation, I believe Admiral Stark, after he laid down the 'phone, related the substance of General Marshall's conversation. As I remember it, in substance, it was, "I have a hunch that the Japanese have something timed with the delivery of the note, and I propose to send a message to the forces in the field, stressing the necessity for an alert." The question of the Japanese asking for an appointment for Sunday afternoon was discussed to some degree, as it was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service.

67. Q. At about what time did this discussion take place which you have just related, Admiral?

A. I cannot accurately place the time, but I would say it was probably about 10:30.

68. Q. Was the Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, present with Admiral Stark at this conversation?

A. No, he was not present with Admiral Stark. It was a telephone conversation, of which I heard one end, and Admiral Stark, in effect, related the other end after laying down the 'phone.

69. Q. Can you recall what Admiral Stark did about it?

A. Admiral Stark concurred in the dispatch of the other message by General Marshall.

70. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Department, did you, after overhearing this discussion between Admiral Stark and the Army Chief of Staff, have occasion to tell the State Department the subject thereof?

A. No.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[206] 71. Do you know whether or not anybody in the Navy Department told the State Department about this matter prior to 1:00 o'clock on 7 December 1941?

A. Well, I certainly did not. I was here in the Department till noon and left and was back around shortly after the messages began to come in that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I am sure that the State Department was informed of that conversation.

72. Q. Between Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

A. No, the State Department was not informed of the conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

73. Q. Now you have stated that there was a conversation between Admiral Stark and General Marshall on the morning of 7 December 1941, during which General Marshall communicated certain information to the Chief of Naval Operations. You have stated that you knew in substance what General Marshall had some communicated, because Admiral Stark had repeated it to you in substance after he

put down the telephone. Now do you know whether or not Admiral Stark had information of a similar nature to that presented by General Marshall at the time of the telephone conversation that you have just related?

A. Admiral Stark knew that the Japanese had requested an appointment with the Secretary of State for 1:00 o'clock, for delivery of a note. Whether or not he had the same hunch that General Marshall had, I do not know.

The court then, at 12:40 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[207] Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the parties to the inquiry and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

R. E. Schuirmann, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

74. Q. Admiral, you testified this morning as to numerous conferences you had with State Department people and as to numerous trips that you made to the State Department, and conversations that took place at that time. Was the seeking out of these conferences and the leg work involved largely yours on behalf of the Navy Department?

A. Yes.

75. Q. It was largely a Navy Department initiative, rather than an initiative of the Department of State?

A. Well, the leg work was done by the Navy Department; I mean, as far as personal contact with Mr. Hull was concerned. Whether he asked me to come over to go over the results of these meetings after they were held—I am now referring to conversations with Kurusu and Nomura—or whether I asked him to come over, I don't know, but there was a general agreement on it. There was no appointment made; it was more or less a custom that grew up.

76. Q. But in order to get the information that you got, you went to the State Department, usually, to get it?

A. Yes. At times, we used the telephone, but somebody had to go to get the information and we never made any issue as to whether I went over there.

77. Q. Did I understand you to say this morning that in connection with the information that was secured from various sources by both the Navy and the State Department, that Secretary Hull commented at one point that the Navy seemed always to be ahead of us?

A. Well, yes, I think that remark of Secretary Hull's was more or less to say, "Well, I apologize for making this suggestion" which he, in effect did. If it was time to send out some message, I took it, and that was just a polite way of apologizing for making a suggestion which he thought primarily was of Navy Department concern.

[208] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he had no further questions of this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :

78. Q. In your capacity as liaison officer with the State Department, I understood you to testify this morning, Admiral, that you felt during the fall of 1941 you had thorough and complete information as to the Far Eastern situation from Naval Intelligence?

A. Yes.

79. Q. And by that did you mean that you felt that you had, and were told all the intelligence information they had concerning that area?

A. I don't believe that I followed every detailed report that came in on that area because that was too large, but I felt that I was cognizant of their estimate of how they felt about the situation.

80. Q. How did you get that information, Admiral?

A. Well, there was no form of memoranda that were exchanged, but I talked to the directors of Naval Intelligence, or heard them talk, and I talked to McCallum at various times, but there was no set routine whereby I would deliver certain information every time it came in, or the reports.

81. Q. If their information was in written form, did you see the written form in which they had it?

A. No, I don't believe I did see written estimates, although I may have. My memory is not clear on it.

82. Q. I am referring more to the original written sources of their information, rather than estimates or conclusions that they formed from it.

A. No, I didn't follow the original sources from which their information was derived, original reports.

83. Q. Did you have access to those?

A. If I desired them; there was no attempt to bar me from them. I made no particular attempt to look at them.

84. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence on or about the 15th of October of Japan's plans and intentions for the conquest of southeastern Asia?

A. I don't remember that report, no.

[209] 85. Q. Well, do you remember any information at or about that time of that character?

A. Not distinctly. There was lots of information. I think most of the information tended to show that Japan intended to expand to the southward through Indo-China, and perhaps Malaysia.

86. Q. Sometime during the month of October, 1941, did you learn from Naval Intelligence that they had information that Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese nationalists from N. E. I., Malaya, the Philippines, Hawaii, America and Europe?

A. I don't remember the date but I do remember we had information that the Japanese Nationals had been encouraged to get out of certain areas, and I believe that there were some—I am not exact on this point, but I believe that there was some question of whether an exchange or repatriation ship should go into Panama at the time. Of course, they would require permission from the United States government.

87. Q. Do you recall learning from the Office of Naval Intelligence early in November that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, primarily as a result of the American embargo and freezing orders, had become so desperate that the Japanese government had determined to distract popular attention, either by a foreign war or a definite diplomatic victory?

A. I don't recollect it, no.

88. Q. You have no memory of anything of that character?

A. No.

(NOTE: Question No. 89 and the answer thereto, numbered Page 209-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.)

90. Were you getting information from any sources other than Naval Intelligence and the State Department concerning the Far Eastern situation? I am not going to ask you what the sources are. Or were there other sources?

A. Yes, there were other sources.

91. Q. Were those other sources within the Navy Department?

A. Yes.

92. Q. Can you tell us the Navy Department division whence that information emanated?

A. From the Communications Division.

[210] 93. Q. Would you get that information, Admiral, through Naval Intelligence, or from some other source directly? Would you get it via Naval Intelligence, or otherwise?

A. I would get it via Naval Intelligence.

94. Q. So that the immediate contacts, as far as you were concerned, were Naval Intelligence?

A. Yes.

95. Q. Well, then, is it correct to say that so far as the Navy Department information is concerned, your source was Naval Intelligence?

A. That is right.

96. Q. Regardless of whence they may have gotten it?

A. Yes.

97. Q. You got it through Naval Intelligence?

A. Yes.

The following pages, Nos. 210-A, 211, 212 and 212-A have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[213] 108. Q. Coming down to Sunday, December 7th: When did you come to your office?

A. Between 9:00 and 9:30, as I remember.

109. Q. When you reached the office, did you receive the information about which we have been talking with Admiral Stark?

A. With Admiral Stark, yes.

110. Q. It was available to you?

A. I received information that the Japanese were going to present a note, and requested an appointment with the Secretary of State for 1:00 o'clock to deliver a note.

111. Q. And that was available to you immediately upon your arrival at your office, between 9:00 and 9:30?

A. Practically immediately.

112. Q. Do you know when that information was received in the Navy Department?

A. No.

113. Q. Could you ascertain that fact from records now available to you?

A. I do not believe so. If I could, the records which would be available to me to substantiate the fact, I would object to discussing it on the grounds of national security.

114. Q. I am only asking the time of the availability of that in the Department.

A. In the Department? Well, that is correct, I received the message; it was available to me at 9:30. The only records which I know of which would substantiate it would be objectionable on the grounds of national security, to establish the date or the time when that information was first available in the Department.

115. Q. Bear in mind, I am not asking to see the records; I am merely asking if from your examination of the records now you could establish the time when that was available to the Navy Department?

A. I don't know, but probably so.

[214] 116. Q. And would the disclosure to this court of the time of availability in the Navy Department, in your opinion, violate the national security?

A. Yes.

117. Q. Do you recall any conversation on Sunday morning, 7 December, with those with whom you talked, as to when that information had been available in the Navy Department?

The court announced that it would object to any further questions on that subject, on the grounds that the witness has stated that to answer them would be a violation of state secrets; and that the war effort, not as of December 7, 1941 but as of today would be endangered.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated as follows: May I state what I understand to be the court's ruling, and I certainly intend to abide by it: That because of the statement of the witness as to the current national security I am forbidden from asking any more questions concerning the receipt of the message about which he has testified that he had on Sunday morning.

The court announced that that was correct.

118. Q. We will refer to your conversation with Admiral Stark. Please fix as precisely as you can—and I appreciate much allowance has got to be made for the passage of two years and a half—when you first saw Admiral Stark on Sunday morning?

A. I believe it was about 10:00 o'clock.

119. Q. Might it have been later? Might it have been an hour later?

A. I think about 10:00 o'clock as near as I can remember.

120. Q. Do you recall who was with Admiral Stark—strike that. Where did you confer with Admiral Stark?

A. In his office.

121. Q. In his personal office?

A. That is right.

122. Q. Who was with Admiral Stark when you first went into his room?

A. As I remember, I and possibly Commander Wellborn were the only two there, but I'm not sure that there was anybody other than myself there when I first went in.

123. Q. How long did you stay in Admiral Stark's office in conference with him?

A. I think I was there probably upward of an hour, or close to an hour. There were various people coming in and going out.

[215] 124. Q. Can you recall who those other people were coming in and going out?

A. I believe Captain Turner, Captain Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, are the only three I can remember at this time.

125. Q. While you were in there, was additional information brought in to Admiral Stark concerning this Japanese situation?

A. None that I remember, no.

[216] 126. Q. You testified this morning that sometime during that conversation there was a telephone call to or from General Marshall?

A. From General Marshall, yes.

127. Q. That was from General Marshall?

A. Yes.

128. Q. How long after you first went into Admiral Stark's office was the telephone call from General Marshall?

A. I should judge thirty to forty-five minutes.

129. Q. It would be between 10:30 and 11:00?

A. That is correct, 10:30.

130. Q. Did you have any conversation, or did you overhear any conversation between Admiral Stark relative to the sending of the message by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No.

131. Q. There was no mention of that in your presence?

A. None that I remember.

132. Q. You told us this morning that you left the Navy Department; what time was that?

A. 12:00 o'clock.

133. Q. You went home to dinner?

A. Yes.

134. Q. Do you know Commander McCallum?

A. Yes.

135. Q. What was his position at that time?

A. I believe he was in charge of part of a section of Naval Intelligence.

136. Q. During the week preceding 7 December, did you attend any conferences with Admiral Stark and Commander McCullum?

A. None that I remember, no. I don't remember of any conference at which McCallum was present with Admiral Stark, that I was also present.

137. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Brainard was present Sunday morning at the conference with Admiral Stark?

A. I am not positive, but I believe he was, that he did come in some time that morning.

138. Q. Did you personally talk to Admiral Stark, or were you present when it was discussed with Admiral Stark, any time during the week preceding 7 December, the question of sending any additional messages to Admiral Kimmel—additional to what had been sent?

A. No.

[217] 139. Q. That wouldn't come within the field of your activity?

A. No, it would not.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The court was cleared.

The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered.

Examined by the court:

140. Q. Admiral, were negotiations continuing between the Japanese representatives and the State Department between 27 November and 7 December 1941?

A. I think that depends on how you define negotiations.

141. Q. Well, change that—were discussions continuing?

A. Discussions, I believe, were continuing to the extent that there were certain points being cleared up; for instance, what Tojo had said in a speech and various other points, but they were awaiting a reply to the note that was delivered on November 26, which reply was delivered, I believe, on December 7.

142. Q. During this time, 27 November to 7 December, did you make daily reports and keep Admiral Stark conversant with these discussions you speak of at the State Department.

A. To the best of my knowledge I believe I did.

143. Q. Were you familiar with the note of November 26, which this government delivered, as we understand, to the Japanese Government?

A. I am perfectly familiar with the note to which you refer, and I have done my best to recollect whether or not I was furnished a copy of that for delivery to the Navy Department prior to its dispatch, but I cannot state that I did; and to the best of my recollection, I did not.

144. Q. Did you consider at that time that this note of 26 November was an ultimatum to Japan?

A. To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note were such that there was no hope in anybody's mind—at least nobody with whom I discussed the question in the Navy Department—that the Japanese would or could under the circumstances agree to the terms of the note.

145. Q. Did you inform Admiral Stark as to this note, or did you discuss it with him?

A. I did not, specifically, no.

146. Q. On Sunday morning, December 7, while you were [218] discussing matters which have been brought out in this testimony, with Admiral Stark, did any question arise as to the importance of phoning or any communication direct from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel?

A. I remember of none. I believe that Admiral Stark, after receipt of the telephone call from General Marshall in which General Marshall said that he would send the dispatch, felt that it would take care of Admiral Kimmel on its arrival in Pearl Harbor.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 2:45 p. m., adjourned until 10:15 a. m., Monday, August 14, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944.

[219]

NINTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the eighth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

The witness, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), informed the court that he had an interest in the subject matter of the inquiry, and requested that he be permitted to have counsel present.

The court announced that the request of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), was granted, and informed him of his rights as interested party.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), examined the precept, stated that he did not object to any member of the court, and with the permission of the court, introduced Brigadier General T. H. Green, U. S. Army, as his counsel.

[220] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present status, General Short?

A. Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret).

2. Q. What was your station and duty on 7 December 1941?

A. I was commanding the Hawaiian Department. I was stationed at Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

3. Q. When did you assume that duty?

A. February 7, or it might be carried on the War Department's records as the 8th. The War Department records will show February 7 or 8, 1941.

4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty?

A. December 16, 1941.

5. Q. I show you a document which is marked Exhibit 6 before this court for identification, and it is entitled Joint Army and Navy Action 1935. Generally, speaking, are you familiar with the provisions of this document?

A. I am generally familiar with it.

6. Q. I show you page five of this document, under paragraph nine, the general subject matter of determination of methods of coordination, and ask you, had unity of command been placed in effect in the Hawaiian area prior to 7 December 1941?

A. It had not.

7. Q. So far as you were concerned, had any consideration been given to placing unity of command in effect under the provision that it might be done by the commanders of local forces?

A. As long as I had communication with the War Department, I would have not considered it without consulting them.

8. Q. Under Chapter Two, Article 9, subsection b. (3), what officer did you deal with as Commander of Naval Forces in the Hawaiian area?

A. I dealt with two officers; primarily, on routine matters, with Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and on matters of immediate importance with Admiral Kimmel, with Admiral Block usually present—the three of us in the discussion.

9. Q. In matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor, what officer in the Navy, in the Hawaiian area, did you usually have dealings with?

A. The same reply pertains. When it was routine I dealt with Admiral Bloch. When it got beyond routine I usually dealt with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel together. [221]

10. Q. Was it the practice in the Hawaiian area to hold conferences on military matters affecting the defenses of Pearl Harbor?

A. We had no stated time set for holding conferences, but whenever Admiral Kimmel or I either got anything of prime importance from the Navy or War Department, we practically always had a personal conference.

11. Q. How would you describe the relations between yourself and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet—as cordial, strained, cooperative, or what language would you use?

A. I would say that they were extremely friendly, cordial, and cooperative. We were on a very friendly basis personally, as well as officially. We played golf together about every other Sunday, and the Sundays we didn't play golf, very frequently Admiral Kimmel dropped in to see me in the morning; because his family was away he came to my quarters more than I went to his.

12. Q. I show you a document marked Exhibit 7 before this court of inquiry, which purports to be JCD-42. If you recognize this document, will you state what it is?

A. The full name of the document is "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," and that is the way we usually designated it, rather than leaving out the word "frontier."

13. Q. Again adverting to Exhibit 6, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and referring to Article 19-D, thereof—

A. "B" or "D"?

14. Q. D. I ask you if exhibit 7, that you have just identified, is the plan made in accordance with that article?

A. It is.

15. Q. By whom was this document, JCD-42, prepared?

A. By the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

16. Q. On what date was it promulgated?

A. 25th of April, 1941, is the date that it—probably the date of the amendment rather than the original document. I think it was probably a 1939 document and had been amended.

17. Q. I ask you to read Article 21 of JCD-42.

A. Reading:

This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except [222] that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan. (Signed) WALTER C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department; C. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

18. Q. According to Article 12 of this same Exhibit, what category of defense was in effect?

A. Mutual cooperation—category "D".

19. Q. Now was the whole Exhibit, this JCD-42, in effect on 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, before that date it had been amended, so that the amendment would be included in it.

20. Q. Adverting to this same Exhibit, would you please read Article 14?

A. Reading:

TASKS. a. JOINT TASK To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

21. Q. Adverting to Article 17 of JCD-42, which states that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall provide for the beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defenses of OAHU, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, will you please state in general terms what provisions had been made to carry out the Army's undertaking in this respect prior to 7 December 1941?

A. The Army had provided proper defenses—harbor defenses, anti-aircraft defense, aircraft defenses, communications, and aircraft warning service. I say in general terms that would be the answer.

22. Q. On 7 December 1941, would you state what your opinion was as to whether the dispositions that had been made were adequate to meet the Army's undertaking under this section.

A. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that—whether the dispositions would be provided for in our plans or whether the dispositions we were actually occupying at the minute.

23. Q. I shall rephrase my question. Will you state what your opinion was on about 7 December 1941 as to whether the [223] Army had adequately provided the materiel and

the personnel to carry out the requirements of Article 17, section a., that I read you in my question a moment ago?

A. The materiel of the harbor defense, on the average, yes, as pertaining to the harbor defenses proper. As pertaining to the anti-aircraft, there was a shortage of allotted guns, I think of twelve 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. There was a shortage of the 37-millimeter; we had 20 out of 140. In the 50-calibre guns, we had 180 out of, I think, 345, so there was a shortage of equipment that had been allocated that we were trying to get; and when it came to the personnel, there was a decided shortage of personnel in the Coast Artillery, which resulted in practically all our organizations having two assignments. They had to man harbor defense guns and anti-aircraft, and if you had gotten both kinds of attack at the same time, it would have been impossible to man all the equipment. If you got one attack at a time, there was sufficient personnel to man the equipment. That covers, I think, the harbor defenses. On the question of the air force, we had nothing like enough to carry out our mission properly. We had made a study, had it written; we felt we should have 180 B-17s for long-distance reconnaissance and for bombers. We actually had 12, and only 6 of them in commission. We required approximately 200 pursuit planes. We had, I think, something like 105 P-40s, and 80 of them were in commission, but the others could have been put in commission fairly soon. On the anti-aircraft warning service, we had a program approved and funds allocated for the construction of six fixed stations and six mobile stations. Originally, the program had called for only three fixed stations and had been increased some time along in perhaps September or October, I don't remember the date, from three to six. None of the fixed stations on Oahu were to be placed at as great an altitude as 10,000 feet, and on the other islands at the highest suitable point we could get, which we hoped would give us 200 miles effective radius. None of those were in action. The parts had not all been received; certain articles, cable and material of that kind, were essential before we could construct the station, and it had not been received, so no fixed stations were operating. The six mobile stations were in condition to operate and were all stationed on the Island of Oahu. I believe that about covers the points.

[224] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

24. Q. Adverting to your answer with reference to anti-aircraft guns in the Pearl Harbor area. Had you made any estimate of the number of anti-aircraft guns, together with their calibre, which you considered adequate for the defense of this base against an aircraft attack?

A. In addition to what had been allocated there, we were supposed to have twenty-four, 90-millimeter guns, fixed at the time the allocation was made, and we had felt that with the exception of Kaneohe Bay—the Army had not assumed the responsibility for the defense of Kaneohe Bay then—that the equipment, if we got it all, would be fairly satisfactory. Shortly after I got there, I strongly recommended to the War Department that the Hawaiian Department assume the responsibility for the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it was like shutting your front door and leaving your back door open if you

didn't. We asked for a garrison for Kaneohe Bay which had never been approved up to that time because they said no approval would be given until after the limit of the strength of the Hawaiian garrison was lifted, which was placed then at 59,000, and we had asked them to raise it to 71,500 so that we could provide some additional personnel for Coast Artillery, Engineers, Air Corps, and a garrison for Kaneohe Bay.

25. Q. Do you consider, General, that if you had gotten all the 90-millimeter guns that were allocated to you, that you would or would not have still been short of anti-aircraft fire to defend Oahu?

A. We could have done pretty well, disregarding Kaneohe Bay, and the allocation, when it was made, did not include Kaneohe Bay.

26. Q. Do you consider that 90-millimeter guns are effective against high-altitude bombers?

A. Probably not-as effective as your 5-inch, but they were the most effective thing the Army had.

27. Q. Now, adverting to your aircraft warning service. You have told us what some of the technical equipment was that you had. What was the status of training of personnel in your aircraft warning service?

A. They were not expert by any means. We started our training, I think, about the last of October or the first of November, when we really got enough of our equipment to begin training our men. As the first step in our training, we had earlier sent 15 men to sea with the Navy to learn something of the operation of the naval radar before we got any of our equipment. Our operators had [225] gotten to the point where they were fairly satisfactory. As I say, the whole thing was new. The Army had just recently gone into it and they were by no means expert but had been working hard at it for at least a month, a little more than a month, and could be counted on to do fairly satisfactory work.

28. Q. What communication facilities did you have between this aircraft warning service and the Commandant, 14th Naval District?

A. We had several types of communication with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. We had commercial telephones and we had a very fine cable system, Army cable system, that looped the island and went into, I think, your switchboard of the 14th Naval District. I don't think it went to a direct line to the Commandant. We also had messenger service by plane from the headquarters of the Department, these small messenger planes to Hickam Field, which was right alongside of Pearl Harbor, that we could use in case other signals went out. We had in operation, in addition to radar, about a hundred lookout stations throughout the island, and the Navy had some signal stations that they based on the island at various places and quartered with the Army troops, and they had communications with their own naval crew.

29. Q. You have mentioned something to the effect that there were about 100 lookouts. What were those lookouts?

A. Those were regular Coast Artillery stations with communications and everything of that kind. They served as a combination for spotting ships, or they would have spotted planes if they were visible.

30. Q. As a general statement, where were these lookouts stationed?

A. They were pretty much on the high ground around the whole island.

31. Q. Of Oahu?

A. Of Oahu.

32. Q. What sort of communication did they have?

A. They were tied in with the cable that circled the island so they had instant communication, practically.

33. Q. Were these lookouts continuously on watch day and night?

A. They were not. They would have been if we had considered the situation such as to go on that type of alert.

[226] 34. Q. The point I would like to have you answer is whether these lookouts were or were not stationed on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. They were not because they were not alerted for aircraft attack or for attack by a landing force, or an all-out attack.

35. Q. But you did have provision for that in your plans?

A. Our plans were very complete for that and we had lots of training in it, and if we had been on Alert No. 2 instead of Alert No. 1—

36. Q. Do you consider that your personnel were adequately trained to fulfill those duties?

A. They were.

37. Q. Was your aircraft warning service in direct communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? You have said that it was in communication with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

A. I think we were connected with the switchboard at Pearl Harbor, and it would be the naval communication through the switchboard to the Commander of the Fleet.

38. Q. Did the Navy have a liaison officer, or any other personnel, assigned to the aircraft warning service?

A. I will have to answer that a little fully. On August 5, 1941, I wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel pointing out the desirability of a naval liaison officer, and I think it was the 24th day of November that Lieutenant Burr—who was the naval liaison officer in G-3—was requested to set up liaison offices with the Navy because we were then working enough of these services that it was desirable to have it. I don't know whether they had actually reported on December 7th, or not. I thought they had. I thought they were actually working daily from November 24th to December 7th. I don't believe that I personally visited the anti-aircraft warning information room between the hours of 4:00 and 7:00. I visited it two or three times during that period but not between the prescribed hours and I can't say whether there was a naval officer there on duty, or not, when I visited it, or whether there was a naval officer on duty daily between November 24th and December 7th.

39. Q. In your testimony as regards the aircraft warning service, I don't recall that you mentioned anything concerning sound detectors. Did you have any such materiel?

A. We had sound detectors. We felt that as soon as our radar was operating 100 per cent that the sound detectors would have little value and I don't think we were manning them when we look at the shortage of the [227] personnel because they were so much less valuable than the radar, as long as the radar was working.

40. Q. Then am I to understand that your position is this: That you had some sound detectors——

A. We had some sound detectors and we were using some of them because we didn't have the radars where we were sure of them at that time. We didn't have our fixed stations on December 7th. For that reason, the sound detectors were still valuable on account of the height of the mountains. We might have gotten them when they were close to the mountains, where we wouldn't have gotten them with the mobile stations.

41. Q. Do I understand you to say that these sound detectors were not in use on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. They definitely were not because the command was not alerted that way.

42. Q. Was there any organization in the Island of Oahu for civilian aircraft squadrons or lookouts?

A. There was not. May I add there, that the limited terrain of the island was such that plotting by an individual was of very little value because the distance was so short, before the report could be made the aircraft would be upon us and considering that, we had not organized civilian lookouts.

43. Q. Had you ever considered the practicability or the desirability of having an aircraft patrol organized?

A. I didn't think that the aircraft patrol would be of any value for anything but submarines, considering the distance that we were supposed to go out. As far as air went, it would have been of no value.

44. Q. Would you give the court an opinion of the efficacy of the aircraft warning service as you had it set up; not as it was operated but as it was set up on the morning of 7 December 1941, to perform the functions for which an aircraft warning service would be provided?

A. Those mobile sets were supposed to be effective about 75 to 100 miles. Actually, under favorable conditions one morning, one set picked up enemy planes at 132 miles. There was one great handicap: They were not at sufficient height when the enemy planes came in and apparently turned to the east of the Koolau mountain range, and they lost them because of the intervening body of mountains. Now with the higher one, if we had had the one fixed station on Kaala in operation it might not have lost them.

45. Q. As I understand it, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor? Is that correct?

A. Supported by the naval forces.

[228] 46. Q. Supported by the Naval forces. What support, in general, would be included in that statement?

A. If the enemy tried to make a landing, we had even hoped that the Navy might stop that by themselves before he got near there. As to anti-aircraft, we had certain Marine organizations that functioned in our net. There were certain naval guns ashore that functioned with our anti-aircraft. Also any planes of the Marines or anti-aircraft planes that had been sent ashore because their carrier was in port or anything—all of those things would have been able to give us support. And then one of the most important things, of course, was the long-range reconnaissance.

47. Q. If units of the Pacific Fleet were present in Pearl Harbor, would they also be considered?

A. They would be a very valuable addition to the anti-aircraft fire, but we had not carried our coordination to the point where their fire, that is, the anti-aircraft fire from ships, was controlled by our anti-aircraft, before I gained command. We had not carried the coordination to that extent.

48. Q. You have mentioned certain anti-aircraft artillery that was available for the protection of Pearl Harbor. Do you consider that Army pursuit ships should be classed in one of the defenses of Pearl Harbor?

A. Very decidedly.

49. Q. Do you recall what the condition of readiness for combat of your pursuit ships was at 7:55 on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. We were in the state of routine training at that time, except for the alert against sabotage and the anti-aircraft warning signal.

50. Q. It might be well at this point, General, since we are to speak of conditions of readiness, or alert, I believe, as the Army calls it, to set out for the record what the conditions of alert were according to your plans?

A. We had three types of alert. Alert No. 1 was an alert against sabotage and against internal disorders and uprisings with no threat from without, Alert No. 2 was an alert that included No. 1, all the threats of No. 1, and in addition, a threat of an aircraft attack and surface or submarine attack. Alert No. 3 was all-comprehensive. It included every element of No. 1 and No. 2, and in addition, the danger of hostile landings. I think, in general terms, that that makes it plain.

51. Q. What was the condition of alert at 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941 as regards the Hawaiian Department? Was it all the same?

A. We were on Alert No. 1; and in addition to Alert No. 1, our aircraft warning service was directed to operate between the hours of 4:00 and 7:00.

[229] 52. Q. Being in condition of Alert No. 1, what would that mean as regards the condition of readiness of your aircraft to commence combat?

A. It was routine training. They were not alerted for combat. They were alerted, I may add, definitely, for the protection of the matériel.

53. Q. Could you give the court an estimate of the time required to get into action from this condition of Alert No. 1?

A. It actually took, that morning, 55 minutes. They were in action at 8:50. The attack struck at 7:55, so it is not theoretical there. That is what it actually took.

Questioned by the court:

54. Q. 55 minutes?

A. 55 minutes.

55. Q. And the attack itself took place at 7:55?

A. At 7:55; and at 8:50 they took off.

Questioned by the judge advocate:

56. Q. Adverting to Article 17 *f.* of Exhibit No. 7, which is JCD-42, it states: "The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for '*f.* Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol

of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol, and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.'” We have covered the matter of the aircraft warning service. What was the arrangement for the cooperation of the Naval Inshore Patrol?

A. We had one reconnaissance squadron of 6 planes stationed at Bel- lows Field, and all of this training was along reconnaissance lines and was carried out in such a way as to constitute a patrol during the train- ing period. A great deal of our pursuit training also was taking place at such a place that they did perform a certain amount of reconnais- sance.

57. Q. Well, under your system of Alert No. 1, did you or did you not have this in operation?

A. We definitely did not.

58. Q. Did you have these aircraft armed at the time, and supplied with ammunition?

A. There was one squadron receiving machine gun training at Haleiwa that did have ammunition right adjacent to their planes. They were able to put it in in very short order.

[230] 59. Q. Adverting to Paragraph (g) of this same exhibit: “The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department will pro- vide for the support of naval aircraft forces and major offensive operations at sea conducted in conjunction with Army bombers.” You have previously testified as to the number and types of planes that you had available, and the number that were in operating status on the morning of 7 December 1941. Am I to assume that these planes that you had at this time were available for cooperation with the Navy had they been requested?

A. Yes, sir, the cooperation was automatic. If it was requested they were sent immediately, and if an emergency like an attack took place, they didn't wait for a request; they reported for instructions.

60. Q. In other words, am I to understand that you had plans that provided for just such a contingency?

A. We did. I may add there, that when we sent them to the Navy they went under the direct orders of the Navy, they were assigned missions by the Navy, and operated just as much under the Navy as if they had been Navy planes.

Questioned by the court:

61. Q. These are the long-range bombers; is that right?

A. Yes, sir. We had the same provision that if it became neces- sary to furnish pursuit planes at ranges where they could operate, to assist in any naval attack over the sea of any Navy vessels, they went under the Navy command in the same way.

Questioned by the judge advocate:

62. Q. Can you recall, General, the maximum radius of operation of the planes that you had available for support with the Navy?

A. The B-17s, I think, fully equipped, were good for 24- or 2500 miles; I think that's about right, round-trip.

63. Q. Round trip?

A. Round trip.

64. Q. Then that would be a radius of about what?

A. About 1,200 miles. I think that is correct, if they carried bomb loads.

65. Q. And just as a matter of having this in the record at this point, would you please repeat the number of such planes you had available, and then state how many were in operating condition on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. We had 12 B-17s; 6 of them were in commission. The other 6 had been stripped of parts in order to keep our ferrying of planes to the Philippines going. Now, we [231] had some other planes that were all right for short distances. We had 10 A-20s. They were modern planes, and 9 of those were in commission. We had, I think, approximately 50, B-18s, an obsolete plane. Twenty-four of those were in commission but they would have been death traps if they had been sent against a modern plane.

66. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (h) of JCD-24, which provided that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department shall provide personnel and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in Article 18 (c). Was such a harbor control post established to your knowledge?

A. It was. We had habitually, daily, one lieutenant colonel and one sergeant. When we carried on exercises we had a detail of 3 officers so they could operate 24 hours a day. We had cable lines in there. We were required to furnish, when we carried on exercises or in case of an emergency or attack, certain telephone operators, certain teletype machines, and a clerical force for the use of these officers who were with the control post. The control post was operated under naval command.

67. Q. Do you know what its condition of readiness or alert was at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. I do not. It is my understanding that the Navy operated the post 24 hours a day. We had an officer there for the purpose of keeping the constant training going only eight hours a day. Whether he was there at that minute, I don't recall personally.

68. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (i) of this same document, JCD-42, "The Commanding General shall provide for a system of land communications in conjunction with the Navy for the prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence." Will you please state what this system of land communications with the Navy was in Oahu on 7 December, 1941. Is it something which you have already described, or is it different?

A. No, it is slightly different. They, of course, had the ordinary telephone communication for communication by commercial wire, or by the Army cable, but in addition to that, we had a teletype circuit, a complete circuit that connected ONI, G-2, and FBI so that there was instant communication between the two. It worked both ways.

69. Q. What facilities did the Navy provide in this system?

A. I frankly don't know whether the Army provided that teletype circuit, or the Navy. I think the Army provided them but I couldn't be sure, but they were there.

70. Q. Was there a unity of command in carrying out the functions of this system?

A. There was not.

[252] 71. Q. Adverting to Article 17 (j) of JCD-42, which sets out that the Commanding General shall provide for an intelligence

service which shall gather, evaluate, and distribute Army and Navy information of activity of enemy aliens in the Hawaiian Islands. Was such a service functioning during the period October 16, 1941 to December 7, 1941?

A. It was. We had, in addition to the ordinary G-3 personnel, we had personnel of the Civilian Intelligence Corps. They operated sometimes as undercover men. They had an office immediately adjacent to the FBI, and I believe that Naval Intelligence had an office at the same place, the Norfolk Building downtown; not on the post. They were used constantly on activities of that kind. As to counter-espionage, however, the Army was responsible only in its own organizations. The Navy was supposed to be only a naval establishment, and the FBI would cover the civilians, the civilian aliens, and citizens who were suspects. However, I believe that the FBI had never fully taken over those duties from the Naval Intelligence; that the Naval intelligence had been requested to continue their work until FBI was able to take it over fully, and I don't recall that that had ever happened. I think that the ONI still had the main responsibility on counter-espionage.

72. Q. You have mentioned a Naval Intelligence service. Was there any liaison or connection between the Army Intelligence service and the Naval Intelligence service?

A. There was constant touch; undoubtedly many communications each day.

73. Q. Now, the information that the Army Intelligence system collected: Was that available to the Navy constantly?

A. That was available not only to the Navy but the FBI. Anything that anyone of the three services got was available to the other two, and they worked very close together.

74. Q. What was the frequency of reports made by this intelligence service of the Army?

A. We didn't make any routine, daily report that came in at a certain time. It was a question of getting in touch on a particular case at any time, and I think it would be safe to say that they made several reports a day on the average.

75. Q. Adverting to the period 16 October 1941 and 7 December of the same year: Can you recall any items of importance that were reported by this intelligence service?

A. There were two things in particular. There may have been a good many more but two that made enough impression that I remember. One was a conversation between a man named Mori in Honolulu and some party in Japan that I think took place on the 6th and was reported to me about 7:00 o'clock on the 6th.

76. Q. Of what month, sir?

A. Of December. The other was a report of burning of papers in the Japanese Consulate. I think that took [233] place either on the 6th or the 5th. The report was made on the 6th.

77. Q. Do you know whether or not the Navy received this information?

A. When I received this information about the message from Mori, it was given to me by our contact officer, Colonel Bicknell, given to G-2 and me at the same time, and I asked specifically whether the Navy had information that had come from FBI, and I was informed

that it was turned over to Naval Intelligence at the same time it was turned over to our G-2, to our contact officer.

78. Q. What was that conversation?

A. I couldn't describe it exactly. There were several pages of conversation that went on back and forth for sometime. They talked about the weather. They talked about whether there was much activity around Honolulu in the way of ships. The man said, "Well, there wasn't as many as there was a year ago." They talked about the air activity, asked what the feeling of the Americans were toward the Japanese-American population, and they were told that as far as the old-timers went, there was apparently no prejudice; that the newcomers, when they first got out there, they were likely to be decidedly prejudiced but in a short time they accepted the situation the same as the old-timers. It was a good deal in detail. That, in a general way, covers the scope of the thing.

79. Q. Do you have any present knowledge of where copies of this might be obtained?

A. I believe there is a copy of that in the Roberts Report. I think there is a copy in the Roberts Report.

80. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (a) of JCD-42, which states, "The Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for an inshore patrol." What is your recollection as to what the Navy was doing in this respect between 16 October and 7 December, 1941?

A. I don't know in detail. I am sure that they had one because it happened that there were some submarine scares, and I think they trailed what they thought was submarines and sometimes they were not sure whether it was a submarine or a whale. I believe Admiral Kimmel will bear me out in that. They did have both there during the keeping of the lookout.

81. Q. Adverting to Article 18 (b) of JCD-42, "The Commandant 14th Naval District shall provide for offshore patrol." During the period 6 October to 7 December, 1941, do you have any knowledge of what the Navy was doing as regards providing and conducting an offshore patrol?

A. I don't know the exact details of any coast offshore patrol like 150 or 200 miles, which they provided for, but I did have pretty constant information of the task forces that were sent out all the time and did the patrolling, which I considered was very much more important than closer in.

[234] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

82. Q. In Article 18 (e) of JCD-42 the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was to provide for harbor patrol posts for Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor. Do you have any knowledge of whether this was done?

A. Yes, sir, that was provided, and we had personnel operating then.

83. Q. Adverting to paragraph 18 (h) of JCD-42, do you have any knowledge of what the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was doing with respect to sweeping channels immediately prior to December 7, 1941?

A. I know that there was a certain amount of channel sweeping, because I happen to remember that the standing order was such that whenever any important elements of the Fleet went in and out of the harbor, they were preceded by mine sweepers. That is just recollection from talking over their plans with them, and I couldn't give any details.

84. Q. General, I invite your attention to Article 18 (i) of JCD-42, which provides that the Navy shall furnish distance reconnaissance. Do you know whether or not before December 7, 1941, there was any plan for effecting this reconnaissance?

A. There was, and exercises had been carried out. It had been functioning.

85. Q. Was the Army a cooperating body in this plan?

A. It was.

86. Q. What is your recollection as to what officer was primarily responsible under the plan for distance reconnaissance?

A. In the actual carrying out of the details, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin worked together.

87. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 23, which is in evidence for identification before this court of inquiry, and advert to Annex 7. I ask you if you recognize what that is?

A. I do. That is a plan for the joint air operations of the 14th Naval District and of the Hawaiian Department.

88. Q. Is this the plan which was in effect on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. It went into effect on March 21, 1941, and continued in effect as long as I was commander of the department.

89. Q. You mentioned some time ago drills which were held in the matter of distance reconnaissance with the Navy. Can you give the court some idea of the frequency of those drills and the extent thereof, say, between October 16, 1941, and December 7 of the same year?

A. We had air exercises not less than once a week. Now, whether during that period we had the long-range bombers [235] working with them I'm not sure, because there was a time when we had to suspend the exercises as far as B-17's were concerned in order to get ferry teams ready to take the ships to the Philippines. I don't know the date that happened, but we were having constant air exercises with the Navy.

90. Q. In your opinion, the drills which were held were sufficient in time and character to indoctrinate personnel properly?

A. They were.

91. Q. I believe you have testified—and I ask you to correct me if I am wrong—that on the morning of December 7, 1941, the condition of alert for the whole command, which included aircraft, was alert No. 1?

A. That is correct.

92. Q. Do you know what the corresponding condition of readiness or alert was in the naval establishment at the same time?

A. I think that they were definitely alerted for antisabotage, and I know, from talking with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, that they had increased their reconnaissance where the task forces were operating. I don't know definitely just what reconnaissance was sent out independent of the task forces.

93. Q. Can you tell us, General, whether or not Army and Navy aircraft under this plan were, on the morning of December 7, 1941, operating under the provision of mutual coordination or the other provision, unity of command?

A. Mutual cooperation.

94. Q. Then, did the condition of alert in the Army necessarily have any corresponding relationship to a condition of readiness or alert with naval craft? In other words, were they independent in this respect?

A. They were independent, but we used exactly the same letters and numbers to describe their condition of readiness in regard to matériel and personnel, so they were speaking the same language.

95. Q. In other words, when speaking of the condition of readiness or alert, so far as aircraft were concerned, if the condition were prescribed as condition 1 or alert No. 1, it meant the same thing, so far as naval aircraft were concerned, as it did for the Army?

A. The letters meant the same percentage of craft to be ready, and the numbers meant the same number of minutes required to get them in the air. You will find that in the plans signed by Bellinger and Martin.

[236] 96. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 23, which I showed you a moment ago and which is this joint agreement for the employment of Army and Navy aircraft, I ask you to read the next to the last sentence of Article 1.

A. (Reading:) "These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of the renouncement in whole or in part."

97. Q. Adverting to this same exhibit, I will ask you to read Section 2, paragraph 2 for the record.

A. (Reading:)

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant of the 14th Naval District) agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other such proportion of the air forces at its disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plan.

98. Q. Article 18, sub-paragraph "I", which is JCD-42, states that the Commandant, 14th Naval District shall provide for distance reconnaissance. Was there a plan in effect or do you know of any plan that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had provided for distance reconnaissance?

A. I don't know the details of his plan. I know that it was his responsibility, and he had full authority to call on me for planes when he did not consider that he had a sufficient number ready. I think, in any case, his reconnaissance would change so constantly that if I had known one day what he was doing, I would not necessarily have known the next.

99. Q. For the purposes of the record, General, I am going to ask you to read from Exhibit 23, Section II (c) and (d).

A. (Reading:)

(c) When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

(d) In the special instances in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

100. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 9, which is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941. I am going to ask you to take your time and to look over this letter. Then, I shall ask you a few questions about it.

[237] The court then, at 11:45 a. m., took a recess until 11:50 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued:)

101. Q. Since you have inspected this exhibit, I ask you to state whether the views expressed on the question of the military defenses of Pearl Harbor had ever, in general, been made to you?

A. They had. A copy of this letter was furnished to me along in February, 1942.

102. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not you concurred in the views expressed therein as to the defenses of Pearl Harbor?

A. There are some elements of the letter in which I did not concur. He envisaged the danger, in order of importance, as it were, as a constant, continuing thing. He based air bombing attack first, air torpedo second, sabotage third, submarines fourth, mines fifth, and bombardment by gun fire. I think that would be an ever-changing thing. What was the most important would appear to be what was the most probable, in view of the information you had of the enemy and the information you had from the Navy and War departments, but you could not always say that you would have air bombing as the most important. If your situation was such that it looked like air attack was completely ruled out, sabotage moved up to first priority.

103. Q. Adverting to the proposals of the Navy Department in this exhibit which I have just shown you, wherein the Navy Department suggested certain corrective action, what were your views on the Navy Department's suggestions?

A. I agreed with all the suggestions except as regards smoke and balloon barrages. We convened joint committees on the use of smoke and balloon barrages, and I believe there was a unanimous recommendation that under the conditions prevailing there, they were not practical, that the wind conditions were such to eliminate the use of smoke, that the restricted area was such to make balloon barrages more dangerous to us in the end. The air people in both services were opposed to those two things.

[238] 104. Q. I show you Exhibit 24, which is in evidence before this court and which is the reply of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy on his letter, which you have just inspected. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, have the general information that the Secretary of War sets out in his reply here?

A. I did.

105. Q. Between November 27, 1941, and December 7 of the same year did you have anything in your department corresponding to an interceptor command?

A. We had an actual operating interceptor command, which was put in operation by verbal instructions and was not put in as a definite organization with written orders until December 17. I wish to explain that rather fully. It was entirely a service in the Army. We had prescribed conditions when standing operating procedures, and we had sent four officers to school in the States, including General Davidson, the Commander of the Pursuit Wing, and Colonel Powell, who was the Signal Officer of the Department. We wanted to get the latest thought from the War Department before we put out a definite organization on paper. This had been operating from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily from November 27 to December 7, although the actual written order organizing it was not put out until December 17. We were trying to avoid a lot of changes. We wanted to give them a few days to try out what they were doing and get their ideas in a positive statement before we put it in printed form.

106. Q. Do you have any recollection, General, whether there was any liaison between this pursuit organization and the Navy?

A. I think I stated previously that I had requested, in a letter of August 5, liaison officers from the Navy to operate the war-craft warning service, and on November 24, 1941, Lieutenant Burr, who was the liaison officer from the Navy with our G-3 section, had been requested to ask liaison officers. I was under the impression they were present from November 27 to December 7 from four to seven. That is an impression. I did not verify that at any time.

107. Q. How do you spell Lieutenant Burr's name?

A. B-u-r-r.

108. Q. Do you know his initials?

A. I do not.

109. Q. Are you sure he is a naval officer?

A. I'm sure he is a naval officer. Admiral Bloch can probably give you his initials.

[239] 110. Q. We have gone into the question previously of anti-aircraft fire in connection with the defenses of Pearl Harbor, in which there was some reference made as to naval units acting or cooperating with the Army in that regard. Can you tell us whether or not there was any system of anti-aircraft fire coordination for these different units.

A. The marines anti-aircraft organization, and I believe—I may be wrong—there were four naval guns in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor that reported to the Army anti-aircraft commander and took positions from him.

111. Q. Assuming that units of the Pacific Fleet were present in Pearl Harbor, is it my understanding that they were to be used as anti-aircraft guns, supplementing the fixed defenses?

A. They were but not to be under the command of our anti-aircraft commander.

112. Q. I understand that coordination of gun fire between naval units and other units had not been effected.

A. That is, naval units on board ship. That is correct. They selected their own targets.

113. Q. You have previously stated, General, that the condition of alert No. 1 was in effect on the morning of December 7, 1941. Would you please state to the court more fully your reasons for ordering this condition of alert?

A. Alert No. 1, leaving out the question of whether it covered the proposition from the point of view of enemy activity, permitted the units to go ahead with their routine training. We had, especially in the air corps, a very serious training proposition. We had been assigned the mission of ferrying B-17's to the Philippines. We had to furnish all the crews. We had only six B-17's available for training crews. If we went into alert No. 2 or 3, all training of air would stop, and we would not have had the crews ready to carry out the ferrying operations, which the War Department considered very important. I had been in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch from the morning of November 27 for possibly three hours. I had been given the information of the movements of the Japanese Fleet, and, as I remember, the main movements of the Fleet, outside of the home waters, was to the south or to the Philippines and possibly the Malay Peninsula. Admiral Kimmel during this conference—the conference was primarily for the question of the reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army air squadrons. Naturally, if we reenforced those, we temporarily reduced our own defenses at Honolulu. We lost that much air, and we did not have much to spare. We talked over the thing from many angles as to the effect of reducing our planes and the danger and so forth, and Admiral Kimmel asked Captain McMorris, who was his operations officer [240] or war plans, what he considered was the probability of enemy aircraft, and he said "none" and there was no disagreement. Nobody in the naval staff or no naval officer present raised the point. Apparently they were following the view, with the information we had and the task forces that they had out, that the Navy did not definitely believe in the probability of an air attack. Also, as I remember the discussion, we knew that battleships were going to be brought into Pearl Harbor, and from discussions with Admiral Kimmel, I knew he felt if there was an air attack, he would get everything in the way of naval ships out of Pearl Harbor. In addition to that, the language of the message that I had received indicated to me that they were more concerned about not alarming the civilian population and not disclosing intent and any number of things, which lead me to believe we were not going to be attacked at Honolulu. Hostilities may have been considered imminent, but there was nothing in the message to indicate that would be the form that hostilities would take. As a matter of fact, I have read General Martin's testimony before the Roberts' Committee. He stated that the attack at Honolulu was a surprise to him, and he considered the main threat was at the Philippines. He looked for disorder and sabotage at Honolulu. Apparently, I got the same idea, from the messages and the actions of the War Department, that he had in mind. There were two other things that would confirm this belief of the War Department very fully. On the 5th of December a B-24 came in to Honolulu, being sent over the Mandate Islands to Manila. It had the mission of photographing Truk and Jaluit. It had one 30-caliber machine gun and two 50-caliber machine guns. That was all the armament it had. We had machine guns which we could have taken and put on it, but we didn't have any adapted to it.

That ship had the strictest kind of orders: It must be ready to fight when it left Honolulu. You could draw the inference that they thought it was perfectly safe up until it reached Honolulu, and the hazard of carrying the additional weight of the guns was greater than meeting the Japanese attack. General Martin prepared a wire to the Chief of the Air Corps, which went over his signature and mine, telling them we were holding up that plane until another B-24 came along with additional equipment and that we would not let this plane go over the Mandate Islands until it was properly equipped and ready to fight. On the night of the 6th and 7th of December there were twelve B-17's sent from Hamilton Field, California. Six of them left at 9:30 Pacific Coast Time, which would be 12:30 a. m. on the 7th in Washington. The other flight of six left at 10:30 p. m., which would have been 1:30 a. m. in Washington. Those planes came into Pearl Harbor. They had no ammunition. The guns were all cosmolined. They had not [241] been boresighted. They had skeleton crews consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer, and radioman; so if they had guns in firing condition and ammunition, they could not have been manned. As late as 1:30 a. m. in the War Department on December 7 they did not believe there was any danger of air attack at Honolulu, or they never would have been so rash as to send planes out in those conditions. Those planes actually came into Honolulu just five minutes behind the first wave of Japanese, and the direction of approach was just three degrees different. The Japanese came in three degrees east and our planes from straight north. The first one hit Hickam Field, and the first pilot was killed. Twelve of those planes were destroyed without being able to fire a shot. They were not equipped. You can only draw one conclusion. Whoever sent them out felt that the hazard of carrying the ammunition was greater than the hazard of a Japanese attack. In other words, he considered that there was no probability of an air attack at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 or the planes would not have been started from Hamilton Field in that condition, as late as they were.

114. Q. Can you recall when you put alert No. 1 into effect in the Hawaiian Department?

A. Within thirty minutes after I got the message on November 27.

115. Q. 1941?

A. 1941.

116. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before this court and which purports to be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees, in which he sets out a message that was sent from the Army to the Commander Western Defense Command. I am going to ask you to inspect this message and see whether or not it contains, in substance—

A. That was not the message I was speaking of. I got this message from Admiral Kimmel—probably personally, but the message I mentioned came from the Chief of Staff to me.

117. Q. That is not the message?

A. That is not the message. That is the message that came to me from Admiral Kimmel. The one I was discussing came from the Chief of Staff.

118. Q. I ask you to refresh your recollection from any notes which you have and to identify to this court the message you speak of on November 27, 1941?

A. (Reading.) "Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 427-27. Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the [242] Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned to Rainbow 5, so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

119. Q. General, will you state the originator of the dispatch which was read?

A. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

120. Q. To whom is it addressed?

A. To the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

121. Q. Does the dispatch have a number?

A. It is radiogram 472.

122. Q. General, I now show you Exhibit 19, which purports to be a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated the 28th of November. Have you seen the substance of that dispatch?

A. I have seen this.

123. Do you recall, General, whether or not you communicated the fact that you had put into effect alert No. 1 at or about the time you stated you did?

A. When I sent the message, as delivered to Admiral Kimmel, I'm not sure which I did. He was informed, I'm sure, that alert No. 1 had gone into effect.

124. Q. Had you ever had occasion, subsequent to this information being given to Admiral Kimmel, to advise him that alert No. 1 was still in effect?

A. We had conferences on December 1 and December 2, and I'm sure that we talked over pretty much every phase of what we were doing.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserves, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

125. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding then that at those conferences you did advise Admiral Kimmel of the condition of alert which you had in effect?

A. I think he knew exactly what we were doing at the time.

[243] 126. Q. Between the time you put the condition of Alert No. 1 into effect and the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 December 7, 1941, did you have any reason for changing this condition of Alert No. 1 to some other condition of alert?

A. I did not. I received no further information from the War Department—I will change that. I received additional information from the War Department that it was off, cautioning me about the carrying out of measures in regard to sabotage, and if the War Depart-

ment's message of November 28 and my reply of November 28 are not in the record, I would like to put them in.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued:)

[244] 127. Q. General, I believe you read into the record this morning a dispatch which you described as 472, from an officer in the War Department. Did you ever make any reply to this dispatch, and if you did, will you tell the court what it was?

A. That dispatch called for a report of action taken, and in reply to it I sent the following dispatch:

RURD 472 report department alerted to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy (Signed) SHORT.

I want to call attention that the very first thing in this radiogram positively identifies it as in answer to 472, because I say, "Re your radiogram 472." The reason I am calling your attention to that is that General Gerow, who was in charge of the War Plans Division of General Staff, testifying for the Roberts Commission, said he did not connect this with the answer to 472. They had called on me for a reply, and ten days had gone by and they hadn't called on me, and still he didn't identify this as the report of the action taken. They knew exactly for ten days what my action was. I told them as plainly as I could. I was alerted against sabotage, and during that ten days they did not come back and say, "You are doing too much," or "You are doing too little;" and naturally I assumed that they approved of what I was doing. No reason in the world for them not to know what I was doing, because I identified it clearly with the other wire; and I stated before the board that it was the business of his division to identify it, but that some way they just failed to identify it. Now the day after I sent that, on the 27th, I got another radiogram from the War Department that I assume was sent more or less as an answer to this one of mine, because it was sent the following day, the 28th, and on the same subject. Naturally, I thought they were coming back and indicating additional things to me they wanted to do. I received a telegram from Adams, the Adjutant General, which I will read, as follows (reading):

Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter Territory of Hawaii, 482 28 critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See Paragraph 3 MID, SC, 30-45) Stop Also desire that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop. This does not repeat not mean any illegal measures are authorized Stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding un-

necessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not effect your responsibility under existing instructions." (Signed) "ADAMS."

You can see when I got that radiogram everything in it was exactly what my alert called for. It never occurred to me that they hadn't considered my reply when I was alerted for sabotage at the time [245] they were writing this, because everything that they emphasized there I had ordered in my alert and it looked like they were thoroughly satisfied with it, but wanted to make out certain other points. They wanted to be sure I didn't violate Territory laws and get in bad with the Government finally, because they wanted me to be sure and commit no illegal acts. In other words, taking this message on top of my reply, it didn't indicate that anybody in the War Department was excited over an air attack or an attack to make a landing, but that they were very much exercised over the sabotage and civil disorders, possible uprisings, and didn't want me to alarm the public. They didn't want me to do any illegal acts, and they wanted me to be sure and carry out everything that was laid down in regard to subversive measures. In other words, it was just emphasizing everything that I had ordered done. Now I sent a reply to that on the same day, I think addressed to the Adjutant General. I sent a dispatch, which I will read, as follows:

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. Re your secret radio 482 28 full precautions have been taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph 3, MID, SC, 30-45) and military establishment including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section 67 of the Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii, to prevent or suppress lawlessness, invasion, insurrection, etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20 made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawlessness, violence, in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 30, 1941, enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interests of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with the FBI and all Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and with mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. (Signed) SHORT.

Now I explain the reasons that I made this request on the Governor and on the Mayor to take these steps. For two years, off and on, they had had sentinels over bridges and electric light plants, water plants, everything of that kind. There was always the danger that a sentimentally unprotected, because we had no legal right to have him there. For that reason I taken the matter up with the Governor months before and got him to make the formal request that we take over this guarding, and then the Military would be fully protected if we did have to kill somebody. We had roads, especially one, running practically over our 16-inch guns, and if the situation got worse we felt

like we would have to close some of those roads and streets, and I wanted to have the legal authority to do that. I had gotten the Mayor of Honolulu to pass this ordinance so that I would have the authority if I needed it. So I was able immediately to report to the War Department that all of the acts I had taken were thoroughly legal because they had been done at the request of the Governor and with the authority of the mayor. Now may I say one more thing? You can see how this message from the Adjutant General, following the other, just convinced me beyond any question that I had the approval of the War Department on my message telling them what I was doing, because there wasn't a word in what came to me the next day indicating that they had not gotten my message or that there was anything that I had directed to be done that they didn't approve of, and I had no further instructions or information from the War Department from this message on the 28th until seven hours after the attack.

128. Q. General, to emphasize one or two little points, I am going to ask you some questions that are very obvious from your answer. One of them is, you did not make any report concerning aircraft reconnaissance that you were conducting at that time, did you?

A. I did not. The long-range reconnaissance, the Chief of Staff had approved that in Annex Number 7, where the Navy assumed the responsibility for it, and I felt sure that this wasn't intended to abrogate that, and I felt that they should know that it was the Navy's responsibility and not mine, and I didn't cover that.

129. Q. And you state that the War Department didn't take any exception to the action that you had taken in making your report to them; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

130. Q. And I understand you to say that in the absence of a reply either of approval or disapproving the action that you had taken, that you assumed that everything you had done met with their approval?

A. Especially in view of that message of the 28th, that pertained fully to everything that I had ordered.

131. Q. When, during the year 1941, did political matters between the United States and the Japanese Government appear to be approaching a critical stage?

A. About July, when they put into effect that Act freezing the Japanese credits.

[247] 132. Q. Had you been supplied with any estimate of the situation as to the effect this order might have on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan, and if you did, what was it?

A. I had a wire from the War Department. I don't remember the exact phraseology of it, but they were afraid that it might have an unfavorable reaction on business interests in Japan and on the Japanese population in Hawaii.

133. Q. Did you, as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, have any personal estimate of the imminence of war as a result of this Executive Order?

A. There was a very noticeable uneasiness on the part of the Japanese population of Hawaii, and I realized that some event might

happen to make the thing very serious; but the whole people for a few days there were pretty restless.

134. Q. After the issuance of this Executive Order, when next did you receive any information that gave you an opportunity to re-estimate the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. I think the next thing I got of any importance was on October 16; a message came to me through the Commander of the Fleet.

135. Q. General, I show you Exhibit 13 which is in evidence before this court, and ask you whether or not the information contained in this Exhibit, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees, dated 16 October 1941, and ask you if this is in substance the information you received?

A. That is correct. I received that.

136. Q. Did you make any estimate of the situation relative to the imminence of war between the United States and Japan as a result of having received this information, and if you did, what was it?

A. If you noticed, that message said there was a very strong possibility of war between Russia and Japan, and there was a possibility of war between the British and the United States, and Japan. In other words, their main emphasis there was war between Russia and Japan. That weakened, as far as I was concerned, the probability of immediate war between the United States and Japan, because apparently they had considered the strongest possibility was between Russia and Japan.

137. Q. Having this information in your possession, and having estimated the situation as you did, did you take any action other than that in effect at the time, looking towards alerting or making ready the defenses under your command?

A. We had tightened up all our guards against [248] sabotage, and measures against subversive measures, things of that kind, at the time of the freezing of the Japanese assets, and we had never taken off a great part of those; and I figured when I got that message that we were all right, as far as that message was concerned—and I was probably just a little more watchful.

138. Q. Asking you some specific questions regarding thereto: had the condition of alert for the aircraft warning system been changed?

A. We did not have any stations in operation at that time.

139. Q. Did you change the location of any guns?

A. No, we did not.

140. Q. Now what was the condition of readiness of guns that you had in place at that time, on 16 October 1941?

A. We had guards. We didn't have quite as strong guards, so they didn't amount to a skeleton crew, that we had later.

141. Q. Were there any special orders given as to changing the condition of alert, so far as aircraft went?

A. There was none.

142. Q. There is a point we would like to have cleared up with reference to some testimony that is before the court. I draw your attention to page 39 of Exhibit 6, which is the Joint Action of Army and Navy 1935—and refer you to page 39, Article d. The sentence that I am inquiring about is, "Long-range air reconnaissance will be

provided and plans made for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force." Would you explain to this court what General Headquarters Air Force is?

A. Well, the General Headquarters Air Force is an air force that, in the theater of operations, operates directly under the Headquarters—like you would say there are certain bombing commands undoubtedly at the present time operating directly under General Eisenhower's orders that are not attached to the armies in France or Italy; probably operating out of England and directly on his order. That is what we consider G. H. Q. Air Force.

143. Q. May I ask you, General, what were the plans for the use of G. H. Q. Air Force in your Department?

A. We had nothing that we called a G. H. Q. Air Force. The area there was so limited that every plane operated directly under the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. None of it was parceled out to anybody, so if you considered anything as G. H. Q. Air Force, it would be every plane in the Department.

144. Q. Was there any provision made for getting planes [249] of the G. H. Q. from the continent to the Hawaiian Department?

A. We had asked for planes, for increases, and we had not asked for them to go into G. H. Q. Air Force. We had asked for a very considerable increase and been told that the decision on it wouldn't be made until the limit of 59,000 for the Hawaiian Garrison was lifted.

145. Q. Am I to understand that there may have been some planes in the General Headquarters Air Force—?

A. In this book they may intend, here, to refer to G. H. Q. Air Force in the United States. It is really hard to say how they mean that.

146. Q. In other words, from having read that article, you wouldn't be able to tell the court whether the G. H. Q. Air Force to which this article refers means planes that might be available in the Hawaiian area or whether they were planes that might be available on the continent for being sent to Hawaii?

A. I would say this, that with the distance from Hawaii to the United States, it would have been impracticable to operate the planes in Hawaii that were controlled by G. H. Q. in the United States. The distance is so great they couldn't have operated. If they had been going to give us reinforcements, they undoubtedly would have been given to us outright and not sent to carry out missions and return.

147. Q. Between 16 October 1941 and 24 November the same year, did your estimate of the intentions of the Japanese military toward the United States change because of any information you received?

A. I received nothing to cause me to make a re-estimate from the 16th of October until the 27th of November.

148. Q. You said you received nothing?

A. Nothing.

149. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is in evidence before this court. It is Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November 1941—and I will ask you to read it and state whether or not you had received from any source information of a similar nature as is contained in this dispatch.

A. I do not remember receiving this message at that time. I do not think it was received at my headquarters.

150. Q. Do you recall if, between 24 and 27 November of 1941 you had had any request made on you by Naval authorities for the use of Army planes, and long-range reconnaissance?

A. I had not.

151. Q. And as you say, you had no information upon which to make any advice to the Navy during the same period of time?

A. That's right.

[250] 152. Q. Adverting to dispatch 472, which you read into the record this morning, did you make any re-estimate of the situation based on the information contained in that dispatch?

A. I looked over that very carefully and talked the matter over with my Chief of Staff, and considered all the things they put in there, before I decided to order Alert Number 1. I considered it all fully, and considered it in the light of conversations that I had had with Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters that morning.

153. Q. Was the decision that you made based upon this estimate?

A. My estimate was that there wasn't a danger of any immediate air attack, and that our real dangers were from sabotage, disorders, or possible uprising.

154. Q. I believe you said this morning that you put Alert Number 1 into effect at that time?

A. That's correct.

155. Q. This was one of the decisions you made?

A. That was the decision I made.

156. Q. And the only one?

A. That covered it—and I turned out the aircraft warning service from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m.

157. Q. Other than this changing the alert and the putting into effect of your aircraft warning system between 4:00 and 7:00 in the morning, did you make any changes in your antiaircraft defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't think that they found it necessary to move a single gun. We did this: There was a skeleton crew based at all these guns, and there were small arms ammunition in the immediate vicinity of the guns, the small arms guns—and except for four batteries there of 3-inch guns, in all other cases there was ammunition not more than 75 or at most 100 yards away, and in most cases considerably less than that. We didn't bring it out of the casemate, but we had it where it was available, I say, in three to five minutes.

158. Q. And there had been no change in the condition of alert for aircraft, either reconnaissance or pursuit?

A. Except tightening up on the guarding of the aircraft—more vigilant than we had been at any time.

159. Q. Have you any recollection that the Naval authorities requested you for any assistance in the way of long-range reconnaissance after 27 November 1941?

A. They did not.

160. Q. Can you recall whether or not there had been a discussion between you and the appropriate Naval Commanders as to [251] the advisability of establishing a long-range reconnaissance after 27 November 1941?

A. We had conferences on the 1st and 2nd and 3rd of December. While it was primarily in reference to the relief of the Marine garri-

sons at Wake and Midway and Canton, by the Army, it just naturally drifted into every phase of it, you might say—of the defense of Honolulu. These were long conferences, two or three hours on the 1st and 3rd, and a shorter time on the 2nd.

161. Q. Did I understand from your previous testimony, General, that you testified that the primary responsibility for the defense of Oahu lay in the Army?

A. Supported by the Navy.

162. Q. Can you recall from plans, orders, or agreements what the responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, was in the matter of defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I'd say in the beginning, the distant reconnaissance, to get the information. The question of meeting the enemy at sea, if they attempted to land, would come under the Fleet Commander rather than the 14th District. I think that, as I remember, the 14th District would have had the function of employing anything that was strictly ashore, like their anti-aircraft guns that they probably operated, and instruments of that kind; but Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel could tell you much more definitely than I could about that. Of course, we had harbor control posts, things of that kind, working with the 14th District.

(NOTE: Question No. 163 and the answer thereto, numbered Page 251-A, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.)

164. Q. I will ask you, General Short, if you can read into the record the dispatch you received on 7 December?

A. (Reading:)

To Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter Territory of Hawaii 529 7 Japanese are presenting at one pm Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication Marshall.

That message was filed at 12:18 p. m., the 7th, in Washington, signed by General Marshall, 6:48 Honolulu time. It was sent by the RCA. It was not sent by the War Department Radio. Apparently the War Department Radio was fading out that morning. I know it was true. We were having difficulty getting in connection with Washington from Hawaii that morn [252] ing; and it was sent by RCA. It arrived in the RCA, Honolulu, at 7:33. It was delivered to the Signal Officer at 11:45 a. m. Now I don't know the reason for the delay, but in all probability the messenger may have got caught in the attack and gone back and waited until the attack was over, which was about 11:45 it was delivered. It was decoded by the Signal Officer and delivered to the Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department at 2:58 p. m. That was the first information we had of it. No, it wasn't the first information we had, because sometime between 8:30 and 9:00, I told my Chief of Staff to call General Marshall and inform him that we were being attacked. When General Marshall was informed that we were being attacked, the first thing he said was, "Did you get my message?" Colonel Phillips called him over the scrambler telephone. The Chief of Staff replied, "We have had no message from Washington

this morning." Then this came in later in the afternoon; and then, on the 9th, we got a message—I don't know whether it was signed by Marshall or by the Adjutant General, requesting us to state the exact time this message was received in Honolulu, when it was delivered to the Signal Officer, when they finished decoding, and when it was delivered, and to what Staff officer at Department Headquarters. That is the history of the message. Now if that message had been put through by scrambler phone, like my Chief of Staff called the Chief of Staff to report the attack, nine chances out of ten it would have been received by me ten or fifteen minutes after he wrote it, without any loss of time for in-coding, transmission, and decoding. Now in all probability we would have had two hours, which would have been plenty of time to warm up planes, disperse the pursuit planes, send the bombing planes to the other island, and have every man at his post. We could have been ready for practically anything. If they had, it would have come through in plenty of time; and I felt like that Washington considered that there was a direct probability of an air attack, and we had a right to expect the shortest possible time in notification. General Marshall was asked before the Roberts Board why he did not use the scrambler phone, and he replied that he wasn't sure of the secrecy, that there was some doubt as to just how secret the phone is, that it had to cross the Pacific and might have been intercepted; and if he had been going to phone it, he would have phoned it to Manila first, because that was where he considered the greatest threat. That is in the General's testimony before the Roberts Commission. You will have it in Volume I of the Roberts Report.

165. Q. The point I would like to have you make clear to the board is this, General, at exactly what time did this message that you speak of as coming from General Marshall first arrive in the hands of anybody connected with your Command?

A. 11:45 a. m., it got to the Signal Officer, but had not been decoded.

[253] Examined by the court:

166. Q. Honolulu time?

A. Honolulu time.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued):

167. Q. Now there is evidence before this court in considerable quantity, and you have given some yourself, that there was actually an attack made by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor at about 0755 on December 7, 1941. When were you first informed of this attack?

A. When the first bomb exploded, I heard it. My first thought was that the Navy was having some exercises that I had forgotten about. Then another one exploded in a minute or two, and I ran out my back door, which gave me a view of Pearl Harbor, and I could see the smoke, and things didn't look right. Just at that time, I think, my Chief of Staff, who lived next to me, ran over and called and said, "It's the real thing. I have just had word from Wheeler Field and Hickam Field that we are being attacked."

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, reporter, withdrew.

[254] Q. At the time of this attack, I believe you have previously testified that the condition of alert was No. 1. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

169. Q. You have recited in a few words some of the things that happened when the Japanese attacked. Will you state in general also what the Hawaiian Department did to repel the attack immediately after 0755?

A. As soon as this report was made to me I immediately said, "Go into Alert No. 3", which is an all-out defense. In other words, since we had been surprised by an air attack, I felt that we might even be surprised by an attempted landing and I ordered Alert No. 3 rather than No. 2. The minute the attack struck, all of the anti-aircraft, on their own, replied to the enemy fire and we brought down planes as early as 8:05 and there was one brought down at Fort Kamehameha that might have been brought down a little sooner than that. And at 8:15 a plane had been brought down at Schofield. As soon as the alert struck, most of the pursuit pilots—they were sleeping in their quarters at Wheeler Field and their planes were 7 miles north at Haleiwa, that is, one squadron—jumped in their car and raced to Haleiwa as soon as they could, and when they got there the officer who was in charge there, and the men, were arming the planes with ammunition, and that squadron, I think practically all from that squadron—there may have been a few planes able to take off from Wheeler Field, I'm not positive, but most of those were involved in burning and explosions on the runways and I am inclined to believe that the first group of planes all were from Haleiwa, and they brought down 10 enemy planes. The anti-aircraft continued to fire as targets offered themselves, and they brought down somewhere between 19 and 28. G-2 figured that there were not less than 29 verified planes, and possibly 38, with some duplications that we couldn't be sure about. Shall I go ahead with what happened to the enemy?

170. Q. I think that will give us a general idea.

A. I might show the whole picture. The infantry divisions immediately fell in by 8:10. In the 24th Division they had engaged enemy planes by small arms fire. At 8:30 they were moving into battle positions. The same way with the 25th Division. All the anti-aircraft got their 3-inch ammunition immediately. There were 4 batteries that didn't have ammunition at hand. The first one started throwing its ammunition at 8:15 and they had all finished by 10:00 a. m. In the infantry divisions, one of them was in battle position complete at 4:00 o'clock and the other at 5:00 o'clock with one day of fire. The second day of fire was gone that night. The department headquarters, we had an advanced command post in the crater and we started moving there and I think [255] we opened that command post perhaps along about 8:35, and I left the Chief of Staff and the Supply at headquarters and I went there with the G-2 and G-3 sections.

171. Q. You mentioned your first intimation of an attack around 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941 as being an explosion that you heard.

A. That is right.

172. Q. Had you had any information of any other enemy activity in the Hawaiian area shortly before this time?

A. I had not.

173. Q. You had no information on a submarine being present in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor?

A. I heard about that later, but I think it was the next day. It could possibly have been that afternoon but I did not know at the time. Also, later that afternoon, as I said before, we got a submarine off of Bellows Field. We got a rope around it and towed it in.

174. Q. General, I am going to show you Exhibit No. 20, which is in evidence before this court. It is a naval dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees, among them being the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and has to do with information that had been received concerning the destruction of Japanese diplomatic and consular codes in certain areas. Will you read the dispatch to yourself and then state to the court whether or not you had that information prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I am quite sure that I did not.

175. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a naval dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Station, Guam, with information copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others. The subject matter of the dispatch directs the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy secret and confidential publications. I show you this dispatch and ask you to read it and then tell the court whether or not you had been informed of the general subject matter contained therein prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't think I had.

176. Q. I show you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as the action addressee, dated 6 December 1941. This dispatch directs certain outlying Pacific Islands to destroy secret and confidential matters in their possession. I ask you to read this dispatch and to state to the court whether or not the general subject matter contained in this dispatch had been communicated to you prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I make the same reply; I'm quite sure that I had not seen it.

[256] 177. Q. I will ask you, do you recall any conversations with naval authorities in Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, as to any matters relating to the destruction of codes and ciphers by the Japanese anywhere?

A. I knew on December 6th that the Japanese Consul had been burning papers. I don't know whether I had them identified as codes, or just papers, but I remember that a contact officer made some report. That, I think came from the FBI, probably.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

178. Q. General, with two hours advance notice on Sunday morning, couldn't the Department have been fully ready by the time of the attack if you had immediately ordered the full alert?

A. We could have been completely ready for an air attack. The infantry divisions would not have been on their battle positions complete if we had ordered them to their battle positions for an all-out attack.

179. Q. General, would you have made a very quick reestimate of the situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scrambled telephone conversation with General Marshall?

A. I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter

wouldn't have made an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter.

180. Q. Had you received in the two or three days prior to 7 December any information from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the effect that the Japanese had been detected in destroying codes, ciphers, and so forth?

A. I had not.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

181. Q. Over all, how many troops did you have, General Short, on 7 December 1941?

A. About 57,000.

[257] 182. Q. What was your estimate of minimum requirements at that time?

A. I had asked for the Hawaiian Garrison to be raised to 71,500, and told them at the same time that I would put in a later estimate for troops for the outlying islands which would have been in addition to the 71,500.

183. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, the opposite members of the Army and Navy in charge of the aircraft, exchanged daily information as to the number of planes that each service had available for service that day, did they not?

A. I'm quite sure they did. They were supposed to do that constantly, and I think they did.

184. Q. Did you show Admiral Kimmel the message that you received from the Adjutant General, on the 28th of November?

A. I did on the 27th, and I am inclined to think that I gave him copies on the 28th. It is possible I didn't but I think I did.

185. Q. You told Admiral Hart what you would have done if you had received the scrambled telephone message at the time that the dispatch was filed in Washington. That was 12:18 Washington time.

A. I figured that in place of filing it then—you see that allowed time for decoding, which would have been an hour, and I would have probably had it an hour ahead of that.

186. Q. What you have told Admiral Hart as to what you would have done if you had had the message at 11:18 Washington time, would have been made more certain and more sure had you received the information at 9:30 Washington time?

A. Very much surer.

187. Q. Could you have done any more had you received that information at 9:30 Washington time?

A. The preparations would probably have been a little more complete, although I think in two hours, our planes would not have reached the outlying islands but they would have been on their way and the additional time would have been valuable. I mean our bombers, because our plan was to send them to the outlying islands.

188. Q. You told the judge advocate that you did not recall seeing the message received by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval Operations dated the 24th of November?

A. I did not. I might have received it but I don't recall it.

189. Q. Well, what you mean is that you have no positive memory one way or the other about it?

A. Well, I think I would have remembered it if I had received it, because I remember other messages there without any question.

[258] 190. Q. Do you recall your testimony before the Roberts Commission, about seeing this message of 24 November?

A. I don't remember exactly what I said. I probably said the same thing, that I didn't know positively, because I don't remember. Of course, my memory might have been better then than now. That was much closer to the time.

191. Q. Would it refresh your memory as to the possible receipt of learning about the message of November 24th, General Short, to know that Lieutenant Commander Layton, intelligence officer to Admiral Kimmel, reported to him that a copy of this had been delivered to you at 12:20 on November 24th?

A. Did he state that it had been delivered to me personally?

192. Q. Delivered to General Short.

A. Personally?

193. Q. I will show you the report.

A. If he said he gave it to me personally, he probably did, but I do not remember the message.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

194. Q. General, this morning you spoke of a procedure that you had developed in connection with the interceptor command but which had not been officially promulgated.

A. That is correct.

195. Q. That document was in draft form and in the hands of your people?

A. Yes, sir.

196. Q. It bore the date of approximately 5 November, and do you recall it stating that the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, including available naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, the aircraft warning service and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control? I am just asking you about the document.

A. Yes, that's about right.

197. Q. Now, if you will remember, in that same document under Section 15 (i) of this same standard operating procedure, did that provide that the Department signal officer will (1) insure occupation of all battle stations by the aircraft warning service and then release it to the interceptor command, and then (2) insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in immediate readiness for such employment? Do you recall such a passage of the document?

A. I think I do, yes.

[259] 198. Q. Now, even though that procedure in the document was not officially promulgated, is it not the fact that the procedure was in effect from perhaps November 27 on, as indicated therein?

A. I am sure it was.

199. Q. That is how it was operating at the time, even though the paper wasn't released?

A. That's right; I'm sure that it was.

200. Q. Very good. Now, I have something I want to get straightened out and perhaps you can help me with it. This Exhibit 6, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935: Am I not correct in saying that this document represents Army-wide and Navy-wide general policy?

A. That is correct.

201. Q. It does not relate to a specific place?

A. That is correct.

202. Q. It represents general policy and agreement?

A. That's right.

203. Q. Now, in connection with JCD, General, being Exhibit 7: Is it not the fact that all pertinent provisions of policy that were in the joint action, this document, were picked up and incorporated in this document?

A. They should be.

204. Q. You have no doubt that the pertinent ones were; I mean, there is no question on that?

A. No.

205. Q. So that JCD, this document, really is, to all the extent that we need concern ourselves with, the document that bears upon the Hawaiian Islands?

A. That is right.

206. Q. And we need not concern ourselves with this because Exhibit 7 is the one that contains what goes on in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. That is right.

207. Q. Now, attached to this JCD were certain appendices that you have referred to, joint air defense, appendices 1 up to 7, that were made a very part of JCD-42?

A. Yes.

208. Q. And those documents and this document represent a plan; is that right?

A. Yes.

209. Q. That plan, while the language used here has been that it was not effective, by that we would understand that it was not in execution, nor was it in operation. Am I [200] I correct in that?

A. The plan?

210. Q. The plan.

A. It was in effect but not in operation.

211. Q. That is right. This JCD, in turn, was predicated upon the Rainbow War Plans; is that not correct?

A. That is right.

212. Q. In JCD on Page 8, Paragraph (C) (2), it provides that JCD will go into execution upon the execution of the War Plans, being the Rainbow Plans; is that right?

A. Yes.

213. Q. Or the establishment of M-day?

A. Yes.

214. Q. So the things you were describing, sir, this morning, that you did, were, so to speak, in anticipation in training, in getting ready for the actual execution of this plan?

A. That is correct.

215. Q. And so it was with the Navy?

A. That is correct.

216. Q. They, too, were taking anticipatory drill and training methods so that all of you might put this into effect when it came into effect as provided by Paragraph (2); is that correct?

A. That's right.

217. Q. Now, that plan and the appendices, which include the air measures, actually was in execution during the drill periods; is that right?

A. When we were having exercises, maneuvers, yes.

218. Q. When you were having exercises and drill plans, that plan and all appendices were in effect during that drill period?

A. That is correct.

219. Q. At the closing of the drill period, then the plan went back to its unexecuted status again?

A. That is correct.

220. Q. I would just like to clear up one other thing, General. I recall that you mentioned about a liaison officer in connection with the air raid warning service.

A. That is correct.

221. Q. And you mentioned something about the 5th of August?

A. Yes.

[261] 222. Q. Now, am I correct in this: That on August 5th you wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel which had a heading on it, "Aircraft Warning Service", or some such as this, and in it—and I quote what portions of it that I have—that the aircraft warning facilities, in connection with those, "Small scale operations are expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original set-up the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months". And then you went on to a further paragraph, "It seems greatly to the interests of both services to have a naval officer as a contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your headquarters be detailed to serve as a liaison between your headquarters and mine." Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

223. Q. That is the letter you were speaking of this morning?

A. Yes.

224. Q. Then in answer to that, do you recall receiving from Admiral Kimmel on August 16th, a reply to that in which he says that, "In reply to your suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison with your headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Morris D. Curtis, U. S. Navy, communications officer on my staff, has been assigned to that duty." Do you recall that reply?

A. Yes. I am doubtful whether he understood, whether he intended from that letter that Curtis was to act as liaison in the play of the game with the aircraft warning service.

225. Q. General, the liaison officer that you were talking about in respect of August 5th, in fact, was appointed by Admiral Kimmel August 16th, from that point on. Right?

A. A liaison officer was appointed.

226. Q. No, but I mean, the very one that you are speaking of, sir.

A. I do not know personally whether Commander Curtis functioned in that capacity, or not.

227. Q. Then we will let the letters speak for themselves, as far as you know?

A. I have had the feeling that he intended for a general liaison, rather than for a liaison officer with the aircraft warning service.

228. Q. General, sir, in connection with that liaison: In addition to whatever may have been the matter of Lieutenant Commander Curts, there did come a time subsequent to the 15 men going out with the Fleet, that you [262] wished assistance in connection with radar, and there was made available to you by Admiral Kimmel, an expert in those matters?

A. Commander Taylor.

229. Q. Even previous to him, there was a Commander Hitchcock, was there not?

A. I don't remember him. I remember Taylor.

230. Q. And those, at least so far as you recall—Commander Taylor was made available to your people, worked with them in connection with giving them all the experience that the Navy had with these matters?

A. That is right.

231. Q. And worked with you, for example, clear through this period that we are talking about?

A. That is correct. May I make a statement here? When I wrote the letter, what I had in mind was a liaison officer as provided in Paragraph 6 of Section 3, Communications, Appendix No. 7. Now, I would like to read what it says. This is in regard to the coastal frontier defense plan. "Upon establishment of the aircraft warning service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the aircraft warning service information center." What I had in mind in writing that letter was a naval officer that would sit right there in the interceptor command and comply with that paragraph, tell the Navy where targets were, and if they had information, tell the interceptor command of the information they had.

232. Q. On that, sir, during the drills conducted under these documents, there was such a liaison officer there during the drills; is that not right?

A. I frankly don't know because unfortunately I didn't get over to the station between 4:00 and 7:00 in the morning. I was there several times in that period other times of the day when they were going ahead with their training but the liaison officer, the period they were formally working was 4:00 to 7:00, and I thought that there was a liaison officer from the Navy working with them all the time and I can't say definitely there was because I didn't go through at that time.

233. Q. Now, the time that we were speaking about, sir, in connection with this paragraph, this that you have [263] referred to calls for there being a liaison officer, or at least it can be inter-

preted that way, upon establishment of the aircraft warning service.

A. That is right.

234. Q. I take it you issued no orders that the aircraft warning service had been established?

A. There were only verbal instructions, but no formal, written orders the 7th day of December, but it was operating.

235. Q. It was somewhat of a training device?

A. Well, yes. It was really both. It was training and getting information, and as I remember, about the 24th of November we asked Lieutenant Burr to take up informally again about getting liaison officers to work with the aircraft warning service. Now as I say, I don't know whether that request was complied with, or not.

236. Q. As you recall that, that would be something over and above Lieutenant Commander Curts, and Taylor?

A. Oh, Yes, that would be definitely under the provisions of this Paragraph 6, Section 3, Communications, Appendix No. 7.

237. Q. On this same thing in connection with this communication facility, General, was your aircraft warning service fully equipped on December 7th with all parts?

A. There were 6 mobile stations which were equipped.

238. Q. And your switchboards were all fully manned?

A. Yes, everything as far as the mobile stations were concerned, and we had our control room operating from November 27th, just like it operated later; only it wasn't being done by a written order.

239. Q. Only just for those few hours?

A. From 4:00 to 7:00. Well, I think it was actually operated but they went ahead and trained, did more or less as they wanted to—I mean the different commanders—from 7:00 to 11:00, and from 1:00 to 4:00.

Examined by the court:

240. Q. General, were you familiar with the State Department note of November 26th to Japan?

A. I may have read it in that State Department paper that came out a year or so after the attack. I am sure I never saw it before.

241. Q. Up to December 7th you had no intimation of its existence?

A. No. That was true of most of the stuff that was in that State Department paper. I read it all carefully but most of it was new to me.

[264] 242. Q. General, were you influenced in any way, or perhaps deterred in assuming Alert No. 3, by the War Department's injunction not to alarm the populace by unusual activity?

A. Alert No. 2, or No. 3 either one would have had us carrying live ammunition out; I mean, large 3-inch ammunition right in the middle of the city, and would undoubtedly have caused some alarm with the strained relations we had. That entered into the thing because I had been cautioned not to alarm the public.

243. Q. You mean, then, the War Department's warning to you did affect your decision?

A. It did, unquestionably.

244. Q. Then General, if you had received the dispatch which you did not receive until 2:58—had you received it earlier that morning, would you then have been influenced by this War Department injunction?

A. No, I would not have been because I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously.

245. Q. You would have thought that over very seriously?

A. I would have taken it very seriously.

246. Q. General, do we understand that at frequent intervals during this period from 27 November to 7 December, you had telephonic communication with officials in the War Department?

A. I did not.

247. Q. You did not?

A. No.

248. Q. You had no 'phone communication with them?

A. I don't think I talked to them by 'phone a single time. The communication system was there but we weren't using it.

249. Q. Nor was your Chief of Staff using it?

A. No. We just used that scrambler 'phone on very important things where we wanted to talk to the Chief of Staff himself and be sure we got his slant. I hardly ever used it any other way.

250. Q. General, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, did you have information, intimation, or even a suspicion from any source, officially or otherwise, that Japan's known preparations in the Western Pacific might indicate a hostile movement elsewhere than toward the Malay Peninsula?

A. As to the information of movement of enemy vessels, all I got from Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, as I remember, the only thing was that they were in home ports, or a considerable number had moved to the south, and mentioned several places to the south and southwest.

[265] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reported, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

251. Q. Nothing indicated there were vessels east of Guam, for instance?

A. Nothing.

252. Q. General, what is your estimate of the time interval between the first bomb that was hurled by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and the total manning of the anti-aircraft guns at Oahu?

A. I think, except for four batteries which had 3-inch guns and had to draw their ammunition from the munition depot, that they were all ready to open fire at 8:15. That does not mean they opened fire. I think they were all ready except four batteries which did not have ammunition.

253. Q. What were the considerations governing your order to limit radar operations from four to seven on the morning of December 7?

A. Our study indicated that any enemy that was going to make an attack had the best chance of making the attack and getting away if he made it either at dawn or at dusk. It finally got around to the point that the most advantageous time would be dawn. We felt that by working two hours before dawn and one hour after dawn we would cover the most dangerous part of the day and also give our men practice in the part of the day where they would have to be most careful if we had hostilities.

254. Q. In that connection if the range of your radar was not much more than a hundred miles—You stated it was about seventy-five?

A. That's what you count on. We actually got 132.

255. Q. Wasn't 7:30 a. m. a little early to secure the radar?

A. 7:00 a. m. was an hour after daylight. Daylight was just about 6 o'clock.

256. Q. You have testified, General, that your radar actually picked up planes at a distance of about 132 miles.

A. That is correct.

257. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you known that there were enemy planes about to attack Oahu, immediately when this contact was made and with the means available to you, could you have repelled the attack which actually took place and prevented the resulting damage done to Army and Navy personnel?

A. We would not have had time to get our planes in [266] the air. We would have had time to disperse their planes. You could have gotten the planes dispersed, and we would have suffered less loss of planes. I don't think we could possibly have prevented that attack by torpedo planes on the battleships.

258. Q. If you had had that information from the War Department, say, two hours sooner, would it have enable you to repel the attack which actually took place with the means available to you and prevented the resulting damage?

A. It is awfully difficult to say about that. We could undoubtedly have gotten part of them, but I doubt very much whether we could have prevented their making the attack against the battleships, and even if the anti-aircraft had been ready to fire, they came in so low, the 3-inch guns couldn't have fired on them, and the anchor chains were fast.

259. Q. Is it not a historical fact that practically every aircraft attack launched in this war has been partially driven in?

A. I think it can always be driven in. We would have knocked down more of their planes if we had everything we had in the air.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy (Continued):

260. Q. General, I shall read to you from a dispatch which is Exhibit 20 before this court: (Reading) "Highly reliable information has been received, and categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at, among other places, Manila and Washington." That is a dispatch dated December 3, sent from the Navy Department to various addressees. Referring to your testimony in response to my previous questions, if you had been informed of that dispatch soon after it was sent, in what way would that have changed your dispositions and actions?

A. I'm not sure, because if you look at that dispatch again, it points down toward the Malays and that section of the world where all this action was taking place, and taken in conjunction with the information I had from the Navy as to the Japanese Fleet, it might have concurred with my idea that that was where the action would be.

261. Q. General, insofar as Washington is concerned, that dispatch gave the same information which you might have received from General Marshall by telephone on the morning of December 7?

A. Oh, no. He said there had been an ultimatum delivered and ordered codes destroyed.

[267] Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret.), (Continued):

262. Q. General, you had a special communication by telephone with the War Department?

A. I had one in my office and they had one.

263. Q. It was not commercial?

A. It was partially scrambled. It was partially scrambled in Honolulu and partially scrambled in San Francisco, but it was a mechanical device. You got all your connections, and they said, "Pull up your plug." It was a commercial phone.

264. Q. It was on an Army circuit?

A. Yes, but whether the commercial telephone people could have done anything to it, if they wanted to, I don't know.

265. Q. All six of the mobile radar were operating on December 7?

A. I think they were.

266. Q. Now, do you know in what direction the planes which were ultimately determined to be Japanese were detected on this radar at 7:15 or thereabouts?

A. Three degrees east of north, about 132 miles out.

267. Q. Do you know whether that radar detected the approach of the Army bombers?

A. I don't know, because the Army bombers came in five minutes later.

268. Q. You knew the course in which the Army bombers were due to come?

A. They were to come in from the north. There were only three degrees difference.

269. Q. The people who were operating the radar knew about the approach of the Army bombers?

A. No, they didn't. The officer in the Control Office in the Interceptor Command did, but the sergeant who was working the station did not know that any planes were coming in.

270. Q. But the officer did?

A. The officer in the Control Station did.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (Continued):

[268] 271. Q. Admiral, you stated that in your opinion it was the responsibility of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel to go to sea and to do distance reconnaissance. You, of course, are expressing only an opinion. You do not know what the fact was?

A. I do not know exactly the division of labor between them. What led me to say that, there had been talk about assignment of planes, so if the Fleet went out, we would still have something for distance reconnaissance. If the Fleet went out, the 14th Naval District Commander would have full responsibility.

272. Q. During all this period you are talking about, the Fleet Commander was there?

A. Yes. I frankly don't know the division between the two of them, only I have the feeling, through my liaison with Admiral Bloch—

273. Q. Sometimes with Admiral Kimmel alone?

A. Sometimes and sometimes he came to my headquarters and discussed things. A great many times Admiral Bloch was in on it.

Examined by the court:

274. Q. General, in making your estimates and studies and in your several discussions with your staff and others regarding the probable war with Japan, as we understood it, you finally decided that sabotage would be given priority?

A. With the information we had then.

275. Q. And you and your staff were in agreement on that?

A. We were. I know my G-2 and my Chief of Staff agreed. I didn't talk over the details with anybody but them.

276. Q. You did discuss this on the 27th with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific?

A. We had discussed the probability of air attacks that morning, and we got that wire in the afternoon, and I sent him a copy of it, and I am quite sure—I don't believe I took that copy to him, but I am sure he was informed.

276. Q. Following December 7 there was in the papers—and I understood there was some reference to it in the Roberts Report—a reference to over-indulgence in alcoholic liquors on the part of the naval and armed forces in the Hawaiian Islands. Can you enlighten us on that in any way from your knowledge of conditions?

A. You mean on that particular night?

[269] 277. Q. Yes, the night of December 6 and 7th?

A. I couldn't say anything about the Navy on that night, because I went to Schofield Barracks about 7 o'clock and came back about 10 and wasn't down in that part of the city. I can say definitely that at Schofield Barracks, where our two infantry divisions were stationed and a big majority of the officers were present at a party given for Army relief purposes, where they had a cabaret, there was no drinking in excess. I imagine that various people had dinner parties, and probably most of them had a cocktail or two before dinner, but I saw no one who had too much to drink. I didn't see any Navy, except a few naval officers who happened to be at the Army post that night.

278. Q. Were the effects of possible over-indulgence evident on the morning of December 7?

A. They were not. I don't believe I saw more than two officers under the influence of drink during the whole time I was in Hawaii.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

279. Q. You have testified that the aircraft warning by means of its radar picked up some planes at a distance of 132 miles from the station at Pearl Harbor in a northerly direction. Is that substantially correct?

A. Three degrees east of north.

280. Q. Was there any way that this radar station had of identifying those planes as friendly or enemy?

A. There isn't any possibility.

281. Q. Unless there had been some means of knowing what friendly planes were around, it would then be, I understand, impossible to tell whether planes picked up at this time by radar method could be identified as friendly or enemy?

A. And when you are expecting friendly planes on a direction just three degrees difference, I don't believe anyone would dare say definitely they were enemy planes.

282. Q. Do you know whether any track was made of these incoming planes by the operator who detected them?

A. They were followed until they were a few miles north of Oahu, and apparently they turned east, so that they were out of the range between the station and the planes.

283. Q. Technically, in making this track you speak of, is the actual path of the planes indicated in any manner graphically for the record?

A. I have forgotten. I have watched them operate, but I think they should record.

[270] 284. Q. Do you remember whether any track was made of these enemy planes when they departed from the attack on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. It would simply indicate that a bunch of them, some little distance down in the southwest, seemed to disappear. It indicated they had been aboard a carrier.

285. Q. To save the time of the court, do you or do you not feel that you can give us any testimony with regard to this track of planes as they retired?

A. My information is not definite on that.

Examined by the court:

286. Q. In that connection, did you receive prior information regarding the sending of planes from Hamilton Field to Oahu?

A. Oh, yes, we knew they were coming in.

Neither the judge advocate, the interested parties, nor the court desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness said that he had nothing further to state.

The court inquired of the interested party, Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), whether he desired to remain an interested party.

The interested party, Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), stated that he did not so desire.

The court announced that Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army (Ret), was, at his own request, released as an interested party and was no longer accorded status as such before the court.

The witness was duly warned, and with his counsel, withdrew.

The court then, at 3:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 15, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944.

[271]

TENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the ninth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, one of counsel for the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

1. Q. You are the same Robert D. Powers, Junior, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, who testified earlier in these proceedings?

A. I am.

2. Q. I hand you a document; can you identify it?

A. I can, sir. I am the authorized custodian of this document, which was received under official seal from the War Department. It is a memorandum of a dispatch to be released, in which it is certified that it was released to various officers, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12:17 December 7, 1941, by Western Union Telegraph and Radio Corporation of America.

[272] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), requested that the time, 12:17, be clarified as to time zone; that is, whether it be Eastern Standard time or some other time.

The court directed that such clarification be made.

3. Q. Do you have any means of knowing to what time the various time zones in this message refer; whether it is Eastern Standard Time, Greenwich Civil Time, or what?

A. Of my own knowledge, I do not.

With the permission of the court, the judge advocate directed the witness to confer with the War Department in order to ascertain as to the time zones in which the times indicated in the message refer, and to report thereupon.

It was stipulated by the judge advocate and the interested parties, with the permission of the court, that the determination by the witness would be admissible before the court.

The memorandum of dispatch released by the War Department, certifying as to the dispatch of a message by the War Department to various officers, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at 12:17, December 7, 1941, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 48."

4. Q. Will you please read the memorandum?

The witness read the memorandum, "Exhibit 48."

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by his previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, was called as a witness by the judge advocate, [273] was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Husband Edward Kimmel, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy retired.

2. Q. Please state what your duty was on 7 December 1941?

A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and U. S. Fleet.

3. Q. When did you assume this duty?

A. 1 February 1941.

4. Q. When were you relieved of this duty?

A. 17 December 1941.

5. Q. I show you a document, marked Exhibit 5 before this court, which is called WP Pac 46. Please state its nature and whether it was in effect on 7 December 1941.

A. WP Pac 46 was made effective on 7 December 1941, by my order, immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Complete readiness to place WP Pac 46 was required of all elements of the Pacific Fleet.

6. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 6 before this court. Can you identify it?

A. I recognize Exhibit 6 as a publication called, "Joint Action of Army and Navy 1935." I presume and request the assurance of the

judge advocate that this copy of the Joint Action of the Army and Navy is corrected as of 7 December 1941.

The judge advocate stated that the witness might be assured.

7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 7, which has been presented in evidence before this court, and ask you if you recognize it and what it is.

A. I recognize Exhibit 7 as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, prepared in Hawaii, and approved by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

8. Q. In a general way, Admiral, can you state to the court what the major task groups of the Pacific Fleet were on 7 December 1941, and who were the respective commanders of task forces?

A. The major task groups of the Pacific Fleet on [274] 7 December 1941, are shown in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, of 31 October 1941. With minor changes, this task force organization was in effect during all the time I commanded the Pacific Fleet. The changes which were made as a result of experience may be obtained from a comparison of Pacific Fleet Letter No. 4 CL-41 of 30 April 1941. It will be noted that the publication of October 31, 1941, is much more complete. Task Force One under the command of the Commander Battle Force, Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy, was composed of six battleships, one carrier, five light cruisers, one old light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen destroyers, one mine layer, and one minesweeper. His primary mission was to organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force, in order to provide an efficient covering force available for supporting operations of other areas; or for engagement, with or without support, in Fleet action.

Task Force Two under the command of the Commander Air Craft Battle Force, Vice Admiral William Halsey—William F. Halsey—U. S. Navy, was comprised of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four heavy cruisers, one old light cruiser, two destroyer leaders, sixteen destroyers, and four mine layers. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three under the command of the Commander Scouting Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, was comprised of eight heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, one destroyer leader, eight destroyers, thirteen minesweepers, and six transports. I might state that the troop transports were non-existent. Its primary mission was to organize, train and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by

the task force in order to provide an efficient amphibious force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four, under command of the commandant 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and develop the island bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations. By the provisions of 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941, the [275] Commandant 14th Naval District was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and his duties were laid down in detail in that publication, which is in evidence before this court. Task Force Seven, under the Command of the Commander Submarine Scouting Force, Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, U. S. Navy, was composed of all the submarines in the Pacific and their tenders. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases. Task Force Nine was under the Command of the Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy. It included all of the patrol planes and sea plane tenders in the Pacific. Its primary mission was to organize, train, and concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine in tactics in order to provide an efficient long-range Air Scouting and Air Striking Force for independent operation or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases. Task Force Fifteen, Commander Base Force, Rear Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, was composed of four CA and CLs, whose primary mission was to escort trans-Pacific shipping in order to protect trans-Pacific shipping against possible attack. Cruisers were rotated in duty under Task Force Fifteen and supplied from the other forces, according to the Command. Force and Type Commander continued to exercise the other functions as required by the administrative organizations as set forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 13CN-41 of 1 October 1941, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

9. Q. Who was your next senior in command in the Pacific Fleet?

A. Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy.

10. Q. I call your attention to General Order No. 143. Will you state what your duties were under this order for the period in which you were in command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

A. For the period 1 February to 17 December 1941, I was Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet. My duties were set forth in General Order No. 143, the Navy Regulations, General Orders and War Plans; General Order No. 143 provided for the organization of the United States Fleet into three Fleets, viz., U. S. Atlantic Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. In addition it provided for: National Coastal Frontier Forces;

Special Task Forces; Special Duty Ships; Naval Transportation Service; Naval District Craft. As Commander-in- [276] Chief Pacific Fleet, I exercised command over the Pacific Fleet, and as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet, I exercised command over either one or both of the other two fleets when concentrated with the Pacific Fleet to form a task force. Also, under the Chief of Naval Operations the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet, through the Type Commanders, was required to prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy.

11. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, what duties had you assigned the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, I had assigned the Commandant 14th Naval District to perform the duties of Naval Base Defense Officer for Pearl Harbor and set forth his duties in 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941. I had also assigned the Commandant 14th Naval District to Command Task Force Four, U. S. Pacific Fleet, which included that part of the 14th Naval District Activities which involved the Island Bases. He was charged with the duty of organizing, training, and developing the island bases.

12. Q. As Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, had any other duties, other than those set forth in 143, been assigned to you?

A. As Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, the duties as set forth in Navy Regulations, General Orders, and War Plans, were assigned to me when I was detailed to these duties. The duties required are reasonably well summarized in General Order 143, the essential points of which have been covered in this discussion.

13. Q. What were the aircraft forces under your command, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in the period from October 16, 1941, to December 7, 1941?

A. The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet was divided into two general categories: the aircraft which was based on carriers, and included land-plane types only; the aircraft which were based on shore, which included both seaplanes and land planes. Seaplanes could be, and frequently were, based upon a seaplane tender in a sheltered harbor. While based on an aircraft carrier or on a seaplane tender, the planes were under the command of the forces afloat exclusively. While the planes were based at Pearl Harbor, there were certain planes which were under the Command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District and assigned to him to perform more or less routine tasks. Under the Commandant on Ford Island there was an officer ordered to command an air base. He was responsible to the Commandant for operating the planes assigned exclusively to the Commandant, and was also responsible to the Commandant for supplying to the carriers the facilities for their operation while the carriers were in port. The commander of the air base was also responsible for supplying the Patrol Wing Two facilities and services necessary to operate those patrol planes based on Ford Island, and under the Command of [277] Patrol Wing Two—Commander Patrol Wing Two was in command of the Patrol Wing, which was a part of the Fleet. He was also Commander of the aircraft assigned for the defense of bases

as set forth in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of 11 April 1941, in addendum 1, the Naval Base Defense Force, Air Force Operating Plan No. A4-41, of March 31, 1941. Briefly, Patrol Wing Two was responsible to Commander-in-Chief for the training and operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Fleet, and was responsible to the Commandant, 14th Naval District for the training and operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Naval Base Defense Forces, at which time, of course, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.

14. Under the organization you had in effect; how were aircraft made available to the Commandant 14th Naval District?

A. Aircraft were made available to the Commandant 14th Naval District upon his request, either to ComPatWing Two, or to the Commander-in-Chief. Normally, ComPatWing Two would make such aircraft available upon request unless there were conflict with other commitments, in which case he would refer to the Commander-in-Chief. All Navy shore-based planes were automatically made available to the Commandant, 14th Naval District or the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, upon sounding of the air-raid alarm, either for drills or for the real thing. All such planes had frequently been made available in this matter for practice prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to the best of my knowledge, were so made available when the attack took place.

15. Q. Did you, on 7 December 1941, have in effect any written orders for security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, 2CL-41 of 14 October 1941. I might add that this letter of 14 October was a revision of a letter written in February of 1941, and promulgated to the Fleet at that time. This revision was the result of tying up certain loose ends, which we found as a result of experience to be desirable.

16. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8 and ask you if this is the document to which you refer—it being marked Exhibit No. 8 for identification.

A. That is the document to which I refer.

2CL-41, of October 14, 1941, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 8."

17. Q. I will ask you to read it to the court.

The witness read 2CL-41 of October 14, 1941, Exhibit 8.

[278] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

18. Q. Did this Order 2CL-41 comprise all the security measures issued by you for the security of the Fleet and naval establishments in the Pearl Harbor area and which were in effect on 7 December 1941?

A. Certain measures which are prescribed in Fleet Tactical Orders and Instructions were applicable to the Fleet or individual ships thereof while in Pearl Harbor. In this category were the conditions of material readiness which could be and were prescribed on occasions. I cannot now recall any specific instructions for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor except those contained in 2CL-41 of October 14, 1941. Certain standing orders pursuant to 2CL-41 were issued

by the task force and type commanders. Such a one was an order of Commander, Battleships, Battle Force, issued in April, 1941, which required a continuous manning of a part of the anti-aircraft batteries. This was a twenty-four hour watch on the anti-aircraft batteries. In other orders, I provided for all types to have ready ammunition on deck in ammunition boxes readily accessible to the anti-aircraft guns at all times, both day and night.

19. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, preceding the attack, can you tell the court what the material condition of readiness was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet then in Pearl Harbor?

A. The condition of readiness No. 3, as laid down in 2CL-41 had been prescribed some time before by Vice Admiral Pye, and that was in effect on the day of the attack. In addition to that, the Commander of Battleships, Battle Force, had issued an order requiring two, 5-inch guns and two, 50-calibre guns on each battleship to be manned at all times. These were, to the best of my knowledge and belief, manned on the date in question.

20. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, where did you have your flag flying on 6-7 December 1941, up until the hour of the Japanese attack?

A. My headquarters were at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. My personal quarters were in a house on a hill in a new development behind and to the rear of the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. All provision was made to control the Fleet from my headquarters at the Submarine Base. We had communication direct from the Submarine Base to the Fleet by way of the high-powered stations on shore, and I felt, and my communication officer advised me, that we had facilities equal to, if not superior to, those that we had on the PENNSYLVANIA for communication with the Fleet.

[279] 21. Q. Under these conditions and your own 2CL-41, which has just been read into the record, do you consider that you were embarked in Pearl Harbor?

A. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I transferred my flag to shore solely because I felt that I could exercise command of the Pacific Fleet more expeditiously from that point than I could from on board the ship. When I went ashore and established my headquarters on shore, I did not intend to supplant the Commandant, 14th Naval District in the exercise of the duties assigned to him by the Navy Department and by my orders.

22. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-41, I ask you to look at Paragraph 3 (g), which has a sub-title, "Defense against air attack", and under that paragraph, refer to sub-paragraph (d) (1), in which are outlined some of the duties of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, one of which is advising the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, what condition of readiness to maintain. What I am trying to find out is this, Admiral: Under the conditions of having your flag flying on shore, did you consider yourself the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor within the meaning of this sub-paragraph?

A. I did not.

23. Q. Will you tell the court who, on the morning of 7 December 1941, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, the senior officer was?

A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, USN, Commander Battle Force U. S. Fleet and Commander Task Force 1, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

24. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph 3 (g), "Defense against air attack", under sub-paragraph 6 thereof, certain duties are laid down for the Commandant, 14th Naval District in regard to matters affecting the defense of Pearl Harbor and the ships of the Pacific Fleet therein. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, except the Commandant to carry out these various functions directly with the Fleet or officers concerned, and without reference to you?

A. Yes. If there was any doubt in his mind about what he was to do, he had access to me at all times.

25. Q. Now, one of the duties prescribed here and to which I have before adverted, was the duty of advising the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Can you remember the condition of readiness that had been prescribed by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in compliance with this directive on the night of 6-7 December, 1941?

A. I do not know that he prescribed, or advised Admiral Pye to prescribe, any condition of readiness on that day.

[280] 26. Q. Can you state to the court what the condition of readiness was on 6-7 December 1941 up until the time of the initiation of the Japanese attack?

A. I have already stated to the court, Condition 3. That condition 3 was prescribed with certain modifications which, incidentally, were additional safety measures prescribed by the Commander, Battleships and Battle Force.

27. Q. And this condition of readiness to which you have just referred in your last answer met with your full approval?

A. Yes, I thought it was sufficient.

28. Q. As Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and with your headquarters located as you have described them, did you have any unit for furnishing you with combat intelligence?

A. I depended largely upon the units under the direction of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, who had a reasonably complete set-up for obtaining this information.

29. Q. Am I to infer, then, that your own intelligence unit, that which belonged to the Fleet, was rather a minor part of this organization, or what am I to understand?

A. Well, it was an essential but not a major part.

30. Q. Did this intelligence unit that belonged to the Fleet work with and function with the intelligence unit that you have described as belonging to the Commandant, 14th Naval District?

A. Yes.

31. Q. What do you consider the efficiency of this combined intelligence unit to have been prior to 7 December 1941?

A. From my observation of their operation, I thought the efficiency of this intelligence unit was quite satisfactory prior to 7 December 1941.

32. Q. Did you, prior to 7 December 1941, receive combat intelligence from other sources than your own unit?

A. Yes. We received reports from Commandant, 16th Naval District, from the Navy Department, and our own forces, wherever they may be.

33. Q. From your experience with combat intelligence as you received it, did you feel that it was—

A. Well, I am talking about all kinds of intelligence.

34. Q. That is what I am talking about too, generally,

A. I think combat intelligence is a little more restrictive than what we are talking about.

[281] 35. Q. The meaning I am trying to convey to you when I ask you questions about combat intelligence is essentially the information you had upon which you made military decisions?

A. That is right. Well, by that definition, I received combat intelligence from all naval sources, from many naval sources, and the decisions I made were based upon my evaluation of this information.

36. Q. Speaking of evaluation, Admiral, did this intelligence service that you had organized ordinarily evaluate the information prior to giving it to you, or just exactly how did the evaluation function operate, if you can remember?

A. They presented to me summaries of the information. It was physically impossible for one man to go over all the information. I received summaries and, to a certain extent, conclusions that the intelligence units had drawn, and the basic facts generally presented, what they considered important basic matter.

37. Q. I presume you had a War Plans officer or division set up in your own staff, did you not?

A. I had a War Plans division set up within my own staff composed of Captain C. H. McMorris, Captain McCormick, Commander V. R. Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer of the United States Marine Corps, and one lieutenant whose names escapes me for the moment. Incidentally, the War Plans division of my staff was greatly expanded immediately after I took command. I thought that the number of people engaged in producing War Plans should be considerably augmented. I therefore added two captains and a colonel in the Marine Corps to the ones that I got at the time that I took command. And in that connection it may be well to point out to the court that that was one of the prime considerations which decided me to move my headquarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to the Submarine Base. I had a choice of dividing my staff or of going ashore. I could have divided it by putting part of the staff on other ships. I could not have my staff available to me with their advice in their entirety in any other way than by taking up my quarters on shore. The number of the staff in War Plans and in intelligence and public relations was such that it was a physical impossibility to have them on board the PENNSYLVANIA and at the same time have them operate in an efficient manner.

38. Q. Would you tell the court how this War Plans division functioned with you in evaluating enemy intelligence?

A. All enemy intelligence went to the War Plans division and was discussed and estimates drawn from day to day as to what this information meant and what action we should take as a result of this information. I had [282] the Fleet intelligence officer bring to me daily the summaries made of the information received in the last 24 hours and go over it with me in detail. My chief of staff was generally present, and also the War Plans officer was present at this conference. In any event, they always received this information, and this information included all messages that I received from the Navy Department. In addition to the senior member of the War Plans division—who was Captain McCormick—Captain DeLany, my opera-

tions officer, was also kept fully informed in order that the War Plans and Operations should not get in any degree at cross purposes.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), suggested that the question referred to enemy intelligence, and asked if it were to be assumed that the question referred to countries who are now enemies.

The judge advocate replied in the affirmative; that the judge advocate meant, in asking his question in which he used the term "enemy", "possible enemies".

With the court's permission, the witness made the following statement: Up until the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 December we were at peace and I was the first one to recognize the changed situation.

39. Q. Did your organization exchange intelligence with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. We did, to this extent: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had his interests restricted to the defense of Hawaii and to such of the outlying islands as he had his forces and the ones to which he expected to send his forces. He was primarily interested in the probability of attack where his forces were stationed, and in general, the information I gave to him bore upon his interests, or was confined to his interests. My own interests covered a much greater geographical area and many more factors. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of everything that I thought would be useful to him. I did not inform the Commanding General of my proposed plans and what I expected to do in the Marshalls and other places distant from Hawaii. I saw no reason for taking the additional chance of having such information divulged by giving it to an agency who would have no part in the execution of the plan.

[283] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

40. Q. Did you likewise receive any information from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. I believe the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department gave me every bit of information that he had. We exchanged information fully and freely.

41. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 8, which is Fleet Letter 2CL-41, and calling your attention to paragraph 2 (b), which has been read into the record but which I shall now read for your information: "That a declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, (3) a combination of these two." Did this estimate continue from the time this letter was promulgated up to the time of the attack by the Japanese on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. This specific confidential letter and the assumptions upon which it is based are not so much an estimate as they were a basis for the training of the Fleet to meet all contingencies that might arise. Estimates and the chances of any particular action might change from day to day, but this was a letter to provide for the security of the Fleet under all the contingencies which we could foresee.

42. Q. I again refer to Exhibit 8 and refer you to paragraph 3 (G) entitled "Defense Against Air Attack." After you have read each

directive thereunder to yourself, will you state to the court categorically what action had been taken prior to December 7, 1941, or at the time of the attack on that morning, whichever way may be applicable?

A. In my opinion, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department disposed his available troops and material to the best advantage. I felt then and still feel that there were many deficiencies, particularly in anti-aircraft defense. General Short testified here yesterday about the steps he took as to the adequacy of the material and as to the material he had available and as to the number and types and weapons and personnel that he had available. I feel that his statement is better than any I could make on this subject. So far as the other paragraphs in this letter, there were practically no naval guns based on shore except those which belonged to the marine defense battalions temporarily stationed in Pearl Harbor. My recollection is that there were very few marine guns available on that day. Do you wish me now to cover the question of long distance reconnaissance?

43. Q. Just in a general manner. I shall cover it specifically later on.

A. The number of planes available to the Fleet, to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and to the Commanding General in Hawaii had all been lumped into one coordinated force by the agreements arrived at. Of those planes, there was not a sufficient number of the type required to perform distance reconnaissance effectively. There was not a sufficient number of planes of the long range available to make a complete reconnaissance for one day, utilizing all of them. A continuous patrol over long periods of time was out of the question. In this connection, I can state there was a total of eighty-one patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian area. There was a total of twelve B-17 Army planes in the Hawaiian area. Of these, a maximum of sixty-one patrol planes and six B-17's were available on the island of Oahu during the period immediately preceding the attack. We had some patrol planes operating from Midway. I base my statement that there was not a sufficient number of planes to perform a 360 degree search for one day on a requirement of eighty-four planes to make the 360 degree search, based on a fifteen-mile visibility. I think that can be demonstrated. I might state that when I took command of the Fleet I thoroughly appreciated the deficiencies in anti-aircraft defense that existed in Oahu and in the Hawaiian area. I read the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War. I read the answer written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy. I also read the letter written by the Commandant, 14th Naval District and forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief on or about January 7, 1941. All these letters set forth clearly the inadequacy of the force available in Pearl Harbor for aircraft defense. There was a deficiency in reconnaissance planes and in various other elements. Recognizing this and recognizing that it was a physical impossibility for General Short to perform distance reconnaissance, there was nothing that we could do. We had no choice except to attempt to utilize the forces that we had to the best advantage, and I think we did organize and use these forces to the best advantage. It was unfortunate that the warnings, messages, and information from the Navy Department did not convey to us the imminence of war and the imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor that some witnesses now want to read into those warnings. We did

not get it. We had in the Fleet a constantly changing personnel—officers and enlisted men. In November I mentioned in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations that we needed 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet to fill our complements and to fill the schools and other training institutions that we had. I had also attempted to get the enlisted men of the Navy frozen in their positions. In other words, I wanted to cancel the [385] expiration of enlistments. I made a trip to Washington, advanced that in letters both before and after that trip in June, 1941, and I took it up with the chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committee. We never did get that revision put into effect, and we continued to lose our men, who were attracted outside by the high wages prevailing about that time and doubted whether or not we would get into the war. It was absolutely essential that we maintain training in the Pacific Fleet up until the last minute. If we had stopped training the first time we received these alarming messages, I feel certain that by the time war was declared our ships would have been in a dangerously ineffective condition. As an example, we were supplying men for the expansion program both on shore and at sea, and as I recall at the present time, we were transferring twelve patrol plane crews a month from Pearl Harbor to the mainland, training those patrol crews in the Fleet, and we had a great urge to continue our work of training the Fleet. These were the conditions that confronted me when I made the decision on the 27th of November not to stop training in the Fleet but to continue until further developments.

44. Q. The judge advocate is primarily concerned at the present moment with your views as to whether or not the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer, did or did not carry out the duties under sub-paragraph 6 of Article 3 (G), which you have just read, and he would like to have you, as the Commander-in-Chief and as his immediate superior, state categorically whether or not the duties outlined thereunder were performed to your satisfaction?

A. I can state, in general, that the performance of duty of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer and as prescribed in paragraph 3 (G) and sub-paragraph 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), was, in general, satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief. If it had not been so performed, I would not have hesitated at any time to call his attention to the fact.

45. Q. Was there any different condition of readiness for action in regard to naval base defense activities than those prescribed for units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. As Naval Base Defense Officer was charged with fixing the state of readiness for all the shore activities, and he was charged with advising the senior officer afloat, in this case Admiral Pye, what he considered to be the state of readiness of the ships. That was put in to insure that all the information in the hands of the commandant of the district was placed in the hands of the senior officer afloat [286] and not to have any condition arise where the Commandant of the district might have information which was not in the hands of the senior officer afloat. The responsibility for fixing the state of readiness of the ship was not taken away from the senior officer afloat.

46. Q. It is not quite clear to me, Admiral, exactly what connection the advice of the Naval Base Defense Officer had to do with a con-

dition of readiness in the Fleet, but if I understand your answer correctly, it is that the senior officer afloat in the Fleet prescribed his own condition of readiness?

A. That is correct.

47. Q. And he might take into consideration, if he wanted to, the condition of readiness which was being maintained by the Naval Base Defense Officer if he so desired?

A. And the advice he received from the Naval Base Defense Officer.

48. Q. The senior officer present afloat was responsible for the condition of readiness of vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. That is correct.

49. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941 and which has been introduced in its entirety into the record. Do you recognize this letter as any that you have been acquainted with?

A. Yes, I saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, early in February, 1941.

50. Q. Referring to this letter as of the time you received it, did the views expressed therein differ from your own views materially on matters of military defense at Pearl Harbor?

A. I was in substantial agreement with this letter, although I differed somewhat from the probabilities as established therein. This letter was, I believe, initiated in the Navy Department after the receipt of a letter prepared by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, who at that time was Admiral Richardson. In these two letters, submitted in early January, 1941, practically all the points covered in the Secretary's letter of January 24 were included. I felt the most probable form of attack in the Hawaiian area was by submarine. I thought a bombing attack by airplanes was second in order of probability. I also felt the danger of torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor was nil, because I believed [287] torpedoes would not run in the shallow water of that harbor. The maximum depth at any point was only forty-five feet. I felt that the probability of a surface gunnery attack by bombardment was a low order of priority. The probability of mining was considered a high order of priority. The unlimited areas which required sweeping made mining no particular menace, and this was due to the extreme depth of the water in the immediate vicinity of the island of Oahu and limited areas.

51. Q. I know that in the answer you have just given you envisaged a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as the most probable form of attack?

A. That is right.

52. Q. And that an air attack was second in order of probability?

A. I would like to amend the second in order of probability. I did not think it was second in order of probability, because the airplane attack I thought was a remote possibility. I did not think it was a probability at any time. I want to make that clear now. My previous statement was in error. I did not mean that, but what I was thinking of was that a submarine attack would hurt us and the thing which would hurt us next the most was the airplane attack.

53. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is your letter 2CL-41, and to paragraph 2 (b) (1), you say that a declaration of war may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. What form

of surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor did you contemplate by this statement?

A. An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose. I felt, as the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor, and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I consider it more than a possibility, and one which ordinary prudence would make us guard against.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

54. Q. Then, the order in which you set out what might happen on a declaration of war, in paragraph 2 (b), does not necessarily mean the order of importance as you envisaged the probability of forms of attack?

A. No.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[288] Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The judge advocate stated: Adverting to Exhibit 48, which was introduced in evidence before this court this morning, there was a stipulation made by the interested parties and by the judge advocate that Lieutenant Commander Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, the witness before the court who introduced the exhibit, would communicate with the War Department, and that the information he obtained from them as to the time, or the character of the time, that was being used on Exhibit 48, would be accepted in evidence before this court as of the times which are thereon indicated. I will now ask Lieutenant Commander Powers to make to the court a statement as to the information he received from the War Department.

With the permission of the court, Lieutenant Commander Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, stated: Traffic Operations Branch, Army Communications Service, has advised me that the times indicated upon Exhibit 48, as used by the War Department on 7 December 1941, were Washington time; that is, Eastern Standard Time.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (continued):

55. Q. Admiral, in the questions I am about to ask you, I would request that you note the distinction between air bombing attack and air torpedo plane attack. This is just for the purpose of clarify-

ing the questions in your own mind. With reference to an air bombing attack, what was the status of the defenses of Pearl Harbor in this regard when you took command of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. The status of defenses of Pearl Harbor in reference to air bombing attack when I took command of the Pacific Fleet were the same as those stated in the letter forwarded by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District through the Commander-in-Chief, to the Navy Department, early in January of 1941. The Commander-in-Chief at that time was Admiral J. O. Richardson, U. S. Navy, who signed the letter addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the Navy Department.

[289] 56. Q. I show you Exhibit 28, which is now in evidence before this court, and has been read in full, and ask you if that is the letter to which you refer?

A. That is the letter, together with the enclosure of a letter from the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

57. Q. Will you sketch as best you can any changes that were made in these defenses during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. During my tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, a number of pursuit planes were brought to Pearl Harbor. The net increase of operating pursuit planes during this period was approximately 100 pursuit Army planes. This was an increase from no effective Army pursuit planes to approximately 100. I do not know the exact number of Army anti-aircraft artillery, but my recollection is that at no time did it exceed approximately one-third of the number recommended by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and approved by the Commander-in-Chief in his letter of early January, 1941. Regarding bombing planes, the Army supplied a maximum number of 27, B-17 Flying Fortresses. The Army planned, as I recalled it, to supply about 180 of these B-17s. However, prior to December 7, 1941, order were received to send a number of B-17s to the Philippines. This resulted in stripping Oahu of all but 12 B-17 Flying Fortresses, of which 6 had been further stripped of essential gear to outfit the ones going to the Philippines, and this left 6 B-17 planes in operating condition on December 7, 1941. Therefore, during my tour as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, Army had a net increase of 6 bombing planes, no balloon barrage, no smoke-making apparatus, and none of the other facilities that I can now recall and which were mentioned in the Secretary of the Navy's letter had been supplied prior to 7 December 1941. In this connection, it is my recollection that a number of Navy Patrol planes was increased by one or two squadrons during this period. In any event, there were stationed on Hawaii on 7 December 1941, exactly 81 patrol planes, of which 61 were in operating condition on Oahu on 7 December 1941. There were 12 operating from Midway, and the remainder were under overhaul or out of commission for various reasons. An agreement as to the operation of Army and Navy airplanes stationed on shore was put into effect. The agreement was arrived at by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, which provided in general that the Army would command all fighter planes, both Army and Navy, and the Navy would com-

mand all distance reconnaissance and bombing planes. My order 2CL-41, issued in February, 1941, and revised on October 14, 1941, provided that all naval forces in Pearl Harbor would assist the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was designated in this letter as the Naval Base Defense Officer, and vested with the necessary authority to direct [290] the naval forces in the event of attack, and he was also given authority to conduct the necessary drills to insure the most effective use of the naval forces in port. There was a very considerable increase in the number of troops supplied by the Army to the Commander of the Hawaiian Department. I believe there were some 50,000 troops in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, but I might say that General Short felt that the minimum required for the defense of Hawaii was in the neighborhood of 75,000 troops. It would be noted in the letter of 24 January that the establishment by the Army of a radar station and aircraft warning net is given a very high priority. The answer to this letter, written by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, promises a high priority for this work. It stated that it would be completed in the summer of 1941. I know that members of my staff who appreciated the importance of the Army radar in the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the aircraft warning net, did everything within their power to assist the Army, and incidentally the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in the training of personnel and in rendering them whatever other assistance they considered within our power. We took Army personnel to sea in our ships prior to the time they received their radar, and we sent several officers at different times to work with the Army in establishing their service, all the time urging them to get something. The aircraft warning net was far from complete on 7 December 1941. Specifically, the permanent Radar stations were not anywhere near completed but there were several mobile units which had been placed in advantageous positions on the island and had been operating with some degree of success prior to 7 December 1941. You have heard General Short testify as to the operation of this radar, that it was being operated from 4:00 to 7:00 every morning, and that training continued throughout the day until about 4:30 in the afternoon; also that it was decided on December 6 by the personnel on the job that they would not operate the radar after 7:00 a. m. This was unknown to me at the time, and I knew only in general that the radar had been in operation. I knew, of course, that it was far from perfect. During 1941, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, completed their Joint Frontier Coastal Defense Plan. Four destroyers were detailed to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for use in anti-submarine patrol and other patrol duties. He also had some tugs which he used for mine-sweeping, as I recall it. However, there were available to him sufficient forces to do the limited mine-sweeping which was required at the District.

58. Q. That goes into a little more detail than I intended, but I thank you, Admiral. Who gave the order to transfer the B-17 bombers from the Hawaiian area? Do you recall?

A. The War Department.

[291] 59. Q. And at about what time of the year did this order take effect?

A. Oh, that transfer, the most of it was effected in November of 1941.

60. Q. Do you feel that you had kept the Navy Department in Washington reasonably well informed as to the status of the defenses of Pearl Harbor in the matter of protecting that area against aircraft attack during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief?

A. I do.

61. Q. With special reference to aircraft torpedo plane attack, what would you say would be the requirements for such a defense that are different from the defenses against air bombing attack in general?

A. Well, the defense against an air torpedo plane attack in addition to the elements required for an air bombing attack, requires nets so placed that they will deflect or explode the torpedoes before they reach their objectives; in lieu of a net, baffles, target rafts, or any objects properly placed that will explode or deflect the torpedo, are required.

62. Q. Were any of these means of defense available in Oahu or in the Hawaiian area when you assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in February 1941?

A. None of the defenses against an air torpedo plane attack, as such, were available to me when I assumed command of the Pacific Fleet.

63. Q. What was done, to your knowledge, to improve these defenses against airplane torpedo attack during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet?

A. No effective steps were taken that I recall. In addition to the defenses that I have mentioned against an air torpedo plane attack, the use of barrage balloons would have been a help, because they would have tended to keep the planes so high that they could not have dropped the torpedoes.

64. Q. What would have been the effect of these barrage balloons on our own air activities in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. They would have stopped the air activity to a very large extent, and they were not recommended.

65. Q. When you assumed command of the Pacific Fleet, what was the technical view you held on the performance of torpedoes dropped from aircraft in depths of water that prevailed at Pearl Harbor? In other words, was it your view that this could, or could not, be done?

A. I felt that there was no chance of aircraft torpedo attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. I based this opinion on letters which I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations.

[292] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), requested that the letter of February 17, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, to which he referred in his testimony, be admitted in evidence at this time.

The judge advocate stated that he had no objection.

The said document was submitted to the judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked "EXHIBIT 49."

66. Q. Please read the letter.

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 49.

66-A. Q. I would ask you if there were any changes in the views of technical bureaus or others in authority as regards the possibility of using aircraft torpedoes in waters of depths prevailing at Pearl Harbor during 1941?

A. On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a letter to the Commandants of all naval districts, with copies to CinCPac, CinClant, and so forth. The subject was, "Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks." Reference (a) is a CNO confidential letter of February 17, 1941. (Reading:)

In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo. 3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of [295] water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely. 4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

(Signed) R. E. Ingersoll.

Now when the letter of 17 February, which was a letter to the Commandant of the District, was received, Admiral Bloch submitted a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, and his letter dated 20 March 1941, stated (reading):

The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed 45 feet. b. There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths, which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice. c. Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipelines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the Fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted. Other harbors in the 14th Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor. In view of the foregoing, the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for mooring in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the 14th Naval District.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, under date of March 12, 1941, wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and stated, "In view of the contents of reference (a), that is, the CNO's confidential letter of 15 February 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Pacific Fleet recommends that until a light, efficient net that can be laid temporarily and quickly, is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area." When the letter of June 13 was received at my headquarters, we went over this letter thoroughly and my staff considered that, in view of the

statements in this letter, that there was still no danger from torpedoes in Pearl Harbor. While the statement was made that no ship could be considered safe, yet, there was strong presumption that the torpedoes would not run in the depths of water which obtained in Pearl Harbor, and those depths are 40 feet or less. In any event, I recall of no effort on the part of the Navy Department to put these nets in Pearl Harbor. I feel that the Navy Department was no more concerned about the use of aerial torpedoes in Pearl Harbor than were the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. To the best of my recollection, no further correspondence on this subject was had.

67. Q. What did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor prove as regards the use of air torpedoes in depths of water of those prevailing in Pearl Harbor?

A. They performed very well indeed from the Japanese standpoint.

[294] 68. Q. Admiral, in a number of instances, especially in the testimony of General Short, there was reference made to a General Headquarters Air Force. What is your conception of such a command? What does that mean to you?

A. My conception of the Army G. H. Q. Air Force has always been a little bit hazy. I have never been able to grasp all of the details of what the General Headquarters Air Force does nor how it is administered. So far as our activities in Pearl Harbor were concerned, we had to work with what we had. We were forced to work with what we had, and the General Headquarters Air Force was a theory. I would add this: I would like to add this point: In all that I have said about the inadequacy of the forces in Pearl Harbor, and of the efforts of the Navy to supplement the Army deficiencies, it is my belief that what we did does not alter in any way the basic responsibility of the Army for the defense of Pearl Harbor, as provided for in the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy."

69. Q. What were your views immediately before 7 December 1941 on measures to be employed for locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objective? I am assuming now that an attack has been launched and that the planes are en route to their objective.

A. After aircraft are launched and are en route to their objective, the only practicable means of locating them in time are by radar and to a very much less efficient extent by visual observation, either from shore, from ships, or from scouting planes. This was true before December 7, as it is now. Prior to December 7, however, radar was in its infancy, so far as our services are concerned, and it was to that extent in effective due to the limitations of material and the greenness of the personnel. We had carried on an intensive training program on radar operations on the ships of the Fleet in which this was installed. I have told you about taking the selected personnel from the Army to sea and about giving them the benefit of what we had learned about radar. Now the supplement to the shore radar was the aircraft warning net, which was an Army responsibility; and you have heard General Short describe the conditions of this net on December 7, 1941. I think that the Army personnel in Hawaii did everything they could, or I should say, perhaps, General Short, I felt, did everything that he could within the limitations of material supplied them to establish this

warning net and to put together the radar. Of course, I was not familiar with the details of their construction, but I know our people did put pressure on them constantly to get something done.

70. Q. What service was charged under existing orders and agreements on December 7, 1941, with locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives?

A. Army.

[295] 71. Q. Was the other service to lend any assistance?

A. In Hawaii each service was prepared to render any practicable assistance to the other; and if the Navy in any of their planes which were under naval command at the time, had sighted attacking aircraft, they would have rendered such assistance to the Army as was practicable and possible. When planes are once launched and coming in to make an attack on Oahu, the Army is responsible for locating the planes. The methods of locating the planes are radar, observation posts on shore, in ships, and in scouting or observation planes. Now while it is the Army's basic responsibility to locate these planes, the Navy by agreement was obligated to give them all the information they obtained in the performance of whatever mission was assigned to them.

72. Q. What service in Hawaii was charged with repulsing enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, on 7 December 1941?

A. The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all the guns, including 30 calibres and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the Navy Yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the planes.

73. Q. What was the agreement for joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise raids on Pearl Harbor?

A. It is set forth in several publications which the court has already examined, and I will re-state that the principal agreement effectuating the coordination of effort was the status of aircraft, Army and Navy aircraft. In general, this provided for all fighter planes from the Navy that were based on shore to report at once to the Army. It provided for all bomber planes from the Army and all patrol and bombing planes from the Navy, that were based on shore, to report to the Navy. The naval planes were under the command of the naval base defense officer, who in turn had the command of the naval base defense air force to actually operate the planes. The Army operated the fighter and pursuit planes. We had arrangements made whereby daily reports were made of the availability of planes, and Admiral Bellinger made his report to the Army of the planes that he would have available on any one day. The Army made its report to Admiral Bellinger so that each knew what planes were available and, very closely, what all the planes were doing on any one day.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[296] 74. Q. Were there any drills held in furthering these joint exercises?

A. Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each week. For about two to three months prior to December 7, 1941, we

conducted the drills once every two weeks. This was in order to insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or some work that they considered essential and more important than taking part in the drills. It was particularly difficult at times and it required considerable insistence to get these people all ready to take part in the drills. We had better results and accomplished more after we went to the bi-weekly drills than we had had when we had the weekly drills because when we made that concession we also tightened up on the people who we required to take part in them.

75. Q. With regard to the activities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area—I speak of their activities in a military sense—did you ever have any discussions with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command in effect in the Hawaiian area?

A. No.

76. Q. Do you feel that any problems that you had would have been more easily resolved, or not, if you had had unity of command in effect?

A. I feel that where command is vested in one agency, other things being equal, you will get very much better results than where there is a divided responsibility.

77. Q. Do you consider that the Commandant, 14th Naval District, had authority, so far as you were concerned, to put unity of command in effect?

A. I do not, not without reference to me, and I would not have put unity of command in effect, or accepted responsibility for the Army actions, without reference to the Navy Department.

78. Q. There is evidence before this court that in July, 1941, an executive order had been issued freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Did this order give you any views as to the imminence of war with Japan?

A. This executive order tended to worsen the relations betwixt the United States and Japan. I judged that it was one more step along the road to war. However, there was room for the opposite view, and that is that a firm stand against Japan would deter them from taking any action. I believe a good many people had advocated and argued that that would be the case.

79. Q. Subsequent to this executive order, can you remember the next development in United States-Japanese relations that bore on the imminence of war with Japan?

A. Well, I knew of the Atlantic conference, but I knew of no commitments that were made there. I got my [297] information from the newspapers. I also had a message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated October 16th which indicated that an attack by Japan on Russia was considered a strong possibility, but that Japan blamed the United States and Great Britain for her present situation and it was possible that Japan might attack either one or both. There were other developments which were unknown to me until after the war started. One of these is the alleged commitment by the United States that even if not herself attacked she would come to Britain's aid in the Far East. Also, on 16 August, 1941, Mr. Hull

delivered to Japan a note protesting strongly against further movements to the south. This was not known to me until after the war was started.

80. Q. You mentioned having received the dispatch of 16 October, 1941. What was your estimate at the time of the receipt of this dispatch on the imminence of a United States-Japanese war, on 16 October 1941, after you received the dispatch which is Exhibit 13 before this court?

A. I did not consider at this time that war betwixt the United States and Japan was imminent. I had attempted to find out what the action of the United States would be in case Japan attacked the Maritime Provinces, but I got no definite answer. I did not consider that war was imminent.

81. Q. In this dispatch, Exhibit 13, there is this directive: "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose the strategic intention, nor constitute provocative attacks against Japan." What did you do, as Commander-in-Chief, in complying with this directive to take due precautions?

A. This dispatch states, in part, "In view of these possibilities, you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative attacks against Japan." I took the action at this time which I described to the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October, Exhibit 14, and which action was approved specifically in the letter of 7 November from the Chief of Naval Operations. In that letter of 22 October I stated that I had placed and would continue to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway. I dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway. I dispatched two submarines to Wake, and they would arrive there on 23 October. I dispatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnson and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores. The CURTISS arrived at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil, and bombs. I prepared to send 6 patrol planes from Midway to Wake; to replace the 6 at Midway from Pearl Harbor. I dispatched additional marines to Palmyra. I placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October. I had 6 submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. I put some [298] additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside of Pearl Harbor. I delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November, when she was due to go for an overhaul at Puget Sound, and I deferred final decision until that time. With minor changes I proposed to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops.

The court then, at 3:00 p. m., took a recess until 3:10 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate, (Continued) :

82. Q. Admiral, I show you a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November 1941 which is now in evidence before this court marked Exhibit 15, and ask you if you received that dispatch?

A. Yes, I received it.

83. Q. Did the receipt of this dispatch cause you to make any changes in your estimate of the situation as regards the intentions of the Japanese government as of this date?

A. There was, in my opinion, a possibility of an aggressive movement, and the dispatch itself indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam was a possibility. I felt that this required no action by me further than that which I had already taken and I did not stop the training program. The Chief of Naval Operations felt that no change in the training program was desirable or required by the dispatch of 24 November.

84. Q. Did your estimate of the situation at this time of what the Japanese intentions might be, include a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. At this time I considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility. However, if Japan attacked the Philippines, a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected.

85. Q. At the time of the receipt of this dispatch, did you take any additional security measures within your command?

A. No.

[299] 86. Q. Specifically, what did the words contained in this dispatch, and I quote, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction" convey to you?

A. "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility," is the wording of the dispatch. I thought when I received it that the surprise, aggressive movement in any other direction than the Philippines or Guam referred to a foreign territory.

87. Q. The words "in any direction," then, did or did not include, so far as your estimate was concerned, the Hawaiian Islands?

A. That is correct; only as regards submarine attack and not as regards an air attack.

88. Q. Can you recall the next information that you received from any source which gave you any information on the change in United States-Japanese relations looking toward war?

A. On 27 November 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations.

89. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 17, which is now in evidence before the court, and ask you if that is the message that you refer to?

A. Yes.

90. Q. Did you, as Commander-in-Chief, take any additional security measures other than those that you have already stated were in effect in your command?

A. We ordered to Wake, one patrol squadron then at Midway, and it proceeded on 1 December, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route. The patrol squadron at Midway was replaced by a patrol squadron from Pearl, which left Pearl the 3rd of November via Johnston Island, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route to Johnston, and also from Johnston to Midway. This patrol squadron made

a daily search from Midway on 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 December. They were to make daily searches until further orders. We sent the ENTERPRISE to Wake with one Marine fighting squadron, which departed from Pearl on 28 November and landed the planes at Wake on 3 December. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes. The patrol squadron at Wake was then withdrawn. It conducted a reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to Midway, and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl. The LEXINGTON proceeded to Midway with a VMF squadron, departing Pearl 5 December. It conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes en route and was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke. The BURROUGHS was dispatched to Wake with additional forces and supplies, including radar, but was short of Wake when the war broke. She departed Pearl 29 November. We conducted daily reconnaissance flights with PB planes based on Pearl Harbor [300] to cover the Fleet operating areas and approaches thereto. On 27 November I issued an order that any submarine contacts in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be depth bombed, and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations, as I have previously noted. These dispositions of mine were well known to the Navy Department, and Admiral Stark testified before the Roberts Commission that he considered them sound; that he knew of them and considered them O. K. We had two submarines operating at Wake and two at Midway doing patrol duty. I issued orders for full security measures to be taken by ships in operating areas and at sea. In Pearl Harbor proper, the Commandant warned all of his anti-submarine patrol forces to take additional security measures against submarines. I have previously testified about the condition of the anti-aircraft batteries at this time. I would like at this time to tell the reasons that actuated me in issuing the order to bomb submarines in the operating area. In February of 1941, shortly after I took command of the Fleet, we had what the destroyer personnel who trailed this contact always insisted was a Japanese submarine. They had it under observation for, I think, about 48 hours, something over 48 hours. They got propeller noises, and I was much concerned. I wrote out a dispatch telling them to bomb the submarine and my staff pointed out to me that that was not in accordance with orders and that we were forbidden to bomb submarines except in the defensive sea area which was about 3 miles from land. I made a complete, full report to the Chief of Naval Operations after this incident. Incidentally, I had 4 destroyers trailing the submarine contact. I was most unhappy while the destroyers were exposed in this way and I suggested that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb the submarines, any submarines contacted in the operating areas. That was in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. His answer came back by dispatch telling me not to bomb any submarine contacts in the operating area but to keep in effect the orders that had been issued by my predecessor. On four or five other occasions we had submarine contacts in the operating area. In September, after another one of these contacts which lasted for some time, I wrote another letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in which I said I would like to bomb the submarines, and was again informed that in case we got positive evidence that there was a submarine in the operating area it would be in order to make a protest to Japan. During all

this time, and at various other times which I am not detailing now, I felt that I was exposing these destroyers' crews to considerable danger, and when I got the dispatch of 27 November I decided that I would go ahead and tell them to bomb all the submarine contacts. I got no answer to the information copy which I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Pearl Harbor operating area was some 2,000 miles from the nearest Japanese possession. I knew that if we sent any submarines into a Japanese operating area they wouldn't hesitate a moment to bomb them. I felt that any submarine operating submerged in the Pearl Harbor operating area should be bombed. I had felt it a long time, and I decided on 27 November to bomb them anyhow.

[301] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, moved that that part of the answer with reference to what he testified before the Roberts Commission be stricken out.

Neither the judge advocate nor any of the interested parties replied.

The court directed that that part of the answer dealing with the testimony of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, before the Roberts Commission be stricken out.

91. Q. Did the receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of November 27, 1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation in regard to Japanese intentions?

A. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this dispatch of November 27 was as stated in the dispatch, that a move would take place within the next few days in the form of an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. I estimated from this and all other information available to me that if the aggressive move eventuated against a U. S. possession, it would be made against the Philippines, and if it were made against the Philippines, I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area. I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility, and I did not expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at this time due to the tenor of the dispatches, the other information available to me, the difficulties of making such an attack, and the latest information I had from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters. I considered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch was, as stated, that negotiations had ceased. Consequently, when the press indicated further conversations were continuing between the Japanese ambassadors and the State Department, the warning lost much of its force. I further assumed that no ultimatum had been given by the United States Government to Japan, because I had been informed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ultimatum be delivered. I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor of the note handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese ambassadors on November 16 until long after I returned to the United States.

[302] 92. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 17, I quote: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Did those words which I have just quoted have any special significance to you?

A. I regarded that phrase as a characterization of specific intelligence which the message contained.

93. Q. Did these words change in any manner your estimate of the imminence of a war with Japan?

A. The text which accompanied this phrase indicated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days. This made the war with Japan closer than it had been before I received the message of November 27. Other statements in the dispatch, however, directed my attention to specific localities in which the Navy Department apparently expected the attack to eventuate. The more cautious phrasing and the emphasis of measures contained in the War Department's messages and the precaution against taking measures which might alarm the civilian population, all lead me to the conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor or anything other than a surprise submarine attack was most improbable. Of course, the surprise submarine attack could be in conjunction with an attack made on the Philippines.

Examined by the court:

94. Q. What do you mean by a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I mean by that a mass submarine attack on the ships in the operating area. In this connection, I was using Pearl Harbor in the sense not only of the harbor itself but in the operating areas surrounding Oahu.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

95. Q. Did you take any additional security measures as a result of the receipt of this dispatch of November 27, 1941?

A. I already stated the additional security measures which I placed in effect upon the receipt of this dispatch, and they are much more convincing.

96. Q. What naval officer was, under your existing plans as of November 27, 1941, responsible for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base?

A. The joint agreement with the Army—and it is prescribed in the Naval Coastal Defense Plan—makes the Army primarily responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor. However, the forces supplied by the War Department to the Army were never adequate to perform this task properly. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District entered into certain agreements with the Army, looking to the best utilization of [303] both the Army and Navy forces available in Oahu. The War Department, in effect, admitted that they were unable to defend Pearl Harbor by not supplying sufficient long-range bombing planes and sufficient fighting planes and artillery of all description to accomplish the task unaided. Admiral Bloch, with my approval, made these agreements with the Army, and with the security orders which I issued and which included 2CL-41 of October 14, looked to the utilization of every force, both Army and Navy, which was stationed in Hawaii or which, at the time, was in Pearl Harbor. I compiled and issued this order, 2CL-41, and specifically designated the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense Officer of Pearl Harbor, who was charged in this order, as well as in the war plans, with coordinating the naval effort, which was to supplement the Army effort in defense of Pearl Harbor. He agreed to undertake distance reconnaissance, insofar as the planes available per-

mitted. Our agreement with the Army pooled the patrol planes under Navy command and the fighters under Army command.

The question was repeated.

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was the Naval Base Defense Officer and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort to supplement the Army effort in defense of the base.

97. Q. Did you on receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of November 27, consult with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District on any measures of security to be adopted in the 14th Naval District that were different from any then in effect?

A. Yes, I discussed this message with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

98. Q. Were any additional measures of security deemed advisable as a result of this conversation?

A. No.

99. Q. Specifically, did you consider such a measure as having an air cover during morning twilight?

A. By air cover, I presume you mean having fighter planes in the air during this period?

100. Q. That is correct.

A. That was considered, but inasmuch as the Army pursuit planes would remain in the air for only one hour without refueling and were restricted to flying within fifteen miles of land, this measure was not considered practical.

101. Q. Was the condition of readiness of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area changed in any manner as a result of the receipt of this message, Exhibit 17?

A. The full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect.

[304] 102. Q. Did you consider a higher condition of readiness advisable at this time?

A. For ships at sea?

103. Q. No, ships at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, I considered it, but we didn't put any additional steps into effect.

104. Q. Do you feel that the Fleet would have been more secure if, after November 27, you had adopted some such security measure as having all ships go to general quarters at an hour before sunrise?

A. It might have been. In the light of what has happened, it was, of course, a precaution that perhaps should have been taken, but if I had considered an air raid on Pearl Harbor at this time imminent, there are many other steps which we would have taken.

105. Q. From your naval experience, what is the most probable time of day to expect an air attack from carrier-based planes?

A. If you are referring to Pearl Harbor, as I presume you are, I should say the most probable time is shortly after daylight, because that would give the aircraft a chance to complete their attack, return to the carriers during the daylight, and they would have a full dark period to get out of the range of the shore-based aircraft. That, however, can be argued. That is merely my opinion.

106. Q. You gave us some testimony this morning, Admiral, on the organization of the Army's aircraft warning system. I should like to have you summarize briefly at this point what the general equipment was and the proficiency of the personnel in its operation?

A. I have been informed that the personnel of the Army's aircraft warning system were green and untrained. The aircraft warning system and the radars were new. The equipment was not entirely adequate. The radar was limited in operation to a limited range, and the permanent station was incomplete. The warning net needed much polishing and adjustment to make it a real, efficient service.

107. Q. What would be the range in miles from Oahu that a long-range reconnaissance flight would have to be flown to be effective against known Japanese carriers as of November 27, 1941?

A. 800 miles.

[305] 108. Q. In order to cover thoroughly a 360-degree arc, how many patrol-type aircraft would have been necessary to cover this area efficiently at this range of 800 miles, the patrol to be flown once daily for, say, as long as ten days?

A. Well, assuming 15 miles visibility, it would require 84 planes to make one flight and cover 360 degrees, and to maintain a continuous patrol would take anywhere from two-and-a-half to three times that number for search only.

109. Q. What would you consider the most probable areas of approach for a surprise air attack launched from carriers against Pearl Harbor?

A. I testified before the so-called Roberts Commission that I thought the northern sector was the most probable. I thought at the time that the aircraft had come from the north—the time I testified I mean—and I didn't wish to make alibis. However, I feel that there is no sector around Oahu which is much more dangerous than any other sector. We have an island which can be approached from any direction. There is no outlying land which prevents this, and you have got a 360-degree arc, minus the very small line which runs up along the Hawaiian chain. From the southern, we have observation stations, Johnston and Palmyra, and the closest Japanese possession is to the southwestward in the Marshalls, and these Japanese carriers were fuel eaters and short-legged. I would say that while all sectors are important, if I were restricted, I would probably search the western 180-degree sector first.

110. Q. In the dispatch of November 27 there is a directive: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. On receipt of this dispatch what did those words mean to you?"

A. This appropriate defensive deployment was a new term to me. I decided that what was meant was something similar to the disposition I had made on October 16, which had been approved by the originator of both these dispatches, and I therefore made the dispositions which I have outlined.

111. Q. This dispatch of November 27 also contains the statement, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased." Was this information in conformance with any other information that you had, or was it contrary to other information that you had?

A. I had received several statements saying, as I recall, that conversations had about reached an impasse, and on two or three occasions—all of which are in the record here—a statement was made that conversations were just about finished—just finishing, and this was news that conversations had actually ceased.

[306] 112. Q. Did you see any notices in the public press or hear any radio broadcasts which were contrary to this statement?

A. Oh, subsequently, yes, that the conversations, at least, were continuing. That was in the public press, and it came over the radio, and it was discussed among me and my staff and my principal advisors. I was in consultation during this period with Admiral Pye, Admiral Bloch, General Short, Admiral Brown, and Admiral Halsey. To be sure, Halsey went to sea on the 28th of November and made a trip to Wake and got back on the morning of the attack. Brown went out several days later, and I discussed the measures with him as well as with my staff—those and other things. I had adopted a policy whereby I showed my correspondence with the Navy Department, and, particularly, the letters which I received from the Chief of Naval Operations and all the dispatches, to the officers that I have named, and insofar as they were available at my headquarters during this period, I showed them these dispatches and these letters and discussed the matters with them, and we certainly discussed the question of the apparent resumption of conversations between Mr. Kurusu and Admiral Nomura and Secretary Hull.

113. Q. Did this information which you had thus gleaned from public sources affect, in any way, your estimate of the situation in regard to the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. Oh, yes, everything affected—All the information a man gets affects him in arriving at a decision.

114. Q. Can you tell the court in what way this information affected the estimate which you had previously made regarding the imminence of war with Japan?

A. The attempt here to find a distinction between negotiations and conversations was not apparent to me, and I thought that negotiations were continuing. They were having conversations. That, I think, is borne out by various evidence which we have. If negotiations had ceased, that means to me that they didn't have anything more to do with each other.

115. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch of November 27, 1941, and up until the attack on Pearl Harbor at 0755 on the 7th of December, 1941, had you received any further official information from the Navy Department as to the progress or the status of negotiations with the Japanese?

A. No.

116. Q. In other words, the Navy Department had failed to say that negotiations were either continuing or had stopped?

A. That is correct. I got a major part of by diplomatic information from the newspapers.

[307] 117. Q. Do you mean to tell the court that you acted on newspaper information in preference to official information supplied you by the Navy Department?

A. No, I make no such statement.

118. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is a dispatch of November 26, 1941, and ask you if you will identify it for the court and state whether you received it or not?

A. I did.

119. Q. Will you say what it is?

A. This is a proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine planes for expeditionary duty. It goes into considerable details as to how we shall land the planes and says that planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats, etc.

120. Q. Do you consider the matter of stationing these twenty-five pursuit planes at Midway and a considerable number at Wake to be a directive or a suggestion? How do you consider that?

A. I considered it as a suggestion, and in my letter of December 2, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, which I request to be read to the court and placed in evidence, you will see the steps that we took and that we recommended. I replied to this dispatch by a dispatch of November 28, I think it was. Incidentally, at the same time, or during the same period in which I received this dispatch from the Navy Department, General Short received a dispatch from the War Department. In his dispatch the proposal was made to relieve the marine infantry units on the outlying islands with Army personnel. It also touched on the question of taking Army pursuit planes to put on the outlying islands instead of the Navy planes. This proposal, if carried out, would have meant that the Army transfer something similar to a Marine defense battalion. They had nothing of the kind organized. It would have involved a great deal of transport and boat work, and at Wake, for instance, it took on an average of five or six days to unload a ship, due to the fact that the unloading had to be done in the open sea. On one occasion that I recall it took thirty days to unload a ship lying off Wake. We were making every effort to open a channel into the lagoon and permit the ships to go inside. That work was proceeding at top speed when the attack came, but this proposal was made by the Navy Department, who were fully cognizant of these conditions which existed on the outlying islands, and the proposals in themselves were evidence—at least, some evidence to me—that the Navy Department did not expect any serious upsets in the outlying area.

[308] 121. Q. The time group of this dispatch of 26 November indicates that it was released to the Navy Department at what time, sir?

A. 270038.

122. Q. The dispatch of 27 November, which is Exhibit 17 before this court, bears what date time group?

A. 272337.

123. Q. Approximately how many hours later is this dispatch of 27 November than the dispatch of 26 November?

A. About 22 hours; 23 hours.

124. Q. About 23 hours?

A. Yes.

125. Q. In other words, the Navy Department, when it wrote the dispatch of 27 November, had cognizance of the suggestion to you in its dispatch of the day before regarding the transfer of planes to Midway and Wake. Is that not a fact?

A. I have every reason to think that is correct.

126. Q. What means had you at the time of delivering pursuit or fighter planes to Midway or Wake from Oahu?

A. Pursuit planes had to be hoisted aboard the carriers at the flying field, Ford Island. They could be taken to within flying distance of

the islands and the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force informed me at a conference that his planes could only fly 15 miles from shore, his pursuit planes could only fly 15 miles from shore.

127. Q. Did that mean then, Admiral, that you had to send your carriers to an area approximately 15 miles from their destination before you could deliver these planes?

A. If you followed what he said literally, yes. However, the pursuit planes could be flown off the carriers and could have landed on the flying fields at Midway and at Wake. Once on the flying fields at Midway and Wake, these planes could not again be flown off and landed on a carrier. They could not land one of the pursuit planes they had then on one of our carriers. They didn't have enough run for it. And that was another reason given in my letter of 2 December to the Navy Department why I thought it better to send Marine planes to the islands because I felt them, and so indicated, that the planes would probably have to be removed from the islands before war came. We had very limited facilities on these islands to maintain the planes at this time. And that was the reason we had delayed sending the planes out there until the last minute. In this letter I also stated the arrangements I had made for handling material for planes and ground crews at Wake and at Midway and of the fact that I was sending the ENTERPRISE to Wake, and the LEXINGTON to Midway.

[309] 128. Q. Would the dispatch of a carrier subsequent to November 26, 1941, to these areas for the purpose of delivering planes, involve the absence from Pearl Harbor for a period of some days of this carrier and her escort?

A. Yes.

129. Q. About how many days would you estimate for the trip to Wake?

A. My recollection is that Wake is some 2,000 miles from Pearl Harbor. Midway is about 1,100 Miles. Halsey, with the ENTERPRISE, left on the 28th of November and would have arrived back in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.

130. Q. The Navy Department, after sending you this dispatch of 27 November in which it mentioned the war warning and the fact that an aggressive action is expected within the next few days, didn't then give you any further instructions as regards dispatching this carrier toward Wake and Midway, did it?

A. I sent a dispatch on 28 November telling what I was doing in regard to the transfer of these planes and as I recall it, recommending that no marines be relieved and no army be sent to the islands.

131. Q. Did you report to the Navy Department that you were dispatching or had dispatched a carrier to Wake or Midway for the purpose of delivering planes in response to its suggestions of 26 November?

A. I told the Navy Department that I was dispatching a carrier to Wake on 28 November and that I expected to send another carrier with Marine planes to Midway later.

132. Q. You say the Navy Department gave you no instructions as regards sending the carrier on its mission, as you have stated you reported to them in your dispatch of 28 November?

A. You mean did it stop me?

133. Q. Yes.

A. No. .

134. Q. Did this situation that you have described of having suggested to you sending carriers a long distance from their base have any influence on your estimate of the situation at the time, that is, 28 November 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese on the United States?

A. Every communication that I received from the Navy Department, and every bit of information that I had that bore even remotely on this subject affected me in some degree. This action by the Navy Department, which we have just been discussing, indicated that they did not expect much immediate activity in the Hawaiian area.

The court then, at 4:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., August 16, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944

[310]

ELEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the tenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate at this time would request that the witness under examination at the end of yesterday's session be asked to resume his status as interested party, for the reason that the judge advocate desires to recall Admiral Schuirmann for the purpose of conducting further examination into matters connected with the inquiry, which should be inquired into at this time, for the reason that his testimony may have some bearing on witnesses whose return to duties in connection with the war effort are imperative and we can no longer afford to keep them in Washington.

The court directed that the witness who was testifying at the close of yesterday's session resume his seat as interested party.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness [311] for the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The court made the following announcement: During your cross-examination, when you were last on the stand, the court made a ruling which prohibited the counsel for Admiral Kimmel from continuing along a certain line of examination. The court now rescinds that ruling, and your cross-examination will be continued along those lines if the counsel so desires.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Admiral, I refer you to a document entitled "Peace and War", which is an official State Department publication, and which the court was requested to take judicial knowledge of, and the court announced that it would. I refer you to a document printed on page 823 of this publication, and ask you if you can identify it.

A. I can identify it to the extent that I have seen it before, yes, and more or less recall that such a note was sent, and the contents.

2. Q. What is the title of this document as set forth in the publication?

A. Memorandum regarding the conversation between Under-Secretary of State Welles and the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and Mr. Kurusu, on the 2nd day of December 1941.

3. Q. Adverting to this document, I will request you to read to the court for the purpose of inserting into the record the statement of the Under Secretary of State Welles, and the reply of the Japanese Ambassador.

A. (Reading):

I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purpose of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of [312] Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government.

4. Q. Admiral, in your duties as liaison officer with the State Department, had the subject matter of this note been brought to your attention?

A. I cannot recall definitely, but I presume, in view of the close liaison maintained, I was aware of the fact that such a note had been handed to the Japanese.

5. Q. Then you would not have any present recollection as to whether or not the information contained in this note had been communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations by you?

A. No.

6. Q. Adverting to your testimony when you were before the court at a previous session, you named certain individuals that were present when you and Admiral Stark were in his office about 9:30 on the morning of 7 December 1941. I would ask you to re-state, to the best of your ability and recollection, the officers who were there present at that time, in addition to yourself and Admiral Stark?

A. To the best of my recollection, Captain Turner and Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot place definitely whether they were there at 9:30 or later. Admiral Ingersoll was in and out of the office during that morning.

7. Q. Would you please re-state your best estimate of the [313] time that Admiral Stark came into his office.

A. My best estimate is 9:30.

8. Q. At the time he came into his office, had there been any information received from the War Department with reference to the Japanese-American situation; from the War Department, I ask?

A. None that I remember of, no.

9. Q. While you were present at the office did any such information arrive?

A. From the War Department?

10. Q. From the War Department.

A. None that I remember.

11. Q. Did any such information arrive from any officer of the War Department?

A. None that I recall.

12. Q. As I remember your testimony of the other day, this information was in your possession at 0930, or arrived in your possession shortly after 0930, as to certain information which was in the possession of the War Department relative to the status of the Japanese-American diplomatic situation. Do I remember correctly?

A. As I recall my testimony, the only thing that I stated which might be of that nature was the telephone conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I presume that this was available in the War Department, the same information that I mentioned and which formed the basis of General Marshall's telephone conversation.

13. Q. Did you not, at your last appearance before this court, tell us in substance that which you gleaned, or what you deemed to be the subject matter of this conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark?

A. That is correct.

14. Q. I show you Exhibit 48, which is now in evidence before this court and ask you to read to yourself the substance thereof. Can you recall whether or not the substance of the subject matter set out in Exhibit 48 was or was not the subject matter of the conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark, as you then understood it?

A. I presume that that message was sent following the conversation with Admiral Stark, and that, as I recollect, the information on which the message was based was in possession of the Navy Department and Admiral Stark.

15. Q. Did you yourself know about this general subject matter at that time?

A. As I recollect, I did not.

NOTE: Question 18, and the answer thereto, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the following page, page 314, and placed on page 314-A, which has been deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[314] 16. Q. Prior to Admiral Stark's arrival in the Navy Department at or about 0930, did you make any attempt to communicate the information you had on this subject matter?

A. Prior to his arrival, no. I reached the Department, as I recollect, about 0900 o'clock, and Admiral Stark came in about 9:30.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

17. Q. Referring to "Peace and War", the same volume from which you read, I read a paragraph on page 847, which is a paragraph of a radio address delivered by President Roosevelt from Washington on December 9, 1941 (reading):

Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in the dividing of spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would get complete and perpetual control of the whole Pacific area, and that means not only the Far East, not only all of the islands in the Pacific, but also a strangle hold on the west coast of North, Central, and South America.

In your capacity as liaison officer between the Navy Department and State Department, did you know, prior to 7 December 1941, the information stated by the President on December 9, 1941, in his public address, which I have just read to you?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.

18. Q. (SEE NOTE AT BOTTOM OF PAGE 313.)

19. Q. Did you tell the Chief of Naval Operations of the information concerning that subject matter which you acquired?

A. No, but it would have been conveyed to him in the normal course of events, by Commander Kramer.

20. Q. Did you have any conversations with Admiral Stark on that subject matter?

A. No conversation that I can recall. I feel sure that Admiral Stark did receive this information.

21. Q. Did you interpret this information as indicating a time when Japan would initiate a military offensive?

A. It is difficult for me to determine just how I evaluated the information at that time, because of events which have transpired since and which may lead me to believe that I placed a certain interpretation on it when at the time I did not. To the best of my recollection I believed that when the negotiations ended there would be a rupture of diplomatic relations, possibly a military move by Japan, but that such a move would not necessarily be directed against the United States.

[315] 22. Q. On or prior to December 6, was there information in the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States?

A. None that I know; no positive information of that character, that Japan would attack the United States.

23. Q. Was there any information from which you estimated Japan would attack the United States?

A. None that came to my attention of such a definite character, that Japan would attack the United States.

24. Q. Or any United States' possession?

A. Or any United States' possession. There was information, I believe, but I cannot be positive, that Japan would sever diplomatic relations with the United States.

25. Q. If a foreign nation—and this is a hypothetical question—if a foreign nation, during a period of strained diplomatic relations, manifested marked interest in the movement and location of units of the United States Fleet at a specific Fleet base, would not those circumstances lead to the opinion that the base in question was a likely place for such foreign nation to attack in the event of war?

A. It would depend in my opinion as to the detailed information. If the period of strained relations existed, and that nation was to embark on a military expedition, say into Indochina, which might in her opinion be opposed by the United States, she would be interested in knowing the location and movements of all the armed forces of the United States, particularly the Fleet, in order that she could evaluate whether or not any move by the United States to oppose by force her movement against a third power was under way. If the detailed locations of the ships within the harbor was a question of which the hypothetical power was concerned, it might indicate that an attack on that particular place was under consideration.

26. Q. Was there information in the Navy Department, Admiral, prior to 6 December 1941, that Japan was manifesting interest in the movements and location, not only generally, but in Pearl Harbor, of the units of the United States Fleet?

A. In answering this question I wish to make plain that whether or not I knew in December that such information was available in the Department, I do not now recollect. I have ascertained that certain information on that subject was in the Navy Department about the 5th or 6th of December.

[316] 27. Q. Will you look at Exhibit 48, which you read a moment ago. Was any of the information set forth in Exhibit 48, which is the dispatch from General Marshall to Hawaii on Sunday—was any of the information contained in Exhibit 48 available in the Navy Department?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, all of it was.

28. Q. Was any of it available in the Navy Department prior to 7 December?

A. I do not know whether any of it—I do not recollect whether any of it was available prior to 7 December, or not. I believe that part of the information, the first item, was available on the 7th of December, and the second item of information was available prior to that date, perhaps on the 6th of December.

29. Q. Do you know whether any portion of the information in that dispatch that was available in the Navy Department prior to 7 December was distributed to responsible officials in the Navy Department or in the Government when received?

A. I don't know.

30. Q. I understood you to testify on the occasion of your previous appearance that you had no recollection of anyone in the Navy De-

partment telling the State Department on Sunday morning, 7 December, of the subject matter of the discussions between you and Admiral Stark and whoever else may have been present?

A. The subject matter of discussion, you mean, about the note?

31. Q. Yes.

A. I did not tell the State Department, but I am sure that the State Department was informed.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

32. Q. Admiral, for a number of years prior to December 1941, was it not a matter of common knowledge that Japan made a point of observing the movement of the United States Fleet units whenever possible?

A. That was the general belief throughout the Navy.

33. Q. Have you not personally observed Japanese merchant vessels in the vicinity of the United States Fleet when the said Fleet was maneuvering?

A. I do not know whether I personally observed, but during Fleet maneuvers there were reports generally received that merchant ships or Japanese tankers were in the vicinity for the purpose of observing.

[317] 34. Q. Admiral, do we understand that you were the liaison officer between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Department?

A. Yes; may I add, I did not transmit information—I mean personally transmit all the information. There was a system set up whereby a courier went to the State Department with items of naval intelligence, which were matters of general information. Then if there was to be a discussion of that information, then I did the discussing of it with the State Department, unless it was done on a higher level.

35. Q. As the court remembers, you stated that you made a daily memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations as to what had transpired in the State Department that day?

A. No, sir. I did not make a daily memorandum. Sometimes I would go in and just relate, after a visit to the State Department, to the Chief of Naval Operations what had occurred.

36. Q. But that was the daily custom; is that correct?

A. I couldn't say it was a daily custom, Admiral. There were no regularity about the visits. If I thought it was necessary to go over there, I might go three times a day. Then maybe there would be a day or so elapse when there was no occasion to go.

37. Well, during this interval between 27 November and 7 December, you had daily contacts and made daily reports; is that correct?

A. Practically daily, sometimes oftener; some days it would be two or three times.

38. Q. And these reports and conversations were discussing questions regarding Japan?

A. Most of them, yes.

39. Q. In this note or letter you just read, of December 2, regarding conversations of Mr. Welles with the Japanese representatives, did you discuss that with the Chief of Operations?

A. I cannot state definitely whether I did or not.

40. Q. Will you please state to the court the system by which Chief of Operations received reports from the State Department relative to our relations with Japan?

A. The Chief of Naval Operations—I presume you mean this particular period, 27 of November to 7 December?

41. Q. That's right.

A. I think the Chief of Naval Operations received it sometimes direct from Secretary Hull via telephone. I think he received certain information from the Secretary of the Navy, after conferences that he held with Secretary Hull. If [318] matters of this nature were discussed in cabinet meetings, which I presume they were, he was undoubtedly informed by the Secretary of the Navy, although I was never present when the Secretary did inform him. I informed him during this period, verbally, of the meeting I attended on this subject with the State Department.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

42. Q. Do we understand that during that period, November 27 to December 7, you informed him and conversed with him regarding negotiations being carried on with Japan by the State Department?

A. That is correct, sir.

The proceedings following, Page 318-A; questions 43, 44, 45 and the answers thereto, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[319] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 10:30 a. m., took a recess until 10:45 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties, and their counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, a witness for the judge advocate, was recalled and warned that the oath perviously taken by him was still binding.

The proceedings following, Page 320, Question Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[321] 6. Q. The court understands, of course, that through your liaison officer you were in daily touch with the State Department, and that you had other means of having knowledge of any conversations that went on?

A. That is right; we were in daily liaison with the State Department.

7. Q. In your answers to these questions regarding negotiations, will you please explain to the court your differentiation between conversations and negotiations?

A. Well, I would say that negotiations might flow from conversations. Two parties might get together and talk things over without coming to any agreement as to what, for example, they might send their respective governments. The line, I would say, would be a rather fine one, but negotiations would mean to me, taking some action on conversations.

8. Q. But did you understand that from November 27th to December 7th there were conversations going on between these respective representatives?

A. I do not recall learning of continued conversations, or at least nothing definite which, to my mind, changed the information which I had sent to the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific on 27 November, except, as I have previously testified, that I had been informed of in this court.

9. Q. It has been testified before this court that the note which was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese representative on 26 November was an incident which was a matter of general knowledge in the Navy Department. Are we correct in understanding that you had no knowledge whatsoever of this note?

A. I do not recall having seen the note, or the extent of it. I may have been told by my liaison officer, but the distinct impression that I had when I sent my dispatch was that we had come to an impasse.

10. Q. Do we understand that you had no knowledge of the contents of this note of 26 November up to and even immediately subsequent to 7 December 1941?

A. May I ask if that is the note which was given me here to read?

11. Q. That is the note of the 26th of November which told Japan our conditions for her maintaining relations with this country, specifying that she would give up Indo-China, withdraw her troops from China, and really revert to her status quo prior to the capture of Manchukuo?

A. I wouldn't say that I had no information. I have stated that I do not recall this note definitely. I have also testified to the fact—though I couldn't remember the date—that I understood a further dispatch might be sent to Japan.

[322] 12. Q. The reason that these questions are being asked is that if we remember correctly you stated when you were before this court that the first knowledge that you had ever had of this note was when it was shown to you at this court.

A. That is right. In answer to the previous question, I was referring to testimony which I gave and in which I said my remembrance of it was hazy; that the President was putting, or might put, before Japan some sort of a proposition looking to letting her have certain raw materials if, in turn, she would do certain things. The note, I do not recall having seen.

13. Q. Or the contents thereof?

A. Or its contents.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

14. Q. Admiral Stark, concerning the shreds of information which may have been brought to your attention and which you do not recall now: Do you recall at any time during the period which followed 27 November having any thought that in consequence of that information you should amend your dispatch of 27 November?

A. I do not.

The interested parties, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I can think of nothing further to give the court. I do have a statement which I would like to make and then I should like to verify my testimony before the court. There are one or two more or less unimportant changes but in the interest of clarification I should like to put them before the court. They are short and will only take a few minutes.

The court granted permission to make the statement.

The witness made the following statement: In reading over my testimony I noted a considerable space devoted to questions on messages which, because of their secrecy, have been made exhibits before this court. I feel that I ought to make a further statement to the court on this matter. The line of questioning on certain messages which [323] I did not recall and still have no recollection of having seen furnishes certain indications to an alert enemy which might be of vital interest to him were he to obtain such information. Should the secret classification of the proceedings of this court be removed, or should a copy of those proceedings or information gained therefrom come into the possession of persons unfriendly to this country while the present war with Japan is still in progress, these certain questions which were asked me might suggest enough to the enemy to be definitely injurious to our present and continuing war effort. From past experience I find myself in complete agreement with the opinion that Admiral Kimmel has already expressed on the record before this court that it is obvious that in due time proceedings of this court and all of the evidence it might have secured will be a matter of open record available to the public. I therefore feel it my duty as a responsible naval officer and as a former Chief of Naval Operations with knowledge of many of the intelligence activities of my subordinates to suggest for the court's consideration that that part of the record which would in any way identify material now held so secret that it has been denied this court be taken out of the record and placed in a top secret status which will absolutely preclude any leak and reference thereto.

The judge advocate stated as follows: The judge advocate is in concurrence with the statement of the interested party, Admiral Stark, and he feels that if counsel for the other interested parties are willing to stipulate that these matters be deleted from the record and filed

in a secure place with due reference to them so that they may be seen by proper authorities on demand, that the record might be, with the consent of the court, so written up.

The court announced that the questions were not objected to and would not be taken out of the record.

The witness stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth days of the trial and that he desired to make the following corrections in his testimony:

In the fourth line I desire to change "dispatch" to "information". I would like to amend the last two sentences to read, "Now that, in itself, did not exclude an attack on the Hawaiian Islands; the dispatch referred to didn't include them specifically because they were not mentioned in the information we had of Japanese naval and military movements. Feeling, however, that we should be on guard against the possibility of an attack coming from any direction, I wrote the words 'in any direction' into that dispatch myself. I remember it very distinctly."

[324] On the same page, Question 138, change "on mentioning" to "or mention"; and change the word "Atlantic" to "Asiatic".

On the next page, Question 142, the answer to the question, change "he was ready" to "he needed".

On Page 76, Question 252, insert after the word "any" in the first line, the words "other than official dispatches". Change the second sentence to read, "I have no further personal letters on file".

On the same page, Page 76, Question 253, insert period after the words "Pearl Harbor" and change the second sentence to read, "I may add that I told Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, that if Japan attacked the United States, we would break them before we got through, regardless of how long it took".

On Page 85, Question 279, in next to the last line, change the word "most" to "mostly".

On Page 106, Question 403, in the fifth line from the bottom, change the words "was ready" to "needed".

On Page 114, Question 444, strike out "yes" and substitute "as I recall".

On Page 143, Question 560, in the third line, change the words "war warning" in the third line, to "aggressive movement".

On Page 158, Question 626, delete the second sentence.

On Page 168, Question 706, change the answer to read, "I was informed that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to present a note to the State Department at exactly 1300".

None of the parties objected to the corrections as made.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.

[325] The court then, at 11:30 a. m., took a recess until 11:35 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel was present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken on Tuesday, August 15, 1944, resumed his seat as witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

135. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch of November 28, 1941. Will you examine this dispatch and state briefly what it is and whether or not you received it?

A. Yes, I received that dispatch.

136. Q. Will you state briefly the subject matter of it?

A. This informs the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific of certain instructions sent by the Army to the Commander, Western Defense Command, and it adds certain admonitions on the part of the Navy Department.

137. Q. Did this dispatch convey to you any information which differed materially from the dispatch of 27 November 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Not materially, no. It stressed that no hostile action should be taken against Japan, that Japan should be permitted to commit the first overt act and not to alarm the civil population. It also directed a report of measures taken, and I knew such a report had been submitted.

138. Q. Did these so-called admonitions, as I believe you expressed them, influence your estimate of the situation on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. As I have stated before, every bit of information I received, which I considered in any way reliable, affected my estimate.

139. Q. Specifically, did this information change any estimate that you had made on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. No, I can't say it materially affected my estimate.

[326] 140. Q. After November 27, 1941, did you know the condition of alert that had been set by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, so far as his command was concerned?

A. I knew on the 27th of November that the Army had gone on an alert. It was reported to me by members of my staff that an alert status had been taken by the Army.

141. Q. Do you know what this alert was?

A. I did not at that time.

142. Q. Well, do you know the condition of readiness which had been prescribed for vessels of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor between November 27 and December 7, 1941, and if you do, state what it was?

A. I have previously testified that the vessels in Pearl Harbor were in condition three, as specified in 2CL-41. I have also testified that, in addition to this condition, all the battleships manned about one-fourth of their anti-aircraft battery continuously.

143. Q. Did the condition of readiness, as prescribed, meet with your approval?

A. Yes.

144. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is the dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations of December 3, 1941. I ask you to examine it and state whether or not you received it.

A. Yes, I received that.

145. Q. Will you state, in general, what the subject matter of this dispatch is?

A. The subject matter of this dispatch is that instructions were sent to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, and Manila to destroy their important and secret documents.

146. Q. How did the information contained in this dispatch influence any estimate of the situation you had prior to its receipt as to the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. This was another indication that some move was contemplated by Japan. It did not change my estimate made as a result of the receipt of the dispatch on the 27th of November. I felt that this was a step which Japan might well take, no matter in which direction she was going, to prevent the seizure of these documents upon the breaking of diplomatic relations.

147. Q. I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 4, 1941, and ask you to read this dispatch and state the substance of it to the court.

A. This is a dispatch to the naval station at Guam, [327] directing them to destroy their secret and confidential publications, except those that were essential for current purposes, and this meant to me that at probably the most exposed outpost we were anticipating anything that might happen as a general precautionary measure.

148. Q. I show you Exhibit 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 6, 1941. I ask you to read it and state the substance.

A. This is a dispatch sent by OpNav to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. This is a deferred dispatch, incidentally. It says that, in view of the international situation and the exposed position of the outlying Pacific islands, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was authorized to have them destroy their secret and confidential documents, now or under later conditions, of greater emergency. Also to retain the means of communication of current operations and special intelligence. I have been informed that the view of the Registered Publication Section of the Navy Department was that we had sent too many secret codes to these outlying islands, and they were concerned about their destruction, because they felt that they had many more codes on the outlying islands than there was any real need for, and I am inclined to think that the Registered Publication Section was correct.

149. Q. Can you recall whether you received this dispatch, Exhibit 22, prior to the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941?

A. I cannot state positively. I presume I did receive it prior to the attack.

150. Q. Can you recall, Admiral, whether or not you communicated the substance of these dispatches, Exhibits 21 and 22, relative to the destruction of codes, to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the Japanese attack on December 7?

A. I tried to keep the Commanding General informed of all dispatches in which I thought he would have the slightest interest. I did

not myself direct that these dispatches be delivered to him. If he states that he did not see them, I presume he is correct.

151. Q. Between November 27 and December 7, 1941, were you receiving any information of a diplomatic or military nature from your own intelligence unit in the Hawaiian area concerning matters which might have a bearing on the imminence of war?

A. Yes, I have testified that I received these dispatches, and once each day the Fleet Intelligence Officer presented a summary of information received during the past twenty-four hours and his estimate of how this affected decisions made at this conference. When the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division did not actually attend, this information [328] was always made available to them, and it was added to whatever we had formerly received, to complete the picture and make such changes as we considered necessary.

152. Q. Can you recall whether or not this information which you received from your own intelligence unit added to or modified in any material manner the information you had received from the Navy Department between November 27 and December 7, 1941?

A. My recollection is that the tenor of the newspaper articles, radio and other news items indicated that conversations were going on in Washington between the Japanese and the United States. I should say the principal thing that we got from my own intelligence unit had to do with the movements of Japanese ships, and there was nothing in these reports which indicated an expedition aimed at Honolulu or Pearl Harbor. We watched this very closely and went over the probabilities from time to time—I mean, daily, not from time to time—and that was my conclusion.

153. Q. I show you Exhibit 48, which is in evidence before this court. It is a dispatch from General Marshall to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, among others, and ask you to state to the court, in general, the subject matter of this dispatch.

A. This was a dispatch sent on the 7th of December, and it states that Japan is presenting what amounts to an ultimatum at one o'clock, that they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately, and just what significance the hour set may have, they do not know.

154. Q. Can you state when you received this dispatch if you ever did?

A. It was brought to me some time in the afternoon of December 7. It was presented to me by a courier—a captain, I think, in the Army. I told him it wasn't of the slightest interest to me at that time, and I threw the thing in the waste basket.

155. Q. Adverting to the information contained in Exhibit 48 and recalling the information that you had up to the time of the Japanese attack, what additional information do you feel that this dispatch, Exhibit 48, would have given you which you did not have at the time?

A. In view of the fact that Japan was presenting an ultimatum to the United States at exactly one o'clock Washington time, which is approximately sunrise or early daylight in Honolulu, and midnight in Manila, I feel that had I had this information, we would have immediately assumed the [329] highest conditions of readiness, at least, until this time appointed was well in the past. That was most definite information. I must at this time say that it is easy to fall into an error of saying what I would have done after the fact, and

when you ask me and when the members of the Roberts Commission asked me what I would have done, I must add I cannot answer that. I can only answer what I now think I would have done, which might be different from what I would have done.

156. Q. I refer again to Exhibit 19, which is the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as one of the information addressees, and which is the dispatch in which the Chief of Naval Operations states that there is an injunction contained in it to the effect that the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Could this injunction have any influence on your decision to have conducted long-range reconnaissance?

A. No, I don't think that had any particular influence on my decision as to the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. It was my firm conviction that any long-range reconnaissance we conducted over an extended period of time would destroy the means that I had, due to the destruction of planes and putting them out of commission. It has been estimated by competent aviators that, in view of the practical absence of spare parts for the patrol planes in Hawaii at that time and the limited repair facilities, thirty days' operation of these planes would have reduced them by not less than twenty-five per cent. That is, twenty-five per cent of them would have been out of commission.

157. Q. If you are sending out long-distance reconnaissance planes under circumstances in which you might expect to encounter a hostile force, would you arm those patrol planes?

A. Oh, under my orders to permit Japan to commit the first overt act, technically, I could not fire a shot at a Japanese Fleet until after they had first shot at us, and also, technically, had I sent out patrol planes armed, I would have had to wait until the enemy fired at these patrol planes or committed some other overt act before I could do anything more than protest. It has been testified, I believe, that a Japanese carrier force approaching within 1,000 miles of Oahu would have been properly considered as an overt act. I had no such information prior to December 7, 1941.

158. Q. But, Admiral, if your planes were out there on reconnaissance and were attacked, would it not be your desire that they be in a position to defend themselves?

A. Oh, if I had sent them out, and when I did send them out, they were armed.

[330] 159. Q. Would the arming of these planes on the reconnaissance flights before an act of war had been committed been any source of alarm to the civil populace?

A. No, because we had been arming them constantly.

Counsel for the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that the judge advocate should clarify what he meant by armed planes.

The judge advocate replied that the interested party would have a right to clarify any questions he desired on cross-examination.

160. Q. What percentage of the officers and men were permitted to be away from their ships in a liberty or leave status on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

A. Those ships which were in Pearl Harbor—

161. Q. I had reference to those in Pearl Harbor.

A. We granted the regular liberty, and the Fleet orders in effect at that time required one-fourth of the officers and one-half the men to be aboard at all times. My orders provided that each quarter of the crew should be trained and capable of manning the anti-aircraft guns on cruisers and battleships, so that there was a complete and trained crew for all anti-aircraft guns and air control on board at all times. On the destroyers, this was provided for on the basis of a watch in three. At the time of the attack there was some ninety per cent, by count, of the enlisted men actually on board on all ships and around seventy per cent of the officers.

162. Q. Had you heard any rumors, or do you know of any statements in the public press as to the number of officers and men who were unfit for duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, because of previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor?

A. I caused an investigation to be made of this matter, in order to present the data to the Roberts Commission. The number of men under the influence of alcohol on the night of December 6 was inconsequential. There were no officers in this condition, and there was no evidence of the after effects of liquor on any individual man at the time of the attack—nothing that affected his performance of duty. As a result of the investigation I ordered, these facts were determined.

163. Q. What was your estimate prior to the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, of the capacity of the Army to defend the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor with regard to an air attack by torpedo planes?

A. I didn't think that the torpedo plane attack would be made, because I didn't believe that aerial torpedoes would [331] run in Pearl Harbor. We did not give this a great deal of consideration, for that reason. However, we had this problem in the Fleet at sea, and the best defense against them is, I believe, the fighter planes to knock them down before they can get in to a point where they drop the torpedoes. The anti-aircraft guns at that time were not anywhere near as numerous as they should have been, and they weren't nearly as efficient then as they are now, either on shore or afloat. The best defense that the Army had against aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor were their pursuit planes, and I don't think they were sufficient. They didn't have a sufficient number of planes nor crews for them, according to my information, and the crews were not well trained.

164. Q. As against the number of pursuit ships the Army had available, what was your estimate of the additional number that would have been required to have prevented a successful torpedo plane attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, in Pearl Harbor?

A. About three times that number.

165. Q. Did you know the condition of alert that had been set by the Army for its aircraft and aircraft defense during the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941?

A. No, I didn't know in detail.

166. Q. Am I to understand from that statement that no Army authorities notified you of that fact?

A. I knew the Army was on an alert, which corresponded, in general, to the alert status assumed by the Navy. I did not inquire into the particular details, as I did not consider that important under

the conditions of readiness which we were maintaining in November and the general situation.

167. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, know what condition of alert was being maintained in the Army's aircraft warning system?

A. My answer is covered in the previous question. I had been informed that the aircraft warning system was being manned but did not inquire into the details of the watch standing. I have testified that I knew this was a new system and needed training.

168. Q. Were any of the ships which were present in Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, equipped with radar?

A. Yes.

169. Q. Do you know whether or not these instruments were being manned prior to the attack?

A. We did not require the ships in Pearl Harbor to man their radar, because due to the surrounding hills in that port, the radar of those ships so located was virtually useless.

[332] 170. Q. Were any battle lookouts stationed on the ships of the Fleet in the condition of readiness you have described that they were maintaining on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

A. To the best of my knowledge, they had battle lookouts, yes. The crews of the guns themselves were on watch.

171. Q. Did you have any complaints prior to December 7, 1941, as to the communication system which existed between your own command and that of the Army in the Hawaiian area?

A. No, I had no complaints. I knew that the commercial telephone system in Honolulu was entirely inadequate, but I believe the communication between responsible Army and Navy commanders was fairly good and that steps were being prosecuted vigorously to make this communication.

172. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, just prior to the attack by the Japanese, do you have any recollection as to whether or not there were any deficiencies in the communications between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and your own Flag Office?

A. I have no knowledge of any difficulties at that time.

173. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

A. The first information that I had which conveyed to me that an attack was being made on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a telephone message from my staff duty officer, telling me that a raid was in progress. I ran out of my quarters, which were on the hill immediately behind the submarine base, and saw the first torpedo plane attack which was launched on the battle-ships. I stood there for perhaps five minutes estimating the situation and got into my car, which had appeared, and drove down to the headquarters. I was in my headquarters by five minutes after eight—probably before and proceeded to take such steps as appeared to be practicable. Prior to this time, between 7:30 and 7:40, I had a report from my staff duty officer that a destroyer reported that they had attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor. In the ten days between

November 27 and December 7, and after I had issued orders for ships to bomb all submarine contacts, I had at least a half dozen reports of such bombing, and when I received this information that the destroyer had attacked the submarine, I presumed it was another bombing of a submarine contact of some kind, and while I was waiting for an amplification of this report the bombing attack started. You will note that in my order 2CL-41 we specifically provide that when a ship is attacked by a submarine and, by implication, when they definitely knew a Japanese submarine was in the area, [333] they were to broadcast that information in plain language in order to alarm all the proper people and put them in a state of readiness. This provision was not carried out by the commanding officer making the attack, and I think that changed considerably the course of events that followed.

174. Q. At about what time did you get this report of the attack by a destroyer on a submarine in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. Between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[334] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued):

175. Q. Did you yourself, as Commander-in-Chief, ever make an official report of the personnel casualties and damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor after the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941?

A. I did. About the 12th of December I submitted reports as to personnel and materiel casualties. These reports were necessarily incomplete, and I believe that better data was eventually submitted by my successor.

176. Q. Do you have any recollection of receiving a radar report from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department which showed a radar track of Japanese planes after the attack?

A. I never saw any written document on the subject, that I now recall, but about three days after the attack my Fleet Gunnery Officer, My Fleet Marine Officer, was shown such a track by General Davidson, who was in command of the Interceptor Command. They reported this to me upon their return to Headquarters. That was the first news I had of any radar information.

177. Q. Do you know what this radar information disclosed?

A. It was reported to me at the time that the planes were picked up at a little after 7:00 o'clock, I think. The planes were picked up about 132 miles, bearing north of Oahu.

178. Q. The question I meant to ask you, Admiral, was with reference to planes that were returning after the attack had been completed. Did you have any radar information as to the track these retreating planes were pursuing?

A. No, neither before nor after the attack did I have any such information until very recently, since this court has been in session, as testified to by General Short. That is all I know about it. I would like to make it clear to the court that I had absolutely no reports from the Army as to the location of enemy planes or enemy carriers, which were of any use to me. Any information that I got came so late that it was of no use.

[335] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

179. Q. Admiral, with respect to the war warning message, dispatch of 27 November, you testified that the warning was weakened by subsequent press and radio reports that conversations with Japanese representatives were continuing after the message from Chief of Naval Operations stated that negotiations has ceased; is that correct?

A. I stated it, yes.

180. Q. Did you receive, subsequent to November 27, any dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department which cancelled or modified in any way the war message?

A. No.

181. Q. Then I gather the conflict between the official dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations in the period between 24 November and 7 December and the press and radio reports which you got during that same period left you uncertain as to the exact meaning of the dispatches, or, as you put it, that weakened their effect; is that correct?

A. That is true, and that same cycle I had gone through with on previous occasions.

182. Q. Well, in view of this conflict and confusion in your own mind as to the meaning of this dispatch, did you ask for any clarification during this ten-day period?

A. I did not testify that I had any confusion in my own mind as to the meaning of the dispatch.

183. Q. Well, I understood that you testified that there was a conflict between the information you received from the Chief of Naval Operations and information you received from other sources, such as press and radio, which caused you to have some doubt as to the efficacy of the first dispatch.

A. I did not seek any clarification from the Chief of Naval Operations.

184. Q. You stated yesterday that—this was in answer to a question concerning the relations between you and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District—you stated that if there was any doubt at any time in the mind of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District or his staff about the instructions that you had given him with respect to your orders for the defense of the naval base, that you were available to him for discussion of those orders and clarification at any time.

A. That is correct.

185. Q. Did you have that same feeling about approaching the Chief of Naval Operation about clarification of his dispatches?

A. Yes.

186. Q. Then am I to gather from this discussion that you [336] were relying to some extent at least on the press and radio reports of what was going on in Washington for the critical military decisions that you were making at Pearl Harbor?

A. I used all means of information at my command, and evaluated the information which I received, and considered the source.

187. Q. Now you have testified in effect that the dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, in view of these conflicting press and radio reports, didn't cause you to think that war was particularly imminent or that an attack by Japan on United States territory was particularly imminent—in spite of the fact, however, that you had not received approval from the Chief of Naval Operations of your request to bomb submarine contacts, you decided on November 27, after receiving the war warning dispatch, to bomb submarine contacts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

A. In answer to your question, yes. I decided to bomb submarine contacts as previously I have stated.

188. Q. Was that decision made after the receipt of the war warning message on that day?

A. Yes.

189. Q. Then I understand that the situation regarding the possibility of submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, and the measures which you decided to take to meet it, were considered by you to be different after you received the war warning dispatch than existed before?

A. I would say that the war warning dispatch gave me an excuse to do something that I had wanted to do for several months.

190. Q. Did you consider the situation to be any more serious after receiving the war warning dispatch than before, with respect to submarine attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I considered that if an attack were made by Japan on the Philippines, it would probably be accompanied by an attack by submarines in the Pearl Harbor area.

191. Q. With respect to the reasons and your consideration of the reasons why the Navy Department withheld the permission that you had sought to bomb submarine contacts, or suspect contact submarines, did you give any thought to the possible situation in the western Pacific where our own submarines were operating in waters adjacent to those waters used by the Japanese Navy?

A. Yes, and I was convinced that if one of our submarines operated in the vicinity of a Japanese operating area, it would be bombed without question, no matter what my action was in Hawaii.

[337] 192. I believe you stated the war warning message was followed within twenty-three hours after the message of 27 November, on the 28th, asking your advice concerning the Army proposal to send planes to Midway; it came within twenty-three hours, as I recall.

A. The evidence and the message themselves indicate that.

193. Q. There was also another message, 2740, at the same time, concerning an Army proposal to reenforce certain defense battalions, wasn't there?

A. Yes.

194. Q. Now did the proximity in point of time of these two dispatches to which I have referred cause doubt as to the real meaning of the war message? Perhaps I should clarify by saying, I mean by that, did the proximity of these two messages in point of time to the war warning message—that is, within twenty-three hours of the war warning message—cause any doubt in your mind as to the real meaning of the war message?

A. Well, I think they lessened the force of the war warning message to the extent that the Chief of Naval Operations was apparently willing to temporarily upset, to a considerable degree, the defenses of Pearl Harbor as well as of the outlying bases.

195. Q. Didn't it occur to you that these might be steps in furtherance of the war warning message; that is, providing for reeforcement of positions which were not considered in an appropriate state of readiness?

A. There was that consideration, of course, but the difficulties of reenforcing the outlying stations were undoubtedly well-known to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the War Department message, which I have mentioned, but which has not been put in evidence before this court, proposed a replacement of marine defense battalions on Midway and Wake in toto by Army troops. I have my letter of 2 December, written to the Chief of Naval Operations, reviewing this matter completely; and in that letter, War Department message number 48, of 29 November—that was to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department—was likewise a proposal from the War Department that indicated a conflict betwixt the ideas of the War Department and the Navy Department at that time, which I attempted to iron out in my letter of 2 December 1941, and also in my dispatch of 28 November 1941, a part of which I quoted to the court here the other day.

196. Q. Did you ask the Chief of Naval Operations to clarify these apparent inconsistencies between these dispatches and the war message, by this dispatch of 28 November?

A. No. I reported the action I was taking.

197. Q. Admiral, you testified yesterday, I believe, that [338] you considered an air bombing attack on Pearl Harbor to be a remote possibility; is that correct?

A. At that time, yes.

198. Q. Did you consider it at that time to be a remote possibility?

A. Yes.

199. Q. Now, referring to Exhibit 30, which was the letter of 18 February from you to Admiral Stark, will you read to the court, please, the second paragraph on page three.

A. (Reading:)

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces, DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

200. Q. Between the date of your letter, 18 February 1941, and December 7, 1941, did you change that estimate of the situation as you recited it there?

A. When I wrote the letter of 18 February 1941, I was trying to urge that steps be taken to place Pearl Harbor in a proper defensive posture, and that we have there all the forces necessary to meet the contingencies which might arise. I continued that policy as long as I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. I wanted the base to be self-sustaining in the defensive way in every respect.

201. Q. Excuse me, Admiral, but I have an obligation not to burden the record with more than the answers to the questions, and I just want

to know whether that letter of February 18 represented your estimate of the situation at that time, and whether you changed that estimate between then and December 7.

A. I maintained the same estimate of the situation in regard to the possibility of an air and submarine attack on Pearl Harbor and the Pearl Harbor area as long as I was Commander-in-Chief. The probability of the attack I think I have completely covered here for the period of 27 November to 7 December, in the previous testimony.

202. Q. I show you Annex 7 to Exhibit 23, to which is attached an addendum one to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, and showing the signature of Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. As I understand it, Admiral, that represents an estimate of the [339] situation made by the air officer attached to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, in conjunction with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force.

A. That represents an estimate made by Admiral Bellinger in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Air Officer, and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. This estimate was approved by Admiral Bloch and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. I also approved the estimate.

203. Q. Now will you refer to Paragraph 3, b., I believe it is, and read that paragraph?

A. (Reading:)

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

204. Q. Now, having in mind that you had said a surprise attack by air is a remote possibility, and having in mind also that a surprise ordinarily occurs once, didn't you consider it important, upon receipt of the war warning, to put all possible security measures into effect to guard against an air attack, even though it was only a remote possibility?

A. I took action to which I have testified, after mature consideration and balancing all the factors. I did not make a decision lightly, and I had had many difficult decisions to make before. My actions, I think, speak for themselves.

205. Q. What were the other factors that you took into account, other than the war warning, in making that decision?

A. I took into account the necessity for continued training, and the chances of attack against Pearl Harbor at that time—in fact the chances of an attack against the United States at all at that time—although I gave, I think, full consideration to the warning from the Navy Department.

206. Q. You have testified that you had in your own command an Intelligence Unit. Did you, during the last half of November, have, from any of these units or organizations within your own command, any estimate that a force of Japanese carriers had recently gone to the Marshall Islands?

A. We had some information that, I think, there was one or two carriers which had gone to the Marshall Islands, and no more.

207. Q. Had you heard of Japanese carriers being previously reported so far from home waters?

A. What do you mean? When?

[340] 208. Q. Well, during say the previous year.

A. To the best of my recollection, the Jap carriers had been in the Marshalls during the previous year.

209. Q. Would you consider that the information you got from your intelligence unit was significant in connection with the war warning message that had been received about this time?

A. I weighed the information and gave it the weight that I thought it was entitled to. I did not consider it especially significant, no; all those things had a significance.

210. Q. I understood you testified this morning that about this time you were receiving from your own intelligence unit mostly military information concerning the movements of the Japanese Fleet, and there was nothing received during this period from that unit which gave any indication to you of an expeditionary force that might be directed to Pearl Harbor?

A. That's right.

211. Q. You didn't consider the information concerning the Japanese carrier task force going into the Marshalls was that type of information?

A. That's right.

212. Q. In your letter of July 26, 1941, to Admiral Stark, you ask a series of questions concerning the United States attitude toward Russian participation in the war, and you ask him a number of questions. You were asking information as to what the United States attitude would be in case certain contingencies, which you outlined in the letter, might occur. As I understand from your testimony, you don't feel that you ever got any satisfactory answers to the questions that you put in that letter?

A. I did not have any clear and definite answers to certain phases of that.

213. Q. Well, you knew, of course, did you not, and Admiral Stark had informed you on numerous occasions, that he, too, would like to have answers to some of the questions that you were proposing in these letters; and that he himself asked these questions in other places and had been unable to secure an answer?

A. That is contained in his answers to my letters, and what is not contained in his answers to my letters doesn't exist, because I I didn't see him.

214. Q. Now in connection with the letter of January 24, from the Secretary of the Navy to the War Department, relative to the weaknesses in the Army defense of Pearl Harbor. You testified, I believe, that you felt that you kept the Navy Department informed concerning the lack of progress in making up these deficiencies; is that correct?

A. In general, yes.

215. Q. Would you tell the court in what way you kept the Navy Department informed of the failure of the Army to make good the deficiencies which existed in the defenses at Pearl Harbor?

A. If you will read my letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, that is where I kept him informed, and I think that is in the letters.

If you will give me a little time I can bring it out specifically, where it was.

216. Q. Did you do it by personal letters?

A. All kinds of letters, personal and official, and dispatches.

217. Q. You stated yesterday specifically, with respect to the failure of the Army to make good the deficiencies that existed in the defense there—not your deficiency of matériel and men that you had, but it is the Army deficiencies that I am speaking of—you informed the Chief of Naval Operations or the Navy Department of the Army's failure to make up their deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. If you mean that I informed him specifically about the failure of the Army to make up their deficiencies, I did not inform him specifically of that. I did inform him in general of such things. I felt that that was a responsibility of the War Department. I had seen the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War. I saw the Secretary of War's answer to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he placed the remedying of this unsatisfactory situation at Pearl Harbor in the highest priority; and the Navy Department's attention had been very forcibly called to this—and I didn't think that the detailed report was called upon by me. Now the Commandant of the District, in addition to the Commander-in-Chief, did send in certain information to the Navy Department, and I felt then and now feel that the Navy Department was reasonably well informed of the progress of the Army installations at Pearl Harbor. I did not accept responsibility for everything that the Army failed to do.

218. Q. You stated yesterday that you worked closely with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and that you pressed him to improve the defenses of Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

A. Yes, we discussed those affairs on many [342] occasions, and the Commanding General of Pearl Harbor was very anxious to improve them, and he was doing all he could.

219. Q. During the last half of 1941, did you make any representation to the Chief of Naval Operations to take up with the War Department the matter of the failure of the Army to provide what you and General Short considered to be the adequate defenses of Pearl Harbor?

A. I had no doubt that the Chief of Naval Operations was adequately informed.

220. Q. But you made no specific request on him to follow this matter through?

A. No, I did not.

[343] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frann Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

221. Q. You stated this morning that the Army did not notify you specifically of the state of readiness which they were observing after the war warning messages, and that you did not ascertain the state of readiness which the Army was exercising at that time. I believe you stated that the reason you didn't was because you understood that the Army was on an alert status corresponding to the Navy's alert status, and knowing what that was you didn't consider it important to follow it further. You further testified that the Navy's condition of alert was Condition 3. Is that right?

A. Yes.

222. Q. Are we to understand by that that in view of the fact that you received from the Navy Department an official war warning on November 27, that you did not consider it important to determine from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether or not he was in the best state of readiness he could possibly be for the protection of Pearl Harbor in any eventuality which might be faced in the event war should develop?

A. The Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department was faced with a considerable number of difficulties which were parallel to those that I had and that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had. He had untrained troops and he had to continue his training, and I think that he did make his decision to do what he considered was the proper thing after full consideration of all the factors.

223. Q. Did you make any inquiries of the Commanding General to make sure in your own mind that he was doing the utmost with everything he had to provide for any eventuality should war develop; that is my question.

A. I felt sure that he was doing that.

224. Q. But you didn't make any inquiries of the Commanding General at that time?

A. In the specific terms that you have stated, perhaps not.

225. Q. Now, you stated this morning with respect to the dispatch of 7 December which was received after the attack, that had you had it prior to the attack it would have had a great influence on your actions and on your estimate of the situation. Now, I take that to mean that the destruction of the code machines which was called to [344] your attention, or would have been called to your attention in that dispatch had you received it before the attack, had considerable significance to you, did it?

A. No, that wasn't the thing that was most significant to me. There were two other factors in there which were much more significant than that. One was that an ultimatum was being delivered. The other was that it was being delivered at a specific time and that the Japanese Ambassador had instructions from his government to deliver it at a specific time. The question of the destruction of the code machines was just one more thing which I did not consider of any vital importance.

226. Q. Did you consider the message that you got on December 3, saying that the Japanese had given urgent and categorical instructions to destroy the code machines, and even to burn secret and confidential documents, as having any peculiar significance in view of the fact that you had received the war warning?

A. I have testified as to my views on that subject.

227. Q. Would you mind stating whether or not you did, that is, whether or not you considered that as having any particular importance in view of the war warning that you had received?

A. Those were all factors that had to be considered.

228. Q. That wasn't a factor of major importance?

A. No, I didn't so consider it.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

229. Q. In general terms, during your discussions with General Short beginning on 27 November and covering several days there-

after to and including 7 December, did you canvass with him the whole situation and what both he and you were doing in view of the warnings that you both received?

A. I would say yes.

230. A. After 27 November did you issue from time to time instructions, in the event of war with Japan, for the Fleet?

A. I caused my War Plans officer to maintain a memorandum which was in the hands of the duty officer at all times, and this memorandum was revised whenever necessary and contained the action that I would take in the event that we had a war with Japan. I did that as a general precautionary measure and that was kept on file. The date of the last one was December 6, 1941. It [345] was submitted to me by then Captain McMorris, and I approved it. That was a summary of the orders that we issued, indicating what we were going to do with each one of the task forces that we had out there in the Pacific.

231. Q. That was a measure which was taken after and as a result of the warning of 27 November, and in addition to those measures which you enumerated yesterday?

A. Yes.

232. Q. That you adopted as a result of it?

A. Yes.

233. Q. There has been talk about correspondence that you had with Admiral Stark on 2 December relative to this situation in the outlying islands. I ask you if you can identify the document I now hand you?

A. I do. I identify this as a personal letter which I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, on 2 December 1941, and which covers all of the current action I was taking.

The personal letter dated December 2, 1941, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 50" for reference, description appended.

234. Q. I show you another document and ask you if you can identify it?

A. This is an official letter which I wrote to Admiral Stark on the same day, December 2, 1941.

The official letter dated December 2, 1941, from Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 51" for reference, description appended.

The court then, at 2:45 p. m., took a recess until 2:55 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[346] Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, (Ret) (Continued):

235. Q. Since the letters are rather lengthy, Admiral, can you summarize them briefly, for the benefit of the court?

A. These two letters, one an official letter and one a personal letter, written by me to Admiral Stark, are Exhibit Nos. 50 and 51. In general, the two letters cover the same information. They discuss the dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to the reenforcement of marine crews on the islands, and the replacement of the Marine aircraft by Army aircraft. They also invite attention to the War Department's dispatch which apparently contemplated the replacement of all Marine units on the islands. We pointed out the fact that the Army had no defense battalions organized; that it would take some time for them to organize a defense battalion; and we also pointed out the inadvisability of mixing Marines and Army on a small island, and I informed the Chief of Naval Operations that in my opinion we should let the Marines alone where they were and let the Army go down to Canton and Christmas Island and develop them. In case the Army took over the defense of the islands, they could not furnish the anti-aircraft guns and they wanted us to turn the anti-aircraft guns that the Marines had over to them. They could furnish men and some surface guns. They wanted us to furnish them with 5-inch guns also. Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7-inch and 5-inch guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-millimeter guns from Hawaii, the Marine 5-inch guns might be replaced, but the 155-millimeter guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost. Army can spare no 50-calibre [347] machine guns but can supply rifles and 30-calibre machine guns. Army has a limited number of 37-millimeter guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening defenses here, particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present, there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37-millimeter guns. Incidentally, I received a dispatch just about this time in which they told me they were going to send me either four or six 37-millimeter guns for the Marines. I informed him that Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE and three heavy cruisers, and so forth, were going to Wake. I think that any further information that the court wants they could obtain by reading this.

236. Q. Would not the sending of a carrier over 2,000 miles to the westward, within 600 miles of a Japanese base as proposed in these dispatches from both CNO and the War Department, have been a rather dangerous operation if war was expected imminently?

A. Yes. And when we sent the ENTERPRISE to the westward—this affected my estimate—that is, to Wake, we covered our advance by a couple of squadrons of patrol planes operating between Pearl, Johnston, Midway and Wake.

237. Q. Although the dispatch of the 27th concerning the relief of these outlying bases was sent some 22 hours prior to the war warning dispatch of 27 November, did you ever receive any modification of the suggestion about relieving these outlying bases?

A. I recommended certain action which was different from that suggested by the War and Navy Departments, and the Navy Department approved the action which I recommended, which was to send Marine planes to Wake and Midway.

238. Q. What I meant was, on the receipt of the war warning dispatch of 27 November, did you receive any cancellation or modification of the suggestion about relieving the outlying bases specifically?

A. No.

239. Q. As a matter of fact, did not this proposal about relieving the outlying bases, coming so close to the war warning message of 27 November, modify the war warning as connoting no prospect of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. It tended to and did reduce, in my mind, the chances of an attack on Pearl Harbor insofar as the Navy Department had any idea that there was imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[348] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

240. Q. Admiral, you have testified yesterday and again today that when you received important dispatches and letters, important letters, you would apprise your senior officers of the contents of them and discuss them with them?

A. That is right.

241. Q. And that was a customary and rather an invariable practice of yours, was it not?

A. That is right.

242. Q. I take it that this practice obtained in connection with the messages that we have here discussed of 16 October, 24 November, 27 November, and 3 December—that series of messages?

A. Yes.

243. Q. At these conferences I think you have indicated that there would be present your War Plans officer?

A. That is right.

244. Q. Your chief of staff?

A. Generally.

245. Q. Your operations officer?

A. Generally.

246. Q. At the time, there were under your command three vice admirals; am I correct in that?

A. Correct.

247. Q. And they would attend these conferences if they were important?

A. That is correct.

248. Q. From November 27 on, I take it that at least two of them were there at all times; or am I incorrect in that?

A. No; both Halsey and Wilson Brown were out. Halsey left on the 28th and didn't come back until after the attack; and Brown left, I think it was the 4th or 5th.

249. Q. The 5th of December?

A. The 4th or 5th of December, and didn't come back until after the attack.

250. Q. Now, at these discussions you would have Rear Admiral Bloch at such discussions?

A. Yes.

251. Q. Those are different discussions than the ones you mentioned about discussing intelligence information that you had every day?

A. That is correct.

[349] 252. Q. Those discussions you had were with your own people at your own headquarters?

A. That is correct, but at the general conferences I made it a practice to have my intelligence officer come in and summarize to the conference everything up to that moment.

253. Q. Now, in connection with that intelligence, your headquarters, and indeed you personally, received through your people the intelligence information gleaned by the unit of Com14; am I right?

A. That is correct.

254. Q. There was close liaison between your headquarters and theirs on that subject?

A. That is correct.

255. Q. Mention was made of an estimate that some Jap carriers were in the Marshalls?

A. That is right, and I have given here what my recollection was.

256. Q. But that information, as you recall, came to you immediately from the unit of Com14?

A. It was presented to me by my intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Layton, who worked in close contact with Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of the Commandant, 14th Naval District unit. And in addition to Layton, there were three or four other officers who were really under Admiral Bloch, worked under Rochefort and were attached to the Commander-in-Chief's unit.

257. Q. Now, the information that this intelligence unit of Com14 supplied, largely had to do with the estimates of the disposition of the Japanese Fleet?

A. That is correct.

258. Q. That would not be political intelligence?

A. No; that is right. I think they called themselves the combat information unit.

259. Q. After these conferences that you would have with your senior officers after you had received important dispatches, on the basis of those discussions and the intelligence that you had previously received, you would make your decision as to what steps should be taken?

A. That is correct, and the decisions were mine.

260. Q. The decisions were yours and you made them at the time?

A. That is correct.

261. Q. Now, at that time, and in making those decisions, you were then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet and your rank at that point of time was admiral?

A. That is right.

[350] 262. Q. And from all of 1941 down to and including December 7, the Pacific Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor?

A. That is correct.

263. Q. During all of that period, except for your trip to Washington, I think 1 June, and perhaps a couple of sea voyages, you were personally present at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

264. Q. And I think you testified yesterday that your headquarters were at the Submarine Base; your residence was on the military reservation just behind it?

A. That is right. There were more than a couple of trips to sea, but not many.

265. Q. In any event, you were there at all times from October 16 and through December 7?

A. Yes. Wait a minute. We had a maneuver to the islands, which I think took place after October 16, when I went out, for about four or five days.

266. Q. Four or five days only?

A. Yes. That is my memory at the present time.

267. Q. Now, after the October 16 message, which is Exhibit 13, you sent, as I recall it, twelve patrol planes from Oahu to Midway?

A. Twelve patrol planes, yes.

268. Q. And then these same planes were sent to Wake and they replaced some planes at Midway; is that how it worked?

A. My recollection now is that we sent a patrol squadron to Midway and then when we sent Halsey out there we sent another patrol squadron up from Pearl to Midway, and the patrol squadron which had been at Midway we sent to Wake. And in reverse order, we brought them back.

269. Q. Then there was mention of some Marine planes that were sent from the Hawaiian area. You sent some Marine planes about October 27 or 28th to Wake?

A. No. I sent the Marine planes on the ENTERPRISE to Wake, leaving Pearl on the 28th of November.

270. Q. The 28th of November?

A. Yes.

271. Q. Then you sent other planes on December 5 to Midway?

A. That is correct; on the LEXINGTON.

[351] 272. Q. You have previously mentioned, Admiral, that in all Hawaii—and correct me if I am wrong—there were only 81 patrol planes during the period November 27 to December 7?

A. That is according to my records and my best information.

273. Q. And not all of those were available for full operation?

A. That is correct.

274. Q. From November 15th to December 7th, Patrol Wing One and Patrol Wing Two in the Hawaiian area were commanded by a Rear Admiral Bellinger; is that not so?

A. That is right.

275. Q. Rear Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the Fleet?

A. Yes.

276. Q. And he was also the Senior Fleet Air Detachment officer at the air station during that period?

A. That is right.

277. Q. He was also, under your orders, the Commander of Task Force Nine; is that not so?

A. Yes.

278. Q. And that had been set up by you in an order that became effective on November 15th?

A. Well, I don't recall now.

279. Q. You don't recall at this time?

A. I don't recall just exactly the date. The first paragraph of this letter says "Reference (A) is cancelled and superseded by this letter effective 15 November 1941" and I presume that this letter is a revision of a previous letter which had been in effect for some time previous and I am quite sure that that is true.

280. Q. Now, the 81 patrol planes which you have testified about are the identical patrol planes which are in this task force; is that not so?

A. That is right. May I revert a moment? You omitted to state one of the duties of Admiral Bellinger. I hope you will remedy that later.

281. Q. I show you now a paper and ask you if you recognize it?

A. Yes, this is a letter effective November 15, 1941 which supersedes and cancels a previous letter on this same subject. It is merely a modification of the previous letter which had been in effect for some time. It is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41.

[352] The Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated October 31, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "Exhibit 52" for reference, description appended.

282. Q. Admiral, the other day you read certain parts of this exhibit 52, even though it wasn't evidence; you read some extracts from it. Isn't that correct?

A. Yes, in my answer to a question as to what task force the Pacific Fleet was incorporated into, I copied certain parts of that into my answer.

283. Q. In Exhibit 52, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, you prescribed certain missions and tasks for your various task forces, including Task Force Nine, did you not?

A. Yes.

284. Q. And you indicated in that order and prescribed the composition of the task force?

A. Right.

285. Q. Will you please read the paragraph under the caption "Task Force Four, Commandant 14th Naval District"?

A. (Reading:)

That part of the 14th Naval District activities which involve the Island Bases. Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

Task Force Nine: Commander Patrol Wing Two. PatWingOne 36 VPB (A), 1 AV, 2AVL, 1AVP, PatWingTwo 42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1AVP. Primary missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide

an efficient long range Air Scouting and Air Striking force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and Bases. Paragraph 5. Commanders of Task Force 7 and 9 established by this order will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operations of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

[353] 286. Q. Now, at that time, specifically, from November 15 to December 7, I believe you testified, Admiral, there were not enough patrol planes to do distance reconnaissance for even so much as a day with all these planes?

A. That is right, as a complete reconnaissance.

287. Q. And did that condition obtain during the period from November 15, in any event, to December 7?

A. Yes.

288. Q. In this order you required, did you not, that Task Force Nine submit to you for your approval their schedules of employment?

A. That is right.

289. Q. And those schedules came to you and you approved them?

A. That is right.

290. Q. There were also during this same period some ship-borne aircraft temporarily based at the Naval Air Station at Ford Island, were there not?

A. Yes.

291. Q. And in addition, there were some Marine planes temporarily based at Ewa field, were there not?

A. That is correct.

292. Q. Now, these types of planes, I take it, are not capable of doing distance reconnaissance?

A. That is right.

293. Q. It is the fact, isn't it, that these planes have their own commanding officers and their own missions and duties and training schedules prescribed by those commanding officers; is that not so?

A. That is right.

294. Q. And their employment and training schedules were approved by you?

A. Yes. They were approved by me, or some of my subordinates. I didn't approve the training schedule for every plane squadron.

295. Q. Now, during this period, Admiral, you testified it was your decision that you did not wish to interrupt training?

A. That is correct.

296. Q. And you continued the training?

A. That is correct.

[354] 297. Q. Admiral, isn't it a fact from what you have said that these planes were not available for the exclusive use of the Naval Base Defense officer, or Com14 as you remarked yesterday, but could only be considered as available for drill or in the case of an immediate emergency or positive information of the imminence of an attack; is that not so?

A. That is correct. The planes that I spoke of that I considered as immediately, exclusively available for the Commandant of the 14th

Naval District were what I thought to be a few of these utility planes which I believe he had over there, which were of no use for patrolling or for distance reconnaissance. Now, he did hope to get some day some observation planes to attack submarines. He did hope to get some planes which could be permanently assigned to him, and we had had promises that they were coming. Those had not arrived, and when I spoke of those planes which were exclusively available to the Commandant of the District, I was speaking, perhaps, of theoretical planes. I thought he did have a few of the utility planes. I think he did have a few.

298. Q. Let me refresh your recollection. Even on the utility planes, Admiral, is it not the fact that there was some discussion initiated by him to try to get some utility planes to be used, but that you were not able, under conditions as they then stood, to furnish them to him. Does that refresh your recollection?

A. That is quite possible. I know they had tried particularly to get observation planes for use in antisubmarine work.

299. Q. Now, in your testimony yesterday, I think I heard the remark that you made that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had agreed to do distance reconnaissance. I take it, what you had in mind was JCD-42; is that right?

A. That is correct.

300. Q. That would be the item, Admiral, in Exhibit 7 on Page 10 under Paragraph 18 (i), the words "Distance reconnaissance"?

A. Yes.

301. Q. That appears under the caption of "Navy, 18"?

A. Yes. And when the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was charged with this duty by the Naval Frontier Coast Defense plan, it was his duty to keep himself informed, and in my opinion when he considered it necessary to request planes for the purpose of performing the duties that he had responsibility for under this Naval Coastal Frontier Defense plan.

[355] 302. Q. Now, Admiral, you say the responsibility that he was charged with under this JCD-42 was distance reconnaissance; is that right?

A. That is right.

303. Q. There are several ways of doing distance reconnaissance, are there not?

A. Oh, I would say, yes, but every one of them involves the use of long-range planes. They have that in common.

304. Q. Well, let's see; radar is one of the means of doing a distance reconnaissance, am I right, to obtain intelligence and information?

A. I hadn't thought of radar being termed as an instrument to perform distance reconnaissance, no. I don't consider that a proper term.

305. Q. I take it that submarines may be used for distance reconnaissance?

A. That is correct.

306. Q. They may be sent out and placed on picket, or to take tours?

A. Yes.

307. Q. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District didn't have any submarines, did he?

A. No, but when he assumed the responsibility, or when he was given the responsibility, and the responsibility was placed upon him, he had that obligation to do what he could, and one of the things he could do was to apply and I did not consider it practicable at this time to perform distance reconnaissance. I stated that.

[356] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

308. Q. Well, the long and short of it is that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District did not have any submarines at this time?

A. No, he did not.

309. Q. Another method of making a distance reconnaissance is with destroyers and cruisers; is that so?

A. Yes.

310. Q. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District did not have any cruisers at the time, did he?

A. No, he had four destroyers and a few mine sweepers. He had no means under his direct command which were adequate to perform distance reconnaissance. Is that the answer you are driving at?

311. Q. Yes. Admiral, I want to be sure about this responsibility with which Admiral Bloch is charged. I understood you to say that under JCD-42 Admiral Bloch was charged with the responsibility of distance reconnaissance.

A. I should say so, from the papers.

312. Q. I refer to paragraph 2, page 8 of Exhibit 7 of JCD-42. Isn't it a fact that at no time, up to and including December 7, that that instrument was ever in operation or execution?

A. It is a fact—Wait a minute. These war plans did not become effective—were not executed until after the attack. However, it was well known that the reconnaissance had been made on occasions, and I considered those measures provided in War Plans, which required attention prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, to be, in fact, in effect, and the officers charged with the execution were responsible. By that token. I considered myself responsible for the preparations and the preliminary steps necessary in carrying out this WPL-46 in toto in the Pacific Fleet.

313. Q. That is a different document from the one to which I was referring.

A. Yes, but the document you quoted flows directly from WPL-46 and from the basic war plan gotten out by the Navy Department.

314. Q. The Rainbow Plans?

A. Yes.

315. Q. Admiral, it is also true that the Rainbow Plans were never placed in execution, nor, indeed, was WPL-46 in execution prior to December 7?

A. No, they were not placed in execution prior to December 7, 1941.

[357] 316. Q. Now, the term Naval Base Defense Officer has been used, and reference has been made to it. That is not standard nomenclature?

A. That is not standard nomenclature, but the duties of the Naval Base Defense Officer were prescribed by me. I coined that title. It was coined on my staff, and he was assigned certain specific duties.

317. Q. The document you speak of wherein you defined his duties is 2CL-41?

A. As a matter of fact, the term Naval Base Defense Officer has been used in the Navy and had been used for some time. I did not coin the term; it had been used for some time.

318. Q. As a series of words?

A. Yes.

319. Q. No precision of meaning to it?

A. The precision of meaning would vary with the conditions and the orders given to the Naval Base Defense Officer and the responsibilities assigned to him.

320. Q. So that insofar as the Naval Base Defense Officer is concerned, we find all there is to know about it in Exhibit 8, being 2CL-41; isn't that right?

A. I would say the major part of it appears there. There may have been other specific orders. I wouldn't want to commit myself entirely to this. However, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had certain other responsibilities as the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

321. Q. Admiral, since you brought up the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, under General Order 143 there was discussion in that agreement that they would have certain forces; is that not so? The Coastal Frontiers would have certain forces?

A. Yes.

322. Q. But by the directive of July 1, 1941, it was determined by competent authority in the Navy Department that they should not have forces and they would not be formed; is that right?

A. I don't recall. That may be true.

323. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 4, the directive of July 1, 1941. Just read the first sentence of paragraph 4. It may refresh your recollection.

A. (Reading) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established."

[358] 324. Q. Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.

A. (Reading) "For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, as prescribed in General Order No. 143, will not be formed."

325. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-41, revised October 14, 1941. I ask you if it is not a fact that the term Naval Base Defense Officer does not appear in the following paragraphs of that document: The first paragraph, being 3 (a), Continuous Patrols; 3 (b) Intermittent Patrols; 3 (c) Sorties and Entry; 3 (d) Operating Areas; 3 (e) Ships at Sea; 3 (f) Ships in Port.

A. I presume what you say is true. I did not follow you. You went too fast for me, but that can be verified by reading the document.

326. Q. It is not there down to that point, paragraph 3 (f).

A. I presume that what you say is correct, sir.

327. Q. In the same document, Admiral, may I refer you to paragraph 3 (h), and the caption of that reads: "Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area." That is the caption of it?

A. That is right.

328. Q. I want to call your attention to the next page. I believe the only place in that referring to the Naval Base Defense Officer—

A. This document refers to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who, in fact, was the same individual.

329. Q. Paragraph "J" mentions the Naval Base Defense Officer, does it not?

A. Now, what are you talking about?

330. Q. In the exhibit you are holding there is mentioned in paragraph "J", page 6, the Naval Base Defense Officer; is that not so?

A. Yes.

331. Q. There the document recites that the only connection that the Naval Base Defense Officer has at that point is that if Pearl Harbor is also attacked—when a submarine attacks an operating area—such instructions as the Naval Base Defense Officer may issue as to shore-based aircraft will have priority; isn't that what it provides?

A. Yes.

332. Q. Do you find in paragraphs "I" and "J" of the same document that there is a distinction made between shore-based Fleet aircraft on the one hand and patrol wings on the other; is that not the fact?

A. There seems to be some distinction there.

[359] 333. Q. But it does describe two different forces, does it not? One paragraph deals with the patrol wings and the other with shore-based Fleet aircraft.

A. Yes, that is what it says.

334. Q. Now, if you will please turn to paragraph 3 (G) under the heading "Defense Air Attack," which happens to be the only paragraph that we have not dealt with in the whole order, the Naval Base Defense Officer is mentioned there in sub-division 6 of "G"; is that not right?

A. Yes.

335. Q. Can you show me in that document any place where it is stated, as you testified yesterday, that the Naval Base Defense officer is responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor? Can you show me those words in that document?

A. I would have to search the document, and if you haven't been able to find those words in the document, I presume they are not there, but there are other items there which speak for themselves.

336. Q. That is a matter for the court to determine on the whole evidence.

A. That is correct.

337. Q. At any place in that document is there used the expression "distance reconnaissance"?

A. In this document?

338. Q. That document, Exhibit 8? If it helps you, I have never found it.

A. I will answer that question by saying I don't know. By reading that document, it can be readily determined.

339. Q. I take it, Admiral, that in this document there is no place where it is stated, as you testified yesterday, that the Naval Base Defense Officer is vested with authority to use all naval forces in the event of an attack? Do you make the same answer?

A. No, this and my other statement were my own conclusions from the text of this order.

340. Q. Admiral, in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, is it not the fact that the Army was responsible for the command and employment of pursuit planes, whether they were Army or Navy?

A. In exactly the same way that the Navy was responsible for the bombing planes under the command of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

[360] 341. Q. The bombing planes——

A. I mean patrol planes.

342. Q. Under the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. That is right.

343. Q. The Army was also responsible, I take it, from what you said before, for the command and employment of anti-aircraft weapons which were mounted ashore, and the Army was also responsible for the command and employment of the seacoast batteries in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. That is right.

344. Q. And also for the command and employment of the air-craft warning service in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. That is right.

345. Q. I take it, from what you said, the only duty the Navy had in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor was in support of the Army?

A. That is right.

346. Q. In connection with that support, available guns on the ships of the Navy would be used, and you have prescribed certain orders, giving sectors and the firing positions of naval vessels and naval anti-aircraft in the harbor?

A. Yes.

347. Q. In connection with the general defense of Pearl Harbor, you came to know of conditions of defense there very intimately while you were there?

A. I had a good working knowledge of what was there for defense. I took a great deal from the reports of my subordinates.

348. Q. One of the reports, I take it, would be such a document as has been previously read about the condition of local defense at Pearl Harbor, some instituted by Admiral Bloch while others went through your office with endorsement?

A. Yes, I had a large staff, and I was kept reasonably well informed of what went on.

349. Q. I will recall to you, Admiral, Exhibit 46, which is Admiral Bloch's letter of October 17, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations via the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

A. I remember that letter very well. I put an endorsement on it and forwarded it approved to the Navy Department and urged them to furnish the forces which the Commandant of the district requested and which he stated he didn't have.

[361] 350. Q. In the letter of the 17th, which has been read in evidence, the Commandant explained about the four old destroyers, the old SACRAMENTO, the fact that he hadn't any planes, and that he was afraid that it would be, as in the case of the British, "Too little and too late."

A. Yes. I think the Commandant kept the Navy Department fully informed of the condition of defense forces at Pearl Harbor.

351. Q. And yourself, too?

A. Yes.

352. Q. In the endorsement on Exhibit 46 you stated: "There is a possibility that the reluctance or the inability of the Department to

furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation." Down to December 7 is it not a fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had only four old destroyers, all of which were occupied on inshore patrol, four small mine sweepers, which were constantly engaged in sweeping the channels, three Coast Guard cutters which were in patrolling off Honolulu, in addition to their regular Coast Guard duties, and, then, of course, he had the old SACRAMENTO. That is the status of the forces in the 14th Naval District at the time we are talking about; isn't that so?

A. He also had some sanpans, which the Department had promised him in the future.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

353. Q. In your last cross-examination were all the duties of Admiral Bellinger included in the questions propounded to you?

A. I think one duty was omitted. He was the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing 2).

354. Q. Now, referring to WPL-46, which is Exhibit 4, are there any other paragraphs in that to which you wish to call the court's attention in connection with the establishment of the Hawaiian Naval Base Frontier?

A. In paragraph 1 of the letter of July 1, 1941, I read: "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232, and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established." Now, paragraph 3232: (Reading) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the Pacific area are (a) Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier; (b) Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier; (c) Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier." In paragraph 4 I wish to call [362] attention to the fact that the statement is: "For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, as prescribed in General Order 143, will not be formed." That is different from the establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.

355. Q. In 2CL-41, paragraph "G", sub-paragraph 6, were the duties there defined the basis on which you made the statement yesterday that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in general, was charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor with the Army?

A. Yes, and other paragraphs, such as 9-C and the paragraphs under "A" and other points where the Commandant of the 14th Naval District is charged with other duties in that connection.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

356. Q. With reference to the order of July 1, 1941, in Exhibit 4, the directive from which you just read portions, the question that I was concerned about was whether there were forces, not whether there was a frontier. This order states that the frontier forces would not be formed.

A. That is correct.

357. Q. So that there might have been a frontier formed, but there were no forces?

A. There was a frontier formed.

The court then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 17, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944.

[363]

TWELFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeir, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the eleventh day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken yesterday, Wednesday, August 16, 1944, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the court:

358. Q. Admiral, was there anything irregular in establishing your headquarters on shore?

A. No.

359. Q. To your knowledge, has it ever been done before you did it, or since?

A. I presume it had been done before I did it. I do not have any examples readily available, but subsequent to the time that I established my headquarters on shore, Admiral King, in the Atlantic, established his headquarters in a [364] station ship tied up at Naval Training Station, in Newport. Admiral Hart, I have been informed, established his headquarters on shore at Manila. During the war I am informed that Admiral Nimitz maintained them in the submarine base until the new headquarters had been constructed, money for which I had obtained from the Navy Department prior to my detachment.

360. Q. Did this move relieve you in any way of the responsibilities which you held while operating from a Flagship?

A. It did not. It changed in no way any responsibilities which were assigned to me, nor did it add anything to my responsibilities.

361. Q. You have testified that you gave to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department all information that came to you which you considered to be of any value to him.

A. That's correct.

362. Q. Would not all information which was available to you, however remote from Pearl Harbor, have been of assistance to him in forming his general estimate of what he might then or eventually expect at Pearl Harbor?

A. I attempted to give him all such information, and I intended to do so. If at any time I failed, it was not for lack of intention.

363. Q. The question was based on the exact wording of your reply, that is, you gave him all that you considered of value to him, not that you gave all, and my question was based on that—that wouldn't all the information that you had relating to the war conditions in the Pacific, or anticipated war conditions in the Pacific, have been of value to him in forming his estimate of what he might expect?

A. Yes. I gave him that.

364. Q. In your answer to a question relating to the condition of readiness of forces afloat in Pearl Harbor, you made an answer that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District advised the Senior Officer Present as to the condition of readiness. Your exhibit, 2CL-41 says that the Commandant shall place the condition of readiness. There may be no conflict in these two statements, but I would like to clear it up a little.

A. I was attempting to state what is contained in order 2CL-41. That was the order under which the Commandant was operating at the time. In paragraph 6, d., it reads: (Reading) "Coordinate fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by (1) Advising the Senior Officer Present embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. (2) Holding necessary drills."

365. Q. Well, specifically, the Commandant set the condition [365] of readiness?

A. I did not so consider it. I considered that he advised the Senior Officer Present; and you cannot, in a naval organization, take away from the Senior Officer Present the prerogative of setting the condition of readiness that he himself considered necessary and essential.

366. Q. Well, Admiral, as I read this exhibit, reference is had only to the state of the condition of readiness of anti-aircraft batteries of ships.

A. Yes, I so read that.

367. Q. Is this the only condition of readiness that anyone prescribed for the naval force, for ships afloat, in Pearl Harbor?

A. No. The Senior Officer Present afloat in Pearl Harbor, exclusively of the Commander-in-Chief, was charged with setting the condition of readiness for the ships in Pearl Harbor.

368. Q. What condition of readiness was in effect on the morning of 7 December?

A. Admiral Pye has stated that the condition 3 was in effect, and to the best of my knowledge and belief that is true.

369. Q. As the court understands it, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was charged with the coordination, the coordination

of fire of the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, with the shore batteries; is that correct?

A. I will put it this way: that was my intention when this order was written.

370. Q. To your knowledge, did the Commandant of the 14th Naval District take any steps or give any orders in the way of coordinating the fire of ships of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and shore batteries, prior to 7 December?

A. Yes, he took many steps in conducting drills and giving the alarm; and he was charged with conducting the drills and directing all the naval effort against antiaircraft attack, and he did so during drill periods. Now I think that you will find the duties of the Commandant of the District, as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as Commander of the Hawaiian Frontier, and as Naval Base Defense Officer, set forth in 2CL-41, revised, paragraphs a. (1) and (2), which charges him with the maintenance of the inshore patrol and the boom patrol; and other articles in 2CL-41. He was a party to the agreement contained in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941, in which he assumed certain responsibilities. In the Operation Plan No. 1-41, of 27 February 1941, he sets up a task organization for the inshore patrol, the boom patrol, the harbor patrol, the mine-sweepers, the base defense air force, antiaircraft defense, the harbor control posts—some of these in conjunction with the Army.

[366] 371. Q. I might say that that is all a matter of record, and that the court is cognizant of that; and the questions we have asked are simply for the purpose of clearing up what in our minds appeared to be a little conflict. I don't think, unless you wish, it is necessary to go any further with that.

A. What I'd like to make clear to the court is that for all of the duties of the Commandant—don't depend on my recollection now what it was. It is laid down in the documents.

372. Q. In answer to a question during the course of your testimony, you made reference occasionally to opinions of your staff. Specifically in one answer to one question you stated that your staff considered there was no danger from air attack in Pearl Harbor.

A. That's right.

373. Q. Did you concur in this opinion?

A. I did, indeed. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not asking my staff to assume any responsibility. I did receive advice from my staff, which I considered in making my decisions.

374. Q. What was the consensus of your staff and senior subordinates as to the probability of an air attack by the Japanese?

A. Members of my staff—a considerable number of them are available here in Washington at the present time—I can say without any fear of contradiction, that none of them considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor any more than a possibility, myself included. I considered it a remote possibility.

375. Q. Does that also apply to your Senior Subordinates in the chain of command?

A. In so far as I know their opinions, yes.

376. Q. Did you at any time, as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability of maintaining the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. When I took command of the fleet, I knew of the disagreement between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in Washington, on the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, but when I took command of the fleet we had been for some time without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of that material from the coast. I did not make any protest, any formal protest, against maintaining the fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I did, in conversation with the Chief of [367] Naval Operations, in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base. The various elements that entered into that are well known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the fleet in port if and when the air attack came; that it took from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started, the attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the disposition of the fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the entrance, the single entrance, that we had, and the danger from the oil storage as it was at that time; and I don't recall anything other than that at the present time, although there probably was. These were factors which were well known both to the President and the Chief of Naval Operations, prior to any statement by me. I accepted the condition at Pearl Harbor, and that was one of the reasons why, repeatedly, in correspondence, I requested to be kept informed of developments.

377. Q. In other words, does the court understand you concurred with your predecessor in that the fleet should not be kept at Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, yes.

378. Q. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with the President and the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I did not definitely recommend that the fleet be withdrawn at the time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in. I accepted the situation, but pointed out the dangers that existed so long as the fleet was in Pearl Harbor.

379. Q. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to withdrawal of the battleships and carriers, or battleships alone, from Pearl Harbor?

A. Not that I recall.

380. Q. What were your relations with General Short, both personal and officially, during the entire time you were Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet? Did you have conferences with him—and the court would like to have you explain more or less in detail the conditions existing.

A. I will be very pleased to. When I became Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, I remembered the situations which had arisen in the Hawaiian area on various occasions. They had been the subject of newspaper comments throughout the nation. For many years I had felt that the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy not only in

Hawaii, but on our own coast, had been entirely inadequate. When I was Chief of Staff of [368] Commander Battleships, Admiral Craven, he made several attempts to get some joint exercises, in which he was not entirely successful. I give this background to show I became determined that no such occasion as that should arise while I was Commander-in-Chief. General Short arrived in Honolulu a few days before he took over command of the Hawaiian Department. He was quartered in Admiral Richardson's house on Honolulu. I made a trip in civilian clothes and paid my respect to General Short, attempting to establish friendly relations. He responded wholeheartedly, and I had a real regard for him before I had known him for a very long time. The thought that was uppermost in my mind at that particular time was to obtain some degree of cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy air forces stationed on shore in Hawaii. I think I broached the subject during our first interview. If not, I did on an early subsequent interview. I found General Short in complete agreement with me on the steps that should be taken—the broad steps that should be taken—and Admiral Bloch and General Short at once put into process the question of attaining the cooperation and agreements betwixt the air forces. I saw General Short frequently because I made it a point to see him. I think he also made it a point to see me. We conferred officially on many occasions, and at practically every official conference, Admiral Bloch was present, because Admiral Bloch was the officer in Hawaii who was charged with dealing with the Army, and at no time did I wish to by-pass him. I think I kept Admiral Bloch thoroughly informed of every dealing I had with General Short. I played golf with General Short at a little 9-hole golf course which he had established near his headquarters at Fort Shafter. That was particularly convenient for me, because it was only about fifteen minutes by car from my headquarters. Since this affair has happened, a Colonel Throckmorton, who was on General Short's staff, informed my brother, in Kentucky, that he remembers distinctly that General Short and I had an engagement to play golf about 9:30 on Sunday, the day the attack came; and of course we did not play golf that day. My relations with General Short were highly satisfactory, both my personal relations and my official relations. I found him a very pleasant gentleman. I consider him my friend, and officially he was very cooperative, and we had no differences of opinion which were not resolved in a most amicable way.

381. Q. Admiral, have you heard rumors and reports that your relationship with General Short, during the time of your command, were not cordial, that you did not cooperate, that you had few conferences, and so forth. The court presumes that this is not correct, by your previous answer. Is that in line with your thought?

A. I believe every man, woman, and child in the United [369] States who can read, has read such statements. I wish to state that all such statements are malicious lies.

382. Q. Did you have any idea at that time, or do you now, how these rumors originated, or how they were brought about, or any instances which would tend to prompt such rumors?

A. There was absolutely no basis for the rumors, and I am forced to the conclusion that this was part of a deliberate campaign to smear me and General Short.

383. Q. Why were certain ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, and why were not all ships at sea?

A. A fleet must have time in port for repairs, upkeep, and recreation of the crews, also to obtain fuel and supplies. I had established a rotation of task forces. When I took over the fleet, Admiral Richardson had put in process a scheme which required one-half of the fleet to be at sea while the other half was in port. I operated under this scheme about two months. I found that there was not sufficient time for upkeep of the fleet, and I also found that the fuel oil supply at Pearl Harbor was being depleted. We did not have a sufficient number of tankers to maintain the level of fuel oil, and at the same time operate half the fleet at sea all the time. I then changed my plan and had one-third—approximately one-third—of the fleet operating at sea all the time, and part of the time two-thirds were operating at sea. During the periods of maneuvers, and we had a maneuver—five-day maneuver—about once a quarter, all the ships went to sea. I felt that I was operating the ships at sea as great a proportion of the time as it was possible to do so and still maintain them in top efficiency, ready for any eventuality. I felt that when war came, I wanted the machinery and material, and personnel, in the highest possible state of efficiency, and balanced the time at sea against the time in port in order to accomplish this most effectively.

384. Q. On December 7, 1941, what was the proportion of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. I'd say about two-thirds.

385. Q. Was this an unusual number of ships to have in Pearl Harbor?

A. It was a condition which occurred for a few days when Task Force One and Two overlapped for a few days in port.

386. Q. Who, in your opinion, was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, in event of any form of attack by the enemy—by an enemy?

A. The actual responsibility was undertaken by the Army, in the Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935. The Navy, however, was responsible for assisting the Army in any way [370] they could. It is just common sense that they should. General Short was the Commanding General, and therefore responsible for whatever Army efforts could be made. Admiral Bloch had been designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and was responsible for coordinating the naval effort with that of the Army. I was responsible for the safety of the ships, and at no time did I want or expect to evade such responsibility.

387. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Fleet, or the ships of the Fleet, would render certain assistance to the Army in case of attack?

A. That is correct.

388. Q. Could the Army depend at all times on the assistance of the Fleet?

A. They could not, and during the period betwixt November 7 and December 7, we had a maneuver and we were out for about five days, up to the north of the Islands, and during that period, the only ships in Pearl Harbor were of no consequence; that is, were undergoing overhaul, and there was very little assistance from the batteries of ships during that period. That condition was liable to occur at any time, and my object in all the orders and efforts that I made was to, first,

get adequate defense from the Army there, and second, to utilize whatever might be aboard ships of the Navy that were still in port; and Admiral Bloch was put in charge of the coordination of the naval effort, primarily because he was the only responsible officer attached to the Fleet who was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor. The Commander Base Force was there most of the time, but I didn't know, in the course of the campaign, when the Commander Base Force might move out, and I did not wish to put him in charge as Naval Base Defense Officer.

389. Q. In other words, Admiral, we understand you are stating that the Fleet should be mobile and footloose at all times regardless of any consideration of defending the base as a Fleet?

A. I do, and a base which depends upon the Fleet for its defense is a very poor base.

390. Q. Then, as the court understands, in your opinion the Army, in accordance with the plan referred to by you, the Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, was primarily responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. Correct.

391. Q. Would you leave out that word, "primarily"?

A. Yes.

392. Q. Admiral, please state in brief what in your opinion [371] was the direct responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I considered the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in general responsible for coordinating with the Army all the naval forces that were in Pearl Harbor, and for their use in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

393. Q. Do you mean "all naval forces", or naval defense forces?

A. Well, every element of the naval forces that could be used in the defense of Pearl Harbor. I think you are asking me to draw conclusions from records which are available to the court.

[372] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

394. Q. It isn't that, Admiral. It is trying to get your statement there that he had responsibility for using all naval forces. Now, if we follow that line of thought, then does this court understand that with that responsibility he had the right to give orders to a battleship to use her defense forces? That is the question that we are trying to straighten out.

A. I see what you mean now. The Commandant's duties were confined to coordinating the efforts. The senior officer present afloat and the sector commanders which were appointed by my 2CL-41 were, of course, responsible for the actual fire and control of fire of the ships in Pearl Harbor. Now, the Commandant was responsible for suggesting changes, and matters of that kind. Again, gentlemen, I must state that I was responsible for everything that went on in that Fleet. I tried to exercise my responsibilities by delegating certain authority and certain tasks, and some of these questions that you ask are very difficult to answer categorically. It comes down to a question of opinion.

395. Q. You have stated in your testimony and explained very minutely the responsibility of the Commandant, 14th Naval District in coordinating his efforts with the Army.

A. Yes.

396. Q. But did not the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have a direct responsibility in other matters?

A. Oh, yes.

397. Q. For instance, you have stated that at some time there might be a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. That is right.

398. Q. Was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District responsible for the defense against submarines?

A. There was a net across the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The Commandant operated that net. No ship moved in or out of Pearl Harbor, and no ship moved in Pearl Harbor, without the knowledge and approval of the Commandant.

399. Q. Did the Commandant, 14th Naval District, have certain forces directly under his command?

A. It has been testified here that he had 4 destroyers which were utilized primarily for the inshore patrol, as I would call it. He had some minesweepers and he had some tugs. He had from time to time forces detailed from the Fleet to report to him and to perform duties under his direction and control.

[373] 400. Q. Was there any attempted attack on ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor by submarines?

A. Yes; one submarine got into the harbor. I think they got her before she did anything, before she accomplished anything. That, incidentally, was a midget submarine, a surprise type.

401. Q. Admiral, you have testified that the Navy had a certain number of planes, patrol planes, under your command at Pearl Harbor?

A. That is correct.

402. Q. As the court understands, these patrol planes were under the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger; is that correct?

A. Yes.

403. Q. You have further testified that these patrol planes were used for searching; is that correct?

A. Yes.

404. Q. When you took command of the Pacific Fleet, were these patrol planes being used daily for search?

A. Yes, they were being used daily for search, and I used them myself, some of them, daily, to search the operating areas, and my understanding and belief is that prior to my taking command they used these planes to search restricted arcs on occasions. At no time do I know of any 360 degree search being continuously conducted.

405. Q. Are you aware of the fact that prior to your taking command these patrol planes were used in daily search over a certain arc emanated from Honolulu?

A. No, not as a permanent fixture. I did know that certain searches were being conducted. Personally, I considered them ineffective and at the time immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor we had gotten the number of planes we had—I think some

54 of them—which were brand new planes from the States. They were having a great many material troubles and the nose casting was going bad and we were conserving the planes much more then, I think, than had been the case for some time. We were in a more critical state for planes then than we had been for maybe some time before.

406. Q. Had you considered the use of all or part of the number of patrol planes in searching a probable area of advance, by enemy carriers, on Pearl Harbor?

A. I had considered such, yes. Some time prior to the attack we ran a search for a few days at Admiral Bloch's suggestion on the line from Jaluit to Pearl. We had in mind that we might catch a submarine on the surface out there, as well as perhaps find any other thing that was moving around. We found nothing, and this was discontinued after a few days.

[374] 407. Q. Were any of these patrol planes searching or in the air for search on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, there were a number that were searching the operating areas, and there were some more that were engaged in maneuvers with our own submarines. I think I was told about a dozen planes were in the air.

408. Q. Were there any searching activities going on by planes stationed at Midway?

A. Yes, they were running such a reconnaissance as they could with twelve planes, which was not much. I had them there primarily getting ready to start out with the Fleet in case of war, part of the deployment, and we were utilizing them to run a search from there.

The court then, at 10:45 a. m., took a recess until 10:55 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:

All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the court (Continued):

409. Q. What was the number of patrol planes capable of operating in the air on the morning of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor?

A. I cannot answer that question categorically because I do not know the number of patrol planes which were laid up temporarily for periodical checks. My best estimate, however, is that not more than 50 patrol planes on the Island of Oahu were in flying condition on the morning of 7 December, 1941.

410. Q. What proportion of these planes were operating in the air?

A. About 12 of them were in the air.

411. Q. Whose direct responsibility was it to have these planes operating in the area at this time?

A. They were operating in the area in accordance with the approved operating plans which my headquarters had approved. If you mean,

who was responsible for deciding whether or not a distance reconnaissance should have been undertaken, I was.

[375] 412. Q. In other words, we understand that you were directly responsible for not having more operating planes in the air, more available operating planes in the air on 7 December?

A. Yes, I was responsible. I can add, however, that I had received no recommendations from my subordinates to conduct a distance reconnaissance on this date.

413. Q. To which subordinates do you refer?

A. All of them; my staff and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

414. Q. On the morning of 7 December did you have any inner patrol established around Pearl Harbor?

A. You mean an inner air patrol?

415. Q. Inner air patrol.

A. My recollection is that there was no inner air patrol on that date.

416. Q. Had this been considered?

A. Yes, and not only considered but was provided for to be undertaken when ordered.

417. Q. Did you have any information regarding the arrival of the Army air squadron coming from Hamilton Field on the morning of 7 December?

A. I do not now recall whether I had any such information. I think it is highly probable that the appropriate subordinates did have such information. They would not necessarily have reported such a movement to me.

418. Q. Admiral, you stated that the Chief of Staff of Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy had presented to the President a communication not recommending that an ultimatum be sent to Japan. Is that correct?

A. I was so informed in an enclosure to a letter sent to me by the Chief of Naval Operations.

419. Q. Upon receipt of the message from OpNav on November 27, referred to as the war warning message, did you have a conference with officers regarding this message?

A. Yes.

420. Q. Who were the officers present; not by name but probably better by reason of their positions?

A. The message was received about 4:00 o'clock p. m., Honolulu time. I asked the Commandant of the District to come over, and his chief of staff came. He informed me that the Commandant was visiting his wife in the hospital. I delivered this message to the chief of staff with directions to give it at once to the Commandant, and dispatched my intelligence officer with the dispatch to be delivered to General Short. I also received this afternoon a copy of the dispatch which General Short had received from [376] General Marshall, which was delivered to me by the Navy liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, in my headquarters. On 28 November, as nearly as I can remember the date, we had a conference in my headquarters at which Admiral Bloch, General Short, members of my staff, Captain Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, all took part. And at that conference we discussed these measures to be taken and a good part of

the time was taken up with consideration of the proposed relief of Marine personnel on the Islands by Army personnel. However, in considering this movement and these reenforcements, all phases of the situation were discussed and these messages were taken into consideration in the preparation, or in deciding upon the action which we would take.

421. Q. That was on 20 November?

A. 28 November; in the forenoon, as I remember.

422. Q. Was this dispatch of November 27th the principal matter of discussion in the conference which you speak of as taking place on 28 November?

A. The implications growing from that dispatch were the principal subjects.

423. Q. In that conference, what was the general consensus of opinion as to the probability or possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think we considered it a remote possibility. General Short has testified to a statement made by Captain McMorris in answer to my question. Although I cannot recall that exact circumstance, I have no doubt but that General Short's testimony is correct.

424. Q. As pertains to Captain McMorris?

A. No, General Short's testimony was that, as I recall it, that he asked me the question and I turned to McMorris and asked him to answer it, and McMorris answered that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and that none of the members of the conference dissented in any way from that view. I think that is his testimony.

425. Q. At that conference, was it the general opinion that in lieu of an outside attack on Pearl Harbor, that their real concern was internal sabotage?

A. I do not recall that the question of internal sabotage was discussed at any length. Sabotage was mentioned in these various messages. I knew that the Navy had long since taken all measures which could be taken in the prevention of sabotage, and I felt that that was purely an Army concern to put into effect such antisabotage measures as might be necessary to protect the Islands. Our action was an accomplished fact, and we dwelt very little on that subject.

[377] 426. Q. At this conference, was there any discussion as to the proper state of readiness into which the Army and Navy should be placed in view of the message of 27 November?

A. The decision, whether stated or not, specifically was that no change in the conditions that we had been maintaining was indicated at that time for the Island of Oahu.

427. Q. And you had been maintaining what condition of readiness?

A. We had been for some time maintaining the condition of readiness of Condition 3 in the Navy. I knew that General Short had ordered an alert on 27 November. That was reported to me by members of my staff.

428. Q. But that alert was changed to Alert 1 later?

A. No, that was the alert that he ordered.

429. Q. That was Alert No. 1?

A. Yes, the anti-sabotage alert.

430. Q. Admiral, if you had received notice immediately that Japanese planes or foreign planes were 132 miles from Oahu and head-

ing in for Oahu on the morning of 7 December, what would you have done and what effect would this have had on the attack?

A. I would have ordered general quarters on all ships. I would have started the destroyers, the light forces out of the main channel on sortie and put all the planes in the air; mustered every available plane starting to search in the particular area indicated, and launched an attack on their carriers. At the same time I would have expected the Army to get all of their pursuit planes in the air to meet the attack. The ENTERPRISE was about 200 miles to the westward of Oahu and headed for Oahu and she had an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. The LEXINGTON was 400 miles southeast of Midway with an escort of 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. I would have put both those carriers on an intercepting course and kept them informed of the movements of the Japanese force. I would have had all available light forces join Halsey in the ENTERPRISE and I think we would have had quite a party.

431. Q. With the foreign planes 132 miles off, assuming they would be over Pearl Harbor in an hour or less, in general and roughly, how much of all of this preparation which you say you would have taken, could have been taken?

A. Well, the location of the Japanese carriers was the principal benefit, the greatest benefit from this information.

[378] 432. Q. Then you were not thinking solely of what the planes might do?

A. I think I can develop that. The ships in Pearl Harbor would have greeted the planes with full anti-aircraft fire. The ships would have been at general quarters and closed up for general quarters. That, I think, is beyond question. I believe that most of the planes, the patrol planes, would have been in the air by that time. A certain number, possibly two squadrons, were kept constantly on one-half hour's notice while they were on the ground. The others were on four hours notice but it took nothing like that long to get the people there and ready to put the planes in the air. I think it is fair to state that more than 50 percent, perhaps 75 percent of the planes on the ground in flying condition would have been in the air; well, 50 percent, we will say, would have been in the air by the time those planes arrived for the attack. Now, so far as the ENTERPRISE and the LEXINGTON were concerned, we could have directed them to the area in which they would have made a contact with the enemy and we could have supported them with such of the cruisers and destroyers as we were able to get out of Pearl Harbor. The battleships would probably not have been of much use because they are too slow and couldn't get up there. Does that answer the question?

433. Q. Were all anti-aircraft guns manned on all ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of attack, about 7:55 a. m., on the morning of December 7?

A. They were not.

434. Q. What proportion of anti-aircraft guns were manned?

A. It is as prescribed in here, but roughly one-fourth.

435. Q. In your estimation, how long was it before all anti-aircraft guns were manned after this attack?

A. Oh, I should say within 5 to 10 minutes all the anti-aircraft guns were manned and firing. I had stressed the importance of keep-

ing trained crews on board, or requiring trained crews be kept on board at all times and of having ammunition readily available at the guns. On one ship I heard that the ammunition was in the ammunition boxes but they couldn't find the keys and they knocked off the locks and everything else and opened it up and went ahead.

436. Q. You stated, Admiral, that on the morning of 7 December you received word from your duty officer a raid was coming in?

A. That is right.

[379] 437. Q. What time did you receive this, and how did he receive this information?

A. I received that between 7:55 and 8:00 o'clock. He had obtained it, I believe, from the signal tower which we maintained in Pearl.

438. Q. In other words, do we understand that you received this information just immediately prior to the attack, or after the attack?

A. They attacked the fields first, and I should say I received it after they had dropped bombs on Hickam Field and Ford Island. That, you understand, is an estimate. I didn't stop to figure those things out.

439. Q. When did you receive information that certain planes had been picked up 132 miles from Honolulu?

A. I think it was on Tuesday, December 9, 1941, in the afternoon.

440. Q. Did you have any information as to the probable breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan as of November 25 or November 29, 1941?

A. No.

441. Q. Admiral, did you feel that during the period October 16 to December 7, 1941, you were kept fully informed regarding conversations, negotiations, et cetera, by our government with Japanese representatives as to the Japanese situation, and their import and significance?

A. It is hard at this time to state accurately what I felt prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I had requested many times that I be kept informed. I had been assured that I would be kept informed. I believed that there must be details about which I was not informed and I could only guess. You are asking me to recapture something which is a long way in the past about what I would feel.

[380] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

442. Q. In the light of events preceding December 7, 1941, of which you now have knowledge would that knowledge have altered your dispositions and actions independently without reference to the Department?

A. It would have altered my actions and dispositions, but I would have promptly informed the Department.

443. Q. At any time from October 16 to December 7 did you receive by official communication or personal communication from OpNav the suggestion of an air attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I did not.

444. Q. You have stated that there was a unanimous opinion among your principal advisors, in concurrence with your own state of opin-

ion, to the effect that an air attack was merely a remote possibility. In the discussions which took place was a distinction drawn between the possibility of attack during the existence of a state of peace and the existence of a state of war?

A. I think we were primarily concerned with what would happen to us immediately, and our conclusion related specifically to the condition that confronted us there while we were in a state of peace.

445. Q. But had a state of war existed on December 7, 1941, would not your condition of readiness been radically different?

A. Yes, it would have been different. I would have then placed considerations of security ahead of any consideration of training.

446. Q. In earlier testimony you accepted the responsibility for not having ordered a distance reconnaissance on December 7, 1941.

A. That is correct.

447. Q. Does the court understand that your reason was that the use of patrol planes for distance reconnaissance was not warranted, in that the presence of carriers of a foreign power within the range of such a reconnaissance was neither known nor suspected?

A. Yes.

448. Q. How long before the attack on December 7 did you have information concerning the movement of Japanese carriers to the Marshall Islands?

A. I cannot now recall.

449. Q. Is it your recollection that it was not within, let us say, a week previous?

A. It was something on that order, yes.

[381] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (Continued):

450. Q. Questions have been asked you relative to the transfer of your headquarters from the PENNSYLVANIA to shore. Was that move taken up by you with the Department in Washington before it was effectuated?

A. I informed the Chief of Naval Operations of the place I proposed to take. Eventually, and after I had transferred my headquarters on shore, I took up with the Department the question of getting permanent headquarters there, and the money was allocated and the plans drawn to provide these permanent quarters prior to the time I was relieved.

451. Q. Did you receive specific approval for the removal of the temporary quarters before it was done?

A. Yes, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations. Furthermore, I received his approval for the Commandant of the 14th Naval District to allocate my quarters on shore, which the Commandant did.

452. Q. You have related, in answer to questions, the officers of your staff who were present at the conference on November 28 in reference to the dispatches received both by you and the Army on November 27. In addition to your staff, and Admiral Bloch and General Short, were any of the flag officers of your command present?

A. I think Admiral Wilson Brown was also present.

453. Q. Had Admiral Halsey gone?

A. Halsey left on the 28th. He may or may not have been present. I don't recall.

454. Q. Did you confer with Admiral Halsey, after the receipt of the dispatch of November 27 and before he left on his mission, relative to the dispatch?

A. I'm not sure that there was an opportunity for him to come to the office before he sailed. I believe, however, he did see the dispatch before he sailed.

455. Q. Did any of your flag officers or staff officers recommend to you any other disposition of the Fleet or extra precautions as a result of the message of November 27?

A. None except the ones I took.

456. Q. Did these officers have all the information regarding the situation which was in your possession?

A. The members of my staff to whom you refer did have all the information that was in my possession. The three Fleet task force commanders, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Calhoun had all the information which was available [382] when they visited my headquarters.

457. Q. The question was asked you whether between October 16 and December 7 you felt that you were kept fully informed by the Navy Department as to the progress of relations between the United States and Japan. Can you answer that question categorically, yes or no?

A. As to how I felt prior to December 7?

458. Q. Yes.

A. No, I cannot answer that question categorically, yes or no.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: I should like to introduce in evidence Operations Plan 1-41, dated 27 February 1941, with annexes: (a) Inshore Patrol Plan; (b) Base Defense Air Force Plan; (c) Anti-aircraft Defense Plan; (d) Harbor Control Post Plan; (e) Communications Plan. It was issued by C. C. Bloch, Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I do not care to read it, but I should like to have it as an exhibit.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 53".

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

459. Q. Do you recall, from any data which you have, how long it took those Japanese planes to fly 132 miles?

A. My best answer is only an estimate, and I will say it took them something over an hour to fly 132 miles.

460. Q. That is the best answer you can give from any information you have?

A. Yes, and that is not accurate. I don't know.

461. Q. I ask you if you are acquainted with charges that have been made as to lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian area, specifically that neither service knew what security measures were in effect in the other and that the services did not cooperate in matters of defense. Can you state, Admiral, what the facts are in this regard?

A. These charges, as I recall them, were made in the report of the Roberts Commission substantially as you state them. They were widely made in the press. In my opinion, such charges were entirely unsubstantiated by the recorded testimony of the Roberts Com-

mission. Regardless of the testimony and conclusions of the Roberts Commission, [383] the charges were entirely without any solid foundation in fact. We did cooperate, and we did know—quite accurately—what was going on in the other service.

462. Q. You knew what condition of alert was set in the Army on the night of the 6th and 7th of December, 1941, did you not?

A. I knew the condition of alert was set there and, in general, what it was.

463. Q. Do you consider, from all the plans, orders, and agreements we have introduced in evidence before this court and which are now a matter of record before it, that the charge that there was lack of cooperation in the defense of Pearl Harbor is now refuted?

A. I do. I consider that the evidence submitted to this court most conclusively disposes of any such charge.

Reexamined by the court:

464. Q. Admiral, did you have available to you telephonic communication with the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

A. By commercial line, yes. During the attack, the Chief of Naval Operations was in communication with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

465. Q. Was this telephonic communication available to you in what is known as the scrambler telephone?

A. No special arrangements had been made, and I am not familiar with the commercial telephone, but I believe it was the scrambler system. In addition to the commercial telephone, there was a direct communication provided between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commanding General in the Hawaiian Department, which I presume the Chief of Naval Operations might have used, if he so desired. That I do not know.

466. Q. That, Admiral, has been brought out in the testimony regarding the scrambler system which the Army had in Honolulu with Washington. The court was trying to find out whether a similar telephone system was available to you.

A. It was not.

467. Q. Only the commercial line was available to you?

A. Only the commercial line was available to me.

468. Q. The scrambler telephone had not been installed in your headquarters?

A. That is correct.

[384] 469. Q. Did you at any time during this period use the commercial telephone in discussing matters with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I did not.

470. Q. Did he at any time call you over his telephone?

A. He did not.

471. Q. Admiral, were you completely satisfied with the performance of duty of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District previous to and on December 7, 1941?

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District has had a distinguished career in the Navy. I had the greatest confidence in his ability and acted accordingly in all my dealings with him. He had a very difficult job. The personnel supplied to him in a rapidly expanding agency required a lot of training. He was faced with

the same difficulties that the Fleet was faced with. He repeatedly requested personnel to be detailed. I agreed that he required the personnel. Under the handicaps which he was laboring, I considered his performance of duty highly satisfactory.

472. Q. You included the whole period?

A. Yes.

473. Q. Admiral, were you satisfied with the performance of duty of all your senior subordinates, insofar as that performance of duty had any bearing on the Japanese attack?

A. I was.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness ~~was duly warned and~~ resumed his seat as an interested party.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), made the following statement: It has been brought out before this court that some of the findings of the Roberts Commission dealt with relations existing between the Commandant, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet to their disadvantage in describing these [385] relations as unsatisfactory. It is this report which has been published to the world and which has given rise to the campaign in the press for the last two years as to the lack of relations between the Army and Navy in that area. It is noted that the report of the Roberts Commission has been submitted to this court, and I wish to ask the court if it intends to use the report in question as evidence in reaching its findings? There are contained in the public version of the report of the Roberts Commission misstatements which can be readily disproved.

The judge advocate replied as follows: The reports of the Roberts Commission were furnished to him, as well as all other documents he desired in the Navy Department for use in conducting this inquiry. The reports of the Roberts Commission are not now in evidence before the court, and the judge advocate has no knowledge of what intention the court has with regard to them, but they will be subject to proper objection and to a ruling if and when the occasion arises that any parts thereof are to be put in the record.

The court then, at 12:10 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[3584] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, was

called as a witness by the judge advocate, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, retired, on active duty as a member of the General Board.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the year 1941?

A. Commandant 14th Naval District, and appertaining thereto, Commander Local Defense Forces; Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier; Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor; and as an officer of the United States Pacific Fleet and appertaining thereto, Commander Task Force 4, and as a Task Group Commander under 2CL-41, under the title of Naval Base Defense Officer.

3. Q. Were you performing any duties in conjunction with or in cooperation with the Army?

A. Yes.

4. Q. What were they, in brief?

A. I was performing duties prescribed by the Navy Regulations, Joint Action 1935, Rainbow War Plans, Fleet Letter 2CL-41, and directives from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5. Q. What was the method in effect for the coordination of these duties with the Army?

A. I assume you mean the method of coordination with the Army.

6. Q. That is correct.

A. That was done by the principal of mutual cooperation.

7. Q. Will you refer to section 3 of JCD-42, and state what the Army task was.

A. The Army task was to hold Oahu against attack by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

[336] 8. Q. What is the Navy task?

A. The Navy task—to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

9. Q. Will you state what forces were assigned you as naval local defense forces; what ships or equipment was in this category?

A. During 1941, the following forces were assigned as naval local defense forces: 4 old destroyers, destroyer division 80—that is the 4 old destroyers; 4 small minesweepers, 3 Coast Guard cutters of different sizes and capabilities which also performed the duties of the Coast Guard; the SACREMENTO; 1 net vessel, 1 gate vessel, 2 self-propelled oil lighters, YO's; a few tugs and a few small craft, which were unsuitable for any real military use.

10. Q. Did you consider this force as adequate to perform the Navy Task assigned under JCD-42, that you have just referred to?

A. No.

11. Q. Would you like to amplify that answer by stating wherein you considered they were deficient?

A. I did not have enough patrol craft to properly organize inshore patrol. I had neither surface craft nor aircraft for offshore patrol, no escorts except that the Commander-in-Chief had made arrangements to supply, under the Commander Base Force, one when Rainbow 5 was executed. I had no attack force except such Army bombers as could be used under the Joint Agreement. They were not adequate

in numbers and types. I had no aircraft assigned to the Naval District to be used to meet the requirements of the Joint Agreement.

12. Q. We have had considerable reference before this court to Exhibit 7, which is the Joint Defense Plan, JCD-42. Had any part of this been put in effect in 1941?

A. No part of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan as such was put into operation by the orders of the War and Navy Departments, or by mutual agreement of the local commanders of the Army and Navy prior to December 7. However, some parts of appendix 7 were in operation.

13. Q. Will you describe in general terms what these parts of appendix 7 were and what they pertained to?

A. Appendix 7 was a joint agreement between the Commanding General and the Commandant 14th Naval District in regard to air defense. The pertinent parts which were in operation were: The Army agreed to turn over to Navy tactical control all bombers in the case of air attack, or when required. The Navy agreed to turn over to the tactical control of the Army all fighters or aircraft suitable as fighters in case of emergency, or when required.

14. Q. As Navy Base Defense Officer, did you consider you had [387] a fairly accurate picture of what military forces and equipment the Army had for the execution of its task; that is, to hold Oahu against attack by sea, land, and air forces, particularly as this task applied to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base?

A. Yes, and my knowledge has been reflected in correspondence which has been read before this court.

15. Q. Adverting to article 17 of JCD-42, where the Army is charged with providing certain service and key defenses, I shall ask you to state opposite each category that is applicable to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, not on others, what the Army had provided in accordance with the Joint Agreement, prior to 7 December 1941.

A. Under subparagraph a., which was beach and land, seacoast, and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, I knew that there were insufficient military personnel according to the estimate of the need by the Commanding General. It was my belief that the seacoast batteries had had insufficient target practice. I knew there were insufficient numbers of anti-aircraft guns, both in the long-range type and in the close-in weapons. I knew there were insufficient modern Army bombing planes. I knew that there was a deficiency in the numbers and types of Army pursuit planes. I knew that the permanent anti-aircraft warning service was nowhere near complete. I had general knowledge that a number of mobile stations had been set up, but that the personnel was not trained, that the entire system was in a formative condition, notwithstanding the assistance which had been provided to the Army by the Navy. With reference to subparagraph c., I knew that no protection had been provided to landing fields in outlying islands by the Army. In reference to paragraph d., I believed that this had been taken care of. Subparagraph e., I knew this had been provided for. Subparagraph f., I knew that the Army could not perform inshore aerial patrol, and I had endeavored to get aircraft so that the Navy could take over these duties until such time as the Army was properly equipped. Results—negative. I have also referred previously to the aircraft warning

service; that is also under f. Subparagraph g., arrangements had been made for this by Joint Agreement, appendix 7, but Army did not have adequate numbers or types of bombers, and specifically during the period from November 27 to December 7, the Army had only 6 modern bombers in serviceable condition. Paragraph h., this had been one of the subjects of the Joint Air Defense Agreement. My recollection is that the Army furnished personnel during the day time, but that up to December 7, we had been unable to get them at night. Paragraph i., this had been diligently prosecuted. Paragraph j., this service was operational. Paragraph k., this service was operational. Paragraph l. (love), the Army, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had a plan for taking care of this detail. Paragraph m., I knew that the Army were working on this. Paragraph n., many conferences and studies had been held on the subject. Paragraph o., A [388] plan had been made. Paragraph p., a plan had been made.

16. Q. Referring to Article 18 of JCD-42, which sets out what the Navy shall provide, will you state categorically what the Navy did provide, as they relate to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base prior to 7 December 1941?

A. According to paragraph 18, the Navy was first required to supply an inshore patrol. The vessels for the inshore patrol were inadequate, as I stated before. Paragraph b., the Navy was required to provide for an offshore patrol. There were not vessels or aircraft available for this patrol. None had been supplied. c.: Navy was required to supply an escort. No vessels were available, but the Commander-in-Chief in his war plan had arranged to have an escort force under Commander Base Force. Paragraph d.: An attack force. I had no surface vessels; none were supplied, for an attack force. Complete reliance had to be made on Army bombers. They were inadequate in numbers and types. The Navy might possibly have temporarily based on shore Navy dive bombers and other shore-based aircraft, but they might or might not be present. e.: This had been provided for and was adequate except for trained personnel. f.: Torpedo nets had been installed in both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, magnetic loops and sono-buoys had been installed, but I am not sure whether they were installed before or after 7 December. g.: Army forces are to be supported by Marine anti-aircraft. This varied from time to time. Arrangements had been made to support Army forces as fully as could be done by the Commander-in-Chief in his Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 of October 14, 1st of February, 1941. h.: Number of mine-sweepers were inadequate. i.: There were no means for the 14th Naval District to conduct distant reconnaissance, either by surface vessels or long-range aircraft. No long-range aircraft had been furnished. j.: Only means of attacking enemy's naval forces were by aircraft. This meant Army bombers and whatever Navy planes happened to be present. Army bombers were inadequate in numbers and types. k.: Adequate. l.: Fairly adequate but improving all the time. m.: Completely effective and ready to take over. n.: In operation. o.: Inadequate but being remedied very rapidly by the construction of new hospitals. p.: Plans made but not put into operation until after December 7.

17. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 8, which is 2CL-41, what was the relation of the Naval Base Defense Officer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in the chain of military command?

A. The Commander-in-Chief was my immediate superior in command.

18. Q. Adverting to paragraph 3, g., subparagraph (6), of this same exhibit, will you state what the Naval Base Defense Officer was responsible for under each of the subparagraphs, and opposite each state the action taken by you as Naval Base Defense Officer prior to the Japanese attack [389] on 7 December 1941?

A. g. (6) A. This was done by effecting agreement in regard to the use of Army planes by the Navy, and naval planes by the Army in case of attack. Frequently drills were held, difficulties were determined, remedies applied, and Marine anti-aircraft was made available to assist the Army, in arranging to have Army personnel sent in ships of the Fleet for training. All of this done prior to December 7. (6) B. About February 20, I had a conference with General Short, and urged the necessity of emplacing his mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. On February 23 I was informed by his Chief of Staff, in writing, that General Short had given orders that mobile anti-aircraft artillery would be emplaced as close to the sites of our emplacements as possible, having due regard for the ownership of land. It is my belief that his representations were not lived up to. In the intervening period until October, the Naval Base Defense Officer personally examined the plans for location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be emplaced, particularly those that were to be located on the naval reservations. Subordinates of the N. B. D. O. were in constant touch with Army representatives, endeavoring to have the guns in place, and on December 7, the Navy was actually making arrangements to mess and quarter Army gun crews on naval reservations, so that objections would be removed. At a date somewhere between 15 October and November 1 or 15th, Naval Base Defense Officer personally talked to Lieutenant General Short about this matter. General Short explained his position, that he could not emplace these guns for several reasons—sites were not on government land, fire-control communications would have to be out in the weather, usually in cane fields and irrigation ditches and be subject to deterioration; furthermore, that it would be extremely difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. There were approximately 26, 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in fixed emplacements, about 20 of them being in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of these measures were taken prior to 7 December. C.: Commander Patrol Wing Two was a flying officer and as such understood all the technicalities of air operation and was qualified to command air forces. Control was exercised through him, and it is believed that thorough coordination with the Army was effected. Detailed operating plans were prepared, drills were held, difficulties determined, and improvements made. All done before December 7. D. (1): N. B. D. O. was responsible for advising the S. O. E. of what condition of readiness to maintain. This was done by means taken by him in drill. Communication plans were provided whereby it could be effected quickly. All before December 7. (6) D. (2) Drills held weekly until the autumn, when they were changed to be held every two weeks, and in these bi-weekly drills, the arrangements were made to

always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to bi-weekly drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army participation and, also due to their frequency, there [390] had been absentees. The bi-weekly drills were arranged well in advance and insured the Army participation and all hands being at each drill. All prior to December 7. (6) D. (3) : This was done; all signals that were contained in the Communication Annex to the Operations Plan 1-41. (6) D. (4) : This was practiced at actual drills, and communications provided for the purpose. All done prior to December 7. D. (5) : A communications plan was promulgated prior to December 7, was used at drills. D. (6) : Air raid alarm signal was contained in the communication plan.

19. Q. Do you recall what condition of readiness was in effect in the 14th Naval District on the night of 6 December 1941?

A. Admiral Kimmel testified that there was a Fleet order to maintain condition of readiness No. 3, and General Short has testified that Alert No. 1 was in effect in the Army in the harbor control posts. Condition No. 3 was in effect, full anti-sabotage measures. It had been in constant effect for several months. The various posts comprising my command, such as the air station at Ford Island, the one at Kaneohe Bay, the ammunition depot at Lualualei, and the communication station at Wahiawa, and other places—the conditions of readiness were determined by the Commanding Officer, but there were no conditions of readiness in effect.

20. Q. Had the condition of readiness existing in the 14th Naval District been notified to the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor on the night of 6 December 1941, to your knowledge?

A. The condition of readiness—no.

21. Q. No condition of readiness was advised to the S. O. E.?

A. It should be borne in mind that the normal condition on board ships in Pearl Harbor, with their guns ready and ammunition at the guns, a large percentage of the officers and men on board, was equal to and probably higher than the Army Alert No. 2.

22. Q. What condition of readiness for aircraft was being maintained in the 14th Naval District, if you had any?

A. The condition of readiness for aircraft, that is, shore-based aircraft, was the normal day-to-day condition of readiness prescribed according to the requirements of the various squadrons or units, in accordance with their most probable use and their days' tasks and missions, which at that point were largely training, personnel-type training exercises and matériel lessons.

23. Q. Adverting to page 5 of the Exhibit, which is 2CL-41, there are laid down certain duties of the Naval Base Defense Officer. In each case, state what was done by you when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor Naval Base at 0755 December 7, 1941.

A. Paragraph 3, big G, subparagraph 9, subparagraph c., (1). That is to give alarm indicating attack in progress or [391] imminent. If not already blacked out, black out when the alarm is given. This was done both by visual signal and by air-raid alarm. Next is (2). That was done. Paragraph 3 and 4, one of which is, launch air search for enemy ships, and the other is to arm and prepare all bombing units available. Many drills had been held with a view to making all these actions automatic and not requiring orders consuming time. They were done insofar as aircraft were available after the attack.

24. Q. Adverting to the aircraft warning system which you have testified was the responsibility of the Army, were you required to have any personnel attached to this system? If so, what?

A. The Joint Agreement with the Army required the Navy to have a liaison officer in the interceptor command to evaluate and relay the messages, when the aircraft warning system was established. This system was not established until December 7, when officers were sent.

25. Q. Am I to understand, then, that the aircraft warning system had not yet been organized by the Army?

A. The entire system, the permanent system, was nowhere near completed. Some five or six mobile stations had been placed at points around the island by the Army. The entire system, including the training of the personnel and the organization of the system, was in a very formative state, and no order had been issued for the establishment of a station, nor was it issued until December 7. The entire anti-aircraft warning system was the responsibility of the Army, and General Short testified before this court the other day that the establishment order was not issued until December 7.

26. Q. Admiral Kimmel has testified he considered the intelligence unit under your command to have been adequate and, I believe, efficient. How did you classify this unit at the time of the Japanese attack?

A. I considered the Combat Intelligence Unit efficient, but that personnel numbers were inadequate.

27. Q. As you look back upon the events which preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, are you still of the same opinion?

A. Yes, I believe it was efficient, except now I know that the space, numbers of personnel, and equipment, was grossly inadequate.

28. Q. Do you feel that this unit kept you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet currently informed?

A. Yes, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and [392] the Commandant 14th Naval District were kept informed from such information as this unit was able to obtain.

29. Q. Do you remember if you received intelligence information from sources other than this unit?

A. Yes, from the Commander-in-Chief, from the District Intelligence Officer, who had an organization under the Office of Naval Intelligence and who had contact with Military Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

30. Q. Did you get any intelligence information from the Navy Department in the form of bulletins or dispatches, that you remember?

A. I got none in the form of dispatches that I remember. It is possible that the Intelligence Office got bulletins. I don't recall seeing them.

31. Q. Do you feel that you and the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet worked in harmony in military matters affecting your command?

A. Yes, unequivocally so.

32. Q. Do you recall whether your conferences were frequent, or otherwise, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, from the period, say October 16, 1941, to 7 December 1941?

A. I believe it to be a fair estimate to say that I saw and talked to the Commander-in-Chief four or five times weekly.

33. Q. In the light of what you now know, do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet kept you currently informed in military matters?

A. I felt, and still feel, that the Commander-in-Chief made an honest effort to keep me fully and currently informed on all matters, and I did my best to reciprocate.

34. Q. And can you say now that you feel that you were informed?

A. So far as I know he gave me all the information he had.

35. Q. What was the nature of your relations in military matters with the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor?

A. I had little contact with the S. O. E. at Pearl Harbor in military matters, in view of the physical presence of the Commander-in-Chief.

36. Q. Did you have any responsibility for the condition of readiness of the vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, or was that a matter under the Commander-in-Chief or the Senior Officer Embarked?

A. Yes, I had some responsibility by paragraph 3 G (6) d. (1) of Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41. I was required [393] to advise the S. O. E. in Pearl Harbor what condition of readiness be maintained.

37. Q. Can you now remember when you first felt that United States-Japanese relationships were becoming acutely strained?

A. I was conscious that United States-Japanese relations were strained, in varying degrees, throughout the entire year of 1941.

38. Q. Do you recall making any decisions based on any estimate as to what the Japanese intentions might be towards an attack in the Hawaiian area?

A. Of course I was not called on to make any independent decisions. I did not have any information separate and distinct from the High Command of the Fleet, nor did any information which was furnished me cause me to disagree with the decisions made.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, withdrew.

[394] 39. Q. I am asking you, did you make any decisions of your own?

A. My answer to that is that I was not called upon to make any independent decisions. I didn't have any information separate and distinct from the high command of the Fleet, nor any information which would cause me to disagree with the decisions that he made.

40. Q. Did you have any views on the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor before 7 December 1941?

A. I considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the declaration of war as a remote possibility.

41. Q. You have heard the testimony which Rear Admiral Kimmel gave before this court as to the views of the Navy Department on the physical possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack as being influenced by the prevailing depths of water in Pearl Harbor. Did these technical views influence any estimate that you may have made of the possibility of such an attack?

A. Yes, inasmuch as it appeared impossible to successfully launch torpedoes from aircraft in Pearl Harbor, I was of the opinion that a bombing raid by aircraft would not be sufficiently profitable to cause an enemy to undertake it.

42. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 27 November, 1941. Had you been shown this dis-

patch by anyone before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on 7 December?

A. Yes. I saw this dispatch, or a paraphrase of it, on the evening of November 27.

43. Q. Do you recall if you had any conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet before December 7, 1941, with reference to the information contained in this dispatch?

A. Yes, I think so.

44. Q. What was your own estimate of the situation as to the Japanese intentions based on the information current with this dispatch?

A. At the conference above referred to, the subject matter was fully discussed, after which the Commander-in-Chief made his decision as to what steps should be taken. I had no information to cause me to disagree with his conclusions.

45. Q. As a result of the receipt of this dispatch, Exhibit 17, at which you are now looking, was the condition of readiness under your command changed in any way that you remember?

A. The various commands in the 14th Naval District did not assume condition of readiness. Full anti-sabotage measures had been in effect for several months. The various commanding officers were responsible as such [395] for their commands. There were adequate armed marines at all stations. There were elaborate identification pass systems in effect. All measures outside the naval reservations, even up to their gates and fences, were Army responsibilities.

46. A. But so far as your command itself was concerned, what I am trying to find out is, did you take any additional security measures by virtue of the information that was contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 17?

A. Yes. We placed a patrol off of Honolulu Harbor, conducted by the Coast Guard. We began sweeping Honolulu Harbor channel and approaches by Navy sweepers. Some time subsequent to the dispatch, Commander Inshore Patrol, who was one of my subordinates, had the captains of the four destroyers, of Destroyer Division 80, in his office, and gave them a pep talk, and particularly he invited their attention to the Commander-in-Chief's directive concerning the depth-charging of submarines in the defensive sea area.

47. Q. Can you remember whether the question of unity of command in the Hawaiian area had been under consideration by you and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941?

A. I recall no discussions concerning unity of command as applying to the Army and Navy. The existing system was mutual cooperation. I had no reason to take any independent steps looking toward a change in the established system.

48. Q. I show you Exhibit 18, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 26 November, 1941. Did you have any knowledge of its contents shortly after this date?

A. Yes, I believe so.

49. Q. Did the action contemplated therein, namely, dispatching a carrier to Midway and Wake, a task the accomplishment of which would have to be executed in the future, have any influence on your estimate of the imminence of war with Japan?

A. No.

50. Q. On the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

51. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 28 November, 1941 and refers to a message sent by the Army to Commander Western Defense Command. Please inspect the subject matter contained in this dispatch and inform the court whether you were familiar with its contents around the time of its probable receipt in Hawaii?

A. I saw the dispatch. The only items in the dispatch which made a real impression on me were those parts [396] concerning the desire of the United States to have Japan make the first hostile act, and the other one was concerning not to alarm the public. By implication it was my belief that it was obligatory upon the Navy to consider these same restrictions.

52. Q. In other words, I understand your view was this: That even though the dispatch was purely informatory, its having been sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to activities in the Hawaiian area, it did have some influence on your actions?

A. The message was an Army dispatch but it contained certain wording concerning hostile attack and alarming the public that was in the Navy dispatch of the same date. I believe that these restrictions applied to the Navy.

53. Q. Did these matters which you say you feel applied to the Navy limit your initiative in any way relative to measures for increased security that you might have taken in the 14th Naval District?

A. No.

54. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibit 20, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 3 December, 1941, the subject matter of which is informatory of the action of Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at certain places destroying most of their codes and ciphers and burning all other secret and confidential documents. Do you recall whether you were informed of the subject matter of this dispatch at any time after its probable time of receipt by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I saw the dispatch.

55. Q. Did the receipt of this information revise your estimate in any way of the imminence of a United States-Japanese war?

A. The dispatch itself did not cause any change, in my opinion, regarding the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the declaration of war. It did not cause me to take any increased security measures in the 14th Naval District except to direct the District Intelligence Officer to arrange with the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate General. Adequate security measures were already effective.

56. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibits 21 and 22, which are the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatches of 4 and 6 December, 1941, respectively, and which contain directives to destroy secret and confidential publications on Guam and outlying Pacific bases. Do you remember whether you had been informed of the subject matter of these dispatches prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I believe Admiral Kimmel showed me these dispatches, or paraphrases of them.

[397] 57. Q. Did these dispatches influence you to revise in any manner your estimate of the imminence of war between the United States and Japan as of that time?

A. No.

58. Q. The possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

59. Q. Did the information influence you to take any increased security measures in the activities under your command?

A. I believe that Admiral Kimmel caused me to send dispatches to Wake and, possibly Midway concerning the destruction of such confidential and secret codes as they might have. I am not certain on that point but that is my belief.

60. Q. Were you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in contact frequently between 27 November and 7 December 1941, on matters of a military nature?

A. Yes.

61. Q. Do you feel you were reasonably well informed in matters affecting your command?

A. Yes, I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to tell me everything.

62. Q. Will you answer the questions? Do you feel that you were reasonably well informed on matters that affected your own command?

A. Yes.

63. Q. You and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet were in accord in these matters?

A. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief never indicated any disapproval of my actions.

64. Q. Do you, yourself, remember having informed him of the condition of readiness which you were taking in your command up to the time of 0755 on 7 December 1941?

A. No, I do not remember ever having categorically advised him, but on October 16 and on November 27, and possibly on November 24, conferences were held with the Commander-in-Chief and it was decided to make no changes. I had every reason to think the Commander-in-Chief knew the conditions.

65. Q. On the question of long-range reconnaissance, I would like a summary at this time of the command relationship that existed between yourself as a Naval Base Defense officer and the Commander of Patrol Wing Two. For what matters did he come under your command?

A. My sole connection with long-range reconnaissance [398] was that as Commandant of the 14th Naval District I had made a joint agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department which would be placed in execution on M-day, or by order of the War and Navy Departments, or upon the mutual agreement of the two local commanders of the Army and Navy, after which time it would then become a responsibility of the Navy to provide distant reconnaissance aircraft for this purpose which had been allocated to the 14th Naval District by the Navy Department, but I had been informed that their delivery was indefinite. In connection with Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised), Commander Patrol Wing Two was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and as such he was under

my control insofar as I exercised supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through him, Commander Patrol Wing Two, for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

66. Q. I am still a little bit puzzled as to this command relationship. ComPat Wing Two was whom?

A. Admiral Bellinger.

67. Q. Did he have any other duties than ComPat Wing Two?

A. Yes. He was Commander of Task Force Nine. I believe he was Commander Air Scouting Force. He was also Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

68. Q. That is what I am trying to straighten out, exactly this situation: For example, if Admiral Bellinger had under his command, say 5 squadrons of patrol planes. How would you, as a Naval Base Defense officer, know whether these 5 squadrons of planes belonged to him as Commander Scouting Force, or as Naval Base Defense officer?

A. I don't believe I am the best qualified person to tell you that. Admiral Bellinger was not under my command. He was a Fleet officer.

69. Q. But he was a Naval Base Defense Air Officer, was he not?

A. Yes, but the Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a volunteer fire department. When you sounded the air raid alarm they came, and when the air raid alarm wasn't in effect, they were doing something else.

70. Q. That is exactly what I am trying to get at. Suppose, for example, you, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense officer, wanted to use two or three squadrons of these 5 squadrons of planes that I have assumed Admiral Bellinger had under his command, and you ordered him to turn these planes over to you. Could he say, "Well, they belong to the Scouting Force and I can't let you [399] have them"?

A. Well, he was a very good friend of mine but I don't believe he would have done it without asking the Commander-in-Chief.

71. Q. In other words, for you to get any planes that Admiral Bellinger had under his command it would probably mean that you would have to go to the Commander-in-Chief, or that he would, before you would get them in your capacity as Naval Base Defense officer?

A. Not exactly. There were a lot of aircraft. First, the Marine aircraft at Ewa Field. That had a commanding officer, a Marine officer, a flyer. They had certain duties to do all the time. On Ford Island there were a lot of carrier based planes that had been left there temporarily, and maybe some other types of planes. They had commanding officers. They had their duties and so forth to carry out. Task Force Nine, the patrol planes, the same thing. They had their duties to perform under Admiral Bellinger. Now, normally they were all carrying on their duties. When the air-raid alarm went, then they all became the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and only at that time.

72. Q. In other words, in your capacity as Naval Base Defense officer, you had no planes at all unless you rang the alarm?

A. Of course I might, under some circumstances, receive positive information from the Commander-in-Chief that there was an enemy

approaching, to sound an air raid alarm, and I would sound an air raid alarm, and then this thing would function.

73. Q. Let me put it another way: Suppose, for example, upon the receipt of the information contained in the dispatch of November 27, you felt it your duty, as the Naval Base Defense officer, to send out a long-range reconnaissance. Could you have told Admiral Bellinger then, "I want all the planes you've got to conduct this reconnaissance"?

A. My duties as Naval Base Defense officer are clearly described in the Order. Nowhere in the order does it say that I shall make long-distance reconnaissance.

74. Q. Well, I am puzzled and I don't know whether the court has it clear, or not, but that is exactly the point I would like to get cleared up.

A. I have told you all there is about it. If I know something you want to know, I would be very glad to tell you.

75. Q. Who did have the authority to make long distance reconnaissance?

A. The Commander Task Force Nine, or Commander Patrol Wing One and Two, the same individual, Admiral Bellinger, had as his mission to make scouting patrols and [400] distance reconnaissance. But they were subject to the order of the Commander-in-Chief.

76. Q. To clarify that point, Admiral Bellinger couldn't do this on his own initiative; he would have to have orders from the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I believe so, but I would rather you ask Admiral Bellinger.

77. Q. At any rate during the period 27 November to 7 December, 1941, did you consult with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet looking toward the establishment of a long-range aircraft reconnaissance?

A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, made his decision on November 27, that the intensive training, material upkeep and operational schedules would continue and that no changes would be made. This, by itself, would include the long-range aircraft reconnaissance. I made no suggestions to him.

78. Q. Whose responsibility was it for berthing ships in Pearl Harbor so that they could develop the maximum anti-aircraft fire?

A. The senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of your own whether on the night of 6-7 December, ships were so berthed?

A. I believe so, except possibly in the case of double-berthed battleships.

80. Q. But this was not a matter of your responsibility?

A. That was not a matter of my responsibility and was an unavoidable situation.

81. Q. When did you first know there was an enemy attack on Pearl Harbor, and how did you ascertain it?

A. At about 0755, 7 December 1941. I heard the explosion of bombs.

82. Q. This convinced you of an attack, or did you need somebody to inform you further?

A. I went out on my lanai and saw a Japanese plane coming by.

83. Q. Will you tell the court what action you took at this time?

A. I went to my headquarters as fast as I could. I immediately initiated dispatches to Washington, the Philippines, Guam, ships at sea, and possibly others, to the effect that Oahu had been attacked. I directed local broadcasting stations to call all Navy Yard workers and naval personnel to the yard; directed drydocks to be flooded; also many other local directives.

[401] 84. Q. What percentage of officers and men under your command who had military duties were ready and available for duty at the time of the attack at 0755, if you can remember, in a general way?

A. The Navy Yard, under my command, and the District Headquarters, I do not know the exact percentage, but ample personnel was present and all institutions and vessels in the command were immediately ready.

The court then, at 3:00 p. m., took a recess until 3:15 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:

All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate (continued):

85. Q. Prior to the air attack at 0755 on the morning of 7 December, 1941, had there been any enemy activity in the Hawaiian area other than that of aircraft that you knew about?

A. Yes.

86. Q. What was it?

A. At about 0715 I received a telephone message from my chief of staff to the effect that the USS WARD, the old destroyer which was acting as inshore patrol off the harbor entrance, had reported that she had attacked a submarine, and about the same time, either in this message or a subsequent message, the WARD reported that she was then escorting a sampan to Honolulu. The staff duty officer at Commander-in-Chief's headquarters was given the same information at the same time by the Harbor Control Post. I discussed this with the chief of staff over the telephone and we were uncertain as to whether this was another false contact, or not. Captain Momsen, the War Plans officer, went to headquarters to verify the situation and immediately ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to sea to support the WARD. This was doctrine. Before the matter could be clarified the air attack had begun.

[402] 87. Q. Did you have any information as to where the attack on the submarine took place that you have stated you had a report of?

A. I knew it was somewhere south of the entrance buoys in the harbor entrance approaches.

88. Q. But do you or do you not know whether it was inside or outside of the submarine net?

A. That would be outside the submarine net.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

89. Q. In your testimony, Admiral, you related the Army deficiencies and the Navy deficiencies insofar as the 14th Naval District was concerned. However, when the Fleet was in, the deficiencies in regard to patrol craft and, to a reasonable degree, in regard to patrol planes, could be remedied, couldn't it, sir?

A. No. The Fleet's vessels which could be used as patrol craft, and the Fleet's patrol planes, were all occupied in their own routine employment, which was intensive training, material upkeep, and operation. I could not use those instrumentalities without the consent of the Commander-in-Chief.

90. Q. I think you misunderstood me, Admiral. I will rephrase my question this way: In the event such contingency as occurred on December 7, 1941, there were other craft when the Fleet was in port that could be made available to you, sir. Is that not correct?

A. There were ships and aircraft there but I do not know as to their availability, as to giving them to me.

91. Q. That is, insofar as you were Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. As Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

92. Q. And as far as the Army was concerned, whether the ships came from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, or whether they came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, wouldn't make any difference to them, would it?

A. I don't think the Army had any interest in the ships.

93. Q. My point is this, Admiral: Then as of December 6 and December 7, 1941, in regard to the actual vessels and planes then available at Pearl Harbor, do you think that the Army had any particular criticism to make of the Navy in regard to the readiness of the Navy to meet necessary commitments?

A. I have heard of none.

[403] The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross examine this witness.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

94. Q. Did you have any information on a submarine being sunk inside the harbor?

A. Yes. In my previous testimony I have stated that Captain Momsen ordered the ready-duty destroyer to sea to support the USS WARD. This destroyer got under way about 8:00 o'clock, and in standing out of the harbor she sighted a Japanese submarine which she rammed and depth-charged and sunk. Subsequent thereto this same submarine was depth-charged several additional times. The submarine, after it was raised, was found to have one, 5-inch shell hole through the conning tower, which killed the captain. He was blown into a mass of crumpled steel, and both torpedoes were missing. The submarine carried two torpedoes. The submarine was known as a midget submarine.

95. Q. You spoke a moment ago about an attack that the WARD had made on a submarine. Do you know whether or not this submarine was sunk, or whether it was just a report of an attack that the WARD made?

A. Subsequent to December 7th, I learned for the first time that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine, or another submarine, and attacked it with depth bombs, and that the submarine was sunk.

96. Q. What type of submarine was this?

A. A midget.

97. Q. What sort of net protection against submarines was installed in the Pearl Harbor channel?

A. No anti-submarine nets were installed in Pearl Harbor or Honolulu, but anti-torpedo nets were installed to prevent submarines from firing torpedoes from outside into the harbor. The only nets in operation then, and now I believe, was an anti-torpedo net.

98. Q. If this net had been closed, do you think it was adequate to exclude a midget submarine from the harbor?

A. That is a question of opinion. I think it highly probable that the submarine would have been fouled by the net and the patrols would have seen it and made its detection much easier.

99. Q. Do you have any information as to the condition of this anti-torpedo net in the Pearl Harbor channel; whether it was open or closed on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. The practice and orders required the net gate to [404] be open all day but to be closed all night, except when ships were arriving or departing. At about 4:45 a. m., some vessels which had been at sea, I believe minesweepers, approached the net and the gate was open.

100. Q. What day?

A. December 7th. And I subsequently found that this gate had not been closed until sometime after 8:00 o'clock, when it was ordered closed by Headquarters.

[405] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

101. Q. Will you give a brief description of that net?

A. The net was backed up in the shallow water areas by underwater obstacles. Where the water became deep enough to permit a torpedo to run, the net began. It was anchored on the shore side with heavy buoys. The net was made in interlocking rings, so that every ring interlocked with three or four. It was held afloat by large buoys on the surface known as baulks. They were merely small wooden rafts. On the top of these rafts were powerful steel prongs projected to seaward. At the gate end, on the shore side, there was a gate vessel, which was a steel vessel probably three or four hundred feet long and twelve to fourteen feet draught, which had some generators and powerful winches to handle lines. The other shore end was anchored in exactly the same way I have described the first one, except there was no gate vessels, but there was a hinge on the gate which held in place the large buoys. There were lines which ran from the gate vessel to the opposite side of the net through blocks and came back to the

entrance of the gate, so that when the gate was to be opened, the gate vessel hauled on a wire line, which went through a block on the other side and pulled open the gate. When you wanted to close it, you hauled on the opposite line.

102. Q. What was the depth of the water in the channel?

A. I think the deepest place was about seventy-two feet, but that was in the exact center of the channel.

103. Q. What was the depth of the net?

A. As I recall it, it was forty-five feet.

104. Q. Can you tell us what the overall measurements of the submarine were, from the top of the conning tower to the bottom?

A. I think the submarine was sixteen feet from the keel to the top of the conning tower, and the periscope stuck up three or four feet more—say, twenty feet.

105. Q. The first submarine on which you got a contact was about how far south of the entrance buoy? Do you remember?

A. I have subsequently determined it was somewhat over a mile.

[406] 106. Q. You don't know whether it was a midget or bigger submarine?

A. I believe it was a midget. I think the WARD sunk one, and whether or not the plane sunk another or contributed to the WARD's effort, I haven't been able to learn. However, a Japanese radio broadcast admitted on or about December 12 that the Japanese had lost five submarines on this attack.

107. Q. Now, will you tell the court a little about the submarine which got into the harbor?

A. It is my recollection that the submarine which entered the harbor was first sighted by a barge, which we call YP something. I don't remember the number. It was somewhere south of Hospital Point. This barge endeavored to ram it and made a report by signal to the signal tower. The submarine proceeded up channel and went on the north side of Ford Island—All of this was reconstructed afterwards—and fired torpedoes at the USS CURTIS, which was moored somewhere west of Pearl City. The CURTIS saw the torpedoes. They missed and hit the Pearl City peninsula, and one of them exploded. The CURTIS opened fire immediately, and I believe the five-inch shell found in the conning tower of this submarine was one of the five-inch shell of the CURTIS. The MONAGHAN, which had gotten away from her berth at the east end of the harbor and was standing out, saw this submarine about the same time and rammed depth charges, and the other destroyers coming along later dropped a few depth charges for good luck.

108. Q. Were there any other submarines which got into the harbor, to your knowledge?

A. None, although we had no less than fifty alarms that day, the next day, and the following days.

109. Q. I believe you said that if the gate of that net had been closed, it is probable that the submarine would have been entangled in it?

A. Yes. I might say another submarine was captured.

110. Q. Where?

A. The third submarine ran ashore on the reef off Bellows Field on the northeast coast of Oahu. The Army went out, and the captain

jumped overboard and was captured by the Army. The Army went out and got lines on her and informed us, and we went over and took her apart and brought her to Pearl Harbor, and she is now used for making bond drives around this country.

111. Q. As we understand it, the submarine which you speak of as entering the harbor was not sighted until after it reached Ford Island or was off Ford Island?

A. Sighted by a YP south of Hospital Point first.

[407] 112. Q. How far is that inside the gate and the net?

A. Oh, probably a mile and a half.

113. Q. Were there any lookouts at the gate as a matter of doctrine or as a result of your orders to keep watch?

A. Yes, there was a gate vessel which had a full crew on board in command of a chief petty officer, and there were motor launch patrols.

114. Q. At all times?

A. At all times.

115. Q. They did not sight this submarine?

A. If they did, they did not report it.

116. Q. Did you give orders to close the gate?

A. I believe the captain of the yard gave orders to close it.

117. Q. But it was closed immediately?

A. It was closed.

118. Q. In view of the critical conditions existing with Japan, although we were on a peace footing at that time, was there any consideration given by you or anyone else to keeping this gate closed at all times, opening it only for the passage of vessels?

A. Yes, we considered it, but owing to the heavy traffic in the day time and the fact that visibility was good and that there were men and boats there all the time, it was decided in the day time to keep it open.

119. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, was there any inner air patrol maintained around the entrance to seaward of Pearl Harbor?

A. None that I have knowledge of.

120. Q. Did you ever consider asking for it, looking to the maintenance of such a patrol?

A. Yes, I had asked the Navy, through the Commander-in-Chief, for four observation sea planes for the purpose of anti-submarine patrol and work in the coastal area.

121. Q. But in view of the ships in Pearl Harbor at that time and the fact that these ships had on them OS2U planes and other smaller planes which could have been used for an enemy patrol, were any steps taken toward this end?

A. No, not by me.

122. Q. Was it considered?

A. I think it was considered. I have some difficulty separating pre-December 7 and post-December 7. I think it was [408] considered, but I think that owing to the fact that the ships at sea were employed for long periods—ten days—in which they used their planes, when they came into the Base, the opinion was that these planes and the men were entitled to rehabilitation, the same as the rest of the crew on a ship.

123. Q. Does the court understand that you had no aircraft whatsoever under your direct command?

A. That is correct, sir.

124. Q. Did you, Admiral, consider that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, absolutely so.

125. Q. How many anti-aircraft guns did you request the Army to place on naval reservations in and around Pearl Harbor?

A. In a letter which I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations, via the Commander-in-Chief, dated December 30, 1940, which is an exhibit before this court, I stated, based on my knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft fire, that I thought at least 500 guns were required.

126. Q. On the reservation?

A. Not all on the reservation. The Army Commanding General, through his supporting generals in charge of this particular thing, controlled the distribution of weapons which he had available.

127. Q. Admiral, will you please state your relations with General Short, both official and personal, during your tenure of command?

A. My personal relations with General Short were friendly and cordial. My official relations with him were good. Of course, we had disagreements from time to time—differences of opinion but none of them of any serious consequence.

128. Q. Did you feel that there was close cooperation existing between you and General Short?

A. Yes.

129. Q. You have no doubt heard rumors of the existence of non-cooperation and lack of cooperation between high officials of the Navy in Hawaii and General Short? Are you aware of such rumors?

A. I have read them in the papers.

130. Q. Do you know where such rumors emanated?

A. I do not, but every time I heard them I took occasion to deny their truthfulness.

[409] 131. Q. In other words, you are of the opinion that there was close cooperation between the Army and Navy in Hawaii?

A. That is my opinion.

132. Q. On or prior to the night of 6th-7th of December, 1941, did you advise the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor as to what condition of readiness to maintain?

A. No.

133. Q. During the conference which you speak of as taking place on November 28 with the Commander-in-Chief and at which there were numerous officers present, did you express your ideas to the Commander-in-Chief and to officers present as to the kind of attack, if any, which could be expected?

A. Expected where, sir?

134. Q. Expected at Pearl Harbor?

A. The only information which I had was contained in this dispatch of November 27, in which there is nothing said indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor.

135. Q. But, Admiral, in discussing this dispatch was there any discussion as to the kind of attack which might come from Japan?

A. I believe that there was full and free discussion by all members who were present and that, without exception, everyone believed that the dispatch indicated an attack in Southeast Asia.

136. Q. Did you at that time express your views as to the improbability of an attack on Hawaii?

A. I don't recall.

137. Q. But you have stated that your views were that an air attack was a remote possibility?

A. I have—a surprise air attack prior to declaration of war.

138. Q. In view of the history of the Japanese war with Russia, in which they attacked Russia prior to a declaration of war, was any consideration given in these conferences to the possibility of such an attack by Japan against Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't know that the Chemulpo incident was mentioned, but I think every person present at the conferences knew the circumstances. My own opinion was that if Japan ever made a surprise attack on the Hawaiian area prior to a declaration of war, the probabilities were, first, a submarine attack on ships in the operating areas; second, blocking the entrance channel by running in a ship and sinking it; third, by laying mines to the approaches of Pearl Harbor; fourth, by sabotage throughout the establishment.

[410] 139. Q. And you eliminated, as we understand, the possibility of aerial torpedo attack by reason of information received from the Navy Department and elsewhere?

A. I believed an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor could not be successful, from information which had been supplied by the Navy Department.

140. Q. And if there was any air attack, it would be a bombing attack?

A. Yes.

141. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, at that time that you, by reason of information you had received from all sources, had a complete picture of conditions existing between the United States and Japan with reference to this critical situation?

A. My horizon and my perspective were extremely restricted. I had a great many pressing local duties to do. I felt confident that the Navy Department could evaluate any of these matters and keep the responsible officers advised.

142. Q. Did you have telephonic communication with the Chief of Naval Operations or the Navy Department in Washington?

A. I had a commercial telephone in my office which could be connected.

143. Q. Did you have a scrambler system?

A. Not an individual scrambler system.

144. Q. Any scrambler system which you could use and which was available to you?

A. No, unless it was on a commercial line.

145. Q. As a matter of fact, the scrambler system is attached to a personal line telephone?

A. I believe that is correct.

146. Q. Did you have any telephonic communication with Washington during your tenure of office?

A. Yes, on December 7 at approximately nine o'clock in the morning the Chief of Naval Operations called me by telephone and asked me for details of the attack.

147. Q. He called you and you did not call him?

A. That is correct, sir.

148. Q. Admiral, referring to the gate again, how long did it take to open and shut it?

A. I haven't an exact knowledge. I suppose eight or ten minutes.

[411] 149. Q. In normal traffic, wouldn't that have meant, had you kept the gate closed in the day time, as a matter of practice, it would have been open most of the time?

A. It would have been working all the time. That's correct.

150. Q. Before or since December 7, 1941, did there come to your notice, official or otherwise, any instances of naval personnel being unfit for duty immediately before or during the attack because of previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor?

A. None whatever.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.

The court then, at 4:00 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 18, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944

[412]

THIRTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the twelfth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), an interested party and a witness for the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. In previous testimony before this court, not only yours but others, there has been certain evidence introduced as to the number of guns available for anti-aircraft guns in the protection of Pearl Harbor. It is not clear to the judge advocate the actual number of guns that were in position and ready to fire at 0755, on the morning of 7 December 1941. Will you state as best you can the number and the calibre of each anti-aircraft gun that was in position and ready to fire at that time?

A. You mean on shore?

2. Q. Exclusive of units of the Pacific Fleet or of the 14th Naval District on board ship?

A. To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about [413] 80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 100 50-calibre machine guns—all of these for antiaircraft use. Of the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the

other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army.

3. Q. What calibre were these marine guns?

A. They were 3-inch guns, Army type, mobile.

4. Q. These guns, Admiral, that you have described as being located in permanent mounts at forts in the vicinity, were they sufficiently close to Pearl Harbor Naval Base to be effective as anti-aircraft guns for the protection of that base and units of the fleet at the base?

A. In my opinion they were not sufficient in number or calibre or type.

5. Q. My question related to the closeness of these guns to Pearl Harbor, for the purpose of furnishing protection.

A. They covered the approaches from the sea in the vicinity of the channel, and four or five thousand yards inside.

6. Q. Now can you tell the court or give the court any estimate of the number of these guns that you have described that were actually manned and in the engagement after the alarm was sounded at 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. No, I can't give you any data on that.

7. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter dated February 17, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addresses. I ask you if you can identify it.

A. Yes, I identify this letter.

8. Q. What do you identify it as?

A. I identify it as a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated February 17, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth Naval Districts, and the Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo; subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks; signed by R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.

[414] The letter dated February 17, 1941, from the Chief of Naval operations to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and to the Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 54."

9. Q. Will you please read the letter to the court?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 54.

10. Q. Admiral, I show you a document; can you identify it?

A. Yes, I identify this as a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated June 13, 1941, addressed to the Commandants, First,

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is confidential letter, serial number 055730, signed by R. E. Ingersoll.

The letter dated June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to the Commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Naval Districts, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 55."

11. Q. Will you please read it to the court?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 55.

12. Q. Admiral, I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it?

A. I don't recall ever having seen it before.

13. Q. Can you identify it?

A. The letter is a copy, apparently, of a confidential letter, serial number 07830, dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, on the subject of Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms, signed by H. R. Stark.

The letter, serial number 07830, confidential, dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, was submitted to the inter- [415] ested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

The interested parties, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret); and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that they had never before seen the letter, but stated that they had no objection to its being received as an exhibit.

Accordingly, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 56."

14. Q. Will you please read the letter?

The witness read the letter, Exhibit 56.

None of the interested parties desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

15. Q. Were there any guns mounted or in use or available for use by the Navy, other than guns on board ship at the Pearl Harbor station?

A. The Marine Defense Battalion guns were there, but they were allocated to the Army, in connection with the Army.

16. Q. Does this apply on Kanoeha and other activities under your command?

A. The Marine detachment in the Yard had shoulder rifles and 30-calibre machine guns. They were not designed for anti-aircraft work, but there is no doubt in my mind that they were used to the fullest extent by the Marines there. I know of no other machine guns. I know there were no larger guns, and I know of no 50-calibre machine guns in the Navy Yard that were mounted for anti-aircraft defense and so used, unless they were improvised after the attack. At Kanoeha, the Army had agreed to defend it, and I believe that they had a 3-inch battery, of 4 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, mobile, located in the near vicin-

ity of Kanoeha. Whether they were emplaced and whether they fired, I don't know. The Navy had no guns for that purpose. They had guns, of course, but they were machine guns for the Marines, and I suppose the aircraft had machine guns at Kanoeha. The aircraft at Pearl Harbor had machine guns, but they were either mounted in the planes or outside, so the answer, with those exceptions, is there were no guns.

17. Q. Due to the critical situation and the possibility of war, and a possibility—even though as stated, remote—of attack on Pearl Harbor, did you give any consideration to the obtaining of and mounting in prominent places on buildings, and otherwise, of anti-aircraft guns?

A. The Army's plan for the utilization of their 50-cal- [416] ibre guns and 37-millimeter guns was to take certain numbers of them, which I don't know, and mount them on the top of Marine Barracks, storehouse, submarine base, and the receiving barracks in Pearl Harbor; and I made no independent plans.

18. Q. But the question was, did you give any consideration to the defense by anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, on buildings or other prominent structures in Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't recollect that I did.

19. Q. Did you consider that it was your responsibility to consider this in view of conditions existing?

A. Well, that is a rather broad question. The Army was charged with the responsibility, as I have stated before. I knew that their weapons were not adequate. Naturally, I wanted to do everything possible in my power, but I know that I considered it was my responsibility—I would have done it if I thought it was possible and I could have done it and if I could have manned them, and had trained personnel, and so forth.

20. Q. But you did consider, Admiral, that one of the means of anti-aircraft defense of shore establishments is the mounting of these smaller guns on prominent positions, did you?

A. No, I think when the responsibility of the defense of a place rests with a certain agency, that that agency should do it to the fullest extent, and if it is not sufficient, that anybody who is there should do what he could to supplement, but in no way should the responsibility of the first agency be weakened.

21. Q. The fact remains that you were cooperating with the Army for this defense; is that correct?

A. Yes, I was cooperating to my fullest extent in every regard.

22. Q. The only reason for these questions was to try to find out what had been done in the way of suggestions, cooperation, and otherwise, to install and obtain as many guns as possible, and install these guns in the Navy Yard, in addition to outside.

A. I did not ask for any guns.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

23. Q. Admiral, do you recall in connection with guns, of conversations with the Army representatives in connection with providing quarters and so forth on naval grounds, for this material?

A. Yes.

[417] 24. Q. Would you indicate that?

A. In my testimony yesterday, I mentioned that I had been trying to arrange with the Commanding General, the emplacement of his

mobile guns. I wanted the guns in the Navy Yard, on the buildings and so forth and so on, to be supplied by the Army, to be emplaced with their crews. One of the objections, as I remember it, was that the Army didn't see how they could quarter and mess the men in those localities, and we had sent a letter, I believe, to the submarine barracks and the receiving station, and the Marine Barracks, asking them if they could quarter certain numbers, and mess them; and I believe that at the time of December 7, some of these letters had been answered, but the arrangements had not been perfected.

Neither the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, nor the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), desired to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

25. Q. Are you referring to guns to be mounted on buildings, or 3-inch guns, or guns to be mounted on the ground?

A. I am referring to machine guns and 37-millimeter guns to be mounted on buildings.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as interested party.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret.), at present on active duty in the Naval War College, Newport.

2. Q. Will you state what duties you were performing in the year 1941?

A. In January 1941, I became Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and later in that same year, under [418] special directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Commander of Task Force One.

3. Q. Where were you at 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. I was at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu.

4. Q. The Task Force which you commanded was in port at that time, Admiral?

A. It was.

5. Q. How long previous to the morning of 7 December 1941, had this task force which you commanded, and you yourself, along with it, been in Pearl Harbor—how many days?

A. We had to report on Thursday, approximately the 27th of November, 1941.

6. Q. Who was the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor during the period of time that you and your Task Force were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I was.

7. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 8, which is Fleet letter 2CL-41, in evidence before this court, and ask you if you identify it as such.

A. I do.

8. Q. What is the subject of this letter?

A. Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

9. Q. Paragraph 3 of this letter stated that "The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B)." I shall ask you to read to the court the following subparagraphs and state whether the directive was being complied with as of 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941.

A. (Reading) "Items one, two, and three under continuous patrols: Inshore Patrol (Administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District). (2) Boom Patrols. (3) Harbor Patrols." Although these patrols were not under my direct supervision, to the best of my knowledge and belief they were in effect. (Reading) "Intermittent Patrols: (1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle 10 miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number 1 which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol." To the best of my knowledge and belief, that was being complied with. Item (2) (a) (Reading) "Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force." Also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, within the capacities of available aircraft.

10. Q. Adverting to paragraph (3) (G), which is "Defense Against Air Attack," subparagraph (4), please read this directive to the court for the record and state whether or not [419] it had been complied with at the time of the Japanese attack at 7:55, December 7, 1941?

A. (Reading:)

The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit. In my opinion, it was being complied with.

11. Q. Will you please read subparagraph (5), the next one, and state whether or not at the same time each gunfire sector had a known sector gun commander?

A. (Reading:)

The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in subparagraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

The passing of responsibility to the sector commander was automatic with the ships in that sector. It was the practice upon any change of ships in port for each sector commander to inform the ships of his sector that he had so taken command, and that was the common practice.

12. Q. What was the system employed in these sectors for controlling the fire in the sector?

A. There was no system other than to be responsible for the look-out being maintained within the sector, and the necessary action taken to indicate possible targets.

13. Q. Was there any method or system of coordination of fire between ships of the Fleet and Shore batteries?

A. No.

14. Q. Did you, as Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, set the condition of readiness for ships in the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor when you were in port?

A. There was no condition of readiness set, and in this respect I would like to say that my testimony before Admiral Hart's board, in which I stated that condition 3 was in effect, was in error; also the statement that I had informed Admiral Kimmel that condition 3 was in effect, which statement was also in error. In that testimony I had principally in mind the differentiation between condition 3, 1, and 2; in other words, I meant to imply that neither one nor two were in effect. What was in effect was the result of an order previously issued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, directing that anti-aircraft guns of all ships be available for immediate action. In accordance with this directive, each battleship had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns in readiness, and two machine guns manned; in addition to the anti-aircraft control, with the provision under this directive in effect, [420] the condition of readiness of the anti-aircraft batteries actually was in excess of that required by condition 3, Base Defense Condition 3, of the order referred to.

[420] 15. Q. Rear Admiral Kimmel, who was Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, testified, as the judge advocate recalls it, that it was the duty of the Naval Base Defense Officer to advise the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor in what condition he, the Naval Base Defense Officer, was maintaining of readiness on shore. Exhibit 8, which you have before you, states it was the Naval Base Defense Officer's duty to advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, other than the Commander-in-Chief, what condition of readiness to maintain. This appears to be slightly confusing. What was the normal way of prescribing the condition of readiness for ships at Pearl Harbor?

A. It seems to me that the order is perfectly clear. No condition of readiness other than the condition one, had been prescribed at any time, even during the drills. My interpretation of advise, was written in the order is, "inform as to the necessity for," which was a perfectly sound directive in view of the fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was in direct contact with the Army and had his own intelligence service or operations within the immediate vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. I, being senior to him, it is my opinion that the Commander-in-Chief used the term "advise" because he did not want to use the term "order." The senior commander afloat had no direct communication with the Army and had no intelligence service except his own staff, which was operative only at sea.

16. Q. During the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, had the Naval Base Defense Officer advised you of any condition of readiness to maintain?

A. Not to my knowledge. It is possible that during that period we did have an anti-air raid drill, in which case we may have received word to take condition one, which was indicated by the sounding of the air-raid siren and word over the communication network.

17. Q. Adverting to subparagraph 8, under this same general section that you have been reading from, that is, "Defense Against Air Attack," certain things are directed to be done by the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack. Will you read to

the court for the purpose of putting into the record each item separately, and state after this item, what you did with regard thereto.

A. (Reading:)

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

[421] (4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

As I have stated, I was not on board at 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941. I can state what my chief of staff has informed me of the action he took, but he himself is available in case the board desires to question him. My Chief of Staff was then Captain, now Rear Admiral, Harold Train.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[422] 18. Q. You have stated, Admiral, that certain guns aboard ship in Pearl Harbor were required to be manned under the security conditions that you were then maintaining. Was it necessary for these crews to be awake and alert while they were on watch?

A. They were required to be on deck in the vicinity of the guns, communications manned with the anti-aircraft control. I should like to add to that that the condition in which the Fleet was based at that time, being inside of the defended port, it was assumed that we would have at least from three to five minutes notice of any possible air raid attack. To have maintained people immediately at the guns during all this long period would have resulted in tiring them out and without beneficial results in case of an attack. We had every reason to suppose that the crews on deck would be able to man their guns after information was received of a possible approach of an enemy.

19. Q. Among the personnel stationed under this condition of security, were there any men detailed specifically as battle lookouts?

A. Only the anti-aircraft control.

20. Q. You mean by the "anti-aircraft control" the director room?

A. Yes.

21. Q. If a ship, under the condition of security that you were maintaining at Pearl Harbor between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, had gone to general quarters at any time day or night, would the officers and men that were required to remain on board be sufficient in number and adequately trained to man all your anti-aircraft guns?

A. Yes, they would have been. The organization of each section was such that all anti-aircraft guns and directors could be manned and the personnel had been so trained, using the engineers group when necessary to complete the crews.

22. Q. Were any of the ships present in Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack on the morning of 7 December equipped with radar?

A. Yes; in my Battle Force Two, the PENNSYLVANIA and the CALIFORNIA.

23. Q. Do you know what the general efficiency of these sets was from a material point of view?

A. The efficiency was good. The PENNSYLVANIA's radar was better than the CALIFORNIA's, but on the passage to the States for liberty and recreation in October, 1941, the CALIFORNIA'S radar had picked up a Pan-American plane at 85 miles and continued to detect it until it went out of range ahead at approximately the same distance.

[423] 24. Q. On these two ships that were equipped with radar, what was, in general, the state of training of the operators?

A. The training of the operators was considered good.

25. Q. Preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is, preceding 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941, were any of the ships' radars being manned?

A. No. Ship radars in port could not be used effectively because of the interference of hills and the buildings at the Navy Yard.

26. Q. At what time did you first learn there was an enemy attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. My first suspicion of it was about 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941. I heard gun-fire from my room in the Halekulani Hotel, and having one window in the direction of Pearl Harbor, stepped to the window and could see bursts of anti-aircraft shells in the sky. At first, I considered it was a possibility that some Army aircraft units were holding exercises but the appearance of the bursts over a rather large area made me question this. Before I had actually reached a decision that there was an attack on, my telephone bell rang and my assistant operations officer informed me that he would be by for me in a minute. I was partially dressed and I completed my dressing and went to the entrance of the Halekulani Hotel where I met Admiral Leary, who had also received a telephone message, and we two proceeded to Pearl Harbor with Mr. Kimball in Mr. Kimball's automobile without waiting for my staff officers to arrive.

27. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 13, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees under date of 16 October, 1941, relative to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and possible future military actions by the Japanese. Had you seen this dispatch prior to 7 December 1941?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief I had never seen this dispatch. At the time it was received I was on the Pacific Coast of the United States in command of a task force which had been sent there for leave and recreation. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, sent me a dispatch of which I have no copy but in substance, "Be prepared to return to the Hawaiian Islands on short notice". I immediately recalled all officers and men from leave and put the force on twelve hours sailing notice.

28. Q. Do you recall ever having discussed the contents of this dispatch with the Commander-in-Chief or any of his staff?

A. Not this dispatch, to the best of my knowledge.

[424] 29. Q. Do you know whether or not any decisions based on the information contained therein were made other than the ones that you have already recited, to-wit, being placed on short notice or twelve hours notice to return to Pearl Harbor?

A. That was the only one, to the best of my knowledge.

30. Q. I show you Exhibit No. 15, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which sets out briefly that the chances of favorable negotiations with Japan are very doubtful;

a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated, including possible attack on the Philippines or Guam. Had you seen this dispatch prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. Yes.

31. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the information current with this dispatch?

A. I saw this dispatch on the morning of Saturday, the 29th of November, two days after my task force had returned to port. The instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force commanders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their return from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see the Commander-in-Chief until Saturday, when I went to talk to him concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch.

32. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the information current with this dispatch; and if you do, what were they?

A. I know of no decisions that were a result of this dispatch. I should like to state, however, that in my opinion this dispatch is subject to several interpretations. In the first place, it mentions an aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam as a possibility. It therefore did not indicate that the aggressive action was to be necessarily against the United States. It was well known from the general situation that such an aggressive movement was contemplated. It was assumed that the aggressive movement was to be directed against Thailand. The only significant part of this message, in my opinion, is including the possibility that the enemy might take the initiative by attacking the Philippines or Guam. The fact that the Philippines and Guam are mentioned indicates that that is the estimate of the author of the dispatch and probably places a limitation, in his mind, as to the extent of the aggressive movement against the United States.

[425] 33. Q. Can you recall if at about the time, or at the time you saw this dispatch or were informed of its contents, if there was any estimate of the possibility of a surprise, aggressive movement on Pearl Harbor?

A. I should like to state that there is another dispatch in the record which I saw at the same time, Exhibit 17. As a consequence, I cannot differentiate between the two dispatches in relation to the conversation which I had with the Commander-in-Chief.

34. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November 1941. It contains the information that the dispatch is a war warning, that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days, and directs the execution of an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. That is some of the important information this dispatch contains which I cite to you for identification. Do you recall when you first saw or were informed of the contents of this dispatch?

A. I saw this dispatch at the same time as the one previously referred to on Saturday, the 29th of November.

35. Q. Is the judge advocate correct in understanding that you discussed this dispatch, Exhibit 17, and the previous one of November 24, which is Exhibit 15, at the same time with the Commander-in-Chief?

A. That is correct.

36. Q. Do you recall any decisions that were made based on the information that you had current with these two dispatches?

A. Yes. This dispatch was discussed at some length with the Commander-in-Chief. The significance of the first clause, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" was, in my mind, nothing more than we had been receiving at various times during the past year. From the time of the Secretary of the Navy's first visit to the Fleet in September, 1940, we had known that there was a possibility of war and that every endeavor was being made by those in the Fleet to prepare the Fleet to carry out its plans. It is significant, I think, to note that this dispatch is a multiple address dispatch. It is addressed to both the C-in-C Asiatic and the C-in-C Pacific. It was well known that there were certain strategical deployments that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific anticipated carrying out. As far as any strategic deployment of the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the execution of WPL-46 required the Fleet to depart from Pearl Harbor. There were no other elements of the strategic deployment that were available at this particular time other than to leave the base and proceed toward the West Coast. There were at this time no carriers in port. A Fleet at sea without carriers, sighted [426] by a force of such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, would be more subject to defeat than a force in port guarded by presumably several hundred fighting planes of the Army at the base. We therefore did not believe that under the circumstances it was necessary to take any further action. To have taken the Fleet to sea would likewise have subjected it to possible enemy submarine attack, from which it was guarded in port.

37. Q. How about air attack, along the same line?

A. I have stated that I considered with that Fleet at sea it would have been under greater danger from air attack than they would in port guarded by the Army and presumably, at least, several hundred fighting planes. I should like to add one more thing to that, that during this conference the Commander-in-Chief sent for his intelligence officer and the intelligence officer presented to us the latest intelligence so far as it was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicating that all major units of the Japanese Fleet were in home waters.

38. Q. Do you recall if there was any estimate made at this time of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor as a result of this additional information you received?

A. I am not conversant with whether or not the Commander-in-Chief made a direct estimate of the situation.

39. Q. Were additional security measures ordered in the Fleet as a result of having received the information and directives that were contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 16, the one of November 27th?

A. None insofar as concerned my command.

40. Q. What did the directive, "Execute appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" mean to you?

A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it meant nothing.

41. Q. Was there anything done in compliance with this directive that you know of?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The court then, at 10:55 a. m., took a recess until 11:07 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:

All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, and the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

[427] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate (continued):

42. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 28 November 1941. It relays to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, a dispatch which it states the Army has sent to certain of its commanders. Can you recall having seen or discussed the contents of this dispatch with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet prior to 7 December 1941?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not see this dispatch until after December 7th.

43. Q. I show you Exhibit 20, which is a Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 3 December 1941. It gives information to the effect that the Japanese consular posts in certain areas were to destroy codes and ciphers along with secret and confidential documents. When and under what conditions did you see this dispatch or were informed of its contents, if you were?

A. I saw the dispatch, I believe, on Thursday, December 4. I was not particularly impressed by it as the same account appeared in the Honolulu papers that morning. There is one other comment I would like to make on a dispatch of this nature. If a senior desires a junior to make an inference, he should give him complete information, or else make the inference himself. If the inference from this dispatch which the author apparently desired the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific to make was that war with Japan was imminent, in my opinion the proper procedure would be for the Chief of Naval Operations to make the inference and send to the Commander-in-Chief that war with Japan appears imminent.

44. Q. Did you discuss this dispatch with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at that time, if you recall?

A. I mentioned to him when he showed it to me that I had seen the same thing in the paper that morning.

45. Q. May I ask whether or not the information contained in Exhibit 20 changed in any way your estimate of the situation on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. It did not.

[428] 46. Q. Did it give you any information of a possible United States objective of an attack by the Japanese?

A. Well, there are lots of places mentioned there. They couldn't attack them all, and the latest information we had looked very much more like Thailand than any other place. It, in my opinion, added nothing to what had been previously received. It might have added something had the source of the information been divulged, but it was not.

47. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibits 21 and 22, which are Chief of Naval Operations dispatches of 4 and 6 December 1941, and direct the destruction of confidential publications on Guam and the outlying Pacific islands respectively. Did you ever see or had you been informed of the contents of either or both of these dispatches before 7 December 1941?

A. No. To the best of my knowledge and belief I never saw them until yesterday.

The judge advocate stated: All members of this court of inquiry have had distinguished careers in the Navy and are themselves graduates of the U. S. Naval War College at Newport. However, since this witness is especially qualified in these matters by virtue of his present duties, the judge advocate requests the court at this time to accept this witness as an expert on matters pertaining to the estimate of the situation. Does the court so accept him?

The court stated: The court will accept him as an expert witness as they would any officer of his experience, irrespective of his present status.

The judge advocate further stated: I have asked the court to accept this witness as an expert for the reason that there are matters in the record now, and there may be more, which pertain to such statements as a commander's estimate of an enemy's intentions, the possibility and probability of certain enemy action and decisions based thereon. I hope by this witness to clarify these matters in order that the estimates and the decisions of the responsible officers in the command echelon at the time of the events which led up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 may be cleared up, in a way.

The court stated: To add to our ruling, we consider the court themselves expert enough to analyze all of these matters which you have referred to.

48. Q. Admiral, I shall ask you hypothetically to set out in as brief a manner as possible for the record the various steps that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet might have taken in making an estimate of the situation [429] of the Japanese-United States relationships as they existed on or about December 1, 1941.

The court stated that it did not desire this line of questioning as it did not consider this to be necessary for it in arriving at the facts in the case.

49. Q. Can you recall during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, what your estimate of the enemy's courses of action were at that time?

A. During this particular period I was completely absorbed in making out a history and a critique of a Fleet exercise which had occurred during the last period at sea. After the Commander-in-Chief had moved his headquarters ashore I was placed in the responsibility for training the Fleet to a large extent due to the fact that he did not frequently go to sea. As commander of Task Force One I had the particular responsibility of training the task force for the conduct of major action. At other times, Task Force Two and Task Force Three, together or singly, would be scheduled at sea for periods with me or with my task force in order to coordinate their activities with those of the battle line in Fleet action. During the last period at sea, which ended on Thursday, the 27th, a tactical exercise had

been conducted in which the objective was to determine the best means of defense of a convoy against air attack. This exercise was terminated on Sunday, November 23, and the critique of this exercise was to be held on Wednesday, December 3. From the time that my task force returned to port, with the exception of the visit I made to the Commander-in-Chief on Saturday, the 29th, I was engaged in making the history and critique of this exercise. I therefore did not make any estimate of the situation from the point of view of the higher command.

50. Q. How could any prospective enemy have information of the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor?

A. There were many points in the Hawaiian Islands not under control of Naval authorities from which the entire harbor could be observed. Up to the morning of December 7 there were no restrictions upon commercial or diplomatic communications. It was therefore very simple for them to be informed of the forces in the port at any time. On the 9th or 10th of December, when the one-man submarine was recovered on the eastern end of the Island of Aahu, there was found in this ship a confidential chart of Pearl Harbor with the ships as berthed approximately three weeks before. It is quite evident that this chart was used as a basis of the plan of attack on December 7th as many berths were attacked in which the ships actually present at that time were not the ones indicated [430] in the diagram which we recovered, but much smaller ships. It therefore appeared that in making their plan for an attack they had decided to attack certain berths in the hopes that the allocation of ships at those berths would be the same as it had been three weeks before.

51. Q. Did task force units, according to normal operating schedules, more or less follow a certain well-defined procedure of being at sea so many days and in Pearl Harbor so many days?

A. There was a normal sequence of operations of the three task forces in which the period at sea was about one-half of that in port. The actual dates varied somewhat, depending upon whether or not there were to be any combined operations of more than one task force. As I have pointed out before, at times each task force operated during the full period at sea completely by itself. At other times, two task forces were operating for a period of one or two days together at the end of the period of the one task force which had been at sea the longest. Approximately every six weeks or two months, a period in the schedule provided for the operation of all three task forces for one or two-day periods. Therefore, although it was a schematic sequence, there was not an actual, fixed number of days for the time at sea or the time at Pearl.

52. Q. If, for example, a task force came into Pearl Harbor, was there a reasonable expectation, even to one not knowing the Fleet's schedule, that this force coming in might be in port for a fairly well defined period of time?

A. I should say within the limits of 9 to 14 days.

53. Q. Considering the Japanese psychological make-up as you no doubt knew it, would you not expect them to evidence active curiosity about all matters pertaining to the Pacific Fleet, especially movements of ships?

A. Unquestionably.

54. Q. I am going to ask you a hypothetical question, Admiral: Suppose that on the 6th of December, 1941 you had had information that the Japanese diplomats in Washington were to call on the Secretary of State at exactly 1:00 p. m., Washington time, December 7th, and that they had been directed to destroy their code machines. Would this information have given you any special indication of Japanese intentions as to the probability or the imminence of an attack on the United States?

A. It is pretty hard to answer that after the event, but I do feel that it would have been a definite indication that diplomatic relations were to be [431] discontinued, after which time it certainly would have been more obvious that an attack might take place.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

55. Q. Admiral, were you in general familiar with the logistic situation of the Pacific Fleet insofar as its ability to fight into the Marshall Islands was concerned in late 1941?

A. Yes, sir. In my opinion, the Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall Islands, but it could not have gone very much farther.

56. Q. Did you think that even that might be difficult on account of logistic limitations?

A. It would have been difficult to maintain operations there for any perceptible length of time because of the scarcity of tankers.

[432] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

57. Q. The fuel situation would have been determined somewhat from the Fleet's activity?

A. The fuel in Pearl Harbor had been reduced to what was considered to be the least safe reserve, and the number of tankers which were supplying it were very limited.

58. Q. Admiral, you, of course, remember that the so called Atlantic detachment was transferred from the Pacific Fleet in the spring of 1941?

A. Yes.

59. Q. Had that detachment remained, would the Fleet have been any more powerful in the Marshall Islands, in view of what you have just said about the logistic difficulties?

A. Yes, it would have been more powerful, because the operations, so far as I have indicated their practicability, depended upon the ships not refueling during operations.

60. Q. The logistic difficulties would not have been any greater if you had twice the number of ships?

A. Not in my opinion.

61. Q. You had plenty of fuel?

A. Fuel within a reasonable degree of safety. The Fleet was using it faster than it was coming in, but up to December 7 there was a reasonable reserve.

62. Q. Admiral, was your testimony, in interpretation of the OpNav dispatch of November 24, representative of what you thought at that time and so expressed?

A. So far as I recall, yes.

63. Q. Referring to that dispatch of December 3, why do you think the Japanese were going to the extent of destroying codes and ciphers in Washington and in Manila?

A. It unquestionably indicated a severance of diplomatic relations. It did not necessarily indicate the imminence of war. We did not know—I do not suppose we know today—which ones they destroyed or how many were destroyed.

64. Q. Did you think that the information which you gained from the dispatch of December 3 was altogether different from what you had just testified you gained from the dispatch which came very late on December 7 concerning the action in Washington at 1300? I simply refer to your answer to the judge advocate's hypothetical question.

A. Only in degree. The statement that the codes were [433] being destroyed was merely a dispatch quoting a confidential authority. If the dispatch concerning the definite breaking off of relations at one o'clock had been received, it would have been a definite determination of that condition. Consequently, it was only one of degree, but I think possibly the lack of importance attached to that dispatch about burning codes and ciphers was due to the fact that it was reported in the paper that same morning.

65. Q. Admiral, I am sure you do not wish to be understood as being influenced by what you saw in the local papers in Honolulu?

A. Not at all, but we often get good information that way.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

66. Q. Between the time you returned, on or about November 28, and December 7 was the condition of readiness actually in effect a greater degree of readiness than that prescribed by Condition 3?

A. Due to the size of the task force, it was, because the order only directed that the anti-aircraft battery of one ship be available, consisting of four guns. Under the orders which were in effect the battleships had 25% of their anti-aircraft batteries manned and two machine guns apiece. There being six battleships there, it made twelve guns, when actually only four were needed.

67. Q. How long had that condition of readiness been in effect while the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor?

A. It had been in effect for several months—came into effect shortly after Admiral Kimmel had taken command of the Fleet.

68. Q. You were at sea on the 24th of November, Admiral?

A. Yes, sir.

69. Q. On the 24th of November did you receive a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief relative to any action or precautions to be taken by you?

A. I did receive a dispatch. I don't recall the exact wording of it, but it was to take precaution against attack. I'm not sure whether it said submarine attack or not. From that period until after the Task Force had entered Pearl Harbor all possible means were taken to safeguard this task force against both submarines and aircraft.

[434] 70. Q. From the time when you returned on November 28 until December 7, did you recommend to the Commander-in-Chief any movement of the battle force?

A. I did not.

71. Q. It has been testified at this hearing that the Fleet was practically mobilized prior to December 7, 1941. Have you any opinion

as to whether the Fleet was practically mobilized prior to December 7, 1941?

A. In my opinion, it was far from mobilized. It was concentrated but not properly prepared for the conduct of war in all respects, which mobilization implies. We were short of men, short of machine guns, and short of even a complete allowance of carrier-based planes.

72. Q. In the dispatch received by the Commander-in-Chief from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of November 28, which in substance contained a dispatch that had been sent by the Army Commanding General, there appear the words: "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." Do you think that this injunction influenced the steps that might have been taken in preparation for war?

A. It did not influence mine, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, I never saw the dispatch until after December 7.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

73. Q. Admiral, an estimate of a situation does not necessarily mean a long written document based upon conditions, does it?

A. Not at all. An estimate of a situation is a process in matters of great concern in great areas with large forces. It is normal to make it a written estimate.

74. Q. An estimate of a situation can be made mentally, can't it?

A. Unquestionably.

75. Q. These maneuvers you mentioned, in which you say you were so occupied, did not necessarily prevent you from thinking about the possibilities of war, in view of the critical situation?

A. That is true, but I made no written estimate.

[435] 76. Q. Did you not keep what is known as a mental running estimate?

A. Of course, I think every person who is in a position of responsibility attempts to retain a running mental estimate, but it is, unquestionably, more usual that it be in writing, and even the running estimate can be put in writing after the actual operations are in progress.

77. Q. Well, then, during the few days previous to December 7 what was your estimate of the possibilities or probabilities of an attack in any form on Pearl Harbor?

A. My estimate of the possibility or probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor was that it was a possibility but not within the probability. The basis for this estimate may be found, I think, during the months preceding the dispatches of the 24th and 27th of November. There had been a constant interchange of letters and dispatches between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations, many of which I read, although not all, which gave the indication to me—and I believe to him—that war in the Pacific, if it occurred, would be upon the initiative of the United States. The main reason for such a supposition, in my opinion, lay in the psychological aspect and political aspect of the situation within the United States. There was, as we all know, much diversity of opinion in the Congress of the United States as to whether or not the United States should enter into the war. The fact that the Japanese made an unexpected attack, in my opinion, created the situation which united the people of the United States and therefore increased our strength to a remarkable degree. Al-

though the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was a tactical success, it was, in my opinion, a strategical and psychological blunder, because it reduced the possibility of their winning the war. Any tactical idea, to be sound, must have as its objective a large field of strategy and ultimately the winning of the war. It was this feeling that if no attack was made upon the United States, months might pass before the United States actually entered the war and thus give Japan a much greater time in which to make her desired occupations in the southern part of Asia and in Australia. That leads me to believe that they would not take action which would force the United States to enter the war.

78. Q. Did you hold this opinion which you have just expressed before December 7, or was it formed afterwards?

A. It was not formed afterwards, although I cannot state that I can specifically point to Pearl Harbor. As I said in my last statement, I considered any action which they might take to force the United States into the war would be a blunder.

79. Q. And therefore unlikely?

A. And therefore comparatively unlikely.

[436] 80. Q. In view of your opinion, which was the result of your mental estimate of the situation, to the effect that an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese was a possibility, what would be the priority of the form of attack which you thought might be made?

A. We had considered that the probability of attack in those waters would be by submarine.

81. Q. Not in Pearl Harbor but within the area?

A. Within the area, as an act in advance of the declaration of war. The basis for that argument was that destruction by torpedo from a submarine, if the submarine is not sighted or captured, can be mistaken for an internal explosion and no one can prove to the contrary. Therefore, there was always the possibility that the ships of the Fleet could be attacked by submarines without its being definitely apparent who did the attacking or any visible proof that it was by submarine. There is also the possibility that the Germans might man Japanese submarines and might even move their submarines into the Pacific and attack the Fleet to cause us to go into the war with Japan, believing at that time that war with Germany was even closer than war with Japan. We had contemplated our attack, and in all the plans for defense it had been considered as one of the possibilities. It, however, had been considered primarily as a possibility after the condition became more serious, either by the breaking off of diplomatic relations or the declaration of war.

82. Q. Well, while considering the possibility of any form of attack on Pearl Harbor, do you feel that everything possible had been done in the Fleet to meet an attack, so far as your vessels, personnel, planes, and all other control conditions available were concerned?

A. I thought there might have been other things done.

83. Q. I am talking now about your opinion as of the date before the event.

A. Before the event, it was my opinion that the defense measures taken were consistent with the situation. There is one point which may have been established by other testimony, which is quite important in connection with this, and that is the fact that in our service and in the opinion of our Bureau of Ordnance, torpedo planes could not be effec-

tively used in less than seventy-five feet of water. That point made it particularly difficult for us to conceive the actual conduct of torpedo attack from the direction they made it under the condition of shallow waters and with the degree of effectiveness which they actually accomplished.

[437] 84. Q. With this in mind, then, did you not consider that the likelihood of a practice bombing attack was rendered less probable than otherwise?

A. I think the probability of bombing over torpedoes was much greater.

85. Q. Do you consider that it would be profitable?

A. The attack would be possible, but the damage would be relatively less.

86. Q. I say, profitable?

A. Probably not.

87. Q. To come all the way across the Pacific Ocean to attack solely by bombs?

A. I don't believe it would have been profitable.

88. Q. When you testified that you gave some consideration to the fact that the Honolulu papers carried information concerning the burning of confidential papers, was it not a fact that the information was contained in the papers rather than the character of the information?

A. I didn't say I gave any consideration to it. I just said it decreased the weight of the other official information.

89. Q. Admiral, you testified as to the anti-aircraft guns manned on battleships. Did this same condition exist as to the manning of guns on other ships in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7?

A. I haven't the official order of the commander of cruisers or commander of destroyers, but, in general, it was somewhat similar. The cruisers, I believe, were required to have two anti-aircraft guns and two machine guns ready for action with ammunition in the ready boxes. Because of the fact that most types of destroyers have batteries with double purpose guns which may be considered anti-aircraft batteries, they were not required to keep the anti-aircraft guns in readiness but only the machine guns. The availability of the crews to man these guns, however, up to one-half, as I recall, of the guns on board was maintained.

90. Q. When you departed from the hotel at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, at what time did you arrive on the CALIFORNIA?

A. I arrived on the CALIFORNIA between 8:40 and 8:45.

[438] 91. Q. With reference to sub-paragraph 9 of Exhibit 8, you testified that since you were not on board, the orders were carried out as to action taken at the time of attack. Weren't there certain pre-orders required to be arranged prior to any attack?

A. They were all got up. In fact, the sortie order had been issued. All it had to do was to be put in effect.

92. Q. In your opinion, Admiral, and in view of your knowledge of existing orders, who was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. In the Joint Army and Navy Action I considered the Army was responsible for the defense of the Naval Base, to be assisted in such manner as possible by the Navy.

93. Q. You have testified about a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific on November 29. Was this a general conference, and were there other officers present?

A. There were no other officers present, except during the period in which the Intelligence officer was present to give us the information he had.

94. Q. Having been in an important position in the Fleet for some years and especially having been in the Pacific and Hawaiian area during that time, did you feel, under conditions existing prior to December, 1941, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable, possible, or remotely possible?

A. Remotely possible, and I did not consider that any such attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off.

95. Q. Admiral, did you have, from any source, any information that a note had been sent by our Government on November 26 to the Japanese Government, giving the conditions which we suggested to Japan were necessary to maintain peaceful relations throughout the Pacific?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I don't recall any. The only official messages I saw—

96. Q. I asked for information from any source.

A. Nothing, unless it was something I read in the paper. I don't recall anything definite.

97. Q. In other words, you had no information from papers or otherwise that what has been testified to as an ultimatum had been sent to Japan on November 26?

A. I may have read something along that general line in the paper. I never considered it as an ultimatum. I couldn't swear that I saw any.

[439] 98. Q. Did you at any time make any recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific that the battleships of your force should be based on the Pacific Coast rather than at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I did not. That subject had been discussed by a previous Commander-in-Chief, and it was my understanding that it had been decided that the Fleet was to remain in Pearl Harbor.

99. Q. Did you express your opinion as to this at any time?

A. I expressed my opinion several times that I considered it unwise.

100. Q. Considered it unwise to have the battleships—

A. To maintain the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. I should like to expand on that just a bit. There was one real advantage in keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and that was the fact that the money which became available for the repair of ships could be expended on that navy yard to assist in its development. I believe that the Fleet's being there did advance the capacity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, so that when the war actually broke, the Navy Yard was in better condition than it would have been had the Fleet not been there.

101. Q. Is that statement which you have just made a conclusion which you have arrived at after the attack rather than before?

A. No, it is not a conclusion. It was an expressed opinion at the time. The one reason for staying there was to get the money to try to build a Navy yard.

102. Q. Did you at any time discuss with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific the advisability of using patrol planes of the Fleet—as

many as were available—to make daily searches in scouting expeditions?

A. I did not. They weren't under my command. We had a Base Defense Officer and an Air Officer who were responsible for those activities, and I didn't discuss it with them.

103. Q. Admiral, if the court understood you correctly, you stated that the Fleet was not mobilized by reason of the fact that it did not have the complete number of antiaircraft guns, that the crews were deficient in number, etc. To your mind, could not a Fleet be mobilized without these deficiencies?

A. Mobilization, as I understand it, means the preparation of the units for the conduct of war. Your state of mobilization, therefore, is a relative condition. [440] There are two conditions: One is the concentration of your forces, and the other is the personnel and preparation of your forces. In this case we had endeavored for months to obtain more men, more machine guns, and more planes without success. No order to mobilize had ever been issued. Therefore, in my opinion, those are only a few of the deficiencies indicative of the attempt which had been made to prepare the Fleet for a state closer to mobilization.

104. Q. There was no M-day set or designated, was there?

A. There was not.

105. Q. But if M-day had been set and designated and if there was a deficiency in the number of men and of certain guns, you would not say that the ship was not mobilized because of that condition, would you?

A. You might say that mobilization had been ordered, but I don't think you would say they were mobilized until the mobilization had been completed. The old war plans used to provide, if possible, mobilization would be ordered at least thirty days in advance of the probably outbreak of war.

106. Q. Is that ideal condition, in which everything needed is available, always possible?

A. Your state of mobilization depends on when you start. In our mobilization plan we had orders for certain ships to go to certain Navy yards to get certain work done. Mobilization means the preparation for the conduct of war. You are never completely mobilized.

107. Q. If you had received a message from the Navy Department to mobilize, wouldn't you have considered yourself mobilized?

A. I would have considered that there were many activities which were not in progress and which were essential to mobilize completely the forces and which should have been undertaken immediately.

108. Q. There seems to be a difference of opinion, and some of us in the Navy think that mobilization of a fleet consists of having the ship stripped, fully supplied with provisions, oil or coal, ammunition, and ready for war. That is one opinion, I think, of mobilization. Now, the fact that a ship or ships did not have a complete complement and did not have the full number of guns which had been required, to my mind, is a situation which would not be a condition of non-mobilization but one, rather, of hopeful mobilization in the future.

A. I agree with you except to extent. If all the fleets are below complement, that is different than possibly [441] several. The same thing applies in general. It is one of degree. When the degree is such that all the ships are below complement, you are not

actually mobilized. You may be mobilized up to the point where you are going to war, but you aren't mobilized until you are prepared for war.

109. Q. If a higher authority says the Fleet is mobilized for war and establishes a day for that, isn't that Fleet mobilized, irrespective of the fact that it might not be in as an efficient condition as you, a subordinate in the Fleet, might want or expect?

A. M-day is the date established for mobilization by order, and it meant that certain things would be done. It was the initiation of a movement toward mobilization, which is never completed. You are not, in a sense, mobilized simply because they give the order. If the ships had been separated and out of condition, and they said, "Mobilize," they wouldn't have been mobilized until they were in condition. The order to mobilize simply initiates a certain chain of events.

110. Q. Admiral, in the time you spent in and around the Hawaiian area did you meet General Short, the Commanding General of the Army?

A. I did.

111. Q. Will you please express to the court your opinion as to the cooperation between him and, as far as you know, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and other high ranking officials of the Pacific Fleet?

A. In all respects which I observed, or which came to my attention, the relationship between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Islands, General Short, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, Admiral Kimmel, and other officers of the Fleet was excellent. So far as I am aware, there were no differences of opinion as to the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy in defense of the Naval Base. I believe the conditions existing on December 7 indicated a much closer cooperation than had existed at the period when Admiral Kimmel took command of the Fleet. The Base Defense Order establishing the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as Base Defense Officer provided a definite means of coordination with the Army for the defense of the Base. There had also been much improvement made in the coordination of Army and Navy aircraft.

112. Q. Admiral, have you heard rumors, or have you seen published reports, subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and perhaps before the attack, that there was not friendly and cordial cooperation between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and General Short.

A. I believe I have, but, in my opinion, they were [442] without foundation. In all my relationships, I observed no indication of any disagreement between these two officers.

113. Q. Do you have any idea as to where these rumors started and from whence they came?

A. No.

The court then, at 12:20 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[443] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U. S. Navy (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the court (Continued):

114. Q. Admiral, in your opinion and by your observation, what was the condition of officers and men of the Fleet as to sobriety, on the night of 6-7 December, 1941, and at the time of the attack?

A. The only officers whom I contacted on the night of the 6-7 December, were those attending a dinner at Halekulani Hotel, among whom were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Leary, and various other officers of the Fleet. There was no signs of drinking or intoxication, or revelry of any kind. After dinner, Admiral Kimmel left, as I recall, at 9:30 or 10:30 o'clock to go back to the ship, and I myself engaged in a game of bridge. I saw no evidence at any time of any intoxication or any condition that would prevent most effective action of officers and men.

115. Q. And at the time of the attack?

A. Nor the morning following—6-7 December.

116. Q. You have undoubtedly heard rumors that there was quite a little drinking and so on among the members of the Navy during this night. Do you have any knowledge of those rumors or do you know how they started?

A. I have no knowledge, and in my opinion they were unfounded, from all observation or knowledge that I possess.

117. Q. In your opinion what was the condition of the state of training of personnel of your force and of the Fleet, that is, the Pacific Fleet, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. After over four years continuously in the Fleet up to then, I considered the state of training the highest I had seen since I had been in the Fleet.

118. Q. And was this trainnig being continued?

A. It was being continued most diligently.

119. Q. What is your opinion as to adequacy of material equipment for the Fleet?

A. There were many ways in which the material of the [444] Fleet might have been improved with time and availability of the required matériel. One of those ways which we have followed in the war was the large increase in anti-aircraft and light machine gun weapons, smaller than the 5-inch.

120. Q. But that great increase in anti-aircraft by our ships was probably brought about to a large extent by experience gained in the war; is that correct?

A. That is true to an extent, although it was in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and all of the senior officers in the Fleet at that time, that it should be augmented. I would like to state that at tactical exercise the last week at sea before my force came in, when using the rules for bombing which had been developed at the War College, and we found that the defense of a convoy against aircraft was very difficult; in fact, practically all of the convoys were destroyed, although they were protected by five battleships and sev-

eral squadrons of destroyers. The reason that I desire to bring this up is that I feel that the attitude expressed in the rules invoked at the War College, and I think in the minds of the officers of the Fleet, was that even during the war, the actual efficiency of individual airplanes is no higher than we anticipated that it would be. We, I believe, underestimated the high percentage of the industrial capacity of nations that would be placed into the manufacture of aircraft. In other words, while the individual planes in my opinion have not demonstrated much more than we anticipated, the number of planes greatly exceeded the anticipated number with which we might have to deal.

121. Q. Admiral, did you feel at this time, prior to 7 December, 1941, you were kept adequately informed as to all matters relating to the Fleet in that area at that time?

A. I felt that our information as to the policy of the United States was entirely inadequate. On several occasions, when information was received—a letter from Admiral Stark, which Admiral Kimmel showed me, we remarked to each other, “Well, what are we going to do now?” In other words, the policy of the United States, as extended to us by the information which we possessed, was not definite.

122. Q. And from whom would this policy be received?

A. I should think it would have been received from the Chief of Naval Operations, but not initiated by him; it must have come from a higher source than he.

123. Q. In other words, you believe that if you had had more information from this source or other sources, authentic information, that it would have helped you, as an officer of the Fleet, in making a better estimate of the entire strategical set-up?

A. I cannot say that any information would have helped me, without knowing what that information would have been.

124. Q. Admiral, when was the 40-millimeter first made [445] available to the Fleet?

A. The first 40-millimeter gun that I recall was in the NORTH CAROLINA.

125. Q. When?

A. When she joined up out there in the Pacific; she was made a part of my Task Force and joined up about April of 1942, and that was the time that I first saw the 40-millimeter gun installed in a ship.

126. Q. What was, in your opinion, the behavior of personnel on the morning of December 7?

A. I think it was superb.

127. Q. Were you entirely satisfied with the performance of duty of your immediate subordinates on December 7, and prior thereto?

A. Yes, sir.

128. Q. And you have no complaint whatever to make?

A. None whatever.

129. Q. Are you familiar, Admiral, with communications, letters or otherwise, which stated that there may have been a possibility of Japan attacking Russia?

A. I don't recall.

130. Q. Did this question come up at all before you, or were you cognizant of such a possibility?

A. At this time I think certainly my opinion was that the movement was directed to the southward, that the question of Japan attack-

ing Russia was probably out of the picture, that all the indications that we possessed had a move toward Thailand rather than toward the north.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

131. Q. Admiral, with regard to your testimony concerning the depth of water for torpedoes in Pearl Harbor, I hand you Exhibit 55 before this court, which is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various naval districts, under date of 13 June 1941. Will you please read to the court the second paragraph of the letter?

A. (Reading:)

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. [446] Kimmell, U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Bloch, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement:

I have no information other than that I have given in my testimony, but I should like to state for the record that when Admiral Kimmel was appointed as Commander-in-Chief, I considered it an excellent appointment and I wrote him a letter to that effect, not expecting at the time to serve under his command. At that time I possessed orders ashore, and my orders were later changed and I became Commander Battle Force. I considered that he performed his duties in an excellent manner in all respects, and I know of no Commander-in-Chief who devoted more time and effort to the performance of his duties.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Kermit A. Tyler.

2. Q. Rank?

A. Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps, Army Air Force Board, Orlando, Florida.

3. Q. What was your rank and duty on 7 December 1941?

A. I was assigned as Executive Officer in the 8th Pursuit Squadron. I was a first lieutenant in the air corps at that time.

4. Q. What particular duties were you performing at about 0755 on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I was assigned as pursuit officer with a duty as Assistant to the Controller, at the information center at Fort Shafter.

5. Q. Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii?

A. Yes.

6. Q. Will you tell the court in a brief way what these [447] duties consisted of that you were performing on this particular morning?

A. The duties of a pursuit officer was to assist the Controller in ordering planes to intercept enemy planes or supposed enemy planes, after the planes got in the air.

7. Q. Your duty, then, was in connection with a pursuit squadron, and not in some capacity such as the aircraft warning center?

A. That is correct. I was sent down there for training. Inasmuch as this was just being started, it was necessary to detail certain officers who had some background in order to get the thing going.

8. Q. This duty was actually performed in the, shall we say in the Command Post of your pursuit squadron? I am not familiar with your terminology, and I would ask you to explain just exactly the nature of the post of duty at which you were stationed.

A. The information center was a post from which fighter squadrons on the alert would be ordered to take to the air; in fact, my task at this information center had involved a small switchboard which would reach fighter squadrons.

9. Q. What I am trying to get at now, were you in a branch of an information center, or at an information center, or what?

A. I was at the one information center for all of the islands.

10. Q. At the one information center of all the islands. Now you were in contact at such station with all radar stations?

A. Yes, sir, they had direct lines.

11. Q. Now how long had you been assigned these duties that you were performing that morning?

A. I had one previous tour on the preceding Wednesday, at which time there was only myself and the telephone operator at the information center. This was my second assignment of that nature.

12. Q. Now this particular station or post at which you were then stationed was in what locality in the island of Oahu?

A. It was at Fort Shafter.

13. Q. Fort Shafter is where with reference to Pearl Harbor?

A. I would say it is about eight miles east of Pearl Harbor.

14. Q. How many officers and men were on duty with you in this particular post or station on this morning of 7 December, 1941?

A. Approximately seven or eight enlisted men, and I [448] was the only officer present.

15. Q. Now what duties in general did they perform? Were they assistants to you, or what were they doing?

A. There were five or six spotters whose duty was to display arrows on the information center board, to indicate radar plots of aircraft. There was one man on the telephone exchange, and one man on the historical record—which keep a historical record of all plots that are made by the radar.

16. Q. Now these plots that you were making—the information upon when they were based, where did you get that?

A. They came by direct lines to each plotter from one radar station which gave him the information.

17. Q. Could you give an example as to about what sort of data would come in from a telephone from one radar station when a plane or group of planes were sighted?

A. Simply be a bearing of so many degrees and range, certain number of miles.

18. Q. And then as I understand it, somebody plotting in the center where you were located put that down in the form of a record, a graphic record?

A. It was plotted with a replaceable arrow on the table, and also there was a system of recording it on this sheet of paper which was an overlay of the Hawaiian Islands and surrounding waters. I might say probably they included in the report of the radar station the number of planes expected in the plot, but that wasn't at the time conveyed in each plot.

19. Q. In other words, that was not always done?

A. No.

20. Q. Now, were you the Senior Officer Present in this central station where you were on post?

A. I was the only officer present.

21. Q. And it is my understanding that you were the officer in charge of this particular station or post?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Q. Was there a Naval officer present at this post on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. There was after the attack started, sir.

23. Q. Was there an officer present before the attack?

A. No, sir.

24. Q. Did you receive, while you were on duty on the morning of the 7th December 1941, any report of interest?

A. How do you mean by that, sir?

25. Q. Did you receive any information or any report that [449] you considered of any importance?

A. Well, I received a call from one of the radar stations, I believe it is called Opana, which indicated that they had a larger number of planes than he had seen before on his scope; that is, the original report.

26. Q. Can you recall at about what time this report was received in the station?

A. I would estimate it was around 7:15.

27. Q. Now where is Opana station located from where you say you got this report?

A. It was the north side of the island.

28. Q. And it was about how many miles from Fort Shafter, where you were?

A. I would say thirty-five miles in a direct line, perhaps.

29. Q. Now is this station on top of a mountain, on seashore, or can you tell how it was located?

A. I had never been there, and I don't know.

30. Q. Can you remember the language of the report?

A. I can't remember the exact language. As I said before, the radar operator reported that he had a larger plot than he had previously seen; that is about all there was to it.

31. Q. Did you have any abnormal reaction to this report at that time?

A. No, sir. I thought about it for a minute, and then told him, "Thanks for calling in the report."

32. Q. Had you any information during your tour of duty on this morning of 7 December 1941, as to the movements of any friendly planes in the Hawaiian area?

A. I had no official information. However, I had very good reason to believe that there was a flight of B-17's en route to the Islands from the mainland. I had a friend who was in the bomber command who told me that any time the radio stations were playing this Hawaiian music all night, I could be certain that a flight of our bombers was coming over, and when I had gotten up at 4:00 a. m., to report for duty, I listened to this music all the way to the station, so I was looking for a flight of B-17's.

33. Q. Now when you went on watch, or duty shall I say, that morning, were you given any information by the officer stationing you or the officer whom you relieved, if you did relieve anybody—were you given any special instructions as to what to be on the lookout for?

A. No, sir.

34. Q. Did you actually relieve anybody that morning?

A. No, sir.

[450] 35. Q. How did you happen to come to go on duty? Was that in response to a detail that went on duty at that time every morning?

A. Yes, sir. There was a roster of various fighter pilots. My tour of duty was from 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. on that morning, sir.

36. Q. Did you have any instructions for your post?

A. No, sir.

37. Q. And you say the only previous experience you had had with that post of duty was the time, several days before, when you did a tour of duty there?

A. Yes, sir.

38. Q. Did you have any familiarity with the mechanics of radar interceptors? That is, how they functioned mechanically or electrically?

A. I understood the principle of radar, yes, sir.

39. Q. What information did the radar show to the operator? For example, when he sighted a flight of planes?

A. Well, I understood that it showed a way they call a "blip" or "pip", or something like that on the scope. Beyond that, I don't know.

40. Q. You don't have any idea how this so-called scope indicated the number of planes in a flight?

A. No, I hadn't ever seen one in operation, so I didn't know.

41. Q. And you wouldn't know how they determined the bearing of the flight, or the distance?

A. I understand that, yes, sir.

42. Q. Now exactly, again, Colonel, what information did this radar operator give you when he made the report?

A. He said that at a distance of around 130 miles, he had a larger plot than he had seen on his scope.

43. Q. Did he give you any subsequent reports, after this initial report, as to what these planes were doing, or did he amplify this original report in any way?

A. No, he didn't give any subsequent report.

44. Q. Did you call up and ask him for any subsequent information—amplifying information?

A. No, sir.

45. Q. Did you know whether or not the particular type of radar that was then in use, had any means of distinguishing a friendly plane from an unfriendly one?

A. Oh, I knew that there was no way of distinguishing by radar.

46. Q. And the only information of friendly planes that you [451] had on this morning was the deduction you made when you heard a Honolulu radio station playing Hawaiian music at a very early hour; is that correct?

A. That is the only definite indication I had. I think I was equally divided between the thought that it could be the B-17's, or a carrier force.

47. Q. You mean, by "carrier force", U. S. Naval carrier force, or enemy?

A. Friendly force, U. S. Naval airplanes.

48. Q. Had it occurred to you to identify with the Navy whether or not they had any planes in flight at this time?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. I don't suppose, from the information you had, that you had any idea at that time of the course on which these B-17's would approach Oahu?

A. Only the rough idea, sir.

50. Q. What was this rough idea?

A. Well, somewhere from the northeast.

51. Q. And why do you say somewhere from the northeast?

A. Well, that would be the course from San Francisco.

52. Q. Did you have any special information on the morning of 7 December 1941, as to international developments, especially those between the Japanese and the United States, which would indicate any imminence of war?

A. The only special information was what I read in the papers, and that was that a friendly relations—or that some agreement—had been reached approximately a week before, or thereabouts.

53. Q. Well, had you or had you not been put in some sort of a frame of mind of being on the alert against any possible enemy action when you went on duty that morning?

A. No, sir; in fact, just the opposite, because we had been on alert about a week before, and the alert had been called off.

54. Q. Now do you know whether or not there was actually an airplane attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base that morning by Japanese planes?

A. Yes, sir.

55. Q. When did you first become aware of this attack?

A. It was about five minutes after 8:00 when the telephone operator received a call from some source, which I don't know right now, that there was an attack on.

[452] 56. Q. You don't recall the language of the report that you heard?

A. No, sir, the operator was very excited; and so I told him to call in all information center personnel who had gone off duty at 7:00 o'clock. There was just the operator and myself there at the time.

57. Q. Did he tell you the kind of attack, whether it was a naval surface ship attack, aircraft attack, or what?

A. He didn't say, but, however, I knew that it was an air attack, because at 8:00 o'clock I had just stepped outside for a breath of air and I saw the attack in progress, but at that time I thought it was the Navy practicing dive bombing.

58. Q. Do you recall what action you took when you received this report?

A. I called in the information center personnel, who had all gone off duty at 7:00 o'clock, except the operator and myself, and in a very few minutes, Major Tindall, who was one of the controllers, arrived from Hickam Field, and took charge of operations.

59. Q. Did you go off duty then, or what was your status after Major Tindall arrived?

A. I remained on duty as assistant to him and to Major Berquist, who also arrived soon thereafter, for approximately thirty-six hours.

60. Q. Now can you remember whether or not you received any further reports from any of your radar stations, after the attack was reported, or after it became known?

A. The plotting board was very much confused, due to the number of airplanes flying around, and I don't think there was; I doubt if any definite information could be obtained from it.

61. Q. Do you recall whether or not any attempt was made by the officers in the information center to ascertain from your radar stations whether there were any more planes coming in or not?

A. I don't know that that was done, sir.

62. Q. Do you know whether or not there was any directives given as to plotting planes in any area other than the Pearl Harbor area? What I am trying to get at, Colonel—was any attempt made to plot planes when they retired from the attack?

A. I don't know whether that attempt was made or not; I was busy with the squadrons then.

63. Q. Whose duty would it have been to have directed such a plot, in your opinion?

A. The controller's duty.

64. Q. And that was Major Tindall?

A. Or Major Berquist, who were both there at that time.

65. Q. But so far as you know, of your own knowledge, that [453] direction may or may not have been given?

A. That's right. I don't know, sir.

66. Q. Now you say a naval officer reported shortly after the attack became known to you; is that correct?

A. Well, how shortly I couldn't say.

67. Q. But so far as your recollection serves you now, you are not able to say whether he reported before or after the attack was announced?

A. He definitely reported after the attack was announced.

68. Q. Now do you know this officer, what his name was?

A. No, sir, I don't.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

69. Q. What were your duties, Colonel, when you reported at 4:00 o'clock on that Sunday morning.

A. My duties, I believe, were chiefly for training, inasmuch as it was the first morning I had ever been there on such duty when the information center was even manned in any degree at all. I had no specified duties, either written or oral—just to report there for duty.

70. Q. Well, did you have any instructions to report information that came from different radars to any superior officer?

A. No, sir.

71. Q. Would you have reported it to a superior officer, if you had information that alarmed you?

A. Certainly, if I had been warned that there was any possibility of attack I would have. However, at that time, there being no means of identifying plots, there was not much that one man could do, without having a liaison officer from both the Navy, bombers, and civilian airways, to give you identification between friendly and enemy plots.

72. Q. Did you get any reports between 4:00 and 7:00 a. m. that morning?

A. There were a number of plots in and around the Islands. I believe they started sometime before 7:00 o'clock; the actual time I am not certain of.

73. Q. At 7:00 o'clock, did you get a report of a plot northerly? I mean as distinguished from 7:15.

A. At around very close on 7:00 o'clock, it might have been a little after—I don't know—I walked over to where [454] the boy was working on his historical record, and didn't know what he was doing, so I asked him what his duties were, and so forth. Incidentally, he noted this plot, which was 130 miles somewhere north of the island, I don't know what bearing.

74. Q. Did the plot indicate the number of planes in the air?

A. No, sir.

75. Q. Might have been one, or might have been fifty?

A. Yes, sir.

76. Q. When did that plot come into the center where you were?

A. It was right about 7:00 o'clock, sir.

77. Q. Which station did that come from?

A. I don't remember, sir; probably it was the same one, but I wouldn't say for sure.

78. Q. Did you do anything about that?

A. No, sir.

79. Q. That report came to the man and not to you or to your subordinates?

A. That's right.

80. Q. Well, now what happened at 7:15?

A. That was when I received a call from this radar operator. You see, at 7:00 o'clock, all the plotters folded up their equipment and left the information center.

81. Q. What did you do after 7:00 o'clock, then?

A. There was nothing. I didn't do anything. I was just waiting for my tour to be finished.

82. Q. What did your tour consist of between 7:00 and 8:00? What were you supposed to do after 7:00 until your tour was completed?

A. I had no particular duties to perform, except to learn all I could at the information center.

83. Q. Now what happened at 7:15?

A. This radar operator called the telephone operator and said he wanted to report that he had seen this large indication on his scope, and wanted to report to whoever was in charge. The call was relayed to me, and he made his report.

84. Q. At that time the operator at Opana thought the object reflected in the diagram was a large object?

A. Yes, sir, that's right.

[455] 85. Q. The object reported at 7:00 wasn't a large object?

A. There was no indication of that at 7:00 o'clock, sir.

86. Q. Did you talk with the man yourself?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. On the telephone?

A. Yes, sir.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, withdrew.

[456] 88. Q. Before the 7:15 call came in, had the activity that you had seen reported as of 7:00, increased?

A. I think it was on a slight increase all the time.

89. Q. How did you get the indications of reports of the increase between 7:00 and 7:15?

A. I had no indication then. It increased from the time it started up to 7:00 o'clock, and then all the keys were removed from the board and I had no means of receiving further information.

90. Q. Oh, there had been an increase up to 7:00 o'clock?

A. Yes, sir.

91. Q. When were the first indications of the reflections which were culminated in the report at 7:00?

A. You mean the large report?

92. Q. The one at 7:00?

A. The one at 7:00 o'clock would be the first indication.

93. Q. I understood you to say the activity had increased.

A. Up until 7:00 these local plots were on the increase.

94. Q. This wasn't the northern plot that increased, up to 7:00?

A. You mean the number of plots?

95. Q. I understood you to say that you had a report at 7:00 o'clock of something around 130 miles to the north?

A. Yes.

96. Q. Had that reflection been shown at all before 7:00?

A. Yes, sir. It was shown on the historical record right at 7:00 o'clock.

97. Q. Had it been shown before 7:00 on the historical record?

A. If it was, it would have been a minute or two.

98. Q. Very shortly?

A. Yes, sir.

99. Q. Now, will you relate to the court precisely what you were told on the telephone at 7:15 when you got the call? I am now talking about the second one at 7:15?

A. Whether the operator said "a large number of planes" or "a larger indication" or "a large blip" on his radar, I couldn't say, but he gave

me information of that nature, that the distance was around 130 miles in a northerly direction.

[457] 100. Q. Who was the individual with whom you talked at that time?

A. I believe he was a private, Lockhart.

101. Q. And what did you say to him?

A. I deliberated for a minute and told him not to worry about it, or something to that effect. I don't know exactly.

102. Q. And then nothing more happened until the attack?

A. That's right, sir.

103. Q. Do I understand that you stayed there in that center the rest of the day?

A. Yes, sir.

104. Q. Were you familiar with what was reported into the center after 8:00 o'clock?

A. Well, things were so confused and there were so many plots on the board that I couldn't give any detailed information on that, sir. The historical record, however, should show the information.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

105. Q. Colonel, when you went on duty at this post at 4:00 a. m., on 7 December, had you ever had any instructions whatsoever as to what you were to do or why you were there?

A. On the previous Wednesday when I went on duty, there was just myself and the telephone operator there, and not having any instructions, I called the operations officer, then Major Berquist.

106. Q. You heard my question, didn't you?

A. Yes, sir. And I asked him why I was there and what my duties were. He told me that they were trying to get the information center set up and that we were leading off by furnishing personnel to man it. I got the idea that I was there for training, and he said if any ships went down, if any of our planes went down we might, by radar reports, be able to tell where they went down and I would be able to assist in that.

107. Q. But prior to 4:00 o'clock when you went on duty, you had no instructions as to what you were to do in reporting in any large number of planes or anything else in the air?

A. That is right, sir.

[458] 108. Q. You had no instructions?

A. I had no instructions.

109. Q. And was this the first time you were on duty there, or the second?

A. That was the second time.

110. Q. And there were no further instructions given you as to what you were to do while you were on duty from 4:00 to 7:00 a. m., of that morning?

A. That is right, sir.

111. Q. Do you know how many radar stations were in operation on that morning?

A. Because I had about 5 plotters, I gathered there were about 5 in operation.

112. Q. Did you know their locations?

A. I knew the exact location of just one radar, sir.

113. Q. You had no information from anyone to look out for a large plot of planes, did you, or did you have?

A. I had no warning, sir.

114. Q. You spoke of Hawaiian music playing all night. Will you please explain that?

A. Well, the conventional Hawaiian music, guitars and so forth.

115. Q. But you mentioned that as an indication of planes coming in.

A. Because they would play this music without interruption and even without announcement, and it had been standard practice to do so for homing for the planes coming in.

116. Q. Did anyone tell them to play this music for homing for planes to come in, to your knowledge?

A. From the information I had from this bomber pilot friend of mind, it was that someone, probably in the Air Force or the Bomber Command, apparently had arranged for such homing, you see, because it didn't play on other nights.

117. Q. But you don't know what arrangement they had?

A. No, I don't know, definitely.

118. Q. The instant you saw or became aware of enemy planes over Oahu, what did you do?

A. I instructed the operator to call the information center plotters back in. They arrived very shortly and Major Tindal also arrived almost simultaneously.

[459] 119. Q. Did it ever occur to you at that time to report immediately to your senior, or the officer who would like to have that information?

A. Yes, sir. I'm not certain whether I called Major Berquist, or whether I told the operator to call Wheeler Field and tell them of the events, or just what happened then. It was really quite confusing for a while, sir.

120. Q. About what time was this?

A. About 8:10, I would say, sir. As a matter of fact, Major Tindal arrived so soon and took over that there was hardly time to do anything there. He apparently started on the way as soon as the first bombs hit Hickam Field.

121. Q. No effort was made to pass this information along that you first got about 7:00 o'clock?

A. No, sir; that is right.

122. Q. Or at 7:15?

A. That is right, sir.

123. Q. Well, did it occur to you at all that it might be an attack and that it should be passed along?

A. No, sir; it did not.

124. Q. Well, did you make any effort from any source to find out whether this flight was foreign, or local?

A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

125. Q. The report that came in at 7:15 wasn't plotted historically, was it?

A. That was the same report that was plotted, I'm quite sure, sir, at 7:00 o'clock.

126. Q. Well, the one that you got at 7:15 wasn't recorded other than by telephone call to you?

A. Well, only if it could have been plotted at 7:00 o'clock. I gathered that it was the same plot, sir.

127 Q. Well, if it were a different one at 7:15, it was not recorded?

A. That is right, sir.

128. Q. Did you report to your superior or to anyone else about the 7:15 incident?

A. No, sir.

[460] Examined by the court:

129. Q. Did the Opana station have any place they could have reported to except through your station?

A. No, sir.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (continued):

130. Q. Do you now believe that the planes indicated at 7:15 were the Japanese planes, or were the B-17s?

A. I believe now that they were Japanese planes, sir.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

131. Q. Was the post at which you were stationed on the morning of 7 December in the Air Command, or was it in some other part of the Hawaiian Command, the infantry or something like that? In other words, did you come directly under the Commanding Officer of the Army Air Forces in your station, or did you come under some other department, or do you know?

A. I'm not certain of that. I was working under orders of the operations officer of the 14th Wing, which was the Air Force Command. However, the information center was manned mostly by Signal Corps troops.

Re-cross examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

132. Q. What makes you now think the flight you had reported at 7:15 was Japanese planes?

A. Because, sir, I have learned about radar since then and it would take a large plot, a large number of planes to make a plot at that distance, and I don't think that B-17s coming over as they did, that it would have been possible to pick them up at that range.

133. Q. When did you first reach that conclusion?

A. That would be hard to say. It was in the weeks following, somewhere in the weeks following Pearl Harbor. I learned quite a bit about radar very soon after that, sir.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not [461] been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station, please.

A. William A. Heard, Captain, USN, Deputy Director, Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. What duties were you performing in late 1941?

A. Prior to October 9, I was in charge of the British Empire desk in the Office of Naval Intelligence. On that date I relieved Captain Bode as the officer in charge of the Foreign Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C.

3. Q. How long did you remain on this detail?

A. Until 30 June 1942.

4. Q. I would like to have you state for the information of the court in as brief a manner as possible what the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was between the dates of 16 October 1941 and 7 December of the same year.

A. The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was last revised on August 11, 1941. At that time it consisted of a director, an assistant director, and 3 principal branches. Do you want to include the field organizations?

5. Q. Yes, you might add that.

A. There were three principal branches: Domestic, Foreign, and Administrative; and a field organization of the Naval District Intelligence offices and the foreign posts.

6. Q. That is the broad outline?

A. Yes.

7. Q. Now, you say you headed the Foreign Branch?

A. Yes.

8. Q. Without stating the sources of your information, please tell the court the form in which intelligence information left your division; that is, was it simply a list of facts, or was it facts from which a general [462] summary or evaluation was made, or just exactly how did you pass information along from your division?

A. Intelligence was passed from the Office of Naval Intelligence in the following specific forms: First, when we received items of urgent interest, by oral report. Daily, Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the head of the Far East Section, relayed by Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations. (Not invariably a daily report.) Daily, summary of State Department dispatches. Whenever appropriate, printed serials presenting related items of information. Weekly, known or estimated dispositions of all foreign fleets. When required by the Chief of Naval Operations, comparative strength tables by types of all fleets. A daily bulletin for the President's naval aide. Fortnightly, summaries of current national situation. When occurring, special summaries. Dispatches to foreign posts and the naval attaches. I have undertaken to answer specifically as to whether the information was evaluated. There were varying degrees of evaluation, naturally, in that scope of forms of reporting. Generally, all information was evaluated as to its credibility, as to its implications, and to a greater or less degree as to the conclusions which might be drawn from it. It had been established that the final evaluation in the form of enemy intentions was more properly the responsibility of the War Plans Division.

9. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations get all classifications of information which you have enumerated?

A. I believe, without exception copies of all of the reports and also the oral reports were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

10. Q. I believe you spoke of a classification of information which you called "Political." Would that type of classification of information, for example, include such matters as the diplomatic negotiations that were going on between the Japanese and the United States governments the latter part of 1941?

A. Political information was included, such information as was available to the Office of Naval Intelligence was further reported to the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. Q. Let me ask you another question: What were the sources of this political information, if you are at liberty to so relate. In other words, generally speaking, what were the sources of your political information?

A. Foreign Post Fleet Comamnders, State Department, and other sources.

12. Q. How often was this particular classification of information passed to the Chief of Naval Operations? Do you know?

A. As a rule—certainly I am sure it was the case in the period under consideration—there was a daily report.

[463] 13. Q. In relation to the events of late November and early December, 1941—that is, before the outbreak of war with Japan—was there or was there not considerable information of a military nature passing through your office?

A. There was.

14. Q. Do you feel, from your recollection of those events, that this information was promptly passed to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it was passed quite promptly to the Chief of Naval Operations.

15. Q. Did information arising in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence have to be cleared by anyone between that office and the Chief of Naval Operations before this latter officer could receive it? In other words, my question is this: Was information passed directly from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, that is, those matters which concerned him, without the interference or the permission of any intermediary?

A. The Director of Naval Intelligence enjoyed ready access, both to Admiral Ingersoll and to Admiral Stark.

16. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it?

A. I can. I have had previous knowledge of the dispatch.

17. Q. Will you state what the general subject matter of this dispatch is, for the record?

A. This is a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean Defense Command, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and of the Fourth Army.

18. Q. What is the subject matter of the dispatch?

A. Alerting the addressees as to the impending action of Japanese diplomatic representatives with regard to our relations.

19. Q. Can you recall whether or not similar information was in the Office of Naval Intelligence on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. It was.

20. Q. Can you state from recollection or records of the office, that you have examined to refresh your memory, whether or not this information was in the Office of Naval Intelligence as early as 0900, Washington Time, on [464] 7 December, 1941?

A. From the best record available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the information upon which I believe this document was based was not available in the Navy Department until about 0900 of 7 December 1941.

21. Q. That being your estimate of the time the information was available in your office, from your experience could you give the court an estimate of the time that its evaluation or the facts which the exhibit show were sent to Hawaii, what time this might have been reasonably in the hands of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Captain McCallum, Chief of the Far East Section, who had relieved his chief Japanese assistant at 0800, brought this information which he received about 9:00 o'clock immediately to the Director of Naval Intelligence who arrived in his office at 0900. Some time later—and I believe prior to 10:00 o'clock—the Director of Naval Intelligence took Commander McCallum to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the purpose of presenting the information to him. I cannot state the exact hour.

The court then, at 3:13 p. m., took a recess until 3:21 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present:

All the members, the judge advocate, and the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain William A. Heard, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not care to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

22. Q. Is the information which you have given, Captain, from your personal knowledge as of 7 December, or from records now available to O. N. I.? That is, were you down [465] at the Navy Department Sunday morning, December 7th?

A. I was not here until a little after noon, sir. I did receive, through the official conduct of business, a report from Commander McCallum as to what had taken place in the forenoon. I have also the official statement of the Director of Naval Intelligence which was made very shortly after the event.

23. Q. And you are the custodian of that official report now?

A. I don't know that I would say I am the official custodian, sir. I have a copy of the Director of Naval Intelligence's statement. I have not the original of his statement in my custody and I believe it is not in the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, I was aware of it at the time and at present. I can say that I was aware of the underlying information up until the preceding evening, of my own, first-hand knowledge.

24. Q. Referring to the dispatch from General Marshall to Hawaii, which I believe the judge advocate showed you, Exhibit 48: There appear to be three factual statements in it. "Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p. m., Eastern Standard Time today"—that I would consider to be one factual statement—"what amounts to an ultimatum"—that might be the second—"Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately"—that would be the third. Then there are conclusions drawn from it. Do you know whether any of those three factual statements or information tending to establish those was available to the Navy Department prior to 7 December?

A. As to the destruction of the codes and confidential papers, there was information in the Navy Department on the 3rd of December. That information was made available to the outlying possessions and to the High Command; and based on that information, the Director of Naval Intelligence directed our representatives, our attaches in other words, in Japanese and satellite or exposed stations, to destroy forthwith their communication systems and gave them a plain language code word to report when it had been done. Those reports were duly received prior to the 7th of December. As to the time of the meeting and the precise character of the ultimatum or that there would be an ultimatum, there was not a clear appreciation of either fact until, as I have previously testified, based on the Director of Naval Intelligence's official statement, that became available at just about 0900 on 7 December. There were previous implications and it was a matter of common knowledge, I think, that the negotiations were stalemated and that there would not be, to us, a satisfactory conclusion. But there is that difference, sir, that as of the information available up until about 9:00 o'clock there was not clear-cut evidence which, I believe, led to the formulation of this subject document.

[466] 25. Q. Did the written report of the Director of Naval Intelligence to which you made reference contain top secret information?

A. It did, sir. I might say, incidental to the report.

26. Q. But it is included in the report?

A. It is, sir. There is much material in it which is not in that classification, sir.

27. Q. Who was the assistant to Commander McCallum when he was relieved about 8:00 o'clock Sunday morning?

A. Then Lieutenant Commander—now Commander, I believe—Watts, who was also a Japanese language officer and had been ordered here to the Department as the tentative relief for Commander McCallum.

28. Q. Is Commander Watts on duty in Washington now?

A. He is not, sir. He is, I believe, in the Pacific.

29. Q. Did you then, or do you now, know of a conference on Sunday, 7 December, at or about 10:00 o'clock at the State Department?

A. No, sir.

30. Q. Do you know whether any of this information was communicated to the Secretary of the Navy Sunday morning?

A. I do not, sir, of my own knowledge.

[467] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve; reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

31. Q. And the records do not—

A. I have no records of that, sir. In conformance with general practice, I should be much surprised if it were not, but I have no first-hand knowledge.

32. Q. Do you know whether any intelligence information was communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations Saturday evening, December 6, 1941?

A. I can't be sure of that, sir. It was the practice—certainly in those last few days—for the Director of Naval Intelligence to report, not less than once daily, to the Chief of Naval Operations more or less of a summary of new developments and new information.

33. Q. I am asking about Saturday evening.

A. On Saturday evening I don't know. I was here and the Director was here, and the Chief of Naval Operations was here some time, too, along in the evening of the 6th of December, but I don't know whether or not the Director saw him at that time and whether or not any further information was passed to him.

34. Q. At approximately what time did you go home on Saturday evening, December 6?

A. It was 7 o'clock or after.

35. Q. After you got home did you receive a report of further information?

A. I did not, sir. I would not normally have received it unless I was called to come back to the office, because on Friday, the 4th of December, the Director of Naval Intelligence had established a 24-hour continuous watch in the Far East Section, the watch to be stood by the three or four senior officers in that section who were involved in the processing, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence.

36. Q. Do you know whether or not on Saturday night there was any information available in the Navy Department that was reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence at his home?

A. I do not, but I do know, sir, that there had been since May 27, 1941, a special, continuous watch in the Office of Naval Intelligence, headed by one of the more senior officers in the division, and that watch included junior officers of all the major branches. There was an elaborate arrangement for prompt notification to the Director of Naval Intelligence of any matter of interest to him. That also included my telephone communication with [468] both Military Intelligence and with the State Department. I would like to add I had occasion personally to arrange for a special week-end telephone line between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, to go directly to Mr. Hull's office, where continuous watch was stood in his absence. All of that telephone was active and was available. As to what specific reports passed over it, I'm not sure.

37. Q. Did Naval Intelligence advise the Army Sunday morning of the information about which we have been talking?

A. To my own knowledge, I can't answer. I would say that Colonel Bracken and Commander McCallum were on a close basis of communication and exchange. Whether any specific delivery was made of information that morning, I don't know.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

38. Q. Captain, referring to your testimony about the information concerning the destruction of codes and ciphers, in which you stated it was known about December 3: I hand you Exhibit 20 before this court, a dispatch of December 3 to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific, and two naval districts. Is that the dispatch to which you refer?

A. That is the dispatch.

Examined by the court:

39. Q. Captain, during this time and especially in November and up to December 7, 1941, did you consider that you were kept thoroughly informed regarding all information as to the Japanese situation in your capacity as an officer in Naval Intelligence?

A. You mean within Naval Intelligence, sir?

40. Q. Yes.

A. Yes, sir, I do.

41. Q. Were you also kept informed at this time, or did you have information regarding what was going on at the State Department as to these relations?

A. I had it second-hand only, sir, through the Director of Naval Intelligence. You mean, so far as the conduct of the negotiations were concerned?

42. Q. Yes. Was it your understanding between November 27 and December 7, 1941, that conversations and negotiations were continuing by the State Department with the Japanese representatives?

A. I can't recall as to daily meetings.

[469] 43. Q. It is not a question of daily meetings. You are familiar with the dispatch sent on November 27?

A. Yes.

44. Q. From that time until December 7 were there conversations and negotiations going on with the State Department and the Japanese representatives?

A. It is my impression that they were, sir.

45. Q. Do you have any knowledge of a note of November 26, 1941, being sent by the U. S. Government to Japan and being delivered to the representatives here by the State Department?

A. I have no knowledge of that.

46. Q. Have you ever seen that note?

A. I have not, sir. I don't recall ever having seen it. I have had knowledge of it subsequently.

47. Q. With your information, did you and the officers of Naval Intelligence form any opinion as to the likelihood of a Japanese attack?

A. I think that we were solidly of the opinion that war was near at hand.

48. Q. Did you have any opinion as to how that war would take place or how it would begin?

A. We were quite convinced that war would begin, or, at least, the strongest indication we had was of a war in Southeast Asia.

49. Q. Was it generally known or was it your opinion that an attack would be made on Hawaii?

A. No, sir, we had no information which indicated or would lead to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on Hawaii.

50. Q. In other words, you considered that if an attack were made, it would be made to the southern rather than to the eastern of the chain of islands from Japan to the Dutch East Indies?

A. Including the Philippines.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[470] The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, U. S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Q. What duties were you performing after the month of June, 1941?

A. Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, 14th Naval District, at Pearl Harbor.

3. Q. Will you state briefly the organization of the Intelligence Unit of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, showing particularly how it was linked to other U. S. naval units of the same character, the F. B. I., the Army, and the Navy Department? In other words, how was your unit linked with other units throughout the service?

A. Prior to my reporting as officer in charge, the unit was designated as a field unit, the main unit being in Washington, the other unit being in Cavite under the Commandant of the 16th Naval District. Personnel, for security reasons, were ordered either as assistants to the District Intelligence Officer or District Communications Officer. All orders read: "To the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for duty." It was decided that perhaps it would be a little more in keeping if it were called a Combat Intelligence unit, still retaining the two letters for communication intelligence and placing it more on a military footing. Accordingly, it was organized under the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, to whom I had been ordered for duty. It generally consisted of an interceptor unit, of a direction finder unit, and of a cryptographic or research group. At the direction of the Commandant, this was increased to provide for plotting, the preparation of charts, situation maps, etc.

4. Q. What was the connection with other U. S. naval units of a similar character?

A. The main unit, being in Washington, controlled, to a certain extent, the duties of the two field units by designating their general mission and by allocating the [471] various tasks. For example, if there were certain work to be done which could not be accomplished all in one month and if it were uneconomical to have all three offices working on it, the Washington office designated which unit was to do the particular piece of work.

5. Q. Did you have any link with the F. B. I. or the Army in Hawaii?

A. The collaboration with other than U. S. naval units was more or less on a personal basis, by reason of the extreme security that was in effect regarding the functions and results of the Combat Intelligence unit. Contact was established and maintained, particularly with the F. B. I., the Army, and the F. C. C. in the Honolulu area. That was entirely of a personal nature by reason of the fact that we were not allowed to indicate any results or any details of the work involved.

6. Q. So far as your unit was concerned, did you receive weekly or bi-weekly Intelligence bulletins from the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department or any summary of information of that character?

A. We received two different types of reports or intelligence evaluations, one being the normal reports which were disseminated by the Office of Naval Intelligence and which were available to everybody in the Fleet, the other being personal letters, official letters, or dispatches in our own system, which were more of a technical nature than anything else.

7. Q. Let us suppose, for example, that during the critical period preceding December 7, 1941, the Navy Department was possessed of military information concerning Japanese warlike intentions or movements of their ships, etc. Would information of this character be sent out to your command?

A. Not necessarily, sir. We might or might not get all the information, or any of the information, which was available.

8. Q. Do you mean to state that there wasn't any determined policy in regare to the information which you got from the Navy Department relating to these matters?

A. No, sir, I wouldn't say that. I would say that I could expect all information of a technical nature, particularly that bearing on the tasks which had been assigned our office, but I would not say that all information available in Washington would be forwarded to me or forwarded to the Combat Intelligence unit as a matter of course.

9. Q. Would you say that all information on the Japanese military situation which might be of interest to naval forces in the Hawaiian area would be sent you in the form of a bulletin or a dispatch?

A. Again not necessarily. Perhaps my description [472] of the Combat Intelligence Unit has not been clear. We were more of a technical nature. We were not a Fleet Intelligence Unit in any sense of the word. We provided intelligence only of a particular and rather narrow type, and I did not expect—nor would I expect now—that all information bearing on any foreign country would be sent to my office. It would probably be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

10. Q. Would information regarding political developments and diplomatic negotiations be given you?

A. No. It is my recollection that one or two bits of that information were sent to me, but I would say that not all of it had been.

11. Q. Did you have any information on the location of units of the Japanese Fleet from November 27 to December 7, 1941? Was that the type of information you were handling?

A. Yes.

12. Q. Did you have any information on the location of Japanese carriers during the latter part of November and up to the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

A. We had what we thought was fairly good information of the presence of various types of Japanese Fleet units, included in which were one or more carriers.

13. Q. Were there any of these units in which carriers were a part in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands?

A. No, sir, the nearest that we had estimated their location to be was in the Marshalls.

14. Q. Did you, by means of your intelligence liaison with other units, know whether any other intelligence unit in the naval service had any information of a carrier group being in closer than the Marshall group?

A. No, sir. As a result of an exchange of messages in the latter part of November between the Far Eastern unit and ourselves, I am of the opinion that neither of us considered that any carriers were closer than the Marshalls. We heard nothing from the Washington unit, so I am not in the position to say what they felt.

15. Q. How did you disseminate the information which you received in your unit? To whom did you pass the information that you received?

A. We passed the information that we had received, or any deductions which we had made ourselves, by radio and in our own cryptographic system, which automatically included the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and the two field units. That was automatic. If one message was originated by one of those two field units, it automatically went to all addresses.

[473] 16. Q. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes.

17. Q. What about the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. The other method of dissemination was either verbally with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Fleet Intelligence Officer or in the form of written, daily summaries, which were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

18. Q. From October 1 to December 7, 1941, do you recall receiving information which you evaluated as being of a warlike nature concerning the Japanese Government?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. Can you recall whether or not this information you had revealed any probable Japanese objectives?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the communications indicated a southern and westward movement from Japan.

20. Q. Do you recall any information which you had that might indicate an attack on the United States or its possessions?

A. Definitely not, aside from Guam.

21. Q. How about the Philippines?

A. I will amend that. The Philippines were mentioned on one or two occasions.

22. Q. Then, is the understanding of the Judge Advocate correct that you had no information which indicated any Japanese objective east of Guam?

A. Yes, sir, that is my understanding from reading the various communications.

23. Q. Will you state to the court, if you know, what method of communication a Japanese spy, for example, would have of communicating between the Hawaiian area and the homeland?

A. Prior to December 7, cable, radio, and such methods as delivery to a foreign vessel in port and possibly some form of unauthorized radio transmitter.

24. Q. Do you know whether or not there was available to the authorities in the Hawaiian area any means by which they could censor radio messages going from the Hawaiian area to Japan?

A. No, sir, that was not permitted by law.

25. Q. How about cable?

A. Cable the same, sir.

[474] 26. Q. How about ordinary mail?

A. Ordinary mail the same.

27. Q. Then, am I to understand your answer that there was unrestricted mail, radio, and cable communication between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands which the United States could not stop or censor prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

28. Q. On Saturday, December 6, did Admiral Kimmel come to your office at Pearl Harbor?

A. I wouldn't say whether it was Saturday, but it was in that immediate time.

29. Q. At that time did he gather from you all the intelligence and information that you had?

A. It is my recollection that any time an important message was received either by us or was originated by us the Commander-in-Chief, with the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, came down and discussed the matter at great length.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

30. Q. Commander, in your capacity as an intelligence officer and as the head of Combat Intelligence in Honolulu, were you familiar with local conditions among the civilians of Honolulu?

A. I believe I was, yes, sir.

31. Q. On or about November 27, 1941, and subsequent thereto, did you notice any marked change in public opinion or in the general feeling of the Japanese populace as to any impending war or danger?

A. No, sir, there was no change noticeable.

32. Q. You did not notice any special activities by the Japanese Consul General or his associates?

A. Yes, sir, there had been some activity there, with particular reference to apparent burning or destruction of various articles.

[475] 33. Q. Was there any noticeable propaganda being sent out by the Japanese or circulated in Honolulu relative to conditions existing at that time?

A. Insofar as I could find out, none, sir.

34. Q. I presume that you have heard that there have been rumors to the effect that cordial relations and close cooperation did not exist between the high commands of the Army and Navy at that time. What is your idea about such rumors?

A. My opinion, sir, is that they are entirely unfounded.

35. Q. Did you, as an Intelligence officer, have any idea as to the source of these rumors or how they started?

A. No, sir, I did not hear any such rumors until after the 7th of December.

36. Q. In other words, as far as you know, the relationship between the Army and Navy officials was cordial and friendly?

A. Yes, sir. I gathered that impression from my official relations with the various Intelligence officers in the Army and Navy, plus personal relations with various Army officers at Schofield.

37. Q. Did Army and Navy subordinate officers work closely together?

A. I think as closely as they do now, sir.

38. Q. Did you know of any degree of intoxication among officers and men of the Navy on the night of 6th-7th of December?

A. No, sir; I heard such rumors after the 7th. From what I can gather, after discussing the matter with numerous friends at the alleged places in Honolulu, I do not believe there is any truth in the rumor, insofar as I could find out.

39. Q. In other words, insofar as you know, there was no special intoxication?

A. No, sir; none other than normal—no change from the normal.

40. Q. As Intelligence officer of that community, I suppose you were conversant with the general bearing and deportment of the officers and men of the Navy?

A. Yes, sir.

41. Q. Was that good, bad, or excellent insofar as any indulgence went?

A. I would say, sir, it was infinitely better than during a normal Fleet cruise and perhaps about the same or a little less than in the San Pedro-Long Beach area.

[476] 42. Q. This court understands that you, as the Combat Intelligence officer, not only kept conversant with all information obtainable regarding the Japanese situation but immediately upon obtaining it, you communicated it to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 19, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944.

[477]

FOURTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold B. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the thirteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and your present duty station, Colonel?

A. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff Corps, G-3, of General Stilwell, Myitkyina, North Burma.

2. Q. To what duties were you assigned in the year 1941?

A. I was Chief of Staff to General Short.

3. What was General Short's position at that time?

A. He was commanding the Hawaiian Department.

[478] 4. Q. And were you Chief of Staff during the entire year 1941?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. When were you assigned the duties as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and when were you relieved of these duties?

A. On November 5, 1941, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, and relieved on December 18, 1941.

6. Q. Previous to your assignment as Chief of Staff, were you performing duties under the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

A. I was.

7. Q. What were these duties during the year 1941, that you were then performing?

A. I arrived in the Hawaiian Department the early part of March, 1941. I don't remember the exact date. From that time until the time of my appointment as Chief of Staff, I rotated through the various General Staff Sections, G-1, 2, 3, and 4, in order to become thoroughly acquainted with the situation in the Hawaiian Department. Most of that time I was in G-3, Operations Section of General Staff.

8. Q. Since being relieved in December—17 December, from your duties in the Hawaiian Department, would you state in general what duties you have since been performing?

A. I was relieved as Chief of Staff on December 18, 1941, and at General Emmons' request I was retained as Deputy Chief of Staff to him. I remained with that duty until about November of the next year.

9. Q. That was in the Hawaiian Department?

A. That was in the Hawaiian Department, as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Delos Emmons.

10. Q. Can you remember during your tour of duty with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and during the year 1941 only—can you recall in general what had been the principal problems which the Army and Navy were mutually interested in, in the Hawaiian area?

A. I can, generally. I wish to state that the details of the attack on Pearl Harbor—many of the details—are rather dim, rather hazy. I have been in active operations since that period. I have kept no notes, no file.

11. Q. My question, Colonel, related to the problems that confronted the Army and Navy, mutually, during the year 1941, in the Hawaiian Department, not the details of the attack.

A. My reply is, I know them.

[479] 12. Q. Can you state what they were?

A. Of course, the chief problem was the defense of the islands against any attack. That was our mission.

13. Q. Were there any problems related to the defense of Pearl Harbor, that you recall?

A. No, I don't recall any.

14. Q. Whose responsibility was it, under existing orders or agreements, for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. That was covered in the plans that we had in existence at that time, and I cannot state exactly where the responsibility for that was.

15. Q. Do you recall whether it was a joint responsibility, an Army responsibility, or a Navy responsibility?

A. Generally, as I recall, a joint responsibility.

16. Q. Do you remember if there were any problems as to the adequacy of anti-aircraft defense?

A. We generally considered that there was a shortage of anti-aircraft defense, and had made recommendations to rectify that.

17. Q. Do you recall anything concerning problems in the aircraft warning system?

A. We were exerting every effort to get that installed at the earliest possible time.

18. Q. Can you remember any problems concerning aviation?

A. Yes, there was a definite shortage of planes for reconnaissance, heavy bombers, and small reconnaissance ships.

19. Q. Do you have any recollection of the number of anti-aircraft guns that were available under the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not.

20. Q. And naturally, then, you probably do not remember where these guns were placed?

A. I do not.

21. Q. Can you recall, after 7 November 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941, if there was any condition of alert ordered in the Hawaiian Department?

A. There was, sabotage alert. It went into effect on November 27.

22. Q. Do you remember that the official Army name for this type of alert was, by number or anything else?

A. It was Alert No. 1, I believe, or No. 3; I am not [480] sure. It was one or the other. The alerts were divided into three; one for sabotage, the second requiring more troops with the idea of increasing the defense for anti-aircraft, and the third was an all-out defense against a landing.

23. Q. Under the condition of Alert No. 1, can you recall whether that alert required any of your anti-aircraft guns to be manned?

A. I cannot recall right now the details that were in the plan.

24. Q. Do you know whether or not under the condition, Alert No. 1, that gun crews were required to be at their stations continuously?

A. I do not recall.

25. Q. Can you recall whether or not under the condition of Alert No. 1, ammunition had to be at the guns?

A. I do not.

26. Q. Since you have testified that you do not know the positions of the guns that were designated for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, and further you do not know where the men were quartered, you probably would not be able to give us any idea of how long it would take to man these guns in the event that a general alarm was given?

A. I could not.

27. Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of mobile guns that were available for anti-aircraft fire in the Hawaiian Department just prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I knew at the time, but I have no idea now.

28. Q. Do you know if there was any plan in effect between 27 November 1941 and 7 December 1941, for coordinating the anti-aircraft fire of Army units and Navy units in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I cannot say definitely as to that.

29. Q. Did you have any sort of a committee in the Hawaiian area, represented by both Army and Navy, which committee studied the problems that were mutually affecting both services, that you can remember?

A. We had a committee, of which I became the chairman by virtue of my office as Chief of Staff, which had to do with the plans, and

was only called—this is purely from memory—into being when any change in the plans was demanded by either party.

30. Q. Am I to understand from your answer, then, that this joint committee dealt with plans solely, and not with other problems?

A. That is my recollection, sir.

[481] 31. Q. Can you recall when the last meeting was held prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I cannot.

32. Q. Do you know if there were any other steps, other than this joint committee that you have just told us about, taken with the aim of coordinating any measures or problems between the Army and Navy?

A. Yes, there were. We had an officer in G-3, of the Army, whose duty it was to take back to the Navy any information, all actions, everything of any importance, particularly operation; and we had likewise an Army officer in the Navy Headquarters, whose duty it was to do the same thing. There were many meetings between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in regard to official matters.

33. Q. That is what I am trying to get at, Colonel. I would assume that in an area as important as the Hawaiian Department and the Navy Base at Pearl Harbor, that there might be many military problems arise?

A. Many.

34. Q. Can you tell this court these mutual problems were solved in that area?

A. Directly; the air directly with your air—and those conferences were frequent. If we had any construction, my G-4 was directed to see his opposite, and the problems were threshed out. All of these meetings were reported on through me to the Commanding General, or directly to him by the Staff Officer concerned, usually in my presence.

35. Q. Did you yourself have any opposite in the naval command with whom you dealt or negotiated regarding mutual problems arising in the area?

A. During my time I was present at a number of conferences which Admiral Kimmel had with the General, but I do not recall that I went to my opposite in the Navy during my tour as Chief of Staff.

36. Q. Can you tell the court whether or not it was the Commanding General's custom to confer with the commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet when these problems arose?

A. It was.

37. Q. Now, do you know whether or not these consultations took place frequently or not?

A. I do. They took place quite frequently, officially and socially.

38. Q. Well now, adverting to the answer that you have just made, from your own observation as Chief of Staff, and the other official offices that you held in the Hawaiian Department, what is your frank opinion of the relationship [482] between the Army and Navy, in official matters especially?

A. In my opinion it was extremely cordial and cooperative.

39. Q. Are you acquainted with criticism that has been made public through several sources of the lack of cooperation between the Army

and Navy before the outbreak of the present war—that is, prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I am, generally speaking.

40. Q. Do you have any idea of the source of these rumors or statements?

A. I have not.

41. Q. But in your opinion they are what?

A. Absurd.

42. Q. Adverting to the critical period from 16 October 1941, to the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December of the same year, had any effort been made in the Hawaiian Department and in the Navy, so far as you know, towards improving communications and the exchange of information?

A. I cannot answer that, I do not know, between those specific dates.

43. Q. Now you have stated that the Army was in Alert No. 1 from about November 27, 1941?

A. It was the sabotage alert, from November 27.

44. Q. Do you know what the sabotage alert directed in the way of security measures or readiness measures?

A. I know generally. It is definitely specified in our standing operating procedure, which was furnished to the Navy at that time. The general provisions of the sabotage alert were to defend water works, telephone exchanges, radio stations, bridges, trestles, and so forth, against attack from any enemy.

45. Q. Can you recall whether the alert that you described as having been in effect provided any additional precautions to be taken in your aircraft warning system?

A. I cannot recall that.

46. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before this court, and which I will tell you is a dispatch from our own Chief of Naval Operations to certain addressees in the Navy, and this message purports to quote a message which the Army had sent to the Commander of the Western Defense Command. I ask you to inspect this message and tell the court [483] whether or not a message of similar tenor had been received by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. I believe that is correct. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, received a message similar to that.

47. Q. The dispatch bears date of release in Washington by the Chief of Naval Operations, November 28, 1941. Can you state at about what time you, as Chief of Staff, became familiar with the subject matter of this dispatch?

A. About that date—November 27 or 28; I don't remember.

48. Q. Can you recall that the representatives of the Army and Navy had an conference as regards this dispatch, in the Hawaiian area?

A. General Short conferred once with Admiral Kimmel in regard to this, I am positive.

49. Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, what the result of this conference was?

A. I did at the time. I cannot recall at present.

50. Q. You can't recall any of the details?

A. I do not.

51. Q. I note that the dispatch contemplates certain action on the part of the Army. One directive reads "You are directed to undertake, prior to Japanese hostile action, such reconnaissance and other measures as you consider necessary." Now at that time no Japanese attack had yet been launched; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

52. Q. Was any reconnaissance undertaken prior to Japanese action?

A. Reconnaissance was discussed. We had few heavy bombers. We were sending them, as rapidly as possible, to the southwest, and utilizing the few we had chiefly to train crews for other operations or taking additional planes to the southwest.

53. Q. Can you recall if there were in effect any plans, between 27 November 1941 and the Japanese attack on 7 December, which provided for reconnaissance?

A. As I recall, that was in our joint plan.

54. Q. Can you give us some idea of what this provision was?

A. I think, generally, the Navy was responsible for distance reconnaissance, and the Army for inshore, I believe. I am not positive.

55. Q. Now do you know whether or not there was any conference regarding the matter of reconnaissance after the receipt of the dispatch about 27 or 28 November, that you have [484] been talking about?

A. I am sure there was. I can't state the date, or with whom.

56. Q. Now inasmuch as this message purports to direct the Commanding General to undertake reconnaissance, can you state what was done about it?

A. I cannot.

57. Q. And you can't tell us what the results of this conference was with the Navy on this subject?

A. I don't remember.

58. Q. Can you recall what planes you had in the Hawaiian Department, on or about 6 or 7 December 1941, that were suitable for reconnaissance work?

A. Distant reconnaissance?

59. Q. Yes, distance reconnaissance.

A. As I recall, about a dozen; maybe a few more.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[485] 60. Q. Can you recall whether there were planes suitable for any other sort of reconnaissance than long-range reconnaissance?

A. We had a squadron of small ships, a reconnaissance squadron—I do not recall how many, a small number—at Bellows Field.

61. Q. How far were they suitable for operating at sea?

A. I cannot tell you the range. I do not know.

62. Q. Did you yourself, on and after the time you were informed of the contents of this message which you have examined, Exhibit 19, form any estimate of your own as to the imminence of an attack by the Japanese on the Island of Oahu?

A. At the time of the receipt of this message, we estimated the situation, considering every angle, and arrived at the decision that a sabotage alert was the alert to execute. I concurred in that decision.

63. Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: Did you form any estimate of your own based on the information you had on, say, 28 November, 1941, as to whether the Japanese would attack any objective in the Hawaiian area?

A. My personal estimate was that it was possible but not very probable.

64. Q. Did your estimate include the form of attack that might be made by the Japanese?

A. An air attack more probably than any.

65. Q. Would you distinguish whether this air attack was bombing or torpedo, or both?

A. Generally, an air attack, including everything concerned therein.

66. Q. Did you receive any further information officially or in your conversations with your Commanding General after the information set out in Exhibit 19 that led you to believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was more imminent than it had been?

A. We did not.

67. Q. Can you recall if you received any information whatsoever after having been informed of the contents of Exhibit 19, on the imminence of war between the Japanese and the United States?

A. I do not recall having received any additional information until about 3:30 the afternoon of December 7th.

68. Q. And of course the attack at that time had already been initiated?

A. It had been concluded.

[486] 69. Q. Do you feel that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department between 27 November 1941 and the attack on 7 December, kept you fully informed of the developments in the United States-Japanese situation?

A. I do.

70. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is in evidence before this court, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain naval addressees under date of November 27, 1941. I ask you to inspect this dispatch and to inform the court whether you had seen this dispatch or had been informed of its contents before December 7, 1941?

A. I do not recall having seen that dispatch.

71. Q. Do you feel that you may have seen it and do not remember?

A. That is possible.

72. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit 21, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain naval addressees under date of 4 December 1941, having as its general subject matter a directive to the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy all secret and confidential publications. I ask you to inspect that message and state to the court whether or not you had either seen the message or had been informed of its contents before the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I do not recall having seen that message.

73. Q. Or having been informed of the contents thereof?

A. That is possible that I was informed. I haven't seen the message.

74. Q. Do you have any present recollection whether you had been informed of the contents?

A. I do not.

75. Q. Colonel, I show you Exhibit No. 22, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to certain naval addressees, under date of 6 December 1941, and which contains a directive which has to do with the destruction of certain codes and publications in outlying Pacific islands. I ask you to inspect this dispatch and state to the court whether or not you had seen the dispatch or been informed of its contents before 7 December 1941?

A. I do not recall having seen that message.

76. Q. Do you recall whether or not you had been informed of the contents thereof?

A. I do not.

77. Q. Colonel, will you give the court to the best of your recollection, what was the organization of the Interceptor Command in the Hawaiian Department immediately [487] preceding 7 December 1941?

A. We were barely in the first stage of organization. I should say, just installing the equipment or attempting to install it. We had no permanent stations installed at the time. We did have a mobile station, as I recall, operating.

78. Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is what the set-up in this Interceptor Command was, what units comprised it, and I mean by "units" such items as planes, aircraft warning communications, and the like, if any of these did comprise the Interceptor Command?

A. The organization was, as I recall, under the Signal Corps and the Air Corps. We had sent a general officer with our department signal officer to the Mainland to go to school and become better acquainted with what we meant as an interceptor command. They had just returned shortly before December 7th—I can't give you the date—and the organization was just in the making.

79. Q. Did this Interceptor Command include an information center?

A. Ultimately it did. I'm not sure that it was functioning at that time.

80. Q. Then if it were functioning at that time, your answer is that you do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

81. Q. Then you probably could not state what the set-up was in this Interceptor Command prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I cannot.

82. Q. Can you recall if there was any system in effect in the Hawaiian Department immediately prior to 7 December 1941 for keeping the proper officials informed on the movement of friendly planes in the area so as to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy if enemy planes approached?

A. I do not.

83. Q. You do not remember?

A. I do not remember.

84. Q. Can you recall what the system was for the daily operation of your aircraft warning system between 27 November 1941 and 7 December, 1941?

A. As I recall, it was operated on more or less a training schedule, with the idea of training operators chiefly.

85. Q. Do you know what the scheduled hours for this operation were?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember.

[488] 86. Q. Can you recall whether it was in the morning, in the afternoon, or in the evening?

A. It was in the morning, but what hours or why that particular time, I cannot remember.

87. Q. You say you feel it was in the morning?

A. That is right.

88. Q. Can you remember whether it was before daybreak, or after daybreak?

A. I do not recall.

89. Q. Do you know whether or not during these periods during which the aircraft warning systems were manned, there was an officer in charge of the aircraft warning system in the pursuit command?

A. I do not remember, but I'm sure there must have been.

90. Q. Can you recall whether or not on the morning of 7 December 1941 there was scheduled to arrive in the Hawaiian area a flight of friendly planes?

A. There was. As I recall, 13, B-17s came in during the attack, or about 13.

91. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Colonel, is this: Was the flight scheduled, and if it was, do you know the hour that the flight was due to arrive on the Island of Oahu?

A. I do not.

92. Q. Can you remember whether, between October 1, 1941 and December 7, 1941, any joint Army and Navy drills were held involving long-range air reconnaissance?

A. I do not remember.

93. Q. Can you recall whether or not there were any drills held between the same period involving Navy fighters and Army pursuit ships?

A. I do not remember.

94. Q. Adverting to the morning of 7 December 1941, do you have any knowledge of a radar track having been kept of incoming planes which afterward turned out to be Japanese, or of these same planes when they made a return?

A. There was such a radar track.

95. Q. Was it for both incoming and outgoing, or for just one?

A. I cannot say. I do not know.

[489] 96. Q. What is your information on this radar track?

A. I saw the track several days subsequent to December 7th but I'm not a radar man.

97. Q. Did this track show whether or not it was for retiring planes, or for incoming planes? Can you remember that?

A. I do not remember that.

98. Q. Specifically when, after 0755 on 7 December 1941, did you become acquainted with the existence of this radar track, to the best of your knowledge?

A. I do not remember.

99. Q. Can you recall when you first became aware that an enemy was attacking in the Hawaiian area?

A. According to my watch, it was 7:58 a. m., December 7th.

100. Q. What was the information that you had that led you to believe that this was an enemy attack?

A. I was out in my quarters. I received a telephone message. I received a number of telephone messages immediately thereafter from Hickam Field. The first message, the adjutant general at Hickam Field relayed to me at once, I informed the Commanding General immediately, who lived in the adjoining quarters, ran to my office, issued the order for the all-out alert which the General had directed. That all occurred within a very few minutes.

101. Q. What was the message you got from Hickam Field?

A. That we were being attacked by Japanese planes. The explosions were going on at the time. It was very evident.

102. Q. Can you remember how long after you gave the directive for the general alert that it took to man the anti-aircraft guns for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not remember.

103. Q. Can you recall whether or not this general alert included the matter of pursuit planes getting aloft?

A. I believe it did.

104. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any Army pursuit ships did get off the ground after the initiation of the Japanese attack at 0755 7 December 1941?

A. I do. They did.

105. Q. About how long did it take them to get into the air?

A. I do not know.

[490] 106. Q. Can you state approximately how many pursuit ships did get in the air at that time?

A. I cannot.

107. Q. Do you know whether or not any bombers were able to take the air after the general alert you have described?

A. I do not.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

108. Q. Sometime on Sunday morning, 7 December, did you telephone Chief of Staff, General Marshall?

A. I did.

109. Q. About what time was that, Colonel Phillips?

A. As I recall, that was about 8:22.

110. Q. That would be Hawaiian Time?

A. That is right.

111. Q. How long did it take to get the call through?

A. Not very long. I should say maybe five, maybe ten minutes; not over that.

112. Q. Was the connection good?

A. Excellent.

113. Q. Now, will you relate as accurately as you can recall just what you said and what General Marshall said?

A. I told the Chief of Staff—I think I first got the secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith. I asked for the Chief of Staff and was connected with him. I told him that we were under an attack by the Japanese. I gave him what information I had as to the

casualties and the destruction by that time. He replied, "Did you get my message?" My reply, "What message?" His reply, "The message I sent yesterday", I believe, or "last night".

114. Q. "The message I sent yesterday or last night?"

A. Well, I'm not sure exactly.

115. Q. But it was either one of the two?

A. Yes, sir. My reply, "We did not".

116. Q. And that was about all?

A. That was about all that I recall. This is all that I recall.

[491] 117. Q. Was the call shifted on the Washington end to someone else?

A. I do not know.

118. Q. And repeated by you at the request of General Marshall to somebody else in the office?

A. It was not.

119. Q. It was not?

A. It was not repeated by me.

120. Q. It was not repeated?

A. It was not repeated by me to somebody else in the office.

121. Q. What time did you get the dispatch that General Marshall did send?

A. About 3:30 the afternoon of December 7th.

122. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 in these proceedings and ask if that is a copy of the message that was received?

A. I do not know.

123. Q. You saw it when it came?

A. I saw it and immediately dispatched it by officer messenger in my office to General Short.

124. Q. He was then at some—

A. He was at the forward echelon, as we called it, up in the crater at his forward command post. I was at Fort Shafter.

125. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when that message was received in Hawaii, as distinguished from being received by you, I mean?

A. Not of my own knowledge. I have been told that it came in sometime that morning. It was sent, as I recall, over the Radio Corporation of America lines.

126. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was dispatched in Washington?

A. I have not.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

127. Q. Colonel, are you familiar with the publication, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy"?

A. Yes, sir.

[492] 128. Q. I think you answered a question with reference to the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor, in which you said it was a joint responsibility?

A. I was familiar with those, with the provisions. I haven't seen them for two years and a half.

129. Q. Did you answer that it was a joint responsibility? Am I correct in my recollection?

A. I think my reply, sir, was to the effect that, as I recalled, it was generally a joint responsibility. That is what I meant to say.

130. Q. This publication, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", is still in effect, isn't it?

A. I do not know.

131. Q. It was effective on December 7, 1941?

A. I believe it was, sir.

132. Q. Do you know what the responsibility of the Army and Navy was, respectively, under this Joint Action, and also under any agreements that may have been entered into between the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, as to the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I undoubtedly knew at the time. I do not recall specifically at this time.

133. Q. Don't you consider that it is a matter of such great importance that it couldn't possibly leave your mind as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General?

A. I have been away entirely from that office for many months, Admiral, been on an active combat front, and haven't thought of Pearl Harbor for some time.

The question was repeated.

A. I consider it is of great importance, sir, but I cannot answer the question. I do not remember.

134. Q. You testified to the effect that you didn't remember whether you had Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 3; is that correct?

A. I remember definitely, sir, that it was the sabotage alert. We called them the sabotage alert, the half-out, and the all-out, rather than 1, 2 and 3. I do not at present recall. It is a matter of record in the standard operating procedure.

135. Q. Aren't the Army designations of alert still in effect as 1, 2 and 3?

A. Those were numbers that were adopted in the Hawaiian Department merely for convenience.

[493] 136. Q. But not in general throughout the Army?

A. No, sir.

137. Q. And you don't recall a distinction now between 1 and 3?

A. I recall the distinction, sir, but I'm not sure whether the sabotage alert was No. 1 or No. 3.

138. Q. I'm not talking about the sabotage alert. I am talking about your knowledge of conditions 1 and 3 of the alert. You mean that you are just confused as to the numbering?

A. That is right; that is right exactly.

139. Q. When important dispatches such as the judge advocate has shown you here during your testimony were received by the Commanding General, did he discuss them with you at all?

A. Yes, sir, generally.

140. Q. Then if General Short had seen those dispatches, would he assume that you saw them, or would that be a correct assumption?

A. I may have seen them, but the correct assumption would be that if I did not see them, he discussed them with me.

141. Q. Colonel, you stated that in your opinion an air attack was more probable than any other; an air attack on Hawaii?

A. That was my personal opinion, yes, sir.

142. Q. Upon what was that opinion based?

A. The enemy's capabilities.

143. Q. Did you know anything about the enemy's capabilities or dispositions?

A. Nothing definite, no, sir.

144. Q. In other words, your personal opinion was not based on any definite information?

A. That is right.

145. Q. Simply a question of opinion?

A. Personal opinion.

146. Q. Did you receive any message that certain planes were 132 miles from Honolulu, in a northeasterly direction, on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I did not.

147. Q. In general, did you accompany General Short when he made official visits and otherwise to Admiral Kimmel?

A. In general, I did.

[494] 148. Q. Were they on speaking terms?

A. Certainly.

149. Q. Officially and personally?

A. Yes, sir; and socially.

150. Q. What do you consider their relationship, both personally and officially?

A. Very friendly.

151. Q. Cordial?

A. Very cordial.

152. Q. Have you any knowledge of any disputes among them?

A. None.

153. Q. Or controversies?

A. No, sir.

154. Q. In other words, your opinion was that there was very close cooperation, not only between the General and the Admiral, but between their subordinates?

A. Exactly.

155. Q. What is that?

A. Yes, sir.

156. Q. From your knowledge as Chief of Staff of the General, did you consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Hawaii?

A. I did not.

157. Q. To your knowledge, was there a free exchange of information between the Commanding General of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. There was.

158. Q. Have you any knowledge of the conditions relative to drinking or intoxication of Army personnel on the night of 6-7 December, 1941?

A. I have.

159. Q. What was that condition so far as you know it?

A. Purely normal; no excess whatsoever; no drunkenness. There had been no officer in the Army tried for drunkenness or charges preferred during my tour in the Hawaiian Department.

160. Q. This applied also to officers, as well as men, did it?

A. In the Hawaiian Department. I cannot say as to the charges preferred against men but I can say that there was nothing excessive or anything of that kind on December 6th, 5th, or any other time in that immediate period.

[495] 161. Q. What was the condition of Army personnel and Naval, so far as you were able to see them, at the time of the attack on the morning of 7 December, 1941, with reference to their fitness for duty?

A. There were no cases or any indication of anything except top condition at that time.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

162. Q. In other words, they were all fit for duty and were on the job?

A. All that I came in contact with.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 11:05 a. m., took a recess until 11:25 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.

[496] 2. Q. What duties were assigned you in 1941?

A. In the beginning of the year I was Chief of Staff of Group 4 and on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.

3. Q. When did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff for Operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet?

A. When Admiral Kimmel assumed command, which, as I recall it, was about the 1st of February, 1941.

4. Q. There is evidence before this court that the U. S. Pacific Fleet was based in the Hawaiian Islands during the year 1941. I will ask you to discuss the problems attendant to basing the U. S. Pacific Fleet in that area under the heading, first, of materiel.

A. Well, materiel for getting the Fleet ready for war requirements was hard to get. The normal flow seemed to be toward the Atlantic, and this applies particularly to items such as radar, anti-aircraft guns, bombs, and planes.

5. Q. The second is with regard to supplies.

A. Generally speaking, except for the items mentioned above, the Pacific Fleet was well supplied.

6. Q. What about the morale of personnel?

A. I think the morale was high—as high as could be expected under the circumstances. There were continued rumors of the Fleet's returning to the West Coast, which upset the people to a certain extent. There were few recreational facilities on the Island for the number of personnel in the Fleet, and transportation between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu was difficult. A combination of all these things, I think, made it difficult to maintain the high standard of morale that I think we did maintain.

7. Q. What about training?

A. The Pacific Fleet was divided into three task forces. That permitted an operating schedule, which, in my opinion, gave plenty of time for training and overhaul. The training was realistic, in that ships were required to steam darkened in war time dispositions. The training was emphasized so as to be of an inter-type nature, which included aircraft, submarines, and all types of service forces. I had never seen the Fleet organized and trained under more warlike conditions, and I believe the training conducted during this period, within the personnel and materiel available, prepared them and readied them for war. I think the basic organization of the Fleet was greater, and that is substantiated by the fact that the Fleet has operated in generally that organization during the war. In port, the training was not confined merely to readying the ships for possible war at sea, but also in defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, and the training which was conducted in port was all joint, in that the Army Air [497] Forces always participated. Generally speaking, at sea the exercises were practically of a joint nature, too, in that the Army conducted joint exercises as pertains to range-finder checking and based on artillery defense training. Their aircraft usually participated with the Fleet in training exercises. The training was not confined to any particular area, because we operated both to the northern and to the southern of the Island.

8. Q. From your experience as Fleet Operations Officer, what was your view in 1941 of the correctness of the continuing decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. From my own personal point of view, I could see no reason for maintaining the Pacific Fleet in the Pearl Harbor area as a threat to Japan. If it had to be maintained out there to get funds for the matériel and logistic development of Pearl Harbor, then, the retention has paid dividends.

9. Q. From your official position on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, will you state what views you held between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941, on the question of the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. Well, I knew Japan was on the move, but I believe that the direction of the movement was toward the Malays or toward Thailand. If, in doing that, they had committed an overt act against the United States, what attitude the United States would assume in that case was questionable to me. As a matter of fact, that whole subject was very much, confused in my mind, because as I

saw it, the Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear-cut view of the attitude which the Government was assuming toward Japan.

10. Q. During the same period of time, what were your views, if you had any, with reference to a surprise attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. I never thought there would be an air or surface ship attack on the Pacific Fleet at that time.

11. Q. You mean the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, I never thought that Japan would initiate a war by an attack on the Pacific Fleet, because even though that would gain some temporary tactical supremacy, I thought it would be an act which would hasten the defeat of Japan, that an attack on the Pacific Fleet would wake up America with a bang more than anything else except an attack on the mainland. In addition to that, and referring to the dates of November 27 and December 7, I think we had information indicating that the Japanese Fleet was primarily based in the Empire, and then, too, we were in the throes of long discussions between the Army and Washington on the changing of defense battalions on the outlying islands, the withdrawal of certain aircraft from the bases in the Pacific and substituting Army for Marine planes. A combination of all these [498] things just strengthened my belief that a surprise air surface ship attack would not be made.

12. Q. Had you ever considered the possibility of an air attack on units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, and if you had, will you tell the court what form of attack you estimated they would most probably make?

A. In my opinion, an attack on Pearl Harbor or an attack in the area of Pearl Harbor would have been made by submarine. I think there was evidence of submarines around there before on these dates that you mentioned.

13. Q. In answer to my last question, Admiral, you discussed submarine attack. My question referred specifically to an air attack on units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

A. Well, my answer to your former question applies. I did not think there would be an air or surface ship attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.

14. Q. Did you form any estimate, if the attack were made, of the manner in which it would develop, that is, by bombing or by torpedo plane?

A. No, I didn't, but it would be natural to presume it would be made by both.

15. Q. What were your views in late November, 1941, as to the possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on units of the Pacific Fleet moored or anchored in Pearl Harbor?

A. From information which I had, I felt the depth of water in Pearl Harbor was such that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from aircraft against ships moored in Pearl Harbor.

16. Q. Had this view been influenced by any opinions from the Navy Department?

A. Yes, because I believe there is information available in letters of the Chief of Naval Operations to the effect that—at least, as I recall it—ten to eleven fathoms were required for torpedo launching.

17. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether the view of the Chief of Naval Operations was modified in respect to the depth of water in which torpedoes might be launched?

A. No, I do not.

18. Q. Do you know what condition of readiness was being maintained in units of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor between November 27, 1941, and December 7 of the same year?

A. Generally speaking, no, except I know what conditions of readiness were defined in the security letter of the Commander-in-Chief, and I know it had been prescribed what guns were to be manned and what the condition of readiness for ammunition was to be.

[499] 19. Q. Did you, during this period of time, have any personal views as to the adequacy of this state of readiness which was being maintained?

A. I felt it was satisfactory.

20. Q. Did you know during this same period of time what condition of readiness for aircraft was being maintained in subordinate commands of the Fleet?

A. Generally speaking, no, but I knew what the plane requirements were for training activities and generally what was being done to maintain and prepare planes for their operations.

21. Q. Immediately prior to December 7, 1941, do you know whether there was any aircraft reconnaissance being conducted from Pearl Harbor or its environments?

A. Generally speaking, all reconnaissance was conducted in connection with training flights.

22. Q. Specifically, do you know whether there was any reconnaissance of Fleet operating areas during this period of time?

A. Yes, the operating areas were under constant patrol.

23. Q. Do you recall a so-called war warning message dated approximately November 27, 1941?

A. Yes.

24. Q. Do you recall whether or not any additional aircraft reconnaissance was undertaken after the receipt of this message?

A. I think not.

25. Q. Do you know of any reasons for not making additional reconnaissance?

A. The primary reason was that there were not enough planes and pilots and the requirement for getting planes in operation condition, so far as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned.

26. Q. What facilities did a prospective enemy have for appraising itself of the ships which were in Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, Pearl Harbor is sitting in plain view of everybody, and I presume if anybody wanted to pass out information or get it out of Honolulu, he could send it any place he wanted.

27. Q. Did task force units operate according to a certain well-defined procedure, being at sea so many days and being in Pearl Harbor so many days?

A. The operating schedule provided a varying length of time when ships would be at port and at sea, and there was no regular pattern of sorties, entrances, and operating periods.

[500] 28. Q. Suppose, for example, that an enemy spy saw a task force coming into Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941. Would that be any basis for a presumption on the part of the spy that those ships might remain in port for a certain fixed period of time, such as a week, ten days, or two weeks?

A. I think it would be logical for him to presume that when the ships came into port, they did so for logistic requirements and overhaul.

29. Q. Can you recall whether there were any restrictions on outgoing communications from the Hawaiian area to foreign countries for the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941?

A. Not that I know of.

30. Q. Would it have been possible for any person in the Hawaiian area to have sent any sort of mail communication he wished without censorship?

A. I presume so.

31. Q. Does that apply to radio messages?

A. I don't know, but I would presume so.

32. Q. From your own naval experience in matters relating to a current estimate of the situation, do you consider it an important factor to keep well informed on the location and probable movements of a prospective enemy?

A. Yes, it is highly important that you do that, but to do it you must be able to get the information either through your own organization or you must depend on someone outside your organization to give you all the information that is available to them and not available to you.

33. Q. Do you have any information on whether or not any Japanese interests were endeavoring to keep currently informed on the location and movements of the units of the Pacific Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941?

A. Not from any information that I recall that was available to us in Pearl Harbor or had been furnished to us from any other source.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

34. Q. Admiral, referring to your testimony concerning torpedoes running in the waters at Pearl Harbor, I show you a document, which is before this court as Exhibit 55, dated June 13. Will you read this to yourself, particularly the second paragraph, and state to the court whether you had that in mind when you gave the testimony?

A. No, I did not. I was not referring to this letter.

[501] 35. Q. You, of course, were familiar with the naval war plans which were current in the latter half of 1941, were you not?

A. I think generally, yes.

36. Q. Did you know that that plan was based upon a joint Army and Navy plan? I show you Exhibit 4 in that connection.

A. I think so, yes.

37. Q. Referring to your testimony concerning your own personal doubts as to the policy of the United States in its relations with Japan, did you think during those days that under the circumstances which did exist there were any deficiencies in WPL-46 or that there were any parts of it which were wrong?

A. The plan could not have been executed, in my opinion, with the forces which were available in the Pacific Fleet.

38. Q. Couldn't the official task have been carried out?

A. Some of them, yes, sir.

39. Q. What was the official task?

A. To take the offensive on mobilization and raid certain islands.

40. Q. Now, in any relationship between that plan and what you said about your doubts or lack of knowledge concerning national policy between the two nations, did you see any amendment which could have been made to those plans that would have been helpful?

A. Well, I do not think that the plans as laid out here, or that you are discussing here, are entirely applicable to the question of whether or not the Commander-in-Chief was informed of national policy.

[502] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

41. Q. Will you please read the entire letter of 13 June which Admiral Hart showed you relative to the torpedo baffles, to yourself; were you familiar with that letter when it was received by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir, and I think that my statement in my testimony was based on Paragraph 3 of this letter.

42. Q. Specifically, do you care to change the opinion that you expressed in your direct testimony in view of your memory being refreshed by having presently read the letter of 13 June?

A. If I recall correctly, I said there was a Vice-Chief of Naval Operations' letter which stated that 10 or more fathoms were required for launching torpedoes, and as I read here, I believe that the statement I made refers to Paragraph 3 of this letter.

43. Q. I show you a document, Admiral DeLany. Can you identify it?

A. I don't know whether I have seen it before, or not.

44. Q. Well, can you identify it now?

A. Well, it is a fortnightly summary of the current national situation as prepared by ONI dated 1 December 1941 and signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Captain, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence.

The fortnightly summary of the current national situation as prepared by Office of Naval Intelligence, dated 1 December 1941, signed by T. S. Wilkinson, was submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be deemed pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 57" for reference, description appended.

45. Q. Will you read Paragraphs (a) and (c), please, Admiral?

A. (Reading:)

(a) The Diplomatic Situation. 1. Japan. Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese government and

press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticizing Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against [503] Thailand.

(c) The Japanese Naval Situation. Deployment of naval forces to the south has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and Northern China Coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosa ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small, individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the commander-in-chief, second fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task forces; one gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greater proportion of carriers.

46. Q. Did you have any information in Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December contrary to the information in this report from ONI which you have just read?

A. Not to my knowledge.

47. Q. I ask you if you can identify this document, Admiral DeLany?

A. Yes, sir. This was issued while I was still operations officer in the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean areas. It is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 23CL-42 issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Pacific Fleet which prescribes battle organization and condition of readiness, watches at sea. It lists the batteries, including main AA and automatic weapons, and it is signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz. It has as Enclosure A, a copy of Reference (a), which was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 21st of February, 1941, which has as its subject, "Battle organization and condition watches", signed by H. E. Kimmel.

The Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 23CL-42 dated 6 May 1942, signed by Admiral C. W. Nimitz, and Enclosure A thereof, was submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) offered in evidence, for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be deemed pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 58" for reference, description appended.

[504] 48. Q. Is it fair to state that the effect of the letter, Exhibit 58, is a re-issue by Admiral Nimitz under date of 6 May 1942 of the letter of Admiral Kimmel under date of 21 February 1941?

A. Yes, sir, because the letter of 6 May 1942, signed by C. W. Nimitz, states, "Enclosure (A) is a copy of Reference (a)," and Reference (a) is CinCPac Confidential Serial 0300 of 21 February 1941, and CinCPac Serial 0300 of 21 February 1941 is the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's letter of battle organization and condition watches signed by H. E. Kimmel.

49. Q. Will you read Enclosure (A) to Exhibit 58, omitting Paragraphs 10, 11, and 12, which I do not consider sufficiently important or pertinent to warrant taking the time of the court in reading?

The witness read Enclosure (A) to Exhibit 58, except Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, copy appended.

50. Q. I show you another document, Admiral DeLany, and ask you if you can identify it?

A. Yes, sir. This is a letter that was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, outlining the airplane situation in the Hawaiian area, dated 7 January 1942, and signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, C. W. Nimitz. It has as an enclosure, ComPatWing Two, Secret Letter 0033, December 30, 1941.

The letter issued by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of United States Fleet, signed "C. W. Nimitz", and enclosure, ComPatWing Two, Secret Letter 0033 dated Dec. 30, 1941, were submitted to the judge advocate and to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of such future use as may be desired to be made of it.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 59" for reference, description appended.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

51. Q. Admiral, to your knowledge, was any M-Day set prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, sir.

[505] 52. Q. Was there any order to mobilize the Fleet?

A. No, sir.

53. Q. Do you consider that the Fleet was mobilized?

A. No, sir.

54. Q. In what way was it not mobilized?

A. Deficiencies in personnel, material, logistics in support.

55. Q. Are you familiar with Joint Army and Navy Plan and Agreement as to defense of the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Prior to 7 December?

56. Q. Prior to 7 December.

A. Yes.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[506] 57. Q. Under this plan whom do you consider as responsible for the defense of the Hawaiian area and Pearl Harbor?

A. The Army is responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

58. Q. In your position on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific, were you conversant with official messages received by him from the Navy Department and Chief of Operations regarding the Japanese situation?

A. Yes, I think I saw all messages.

59. Q. Did you at that time feel that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was receiving full information, so as to give him complete knowledge of existing conditions between this country and Japan?

A. No, sir, I did not.

60. Q. Will you please state why, and in what respect?

A. I believe that the negotiations and discussions in Washington were not fully reported to the Commander-in-Chief.

61. Q. Do you have reference, Admiral, to the period 27 November to 7 December, especially, or in the whole period?

A. The whole period.

62. Q. Will you please state to the court how you interpreted the message of 27 November? We refer to the message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and referred to as the "war warning" message?

A. Well, sir, I think I have expressed my opinion on that question before, when I said I believed that Japan was on the move. I thought that they were moving to the southward, and that what the position of the United States would be as to what it would regard as an overt act was questionable.

63. Q. What was your interpretation, specifically, as to the phrase, "war warning", and what did it mean to you?

A. Just what I have said, sir, that Japan was on the move.

64. Q. Did you interpret this as immediate attack by the Japanese on the United States?

A. No, sir.

65. Q. When was the O. N. I. bulletin of December 1, 1941, which was presented to you a few minutes ago, received in the office of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific?

A. I cannot answer. I don't remember.

66. Q. Do you know whether or not it was received prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, sir, I cannot say, but the information that appears [507] in that bulletin, in my opinion, as I recall it, had been probably received from the estimate of the situation or the information that was put out by the 16th Naval District, prior to that time—as I recall the thing.

67. Q. In your position as one of the officers of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did you come in contact with and discuss matters of mutual interest with Army officials?

A. Yes, sir.

68. Q. Will you please state to the court what kind of cooperation existed and what the relationship existing was between Army and Naval officers at that time?

A. I think there was a complete understanding, not only between the officers in the high echelon—I refer to Admiral Kimmel and General Short—but also a complete understanding between the officers of Admiral Kimmel's staff and their opposite numbers in the Army organization. There was complete cooperation, I will say, instead of "complete understanding."

69. Q. In other words, so far as you know, a cordial relationship and a friendly relationship existed between the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and General Short?

A. Definitely so, sir.

70. Q. Have you heard rumors to the effect that such relationship did not exist, that these officers were not on speaking terms, and that there was no coordinated effort between the Army and the Navy?

A. Yes, sir, I have read it in the press, and I think there is an article in this week's "Collier's" which refers to the unfortunate relationship that existed between those two individuals.

71. Q. Have you any knowledge of from what sources these rumors emanated?

A. No, sir, I haven't any idea from what sources they emanated, and I believe that the individuals that would start them are attempting to malign the individuals that are concerned.

72. Q. What was the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet at this time? We refer to the latter part of 1941.

A. I think it was training.

73. Q. Had there been any order received from higher authority in Washington to discontinue this training, or to lessen the training?

A. No, sir, not that I remember.

74. Q. As an operations officer of the Fleet, were you conversant with the conditions of material readiness and the deficiencies of material in the Fleet? [508]

A. Yes, sir.

75. Q. And we understand that you have stated that there were certain deficiencies?

A. Yes, sir.

76. Q. In your opinion, was there an inadequacy of material equipment for ships of the Fleet?

A. Definitely so in particular items, as I mentioned—radar, anti-aircraft equipment, airplane bombs, airplanes themselves.

77. Q. Will you please state to the court the reasons why certain ships were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December?

A. They were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, as I recall it, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Pacific Fleet.

78. Q. Was it necessary that these ships there present return to Pearl Harbor for any reason?

A. Well, there weren't enough oilers to refuel them at sea. They had to come back for incidental repairs and recreation of the crew.

79. Q. On the night of 6-7 December, what, in your opinion, was the condition of officers and men as to sobriety?

A. I have no way of answering that question, Admiral. I was in my own home on that night, and I don't know what the condition was. If you can take the general set-up there in the Hawaiian area, I think that you could say that they were sober, because I don't believe that there was any excessive drinking in the area.

80. Q. In your opinion was there any truth in this gossip, that was afterwards spread, that there were numerous officers intoxicated and men intoxicated at that time?

A. I think that the rumor is a very definite untruth.

81. Q. What, in your opinion, was the condition of officers and men at the time of the attack on 7 December, the morning of 7 December? We refer to fitness for duty.

A. I think they were fit for duty, and the evidence of that fact is that they did perform their duty well.

82. Q. Throughout your tour of duty as Assistant Chief for Operations, was there any evidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of any attitude other than [509] a persistent desire to arrive at a high state of readiness for war, and any action other than a single-minded, intelligent effort toward the attainment of this objective?

A. Most definitely not. I think that any bit of information that is available in the files of the Navy Department will show that his one

single thought was intensive training and preparation, and in readiness of the fleet for war, not only to the extent of requiring that personnel that was necessary to man the ships should be provided, but also in his insistent efforts to get material into the ships.

83. Q. Do you know of any case of disaffection, inattention to duty, carelessness, or irresponsibility, on the part of any individual or individuals which would tend to defeat the success of this effort?

A. No, sir, I do not.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

84. Q. Admiral, referring to your statement to the effect that the Pacific Fleet had not been given any very clear-cut view as to the attitude the United States was assuming towards Japan, you know, of course, that questions of that sort were decided on very high political levels, did you not?

A. I had no idea who was formulating the policy back here, other than it was natural to presume that that would be the status.

85. Q. Did you ever hear from Admiral Kimmel or anyone else that the Chief of Naval Operations repeatedly said that he himself could not get answers to many questions of that nature?

A. I think that statement has appeared in personal correspondence which I saw.

86. Q. Your testimony which you gave concerning the 1 December O. N. I. bulletin which you had not received, do you recall having heard from intelligence units in Hawaii an estimate that two or more Japanese carriers were in the Marshall Islands?

A. I have heard that statement made since the 7th of December, but as I recall it, my knowledge prior to the 7th of December, was that there was a small carrier force to the southward of the Philippines, but that the main strength of the Japanese Navy, as pertains to capital ships and carriers, was based in the Empire, and I do not recall having heard, prior to 7 December, that there were two carriers in the Marshalls.

87. Q. Did you think, during those last ten or fifteen [510] days of peace, that you were fully in touch with all information concerning the Japanese, that was available to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. All the information that was available to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I felt sure I had seen.

Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), desired to recross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 12:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 21, 1941.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944.

[511]

FIFTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.

Present :

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and his counsel.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the fourteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate :

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, Assistant Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

2. Q. State what duties you were assigned between February and December 7, 1941?

A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Sir, I show you a drawing showing certain dispositions, apparently in Pearl Harbor. I ask you if you recognize this drawing.

A. I do.

[512] 4. Q. Will you state to the court what that drawing is and what it shows?

A. This white sheet is a copy of the work sheet which was used by the group of officers, including myself, who made up the official report of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. It was the duty of my division of the staff to prepare an action report. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye and his staff came over and joined the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. Admiral Pye, in the interim, was acting as Commander-in-Chief. He brought some of his staff officers

with him. Among them were Captain, now Rear Admiral, Allen Smith, and Captain Hall Adlon, who actively prepared this report because my section of the staff was very busy. I worked with them on this and I recognize this as the work sheet we used in drawing the path of the various Japanese attacks on that morning. This white sheet shows a layout of Pearl Harbor Base, the docks, anchorages, and moorings, and indicates thereon the position of the various ships which were in Pearl Harbor on that morning, the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

The work sheet showing the disposition of vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended marked "EXHIBIT 60."

5. Q. You have stated that you were the Fleet Gunnery Officer during your tour of duty between February and December, 1941. Did you perform any additional duties in this capacity?

A. Well, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, I was part of the operational division of the staff, performing duty under Captain, now Real Admiral, Walter DeLany.

6. Q. Did your duties include anything in the nature of fleet training?

A. That was my primary duty as Fleet Gunnery Officer.

7. Q. I suppose that the statement that you were in charge of fleet training also included gunnery?

A. That's right, sir.

8. Q. Can you state what the general efficiency of ships and gunnery was on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. In my opinion, sir, it was the highest state that it had ever reached in times of peace in the history of the Fleet as I have known it.

9. Q. And may I assume that also included anti-aircraft guns?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. Now can you state what consideration had been given to Fleet security while in Pearl Harbor, in general terms?

A. Consideration had been given to Fleet security in Pearl Harbor to the extent that in February or March 1941, a [513] fleet circular letter was issued. If I recollect, it was 2CL-41, which laid down the general security measures which were to be taken for the security of the fleet, both at sea and in Pearl Harbor.

11. Q. Was this letter, 2CL-41, which you mentioned, the only written orders concerning the security of the fleet that you recall?

A. There were various operational orders setting forth the mission of various subordinate commanders in the fleet. They were issued from time to time, implementing these security plans. There was also a letter issued in February or March, 1941, and later re-issued, in toto without any change, in the summer of 1942, setting forth the organization of the crews of all the ships in the fleet and the methods of standing conditions-of-readiness watches, the requirement that in general all anti-aircraft guns should have four crews, so that a practically complete anti-aircraft could be manned on the basis of a watch in four. This letter also required the actual firing of target practices by these various crews, four per gun, and provisions or ammunition and a change in the gunnery rules for the

whole Navy were instituted which permitted and insured this training. I do not recollect the file number of that letter, or whether it was a circular or a letter addressed to force and type commanders. It was reissued in the summer of 1942 by Admiral Nimitz, as a circular letter to the fleet, I believe.

12. Q. I show you Exhibit 58, which is now in evidence before the court. Can you state whether or not this is the letter to which you have just referred?

A. Yes, sir. This letter is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to the Pacific Fleet, and has as its enclosure the letter to which I referred. I see the date is the 21st of February, 1941, and it was addressed to the force and type commanders of the Pacific Fleet.

13. Q. Will you state the condition of readiness being maintained in the Pacific Fleet on 7 December, 1941?

A. To the best of my knowledge, nothing less than condition 3 had been maintained at sea for nearly a year prior to the 7th of December, 1941, and to the best of my knowledge port condition 3, or its equivalent, was in effect in port on those two dates. Those conditions of readiness, I might say, are not identical, condition 3, between sea and port.

14. Q. Did the Commandant of the 14th Naval District have any anti-aircraft guns under his control?

A. Only the guns of the fleet, with the possible exception of a battery of 3-inch AA Army type guns which may have been available to a battalion or part of a defense battalion of Marines, which were assembled in Pearl Harbor prior to being dispatched to an outlying base. There were no what might be called Naval shore batteries.

[514] 15. Q. Had any provision been made for the coordination of anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. Will you state in brief what this was?

A. Well, the harbor defense, or base defense officer in Pearl Harbor, as far as anti-aircraft fire was concerned, was in effect an officer in charge of a command post of the anti-aircraft battery set-up of the whole island area, in that under the provisions of circular letter 2CL, the guns of the fleet were made available in sectors to the base defense officer, for his use in coordination with the Army batteries. The set-up was that the whole anti-aircraft defense of that area was under the command of a Brigadier General in the Army Air Forces, Brigadier General Davidson; he had command of the filter station, the Army fighter command, which used what Navy fighters were available on the island strips. He also had command of the anti-aircraft batteries, heavy and light, the search-light batteries, and under that category came the ships of the fleet in the harbor. The anti-aircraft gun batteries were under the command of a Brigadier General of the coastal artillery corps, AA.

17. Q. What was the detailed method of coordinating these batteries on shore with the guns of the fleet?

A. The anti-aircraft master command post at Fort Shafter communicated with the harbor control post. As I recollect, the actual officer in actual charge was Commander Momsen, in Pearl Harbor.

18. Q. And how in turn did this harbor post get in communication or have control of fire with the fleet?

A. It had control to this extent, that it set the conditions, gave the alerts, warned of the approach of enemy planes, chiefly by signals from the signal tower, but obviously could not actually control the fire of the individual battery or ship. That was the function of the commanding officer.

19. Q. Then, as I understand your answer, this officer in the harbor control post warned the ships of the fleet the condition of readiness, the direction of approach of an enemy, and then the officer in command of that sector in the fleet or the commanding officer of ships in the fleet, undertook the fire control from there on?

A. That is correct, sir.

20. Q. Can you recall whether or not anti-aircraft fire was coordinated in any manner on the morning of 7 December, 1941, at the time of the Japanese attack?

A. Certainly was not coordinated through the normal chain of command as expected to be done, because to the best of my knowledge there was no anti-aircraft fire delivered during the Japanese attack except from vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and from the fleet machine gun school at Palua, plus, may I add, machine gunfire and rifle fire from marines and sailors in the Navy Yard. I speak of the area immediately [515] around Pearl Harbor, and for the period of the actual attack by the Japanese on that area.

21. Q. Now do you mean by the actual Japanese attack, the period between 0755 on the morning of December 7, 1941, and the remainder of the day of the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I mean up to the period of approximately the middle of the afternoon. I was informed by Army anti-aircraft officers on the 8th of December, that certain fixed Army anti-aircraft batteries which were already emplaced at De Russy, Sand Island, and I forget the name of the fort just beyond Hickam Field—Kamehameha—had actually fired at Japanese planes during this attack. I have no knowledge of that myself. I do have knowledge that the greatest strength of Army anti-aircraft defense was in mobile batteries of 3-inch caliber, AA guns, which were not emplaced on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

22. Q. And did the mobile batteries which you have just testified about get into action during the period of the Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941, that you have knowledge of?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no. I was informed in the course of a trip around the whole area on the 8th of December, that the first Army anti-aircraft battery got in position shortly afternoon on that day, the 7th.

23. Q. When did you consider that the last Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had ended on 7 December 1941?

A. Sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 a. m.

24. Q. As I understand your answer, the mobile batteries did not get into position until after this last attack was over?

A. That is my firm belief.

25. Q. Can you state the number and calibre of Army anti-aircraft guns available on the island of Oahu for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor and other naval installations?

A. I cannot state that exactly, because batteries were rushed in there over a period of several weeks after the attack, and my memory is confused by that factor. I would estimate that somewhere between eight and twelve 4-gun batteries were available.

26. Q. What calibre?

A. 3-inch. 90-millimeter AA guns were available very shortly after the attack, and it may be that one battery of 90-millimeter guns was available in the island at the time of the attack.

27. Q. How many 3-inch guns in a battery?

A. Four, sir.

[516] 28. Q. And that makes a total of how many 3-inch guns?

A. Somewhere between 32 and 48. That is an estimate on my part, however.

29. Q. How many guns in a 90-millimeter gun battery?

A. Four.

30. Q. And how many 90-millimeter guns would you say were available?

A. Perhaps one battery.

31. Q. Do you know where the Army quartered the gun crews that manned the guns that were in fixed emplacements?

A. I can't testify to all of this to my exact knowledge. This is information I picked up before and afterwards. I didn't actually see all this, but to the best of my knowledge and belief, they were quartered in their barracks.

32. Q. Where?

A. Some at Fort Shafter and Fort De Russy, the various forts around that area, and the guns themselves were in the gun parks.

33. Q. During your tour of duty as fleet gunnery officer, had you given consideration to an aircraft torpedo attack on vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. What were your views on the possibility of such attack taking place?

A. My views were that the particular kind of aircraft attack, namely, by torpedoes, was possible in Pearl Harbor. In that, we had considered counter measures, such as nets and balloon barrages. The feeling in general in my own mind was that the feasibility of a successful torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor—to my mind, that was minimized by the receipt of information copies of one or two letters addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the District Commandant, indicating to me that the water at Pearl Harbor was so shallow that the success of a torpedo attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was dubious. Nets were considered. The difficulty of procuring these nets, on which there was a low priority, and the need of moving the fleet on short notice from berths for a sortie, the difficulties of cluttering up the harbor with these nets—it was my understanding that all these factors placed the nets not only in a low-priority, but gave us a feeling that the risk of a successful torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages were considered in discussions among members of the staff. The chief objection to them was that they would interfere with the normal operations of our own aircraft in that area.

[517] 35. Q. Was there or was there not considerable United States Naval seaplane activity in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. There was a great deal of it, because it was the only place where it could be carried on, on that side of the island.

36. Q. What effect would torpedo baffles laid in the Pearl Harbor channels have on the operation of our naval aircraft?

A. Might probably very seriously interfere. The aircraft people were objectors from the standpoint of both nets and balloons.

37. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what had been done in the matter of anti-submarine nets in the entrances of Pearl Harbor?

A. No more than to know that there were nets at the entrance. I passed back and forth through them aboard the flagship.

38. Q. Did you know the exact type of quality of these nets?

A. No, sir.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

39. Q. You referred, Admiral Kitts, to a letter by the Commander-in-Chief to the various force and type commanders, of February, 1941, describing conditions for readiness. What degree of training was achieved in the Fleet under that letter on December 7?

A. A very high degree of training, sir. I can't say that every ship had actual training by firing every one of its crews that this letter called for, but I would say the goal had been very closely approached.

40. Q. Do you recall whether there was a shortage in 50-calibre ammunition for the Fleet prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

41. Q. Did this shortage affect the target practice of the 50-calibre anti-aircraft guns?

A. Definitely, sir.

42. Q. How did it affect it?

A. We didn't have enough to carry on as much training as we would have if the ammunition had been plentiful. Practices were carried out by all ships, but the actual length of the strings and the number of rounds permitted to an individual gunner were reduced. This also had its effect on [518] the machine gun school at Palua, where we had to reduce to a minimum the number of rounds that the gunners could fire.

43. Q. I understood you to state that there were no naval anti-aircraft shore batteries in and around Pearl Harbor?

A. That is correct, sir.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), asked the court to take judicial notice of a document, 159 of the 77th Congress, 2nd Session, entitled: "The attack upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese armed forces. Report of the commission appointed by the President of the United States to investigate and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941," which was published on January 23, 1942.

44. Q. In connection with your statement that there were no anti-aircraft shore batteries of the Navy in and around Pearl Harbor, I call your attention to a statement in paragraph 12 on page 20 of that

document, "The anti-aircraft batteries of the Army, and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti-aircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition, a high-state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to the necessary action, based upon the warnings, and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy Commands in Washington." Did you testify before the Roberts commission?

A. No, sir.

45. Q. You were not called?

A. No, sir.

46. Q. Were you present in person at Pearl Harbor at the time of the sessions of the Roberts Commission there held?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. The statement which I have read from the Congressional Report—does that change your statement, which I understood to be a categorical statement that there were no shore batteries belonging to the Navy—anti-aircraft shore batteries?

A. That does not change my statement at all except to this extent, and it is not a change: that it is possible that there may have been a Marine anti-aircraft battery, mobile, attached to the Marine defense battalion, under Admiral Bloch, under the Navy Yard. I am not sure whether such a battery was actually there on that morning. If that were so, that is the only battery which could be considered as a Navy shore battery. There was no such thing as a Navy shore battery.

[519] 48. Q. The judge advocate asked you some questions about the probability of an airplane torpedo attack on vessels located in Pearl Harbor. Having refreshed your recollection by reading the letter, Exhibit 55, of June 13, 1941, did I understand you to say that you had read that letter?

A. Yes, sir, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, yes, sir.

49. Q. And after reading that letter, did you make any recommendation or estimate to the Commander-in-Chief on that subject?

A. Not that I can recollect, sir. I know this matter was discussed among members of the staff, and probably with people in the District, since the letter was addressed to the District, but only a copy to the Commander-in-Chief.

50. Q. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel on the subject matter of a torpedo plane or torpedo air attack after that letter?

A. Not exactly, no, sir, I do not.

51. Q. After having read that letter, what was your opinion as to the probability of a successful air torpedo attack on ships in Pearl Harbor?

A. My opinion, as I recollect, of this letter, is that the probability of attack in water of certain depths was increased—and that they had reduced it, in their opinion, to about ten fathoms. The question of the availability of nets had not been changed by this at all, and my recollection of my feeling on this was that 10 fathoms was the limiting depth at which a successful attack could be expected.

52. Q. Was there 10 fathoms of water in Pearl Harbor at any place?

A. I believe one or two spots there was a deep place.

53. Q. Generally speaking, was the anchorage 10 fathoms in depth?

A. The greatest depth was 42 feet, about 7 fathoms, the deepest channel.

54. Q. As Fleet Gunnery Officer on either Tuesday or Wednesday the 10th or the 11th of December, did you go to the Army and investigate the workings of the radar situation on 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

55. Q. Will you tell the court what you did and what you found out as to operation of Army radar during the attack and prior thereto?

A. Well, on the morning of the 8th of December, Monday morning, I received a telephone call from General Davidson.

56. Q. This was the morning after the attack?

A. Yes, sir, he had a complaint to make that the night [520] before the ships of the fleet had, during a false alarm, fired at friendly planes, and that he wanted a conference with me to determine how we could prevent a recurrence.

57. Q. May I direct your attention in particular to conversation about the radar?

A. Yes, sir. I told him that I couldn't get up to meet him that day because I just couldn't get away, that I could come the next morning, and that the subject on which he requested this conference was something in which I was interested, but which properly was a matter for the harbor control post officer to attend to. That was Commander Momsen. I got in touch with Commander Momsen, informed him of the subject on which we were going up there, and Colonel Pfeiffer, now General Pfeiffer—he was a Colonel in the Marines—Captain Hanley, and I went to the filter station close to Fort Shafter and held this conference with General Davidson on the subject of the control of the fire of the guns of the fleet. When it was over, he said, "There is something over here on the drawing board in which you would be interested." And I said, "What is it?" And he said it was the radar plot of the attack on Pearl Harbor, whereupon he took us over to a drafting board and showed us the layout of the area, with radar lines plotted in from a point about 150 miles northwest of the island down to a lot of circles around Pearl Harbor and then out again.

58. Q. This was a plot going out, not coming in?

A. Yes. I was very shocked at seeing such a thing, and told General Davidson at that time that the plot coming in might have been mistaken for friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl Harbor, it was quite evident that the plot out were enemy planes—and we never knew the existence of this plot.

59. Q. That was never reported to the Navy?

A. It was never reported to the Commander-in-Chief's staff in the exactly forty-eight hours it took from the time they took it off the radar until we discovered it.

60. Q. That was on Tuesday morning?

A. That was on Tuesday morning about 11:00 o'clock.

61. Q. Did General Davidson say anything about the reasons for the 48-hour delay in reporting?

A. No, sir. Everybody was speechless there and after we left. There was nothing, no explanation.

62. Q. Speechless over the fact that you hadn't received the information?

A. I would say very frankly I was very disturbed, and got out.

[521] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

63. Q. Referring again to the Roberts Report: Is the statement which I read you earlier relative to the shore anti-aircraft batteries of the Navy at Pearl Harbor accurate, or not?

A. My statement, sir?

64. Q. The statement in the Roberts Report?

A. It is inaccurate.

Cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

65. Q. Admiral, sir, just a couple of questions: In connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, it was the Army's continual and full-time responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor; is that not correct?

A. That was my understanding, certainly.

66. Q. And the Navy's function in connection with it was but that of support; is that not right?

A. Yes, sir, to the extent that when ships of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were made available to the Army through the Harbor Defense Officer, Base Defense Officer.

67. Q. And by that you mean that when such an event happened, the guns at that point of time were then under the command of these generals that you speak of, in connection with their employment and use?

A. Ultimately under the supreme command of Brigadier General Davidson.

68. Q. The vehicle through the Harbor Command post that you speak of is only the facility for activating that command relationship; is that not so?

A. The general command and warning. There is a red, yellow, and green alert; the enemy's approaching from a certain direction and at a certain altitude, warning that those planes coming in from another direction are friendly, and that sort of thing. Not the actual control of the guns, which was always under the command of the commanding officer of the vessel. I might say that long after the attack on Pearl Harbor there wasn't any fundamental change in that set-up, nor to my knowledge is there one now.

Examined by the court:

69. Q. Admiral, were you personally so stationed on the morning of 7 December 1941 as to be able to observe the Army anti-aircraft fire as such firing took place?

A. Yes, sir, to a considerable extent, in that I [522] reached Pearl Harbor from Honolulu at, I should say, about 8:20 or 8:25 in the morning. I stayed in Staff Headquarters until, I imagine, about 10:45—that was approximately, I think, the end of the attack, although I didn't know it at the time—at which time I went in the station wagon all around Pearl Harbor to West Loch, where we were already sending ammunition, replenishment ammunition out to the ships. On my way from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor, I was in a good position to observe Japanese planes dive bombing at altitudes of 5- or 6,000 feet, and observed that all the fire came from Pearl Harbor. I spent a good part of the afternoon out around the harbor in the vicinity of West Loch and back to the Submarine Base. Army troops

were taking position and anti-aircraft mobile guns were being moved at that time. I went all around the area again on the 8th and the 9th of December, on one occasion accompanied by Army officers of the anti-aircraft command, and was at that time informed that some time after noon the first Army mobile anti-aircraft was in place.

70. Q. There is testimony before this court to the general effect that Army anti-aircraft guns were in action within 25 minutes of the beginning of the attack. Does that conflict with what you have already testified to?

A. I can well believe, sir, and it is quite possible and probable, that the Army fixed anti-aircraft guns, of which there were several batteries, actually went into action. I think the nearest one to Pearl Harbor was at Kamehameha. They were, I know, at De Russy and at Sand Island.

71. Q. So that amends your answer to the previous questions, do we understand?

A. I think in my previous testimony, Admiral, I was talking about the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor and I said that there were Army fixed anti-aircraft batteries, a few of which were actually manned and fired.

72. Q. Well, wouldn't you consider anti-aircraft batteries at Kamehameha the immediate defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

73. Q. Were there any anti-aircraft batteries at Hickam Field in operation in the early part of this attack?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

74. Q. Any anti-aircraft batteries within a reasonable distance surrounding Pearl Harbor would be considered aircraft defense of the harbor, would they not?

A. Yes, sir, that is true. I don't believe that I stated in my testimony that these guns were not used. I say it is quite probable they were but two groups of the batteries were quite a distance from Pearl Harbor. They were at Sand Island and at Fort De Russy, on the other side of Honolulu. I don't know whether they fired or not. They were World War I guns, I feel quite sure, [523] with quite rudimentary fire control. The main strength of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Island was the Army mobile 3-inch AA gun with computer, height finder, and everything complete. None of those, to my knowledge, were in place on the morning of the 7th of December except possibly a battery training over on the west coast of the Island at the regular target practice area.

75. Q. Then the testimony that I have referred to about the guns being in action within 25 minutes, you would say that that is not true with reference to the mobile guns?

A. That is correct, sir, except possibly, there was a battery of mobile guns mounted in a camp whose name I can't remember now over on the west side of the Island, beyond Barbers Point, where they had an anti-aircraft training range. There may have been a battery of 4 guns mounted there for target practice and they could have fired.

76. Q. Admiral, you state that a certain condition of readiness existed in the Fleet on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. That is right.

77. Q. What was that condition of readiness and under that condition what part, if any, of the anti-aircraft guns were manned and ready for action?

A. I can't state directly and exactly from my own knowledge, Admiral. However, I think that information is available exactly in the report of the action at Pearl Harbor and the individual report from every ship. My understanding at the time and since has been that Base Condition of Readiness 3, or its equal, was in effect. And I say it is equal because certain of the Force and Type commanders, for example Admiral Pye, had made modifications which were equal or better than the general requirement laid down in the Circular Letter, in the interests of watch standing and better coverage of the sectors. We had 4 sectors laid out to be covered by the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. As a matter of fact, Admiral Pye had submitted a study of this thing to the Commander-in-Chief a day or two before the attack indicating what changes toward betterment he suggested. I know that the ships of the battle force present in Pearl Harbor following his order on security and the manning of guns was equal to or better than the condition of readiness 3 laid down in Port Security, 2CL-41.

78. Q. Have you any knowledge as to the manner or kind of cooperation, if any, which existed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

A. To this extent, sir: I know that Admiral Kimmel and General Short met frequently. I saw General Short many times around Fleet Headquarters. I was certainly under the impression that relationships between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were most cordial and cooperative in every way.

[524] 79. Q. And in your opinion, or to your knowledge, did they discuss matters tending toward cooperation of their separate forces?

A. I cannot state to my knowledge, Admiral, because I was not in that echelon of the staff that would have knowledge of that.

80. Q. Have you any knowledge of measures enjoined by the orders given by the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington as to the specific defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir.

81. Q. Do you know the number of Japanese planes which made this attack on the morning of 7 December? If so, please give it.

A. No, sir, I do not know the number. It was estimated somewhere between 175 and 250.

82. Q. Do you know the direction from which they came? If so, please give it.

A. I'm quite sure that they came from the west, nor'west, a distance of something beyond 200 miles.

83. Q. And from what type of ship did they come? Do you know?

A. Carriers.

84. Q. Have you any knowledge as to the time from the first attack on the morning of the 7th that all anti-aircraft guns were in commission and firing?

A. Since I didn't arrive there until somewhere between 8:20 and 8:25, I cannot testify to that, Admiral.

85. Q. In the reply to your question regarding torpedo aircraft, you stated that it was possible for these planes carrying torpedoes to make an attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. Are you still of that opinion after reading these letters and refreshing your memory on these letters from the Navy Department regarding this matter?

A. As I say, Admiral, all types of aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor were considered as a possibility, including a torpedo attack. I can only testify as to what my impression was at the time, that a torpedo attack was the least possible of all air attacks, and I was led to that belief by my interpretation, right or wrong, of letters received from the Chief of Naval Operations.

86. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with dispatches, et cetera, relative to the probable action of Japan at that time?

A. Not with dispatches, sir; only personal messages. I was not in the echelon that would be consulted on those matters or I was not, in other words, chief of operations, or war plans, or of intelligence.

[525] 87. Q. Would you please state to the court the condition and efficiency of the personnel of the Fleet on the morning of December 7th?

A. It is my very strong belief, sir, that subject to certain handicaps that the Fleet had, that the state of training and efficiency of the personnel of the Fleet was the highest I have ever known it. The difficulties were chiefly those of shortage of personnel. Many ships were going in commission. There was a very large turnover in personnel, crews of the ships, and large drafts had to be sent back to the Mainland to put new ships in commission. Replacements were not forthcoming. We needed excess hands aboard the ships in order to train them and to fill drafts. We didn't get them. The Theobald Board was called early in the year 1941 to go into this whole question to see how many men could be crowded aboard ships in order to have excess numbers for training. That was the chief handicap so far as training and efficiency of the Fleet was concerned. Shortage of small arms ammunition, machine gun ammunition, contributed to that. Other ammunition was plentiful, and day and night surface and anti-aircraft practices were fired. Gunnery practices were "debunked" to the extent that high-speed targets were used and the use of battle rafts was dispensed with. Umpire parties were not transferred at sea. The results were obtained by photography. It was my opinion that the efficiency and training of the Fleet was at its highest level in history.

88. Q. On the night of 6-7 December, had you any occasion to observe personally, or did you have any knowledge of the conduct of the officers and men on shore, as to sobriety and indulgence in intoxicating liquors?

A. Well, I was ashore, sir, myself, until about 1:00 a. m., in the Navy Yard at the Officer's Club. I observed nothing out of line as to behaviour or sobriety or fitness of the officers—all I saw there—for any eventualities.

89. Q. In your opinion, were the officers and crews of the ships fit for duty in all respects on ships of the Fleet on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

90. Q. From your knowledge of the performance of the Navy subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, do you consider that that per-

formance has reflected the high state of efficiency of the personnel to which you have testified as existing on 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

[526] 91. Q. Was not this high state of efficiency of personnel the result of vigorous and intelligent training throughout a period of years, intensified during 1941 and continuing in accordance with carefully planned schedules of operations up to the date of the Japanese attack?

A. Yes, sir, but particularly from the first of February until the 7th of December, it was more realistic, it was intensified, and it reached its peak.

92. Q. Was there any operation at sea going on between 27 November and 7 December in the way of training?

A. It is a matter of recollection now, sir. All ships of the Fleet were engaged in intensive training when they were out and during that—

93. Q. Perhaps I should say that Vice Admiral Pye returned with a task force about that time.

A. He returned on Saturday.

94. Q. And remained in until the 7th of December. Does that indicate a cessation of training during that period?

A. No, sir; it only means that the schedule provided for necessary overhaul of ships, upkeep of the Fleet, rest and recreation for the personnel.

Recross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) (continued):

95. Q. When Admiral Pye came in on Saturday, as you have testified, prior to 7 December, did one or more of the other task forces go to sea?

A. My recollection of the situation is, sir, that Admiral Pye, or the other task force—one still being at sea—had come in on Saturday, the 6th of December. I'm not sure whether it was Admiral Pye's task force or the other task force came in. Well, one-third, approximately, of the Fleet was in port on the 6th of December. Another third, approximately, another task force, came in on that date. The other task force was in that was supposed to go out on Monday, the 8th.

96. Q. Isn't it a fact that the normal operating schedule provided for at least one task force to be at sea at all times undergoing training; sometimes two, but never less than one?

A. That is correct, sir; mostly two, and many times three.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[527] The witness made the following statement: I would like to make a statement, Admiral. I remained in my position as Fleet Gunnery Officer on the staff until September, 1942. I would like to state, sir, that the plan for the security of the Fleet, so far as the

Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had anything to do with it while it was in Pearl Harbor, the plan for the use of the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet by the Commanding General ashore through the instrument of the base defense commanders, the plan for a multiple number of anti-aircraft gun crews for the anti-aircraft guns of the ships of the Fleet, the organization of the Fleet and the method of standing condition watches—all of those things which contributed to our part, the Fleet's part in fighting off the Japs at Pearl Harbor were continued in force with no essential change for at least 9 months after Pearl Harbor. 2CL-41 was written, I believe, first in February or March, 1941. It was revised in October, 1941. In September, 1942, its essential provisions were still in effect. In September, 1942, the method of defending Pearl Harbor by the guns of the Fleet and the anti-aircraft guns of the Army, and the Army Fighter Command under General Davidson, was still in effect. The organization of the Fleet and the method of standing watches, the requirement that watch crews should be competent by actually firing in target practice, was re-issued in the summer of 1942 by Admiral Nimitz, reiterating the provisions which must be carried out, and carrying as an enclosure to that letter the old letter signed by Admiral Kimmel. If there was anything wrong in the plans and how they should be carried out prior to Pearl Harbor, there wasn't any change in the set-up afterwards. What Pearl Harbor brought out by the record indicates that the plan was sound. I may say that there were changes in material and we got anti-aircraft guns of a superior type that we didn't have before, but the basic plan for defense and the basic organization of the Fleet were not changed one iota. Nets were installed later, and balloons, after a long controversy, were installed in August, 1942, and it is my understanding have since been removed because they interfere.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 11:05 a. m., took a recess until 11:25 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

[528] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. William W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval Transportation under the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Q. During the year 1941, what duties were you performing after the month of February?

A. Chief of Staff, United States Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Did you hold that position up to and including the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I did.

4. Q. Are you acquainted with the policies surrounding the basing of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. I don't know what was behind their policy because it started before I took over the job of Chief of Staff, but I was commander of a ship of the Fleet at the time. It began in April, 1940, when we went

to the Pearl Harbor area for a Fleet problem, and while enroute the German Army invaded France, and after we had been at Pearl Harbor for a few weeks we were ordered to remain there. I assumed—and I think everyone did—that it meant the probability of war in the Pacific.

5. Q. Do you know of any military reasons why the Fleet should have been kept in Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

6. Q. Did the keeping of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor have anything to do with the development of the Naval Base there?

A. In my opinion, no. The Hawaiian detachments had gone out approximately a year before and there were enough ships in the Hawaiian detachment to keep the Pearl Harbor base busy. I will add to that that we felt that we were getting better training in the Hawaiian area than we ever got in the San Pedro area because we were at sea more.

7. Q. Was there any relation between keeping the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and the development of, say, Fleet logistics for operating from an advanced base?

A. No, that was not the purpose, in my opinion.

[529] 8. Q. Can you state any military objections for basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, the principal objection at the start was that we had no proper Fleet anchorage. The Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads. We were not protected by mines. We were not protected by air coverage. I am speaking of 1940 now. At that time our two big carriers, the SARATOGA and the LEXINGTON were anchored off Honolulu, and were very vulnerable. That was the principal objection to keeping the Fleet there. But later on and before Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief, Pearl Harbor was fitted so that it could take the entire Fleet, but even at that time we had no nets, no boom to protect anything from getting into the harbor, and of course the channel into the harbor had only one entrance, which was bad. Those were the military objections to keeping the Fleet there.

9. Q. During the year 1941 while you were Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, what was the paramount mission of the Pacific Fleet at that time?

A. Preparation for war, training for war and, I might add, for war against Japan. Whether that was in writing from the Navy Department, or not, I do not recall, but it was in the minds of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff, and I believe of all the officers of the Pacific Fleet.

10. Q. Was this more or less of an intense training schedule, or not?

A. Yes, very much so.

11. Q. Did this paramount mission of training of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ever change before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941?

A. No, I think not. It built up a force. The way we started to steam entirely without lights and take all precautions, I don't recall, except it was a security order, and 2CL-41 was issued 15 days after the Commander-in-Chief took over on the 15th of February. It was revised later on.

12. Q. When, during the year 1941, did you first realize that the international situation as it affected the relationship between the United States and Japan was becoming critical?

A. I realized it before 1941.

13. Q. Did it become more critical during the year 1941, and if so, can you state the approximate date when you reached this decision?

A. I believe that what brought it home to us more than anything else was when we closed the Panama Canal [530] to Japanese merchant shipping. When that occurred, I do not know, but it was long before Pearl Harbor.

14. Q. You have stated that during 1941 up until the time of the Japanese attack on 7 December of that year, that the paramount mission of the Pacific Fleet was training and preparation for war. Were there any compelling reasons during that year why that mission should have been changed?

A. No. I might add that there was a secondary mission, because of our great construction program, to train additional men so that we could send experienced men home, but that did not interfere with the efficiency of the Fleet, although most commanding officers thought it did, naturally.

15. Q. Can you state the source or the authority for this paramount mission? Did it come from higher authority such as the Navy Department, or was it one deduced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet himself?

A. That is a difficult question. It was certainly deduced by the Commander-in-Chief himself, but he received almost weekly letters from the Chief of Naval Operations which certainly indicated that war was probably inevitable.

16. Q. In these letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, do you have any knowledge of whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations was acquainted with the fact that the paramount mission of the Fleet was as you stated it?

A. I would deduce from his letters that he was not. We were continually being advised that the war was in the Atlantic. The fact that in, I think it was May, 1941, they were taking from the Pacific Fleet very secretly the best commissioned battleships we had, the most modern aircraft carriers, a division of four modern cruisers, and some two squadrons of destroyers, would indicate that the authorities in Washington believed the war was to be in the Atlantic, but that was never our idea in the Pacific.

17. Q. From the information you had during your tour of duty as Chief of Staff, and from any information that you since have received, do you consider that you were kept informed by the Commander-in-Chief of all the information he had received on the question of United States military and diplomatic relations?

A. I feel confident that the Commander-in-Chief kept me informed on everything.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[531] 18. Q. I ask you to examine this document, which is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941, and which has been referred to by some witnesses before this court as the "war warning message." Does Exhibit 17 state that negotiations with Japan had ceased?

A. Yes.

19. Q. What information came into the possession of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet after receipt of this message which in any way weakened or confirmed this statement?

A. I cannot state the source of the information, but I am certain that we knew in the Pacific Fleet that negotiations had been resumed, and I believe we got it through the press or the radio but not through an official dispatch.

20. Q. Then, so far as you recall, did the Chief of Naval Operations ever change the statement that negotiations with Japan had ceased?

A. No.

21. Q. Did you, as the Chief of Staff, keep a current estimate of the situation, either in writing or mentally, as to the imminence of war between Japan and the United States?

A. In writing, no; mentally, yes. We discussed it every day. I will add that the War Plans Officer presented to the Commander-in-Chief each day his estimate of what was happening, as did also the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

22. Q. Admiral, I ask you to refer to Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before this court and which is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations of 28 November 1941, purporting to quote a dispatch which the Army had sent to the Commander, Western Defense Command. I ask you to examine this exhibit and state whether or not you were acquainted with the general information that this dispatch contains.

A. I remember the dispatch because of the emphasis placed on the direction that you should not alarm the civil population or disclose intent. I do remember that.

23. Q. Do you recall whether or not the wording which you have just cited had any effect on your estimate of the imminence of war?

A. No, it did not.

24. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ever replied to that dispatch? In other words, did he report the action he had taken to the War Department?

A. Yes, he did. I can't recall the wording of the [532] dispatch or what action it was, but in every matter of that kind, when the Commanding General received a direction such as this, he invariably informed the Commander-in-Chief of the action he had taken. I dare say you will find a copy of the action he had taken in the files of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

25. Q. Do you now feel that you probably did know what the reply of the Commanding General was at that time?

A. I don't remember. There were very many things happening about that time. There was a problem on to relieve the marines in the outlying islands with armed troops, but there were so many things which happened at that time, I can't remember what was stated in any dispatch.

26. Q. Can you remember the date of this dispatch which gave you a directive or suggestion relative to relieving these troops which you have just mentioned?

A. It was not received on the date of the war warning of November 27. It may have been received a few days before or a day or so afterwards, but it wasn't on the same day.

27. Q. In order to refresh your memory, I am going to ask you to examine Exhibit 18, which is the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 26, 1941, and ask you if this is the dispatch which suggested certain dispositions on outlying islands?

A. Yes, I remember it very well. General Short received a similar dispatch from the War Department about the same time.

28. Q. Do you recall the suggested method of the Chief of Naval Operations for effecting the transfer of planes to those outlying islands?

A. Yes, because the message tells us we cannot fly the equipment, and we have to lower it into boats. This particular message caused a little amusement among the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. At that time we had naval fighting planes at both Wake and Midway, and it seemed rather odd to pull them out and put Army planes in. However, we were directed to do it, and the plans were made.

29. Q. What was the method of transporting those planes to Wake and Midway?

A. Only by carrier; that is the only way possible.

30. Q. That dispatch is dated November 26, is it not?

A. Yes.

[533] 31. Q. Assuming that a delivery of these planes by carrier was to be made at as early a date as practicable, just how many days after November 26 could this delivery have been effected?

A. I would prefer that that question be answered by an airman, but my estimate is that the Army could not possibly have prepared the planes for us in less than a week, and adding another week to that for delivery would make two weeks as the best we could have done.

32. Q. Then this suggestion involves the absence of carriers in the direction of the Japanese homeland?

33. Q. And at a time subsequent to November 27?

A. Yes.

34. Q. November 27 is the date of the dispatch to which we have referred as the "war warning message", is it not?

A. Yes. It also involves sending carriers in that direction not fully prepared for war, because when you put planes on board a carrier for passage, she cannot possibly have all her own planes ready for fighting.

35. Q. Did this suggestion on the part of the Chief of Naval Operations have any effect on your estimate at that time of the imminence of war between the Japanese Empire and the United States?

A. Not at all, no.

36. Q. I am going to refer to Exhibits 21 and 22 and ask you to examine them and state whether or not you were familiar with these dispatches at or about the time they were probably received by the Commander-in-Chief. These dispatches refer to the destruction of codes and ciphers on Guam and outlying islands.

A. The first message about the destruction of our own codes—

37. Q. Under what date?

A. 6th of December. I have some recollection of it, but it meant very little to me, because the War Plans handled that situation. Guam, for example, under the War Plans was category "F", which means that it would not be defended but that they would burn the codes, and, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was

prepared to destroy any codes and did not require orders from the Navy Department to do it.

[534] 38. Q. Did this particular suggestion to burn our own codes and ciphers in Guam and the outlying islands have any effect on your estimate of the situation as to the imminence of war between the United States and Japan as of the date of the receiving of these dispatches in your headquarters?

A. The situation as of the 6th of December, when that message was received, was that war was inevitable. The Japanese units had been reported by the planes of the Asiatic Fleet as heading southward. The Navy Department had given us a warning on the 27th of November as a war warning. The unfortunate thing is that they should have put a period after the word "warning", but they told us where it would happen: in the Kra Peninsula, Malay, and possibly the Philippines and Guam. We assumed they would take over Guam, and we had no way of defending it.

39. Q. I ask you to refer to Exhibit 15, which is the dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations of November 24, 1941, and inspect it.

A. Yes, I remember the dispatch.

40. Q. This dispatch states: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines and Guam, is a possibility." Can you recall what the estimate was at that time of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the possibility of an aggressive movement on the United States in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. I don't recall what his estimate was at the time, but I can recall my own. By stating that a surprise attack may occur in any direction, including the Philippines and Guam, the inference is that certainly they are not going any farther to the eastward.

41. Q. Did you have any information during this period preceding December 7 of the performance of airplane torpedoes in water of the depth prevailing at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

42. Q. What, in general, was this information?

A. We received a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations either quoting or enclosing a copy of a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance, stating that aerial torpedoes could not be effective in depth of less than seventy-five feet. I remember that particularly, because Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch had a meeting about it and discussed it, and Admiral Bloch pointed out that the maximum depth in Pearl Harbor was something like forty-six feet. It was a question of whether or not we wanted torpedo nets. The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations asked us whether we wanted them and stated that they were not effective in depths of less than seventy-five feet, and as a result of the discussion between [535] Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, it was decided why clutter up the harbor with nets if the torpedoes are not effective? We don't need them. That was several months before Pearl Harbor.

43. Q. I refer you to Exhibit 55, Admiral, and I shall read you paragraph 2: "Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less

than 75 feet and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." I ask you if you were familiar with that statement?

A. I never heard of that. It is a surprise to me now. I am quite certain that that letter was never received in the Pacific Fleet.

44. Q. I ask you to refer to this exhibit and state whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet is designated by the originator to receive a copy?

A. He is.

45. Q. So far as your own personal knowledge serves you now, you don't remember having seen it?

A. No.

46. Q. I will ask you to examine Exhibit 55 fully and then state whether you have any recollection of having seen it or whether you had been informed of it during your tour of duty as Chief of Staff?

A. I have no recollection of the letter at all, and I never heard it discussed.

47. Q. I show you Exhibit 54, which is in evidence before this court and which is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated February 17, 1941, and addressed to certain commandants. A copy of it is purported to have been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The subject of this letter is "Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks." I ask you to examine this exhibit and state whether or not you had seen it or had the information contained therein during your tour of duty as Chief of Staff under the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

A. I don't remember this letter in the detail in which it is written, but we did receive a letter which included paragraph 3 (a) about the minimum depth. That was freely discussed on the staff, and the Commander-in-Chief answered it, but whether it was this definite letter or not, I cannot answer.

[536] 48. Q. Did you have any estimate of the probability or possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on ships anchored or moored in Pearl Harbor up to and including December 7, 1941?

A. Nothing except a staff discussion when torpedo baffles were considered. We did not believe the Japanese would attack us with torpedo planes, if that is what you mean.

49. Q. I ask you to examine Exhibit 17, which is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 27, 1941, and which you have previously been informed was called the "war warning dispatch." This dispatch states that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days and further that certain movements indicate an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Did the information contained in this dispatch in any way change your estimate of the situation with regard to the possibility of an attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base?

A. No. You will note that this dispatch is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. It directs: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment." There

was a defensive deployment planned for the Asiatic Fleet but not for the Pacific Fleet that I recall.

50. Q. Well, did this information have any influence on your estimate of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No, it did not.

51. Q. What was your estimate of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at that time?

A. My estimate and, I believe, the estimate of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were that the surprise attack would be in the form of a submarine attack, and we were alerted against that and had been for some time. Our operating areas were searched every day by planes. We had plans to meet a submarine attack. We believed that would be the form of attack that we would receive.

52. Q. What were the relations of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department during the period from about October 16, 1941, up until the Japanese attack on December 7 with reference to conferences on matters of political and military developments in the United States-Japanese situations?

A. Relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General were very close. They had been from the start. It is my recollection that when General Short arrived in the Hawaiian area Admiral Kimmel called on him before he shifted into uniform. They were together very frequently, and in all cases in connection with any warning or any [537] dispatch or any letter received that indicated war, they invariably got together. It wasn't always the case that General Short came over to see Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel frequently went over to see him. They met frequently socially and were in conference, I should say, at least twice a week.

53. Q. Do you feel, then, that there was a free and full exchange of military information?

A. Yes, I do.

54. Q. What can you state as to the attitude of cooperation between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in matters of defense of Oahu?

A. I believe they discussed everything that was on the mind of either. I should like to mention one very little thing that indicates the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In the summer of 1941 the then Captain Mountbatten came to the Pacific Fleet and delivered a series of lectures. I drove him up to Fort Shafter when he addressed the Army. Mountbatten stated, "I have dictated a letter during a high level bombing attack. I hold high level bombing in contempt, but I am frankly afraid of the dive bomber." When that speech was over, General Short shook hands with Mountbatten and said, "Thank you for those remarks. I have been trying to make my Army Air Force go over to dive bombing. I talked to Kimmel about it, and he recommends it, but they won't do it." I brought that out to show there was a close cooperation between the two. I believe also, as far as the defense of Pearl Harbor is concerned, your records will show that General Short made frequent requests for better planes and better anti-aircraft guns. A great deal of this was prompted by Admiral Kimmel, and I believe the Admiral wrote to the Navy Department to get a little support for General Short.

55. Q. After the receipt of the so-called "war warning message" on November 27, 1941, did you know at that time what was being done by the Army with reference to taking measures of security in the Hawaiian Department?

A. Yes. I know that the Army was alerted that night, because on my way to Honolulu—

56. What night?

A. November 27. On that night, in driving home, I passed long columns of troops and groups of equipment blocking the road leading into Honolulu, but they were going on the alert to prevent sabotage. Remember that we had something like 160,000 Japanese in the islands, and I dare say that was the Army's primary method of defense—to defend their public utilities, their reservoirs, and defend against sabotage. They were on the alert that night, because I saw it.

[538] 57. Q. Do you have any information, or do you know whether or not the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department knew what measures of security the Navy had adopted in its defense of Pearl Harbor or the Fleet therein at about that time?

A. Yes, he knew, because every directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief was circulated to the Army. Our operating plans, issued a month in advance, were sent to the Army, because they had to co-operate with them. They knew everything that we were doing.

58. Q. A month in advance of what?

A. Of the actual operations. They were always invited to participate.

59. Q. I am not going to ask you for details, Admiral, because I am calling Admiral Bellinger and his then Chief-of-Staff, Captain Ramsey, to give the court the details of the number of patrol planes, their material condition, and the effectiveness, etc., of a distant patrol. I shall ask you, however, if you know whether the question of long-range reconnaissance was considered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at any time between November 27, 1941, and the Japanese attack on December 7?

A. Yes, it was. In fact, it was considered before Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief. The Fleet was there in 1940, and I discussed the matter with Admiral Richardson's staff, and the answer was that they didn't have enough planes to do everything, such as training and meeting the requirements of a long 360-degree search. It is my recollection that Admiral Bellinger in 1941 was trying to get more crews and that he made the statement that they needed two crews for each plane. They were also installing gas proof tanks. I believe they put in their own armor. There were never enough planes to have an all around search. Consequently, the available planes were given the job to search the operating areas. The operating areas were usually to the south of Oahu but not always. When the Fleet operated to the north of Oahu, as they did, the planes searched in that direction, but they did not have an all around search, because we were not only shy of planes, but it is also my recollection that we had to detach some of them and send them elsewhere. Even the War Plan itself called for sending squadrons of planes to Samoa and Alaska and directed that we keep two squadrons in Oahu. Obviously, two squadrons of airplanes cannot make any kind of search, such as would be required.

60. Q. How many planes in a squadron of patrol ships?

A. Twelve, I believe.

61. Q. Then, it is your estimate that the War Plans considered retaining two squadrons, or about twenty-four patrol planes, for the Hawaiian area?

A. Directed that we not reduce it below that level.

[539] 62. Q. I believe you stated in the first part of your testimony that the paramount mission of the Pacific Fleet was training and that you further stated that until December 7, 1941, this mission had not been changed. In view of the information that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific had of the United States-Japanese situation on and after November 27, 1941, had consideration been given to changing this mission?

A. The mission, of course, was laid down in the War Plans. Somewhere about the middle of October, on the receipt of a message, we discontinued the cruises to the coast. We had been sending a small task force to the coast just for recreation, and we discontinued that about the middle of October and never resumed it. In Pearl Harbor they had black-outs for training purposes. The Fleet was alerted all the time at sea. At least once during each operational period of the task forces at sea there would be a drill, assuming an attack by submarine. When the striking force would be organized, the battleships would assemble, and the destroyers would assemble to protect the battleships. Those things had been going on for some time. I cannot say that the mission of the Pacific Fleet was ever changed, because where you state that the mission was training, I would say training and preparation for war.

63. Q. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, state the approximate geographical location of the three major task forces of the Pacific Fleet?

A. Task Force One was in port. That included most of the battleships under Admiral Pye. Each of the three task forces had a carrier, but that task force was without its carrier on the 7th of December. The SARATOGA was on the coast. I don't recall whether she was needing overhaul, but one of her missions was to ferry planes out to Pearl Harbor, because we had no means to get them out there, so she wasn't in Pearl Harbor at the time. She was on the coast. Task Force Two under Admiral Halsey had gone to sea about the same time Admiral Pye got in.

64. Q. This was approximately what date?

A. About the 27th of November. His task force returned on the afternoon of Friday, the 5th of December, except that his carrier, the ENTERPRISE, was at Wake delivering marine planes. He had cruisers and destroyers with him. How much of his task force was in Pearl Harbor I don't recall, except that battleship division 1, which was under Halsey, was in Pearl Harbor. Task Force Three under Admiral Brown had gone to sea about the 5th of December. Admiral Brown was conducting amphibious training in the vicinity of Johnston Island, and his carrier, with some cruisers and destroyers under Admiral Newton, had gone to Midway to land some planes there.

[540] 65. Q. You have stated that the SARATOGA was absent from the Hawaiian area. Do you recall whether or not any other capital ships than the ones you have described were absent from the Hawaiian area?

A. The COLORADO was undergoing overhaul at Puget Sound. The PENNSYLVANIA was at drydock in Pearl Harbor. I can recall only the COLORADO as a capital ship which was away at that time.

The court then, at 12 : 20 p. m., took a recess until 1 : 45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[541] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

66. Q. Admiral, as Chief of Staff to CinCPac, were you familiar with WPL-46, and the initial task assigned by that plan?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Would you state to the court what the initial tasks were that were assigned in WPL-46 to the Pacific Fleet?

A. The tasks defined by the Navy Department were to remove the pressure from the Malay barrier by raiding commerce, by attacking the Marshall Islands in a raid, and also assisting our British allies below the equator from zero longitude, starting in Samoa, to the westward as far as longitude 155 degrees, and we were ordered to send, I think it was, two cruisers and two submarines to that area. That was from Samoa, south of the equator westward as far as 155 degrees longitude, east.

68. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that this plan, that is, WPL-46, implemented certain high-level decisions which contemplated the British bringing some of their capital ships into the Indian ocean as a restraining influence against the Japanese Fleet, and at the same time the United States bringing a unit from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic as a method of furthering the war against Germany?

A. I know that was in the Pacific Fleet war plan. Whether it was in the Navy Department plan originally I don't know, except that during the summer of 1941, a British Admiral—Rear Admiral Dankwerts—who was the British representative in the United States at that time, and he had conferred with our war planners—he, in company with a Captain Clark, who was the British military naval attache in Washington, came to Pearl Harbor and told the Commander-in-Chief that they had attempted to make this agreement with the Navy Department, mentioned particularly Admiral Kelly Turner and said, "We think that the British Empire will fall apart [542] if we lose Singapore." He went further to say that Admiral Turner didn't believe in Singapore, and he said, "We have finally come to an arrangement where if you will send a battleship division to Gibraltar to defend our interest in the Mediterranean, we shall send six battleships to

Singapore. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, gave him no encouragement at all, but told Admiral Dankwerts, in effect, "Well, if you can't get information from the Navy Department, why do you come to me?"

69. Q. Do I understand that was in the summer of '41?

A. The summer of '41.

7. Q. We may be talking about two different things. What I want to establish is whether or not you knew that there was to be detached from the Pacific Fleet a unit which would be transferred to the Atlantic Fleet, and as a part of that plan it was contemplated that the British would transfer some capital ships to the Indian Ocean?

A. I did, but I knew it only through the statement of Admiral Dankwerts, because there was no official paper on the subject that I remember.

71. Q. You testified this morning that the Navy Department secretly, as you told it, sent a force of three battleships, four cruisers, and two squadrons of destroyers in 1941, from the Pacific Fleet, and transferred them to the Atlantic?

A. That's right.

72. Q. And this indicated to your mind the people in Washington considered the war to be in the Atlantic, which was not the view entertained by the staff of CinCPac; is that correct?

A. That is absolutely correct.

73. Q. Well, now, in connection with WPL-46, I'd like to refresh your memory as to whether or not that transfer is in WPL-46.

A. In WPL-46, it states that at the outbreak of war, they will move one division of cruisers from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, in addition to what we had already moved.

74. Q. That's right, but there was also to be transferred, as a part of this agreement—a high-level agreement—a division of battleships, a division of cruisers, and a carrier, and the two squadrons of destroyers, was there not, under WPL-46?

A. At the time that I received WPL-46, which I think was about the first of July, that had already been done. It was made in May.

75. Q. Then there was no movement that you know of in 1941 [543] that was not in accordance with WPL-46?

A. No.

76. Q. Admiral, you testified this morning with respect to Exhibit 18, which is the dispatch concerning the transfer of Army planes to Midway and Wake, that when you received that dispatch at Pearl Harbor, or were so advised, that since you were directed to send these planes out, you carried out these instructions; is that correct?

A. No, we did not carry out the instructions. We made the plans and the Commander-in-Chief sent a dispatch telling how it was to be done, but war broke before we could do it. The marines were still at Wake when war broke.

77. Q. Did I understand you to say that you were not directed to do this?

A. We were directed to do it, and we were prepared to do it, but war broke before we could execute it.

78. Q. I hand you Exhibit 18 and ask you if that was the dispatch you had before you this morning when you were testifying?

A. Yes, it is.

79. Q. I will ask you to read to the court the first sentence and the last sentence on the second page, if you please.

A. (Reading): "In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft available for expeditionary use, OpNav has requested and the Army has agreed to station twenty-five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided you consider this feasible and desirable." (Reading): "Confer to Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable."

80. Q. Which, in effect, is not a directive to CinCPac to carry out this transfer, but rather a request for advice from CinCPac as to whether he considered it as practicable?

A. Yes, however it was construed at the time in my mind, at least, as a directive, just as when your commanding officer says to you, "Don't you think that it would be a good thing for you to do so and so," and you say, "Yes, sir, I do."

81. Q. What action did you take with respect to this dispatch? Did the Commander-in-Chief reply and give the Navy Department the benefit of his suggestion in that respect?

A. The first thing the Commander-in-Chief did was to get General Short and his entire staff, and Admiral Kimmel and his staff together, and we conferred, to my recollection, for at least three days on how to do this thing. We didn't know why, but the Army was in very great doubt as to whether [544] it would put P-39's or P-40's on Wake, and they finally decided on P-39's. The Commander-in-Chief said we could put the planes on the island, but we could not get them off. I tell you that just to let you know that we did consider it; our combined staffs discussed it for at least two days, and I think three days, before the answer was sent in.

82. Q. But you didn't consider that you had to do it; the Navy Department hadn't directed you to carry out this operation? They simply asked for an answer.

A. No, I considered that we had been directed to do it.

83. Q. You stated this morning that you had seen, around the 27th of November, Exhibit 17. That is the so-called war warning dispatch, in which the Chief of Naval Operations informed CinCPac that negotiations with Japan looking toward a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. You also testified that you had seen, a day or two later, Exhibit 19. That is the dispatch from C. N. O., which presented, for the information of CinCPac, the Army's dispatch which stated that, "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes, with only the barest possibility the Japanese Government will come back and offer to continue." Do you recall those two dispatches?

A. Yes, I recall both of these.

84. Q. I understood you to say this morning that subsequent to the receipt of these dispatches you also had press and radio reports to the effect that conversations with Japanese representatives in Washington might be continuing; is that correct?

A. That is my recollection, yes.

85. Q. But you never received any modification from the Chief of Naval Operations of the two dispatches?

A. No, I remember both of these dispatches, but it does not say here that negotiations had been resumed.

86. Q. But you didn't receive anything officially from the Chief of Naval Operations which modified either of the dispatches, copies of which were sent you, before the Japanese attack?

A. No.

87. Q. Then I understood you to say that you and the staff considered that these press and radio reports which you had heard subsequent to the receipt of these dispatches modified, in your opinion, the effect of these dispatches?

A. No, I wouldn't say that. I would say that the press and radio were very frequently ahead of the information we got from the Navy Department.

88. Q. Well, was there any doubt in your mind as to the [545] meaning of the dispatch of November 27, which begins, "This is a war warning?"

A. Not at all. If they had put a period after, "This is a war warning," I think we might have been better off, but they went on to tell us after that where the attack was coming from.

89. Q. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that there is a period after, "This is a war warning", in that dispatch, I think you said this morning that the unfortunate part of it was that the Chief of Naval Operations should have included in the message, he didn't put a period after "war warning", but instead went on to tell you where the attack might come from. Now, I'd like you to look at the sentence in that dispatch which reads, "The number and the equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." Now at the time you received this dispatch you also had information, you were also considering the dispatch which was sent to you by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 24th of November, which is Exhibit 15, did you not?

A. The one about burning the codes?

90. Q. No. It begins, "Chances are—" You received that prior to the receipt of the war warning message?

A. Yes, sir.

91. Q. That dispatch begins, "The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with the statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility." You will also note from the dispatch before you that it is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 15th Naval Districts, all for action. In the face of those two dispatches, Admiral, did I understand you to say this morning that you considered the mention of the Philippines and Guam to indicate that the Chief of Naval Operations intended not to include an attack on any other possession of the United States, including Hawaii?

A. Yes, I do. The inference is plain, I think. When you say that they may attack in any direction, including the Philippines and Guam. They didn't say New York or San Francisco. They didn't say Pearl Harbor. I think the inference is plain that whoever wrote the dispatch had an idea that so far as the attack on the Philippines or Guam, that is what we expected them to do.

[546] 92. Q. What effect did you give to the dispatch of November 24, which says an attack in any direction may be expected, the dispatch having been addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and the naval districts which might be concerned?

A. I can't tell you exactly what was done about that. It may have intensified the action we were taking, but it did not change our general estimate at all.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) :

93. Q. Admiral Smith, did you testify before the Roberts Commission?

A. No, sir.

94. Q. Were you in Pearl Harbor during the ten days or more that they were holding hearings there?

A. I was there all during the hearings. I left Pearl Harbor to go to sea about 15 January 1942. I was available at all times. I was not called.

95. Q. I call your attention to a paragraph on page 19 of the Roberts Report, of which the court has taken judicial notice, paragraph 9, conclusions, "These commanders," referring to General Short and Admiral Kimmel,—“These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.” I ask you whether General Short and Admiral Kimmel failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27.

A. It would be my estimate that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, between 27 November and 7 December, conferred every day. I will give you an example of that. One night Admiral Kimmel, at 6:00 o'clock at night, called up General Short and said, "What are you doing?" He said, "I am going to the north shore;" and he said, "Hang on for a few minutes; I am coming over to see you." And that was in the week of Pearl Harbor. General Short and his staff were over nearly every day. I never heard any expression of ill-feeling between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. They were trying to get along with each other, if I make myself plain.

96. Q. Were these conferences about which you have testified in connection with the warnings and orders issued on and after 27 November?

A. The conferences were always called after receipt of a warning, but they had been going on all the time, because General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very much of the opinion that war was coming. I think in most cases the [547] questions raised by the Navy Department had already been discussed between these two commanding officers.

97. Q. Were the conferences in respect to the orders and warnings, Admiral?

A. Not all, no—oh, no.

98. Q. But these between 27 November and 7 December?

A. Not in response to a dispatch, because they had conferred so frequently on the general situation. You see, General Short had a great many problems, of Canton Island, for example—they had no guns on the thing. He was trying to prepare the thing. They were

continually discussing the problems, but it already connected with war—every word of it.

99. Q. Some of the conferences were in respect to the orders and warnings?

A. Oh, certainly. There was a conference, as I recollect it, after every one of these warning messages was received—there was always a conference.

100. Q. And you observed and were present at some or most of these conferences?

A. I was present at all conferences where General Short brought his staff with him. There were times when General Short came over to see Admiral Kimmel accompanied by no one but an aide. In those cases, having a great deal of administrative duty to do, I stayed out until sent for, but on every conference that involved anything pertaining to the war, I was called in.

101. Q. Were there conferences between General Short and Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November with respect to adapting and using the existing plans to meet the emergency?

A. My recollection is that there was a conference approximately the first of December. Just what was discussed in detail, I do not remember, but I do know that General Short stated to Admiral Kimmel that he had reported to the War Department all of his reactions to these warning dispatches and what he intended to do, and I also know that Admiral Kimmel had done the same with the Navy Department.

102. Q. I now read paragraph 11, on the same page of the same document: "The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages." In your opinion as Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief of Pacific, was the state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 such as was required to meet any [548] emergency envisaged in the warning messages received from the Navy Department?

A. It was. You must remember that what we were thinking about in the Pacific Fleet was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. We were thinking about the fleet and the readiness of the fleet. I believe that the state of readiness is indicated by the fact that how quickly the gun crews responded to the fire which was absolutely unexpected. We exercised as much security as we could in port. We realized that the Army defenses were not adequate, that ships were stationed in sectors and every sector was always occupied for antiaircraft fire, but we also had to get that fleet in readiness to go back to sea. It happened at a time when two task forces were in port. Usually only one was in port. Sometimes three were at sea, depending upon the exercises that were projected by the Commander-in-Chief. The readiness of the ships—they were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out, and how to get out and go into battle. They were not thinking about the defense of Pearl Harbor.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[549] 103. Q. I call your attention to Paragraph 11 on Page 9 of the same document: (Reading) "At about noon, eastern standard

time (6:30 a. m. Honolulu time), December 7, an additional warning message, indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan, was dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack." In your opinion, is the sending of a dispatch from Washington to Pearl Harbor by means of R. C. A., the achievement of every effort to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time?

A. I am not a communicator, but my recollection is that at that time communication between Washington and Pearl Harbor could be established within 30 minutes. We did not have a telephone but we had priority radio.

104. Q. That would be the Navy radio?

A. Yes, of course. Thirty minutes; not more than forty.

105. Q. The Navy radio was more expeditious than the commercial lines?

A. Oh, yes; from Washington, directly controlled from the Navy Department to Pearl Harbor.

106. Q. Now, will you look at Exhibit 48, Admiral? That is, I believe, the dispatch from General Marshall to the Hawaiian Department. I now call your attention to a statement in the Roberts Report on Page 20, Conclusion No. 14: (Reading) "If the message"—referring to the message which is Exhibit 48—"had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it." If the message, Exhibit 48, had been received in Hawaii at the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock a. m., Hawaii time, in your opinion could the Commander-in-Chief have taken measures that would have been of substantial use in repelling the attack?

A. Yes. The measures he could have taken, remembering it was Sunday morning, by sounding the alarm, by getting all the pilots—not of the Navy so much as the Army—back to their planes, getting them out of their homes and getting them back, the Japanese would have suffered much greater punishment. The Japanese attack, however, would have damaged us nevertheless, perhaps not so much as it did. As you probably know, it is difficult to get a battleship under way. It takes time. There is a [550] certain amount of enertia. The destroyers could have gotten out of Pearl Harbor, and the cruisers, probably. The aircraft of both the Army and Navy could have been alerted, and although they could not have prevented the attack and certain damage, they probably would have reduced the damage and punished the enemy much more than he was punished. There is something more that you have to remember: We had two carriers at sea, our only two carriers, and it was very important, if war were coming, to get oil tankers out there to refuel them, and they might have been started out. So far as the battleships getting out, I doubt very much if they could have gotten out, and if they had left the harbor they

would have been sunk in many thousands of feet of water just outside of Pearl Harbor, which would do us no good today. But that information would have been of great value to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet if he had had it.

107. Q. I call your attention to a sentence in Paragraph 17 appearing on Page 20 of the same report: (Reading) "The attitude of each",—that is, General Short and Admiral Kimmel—"that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department." To your personal knowledge, did Admiral Kimmel inform himself of measures undertaken by General Short to carry out the responsibilities assigned the Army under the provisions of the plans then in effect?

A. I may tell you that in the first place I have never read the Roberts Report. I can't get it. Admiral Kimmel, long before he became Commander-in-Chief—you see, I served with him as a cruiser captain when he had the cruisers, Pacific Fleet. And when he asked me to be his chief of staff, he said, "There are several things I want you to remind me to do. One is to keep my Type Commanders, my high admirals, informed of everything that is going on; and the other one is to cooperate with the Army because it has not been done before". And he followed that up.

108. Q. Specifically and to your knowledge, did Admiral Kimmel inform himself of the measures undertaken by General Short to carry out the responsibilities assigned to General Short under the provisions of the plans then in effect?

A. My opinion is "yes".

109. Q. You were present at many of the conferences?

A. Yes; most of them.

[551] 110. Q. Do you know whether General Short informed himself of the measures undertaken by Admiral Kimmel?

A. I'm quite certain he did. When General Short took over, his chief of staff—I can't remember his name; Phillip Hayes, I think it is, the man who is in charge at Philadelphia—said that he had been out there on the staff of the Commanding General years before, which was the commanding general who was opposite to Admiral McDonald, and he told me that he had never seen cooperation between the Army and Navy such as he sees now. He was then a colonel and he was detached, I should say, within three months after General Short took over. But that was the impression he gave me.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

111. Q. Admiral, then I take it, in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, it was understood by the Army that it was their prime and particular responsibility to defend Pearl Harbor; there was no question in their mind of that?

A. No, that is written down in the book called, "Joint Army and Navy Action".

112. Q. Yes. And in respect of such responsibility that the Navy might have, that was only in support of the Army and was understood by all concerned to be such?

A. It was understood by all concerned because all hands knew that the Army was not prepared to defend Pearl Harbor as a naval base. They did not have the anti-aircraft guns or anything, and it was understood that the Navy would help as much as it could and that is why the ships were anchored in four sections because we knew that the only guns that could be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor would probably be fired from the Navy guns.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

113. Q. Admiral, you testified a few moments ago that General Short had reported to the War Department the measures that he had taken after the war warning dispatches had been received and that Admiral Kimmel had also reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the measures which he took, as I understood. Is that correct?

A. Yes. I think you will probably find that in the form of personal correspondence.

114. Q. Isn't it true that the reference that you had to a report by Admiral Kimmel is the personal letter which Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark after the message of October 16th with respect to the change in the Japanese cabinet? Do you recall any further reports [552] by Admiral Kimmel to Chief of Naval Operations concerning the steps which he had taken?

A. I could not possibly recall every detail of everything that happened. All that I know is that I read every report that Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel. It was usually in the form of a weekly letter written on Sunday, and Admiral Kimmel always replied. He showed me the letters from Stark and he showed me his replies. Now, whether you have those or not, I don't know, but I think you will find that in there. Every measure he took he informed the Chief of Naval Operations.

115. Q. With reference to the war warning message: Do you recall specifically that a reply was made to the war warning message regarding what steps were taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to it?

A. No, I do not.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

116. Q. With respect to the last question: I call your attention to Exhibit 50, which is a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark under date of December 2nd, and ask you to read to yourself Paragraph 2. Does that refresh your memory as to whether Admiral Kimmel made a report to Admiral Stark as of December 2 as to what he was doing?

A. Very much. I didn't know the date of it but I do know that at that time when these planes were sent to Wake it was Admiral Kimmel's idea, and his whole staff talked about it. He did it and we did not. It was his own idea to send those additional planes to Wake.

117. Q. The point is, Was the report to Admiral Stark as of December 2nd, a report as to what he was doing?

A. Yes. Well, I can't swear to that, no, but I am certain it was because he always kept him informed, but as you say, it is there, down in black and white.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

118. Q. With further reference to this letter of December 2nd, Admiral, would you care to look a little more closely at that letter, the complete letter, and tell the court whether or not that whole letter doesn't concern the movement of planes to Wake and Midway, and also whether you consider that to be a report to the Chief of Naval Operations of what the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet did with respect to the war warning dispatch of November 27th, not the dispatch of the 27th [553] concerning the movement of planes to Wake and Midway?

A. This letter is in the form of all the correspondence that was held, practically all, between the Navy Department and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. You will notice that it is a personal letter and it starts out "Dear Betty." I believe there the Commander-in-Chief has told what he is doing, and I believe I have previously said that so much correspondence was carried on between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, personal letters, that we had to file it and consider it official correspondence.

119. Q. There were two messages concerning the movement of planes to Wake and Midway which were dated the 26th of November but dispatched on the 27th, with time date references of the 27th, which you have before you as Exhibits 18 and 40. There was another dispatch which bore a time date reference of the 27th which is the war warning message. My question is this, specifically: Do you consider the letter of December 2nd, which has been called to your attention by counsel for Admiral Kimmel, as being a report to the Chief of Naval Operations on the steps taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to the war warning message?

A. Now I believe my mind is clear on what you were driving at. In my opinion, this letter by the Commander-in-Chief dated December 2nd, was what he considered a weekly report on what he had done. The dispatch of planes to Midway and Wake was the idea of the Commander-in-Chief and it was in no way related to the war warning message from the Navy Department about putting Army planes out there. They are not connected at all.

120. Q. To further clarify the matter, the letter of December 2nd is concerned solely with the transfer of the planes to Wake and Midway, is it not, and the discussion of the problems involved in that connection?

A. No, I wouldn't say that. You have asked me to read the letter but I haven't had a chance to read it, but my impression of that letter is that it is sort of a weekly report. Every Sunday Admiral Stark wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel, and he always replied. I think that is a summary of what he had done.

[554] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The court then, at 2:45 p. m., took a recess until 2:55 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present.

Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, (Continued):

121. Q. Admiral, now that you have read the letter, is the question clear to you now.

A. Yes, but this letter is obviously one of the weekly letters by the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations. It does not confine itself to that one movement. As I say, the Commander-in-Chief had already made plans to reenforce those islands.

122. Q. Admiral, let me further clarify the matter. After the war warning message was received by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department—that is, his war warning message—he sent a report by dispatch to the Chief of Staff of the Army of the steps he took pursuant to the dispatch that he received from them. A few minutes ago in your testimony you stated that General Short had reported the steps he took, and you also stated that Admiral Kimmel also reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps he took upon the receipt of the war warning dispatch. I want to clear up in the minds of the court the fact that you do not mean that this letter is to be taken as a parallel to the dispatch which the Commanding General sent to the Chief of Staff but that it is just a routine, weekly letter which Admiral Kimmel wrote?

A. That is right.

123. Q. In other words, do you know of any dispatch which you or Admiral Kimmel sent, reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations the actions you had taken upon receipt of the war warning message of November 27?

A. I couldn't possibly remember that, no.

[555] 124. Q. As far as you know, there was none?

A. We are going back two and a half years, and it is very difficult to remember everything that happened. There may or may not be a dispatch, but I would not go on record and say there was. I'm not sure.

125. Q. So far as you know, there was not?

A. That is not the way I put it. That is the legal way of putting it. I do not remember it. I think probably there was, but I do not remember it.

The court then, at 3:00 p. m., adjourned until 10:00 a. m., August 22, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944.

[556]

SIXTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Commander Harold Bieseimer, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the fifteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral William W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the court:

126. Q. Admiral, in the Roberts Report, of which this court has taken judicial notice, there is a statement made that the responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware of previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods which indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war. Were you aware of this?

A. I think we all were, yes, sir, but that did not necessarily indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor. We knew that they had attacked the Chinese and the Russians before the outbreak of war and we expected they would do it again. We did expect they might hit the Philippines or Midway or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.

127. Q. What effect did this have on the Commander-in-Chief's estimate with reference to the Hawaiian area?

A. We expected nothing in the Hawaiian area except [557]
a submarine attack. We expected that as almost a sure thing.

128. Q. Was telephonic communication available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the Chief of Naval Operations? This question is asked in connection with your statement that the quickest form of communication which could have been used by OpNav on the morning of the 7th of December between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations was by priority, Navy radio.

A. I would say, Admiral, that priority, Navy radio, was the most reliable, quick method of communicating. We had no telephonic communication with Washington. We did have it with the West Coast and it could have been relayed through the West Coast. It has only been recently that we have established telephone communication with Pearl Harbor and it is very unreliable now.

129. Q. But you actually had it; it was available to you if you wanted to use it?

A. To California, yes, sir; but through a commercial station; not through the naval communications.

130. Q. But you actually had it even though you had to go through California for it?

A. Yes, sir.

131. Q. In other words, you could speak directly to Washington over commercial telephone?

A. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

132. Q. What courses of action could the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have taken subsequent to the receipt of a war warning message on November 27th had he interpreted the words "war warning" to mean that an attack on Pearl Harbor was about to ensue?

A. He could have put out a search with the available aircraft and with the Army bombers available. There were not very many. If necessary, he could have used his carrier-based planes for search. He could have had his Fleet out of Pearl Harbor to the westward with the heavy ships in a supporting position and his carriers advanced to intercept the Japanese.

133. Q. Well, without a definite movement on the part of the Fleet toward the westward to meet such a possible attack, what means were available to prepare for it in the Hawaiian area?

A. The only source of searching other than airplanes is the destroyer, but the destroyers were being intensively trained in night attack. They were always required to guard our heavy ships in case of submarine [558] attack which we expected so that we could not use destroyers for scouting. We could have searched a radius of perhaps 600 miles, but not through 360 degrees with the planes available.

134. Q. Were you familiar with the state of readiness of the Army's aircraft warning system?

A. No, sir, I was not. I knew that the Army had installed the radar; that we had sent officers up there. I did not realize that it was in anything but an experimental stage; they were feeling around. Now, it is quite possible that that is not the picture. The radar was a very secret thing and General Short sometimes held conferences with Admiral Kimmel, and when he came over unaccompanied by his staff I did not go in the Admiral's office unless sent for because I had other work to do. It is possible that General Short told Admiral Kimmel of the

state of readiness of that radar but I had no knowledge that it could be depended upon, and in fact, it wasn't dependable. The much published report that a non-commissioned officer picked up the Japanese planes coming in, we learned two or three days after Pearl Harbor. We had no knowledge on that date that planes were coming in. When I spoke to Colonel Davidson about it, I asked why that report had not been given to the Navy sooner, and he said, "We reconstructed that from all of the bearings the man got that morning but we didn't know on Sunday; we were not convinced that that was the direction from which the planes came." And that is obviously correct because we searched to the south rather than to the north. We got no information that day whatever from that radar, even after the attack. Had the radar been dependable, they should have certainly traced the planes out, but they didn't. They didn't report to us.

135. Q. Whether they were dependable or not, whether they were efficient or not, wasn't it worthwhile to keep them constantly manned on the chance that they might pick something up?

A. Yes, sir.

136. Q. In other words, that is one thing that could have been done after that warning message?

A. Yes, sir.

137. Q. How many ships of the Fleet had radars installed, approximately?

A. We had 4 heavy cruisers, possibly 5, that were equipped with radar. The light cruisers and destroyers were not. The carriers were equipped with radar.

138. Q. What was the state of their efficiency and dependability?

A. It was very good. We had had a number of night exercises prior to Pearl Harbor locating and attacking the enemy by the use of radar. It was considered very efficient but of course inside Pearl Harbor the [559] radar on a ship is no good because it fails to penetrate the mountains. I will add to that, there were other ships equipped with a form of radar, but it was very unreliable. My own flagship, the ASTORIA, a month or so after Pearl Harbor, had a radar but it could not pick up a plane that was visible to the naked eye. It was a very poor type. They have all since been taken off. Now, how many other ships were equipped with that form of radar, I do not know.

139. Q. No battleship were equipped with radar?

A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

140. Q. And the ships' radars were not available or effective while anchored in Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir.

141. Q. Then among the steps that might possibly have been taken, what would have been the objection to having a ship outside, after the warning message of November 27th, in order to use all methods available?

A. None, except that we did have ships outside. We had two carriers outside. Both ships had radar.

142. Q. And these carriers did not pick up the Japanese ships from which the planes came to Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir. Not only that, but Admiral Halsey, on his trip to Midway and return, had a search in the air, I believe, to a radius of 300 miles, and he picked up nothing.

143. Q. Then in your opinion to station a ship clear of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of using the radar would not have been effective?

A. No, sir. The radar at that time, I doubt if a ship's radar could pick up anything in the air more than 65 miles, so unless you had a cordon of ships around Oahu, it is very unlikely that you would have found anything.

145. Q. And to have had such a cordon, would it have been very dangerous to the ships?

A. Yes, sir.

145. Q. For what reason?

A. Well, if you are going to use your ships for a scouting line, you have nothing to concentrate to fight the enemy if you meet it.

146. Q. How about the dangers of submarine attack on ships so stationed?

A. That is always dangerous.

147. Q. Admiral, were these matters considered at that time and rejected for the reasons you give?

A. Not to my knowledge. I would like to add to my [560] answer that we did have patrol planes searching from Midway and we also had submarines stationed at both Midway and Wake.

118. Q. Was it considered that because of an attack on Pearl Harbor was held to be only a remote possibility that additional precautions against such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified?

A. Yes, sir.

149. Q. Admiral, so much has been said in previous testimony from officers of the Fleet with regard to training of the Fleet, and that training might have to be stopped under such conditions. The word "training" in the record might be misleading. Isn't "preparation" a preparation for war?

A. The Fleet was training for war, and in my opinion was in very efficient condition for war. I believe where that training discussion arose was that because of the new ships under construction we were required to send so many trained men back for months and we were constantly getting new men, and some officers felt that we were handicapped but I never did because the new men learned very quickly. The Fleet was not filled up, however; we were about 10,000 men shy, as I recollect; below complement.

150. Q. Do I understand your testimony to be that it is your belief that withdrawing men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction did not decrease the efficiency of the Fleet to any extent?

A. Not materially, no, sir.

151. Q. Well, if trained men were withdrawn from a ship and no men were available to take their places, leaving vacancies in the complement, would you please elaborate a little more why the efficiency wasn't necessarily decreased?

A. Some months before Pearl Harbor there was a board convened under Admiral Theobald to look into the complements of all types of ships and to recommend new complements, including lookouts and anti-aircraft guns. These complements materially increased the crews over what we had had before. When I say that we were approximately 10,000 men short of complement, I mean for that new complement. We had never met it, but the ships did have the crews that they had normally held, say a year before Pearl Harbor.

152. Q. Was that on the 85 per cent basis?

A. Yes, sir.

[561] 153. Q. Upon receipt of the war warning message of 27 November, or within a reasonable time thereafter, did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, hold a conference with his staff or with the Army relative to the contents of this message?

A. He called a conference of his staff immediately. He sent the Fleet Intelligence officer, with a copy of the war warning, to be delivered to General Short. He sent for Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch was at the hospital and Captain Earle came over to represent Admiral Bloch. To the best of my recollection, a conference was held the following morning with General Short and, as usual, with all Task Force commanders and Type commanders in port.

154. Q. Then to your knowledge, General Short did know of this message and did confer with Admiral Kimmel concerning it?

A. Yes, sir.

155. Q. Within a day of two after its receipt?

A. Yes, sir, within a day or two. When he received that message, I do not know, but I know that Lieutenant Commander Layton was sent over with a copy to be delivered to General Short that night.

156. Q. You don't know how soon after the message was received that the conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in reference to the message was held?

A. I believe within 24 hours; the next morning.

157. Q. Will you state to the best of your knowledge what took place at this conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?

A. I do not recall the details.

158. Q. Do you recall the consensus of opinion as to what this message meant and as to the probable place of attack in case war came?

A. I believe I stated yesterday that the unfortunate thing about that war warning is, they told us where the attack was likely to happen. It would have been better had it merely said "this is a war warning" and stopped right there. But they told us that the attack would very likely be on the Kra Peninsula, Malay, and Thailand, and we figured that their information was better than ours.

159. Q. Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by heading it "A war warning"?

A. Why, I thought that the intent was to put us on our toes and get ready to carry out the mission required by the War Plan. The War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department.

[562] 160. Q. Was it ever executed?

A. I believe it was on the afternoon of December 7th. I'm not certain. But it was not before the attack.

161. Q. What were the controlling conditions that required the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to send ships into Pearl Harbor at any time during the critical period?

A. Well, it had been proved that ships cannot remain at sea forever and it was part of our program. The Fleet had been in Pearl Harbor a very long time, I mean, had been in the area a very long time, and it was part of our program to bring ships in, refuel and provision them, and give the men some recreation.

162. Q. Well, in addition to being a part of the program, wasn't it an absolute necessity?

A. Yes, sir.

163. Q. Always a necessity?

A. Always a necessity. You see, you can fuel ships at sea but there was no anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor that was at all safe, such as Lahaina Roads. It was not considered safe. There was no protection against submarines.

164. Q. Will you elaborate a little in that connection on the physical and morale condition of the crews of the ships by keeping ships constantly outside?

A. While at sea, we were always in Condition 3, or in a higher condition. We invariably operated without lights. After a week or ten days of these intensive operations—and they were intensive; in one operation alone we had 4 ships damaged by collision—it was necessary to give the officers and men some recreation and relaxation.

[563] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

165. Q. And relaxation?

A. And relaxation, yes, sir.

166. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief or his staff have information that certain Army planes were leaving Hamilton Field on the west coast of the United States on the night of 6th–7th December, to arrive at Oahu early in the morning on December 7?

A. To the best of my knowledge, the Navy had no such knowledge. I did not. It is possible the Fleet aviator did have it. It is quite possible that Admiral Bellinger knew it.

167. Q. Did you on the morning of December 7, or subsequent thereto, have any information as to the most probable location of the Japanese carriers from which the attack against Pearl Harbor was made?

A. Not for some two days. You see, there had been a great deal of confusion. There were radio bearings reported indicating the enemy was to the south of Oahu. We suspected at the time that these might have been sampans or other Japanese ships opening the radio to confuse us, but we found out later that the confusion originated in Oahu itself by false reports being made by excited people reporting things which did not occur and which they imagined.

168. Q. Where would these excited people get their information?

A. Well, for example, one report was that parachute troops were landing on the north coast of Oahu. Some citizen had telephoned that in, and it was put on the warning net immediately. It was stated that they were dressed in blue clothes with red arm bands, and after we had time to trace that down, we found that a training plane—a little seaplane—under the authority of the Commander of the Service Force had been shot down by one of these Japs, and the mechanic was dressed in dungarees and he dropped to safety. Another report was that troops landed at Barbers Point. Ships were sent to look into it, but there was nothing there. That came from excited civilians out in that direction. Then we had a report that an enemy carrier had been sighted south. That came from one of our own planes. It turned out to be the MINNEAPOLIS, I believe. On the afternoon of Pearl Harbor a squadron of seaplanes returned from Midway to Pearl Harbor, and they had been ordered to scout on the way. The squadron commander reported well south of Pearl Harbor a Japanese carrier accompanied by a Japanese destroyer. He stated that he

had dropped two bombs on this carrier, which was zigzagging at high speed, and then had been chased some eighty miles [564] down wind until he found bad weather. We immediately sent a dispatch to Admiral Brown, who was within ninety-two miles of there, telling him to get the carrier. He still had several hours of daylight. Admiral Brown replied that he believed the ship bombed was the PORTLAND and not a Japanese carrier. The pilot arrived about 9 p. m. and was examined by almost the entire staff of Admiral Kimmel. He had a very fine reputation, and he said he knew it was a Japanese carrier because he saw the Rising Sun painted on her deck. He said that this carrier had the plan of a heavy cruiser painted on her deck as camouflage. We then sent a radio message to the PORTLAND: "Were you bombed this afternoon?" and he replied, "Yes, a plane dropped two bombs narrowly missing me astern." That was war hysteria, and there was considerable of it, and that is the cause, in my opinion, of the more or less wild goose chase we had looking for the enemy. It was a case of receiving bad reports from excited people.

169. Q. No reports of this nature were received prior to the attack?

A. No, sir, none at all.

170. Q. You stated that subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor you had information as to the location of the carriers from which the plan attack was launched.

A. I would like to correct my answer to that. On the late afternoon of Pearl Harbor we received a chart that had been taken by the Army from a Japanese plane that had been shot down but had not burned. The Army evidently thought this was of no value until the Fleet Intelligence Officer learned of it and brought it over immediately, and in pencil on that chart it indicated that he had come down from about 200 miles north of Oahu. That was the first information we had of actually where it came from.

171. Q. What was the best information available to Admiral Kimmel or his staff subsequent to the attack as to the location of the ships at the time the attack was launched?

A. He had absolutely no information.

172. Q. I mean at the time Admiral Kimmel left the Fleet.

A. He had that after receiving the radar report from the Army some two days after Pearl Harbor, and that report agreed with the map from the shot-down Jap aviator, indicating that the planes were launched from a position some 200 miles to the northward and that the carriers had then turned around. They were never sighted by any of our planes.

173. Q. Turned around to which direction?

A. To the north, probably seeking bad visibility.

[565] 174. Q. Speaking of visibility in the trade wind area, what would you call the extremes of visibility?

A. Well, by bad visibility, I mean fog. For example, the day after the battle of Midway we headed north with some carriers, and we very soon came into zero visibility and could not transfer planes from one carrier to another.

175. Q. Was a similar condition obtained in the general area surrounding Oahu at a range, say, from 200 to 300 miles?

A. Yes, to the north.

176. Q. What was the state of visibility on the morning of December 7?

A. At Pearl Harbor?

177. Q. In the Hawaiian area?

A. Very good.

178. Q. Admiral, did the messages directing the destruction of codes, etc., at Guam influence your decision or idea of the most probable place of Japanese attack in case of war?

A. No, sir, it did not, because we had known that it was not our intention to defend Guam, and that would be one of the first places where they would be told to destroy codes.

179. Q. We believe that you have answered the question that had you received word from the Navy Department on the morning of December 7 one or two hours prior to the attack, it would have influenced the disposition of planes, etc.

A. Yes, sir. There would have been the opportunity to get the pilots to the airfields and to get the planes in the air and get the light forces out of Pearl Harbor.

180. Q. From your information prior to December 7 and from information received subsequent thereto, is it your opinion that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific was kept sufficiently informed by the Navy Department to give him a clear picture of the Japanese situation?

A. In my opinion, he was not. I will cite an incident. At the time before Pearl Harbor—probably in May 1941—the Commander-in-Chief received orders to send a division of heavy cruisers and a division of light cruisers toward Samoa, prepared for distant service, and to equip themselves with the Mark 6 exploder for torpedoes, which exploder was entirely unknown to destroyers at the time. The Commander-in-Chief was given no information as to where those ships were to go. It was not until they reached Samoa that orders were received from the Chief of Naval Operations, telling them to make a cruise to New Zealand and Australia. I have many a time heard the Commander-in-Chief say, "These people in Washington must have more information than we have. I wish I knew what they are thinking about." Our Fleet Intelligence Officer had [566] placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters mostly. If the Navy Department had better information than that, we should have received it.

181. Q. Was this concern on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific regarding his lack of information from Washington especially apparent from the period of November 27 to December 7?

A. No, sir, at the time he believed that he was getting everything that the Navy Department had.

182. Q. Specifically, did the deficiency in information which the Navy Department was furnishing him have any effect on what actions he took or might have taken with respect to possible action by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area?

A. Yes. I would like to state, for example, that a few days after Pearl Harbor the late Secretary of the Navy Knox arrived in Pearl Harbor to conduct an investigation. He was with Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and I believe Admiral Bloch all morning. I wasn't there, but I was invited to join them at 12 o'clock for lunch. After

I arrived I believe I remember the exact words of Secretary Knox. Present at this conference were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Pye, Admiral Bloch, General Short, Captain Beatty, who was aide to the Secretary, and I. Secretary Knox said, "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" We all answered in the negative. He stated, "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th." 1 p. m. in Washington was about 7:30 in Pearl Harbor, shortly before the attack. He said, "I know that that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." Now, had we had that information on Saturday, the 6th of December, it would have been very valuable. The Army received that message on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor. The Navy never did receive it. The Commander-in-Chief had no message on the order of that mentioned by Secretary Knox.

183. Q. Did Secretary Knox say when this information first became available?

A. My recollection is on Saturday, the 6th of December.

184. Q. Do you now know of any information that the Navy Department had prior to the attack which would have been valuable to the Commander-in-Chief in taking action in the Hawaiian area?

A. Since my return to Washington, I have been informed that the Navy Department did have information that would have been very important to the Commander-in-Chief, but since this information is of a nature that might possibly be damaging to the war effort, I believe that I should not quote it in the interest of national security.

[567] 185. Q. During the course of this luncheon with Secretary Knox on the date you have indicated at Pearl Harbor, did he express any opinion as to what was the prevailing thought regarding the place of attack by the Japanese?

A. He did. His words, as I remember them, are, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor."

186. Q. Do you remember now any other pertinent expressions by the Secretary of the Navy on that date regarding this matter?

A. No, sir, I do not. Most of the conversation was as to the damage done, but what had gone on before I joined the conference, I do not know. They had been together several hours before I joined them.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

187. Q. There has been some testimony by other witnesses before this court, other than yourself, as to actions which might have been, and possibly would have been, taken had the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet received the message from the Chief of Staff setting out the information that the Japanese diplomats were presenting their credentials at one o'clock and the possible further information that the Japanese were destroying their ciphering machines in certain areas. Admiral, you have testified that you saw the message of November 27, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations, which started out by saying, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." It stated further that negotiations with the Japanese looking toward stabilization have ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. This message also indicated possible Japanese objectives, and it directed an appropriate

defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. I should like to ask you to state for the court what this message from General Marshall to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of 7 December 1941, which was not received until after the attack, would have added in the way of a warning so that you could have taken additional measures prior to the Japanese attack?

A. The message received by General Short was delivered by an officer messenger to us at Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of December 7. I glanced at it quickly and said, "It's no good to us now." I don't remember the wording of that dispatch, but if it stated that the final conference was not to be held until 1 p. m. on Sunday, it is a very simple deduction that Pearl Harbor might be the objective, because one o'clock [568] in Washington is about midnight on the Asiatic station and shortly after daylight at Pearl Harbor. For that reason, that information would have been very valuable.

188. Q. What steps would you have taken?

A. We would have given the Condition One, sent the Fleet to sea, and alerted all aircraft. They had two carriers at sea with their task forces. We would have held them up to the northward to try to locate the enemy in an attempt to divert the attack.

Reexamined by the court:

189. Q. How would air coverage for the Fleet been provided in such a case?

A. As it was at that time and still is—by carrier-based planes.

190. Q. I understand you were going to work the carriers to the northward to chase the enemy.

A. Yes, sir, but each one was accompanied by cruisers and destroyers. The battleships would be in support of them.

191. Q. It has been testified that had the Fleet been at sea and attacked without air coverage, the ships would have been irretrievably sunk.

A. That is true if they had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before and were within enemy range, but had they been two or three hundred miles to the westward, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked.

192. Q. Is it not a fact, however, that the speed of the battleships in Pearl Harbor at that time was not such as to enable them to accompany a task force which had carriers as its basis?

A. The battleship fleet speed was about fifteen knots at that time. As I indicated, they could be used only as a support force. Of course, they and the cruisers have their own airplanes for scouting purposes.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

193. Q. You have mentioned a number of measures which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet might have taken had he received the dispatch from General Marshall, which arrived late on December 7. In view of the fact that the Army had a number of pursuit squadrons available, do you think that if they had put them aloft before sunrise they would have been an effective measure for diverting the Japanese attack?

A. It would not, in my opinion, have diverted the attack. [569] It would have decreased the damage done and increased the number of planes shot down, but all of the Air Force that we had in Pearl Harbor at that time would not have stopped a determined attack by

three or four carriers, such as we have today. The way the Japanese do it, if they lose all their planes, they continue to go through. There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged even if we had been alert.

Reexamined by the court:

194. Q. Is it not a fact that the only method by which that attack could have been completely diverted would have been an anticipation of the launching of planes from a Japanese carrier?

A. Yes, by locating the carriers before they got within launching range.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The witness made the following statement: I should like to cite a few incidents to attempt to prove that the Navy in the Pacific was not asleep in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and that Admiral Kimmel did everything he could to keep them awake. I should like to start in 1939, when Admiral Kimmel had the cruisers battle force. I had one of those cruisers. We were intensively trained. We towed each other, fueled at sea, and did about everything that ships can do. In September of that year I was proud of the fact that my ship could launch four planes quicker than any other, which was fifteen minutes. Bear in mind that these planes are in hangars and have to be brought up on deck and their wings spread before they can be catapulted. I came out of the Navy Yard overhaul three months later and found that if I took more than five minutes in launching them, I got a signal, so we started launching them in that time. In 1940 when we got to Pearl Harbor we were required by Admiral Kimmel, if we went out for one or two days' target practice, the first thing on returning to Lahaina Roads was to go alongside a tanker and fuel to ninety-five per cent. After he became Commander-in-Chief he required that of the entire Fleet. In the year 1940 he sent a secret letter to [570] each commanding officer, saying, "Without telling anybody, sound general quarters and send up 100 rounds of live ammunition per gun. The result of this was rather astounding in some cases. The warrant officer down below would answer the gunnery officer, "Are you kidding?" or, "It is against the Bureau of Ordnance regulations." The turrets had no difficulty, but the 5-inch anti-aircraft guns, their ammunition was in galvanized iron boxes. In some cases the gunner's mate couldn't find his wrench. They arrived on deck and there was a great deal of confusion. I think it took me twenty-five minutes to get 100 rounds per gun. It took some ships an hour and forty-five. To do it we had to strip the fuse of its water-proofed and air-tight container, and I believe that we were called by the Bureau of Ordnance on that and told that we had disregarded Navy Regulations. At any rate, when the report of that incident was made to the Commander-

in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, he had a special board appointed and they looked into the ammunition supply of all ships. They found that on some of our battleships—I believe one was the *MISSISSIPPI*—the ventilation was so poor in the handling rooms that after the crew had furnished some fourteen or fifteen charges, they were absolutely all in and could not furnish anything more. I believe that the effect of that investigation on providing ammunition was very good for us on the 7th of December, because the ships had no trouble in getting their ammunition to the guns. As soon as Admiral Kimmel took over, he moved his War Plans. The fleet at that time had one War Plans officer, and an assistant who was merely a secretary. He moved the War Plans section off of the flagship into good, spacious rooms on shore. He increased the number from one to four, putting in some of the Navy's and Marine Corps' most intelligent officers, and told them to bring the War Plans up to date, which they did. Fifteen days after he took over the Fleet, he issued Security Order—I believe it is called 2CL-41—dated 15 February '41. It was revised on October 14, 1941, only because conditions had changed. That Security Order of 15 February was, so far as I know, the only security order that had been issued in the Pacific Fleet, the first one. He then, in conference with the Army, required Army planes to land on Navy fields, Navy planes to land on Army fields. It was soon discovered that the Navy bombs would not fit the Army planes, so the fittings of all planes were changed so either service could use the bombs of the other. When Admiral Halsey started for Wake, he took with him two Army planes and launched them from the carrier's deck, which I believe was the first time that an Army plane had ever seen launched from a Navy carrier. I'd say another thing about Admiral Kimmel: He went from the lunch room to his office. He was never known to take a siesta. The Fleet's problem was not to protect Pearl Harbor, but to guard the entire Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief felt that he had reasonable assurance that he would receive enough information from Washington to avert attack. He was building up [571] the islands as rapidly as he could. We didn't have enough ships to supply those islands properly. The submarines were stationed at Wake and Midway. He had put planes on both Wake and Midway about the 15th of November, 1941. He wrote a letter to Admiral Stark—I do not recall the exact wording—but he stated that the Pacific Fleet should not be used as a training squadron to fill up the Atlantic. Within approximately two months after Pearl Harbor, practically all the ships that had been sent to the Atlantic in 1941 returned to the Pacific Fleet. I believe all except two light cruisers returned. The destroyers from that outfit came alongside my flagship to fuel, and I remarked, "They now have everything that Kimmel tried to get for them while they were in the Pacific." They had radar, the latest methods of depth-charge throwing, a great many improvements that he had repeatedly demanded and had been unable to get. As soon as they got to the Atlantic, the things were installed. Now as for the Washington point of view, I have told you what Secretary Knox stated. The fact that on the morning of Pearl Harbor a squadron of B-17's arrived from San Francisco with their machine guns mounted but with no ammunition, indicates that the west coast of the United States had not been warned from Washington that war

was imminent. Several days after Pearl Harbor we received a letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, written shortly before Pearl Harbor, and as I recall the wording in that letter, he stated: "We know that you would like to have 20,000 men—10,000 to fill up the fleet and 10,000 more for training, and we would like to give them to you, but they are not available; but remember, the war is in the Atlantic, and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." That was actually received after Pearl Harbor. I would like to mention the arrival of the Roberts Board. On the morning of their arrival I called up a Colonel Lee Brown and asked him when the board would be over to Pearl Harbor—told him that all arrangements had been made. His reply was: "We are going out to Fort Shafter, and we may not be in Pearl Harbor for several days." And I said, "If you are going to question General Short, should not Admiral Kimmel have the privilege of being present?" His reply was, "No, this is merely a fact-finding board. We don't want anything like that." I then said, "Admiral Kimmel is not accused of anything. May he have counsel when he appears as a witness?" And the answer was, "No, we are merely a fact-finding board."

The court, for clarification, asked to whom reference was being made, to which the witness answered: Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown. I believe he was secretary to the board; Marine Corps.

The witness then continued his statement as follows: When the board finally did arrive at Pearl Harbor, and Admiral [572] Kimmel went before it, he had no information whatever as to what any witness preceding him had stated, and I have been told by him that it was two years before he could get a copy of the Roberts Board and did read the testimony of all witnesses.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 11:35 a. m., took a recess until 11:50 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Are you the legal custodian of the official report by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, which he made of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which is serial number 0479, dated 15 February 1942? If you are, will you produce it?

A. I am. I identify the document, which I hold in my hand, as the original report, with enclosures, authenticated by the signature of Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time of the making of the report.

The document, official report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning

of 7 December 1941, serial number 0479, dated February 15, 1942, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose only of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as show the damages done to naval ships and aircraft by the Japanese raid of December 7, 1941.

There being no objection, it was so received.

2. Q. Refer to this document and read such portions thereof as pertain to the facts for which it had been offered in evidence.

The witness read from said document extracts, copies [573] appended, marked "EXHIBIT 61."

3. Q. Have you examined the official report submitted by the Commander-in-Chief giving the personnel casualties resulting from the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I have. These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names by ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896.

The judge advocate asked if any party to the inquiry or the court had any objection to the summary of the information as given in the answer of the witness. None of the interested parties nor the court made any objection.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.

The court then, at 12:05 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 23, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944

[574]

SEVENTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeir, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the sixteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The court then, at 9:40 a. m., took a recess until 9:55 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; counsel for the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel; counsel for the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

[575] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Logan C. Ramsey, Captain, U. S. Navy, acting as Chief of Staff to Commander Fleet Air, Norfolk.

2. Q. What duties were you assigned between November 1 and December 7, 1941?

A. During the period specified, I was Operations Officer on the staff of Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger.

3. Q. Will you state what duties were assigned that officer—what duties was Admiral Bellinger performing?

A. Admiral Bellinger's immediate command was Patrol Wing Two. In addition, he was designated as Commander Patrol Wings, Ha-

waiian area, assisting the Patrol Wings One and Two and attached tenders. In addition, he was Commander Task Force Nine, tactical organization. He was also designated as aviation liaison officer to cooperate with the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in the development of aviation facilities, particularly on the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston. The final duty was Commander—or rather, it was termed—Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

4. Q. What were the aviation organizations available to Admiral Bellinger under the designation as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?

A. I have to answer that question indirectly. The procedure was slightly different from that outlined in the question. Units of Army bombardment aviation, of Marine Corps bombardment aviation, reported daily planes that were available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force when that organization was in a functioning status. Of course, in addition, the aircraft of Patrol Wings One and Two were under his command.

5. Q. The force then which was known as the Naval Base Defense Air Force only came into being under certain conditions; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

6. Q. What were those conditions?

A. Primarily, an emergency. Second, the vitalization of that organization for drill purposes or for impending possible emergencies, upon advice from higher authority. For drill purposes, the procedure was for the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send a message, "Drill, danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, drill"—at which time the Naval Base Defense Force was considered vitalized, or [576] placed in functioning status for drill purposes. Similarly, if under conditions where it had been considered necessary to place the organization on an actual war basis, I presume the same message would have been sent, but the word, "drill," be omitted.

7. Q. You mean to tell the court to vitalize the Naval Base Defense Air Force, some specific order from a higher commander was necessary? I mean by "higher commander" some officer senior to Admiral Bellinger.

A. That is correct.

8. Q. Who were these officers who had such authority to vitalize and bring into being the Naval Base Defense Air Force?

A. Naval Base Defense Air Force was simply a part of the Naval Base Defense Force. As such, the normal procedure would be to receive orders from that commander who was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I presume that, in many cases, it might have been possible for us to receive word from higher authority.

9. Q. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet have vitalized or brought into being this air force on orders of his own?

A. I presume so. Ordinarily, it would have been normal procedure for him to have expressed his wishes or his orders to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. On that point I am not certain, because it never arose.

10. Q. I show you Exhibit 53, which is a document in evidence before this court, and ask you if you recognize it and if so, state what it is.

A. Yes, sir. I recognize it as the basic operations plan of the Naval Base Defense Force.

11. Q. Was the operating plan in effect on 7 December, 1941?

A. To the best of my belief and recollection, after more than two years of not looking at it, this is the one that was in effect.

12. Q. It is noted that on this plan, one of the Task Forces is the Base Defense Air Force, and that paragraph 3 (b) of the Operations Plan, directs ComPat Wing Two, in consultation with the Army, to prepare detailed naval participation air defense plans in annex Baker; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

13. Q. I show you what purports to be Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1-41, and ask you if you recognize it as such.

A. That is correct; this plan was in effect.

[577] 14. Q. Now, does Annex B, at which you are now looking, and which is Naval Base Defense Air Force Operating Plan 1-44, Annex B, bear the title "Naval Base Defense Air Force Operating Plan No. A-1-41"?

A. That's correct.

15. Q. Now referring to Addendum I to this operating plan, No. 1-A-41, what is the general substance or subject matter of this addendum?

A. It is an estimate of the situation, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, covering the air situation at the time, which was the end of March, 1941.

16. Q. I will ask you to read paragraph 1, which is entitled, "Summary of the Situation."

A. (Reading:)

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warnings from our intelligence service.

17. Q. I will ask you also to read paragraph 3 (a), under the title, "Possible Enemy Action."

A. (Reading:)

A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

18. Q. I will ask you who signed this joint estimate?

A. Rear Admiral P. N. Bellinger, and Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. Army.

19. Q. And what is the date of this document?

A. March 31, 1941.

20. Q. I will ask you to advert to the extract which you [578] have just read, "Possible Enemy Action." Did this estimate represent your own views?

A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. I will ask you to read paragraph 3 (b) of addendum I.

A. (Reading:)

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

22. Q. Will you state whether this estimate also represented your own views?

A. This estimate—I may say parenthetically that I did not report until after the estimate was prepared. However, in general, I considered and still consider the estimate sound.

23. Q. Adverting to this same paragraph 3 (b), "Possible Enemy Action," will you state the consideration upon which you based your estimate that the most likely form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack launched from one or two carriers?

A. I will have to go slowly, because it is difficult at this late date to distinguish between what I believed prior to Pearl Harbor and what changes in my opinions occurred subsequent to the attack. I served in the same capacity for six months subsequent to Pearl Harbor, and under actual war conditions. My ideas, naturally, were modified. As nearly as I can remember, before Pearl Harbor, I believed that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack, because I did not believe that it would be possible for the enemy, or any potential enemy, to reach a position from which he could seriously menace our naval position in the Pacific by any other means.

24. Q. Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular nation, or was this just a generality for any country—any enemy which might attack without a declaration of war?

A. It was obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phraseology intentionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of mind.

25. Q. Then your conclusion was that if any attack at all were made on OAHU, it would be by air and not by some other means?

A. That is correct.

26. Q. At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did you conclude from the international situation as it [579] existed on that date, that Japan would attack the United States?

A. It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall having mentioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that it was my belief that if the Japanese did attack us by an air raid, that the attack would probably come on Christmas Eve or New Year's Day.

27. Q. What I am trying to develop is, would not your estimate have been the same—that an attack by air would have been the only effective means of attack on OAHU, whether it was delivered by the Japanese, the Germans, or the Italians, or any country?

A. That is correct.

28. Q. Do you know whether or not this estimate of the situation that you have been testifying concerning, was ever shown to Admiral Bloch, the Naval Base Defense Officer?

A. I cannot say. The first time I saw the estimate, it was appended to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan, and the Naval Base Air Defense Force Plan I was handed, had three, bound together with binders—and I assumed that they were all one document; that they were parts of one document.

29. Q. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet had seen or been informed of this estimate?

A. Not to my positive knowledge.

30. Q. I would ask you to advert to addendum I of this Naval Base Air Force Operating Plan No. A-1-41, and read paragraph (d), down to "Material Readiness."

A. (Reading:)

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

31. Q. Between 27 November and 0755, 7 December 1941, in what degree of material readiness were planes which were available for operation under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?

A. The general condition of readiness was Baker 5, 50% aircraft available ready on four hours notice. Many units—I would have to refer to papers and statements to give you the exact numbers—but many units were on a much higher degree of readiness. Some aircraft were actually in the air.

32. Q. Do you have any data from which you could refresh [580] your memory as to this material condition of readiness for the planes, which I have asked you?

A. No, I have not.

33. Q. I will again advert to paragraph 3 (d) of this same operating plan, and ask you to read paragraph 3 (d).

A. (Reading:)

Degree of readiness.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

34. Q. Between 27 November and 0755 on 7 December 1941, in what degree of readiness were the planes which were available to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?

A. My answer is substantially the same as to the last question: generally, Baker 5, but many units—the exact numbers and designations are beyond my personal recollection at the moment—were in a higher degree of readiness.

35. Q. And do you have any data from which you could refresh your memory as to this degree of readiness?

A. No. I have no records. I can give isolated examples, as for example the planes of Patrol Wing 14 were in the air, conducting a search of the operating area, on the morning of December 7. I do not remember how many—I forget now whether there were three or four. There were approximately six planes, I believe, of Patrol Wing Two in the air, at the time conducting tactics with the submarines in the submarine sanctuary over that island. There was a ready squadron, I forget its number, at Pearl Harbor—planes lined up and presumably ready to take to the air in thirty minutes. That squadron was due to be relieved at 8:00 o'clock in the morning by another squadron over at Kaneohe, at which time that squadron was required to be in that same degree of readiness. We modified that from time to time by permitting these planes on thirty minutes' notice to take the air for training purposes and not to proceed more than 30 minutes' flying time from their base.

36. Q. Whose responsibility was it to prescribe the degree of readiness for aircraft available to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?

A. The readiness question was one which was in fact [581] decided by higher authority. Whether it stemmed directly from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or from Commander Naval Base Defense Force, I cannot say. In ordinary practice for drills, and this is the only way I can recollect the details of that problem, we would receive the drill message placing the entire organization in an activated status, from the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, and that "Drill, danger of an air raid exists, drill,"—and then we would send a dispatch to all the units making aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, "Assume condition of readiness 1", and immediately start in issuing the various orders for the drill. Planes in the air already were to be sent out immediately to search sectors. At the conclusion of drill, we would send a message—"Resume normal condition of readiness." At least once during my being on this particular job, the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree of readiness. I am sorry I can't recollect just who sent the message, but it was sent by some higher authority, and at that time was changed, I believe, from Cast to Baker.

37. Q. As I recall the various sources of aircraft which you stated would make up the Naval Base Defense Air Force, when it was vitalized, it seems to me that these planes, under normal operating conditions, were under different commanders; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

38. Q. And then if, for example, you desired to place all planes, while still under these various commanders, in a condition of readiness, how could it be done?

A. We had in our command center several means of communication; where planes were actually in the air, we used radio. For planes of the Marine Corps, based on Ewa, we had to communicate by telephone—field telephone set with specially strung wires. For Army bombardment aviation, we had a field telephone set which had been installed by the Army units and which was our own direct means of communicating to the Army bombardment aviation. We had no means of direct communication, except through the Pearl Harbor, Ford Island, Hickam Field telephone exchanges, to the search and attack groups of the Naval Base Air Defense. It was very difficult

to communicate with General Davidson, who had command of all fighter aircraft on Kanoeha. Our only means of direct communication was the telephone through the Pearl Harbor exchange. In addition to that, we had two or three—I forget which now—teletype page printer circuits, which ran to various localities, but which not on all outlying stations were continuously manned.

[582] 39. Q. If the commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force desired to put into effect a condition of readiness before his air force was assembled under his command, could he do it?

A. I will have to answer indirectly again because the air force was never assembled under his command. The conditions of readiness were set by high authority and based upon logistic considerations. The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, had no power, except under an actual emergency, to take action toward initiating operation of these aircraft or of increasing or decreasing their degree of readiness.

40. Q. Adverting to this same addendum No. 1 about which you have been testifying, I will ask you to read Paragraph IV (a)?

A. (Reading:) "IV. Action open to us: (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits."

41. Q. Between 27 November and 7 December 1941, will you state the number of naval aircraft that were available in the Hawaiian area for conducting a distant reconnaissance?

A. A portion of my answer will depend upon the definition of distant reconnaissance. It was my personal opinion that reconnaissance to a distance of less than approximately 800 miles—which would give visibility, we assumed, to approximately 825 miles—would not protect against surprise air raid in that sector, and I therefore believed that the 800 mile figure was the proper one to use for distant reconnaissance. One squadron of planes attached to Patrol Wings One and Two consisted of the obsolete PBY-3s which had not yet been replaced by PBY-5s and which could not, because of their age and service, go to that distance. They could, however, go to 700 miles and were so used for a brief while, a very brief while, subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not remember the starting date of the operation involving the reenforcement of Wake. However, it was approximately within a few days of November 27th. One of our patrol squadrons, VP-21, had been based on Midway since early in October, 1941. At the time it was decided to reenforce Wake with a squadron of Marine fighters, this squadron was transferred to Wake with orders to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force; and a second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to [583] Midway to scout and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and retirement. I am not certain about the exact dates but I remember that VP-22 left Wake on either the 3rd or 4th of December and arrived back at Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December, which left just the one squadron of VP-21 at the Island of Midway. That squadron consisted of these old obsolete planes, PBY-3s, and were approaching their 18 months service and were overdue, in fact, for overhaul, and it was

planned that they would be flown back to the Mainland very shortly, replaced by the PBY-5s. With 9 planes undergoing repair or out of commission for various reasons, to the best of my knowledge I would say that we had 12 planes at Midway and approximately 60 at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe which could have been used for reconnaissance to the 700 mile point.

42. Q. Then do I understand that the total naval aircraft available for a distant reconnaissance up to 700 miles as a maximum was about 60 planes at Oahu or its environs, and 12 at Midway? Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

43. Q. Can you recall how many Army aircraft were available for conducting a distant reconnaissance?

A. It is my recollection that the last available report we received from the Army was 6, B-17s. These 6 planes were the only planes that the Army reported available to us which could go beyond 300 miles. They could go to 800 miles.

44. Q. With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were available for operation between 27 November and 7 December 1941, could you have complied with a directive to conduct a long-range reconnaissance through 360 degrees?

A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type of search that we could devise, a single plane going to 700 miles would only cover a sector of 8 degrees. Therefore, with 66 planes, only 50 percent of which could be used continuously from a maintenance and pilot fatigue standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily. 360 degrees could be covered only one day, possibly only two days as an emergency measure, but it could not be maintained. It would only cover about three-quarters of the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion point from not only of personnel but from the matériel standpoint as well was reached. The exhaustion period would have been reached in matériel before it was reached in personnel. As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that 3 weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 percent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other [584] planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a 6-week period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.

45. Q. Let us suppose, for example, that it was contemplated that this long-range reconnaissance would have been maintained indefinitely. How many planes do you feel would have been available for such a type of patrol?

A. I believe that under the circumstances and with planning, we could have drawn up for daily searches the use of approximately 30 planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached, provided that we were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for the search alone, because that would have left us entirely without any striking group except insofar as the other approximately 36 planes would have been available.

46. Q. With 30 planes, what sector of 360 degrees could you cover?

A. Approximately 240 degrees, to a distance of 700 miles.

47. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the condition of readiness that was being maintained in Army aircraft between 27 November and 7 December 1941?

A. No personal knowledge. The orders for condition of readiness were B-5.

48. Q. And that was what?

A. Fifty percent of aircraft available on four hours notice.

49. Q. Had you heard anything about an Army condition of readiness designed to prevent sabotage?

A. I had heard indirectly and unofficially of various rumors of attempted sabotage and counter-measures against sabotage, none of which appeared at the time to be of great importance.

50. Q. I thought you had answered this question but to make sure it is clear for the record, how many planes could you have safely and indefinitely operated on a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles without exhausting planes or personnel, assuming that all planes suitable for reconnaissance were made available for that purpose?

A. Eighteen, provided a certain supply of critical spares were made available.

[585] 51. Q. And how many degrees of a sector of 360 degrees could these 18 cover?

A. 144 degrees.

The court then, at 11:00 a. m., took a recess until 11:15 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), whose counsel were present.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued):

52. Q. In your testimony previous to the recess you mentioned to the effect that a squadron of patrol planes was parked on Ford Island in a position for being readily launched. Is that a correct understanding?

A. That is correct.

53. Q. Do you know whether or not the other patrol craft that were at Ford Island were dispersed, or whether they were in a state of repair at the sheds, or what was their position?

A. Some were lined up ready for launching, in the hangars; some were undergoing various maintenance work and in the vicinity of the hangars; some were in the hangars undergoing longer repair or modification. How many of the 9 out of commission and undergoing repairs were in Pearl Harbor and how many in Kaneohe, I cannot state. Broadly speaking, dispersion of patrol seaplanes was impracticable due to lack of handling facilities, boats, et cetera, and the fact that the patrol seaplane is not designed to be moved considerable dis-

tances on land. Dispersal in the water at Pearl Harbor was impracticable due to the congestion of the harbor and difficulty of access in the more remote, uncongested areas.

54. Q. I believe you testified that the patrol planes at Midway were conducting reconnaissance patrols between 27 November and 7 December, 1941; is that correct?

A. That is substantially correct. Actually, on the morning of December 7th, six planes were scouting to cover a task force in the vicinity of Midway and six planes were fully manned on the water loaded with live bombs.

[586] 55. Q. Then there were no other planes other than the six you have mentioned which were covering a task force in the vicinity of Midway, flying a patrol of any description from Midway?

A. Not from Midway.

56. Q. When did you first have knowledge that an enemy was attacking in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. I believe the best way to answer the question is a brief narrative. Our patrol planes covering the operating areas were carrying live depth charges and had specific orders to sink any submerged submarine sighted outside of the submarine sanctuary and without a close escort. At approximately 7:30 on the morning of December 7th I received a telephone call from the staff duty officer who informed me he had received a message from 14-Prep-1 to the effect that they had sunk a submerged submarine one mile off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. I asked him if the message had been properly authenticated, because there was in the back of my mind the feeling that it was quite possible that it was a mistake, a drill message of some variety that had gotten out by accident. So I ordered the staff duty officer to request an authentication of the message immediately. However, that did not stop me from making an immediate report of the information to the staff duty officer of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I believe at the time that I did not consider that as definite information of any enemy attack. I went immediately to the Command Center and for no reason that I know of, drew up a search plan for our aircraft under the conditions prevailing that day. I prepared it in dispatch form. Meanwhile, I was waiting for an authentication of this message. There was a slight delay, and approximately 5 or 10 minutes after I reached the Command Center, I saw, together with the staff duty officer, a single plane making a dive on Ford Island. The single plane appeared at the time to both the staff duty officer and myself in the light of a young aviator "flathatting" and we both tried to get his number to make a report of the violation of flight rules. He completed his dive, pulled up and away. We were commenting together on the fact that it was going to be difficult to find out who the pilot was, when the delayed action bomb which he had dropped, and which we had not seen drop, detonated, and I told the staff duty officer, "Never mind; it's a Jap". I dashed across the hall into the radio room, ordered a broadcast in plain English on all frequencies, "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." The detonation of the bomb dropped by that first plane was my first positive knowledge of an enemy attack.

57. Q. Did you give any further orders, or did you give any orders subsequent to making this report, as to any action that was to be taken by the aircraft in your [587] command? •

A. Yes. Immediately after the broadcast message I ordered the planes in the air to proceed and search the section 315 to 360 degrees from Pearl Harbor to maximum practical distance, followed up shortly later by an assignment of a sector to the planes which had been conducting joint tactics with submarines off the Island of Lanai. Following that, similar orders were issued in accordance with the search plan that I had previously drawn up to various units by the various means of communication available to me in the Command Center.

58. Q. Prior to 7:55 on 7 December 1941, did you have any information of a flight of Army planes scheduled to arrive on December 7, 1941 from the Mainland?

A. No.

59. Q. Did you ordinarily attend Army-Navy conferences on military matters pertaining to aircraft operations as they were related to defenses in Oahu?

A. Not invariably. Captain C. F. Coe, War Plans officer on the staff of Patrol Wing Two, and myself, to the best of my knowledge and belief, attended all such conferences in which lower echelon commands were present. There may have been conferences in the higher echelons that we did not attend.

60. Q. Who, ordinarily, from your organization, attended the conferences in which the higher echelons of command were meeting together?

A. Admiral Bellinger usually attended such conferences, and whenever practicable it was his usual practice to take either Captain Coe or myself.

61. Q. Adverting to the period from about July 1941 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, what is your conception of the degree of cooperation between Army and Navy commanders during this period of time in the Hawaiian area?

A. I will have to take time with my answer because it is difficult to distinguish pre-Pearl Harbor and post-Pearl Harbor opinions. As usual in any cooperative effort, or rather, effort requiring cooperation, certain individuals were extremely cooperative. Others required more diplomatic handling. Generally speaking, our relations with Army bombardment aviation, with which I was principally concerned, were excellent. General—then Colonel—Farthing, was commander of the Eighteenth Bombardment Wing, and my relations with him were very close. We frequently held exercises requiring coordination of facilities entirely outside of the structure of [588] the Naval Base Defense Air Force. For example, I was frequently able, during the course of our own towed target-high altitude bombing practice, to make such targets available to the Eighteenth Bombardment Wing. We would bomb the target between, say, the hours of 10:00 and 11:00, and they would have it between 11:00 and 12:00, and so forth. They did a number of favors for us, particularly in the line of small machine shop work. I am using this merely to illustrate that in the echelons of command in which I customarily moved we got along very well generally. There seemed to be a necessity for precise and meticulous wording of orders. There were more difficulties in lack of coordination, as I saw them from my lower angle, in the line of the necessity for jockeying for technical position, for maintenance of integrity of command, and for the increased allocation of the limited aviation facilities on the Island of Oahu itself. If I remember correctly there

were 8 or 10 joint boards of various descriptions and degrees of seniority to decide various joint Army and Navy aviation matters.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[589] 62. Q. What is your opinion of the cooperation in the exchange of important military information between Army and Navy commanders of aircraft in the Hawaiian area between November 27, 1941 and December 7 of the same year?

A. During that particular period a considerable portion of our effort in the Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings was directed toward the operation involving the reenforcement of Wake. I don't remember at the moment whether or not a naval base defense air raid drill was held during this period.

63. Q. This was exchange of information.

A. Yes. I know of no exchange of information over and above the usual or the customary discussion of details.

64. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, which is in evidence before this court. It is a dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 24, 1941, and states in substance that chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful and that there are indications of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on Guam or the Philippines as a possibility. Prior to December 7, 1941, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. No.

65. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which has been called by some witnesses a "war warning message." I ask you to examine it and state whether prior to December 7, 1941, you had seen this dispatch or had been made acquainted with its contents?

A. No.

66. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, was any patrol plane which you had available for long-range reconnaissance equipped with radar?

A. No.

67. Q. That being the case, do you consider that they were of any value for a night search?

A. No, except in unusual circumstances on bright, moonlight nights.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

68. Q. When you stated in your direct examination, Captain, that there were available for continuous, effective distant reconnaissance, on a daily basis, eighteen planes and that that would cover a sector of 144 degrees, it was on the assumption of a 25-mile visibility, was it not?

A. That is correct.

[590] 69. Q. Was a 25-mile visibility ordinarily prevailing in the Hawaiian area for a distance of 700 or 800 miles?

A. No, a 25-mile visibility was assumed for the search basis on the premise that the visibility around Oahu was either very good or non-existent or so low, rather, that aircraft scouting was impractical, as, for example, in the dense rain areas, tropical storms, and bad weather areas. It was assumed that the most economical expenditure of planes

would be made on the basis of maximum visibility normally expected, and planes would make reports concerning which areas, due to weather or other low visibility, were not covered by the search. That procedure covered not only the period before the war but that subsequent to December 7th and was still in force and was used during the battle of Midway.

70. Q. Is it true in all probability, day in and day out, that there would be certain areas where the effectiveness of the search in the 144-degree sector would be substantially reduced because of weather conditions?

A. That is correct. That varied. On the 360-degree circle from the Island, we took weather reports covering a period of several months and found that approximately 20% in the area for a distance of 700 miles could be expected to have weather conditions where the visibility might go as low as zero.

71. Q. Did you have any percentage estimate of the effectiveness within this 144-degree sector because of weather conditions?

A. Yes, we felt that, except in the single case of a widespread and pronounced front, we stood an excellent chance of detecting any sizeable group of surface vessels on any given day. That belief was borne out by tactical exercise searches in that same area before Pearl Harbor. We might go out in rain squalls and miss them for an hour and get them on the return leg. If there was a widespread front, we might miss them entirely.

72. Q. You spoke about the necessity or desirability of spare parts for the conduct of distant reconnaissance for any continuous program. What was the condition of the availability of critical spare parts for distant reconnaissance planes prior to December 7?

A. For the PBY-5 planes, which had, in the case of several squadrons, just replaced during the months of October and November the obsolete PBY-1, 2, and 3 plane, there was, substantially speaking, a total absence of any spare parts whatever. We had been undergoing the usual, shakedown difficulties with a new type of plane, and there had been considerable difficulty because of the cracking of new engine sections in these planes. A replacement program was under way with the replacement of these cracked engine sections [591] with a new type. In addition, material for installing armor and leak-proof tanks in these PBY-5's was just being received, and the first plane had just been finished in that connection on December 7.

73. Q. Were you in Pearl Harbor during the period subsequent to December 7, when the Roberts Commission was conducting its investigation?

A. I did not leave Pearl Harbor from December 7, 1941, until late in May 1942.

74. Q. Did you testify as a witness before the Roberts Commission?

A. No, sir.

75. Q. Exhibit 59 is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated 7 January 1942. It has as its enclosure a letter written December 30, 1941, from the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. I direct your attention to the enclosure, Captain, and ask whether you were familiar with and generally assisted in the preparation of that letter?

A. I was generally familiar with this letter. I did not assist in its preparation.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

76. Q. Captain, there was a document referred to here as Exhibit 53. In connection with that exhibit, which is referred to as the operation plan in connection with defense matters in the Hawaiian area, there is one annex here from which you read, being addendum one. In that connection, you read extracts concerning the estimate of the situation and possible enemy action. Now, am I correct in saying that that is really a process of reasoning and that ultimately certain decisions were reached on the basis of that information or reasoning, which then became the decisions made in the document?

A. Yes.

77. Q. Will you please read paragraph 4 of the addendum? It is entitled "Action Open to Us."

A. (Reading) "Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits."

[592] 78. Q. I take it that you had no more material up to December 7 than you had at this time; is that correct?

A. That is correct. The estimate was dated March 31. I reported in April. There were no changes in the Navy or, as far as I know, in the Army air situation of sufficient importance to justify or require a re-estimate of the situation.

79. Q. Captain, those documents which you have there, insofar as they relate to the air matters, are documents which your superior, Rear Admiral Bellinger, had to do with in communion with the Army officers there at the time; is that not so? They were prepared by the two of them?

A. The estimate was prepared by the two of them. The annex Baker to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan was prepared only by Admiral Bellinger.

80. Q. Then, under those plans you did have the drills to actually test out the plans at intervals during the period up to December 7?

A. That is correct.

81. Q. When you had the drills, I take it that if you noted defects they were corrected at the time?

A. That is correct.

82. Q. Improvements that you observed or those that were observed which seemed sensible or desirable were initiated?

A. Yes.

83. Q. It was a growing thing—general improvement clear through in connection with the drills; am I right in that?

A. No, I would say that there was considerable improvement between approximately the 20th of April and the middle of October, during which the major or more glaring errors were eradicated. Subsequent to that time very little improvements was noticed in drills.

84. Q. Was it not the intention to try to have these plans in such a position, by virtue of drills, that when an emergency came along it would be as near an automatic and a working proposition as possible?

A. That is correct.

85. Q. In connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force, is it not a fact that that entity only came into existence, first, upon a drill? Second, if an attack were actually made, that would vitalize it, because orders would be issued to vitalize it; is that right?

A. If I may leave aside the word "entity" in your questions, I would say the Naval Base Defense Air Force, as [593] a part of the Naval Base Defense Force, was vitalized only by drills and of the occurrence of an actual emergency. No one gave me any orders on December 7. It was unnecessary; it was automatic in the plan.

86. Q. After vitalization became a part of the Base Defense Air Force, Rear Admiral Bellinger was not a Naval Base Air Force person, insofar as the planes were concerned, until there was a drill or until there was an emergency; isn't that right?

A. That is correct and not in the full sense that the term or title implies, even under those conditions. His authority did not extend over fighting planes, radar detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns; and his authority over Army units was limited in that he exercised operational control through mutual agreement, and not command.

87. Q. With reference to the matter of readiness, I take it that the planes we are here discussing are the same planes that are in PatWing One and Two? In other words, it was just the one force of naval patrol planes at the time?

A. There were two separate organizations. However, Admiral Bellinger had a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that Patrol Wing One was to be under his command, and we were using the title for his correspondence—Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings.

88. Q. Would that be the same as Task Force Nine?

A. Not entirely, because Task Force Nine consisted of Patrol Wings One and Two, attached tenders and such other units as the Commander-in-Chief might detail to that task force for specific operations.

89. Q. Under that, Patrol Wings One and Two were assigned certain tasks in connection with scouting and searching upon deployment schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that the way it ran?

A. The situation was very complicated. We were technically designated as Task Force Nine. There were, in addition, certain patrol squadrons assigned for tactical purposes to Task Forces One, Two, and Three; and the only way we could get quarterly operating schedules approved in those cases was to make up a complete one for our own task force and for the three other task forces and get them approved by all three task force commanders before we could submit our own schedule.

90. Q. If condition of readiness A-1 for aircraft was made the order of the day, you would be unable to carry out the missions which were in the other documents to which you refer?

A. Our assigned mission was in order of priority to [594] the various tasks: expansion training, operational training, and spe-

cific operations. In expansion training we were required to train complete flight crews for detachment, to be sent back to the United States to form the nuclei of squadrons just being commissioned. We were given instructions that we were supposed to provide or allow for a 10% reduction of our qualified combat crews—I'm not sure whether it was every quarter or every two months, but it involved a tremendous training program, and the vitalization of the Naval Base Defense Air Force would have involved a practical cessation of that effort.

91. Q. I take it that, in your opinion, as an aviation officer and being on the spot at the time, the conditions of readiness that were in effect were adequate and sensible for the things that were then being done? Is that a fair statement?

A. We were doing the best we could with what we had.

Examined by the court:

92. Q. Captain, I think you said that the Japanese would make an attack by air in case of war.

A. I thought if they made an attack, it would be an air attack.

93. Q. Well, then, in making that mental estimate did you consider the possible attack by submarines in the Hawaiian area?

A. I did, sir, but I did not believe that a submarine attack could, as I tried to point out in answer to the previous question, seriously affect our position in the Pacific.

94. Q. Well, those mental estimates that you just testified to were pre Pearl Harbor?

A. As nearly as I can recall, I believe they were, sir.

95. Q. In considering the whole thing after the attack, do you think that that estimate is correct?

A. I believe so, yes, sir.

96. Q. The court has taken judicial notice of the report of the Roberts Commission. In one of the findings they made this statement: "Means were available for distance reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack." Do you agree with that?

A. I agree with it contingent upon a definition of the word "measure".

[595] 97. Q. Will you tell the court what your opinion is as to the means available for distance reconnaissance with reference to security against a surprise air attack?

A. The means at our disposal would have provided a certain degree of security, but the means were inadequate for absolute security.

98. Q. Captain, I am referring to paragraph IV (a) of the addendum of Exhibit 53. It is stated that the action proposed therein cannot be "undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits." Please elaborate upon that point and cover the feature of intelligence available which would have prompted—

A. The word "intelligence," as it was explained to me later, was used advisedly to include anything that might be received by fortuitous local knowledge or any source of Naval Intelligence from the Chief of Naval Operations, the State Department, or any other agency.

99. Q. You had no such intelligence?

A. I had no knowledge of any such intelligence.

100. Q. You are speaking of knowledge available to you personally and not to Admiral Bellinger?

A. I am speaking personally, sir.

101. Q. Captain, does the court understand that on the morning of December 7 there was no long-range reconnaissance by any planes stationed at Oahu, although there were planes available for this activity; is that correct?

A. Correct as to fact. The word "available" in there involves an implication which lessens the quality of my answer. During the earlier portion of the week we had been engaged for a period, in accordance with our approved operation schedule known as wing tactics. At that particular time, in drawing up the detail plans for that wing tactics period, I drew them up so we would have a constant daily scout on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of that week to the northward and northwestward of the island of Oahu. As a primary purpose for training, the distance did not extend beyond 400 miles. However, those searches were made during all of that week. In addition, we had the searches running from Midway every day that week. On Saturday we had the arrival of the squadron returning from the island of Wake—

102. Q. Saturday, the 6th of December?

A. The 6th of December or the 5th. I forget exactly which date it came in. I believe it came in late on the [596] afternoon of the 5th. The 6th and 7th were planned principally as a period of maintenance and upkeep, although we had several squadrons in a high degree of readiness. It was practically the culmination of what has been mentioned before—The search had been made, but we were not going ahead with it continuously in order not to depreciate the material readiness of the planes.

103. Q. That is a very clear explanation. However, will you please answer the question? We will put the question another way. Were there any planes at Pearl Harbor which could have been used and were not used for distance reconnaissance on the morning of December 7?

A. Yes, sir, there were planes that could have been used had such a search been ordered by higher authority.

104. Q. How many of these planes were in that category?

A. For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes could have been made available in four hours or less.

105. Q. Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance and under whose authority would the directive have been made?

A. For the full utilization of all aircraft, both Army and Navy, available on Oahu, the orders to us would have come from the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

106. Q. Who is that?

A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Orders solely for the Navy planes would probably have come from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

107. Q. Did you consider in these plans and orders which you had that the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force was the one who would have originated the idea of distance reconnaissance and would have directed you or Admiral Bellinger to have sent planes out on this mission?

A. I would have assumed it would be the duty of any officer higher in the echelon of command above Admiral Bellinger to have taken action on receipt of the information indicating that action was necessary.

108. Q. Who was the officer who, in studying the general situation, had the direct authority to order out these planes and to give Admiral Bellinger orders to send out these planes on distance reconnaissance?

A. It was the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force. He was the immediate superior in command in that organization.

109. Q. Who was in command of Ford Island at this time?

A. Admiral Bellinger was the Commander of the Fleet Air Detachment. Captain James A. Shoemaker was Commander of the Fleet Air Station.

[597] 110. Q. On the morning of December 7 when you, as you have stated, went into the room and sent out the signal: "Japanese attack; this is no drill," how long after that was the general alarm sounded by the station and the activities in Pearl Harbor?

A. I cannot say, sir.

110. Q. You stated that in your opinion there might be or could be an air attack on Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction the air attack would come or the most probable direction?

A. Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view of the prevailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands and other factors, we had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from 315 to 00.

111. Q. Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent out distance reconnaissance, you would have sent them to the northwest sector so as to cover that sector?

A. For any single day, yes, sir.

112. Q. Well, let's consider for every day.

A. For every day there would have to be some variation. In other words, it would have become known that the sector was being covered, and it would have been easy to avoid.

113. Q. In part of your testimony you said that on the morning of December 7 there was a search in process from 350 to 360 degrees; is that correct?

A. No, sir, I do not believe I said that.

114. Q. 315 to 360?

A. No, sir, I said I ordered planes already in the air to cover that sector after the attack.

115. Q. Why did you select that sector?

A. Because we had always decided that was the most likely direction of approach.

116. Q. But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japanese planes?

A. No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and pre-conceived ideas. We always selected that sector, 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was from 315 to around 270. We placed other sectors in their relative idea of importance.

[598] 117. Q. Did you gain any information subsequent to the attack of December 7 as to the location of the enemy carriers from which this attack was launched?

A. Yes, sir. To the best of my belief, from the information received, the Japanese came in from the northwest at a distance of approximately 225 miles, turned into the wind, launched, proceeded along that general course, and finally recovered their planes at a distance of approximately 300 miles somewhat east of north of the island—probably Nor'Nor'East.

118. Q. What information, if any, do you have as to the location of the Japanese carriers when the planes were launched to make the attack? What estimated position do you have?

A. My understanding is that subsequent information showed that they were approximately 335 degrees true, a distance of about 225 miles from Oahu.

119. Q. Have you any data as to the number of Japanese planes which made this attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir, I have an estimate based partially or wholly upon subsequent information. I would estimate approximately 200 planes.

120. Q. And the approximate number shot down?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, there were from 17 to 20 Japanese aircraft shot down.

121. Q. As the court understands, there were certain planes which were sent out to cover the operating areas for the Fleet on that morning; is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

122. Q. And certain planes were left at Ford Island; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

123. Q. Would it be possible to give this court the number of planes actually at Ford Island on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. I may be one or two planes out in each squadron. There were twelve planes of VP-23, thirteen planes of VP-21, and 6 planes of VP-24 on Ford Island. At Kanehe there were thirty-four.

124. Q. How many of these planes were capable of taking to the air and flying at that time?

A. Approximately sixty-three. There were nine additional planes that were out of commission.

The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[599] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

125. Q. Captain, this morning you mentioned the difficulty that there was to disassociate things before Pearl Harbor from those things after. Now, in these questions, I am going to refer specifically to matters before December 7th, and particularly during the period

November 27th to December 7th and not restrict it to just the 7th alone. Now at that time, how many patrol planes capable of doing distance reconnaissance were in the Hawaiian area, as near as you recall?

A. Approximately 83 Army and Navy planes.

126. Q. And of that number there would be 6, B-17's; Army bombers?

A. Twelve B-17s. You asked how many planes were in the area.

127. Q. And of those 12 Army bombers, only 6 of them during that period were capable of actual operation; is that your recollection?

A. No. Presumably all of them were capable of operation. Only 6 were made available to the Naval Base Air Defense, in the last report, which was dated 6 December, or 5 December, I forget which.

128. Q. Now, in respect of the naval planes capable of doing distance reconnaissance, those were in the patrol wings of the Hawaiian area; am I correct?

A. That is correct.

129. Q. And these same patrol planes were also in Task Force Nine; is that correct?

A. That is correct. There is one addition. On occasion, some squadrons were specifically assigned to other task forces, Task Forces One, Two and Three.

130. Q. So that in any event the planes were either in Task Force Nine, or associated in other task forces there in the area?

A. That is correct.

[600] 131. Q. Now, between these same two dates, November 27 and December 7, all these planes, whether they were in patrol wings or in task forces, were conducting operations, they were maintaining upkeep, and they were on operating training schedules that had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet; is that not so?

A. That is correct.

132. Q. And these operating and employment schedules of those planes were matters that lay between Admiral Bellinger and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet; is that so?

A. Yes, sir.

133. Q. And Rear Admiral Bloch, either as Com 14 or as Naval Base Defense Officer, had nothing to do with that situation in respect of the employment schedules?

A. No, sir.

134. Q. Now, if it were desired to institute security against surprise carrier attack between these two dates, wouldn't a daily distance reconnaissance over 360 degrees to a distance of 700 miles be about the best way to do it?

A. That was about the best that could have been done.

135. Q. I take it, then, from what you have previously said here now, that the Naval Base Defense Officer or Com14, in either of those capacities, didn't have authority to order a complete discontinuance of patrol plane operations and their training and overhaul schedules as approved by the Commander-in-Chief, and to institute continuous long-range reconnaissance on his own authority, did he?

A. I would assume that he did not.

136. Q. So that the remark this morning—and possibly I didn't catch it accurately—that the Naval Base Defense Officer had authority

to issue orders for distance reconnaissance, what you meant, I take it, was that in case of an immediate emergency because of the imminence of an air attack, he could give an order or sound the alarm and then, and only then, these planes came under the control of the Naval Base Defense Air Force for the purpose of carrying out orders for search and attack. Am I correct in that?

A. You are correct in saying about the emergency. There might have been other situations in which he could have done the same thing, for drill, or for something for which he had received information or instructions.

[601] Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

137. Q. Captain, did you know anything about the operation of the Army radar system?

A. To a limited extent. Approximately one week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, or possibly ten days before, General Davidson—I believe he was then Commander of the Seventh Fighter Command—came over to call on Admiral Bellinger, and the purpose of his call was to ascertain as to whether or not the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help the Army place its radar system into 24-hour operation. It was my understanding from the conversation and the general discussion that followed it that the equipment was set up but that General Davidson did not have at his command sufficient officer personnel to run it on a 24-hour basis, and I am fairly positive that he made the statement that if we couldn't help out to the extent of 6 officers for permanent assignment over there at this control center that the Army would only be able to run that during the critical hours of the morning and evening; they couldn't run it all throughout the day or all night long. The final decision, you might say, was that the Navy could not provide the officers required at that time on a permanent basis.

138. Q. That was because they weren't available?

A. That I cannot say. I knew the final decision but not the process of reasoning that led up to it.

139. Q. Now, during the attack, did you undertake to find out from the Army people whether the radar had any information that would be of assistance for tracking the planes back?

A. No, it was more direct than that. During the process of the several attacks, Captain Coe, Admiral Bellinger, and myself, called and made requests by telephone, some direct as we could to the control center, some through the teletype system, some through the telephone exchanges at Pearl Harbor, and even an attempt through the direct field telephones at Hickam Field, and in every case these several requests, we asked the Army radar people to please see if they could track the Japanese planes in retiring and to give us their direction, and even included a caution in one case that I know of to please be sure that they give us a true direction and not a reciprocal bearing; give us the direction of the Japanese retirement. We never received any information that we had asked for.

140. Q. During the attack, I believe that there was one of the Japanese planes that was shot down and a chart was found indicating various retirement courses to the northward. Did you know about that, either then [602] or shortly afterwards?

A. Sometime during the morning we received information that a chart, apparently, from a shot-down Japanese plane had been recovered. It was my understanding, or my recollection at this time without a reference to any document, that the purported rendezvous was to the southwest of Hawaii.

141. Q. At some time, did some Army B-17s go to the northward that morning?

A. Yes, sir. At approximately 12:30 there were four, I believe, B-17s—which was all they reported at that time ready for flight—took off loaded with bombs accompanied by four, A-20s. The instructions that we issued from the Command Center, the Commander of the Search and Attack groups, Naval Base Defense Air Force, were to scout in one of these northerly sectors which we specified narrowly by degrees, giving them about 8 degrees per plane; to scout as far as they could on the available gas supply and then return. They came back after going out approximately 150 miles, for the reason that that was the limit of the radius of action of the A-20s and that the B-17s could not go further without protection.

142. Q. While you were at Pearl Harbor, Captain, did you have occasion at any time to see PBY planes in transit through Pearl Harbor en route to Australia or New Zealand?

A. I believe so. I'm more certain as to the planes destined for the Dutch and headed for the Dutch East Indies.

143. Q. About how many were those?

A. I would say roughly and from memory, approximately 40.

144. Q. At that time there was need for PBYs in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir.

145. Q. Were those that went through of the most modern type then in production?

A. They were the PBY-5 planes, which was the latest type available to us at that time which we could reasonably expect to be made available to us in quantity.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

146. Q. Are you familiar with radar as installed on any ships in the Pacific Fleet as of about 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir; with the CURTISS, aircraft tender attached to Patrol Wing Two.

[603] 147. Q. Where was she in the period immediately preceding 7 December 1941?

A. On Monday and Tuesday of the week preceding Pearl Harbor, we had sent the *Curtiss* down to Hilo to act as a station ship to play a part in wing tactics, which was the approved schedule for that week. Later on in the week she left Hilo, I believe late Tuesday afternoon, and we used her during our northerly searches on Wednesday and Thursday as a simulated target purporting to be an enemy aircraft carrier. She came into Pearl Harbor, I believe on Saturday morning.

148. Q. What day was that?

A. December 6th. All of this is the week before December 7th.

149. Q. Are you familiar with the capabilities or efficiency of radar operation from ships moored or anchored in Pearl Harbor?

A. I believe so.

150. Q. Will you state what sectors ships moored in Pearl Harbor could search with their own radars, if they could search any sectors?

A. I am stopping merely to try to disassociate my present knowledge of the subject with what I knew then. I believe that the radar of the *Curtiss* could give a fair radar coverage in the sector bounded by a tangent from her anchorage to the southern edge of Diamond Head, all the way around to a tangent of that 4,000 foot mountain to the westward of Oahu; I forget the name of the range. I would say approximately a 150 to 160 degree arc, generally to the southward. The distance would have been dependent upon the altitude of the target.

151. Q. Will you tell the court upon what general principle a radar can search?

A. I can't give the principle. I can give operational features and limitations but I can't tell how it would work.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

152. Q. In connection with radar, Captain, you said that the Army told you and Admiral Bellinger during this conference that without the Navy officers the Army could only operate during the critical hours. Was there any agreement between the Army and the Navy as to what the critical hours of the day were in the operation of the [604] radar?

A. There I find it impossible to differentiate between present and post Pearl Harbor knowledge. I knew, and as far as I was personally concerned, I always felt, that the most dangerous period was approximately one hour before sunrise and approximately two hours after sunrise in the morning; and approximately the same period with reverse overlaps in the evening. Whether or not that was a common agreement between Army and Navy before Pearl Harbor, I'm sorry, I just don't remember.

153. Q. Sunrise at Pearl Harbor on 7 December was approximately 6:30?

A. Approximately.

154. Q. So that applying that test of one hour before and two hours afterwards, the period would have been 5:30 a. m., until 8:30?

A. I would have imagined that the most probable time of attack would have been during those hours.

Neither the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark nor the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), desired for cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

155. Q. Captain, were the planes which were placed at Ford Island on 7 December armed?

A. Yes, sir. For several months prior to Pearl Harbor no plane of Patrol Wing Two had ever flown without all of its machine guns and the full wartime ammunition allowance. The loading of bombs was a constant and repeated drill, but because of the weight limitation, the actual carrying of live bombs to the maximum capacity was not practiced. All planes on the morning search of the operating areas were required by direct order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to carry live depth charges.

156. Q. Did you know of the condition of the Army planes at this time?

A. I cannot speak from positive personal knowledge. My understanding is that they usually carried machine guns and ammunition, but not invariably.

157. Q. Was there a storage place for bombs on Ford Island where they were immediately available for the planes?

A. Yes, sir.

158. Q. When the first attack came in on the morning of 7 December will you please give the sequence of events, [605] what orders were received as to the employment of planes on Ford Island?

A. At 7:58, on my own initiative, I broadcast a message concerning an attack on Pearl Harbor. By 8:05 I had received an acknowledgment from all planes in the air regarding their assignment to search sectors in accordance with the search plan that I had previously drawn. The search plan was drawn up before the attack for no other reason than to occupy myself while waiting for an authenticator on the submarine sinking message. Additional orders were given by me and by other officers on duty in the Command Center at the time, under my direction, reading off the name of each man who would be on the telephone at the different stations and the sectors to be assigned to that particular station. As soon as that had been completed—I'm not entirely certain exactly what time it was but I believe the telephone part was completed before the part to the planes in the air—I telephoned Admiral Bellinger at his quarters to inform him of the air raid and what I had already done. For the next few minutes there was a constant stream of information and requests for information from various sources from Army generals, from the Commander-in-Chief's staff, and from the Naval Base Defense Force headquarters. The first positive order that I recall having received—and I'm not sure what time it was received—was from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and stated "Locate and destroy enemy", or something to that general effect. At the time of its receipt all possible action had already been taken. In a very few minutes—although at the time it seemed like hours—Admiral Bellinger arrived and approved orders that had already been issued, and immediately thereafter the attacks destroyed, at least temporarily, all means of communication, and for a period of approximately an hour and a half the only thing that we could do was to handle it by runners. We would send runners to one or two of the VJ planes that had radio sets in them which hadn't been destroyed on the ground, turn up their propellers, and use the radio sets of these planes to transmit. We also sent runners over to where the TANGIER, one of our tenders, was anchored, and used the TANGIER's radio facilities until we could get our own back into operation. There was a considerable amount of confusion due to the disruption, the temporary disruption of all communications and the presence of an extremely large amount of black smoke which was practically asphyxiating in its effects. We were able to divert some of the smoke and repair radios, and from then on there was a constant succession throughout the day of small orders to units when one single plane would be reported ready. As fast as we could get that information [606] we would send him out on a new sector. From time to time during the day we would receive, in some cases, orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet regarding the searching of specific sectors, and in other cases we would receive merely information regarding purported radio bearings, and so forth.

159. Q. What was your understanding in such an emergency as this as to who would direct the patrol planes in any search, or give orders for general search, or give orders for them to take off?

A. Admiral Bellinger, sir.

160. Q. Well, who above Admiral Bellinger? Was Admiral Bellinger sole authority for that?

A. No, sir; or any higher authority.

161. Q. Did you look to the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, for any orders to that effect?

A. I would have looked for them normally; owing to the positive knowledge of an emergency, I merely assumed in that circumstance that Admiral Bloch had already sent such a message and I didn't bother to look for it. I figured that the very best thing that could be done under the circumstances was to get things going and check up later on.

162. Q. There was no order received, to your knowledge, to that effect?

A. There may have been, sir. I never looked up to find out. I assumed that it was.

163. Q. Was any order given on the field for planes capable of taking off, to take off immediately, as soon as this attack was made?

A. Yes, sir. All planes that were capable of flight were ordered out as rapidly as possible.

164. Q. Captain, what was the manner in which the officers and men met the situation, so far as your knowledge goes?

A. I have nothing but the utmost praise for every officer and man throughout the day, which came under my personal command, with the single exception of one instance in which I criticize myself. During the course of the attack, the building shook and it looked as though the building was coming down. An authoritative source on the other end of the corridor announced, "The building is coming down; clear the top deck." Without waiting to ask for any more instructions, I went on the double with everybody else and went down on the ground deck. I looked down at the end of the corridor, saw the building was not coming down, and ordered everybody back up to their posts. No harm was done, fortunately, because at the time we were out of communication.

[607] 165. Q. Was there any evidence, so far as you noticed, of any unfitness for duty as a result of perhaps a night out the night before?

A. Absolutely none, sir.

166. Q. In any estimate that you may have made personally or otherwise during the critical days immediately preceding the attack, what was your thought with reference to war being started by an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I can only state that on one occasion—the only thing I can state positively about my opinion at that time was that in discussing with Admiral Bellinger the possibility or probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor—this was sometime in November—I stated at the time, half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that if they did attack it would be an air attack on Christmas Eve or New Years Day. I had a strange feeling, a vague feeling, not enough to have been an opinion, that if they did attack us at all it would probably be some-

time during the winter when the hours of daylight would be shorter. That would have been the logical time for the attack.

The question was repeated.

A. I remember reading an article in Time regarding the relative merits of Admirals Hart and Kimmel as life insurance prospects, in which the general precis of that article was that they would prefer to insure Admiral Kimmel, and I remember at the time agreeing with the gentleman.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have one item. I have, in various instances, expressed an opinion regarding the duration of effort of the Naval Base Air Defense, generally expressing the opinion of its inadequacy in certain respects. To illustrate how it was able to operate continuously after Pearl Harbor and was not, in our opinion, able to operate continuously on the basis of our pre-Pearl Harbor opinion, I respectfully call the attention of the court to the following facts: Before Pearl Harbor, as my assistant in the various operational jobs, the four or five different tasks that Admiral Bellinger had, I had one officer as assistant. From December 8th on up until shortly before the Battle of [608] Midway I had 42 officer assistants to help man and provide the necessary functioning for the Naval Base Air Defense. Those officers were not available to us before Pearl Harbor and were made available only because of the sinking or placing out of commission of the battleships to which they had been originally attached. As far as the continuous operation of the aircraft is concerned, the only reason that we were able to operate continuously without the exhaustion of our personnel was because a great many of our planes were destroyed on Pearl Harbor but their pilots and combat crews remained alive and unharmed, and when additional planes were flown out from the Mainland we then had the necessary reserve of extra pilots and combat crews to provide for continuous operation from a personnel standpoint.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Thursday, August 24, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944.

[609]

EIGHTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the seventeenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. William E. G. Taylor, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, attached to the staff of the Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point, stationed at Charleston, Rhode Island.

2. Q. Will you stated what duties were assigned you between October 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941?

A. I was assigned to temporary duty, to Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet Staff. My duties were to lecture fighter squadrons on combat tactics and on fighter direction. At the completion of my duties with Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet, at the request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian [610] Air Force, I was loaned to Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity verbally, to assist in an advisory capacity in setting up the air warning system at Fort Shafter.

3. Q. Will you state briefly what your experience was prior to 7 December, in the field of aircraft warning devices, specifically, the radar?

A. Well, I had two years' experience in England, mainly as a fighter pilot; one year with the British Navy, one year with the Air Force, and during which time I had access to and took advantage of learning the British air warning system, both aboard ship and ashore.

4. Q. Had you any intimate acquaintance with the radar equipment in the United States Pacific Fleet between October and December, 1941?

A. Yes, I did, I had an opportunity to see the early equipment on four of the American carriers.

5. Q. Will you state to the court what you consider the matériel efficiency of the radar equipment was before December 7, 1941, that you have just stated you had familiarity with?

A. The radar equipment itself was excellent. It was almost as good as the equipment is today. In two carriers it had just been installed and was not completely operative.

6. Q. After what date?

A. The date I was aboard. The date varied. One was on the east coast in September of 1941, and the other on the west coast in October of 1941, sir.

7. Q. Did you have any contact with the radar equipment on the U. S. S. CURTIS?

A. No, sir.

8. Q. Was the radar equipment on the U. S. S. CURTIS similar to that installed on the other ships that you have stated you were familiar with?

A. Yes, it was.

9. Q. From your contacts with radar equipment in the U. S. Pacific Fleet immediately prior to 7 December, 1941, can you state what the efficiency of radar operators was in general?

A. If you mean by "operators", the fighter director officers, plotters, and actual radar operators—they were, in general, fairly inexperienced.

10. Q. Did you consider them capable of taking bearings of aircraft at a distance?

A. Yes, sir. The operators themselves were quite capable of operating the radar equipment. The fighter director officers were green and inexperienced.

[611] 11. Q. When you reported to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, what duties did you perform?

A. I did not report to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. I reported to the Commanding Officer at Wheeler Field, who was acting for the Commanding General, Interceptor Command. My duties were then to assist in an advisory capacity in setting up the aircraft warning system. I spent my entire time working with the Interceptor Command and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, in assisting setting up the aircraft warning system, which consisted of training operators, advising on communication methods. My time was spent at staffs of the various commands in trying to work out liaison between the aircraft warning systems and the commands.

12. Q. As of the date, 6-7 December, 1941, what would you say was the efficiency of this organization that you have just described as having been assisting in organizing and instructing?

A. The radar equipment was adequate to do a fair job of early morning. The communications between the air warning system itself and the other organizations were in, except for the lines to some of the fighter dispersal areas, and the lines to the civilian air warning. The communications between the fighter-director officers', or controllers', positions, and the fighter aircraft, were totally inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore.

13. Q. What was your opinion of the efficiency of the operators of the radar themselves, as of 6-7 December, 1941?

A. The radar operators themselves were well-trained.

14. Q. Adverting to the period of between 27 November 1941, and 7 December, the same year, do you know what hours this radar system was in operation under the direction of the Army?

A. I don't remember exactly what hours the equipment was operating the entire time, but some time within ten days of December 7—

15. Q. Before or after?

A. Before December 7, the information center received instructions, I was told, from General Short, to close down the radar stations except between the hours of 4:00 a. m. and 7:00 a. m.

16. Q. Under what system had these radars been operated prior to the institution of this system of 4:00 to 7:00 in the morning?

A. As I remember, they were operating the radar sets between 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 4:30 in the afternoon.

17. Q. And then when you started to operate them between [612] 4:00 and 7:00 in the morning, do you know the reason why this change was made?

A. I was told that the change was made to save the equipment from breaking down from long periods of use.

18. Q. Do you know why the hours of 4:00 and 7:00 in the morning were adopted in preference to some other hour of the day?

A. No, sir, I do not.

19. Q. Can you add anything further to your testimony concerning the organization of the aircraft warning system?

A. I forgot to mention that the personnel in the aircraft warning center—we had, as I remember, only sufficient numbers of plotters and operators for two watches. There were no liaison officers to man any position. We had no controllers. The controller is the most important man in the information center. We had to use squadron commanders as controllers, and we were in the process of teaching them to control at the time of December 7.

20. Q. Do you know the organization of the information center in the aircraft warning system?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

21. Q. Will you please state it?

A. The organization is headed by a controller, or senior fighter director officer. Under the fighter-director officer or senior controller are several interceptor officers as liaison officers. There are search-light officers, gun control officers, radar officers, bomber command liaison officers, fighter command liaison officers, naval liaison officers, surface; naval liaison officers for air identification; Army ground liaison positions. Under these officers are the plotters, the operators, and the maintenance crews.

22. Q. Where were you at 0755 on the morning of 7 December, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor?

A. I was in bed at the Hawaiian Hotel.

23. Q. Do you know anything, of your own personal knowledge or contact as to what happened in the aircraft warning system at the time of the attack—after the attack?

A. Yes, sir, I do. I got there between 8:30 and 9:00, and got the general story on what had happened. One of the radar stations was

continuing to operate after 7:00 o'clock in the morning, to train operators. The information he received was sent to the information center, where it was handed to the acting controller, who was a squadron commander spending his first morning in the information center, trying to learn the system.

24. Q. Do you know who the officer was in control in the [613] information center?

A. No, sir, I do not remember his name.

25. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I do not remember his name, sir.

26. Q. When you arrived, as you stated you did, about 0830, was it?—

A. Yes, sir.

27. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, what was the condition of the organization of this information center?

A. The information center was in pretty great confusion. In order to man all the necessary positions, the air warning officers had drawn on mess cooks, linemen, every man that they could lay their hands on—all of whom were inexperienced—to man the telephones. The main plot had a paper overlay, ripped off the table, making the scale of the plotting table too large for accurate plotting. The plots that were coming in from the various radar stations were in such confusion it was impossible to determine what was going on.

28. Q. Do you know if there was any attempt made, after you arrived in the information center, to plot either incoming or retiring aircraft from the Pearl Harbor area?

A. All plots that came into the information center from the radar stations were plotted, but the scale of the plotting table itself was so large—so small, that there could be no accurate information plotted. There were also other plots coming in besides the Japanese raid, to add to the confusion.

29. Q. Do you know whether or not a plot was ever made of retiring Japanese planes?

A. There were, as I say, plots made of everything reported by the information centers, but the information center had no way of knowing whether they were Japanese planes or American planes.

30. Q. Was any plot ever made of planes retiring in a northwesterly direction to a distance of as much as 50 to 100 miles from Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. Will you state what that plot was, as best you can remember?

A. Well, the plot of the retiring planes in any one direction also included plots retiring in other directions as well.

32. Q. Can you state what plot was made of the planes that retired, if any did, in a northwesterly direction?

A. There was no single plot of planes in any direction made at the time. Several days later attempt was made to try [614] to assess what had happened from the tracers.

33. Q. What was your opinion as to the efficiency of the personnel in the Army information center in interpreting radar reports?

A. They were very inexperienced.

34. Q. From your own personal knowledge of radar as it was installed in vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet, and the efficiency

of the operators as of 6-7 December, 1941, is it your opinion that these radar sets could have been employed in detecting the approach of planes towards Pearl Harbor?

A. It would depend on where the sets were installed, sir.

35. Q. I Would ask you, for a set that is installed on a vessel of the United States Fleet, and the vessel anchored or moored in Pearl Harbor.

A. The efficiency of the equipment aboard ships was excellent at sea. In a land-locked harbor, particularly with mountains around, only by very good luck would you get any performance out of radar equipment aboard ship.

36. Q. In a sector in Pearl Harbor where mountains did not interfere, would you be able to get efficient results from a ship moored in Pearl Harbor?

A. Regardless of the terrain in the direction that the radar is searching, the mountains to the rearward or the side would still effect radar performance.

37. I would give you the hypothetical case of a ship moored in Pearl Harbor, attempting to locate a plane to the south and west of Pearl Harbor, where I believe there are no mountains interfering. Would this set work from Pearl Harbor in that direction?

A. It might work and again it might not. As I said before, the mountains to the north still affected the performance to the south.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

38. Q. Whose responsibility was it to operate the radar equipment on Oahu on 7 December, 1941?

A. That was the Chief Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. [615]

39. Q. The Hawaiian Department of what service?

A. The U. S. Army.

40. Q. In your opinion, did or did not the Navy lend all possible assistance in placing the radar equipment of the Army in efficient condition?

A. That is quite difficult to answer, sir. The assistance that the Navy gave to getting the radar equipment into operation was nil. They were not asked for any assistance in putting the radar equipment into operation.

41. Q. I think I said, "efficient condition."

A. Yes, sir, the Navy gave all assistance they were asked for in setting up the air warning system, except for furnishing liaison officers.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness. Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), nor interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), desired to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

42. Q. You stated in a reference to the operators of the radar system on ships of the Navy that you inspected, that they were green and inexperienced—that is, the officer operators; is that correct?

A. Fighter directors, yes, sir.

43. Q. Was this due to insufficient training or newness on the job?

A. It was newness on the job, sir. The equipment had just been installed.

44. Q. You spoke of the equipment on ships as being of excellent efficiency.

A. Yes, sir.

45. Q. At what maximum distance?

A. The maximum distance would range between 80 and 140 miles, depending on the height, sir.

46. Q. With reference to the Army mobile radar equipment, what was the range of their equipment?

A. Their range was almost the same, but their equipment was much cruder, much slower to operate. There were many more errors in the plotting range and azimuth than there was in the shipboard equipment.

[616] 47. Q. Was it entirely under the control and responsibility of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

48. Q. Did you have any control or authority beyond your duties as an instructor or adviser?

A. No, sir, my sole duties were in an advisory capacity.

49. Q. So long as this Army radar equipment was operative and efficient within certain limits, to which you have specified, do you know why it was not in operation continuously during the critical period in the days preceding December 7?

A. There were two reasons, sir. One reason was the shortage of personnel to operate twenty-four hours a day. The second reason was it was shut down by, I am told General Short's orders, to save the equipment.

50. Q. Well, in view of the fact that personnel might be taken from other Army organizations, do you not think this was so important that this should have been done in order that they be permanently manned?

A. I feel and felt then these stations should have been operating twenty-four hours a day, and the air warning system fully manned.

51. Q. Do you believe that General Short's orders not to keep in operation continuously because of the deterioration of equipment was a sound decision?

A. Not knowing the Army radar matériel conditions in Hawaii, I would say his decision was not sound.

52. Q. If there was possibility of deterioration of the equipment by having it in constant operation, would not it have been practicable to keep half of the system in operation with some degree of efficiency?

A. With some degree of efficiency. There were just enough radar stations to cover the area of Oahu. Any one set going out would mean the loss of that coverage.

53. Q. Did you ever make any recommendations with reference to keeping the Army system in operation?

A. Yes, sir.

54. Q. What were they?

A. I have a copy of the recommendations I made with me, sir.

55. Q. State briefly what it was and who it was made to?

A. The recommendations were made as a result of a conference held on November 24, and were made to the Acting Commanding Officer, Interceptor Command.

56. Q. And that was who?

A. I can't remember his name now, sir.

[617] 57. Q. Davidson?

A. No, sir. Davidson hadn't come back. He was in the United States then. The recommendations were also made to Colonel Murphy, who was the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, who was present; to Lieutenant Commander Coe, who was liaison officer for Patrol Wing Two, to the 18th Bombardment Wing, the 14th Pursuit Wing, the Coast Artillery, and to the 86th Observation Squadron.

58. Q. What is the date of this recommendation?

A. There is no date on this recommendation, but the copy of the minutes of the meeting was in the hands of all present within three days after the 24th of November.

59. Q. Three days after the 24th?

A. Within three days, yes, sir.

The court then, at 10:15 a. m., took a recess until 10:25 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the judge advocate:

60. Q. What is this document that you have in your possession?

A. This document is a memorandum of the minutes of a meeting that I called at the information center on Monday, the 24th of November, 1941. Copies of this memorandum were sent to all present. One copy was sent to the Operations Officer on Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet's staff, and one was sent to the Acting Commanding Officer, Interceptor Command.

The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate has examined the document in the possession of the witness, which he feels contains information that should be before the court. He therefore recommends to the court that the document be introduced in evidence for the purpose of reading such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to this inquiry, and as the court may desire to put before it.

The court then, at 10:30 a. m., took a recess until [618] 10:44, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, with the exception of the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the judge advocate:

61. Q. Commander, at the time you made this memoranda, was the subject matter of it fresh in your memory?

A. Yes, sir, it was. I wrote it the same day, within two hours of the meeting.

62. Q. At the time you wrote the memorandum, did you consider it a correct account of the events of that conference?

A. I did.

The memorandum of the minutes, made by the witness, Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, of a meeting called by him on November 24, 1941, at the information center, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 62."

63. Q. Will you read the entire document, please?

Yes, sir.

The witness read the document, Exhibit 62.

[619] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

64. Q. Who called this conference?

A. I called it, sir.

65. Q. It was not at the initiation of the Army at all?

A. No, sir.

66. Q. Was any objection made or disagreements expressed by any official to whom copies of the memo were given?

A. No, sir; all were agreed.

67. Q. What action was taken as a result of this conference prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Very little was done as a result of this conference. We managed to complete our communication lines. We were not able to have either the Army or the Navy agree on an aircraft identification system. We were not able to get men to man the information center. We were able to get no more personnel and the information center more or less remained as it was on 24 November. The fact that the radar stations were shut down except for the period of 4:00 a. m., to 7:00 a. m., made it impossible to continue to train plotters and operators for more than three hours a day, which was not enough. That fact alone did more to slow down the development of the information center than anything else.

68. Q. Whose responsibility or duty was it to provide the personnel? Army or Navy?

A. Except for the Navy liaison officers, it was the Army's duty to supply personnel.

69. Q. Was a request made upon the proper naval authorities for the detail of liaison officers?

A. The request was made verbally by me, sir.

70. Q. Upon whom?

A. On Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, staff, and Com 14's chief of staff, and also Admiral Bellinger.

71. Q. Was any reply made or reason given for failure or inability to supply these liaison officers?

A. The reply was that in all three places there were no liaison officers available. The Commander-in-Chief's staff said that they would order 6 officers as soon as possible to the information center at Shafter. This he said after all other sources failed to produce them.

[620] 72. Q. There was agreement as to the desirability and necessity for liaison officers; there was no opposition to the idea?

A. No, sir.

73. Q. Were liaison officers essential to the operation of this radar by the Army's radar equipment?

A. Not the radar equipment; no, sir. They were necessary in order to get the information that was needed by the information center, and also to disseminate it back where it was needed.

74. Q. Then it was strictly the Army's province to get the information, and the liaison were only to be used for getting the information to the Navy?

A. Yes, sir; that is, Navy liaison people.

75. Q. But their absence in no way acted against the efficient use of the radar as such?

A. Their absence didn't affect the use of the radar but their absence, had the information center been going, would have very definitely affected the function of the information center.

76. Q. Only insofar as getting the information around was concerned?

A. The information that we needed from the Navy was just as important as the information needed from the Army in order to operate the center. In other words, unless the officers of the different activities were able to identify the plots on the board from information that they received from their parent stations, it was impossible for the information center to operate, so each man was vital to the whole system.

77. Q. Well, the absence of the liaison officer didn't absolutely exclude the exchange of information, even though it might have been slower?

A. It would be a case, sir, of being slower, but certain information would never get to the information center that was needed, and important information would never go from the information center to the Navy. As it turned out, inasmuch as there were no liaison officers down at the information center at all, the absence of the Navy liaison officers made very little difference.

78. Q. Lieutenant Colonel Tyler, then a lieutenant in the Army, was sole controller, as I understand it, in the information center from 4:00 a. m., until 8:00 a. m., on 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember his name, sir, but there was one squadron commander; that was the first time he had [621] ever been in the information center. We were using squadron commanders as the only source of controllers we could lay our hands on. Unfortunately, though, they had their squadrons to train which took up by far the bulk of their time and they would never have worked out satisfactorily in any case.

79. Q. In consideration of your statement that the Army officer in charge of the center on the morning of December 7th had not been on duty in the center before, did the absence of Navy liaison officers in any way affect the results that were or might have been obtained?

A. No, sir, I do not believe it would have made much difference.

80. Q. Am I correct in the assumption or the conviction that the information center simply was not organized and was not functioning on the morning of December 7th?

A. Yes, sir.

81. Q. In summation of the reasons which you have given and the difficulties encountered, was this not due to the fact that the whole system was in the process of being brought to a state of efficiency?

A. Yes, sir. It could have been made operative sooner had there been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things we needed.

82. Q. Where should this impetus have emanated?

A. It is my opinion it should come from the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

83. Q. Did you remain on duty with the Hawaiian Department after the 7th of December, 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I remained with them for at least one month after December 7th.

84. Q. What was the state of affairs at the end of that month with regard to the completion of the efficiency of the organization?

A. At the end of that month, well, as a matter of fact, at the end of 7 days, the information center was running smoothly with improvised methods. We had only one very bad handicap and that was that the radio equipment was still not adequate for directing the fighters very far off shore.

85. Q. Was part of the deficiency in personnel supplied by reason of the unfortunate fact that they were made available because of the damage to the battleships?

A. It made the liaison officers easier to get.

[622] 86. Q. Commander, how long were you on duty in Hawaii?

A. I don't remember exactly the dates.

87. Q. About when did you report?

A. I reported out in Hawaii, I would say, the middle of October, 1941. I left on the first of February, 1942.

88. Q. In what capacity were you to act in Hawaii?

A. The original intention of sending me out was to talk to fighter squadrons on combat tactics and to talk to the ships' officers on fighter direction of fighters and to bring back to the Bureau of Aeronautics whatever information I could pick up on the way it was used.

89. G. Well, then, you were not sent out there as a radar expert to assist and advise the Army in radar?

A. No, sir. When I completed my work with the Navy, CincPac sent a dispatch to Admiral Halsey's staff saying that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, wanted my services as a technical adviser.

90. Q. And you were so detailed?

A. I was detailed verbally, sir.

91. Q. As a technical adviser for radar?

A. Yes, sir. To qualify that, I'm not a radar technician. I did know quite a bit about the air warning system as it should be set up.

92. Q. By whom were you detailed to report to the Commanding General at Hawaii?

A. By then Captain R. Davidson.

93. Q. By whose direction?

A. By direction of Admiral Kimmel.

94. Q. As we understand, this request for your detail was made by the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

95. Q. To the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Yes, sir.

96. Q. About what time did you assume these special duties?

A. I believe it was somewhere around the second week of November, sir.

97. Q. What prompted you to call this conference on 24 November, 1941?

A. Mainly the hopelessness of getting the information center organized without all hands being present or a representative from each activity being present to discuss the details necessary to set the information center up. We had been having conferences with every commander in Hawaii daily which took up a great deal of time, and in [623] each case we had been able to accomplish practically nothing because the other activities were absent.

98. Q. But as the court understands it, this radar was a primary function of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

99. Q. And as such you had called the conference to advise and suggest to them the proper installation and operation of radar in Hawaii; Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

100. Q. You stated in your testimony that you visited the control center on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

101. Q. This was the only control center?

A. Yes, sir.

102. Q. Did you meet there the officer in charge of the control center?

A. You mean by that, sir, General Davidson?

103. Q. Lieutenant Tyler.

A. Yes, sir; I met him there.

104. Q. Did you have any information as to his knowledge of being the officer in charge of the control center prior to his going on duty?

A. He was not, in fact, the officer in charge, sir. He was understudying the job of controller. There was no officer in charge.

105. Q. But there was no other officer at the control center other than Lieutenant Tyler; is that correct?

A. That is right, sir.

106. Q. So who was there to instruct him in his duties?

A. That I don't remember, sir.

107. Q. Do you know that there was no other officer there?

A. No, sir, I do not.

108. Q. But you just stated there was no other officer there?

A. I stated I did not know that there were no other officers there. There was usually a signal corps officer there during all the watches to instruct the plotters and also instruct the controllers.

109. Q. Upon assuming this duty with the Army, did you make a general survey of radar equipment of the Army?

A. No, sir, only of the radar equipment which was installed and of the actual radar sets that were available.

[624] 110. Q. And how many of these sets were available?

A. As I remember, there were only 5 mobile sets available, all 5 of which were installed.

111. Q. Will you please state where they were installed and in your opinion were they installed in the best positions?

A. I don't remember the exact location, sir, but in my opinion they were as well sited as was possible.

112. Q. Were there any permanent radar installations in the Island of Oahu?

A. No, sir.

113. Q. As we understand, there was no material available to establish those permanent stations?

A. No, sir. My understanding was that there was no permanent equipment there and it would take some months to install it had it been there.

114. Q. Then is the court correct in assuming that the radar equipment of Hawaii was under the direct control of the Army?

A. Yes, sir.

115. Q. And that prior to December 7, 1941, the establishment of the control center and the operation of these radar installations was in a state of being set up to work efficiently?

A. Yes, sir.

116. Q. In other words, it was in a state of working out the different problems in order that they might finally have a radar which would operate efficiently?

A. Yes, sir.

117. Q. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

118. Q. Did the Army, to your knowledge, have any officer in the Hawaiian Department who could have done the same as you did in attempting to get action toward bringing the radar system to an operative and efficient condition?

A. They did not have an officer who had the background knowledge of the information center or the air warning system, but they had officers in the Hawaiian Department who could have assisted in getting the action we needed.

119. Q. Would it have been necessary to have that knowledge to get behind this thing and push it along?

A. No, sir.

[625] 120. Q. There is testimony before this court referring to two enlisted men in one of the radar stations on the morning of the attack who got certain results. Can you give us any information about that?

A. You mean the report that the radar operator picked the report up and passed it on to the information center where the report was ignored; is that it?

121. Q. Yes.

A. The radar operators who were being trained and picked up the raid, which was normally to be expected, the information was passed into the information center where the plotters, as I remember, were then off duty. The plotters were only supposed to be on duty between the same hours that the radar stations were operating. Therefore, at 7:00 a. m., the regular plotters and the information center itself was due to close down. Had the information been properly plotted it would have been impossible to decide whether the plots picked up by the radar station were a Japanese raid, an air group from one of our own carriers, or some planes being ferried in from the United States. As a matter of fact, at that time, at the time of the raid, there were American bombers that came in from the States. But without some method of identifying the planes that came in, no one could have told whether the planes were friend or foe, and therefore no action would have been taken. In other words, until better organization had been planned between the Army and the Navy for aircraft identification and aircraft reporting, with all their liaison officers in position, the information that was picked up by the radar station was of no value to anybody.

122. Q. The spotting of those planes on the morning of the 7th of December was not dependent, as we understand it, upon information from the Navy, was it? It was simply a spot or a pip on the radar machine?

A. That is true, sir, but without the Army and Navy working together a system to identify those planes coming in, it would have to be assumed that they were friendly. The information center is set up with its Army and Navy liaison officers for the single purpose of identifying the planes that are coming in. After that time, when one of our carriers was sending in its air group, the information was immediately telephoned in by direct line to the naval liaison officer giving us the direction from which they were coming, when the raid then appeared on the board, and the naval liaison immediately identified it, and when the Army planes were coming in they were immediately identified by the Navy liaison officers. Any which were not identified had to be accepted as hostile, and immediately when they were intercepted as hostile, the air raid siren went on for people to take cover.

[626] 123. Q. If this radar had been properly set up and had been running efficiently, the man who discovered the spot or the plot of these planes, it would have been his duty to report it immediately to find out whether or not they were expected, or friendly planes; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. He would call immediately on the Army and Navy liaison officer to get them to identify the raid. If they were not able to, then they would check back to the flying activities to check again.

124. Q. Even in the absence of a naval liaison officer, is it not a fact that the flight of a group of B-17s from San Francisco could have been identified by an Army officer as a friendly flight which still would not have determined the fact that there were enemy planes en route?

A. Yes, sir.

125. Q. Referring to the Roberts Report, which is a public document, the findings thereof. The statement is made that on November

27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained personnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout 24 hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 degrees around Oahu could have been covered. Will you comment on that with regard to the complete accuracy of the statement, as well as to the possible efficiency of the system had it been able to be fully manned?

A. The first part of the statement is definitely untrue. There were not sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station, even partially, at any time. The radar equipment was positioned in such a way that we could get fairly good 360 degree coverage around the Island of Oahu. There were times when planes could come in undetected, but not very often. But I believe in no case could a large raid come in undetected.

126. Q. As I understand it, the manning of a station for 24 hours, consistently for 24 hours, would have been for the purpose of rectifying the deficiencies in training. Isn't that what you said?

A. You could train your people during the daytime to operate 24 hours a day, but the point was to get the system going smoothly so that it would work day and night, which takes a regular watch right around the clock. But at the time of December 7th, there was not one complete or even partially trained team.

127. Q. It was a question, then, of the completion of the entire system so that the several parts would operate together efficiently?

A. Yes, sir.

[627] 128. Q. Had all these mobile radars been in top efficient condition they still could not have been operated continuously because of untrained personnel; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

129. Q. At the time you began your contact with the Army were there in evidence any efforts to organize the information center and bring it to an efficient working condition?

A. By two very junior officers, sir. One was the operations officer for the Interceptor Command, Captain Berquist of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing, and a captain of the Signal Corps, whose name I cannot remember, both of whom had been to the information center school at Mitchel Field and both of whom were very eager to get the information center set up, and I think it was at Captain Berquist's request that I was asked for from the Navy. The two of them worked very hard and tirelessly the entire time with me in trying to get the information center operating, but they did not have enough force to get what they needed from the various commands to get the station operating.

130. Q. Before you entered into the picture they did make every effort to get some action?

A. Yes, sir.

131. Q. When was the temporary information center building completed and ready for operation, including the internal equipment?

A. The temporary information center was completed, except for communications, radio and telephone, within two or three days of my reporting to the Army which, as I remember, was in the second week of November.

132. Q. When was the permanent, bomb-proof station completed?

A. The bomb-proof information center was still not completed when I left the Islands in February, 1942.

133. Q. Were the communication facilities in the temporary station completed before you left the Islands?

A. Yes, sir, they were completed except for the civilian air warning system and for the lines to several fighter squadron dispersal points before December 7th.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[628] The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Joseph L. Lockard, First Lieutenant, Signal Corps, Esler Field, Louisiana.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the morning of 7 December, 1941, prior to the hour of 0800?

A. I was that morning assigned as an operator on the 270 unit.

3. What is a 270 unit?

A. Radar unit, sir.

4. Q. Where was this radar unit located?

A. In the northern portion of Oahu, at a site called Opana.

5. Q. What was the altitude of your operating antenna at Opana?

A. Approximately 230 feet, sir.

6. Q. What sector of a circle could you cover with your operating set without interference from such obstacles as land or buildings?

A. Due to the nature of the equipment we got interference from all sections. However, we could cover 180 degrees easily.

7. Q. That is, 180 degrees of a complete circle?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. And in what direction was this sector of a circle of 180 degrees?

A. From approximately northeast to west.

9. Q. Was this in a direction through north?

A. Yes, sir, we could cover north.

10. Q. What orders or instructions had you received as to what duties you were to perform while at this station on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. Our orders were to operate the equipment from 4:00 until 7:00 a. m.

[629] 11. Q. Had you received any other instructions as to exactly what to do while so operating?

A. Normal procedure was to track for flights and intercept them and report them to the center, the information center.

12. Q. You had no other instructions as to the operation of your set, in regard to picking up flights?

A. No specific instructions, no, sir.

13. Q. Then will you tell what your routine of operations was between 4:00 and 7:00 a. m.? How did you proceed?

A. At 4:00 o'clock we would put the equipment into operation and all planes that were intercepted would be plotted and their coordinates reported by telephone to the information center.

14. Q. Will you tell us the exact procedure you followed at the radar station in Opana where you were stationed; that is, did you make a plot there of the location of any objects you picked up with your radar?

A. Yes, sir. We kept an overlay and we also kept a log.

15. Q. And do I understand you to say that in addition to making this plot and keeping a log, you telephoned certain information to the information center?

A. All information was telephoned, sir. The overlay was merely to reduce the azimuth and range to grid coordinates.

16. Q. Then what information were you in the habit of telephoning from your station at Opana to the information center?

A. The exact coordinates of the plane, or whatever the object happened to be, and any other information that the station might ask of us which we could supply.

17. Q. What system of coordinates were you using?

A. Regular Army grid, sir.

18. Q. What was the organization of this radar post at which you were stationed?

A. We were a detachment of a company, which was the designation of SCWH, which was under the platoon leader, who was located at Kawaihoa.

19. Q. Who was in charge of this post where you were stationed at Opana; I mean, physically present and in charge on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. You see, sir, we didn't live at that site. We lived about 10 miles away at Kawaihoa.

[630] 20. Q. I will ask you the question in this way: Who was the senior person present at the Opana radar station on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I was, sir.

21. Q. What was your rank at that time?

A. I was a third class specialist.

22. Q. There were no commissioned officers at this post at this time?

A. Not on that morning, sir.

23. Q. Do I understand that your unit at the time in question was a part of the aircraft warning system in Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. What sort of communication did you have with the information center?

A. Telephone communication, sir. We also had an auxilliary radio station.

25. Q. What method of communication were you using on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. Telephone, sir.

26. Q. Was this communication functioning efficiently at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

27. Q. Will you state what your experience was prior to the morning of 7 December 1941 in connection with radar operation?

A. I had operated the sets ever since we put them into operation in August, 1941.

28. Q. Had you been given any instruction in the theory of electronics or radar?

A. A bare smattering.

29. Q. Do you consider that you were a qualified operator from a practical point of view as of 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

30. Q. How would your set make the operator aware of the presence of aircraft?

A. By producing what we call echoes on the face of the oscilloscope.

31. Q. Were these echoes visual or sonic?

A. Visual.

[631] 32. Q. Can you state how far away from your radar set on this particular morning you estimate you could pick up a single operating aircraft?

A. That can't be stated definitely, sir.

33. Q. Approximately?

A. It is quite variable. The nature of the equipment was such that, subject to change in its efficiency, it was a rather crude construction at that time and produced variances in the tuning.

34. Q. Let us take a specific example. Suppose you had a flight of aircraft at a distance of 100 miles under the conditions that existed on the morning of 7 December 1941. Do you have any estimate of the number of planes that would have to be in that flight for you to have detected it as such?

A. It was possible to pick up one plane at that distance, and it was also sometimes impossible to pick up three or four. It is too inconsistent to give a definite answer.

35. Q. In other words, you can't answer that question specifically?

A. No, sir.

36. Q. On the morning of 7 December 1941, had you been given any information prior to 0800 as to the movement of any friendly aircraft in the area?

A. No, sir.

37. Q. Did you have any means of knowing when you detected an aircraft, by means of your radar equipment, whether or not this aircraft was friend or foe?

A. Not at that time, sir; no.

38. Q. What was the length of your tour of duty on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. 0400 to 0700.

39. Q. What did you do after 0700?

A. We continued to operate the equipment, sir.

40. Q. Was this done by any specific order?

A. No, sir.

41. Q. Did you get permission to operate it, or how did you happen to continue operations after 0700?

A. Operating with me that morning was Sergeant Elliott, who was rather new to the organization and who we were trying to train as an operator. The truck to take us to Kawaihoa had not arrived and probably wouldn't arrive for some time so we decided it would be an opportunity for him to operate the equipment.

[632] 42. Q. How much experience had Sergeant Elliott had up until this particular moment you are speaking about in radar operation?

A. Well, sir, he came to us from the Air Corps. The first occasion I had to meet him was when we moved to Opana, which was in November, around Thanksgiving.

43. Q. Had he been under instruction at this station from the time he arrived around Thanksgiving up until the time of the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

[633] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

44. Q. Did you consider him a qualified operator as of the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. That is a personal opinion.

45. Q. That is what I am asking for.

A. No, sir.

46. Q. Had you picked up any important aircraft contacts prior to 0700 on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. No, sir.

47. Q. Did you make any contacts after that time?

A. Yes, sir.

48. Q. Will you state what this contact was and what you did?

A. We discovered an unusually large response about 0702 at 136 miles in a northerly direction. It was so large, in fact, that I checked the equipment to determine whether it was the fault of the equipment or actually a flight of some sort. We finally decided to call when they had come in to 132 miles.

49. Q. Whom did you call?

A. I was tracking the flight, and I instructed Private Elliott to call the information center and see if there was anyone around.

50. Q. Sergeant Elliott is the one who actually talked to the information center?

A. He talked to them initially, yes, sir.

51. Q. What was the official report, if you know it, that Sergeant Elliott made from Opana to the information center about this flight you have just described?

A. The only person he could get was the switchboard operator, whom we happened to know. We asked him to look around and see if there wasn't someone in the information center to whom we could talk. We told the operator what we had thought we had seen. He left his switchboard and located a person in the information center. This information was passed on to the person in the information center there, but the exact conversation I can't recall. I do know that we were not satisfied with the response, so I got on the 'phone and I asked the switchboard operator to call this person to the telephone, which he did.

[634] 52. Q. Did the person whom you got on the telephone identify himself?

A. The switchboard operator told me he was the liaison officer, and that is as much as I knew.

53. Q. You do not know whether he was Army or Navy or what his position was? Do you know anything about him other than the fact that you had information that he was a liaison officer?

A. I think at the time he was mentioned he was Army Air Corps.

54. Q. Had you asked for the officer in charge of the information center?

A. I asked for whoever was there, and apparently there was no one there with this station.

55. Q. Will you state what conversation you had with this person who identified himself as the liaison officer?

A. I can't quote it word for word, but I gave the information as to distance, apparent size, and direction.

56. Q. What was this information that you gave him?

A. I told him that we had an unusually large flight—in fact, the largest I had ever seen on the equipment—coming in from almost due north at 130 some miles.

57. Q. What response did you get from this so-called liaison officer?

A. No response which was very satisfactory.

58. Q. What happened? Did he hang up the telephone? Was that the end of the conversation?

A. I think I repeated the information, and he then terminated the conversation.

59. Q. Didn't he say anything? Can't you be more specific?

A. I can't honestly be specific on that, because I do not recall.

60. Q. Did you continue to keep this flight target on your radar?

A. Yes, sir.

61. Q. For how long a period of time did this tracking continue?

A. We tracked it in to within a neighborhood of twenty miles of the Island. At that time we lost it in the permanent distortion we had, due to bad echoes from the mountains surrounding us.

[635] 62. Q. Can you state exactly where on the island of Oahu the radar station Opana, at which you were posted, is located?

A. It is located practically on an artillery marker on the north-western tip, ten miles north of Kawaihoa and just back inland a little way from Kawela Bay.

63. Q. What did this middle plot that you got at twenty miles away indicate to you as an operator?

A. As far as the disappearance was concerned, we were accustomed to that due to this distortion that we had, and it only indicated that it had come within such a range of the island that we could no longer track it through the distortion.

64. Q. Did you make any attempt to search visually to see whether or not you could see the object of your radar search at a distance of twenty miles?

A. We did when we closed up the station but not at the immediate time of their disappearance.

65. Q. From your experience in operating the station at Opana, would the confusion of the radar plot which you got indicate a disappearance of planes behind a land area?

A. I don't quite comprehend.

The question was repeated.

A. No, sir. The planes were not behind a land area. They were still at sea, but the distortion produced by the surrounding mountains completely obliterated our view of that section.

66. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an enemy attack on the island of Oahu on the morning of December 7?

A. When we got to Kawaihoa. I imagine it was around 8:30.

67. Q. At that time you had secured your station at Opana?

A. Yes. By "secured" you mean, closed the station?

68. Q. Yes. What did you do subsequent to receiving this information at that time?

A. We had breakfast and went back to the unit immediately. The remainder of our crew had gone up to the unit as we were coming down. It was already in operation when we got there, and we continued to keep it on twenty-four hour operation from then until I left.

[636] 69. Q. At what time did you arrive back at your unit at Opana?

A. About 9:30, I imagine, or 9:10.

70. Q. Did you personally observe any plots made of aircraft retiring from the island of Oahu?

A. Yes, sir, there was an enormous amount of activity in the station as we opened it. It was going every which way—away from it and back to it.

71. Q. Did you identify any planes retiring from Oahu at a distance, let us say, in excess of fifty miles?

A. I can't answer positively.

72. Q. Do you recall whether or not an effort was being made to track retiring planes from Oahu at that time?

A. Yes, sir, they were covering more than their sector in order to get every bit of information they could.

73. Q. How long did you remain in that radar station on December 7, 1941, after you reported back there and subsequent to having had your breakfast?

A. We stayed there from then on. We moved our camp then to right at the spot of the unit itself.

74. Q. Did you during the daylight of December 7, 1941, see any plot that was made of retiring planes from Oahu?

A. I can't answer that with any amount of certainty.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

75. Q. You said in your testimony that you picked up this flight about 0702 and tracked it until it was about twenty miles from the station. To the best of your belief, about what time did you lose that flight in the distortion? Was it a half hour later or an hour later?

A. In the neighborhood of 7:30, I should say.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

76. Q. How many people were working in your unit prior to 7 o'clock?

A. You mean right at the station?

77. Q. That is right.

A. There were two of us.

78. Q. You and Elliott?

A. Yes, sir.

[637] 79. Q. Did you have any regulations as to the number of people who were required to operate that unit?

A. No, sir.

80. Q. Hadn't three people been the usual quota for operation?

A. Three had been what we had been using on a shift.

81. Q. When did you change from three to two?

A. You see, sir, that Sunday morning—

82. Q. Was that morning the first morning that there had been but two operating that unit?

A. No, sir, it wasn't.

83. Q. How many times before had there been only two operating it?

A. I can't recall, but I know we had operated it with two before.

84. Q. Did the third one have any specific duties or assignments in connection with the operation?

A. Yes, sir, he was the motor man. He maintained and operated the generator—the Leroy engine and the generator.

85. Q. As a result of his being absent, you and Elliott had to do that in addition to what you were otherwise supposed to do?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. I gathered from the way you answered the question that there was some connection between the fact that this was Sunday morning and that there were but two people there; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. What is that explanation?

A. I would rather not answer it.

The court directed the witness to answer.

A. Very few people like to get up at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning.

88. Q. Was there someone else ordered to be there that Sunday morning?

A. No, sir, it was arranged within the crew that the two of us should operate that Sunday.

89. Q. Did any officer approve that arrangement?

A. I really don't know, sir.

[638] 90. Q. As senior member of the crew, did you report the arrangement to any officer?

A. My name appeared on the roster to work that day, along with Elliott's, and that is what I did.

91. Q. Did the name of anyone else appear on the roster to work that day?

A. No, sir, Elliott and myself.

92. Q. Who made up the roster?

A. That I don't know, sir.

93. Q. Was it an officer?

A. I can't say, sir.

94. Q. The roster was posted on some bulletin board?

A. It was a roster figuratively only. I was told.

95. Q. Who stated that you and Elliott would be the only ones there?

A. My senior non-com.

96. Q. Who was he?

A. Sergeant Murphy.

97. Q. How long did you stay in the island of Oahu after December 7?

A. I left the island the 22nd of February.

98. Q. Did you testify before the Roberts Commission?

A. No, sir.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

99. Q. Who did you say was responsible, if you did, for seeing that the station was manned in accordance with the roster?

A. Lieutenant Kasaros, who was in charge of the unit at that time and had been since we moved it to Opana.

100. Q. What means did he use for seeing that the station was properly manned in accordance with the orders?

A. Well, sir, we had six men to operate the unit, and we were divided into shifts of three, which gave us two shifts. It was decided beforehand which three men would be in each shift, and since there were only two shifts and six men, we didn't keep a written roster, but rotated our hours dependent upon who——

[639] 101. Q. Was it left to the men to get there without any check-up to see that they were on the job?

A. I suppose so, sir.

102. Q. You don't know?

A. No.

103. Q. When were you first detailed for duty on that station? Not that morning but the first time you were detailed for duty?

A. I helped move the station to its location there and helped erect it there.

104. Q. About what date?

A. About Thanksgiving—in November.

105. Q. That had been your duty since that time up to December 7?

A. The operation, yes, sir.

106. Q. What did you say were the specified hours for duty at this station in the morning?

A. On Sunday, sir?

107. Q. Any day?

A. We had a different schedule for Sunday.

108. Q. Upon the morning of December 7?

A. From 0400 until 0700.

109. Q. The place where you lived was ten miles from this station?

A. Approximately, yes, sir.

110. Q. How did you get back and forth?

A. By truck.

111. Q. What time did the truck call, as a rule?

A. Shortly after seven usually.

112. Q. What time did the truck get there that morning?

A. Rather late, sir.

113. Q. Was that the reason then, you happened to be at the station at the time you picked up the flight?

A. Yes, one of the reasons.

114. Q. If the truck had been on time, you would have been on your way to breakfast?

A. Yes, sir.

[640] 115. Q. Were the hours 0400 to 0700 on Sunday different from the hours on any other day of the week?

A. Yes, sir, through the week we operated a normal working day.

116. Q. With the radar set in operation and in connection with the installation center?

A. Yes, sir.

117. Q. Not twenty-four hours?

A. No, a regular working day from seven in the morning until five in the evening.

118. Q. In other words, if this attack had come on any day but Sunday, the full system would have been in operation?

A. Yes, sir.

119. Q. At 0702?

A. Yes, sir.

120. Q. In connection with the statement you just made to the effect that if the truck had been on time, you would not have been at the station at the time you picked up the flight, had you made any request to be allowed to remain at that station that morning after 7 o'clock?

A. No, sir.

121. Q. You never made such a request?

A. No, sir.

122. Q. You have stated that you picked up this large flight of planes at about 0702 on the morning of December 7, 1941; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

123. Q. What was the estimated distance at that time of these planes from Oahu?

A. 136 miles.

124. Q. Did you immediately report this to the communications center?

A. Not immediately, sir, no.

125. Q. How long?

A. The time it takes a plane to travel four miles. It was just a short period of time—just long enough for me to make a check or two.

126. Q. Then you reported it to the communications center?

A. Yes, sir.

[641] 127. Q. As we understand, you did not know the officer to whom you were speaking at the communications center?

A. No, sir.

128. Q. Have you stated that you had no knowledge that morning of any flight of planes from the mainland to Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

129. Q. You had no knowledge?

A. I had no knowledge.

130. Q. Were you aware of the fact that music was playing all night at Hawaii, and did that have any bearing on your information of that morning?

A. I had no knowledge of that.

131. Q. The testimony before this court is that when a flight of friendly planes was expected, music would be played all night in Hawaii. Did you know anything about that?

A. No.

132. Q. What time did you get to your station on the morning of December 7?

A. We went up the night before.

133. Q. Were you up and on the job at 4 o'clock?

A. Yes, sir.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

134. Q. Do I understand that this Sunday morning, the 7th of December, was the first day that the Opana station had been operated, beginning at 4 o'clock in the morning?

A. I don't think I said that.

135. Q. How long had it been operating from four in the morning prior to December 7?

A. The Sunday prior to that, it was operating from four until seven.

136. Q. Did it operate week days from four to seven?

A. No, sir, week days from seven to five in the afternoon.

137. Q. Sundays only—

A. Sundays and holidays only from four to seven.

[642] Reexamined by the judge advocate:

138. Q. You have stated that there were six men for the detail at Opana and that you had divided yourself up into two sections for the purpose of standing the watches at this radar station; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

139. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, there were two men from your section on watch, Sergeant Elliott and yourself; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

140. Q. Now, where was this other person who was in your section at this time?

A. He was off duty, sir.

141. Q. On Sunday, December 7, 1941, what did the other section do that did not stand duty?

A. They were off duty on Sunday.

142. Q. They had no duties to perform at the radar station at Opana on Sunday, December 7, 1941?

A. No, sir.

143. Q. Well, on week days, when you stood your duties throughout the day, as you have testified, how did these two sections stand the duty?

A. Each group of three—There was no set procedure, sir. We would have four hours at a trick, and the next group would have four hours at a trick. That completed the eight-hour day. That was not hidebound.

144. Q. According to your method of taking this duty, there was always a section of three on post?

A. Yes, sir.

145. Q. From your experience in standing these duties, do you think it would have been possible for your two sections to have stood continuous duty throughout the twenty-four hours?

A. Not over a very long period of time. We operated like that immediately after.

146. Q. How long do you think you could have operated on a 24-hour basis with the six men you had available? How many days in succession?

A. It would depend upon the extent of the endurance of the men.

147. Q. Did you have an estimate of what this endurance might be?

A. Well, sir, we operated for a week under similar conditions, but in addition to the operation, we were also pulling guard, so that is not a fair estimate of the endurance.

[643] Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

148. Q. The Roberts Report at page 11, paragraph 13, states: "On November 27, 1941, in connection with the order for alert No. 1, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ordered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4 to 7 a. m." Did you have any knowledge of the issuance of such orders on the 27th of November?

A. No, sir, I did not.

149. Q. Your station in Opana was not operated each day after November 27 from 4 to 7 a. m.?

A. No, sir.

Reexamined by the court:

150. Q. Do you know why this station of yours was operated from 7 a. m. to 5 p. m. week days and from 4 to 7 a. m. on Sundays?

A. No, sir.

151. Q. In other words, you have no reason to know why it was operated at different hours on Sunday from what it was operated during week days?

A. That is right.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the exception of the interested parties, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

[644] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. George E. Elliott, sergeant, headquarters company, station complement, Camp Lee, Virginia.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. I was performing two duties, sir, at the same time. I was on guard from 12 o'clock noon, the Saturday before December 7; that is, it was not a walking guard post. It was just for security purposes, because it was just peace time at that time. My first duty was the operation of the radar equipment from 4 o'clock in the morning of 7 December until 7 o'clock that morning. My duty was plotter.

3. Q. Will you state where this station was located where you were performing this duty on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. It was at the north end of the island near Kahuku Point. The name of the station was Opana. The call sign was 6QN.

4. Q. On what island was this station located?

A. On the island of Oahu.

5. Q. Territory of Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Will you state what your duties as plotter consisted of on this morning?

A. As soon as the scope operator picked up the target, he would say "Target" and give me the range. I would take the azimuth from the antenna. By taking the azimuth from the antenna and having the plotting board, I was able to locate the position of aircraft as to the direction in which it was approaching the island.

7. Q. Did this plot you have told us about consist of some sort of chart of the island of Oahu with the surrounding water areas?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. How did you put this plot on the map or chart?

A. There is a map of the islands. The center point of the compass is the point of the location of our unit, and the radius rule has the mileage compiled on that map. The zero point, true north on the map, is zeroed with the antenna, and as you rotate the radius to the degree that you [645] received and the mileage, you make a point, and that will be the exact position on the map where the target is located in relation to the islands.

9. Q. Did you do anything with this information which you received in making this plot, other than plot it yourself?

A. This plot was not taken during our regular program. It was after 7 o'clock.

10. Q. I have not asked you about any particular one. This is just general.

A. Yes, sir. Since our operating problem was over and there was no one on the other end of the head set that the plotter has—

11. Q. I have not asked you about any particular time or plot. I am asking you what your custom was in the station when you received a radar contact and when you plotted it yourself. Was it your custom then to do something else with the information you had in the way of passing it on?

A. I misunderstood you completely. From the time I made out the plot, I would send it in over the plotter head set to the information center. The information would go directly to the information center.

12. Q. Who received this information on the other end, if you know?

A. Yes, sir, I do know. The plotter on the other end that would plot on the board at the main information center.

13. Q. Had you received any instructions as to how your duties were to be performed?

A. Yes, sir.

14. Q. Were they given to you in written or oral form?

A. Oral form.

15. Q. Were those instructions materially different from what you have already testified your duties were?

A. No, sir.

16. Q. Now, what was the organization of this post at Opana where you were stationed on the morning of December 7, 1941, with respect to personnel?

A. Well, sir, our detachment was located at Kawaihoa with another unit. Kawaihoa was about nine miles from the position where the detector was. We had no camp at the detector. The organization of the—that is, the title was the Signal Company Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, with their headquarters at Fort Shafter.

[646] 17. Q. I am afraid that you have not understood my question. What was the organization of this particular duty station or radar plot at which you were stationed at about 0700 on December 7, 1941?

A. There were only two men there: Private Locard and myself.

18. Q. You have described the duties to which you were assigned at that station at that time. What were Locard's duties?

A. Private Locard's duties were to operate the scope, thereby giving me the information for my plots.

19. Q. How much instruction had you had in the duties that you were performing prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Between a week and a half to two weeks. That is for the plotting.

20. Q. Do you feel that you were at that time perfectly competent to perform the duties that had been assigned you?

A. Very definitely, sir.

21. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you had any information of the movement of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu?

A. No, sir, none whatsoever.

22. Q. I ask you specifically, Did you know of a flight of B-17's coming to Oahu from the mainland?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. At what time did you arrive at the Opana station for the purpose of assuming the duties to which you were assigned between four and seven on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. The time we arrived at the unit at Opana was 12 o'clock noon, December 6. From that time we were expected to be there for a 24-hour tour of duty, as I said, for security reasons. Within that time, from four to seven in the morning, we were to operate our problem. Actually, we were there from December 6 at 12 o'clock noon.

24. Q. Had you been performing duties during this period of time, from 0400 to 0700 in the morning, on the days preceding December 7, 1941?

A. No, sir, not operating duties.

25. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, at what hours during the day were you performing regularly assigned duties at the Opana station?

A. Well, usually, sir, during the late morning or early afternoon. That, sir, was when I was receiving my training as a plotter. There were no scheduled hours.

[647] 26. Q. There were no scheduled hours?

A. No, sir, there were no scheduled hours.

27. Q. Was the period from four to seven on December 7, 1941, a schedule of operation at Opana?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

28. Q. Do you know of any reason why this should have been a scheduled period on that morning?

A. No, sir, other than the fact that it was just a problem and that we knew at that time that all the plots we sent in were being recorded and checked. That is the only assumption that we had as to our operation.

29. Q. But that period from four to seven in the morning was the first time that you stood a tour of duty that early?

A. That is the first time I ever stood one. They had previously other men operating from four to seven.

30. Q. Had you been at Opana station daily for a number of days prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. Sunday, December 7, was the first morning that you had performed duties between the hours of four and seven; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

32. Q. For a few days preceding December 7, 1941, the duties that you performed at this station were done at some other period of time during the day?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Were the times for performing these duties specifically prescribed as to some particular period during the day, or was it rather discretionary as to when you performed the duties?

A. I can't remember exactly, sir. I don't believe there were any prescribed times.

34. Q. Adverting to the morning of December 7, 1941, did anything out of the ordinary come to your attention after 0700 on that morning?

A. Yes, sir.

35. Q. Will you state what it was?

A. While I was at the scope receiving instructions as to its operation, Private Locard noticed a large echo on the scope. He was looking over my shoulder and could see it also. At first Private Locard thought it was the main pulse and that the mileage scale was off kilter. Checking the mileage scale, I found that it was actually a flight out at a distance of 137.

[648] 36. Q. On what bearing?

A. At 2 degrees, sir.

37. Q. By true azimuth?

A. Yes, sir. Our maps were lined up by true azimuth.

38. Q. Can you recall the time of this observation?

A. Yes, sir, the time by our clock was two minutes after seven. However, sir, at the time I was notified to close down at the end of our scheduled problem, the time by our clock was 0654, and actually when I sent in the reading to the information center over the administrative line, it was about 0706, but in explaining it to him I gave the reading as of 0702.

39. Q. When you received this information to which you have testified, was a plot made in Opana in accordance with what you said was your custom?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

40. Q. Who made this plot?

A. I made the plot, sir.

41. Q. Who did the talking between the station at Opana and the information center?

A. I did, sir, the very first time. You see, sir, at that time, and after we picked up the flight and after recording it on the plotting table, I suggested to Private Locard that we send it in to our information center. At that time Private Locard laughed at me and told me I was crazy for wanting to do it. I kept talking of this flight that we had received and even mentioned the fact that if it was Navy planes coming to the islands, if the Army were to send up interceptors, it would make a very fine problem. After speaking of it for some time, he told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked. At that time I tried to get the information center over the plotter's head set, and there was nobody there, so I called on the administrative line and spoke to the switchboard operator, who was Private McDonald. I explained to him what we had found, although I can't remember whether I gave the actual reading, that is, the code reading and location. I know that I gave the mileage and bearing, but I'm not sure of the other. After explaining to Private McDonald what Private Locard and I had found, Private McDonald stated that he did not know what to do about it, that there was nobody in the information center. I asked Private McDonald to get somebody who would know what to do, so with that I hung up, and Private McDonald called back the unit a few minutes later with the officer that was mentioned in the Roberts Report. I don't know his name, sir, but Locard picked up the 'phone and talked to the officer that was calling through Private McDonald's efforts, and that is when the officer told Private Locard that there was nothing to it and to forget it.

[649] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Latchat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

42. Q. How do you know what this officer on the other end of the telephone told then Private Locard?

A. The only way I know, sir, is by Private Locard relaying it to me.

43. Q. Were any succeeding plots made of this flight of aircraft that was discovered at 0702 on 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I might mention, sir, that after receiving the telephone call from the officer, Private Locard wanted to shut down and I insisted on operating, and we followed the flight all the way in, taking readings every three to six minutes, I would say, to complete the flight all the way in to about fifteen or twenty-five miles off the island of Oahu, at which time, due to land obstructions on the oscilloscope, it was impossible to follow the flight any further.

44. Q. Was this plot recorded in any manner, a permanent record could have been kept of it?

A. Yes, sir.

45. Q. Do you know what happened to this plot?

A. You mean the chart, sir?

46. Q. The chart, the plot that you made.

A. Yes, sir, a very few days after December 7, it was around December 9—from the information that I heard it wasn't definite—the chart and the record of reading sheet was turned into Army G-2, Military Intelligence.

47. Q. You have no personal knowledge of this yourself, except by hearsay?

A. Yes, sir.

48. Q. After the initial telephone report that you have stated you made and the reply that then Sergeant Locard received from some one in the information center, were any further conversations—were there any further conversations between your post at Opana and the information center relative to these plots that you were receiving at that time?

A. None other, sir, than a personal telephonic conversation between Private Locard and Private McDonald. I might mention, sir, that in correction of your statement, Private Locard, the one you referred to, at the time was not sergeant. At the time he was private third class, specialist.

49. Q. Then so far as your information goes, no further reports were made from Opana to the information center relative to [650] this flight of planes?

A. No, sir, there were not.

50. Q. Had any suggestion been made by either you or Private Locard as to the desirability of keeping the information center informed?

A. No, sir, there was not, because it was understood that there was nobody at the information center to receive our plots if we could send them in.

51. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack by an enemy force on the island of Oahu?

A. At 7:45, Private Locard and I were relieved from our duty at Opana by Private Lawrence and Private Hodges. The driver of the truck that came to Opana was Private Farmbeck. Private Farmbeck took us to our camp, which is nine miles from Opana, and upon our arrival at the camp we found the Japs were bombing Pearl Harbor.

52. Q. About what hour of the day was this when you arrived back at camp?

A. It was somewhere near 8:00 o'clock, sir. There was a highway to the camp, although it took at least five to eight minutes to climb down the mountain to get to the highway. It was somewhere very close to 8:00 o'clock, sir, as I remember it.

53. Q. Did you return to the Opana station on 7 December, 1941?

A. Yes, sir. Our purpose for going back to camp was to get breakfast. However, we didn't eat breakfast. We packed our field bags and went right back to Opana.

54. Q. What time did you arrive back at Opana on the morning of 7 December 1941, if you did get back there?

A. Yes, sir, I did get back there, but I don't recall the time it was. It must have been very close around 9:00 o'clock, sir, because we had to pack up our field equipment and take our belongings out to Opana. I don't remember, sir, what time.

55. Q. On your return to Opana about 0900, as you have testified, did you yourself make any more plots of aircraft that day?

A. No, sir, I did not.

56. Q. Did you observe anybody else make any plots from the Opana station on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, and the plots were made on the same chart as the original flight that I referred to a while ago. It [651] was made on the same chart, for all of the flights on December 7 were made on this one chart. That is the chart that was turned in to Army G-2.

57. Q. Can you recall whether or not during the time you were making these observations on the morning of 7 December, the plot revealed aircraft retiring from the Island of Oahu to seaward?

A. That I can't say for sure. I just know that there was quite a few plots on that chart. I don't believe they were able to follow the flights, that is, individual flights, because there were so many scattered flights.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

58. Q. I understood you to say that you closed your station under directions at 6:54, at Opana, which you were operating?

A. Yes, sir.

59. Q. Who directed you to close then?

A. The plotter on the other end at the information center.

60. Q. Did your clock synchronize with his?

A. Sir, I don't remember as to whether a time-check was made.

61. Q. Did you make a time-check before you started operating that morning?

A. I can't remember, sir, whether we did or not, although, sir, it had been the usual procedure to do that.

62. Q. You had been out there at Opana for a week and a half or two weeks prior to 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

63. Q. You never had been on the 4:00 to 7:00 watch before this particular Sunday?

A. No, sir, I had not.

64. Q. Do you know whether the station had been operating during those morning hours, before the 7th of December?

A. Yes, sir, I am sure that it was.

65. Q. Every day?

A. I believe so, sir.

[652] 66. Q. Although you hadn't been there?

A. No, sir, the testimony I just gave is what was told me. I mean there were schedules to operate from 4:00 to 7:00.

67. Q. Every day?

A. Yes, sir, and I presume they did.

68. Q. Now how many were there in the unit that was supposed to be operating the station at any one time? How many were supposed to be in the unit that operated the station at one time?

A. At that time, sir, I believe the full crew was four men, possibly five—but I believe it was four at that time.

69. Q. What duties did they perform? You described what you did and what Locard did—and what did the other two or three do?

A. One man would be the crew chief. He would have taken charge of the unit as a whole, one man operating the scope, one man plotting, and one motorman to take care of the gasoline engine for the auxiliary power we had.

70. Q. How many were there operating on this Sunday morning?

A. There were only two of us.

71. Q. Did only two of you go out on this 24-hour watch on Saturday noon?

A. Yes, sir.

72. Q. Who directed that?

A. Sergeant Murphy. Sergeant Murphy was in charge of our detachment at the time of December 7.

73. Q. Were you on the island of Oahu after the 7th of December for any considerable length of time?

A. Yes, sir, for about six months, sir.

74. Q. Did you testify as a witness before the Roberts Commission?

A. No, sir, I did not.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

75A. Q. Sergeant, this problem that you were engaged in—was that a set-up that you had handed to you in advance? The problem that you engaged in on this Sunday morning—were you given the set-up before you went on out to the station— [653] that you were to put through the telephones?

A. Yes, sir.

75B. Q. It was a prearranged problem?

A. Yes, sir, the problem was operated from the standard form.

76. Q. Then you hadn't got any planes on which you had data; your data was all imaginary, so to speak?

A. When we had actual flights we sent them in. On this particular morning, we had no flight whatsoever.

77. Q. And those flights that were sent in were on the data that was on your sheet of paper; is that correct?

A. I am sorry, sir, I don't—. We had no data to send.

78. Q. You said you were on a problem, didn't you?

A. Yes, sir.

79. Q. What was the problem?

A. The problem was to pick up targets and send them in to our information center.

80. Q. Suppose you had got no targets; then what did you do?

A. We sent none in.

Examined by the court:

81. Q. Sergeant, were two men all that were supposed to be out there that morning of December 1?

A. Sir, referring back to the gentleman's question here, as I remember, there should have been four men, but I can't—.

82. Q. Before you left your base or your quarters or your organization wherever it was, how many men were supposed to go out to be on duty that morning of December 7, at that station? There was you and Locard, and was anybody else supposed to go?

A. Yes, sir. Private Farmbeck was to go out there for motorman for the unit.

83. Q. And why didn't he go out?

A. That, sir, I don't know.

84. Q. Who was supposed to check up to see that everybody that was supposed to be there actually was there? Whose duty was that?

A. Well, that would have been the duty of Sergeant Murphy, our detachment sergeant.

[654] 85. Q. You don't know whether the morning hours at that station were any different from the Sundays?

A. No, sir, they were the same, 4:00 o'clock until 7:00 in the morning.

86. Q. Opana was about nine or ten miles from your quarters?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. And you were supposed to be relieved at 7:00 o'clock Sunday morning, to go back to your quarters?

A. No, sir. There was no definite time that we were to be relieved to go to breakfast. Our original intention was to go to breakfast and come back to the unit and stay til 12:00 o'clock; but that was changed. The two men that came to relieve us at a quarter of 8:00 told us that we need not come back; that they could take over the duties of watching the unit for security reasons.

88. Q. Didn't you know when you left the quarters what time you were to be relieved, the hour you would be relieved? What hour did you expect to be relieved the next morning? You left on Saturday?

A. Yes, sir, at noon.

89. Q. What time did you expect to be relieved on Sunday morning to go back to breakfast?

A. There was no particular time to go to breakfast, sir.

90. Q. You were supposed to close down the station at 7:00 o'clock?

A. Yes, sir.

91. Q. Did you make any request on any higher authority to be allowed to remain there that morning?

A. Yes, sir, we had prearranged permission with the sergeant.

92. Q. Had you made any request for that particular morning, to be allowed to remain there overtime?

A. Well, for the operations purpose, yes, sir. We had asked Sergeant Murphy for permission to operate longer than 7:00 o'clock, for the purpose to instruct me further in the operation of the scope.

93. Q. That was permission for the extra training, but did you ask permission to stay out there in spite of your breakfast, in order that you could continue your operation?

A. No, sir, at that time our——.

[655] 94. Q. I just want to know what your previous arrangement in the form of a request was?

A. I am not sure, sir, that I understand you.

95. Q. Well, was then the request you speak of made after you got to the unit?

A. No, it was prearranged. It was made before. We knew the Saturday afternoon that we came out there that we were going to operate longer than 7:00 o'clock.

96. Q. But by orders or by your request?

A. By our request, sir. This Sergeant Murphy who had charge of our unit would give us permission to operate over our scheduled time.

97. Q. Well, ordinarily, wouldn't that interfere if the truck came out there? Would you have to hold the truck up so you could operate when the truck came to take you to breakfast?

A. Well, I don't even recall whether we were even going back to breakfast. I mean, they called and said they were going to send someone out for breakfast, or to relieve us, so we could go back to breakfast—but other than that, I don't recall of having a specified time that we were going to breakfast, or even that we would get any breakfast that particular morning.

98. Q. Had you any intimation of an attack, or had you been advised that war was becoming imminent?

A. No, sir. One thing, sir, I might say that made me a little cautious at that time. I had been in the Air Corps at Hickam Field and there was a sergeant that used to roll us out in the morning by saying, "Get up and get out; the Japs are coming!"—and every once in a while, why someone would say, "The Japs are coming." But it was all in a joking manner.

99. Q. Did you know of the existence of Alert No. 1?

A. At that time, no, sir.

100. Q. Do you know what Alert No. 1 signified?

A. No, sir, I don't.

101. Q. Well, it is a matter of public record that it is a precaution against sabotage. Were any particular precautions taken by the unit to which you were attached?

A. As I have stated, sir, before, we were there for security reasons. We had the 45-pistol and 7 rounds of ammunition. At all times somebody was present at the unit. There were always 2 men present at the unit.

102. Q. When did this begin, this procedure?

A. That began, sir, from the time that we moved out there. This was about 3 weeks to a month before Pearl Harbor.

[656] 103. Q. Those were normal precautions that might be expected to be taken for the preservation of a station of that nature—nothing particular about it?

A. Yes, sir.

104. Q. As I understand it, there were several, at least 5, other stations, on that warning system?

A. Yes, sir.

105. Q. Was there direct communications between the stations of the system, or did they all have to go to the information center?

A. Yes, sir, in order to talk from one unit to another—that didn't hold true exactly. In a unit that was close together like say the unit that was at our quarters and the unit at Opana, the distance of 9 miles, we had a direct line between those two units.

106. Q. I am talking about radar units now. Was there a radar set at the place where your quarters were also?

A. Yes, sir, that was the purpose of it. We moved out to Opana, had no quarters whatsoever and we were quartered with this other unit that had already been there, and it was 9 miles away.

107. Q. When you and Private Locard both found that you could get no satisfaction over this suspicious occurrence—that is, the presence of a large number of pips on the scope—did it occur to you to try to get in communication with any other one in authority?

A. No, sir, I mean after an officer had ordered on it, nothing more was to be done about it. It would have been jumping over his head at that particular time if we tried to do anything more.

[657] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

108. Q. Have you any information acquired since to the effect that any such flight was detected by any of these other units?

A. Yes, the flight was detected by other units, although I believe it was a little later than our particular unit picked it up. The range, I believe, was greater on ours.

109. Q. Well, it was all after 7:00 a. m.?

A. Yes, sir.

110. Q. I am asking you now from your best recollection from subsequent information, because you had no other information at the time what the other stations did.

A. Well, on that morning, sir, that we returned to camp for our breakfast by Pearl Harbor, the particular units that we were quartered with had picked up a part of the flight that we had.

111. Q. Did you have any reason to believe that anybody had reported anything about this flight except your own unit?

A. Well, no, sir, just by hearsay. Other units had reported it, I think.

112. Q. To the information center?

A. Yes, sir.

113. Q. You don't know positively that any of these other four radar stations reported to the information center, do you?

A. No, sir, just by what I heard.

114. Q. You stated that this radar station was manned every morning from 4:00 to 7:00 during the week; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, I'm sure it was, sir.

115. Q. Well, you are sure, but how do you know it was manned? Were you there to see that it was manned?

A. No, sir, I was not there.

116. Q. In other words, you simply think it was manned; is that correct?

A. That is right, sir.

117. Q. Have you any idea as to the hours this station was manned? Do you know positively when this station was manned during weekdays?

A. Well, yes, sir. At the time I was present, I [658] know it was usually late in the morning or early afternoon on those weekdays.

118. Q. What do you call "late in the morning"?

A. Well, I would say anywhere from 9:30 until 12:00; until probably 3:30. I can't recall correctly just what time we did operate but I know it was about that time.

119. Q. To clear up this reference of your going out there for a problem, which I understood was a problem for Sunday morning. Now, it wasn't a problem, was it?

A. Well, that's what we termed it, yes, sir.

120. Q. Was that what you called it?

A. Yes, sir.

121. Q. Going on duty to guard the surrounding area and report the presence of planes? Was that designated by the term "problem"?

A. Yes, sir, from 4:00 to 7:00. We knew that at that time, between 4:00 and 7:00 that all the plots that we sent in were actually being handled down in the information center and that men from the Navy, Marines, Coast Artillery, and all the different branches were down in the information center to work their problem on targets that we would pick up.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

122. Q. Sergeant, you stated that during the week preceding 7 December you were at the Opana station working the sets in the late morning and early afternoon. At those times when you were working the set, was the information center functioning? Were you funneling the information in to the information center?

A. No, sir, we were not.

123. Q. In other words, am I correct in saying that any time outside of these 4:00 a. m., to 7:00 a. m., hours it was simply a practice session at the individual units, and the whole system, including the other units and the information center, was not in operation?

A. That, sir, I can't answer with full knowledge. I believe, though, that at that time certain units throughout the day took over picking up and sending in flights to the information center. One reason that we were left out of it was that it was a new unit and we had just put it up and there was quite a bit to be done, although I do believe some of the other units did report in.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating [659] to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The Roberts Report, that is, the published report, states, in part, that a non-commissioned officer who was receiving training at that time picked up these planes. That is somewhat the wording. Anyhow, it says a non-commissioned officer. Well, at that time, sir, there was no non-commissioned officer present at our station during the operation. However, when Private Locard went to testify before the Roberts Commission, another staff sergeant, Sergeant Hilton, was put in charge of our detachment the day after Pearl Harbor. Now, he went in with him to the Roberts Commission, although sir, I don't know whether he testified nor whether that could have been where they got the non-commissioned officer, but as I stated before the Commission, Lieutenant Locard was a private at the time of December 7th.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 2:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Friday, August 25, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944.

[660]

NINETEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9 : 30 a. m.

Present :

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the eighteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate :

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Administrative Office, Norfolk, Virginia.

2. Q. What duties were assigned you between 1 October 1941 and 7 December 1941?

A. In answering that question, I would like to go into considerable detail. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows :

(1) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing Two. Included in the larger command were the Patrol Squadrons, aircraft tenders, [661] attached to Patrol Wings One and Two.

(2) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two, plus other units as assigned by Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet for the conduct of specific operations.

(3) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibility of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

(4) Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District for aviation development with the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Island.

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors: (a) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force, who was type commander for Patrol Wings. He was based at San Diego. (b) Commander Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol Wings One and Two were a part. (c) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Commander Task Force Nine. (d) Under Commandant, 14th Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, when performing my duties as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force. (e) Commander of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for operation of patrol planes assigned those forces for specific operations. A change in my status was contemplated in the current Navy Orange War Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my command were expected to make an early move to bases on the outlying islands in case of war, including Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own headquarters were to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in this connection were by no means light, is evidenced by the fact that just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor this War Plan was being played as a joint maneuver. Further, the squadron VP-22, designated for maintenance in the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the initiation of War Plan move to advance bases, was in fact transferred to Midway in October, 1941, for temporary duty. Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March 1941, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet directed me to report to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was senior to me. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the operations plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force. Insofar as [662] Naval and Marine Corps units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when applicable. All the Army orders covering the function of their units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by General Martin and me. That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the naval air situation between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a re-estimate, and information of the Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition. The estimate I believed, and still believe, to be sound, but the orders based on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction, and the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command. Specifically, the organization was designed to function through

mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed. The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made available to it by the various air commanders of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the operational control of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force or the Army pursuit commander, in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status. The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drill was for the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading, "Drill, danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, drill." This placed the search and attack groups in a functioning status. On receipt of this message I, in turn, as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point during such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were reported ready for flight. The term, "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force," was actually a misnomer, due to the limited composition of that portion of the air forces under his operational control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns. The term, "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This authority was non-existent [663] until an emergency was apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status, and when so called into existence was limited in scope in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation. In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the search and attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation were concerned, which were to function under Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army. To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is invited to the report of a joint Army and Navy Board, dated 31 October 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Paragraph (4) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin as senior Army member, and myself as senior Navy member, reads as follows: (4) The problem confronting the board as pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows: "The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

(1) to search for and to destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation. (2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation." It was pointed out that under the Army 54 group program, 170 B-17s and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill the above missions. Naval planes at that time called for 84 patrol planes and 48, VSO planes to be directly under the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to supplement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the naval base air defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being replaced by the more modern B-17s, and in Patrol Wings One and Two, PBV-1, 2, and 3 types were being replaced by PBV-5 types. The new types were subject to the usual shakedown difficulties and maintenance problems. In the case of the naval PBV-5 planes, there was an almost complete absence of spare parts; and in addition, a program of the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Considerable difficulty had also been experienced with the cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this type received, and installation of modified engine nose sections was in progress. The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two during 1941, prior to December 7, was in the expansion training, operational training, security operations, the development and equipment of air facilities—all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and output in the Navy at that time were considerably [664] behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Therefore, particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for expansion training. This necessitated a planning of operations whereby each squadron could be required to conduct training for the qualification of additional combat crews, not only for their own aircraft, but to form nuclei for new squadrons being commissioned back on the mainland as well. The highest priority was placed upon this feature. Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity for keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that any time during a flight they could be diverted from their peacetime objectives to combat missions. The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly scouting to a maximum range and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the naval planes would have been greatly reduced in matériel readiness and their combat crews approaching an operational fatigue point, while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem has resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time

limits. The Commander Naval Base Defense Force did not have authority to place that organization in a functioning status except in the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is no drill", was ordered broadcast at 0758 that morning.

3. Q. You have stated that certain events or directives could vitalize the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I believe among these you mentioned an order for a drill by the Naval Base Defense Officer, and actual emergency, and I believe you said also, "on authority." I would like to have you amplify your answer and say on whose authority could the Naval Base Defense Air Force be vitalized.

A. I think I said, "Proper authority," and by that I meant the Commander Naval Base Defense Force could put the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status by an order. I would like to go further. I believe that if and when such order might have been given, there would have been required to make sure that it would have been carried out in full, some conversation with the Army command. In other words, two people [665] have got to come to conclusions that it was necessary to do something in the absence of an actual emergency which would be apparent to all hands.

4. Q. Could the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet have the same authority to vitalize this air force as you have stated?

A. He would have, as the Commander Naval Base Defense Force was functioning, on the organization as it was set up, under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. I would like to add further that the composition of aircraft that composed the force of the air defense were those aircraft that were made available. They did not include all aircraft, and whether or not aircraft were available depended on the commands of the various units which had command of these aircraft groups.

5. Q. Do I understand your answer, then, Admiral, to mean essentially this—that the aircraft that became available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force when it was vitalized would have to be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No, in accordance with the directives then in existence concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force, the commanders reported planes available to the other commanders concerned daily, and the state of readiness was set by the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. The state of readiness was in terms such as B-5. B meant 50% of the planes available for this within four hours.

6. Q. Were all naval aircraft in the Hawaiian area ultimately under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet—naval aircraft?

A. All naval fleet aircraft were under his command, as a general command. There were only a few planes, such as utility planes attached to the air stations, which came under the commandant, that were not included in those planes. They were not, however, combatant planes.

7. Q. What officer approved in their final form the operating schedules for naval aircraft in the Hawaiian area?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet made the ultimate approval for naval fleet aircraft.

8. Q. I believe you have answered this question, Admiral, but it is so important that I would like to have you set it out as a separate answer to this question: During the last quarter of the calendar year 1941, what was the paramount mission of naval aircraft of the United States Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

A. As a general plan, I would say that what was termed [666] expansion training was the primary objective. Of course, when I say "expansion training" that means preparing for war in all phases. There were other operations required which had to do with certain security and special security measures that may have been in progress.

9. Q. Can you state whether this mission was changed between 1 October 1941 and 7 December, the same year?

A. No, it was not changed.

10. Q. Adverting to addendum No. 1 of the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operations Plan No. A-1-41, which is a part of Exhibit 53 before this court, I ask you what is the date of this addendum?

A. March 31, 1941.

11. Q. Please read for the record Paragraph 1 (e), under the heading, "Summary of the Situation."

A. (Reading) "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service."

12. Q. Was this your view at the time you signed this document on 31 March 1941?

A. I would like to invite attention to the fact that this joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action was based on a study in the event of some hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans.

13. Q. Did the view that you expressed in paragraph 1 (e), that you have just read, change before the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. No.

14. Q. Adverting to paragraph 3 of this same addendum, under the heading, "Possible Enemy Action", will you please read for the record subparagraphs 1, 2, and 3, under 3 (a)?

A. (Reading) "A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two."

[667] The court then, at 10:25 a. m., took a recess until 10:35 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He

was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (continued) :

15. Q. Am I to understand that this was your view on 31 March 1941?

A. It was my best thought on the subject based on considerable thought which actually was started in the early part of 1941 prior to this plan or estimate. In other words, we had given considerable thought to were we ready for war and what kind of war, and in connection with that I would like to invite attention to a letter which endeavored to express my views of the situation at that time because I felt that we were not ready and not getting ready very fast. The letter I refer to was dated January 16, 1941 from Commander, Patrol Wing Two to the Chief of Naval Operations, via Commander Scouting Force and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, who, at that time, was also Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. In this letter I stated that I had arrived there on October 30, 1940 with the point of view that the international situation was critical, and especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing Two and looking over the situation I was surprised to find that there in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advance outpost, we were operating on a shoestring, and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be. I stated that the war readiness of patrol plane squadrons depended not only on the planes and equipment that comprised those squadrons, but also on the many operating needs and requirements at air stations and outlying bases over which the patrol wing commander had no direct control. [668] I refer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, Serial 095323, in which it was indicated to me that there was no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing Two prior to one year, and that Patrol Wing Two would practically be the last wing to be furnished new planes. I stated that this, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicated to me that the Navy Department as a whole did not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm, or else is not taking steps in keeping with their views. I then endeavored to point out the need for proper planning in the Navy Department in the various bureaus in order to coordinate the procurement of the requirements in the preparation for war, both with reference to the planes and to the facilities and bases from which those planes were expected to operate, and I mentioned Pearl Harbor Air Station, the Kaneohe Air Station, the necessity for expediting the development of Keehi Lagoon, outlying bases at Wake, Johnston, Palmyra and Midway, and also the situation in general.

16. Q. Adverting to Addendum No. 1 to the Naval Base Defense Air Force operation plan from which you read a moment ago, will you read for the record Paragraph 3 b.?

A. (Reading) "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles."

17. Q. Other than an air attack delivered from carrier based planes, had you considered any other form of attack on Oahu as possible?

A. Submarines, of course, I considered were what may be present in the operating areas and the vicinity of the entrance of Pearl Harbor and whenever the enemy expected to use them.

18. Q. What I am trying to get at is this, Admiral: What form of attack on the Island of Oahu itself did you envisage?

A. I envisaged an air attack, as that was the most logical or practical method of making an attack by the Japanese on Oahu if they decided to attack Oahu.

19. Q. Could they have made any other form of attack on the Island of Oahu?

A. Not with the same degree of success.

20. Q. Did you mean by an attack on Oahu, to include vessels of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. I assumed they would take the most likely objectives with the idea of a strike, a fast raid, so to [669] speak.

21. Q. In your estimate that an air attack would be the most likely form of attack on the island of Oahu or the vessels of the United States Fleet which might be anchored in Pearl Harbor, had you considered the form of attack that this air attack might take? In other words, would it be bombing, torpedo plane attack, or what?

A. I was surprised that the Japanese actually, as demonstrated on December 7th, could utilize aircraft as well as they did, and particularly with torpedoes. However, I expected, as the estimate indicates, that the most logical way that the Japanese could make an attack—and by “attack” I mean a strike and run—would be by air bombing, primarily.

22. Q. Why had the torpedo plan attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor surprised you?

A. Because of the restricted water surrounding the ships, and the depth of that water. In other words, I think the Japanese were in advance of us considerably with torpedoes at that time.

23. Q. I ask you to examine paragraph 5-d of Addendum No. 1 which we have been discussing, and ask you what condition of material readiness—I repeat, material readiness—had been prescribed for naval patrol type aircraft in the Hawaiian area between 27 November 1941 and the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941?

A. Condition B-5, which means 50 per cent on four hours notice. Now, that means both material and personnel.

24. Q. Who had prescribed the conditions of material readiness and the degree of readiness B-5 that you have just stated?

A. The Commander Naval Base Defense Force, The condition of readiness was prescribed when exercises such as air raid drills were completed and we went back to the normal status, and I think that that condition was ordered after the last air raid drill and was then in effect.

25. Q. Then this condition of readiness B-5 was your normal operating procedure for a condition of readiness?

A. It was the normal readiness prescribed for normal conditions. I would like to elaborate to save time, that in setting a condition of readiness under normal conditions, that the condition of readiness that was set was to permit the required operations from day to day in the schedule to continue without having them tied up standing by.

26. Q. Do you know the condition of readiness of Army aircraft which were suitable for long-range reconnaissance between 27 November and 7 December 1941?

A. I have a copy of the dispatch from the headquarters of the Hawaiian Air Force to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, which stated that the aircraft enumerated therein were in condition Easy Five. This dispatch was on December 5 and prevailed over the weekend.

[670] 27. Q. Did condition of readiness, Easy Five, have the same meaning in the Army as it had in your own addendum No. 1, Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan? In other words, did the Army use the same system as the Navy for designating condition of readiness so far as their aircraft were concerned?

A. The Army utilized the same code as the Navy used because they were all based on the same directives and the "Easy" in this case indicated that all the aircraft were conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan. Then the "Five" indicated to me that they could be made ready in four hours.

28. Q. What do you consider was the radius in miles for operation of the plane PBV-3 for long-range reconnaissance under conditions of war-time operation?

A. In answering that question I am referring to practical war-time conditions as a result of experience subsequent to December 7, 1941, and the question which required considerable thought was whether planes on scouting missions and long-range scouting—I mean the longest they could do—should carry bombs, or not. And we worked under two different conditions after December 7th, both carrying bombs and also without bombs, and finally it was decided that we would consider the earliest information more valuable by this extreme range operation that planes were capable of doing than the effort that they might be able to exert with the bombs that they would be carrying. Normally, PBV-5s searched to a radius of 700 miles. We tried to get them out to 800 miles but practically speaking, 700 miles—that is, including the leg on the end of the triangle of the search—was considered their practical normal limit. The PBV-3s were considered to have a practical range for that kind of duty of 600 miles. In other words you may assign a long range to a plane and you may think the plane has gone there, but it is very possible that the plane did not get there, although you thought it had gone there. In other words, what I am trying to bring out is that the commander charged with early information and for scouting wants to be assured at what range he is going to get this information and not base any assumptions on hypothetical cases.

29. Q. Then your estimate for the maximum ranges of the PBV-3 is 600 miles radius?

A. Yes; and the PBV-5 700 miles radius. The pre-Pearl Harbor estimate was hoped to be 800 miles for the PBV-5s. I would like to recall a conversation I had with General Martin, who made some pre-Pearl Harbor studies wherein he estimated that his mission was scouting and bombardment as well, and that he expected his planes to go 1000 miles radius, but they were not able to do it when they were working for me after Pearl Harbor. We thought the PBV-3

could go to a 700-mile radius. The radius of action that I have given for these planes does not conform to the performance data as put out in technical publications. What I am speaking about is practical operating conditions.

[671] 30. Q. Between 31 March 1941 and 7 December 1941, what can you say from your own experience of the degree of harmonious cooperation between the Army and Navy in military matters relating to the Hawaiian area?

A. My relations with the Army were very pleasant. General Martin arrived in the area shortly after I arrived, and practically on our first meeting we discussed getting together on joint exercises, and we actually did set up a plan wherein we conducted joint exercises, that is, unofficially Patrol Wing Two and the Army Air Force Commander, and they were conducted at times one day a week; at other times one day in two weeks. After the exercise I held a critique over on the air station and many of the Army officers came over to it and attended and I would say that the cooperation between General Martin and myself was very good. Except I would like to say this: that cooperation was good, yes, but there were many times when we could not agree because he was working from directives that emanated from the War Department and through the chain of command, and I was working in connection with the directives that emanated from the Navy Department through the chain of command, and sometimes there was no solution to the problem, such as in the case of this joint Army-Navy Board which I have referred to previously in my testimony.

31. Q. But so far as the local commanders themselves in the area were concerned, is your answer that there was reasonable cooperation?

A. Very good cooperation. I would say that there was very good cooperation insofar as cooperation could go. There was always friendliness. I respected General Martin and liked him; and I think he did me, and when it came to a question of certain effort to be performed, he complied as the conditions fitted his situation, which was perfectly natural. In other words, suppose I wanted to initiate an air raid drill, or suppose the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, wanted to initiate an air raid drill. Unless it suited the situation with the Army—and which I assumed was bound by their problems—they did not always join in and say, "Yes, for the date mentioned, we would like to participate". In other words, they were bound by certain rules, customs, and regulations connected with their business.

32. Q. Were you not similarly bound so far as your own organization was concerned, to some degree?

A. Yes, but there was friendliness and frequent conversations and meetings and, as a matter of fact, joint boards.

[672] 33. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 in evidence before this court which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November 1941 and which sets out, in substance, that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful, that there are indications of a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on Guam or the Philippines as a possibility. Prior to 7 December 1941 had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. No. I would like to amplify that a little bit. I remember attending a conference in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's office—I have forgotten the date; I think it was prior to that date—in which a plan for placing Marine squadrons on Wake and Midway was discussed. There was nothing in connection with that dispatch referred to so far as I was concerned, but I assumed that something must have happened to cause this. It may have been, I thought at the time, the result of a letter which I had written to the Commander-in-Chief in October, 1941, wherein I recommended that the Navy take steps to obtain in some form or another—either from the Army or by assignment of aircraft with Army personnel—180, 4-engine, large type bombing planes, and 180 pursuit planes, with the idea of utilizing Midway and Wake for operating these planes and for bombing missions as necessary against mandated islands when the time came.

34. Q. I show you Exhibit 17 in evidence before this court which has been popularly called by some witnesses the war warning message. I would ask you to examine this dispatch, please. Had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

35. Q. Between the period 27 November and 7 December 1941 had there been any occasion for you to confer with the Army Air Force commander on the subject of long-range reconnaissance from Oahu?

A. No.

36. Q. What is your estimate of the sector of 360 degrees that you could have scouted in long-range reconnaissance with Army and Navy planes of the Naval Base Defense Air Force if you made a daily search, commencing on 27 November 1941 and continuing this search daily for an indefinite period of time?

A. I would like to answer that question by stating this: Considering 25 mile visibility and to search to 800 miles, or 700 miles, as the case may be, required approximately 50 planes per day to cover 360 degrees. Therefore, on that basis, it required one plane for 7.2 degrees. Considering the number of planes which were available to me from the Army and without considering any reservation for a bombing group, there were approximately 8 bombardment planes of the [673] B-17 type which were the only ones the Army had that were capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance. So, considering 8 of those available and with the Navy's approximately 54 planes, that makes 62 planes that would be available. The combat crews available for planes were scarcely more than one per plane, and that was the reason for this expansion training I was speaking about. The employment of combat crews on daily operations on searches out to 7- or 800 miles, could only be carried on by dividing your combat crews into groups of 3, and therefore there would be approximately 20 planes available per day, and figuring 7.2 degrees per plane and 20 planes gives 144 degrees. The term "indefinitely" in this case means an undetermined number of days; in other words, not a permanent, continuous operation with no ending. Of course, that is on the supposition that the planes could be maintained in an operating state. We at that time were having great difficulties in getting spare parts for these planes. I would like at this time to give the dates that planes arrived in the Hawaiian area of the PBY-5 type to replace

the obsolescent planes. One squadron of 12 planes, 28 October 1941. One squadron, 6 planes, 28 October 1941. One squadron, 12 planes, 23 November 1941. One squadron, 12 planes, 23 November 1941. Which indicates those 54 planes of the PBY-5 type had arrived since 28 October and those planes were new planes and we were experiencing shake-down difficulties and maintenance difficulties because of the absence of spare parts. That question of spare parts was a subject that had been under discussion for several months. It was due, I think, to the construction program wherein the desire was for numbers of planes or numbers of units, and little provision was made for spare parts because they did not show up in the same category as units. I would like to say this: That we had received some PBY-5 planes of the first vintage, or earlier vintage, and we had considerable difficulty with the cracking of engine nose sections, and it required a redesign and a strengthening of the engine nose section. That was also one of the problems we were involved in in changing those nose sections to eliminate that defect.

The court then, at 11:10 a. m., took a recess until 11:25 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and the interested party Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

[674] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

37. Q. Admiral, concerning your testimony about the unsatisfactory conditions applying to your command which you found when you assumed that command in Hawaii: Will you state quite briefly what improvements were made in those deficiencies and inadequacies up to 1 December 1941?

A. In my letter I referred to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations which indicated that I would get replacements for planes in about a year. Actually, I did get replacements in just about a year, and that was one thing I was trying to improve.

The question was repeated.

A. Considerable additions in the way of facilities were added. The question was, Were we getting them as fast as the situation demanded that we should have gotten them?

38. Q. Up to 1 December.

A. I was not satisfied with the situation on 1 December. For instance, the Wake Island development was not ready. Midway had come a long ways. Work was going on at Johnston. The Kaneohe Air Station was in use, but we had many difficulties and deficiencies in connection with the Kaneohe Air Station. The Keehi Lagoon I don't think is completed yet and therefore it is a question of whether

everything was done that could be done. I assume perhaps it was but maybe it was because we hadn't started soon enough, but the situation was not satisfactory, actually, for the conditions in the Pacific.

39. But very considerable improvements in the conditions which you first found had been effected; is that correct?

A. Considerable improvements had been effected.

40. Q. Admiral, as to the estimate by General Martin and you of 31 March: I understand you to say that you held the opinions expressed in that paper throughout the period up to Pearl Harbor. Is that correct?

A. I saw no reason to change any opinions expressed in that, and I held to them.

[675] 41. Q. I will ask you a somewhat hypothetical question: Had you been apprised of those two dispatches of 24 November and of 27 November 1941, when they arrived, or soon afterward, would your mind have reverted to this estimate and would you consequently have given any advice as to steps to be taken?

A. Of course that is a hypothetical question and I would like to think that I would have done it and I hope I would have done it, but whether I would have done it or not is something that God only knows.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husabnd E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

42. Q. Exhibit 59 is a letter which has been introduced in evidence dated January 7, 1942, from the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. There appears as an enclosure a letter dated December 30, 1941, signed by yourself. Do you recall writing that letter, Admiral?

A. Yes, sir.

43. Q. And that letter expressed as of that date your estimate relative to search group requirements and long-range reconnaissance in general?

A. Yes, it did, and it was written in order to express that opinion to the Commander-in-Chief with the hope that we would get sufficient and adequate equipment to perform the job we were required to do most effectively, which was then our 100 percent job.

44. Q. Are the studies and estimates in that letter the basis on which you answered the judge advocate's question as to the number of patrol planes that were available for distance reconnaissance between 27 November and 7 December?

A. Yes, that was the basis of my answer.

45. Q. This letter, with enclosures, spells out in detail the rationale for your conclusions in answer to the judge advocate?

A. Yes.

[676] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

46. Q. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to and including December 7 there were, as you said, eight B-17's of the Army which were capable of being used in distance reconnaissance at the time?

A. That remark about the eight B-17's was so stated because of a dispatch, which is the only dispatch I have, from the Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force in connection with the availability of planes, and that dispatch, which is dated December 5, gave as available eight B-17's. I believe they had more than eight in their total output, but eight was the number made available under the conditions of Easy 5.

47. Q. I take it that a dispatch like that was the method used in exchanging information between the Army and you in connection with this joint use of aircraft?

A. That is correct, and it is according to an agreed plan between General Martin and me, and it is required in our joint plan.

48. Q. That had been in effect for some time?

A. That had been in effect since the date of the Army plan, which was subsequent to ours.

49. Q. So that you came to know in that fashion the condition of readiness of the Army planes which were available?

A. Yes, I would know the number of planes that were available under the condition of readiness.

50. Q. During the period from November 27 to December 7 there were, as I recall you said, about fifty-four Navy planes capable of and available for long distance reconnaissance during that period.

A. Yes. I would like to amplify that in this way. There was one squadron at Midway during that period, and there was one squadron which had been away over a month approximately and which had just returned to Oahu on December 5, so that that squadron needed considerable maintenance work. Therefore, there were fifty-four remaining planes available, and those planes were the new PBY planes.

51. Q. These particular Navy planes we are speaking about, that is, both the fifty-four and those which had recently come back from Midway, comprised Pat Wing One and Two?

A. One and Two.

[677] 52. Q. You were the commander of that?

A. I was commander of Patrol Wing Two, and I also was given control of Pat Wing One.

53. Q. Then those planes were the same ones which were also in Task Force Nine that you referred to?

A. Task Force Nine included everything I had.

54. Q. Now, those Navy planes you speak of during this particular period were operating as either Patrol Wings or as Task Force Nine or were being overhauled and were being used in training and upkeep, extension training, intertype exercises and things of that character; is that correct?

A. Correct.

55. Q. In connection with operating schedules and employment schedules, for example, for intertype training, I take it you would arrange with Task Force commanders, and ultimately the schedules would be approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that how it went?

A. Yes. Sometimes it may have been arranged by higher authorities or the general plan—as a scheme, as the policy set out.

56. Q. Set out by whom?

A. By the Commander-in-Chief, and then the details would be worked out by the Task Force commanders.

57. Q. Other than those planes which were being overhauled and were being repaired during this period, the balance of all such planes were occupied each day in those tasks?

A. Yes, sir, carrying the routine schedule of operations.

58. Q. There being only one crew, of course, all the pilots and crew were so engaged, too; is that correct?

A. Yes.

59. Q. The same thing was occurring with respect to shore-based aircraft? They were carrying out routine operations during the period, too?

A. When you speak of shore-based aircraft, I assume you mean now the other aircraft of the Fleet on shore that may be eligible or available for the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

60. Q. Yes.

A. Yes, under their respective commanders.

61. Q. The operating schedules and employment schedules of the planes we have been discussing were matters which lay between those plane commanders and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or his subordinates?

A. Yes, through the regular channel of command.

[678] 62. Q. In establishing a condition of readiness in respect to those planes, I take it that if an A-1—There would be such a thing as A-1?

A. A-1 went into effect when the word came out for a drill.

63. Q. I assume if such a thing—

A. For those planes that were available—Excuse me.

64. Q. We can deal only with those which were available. I take it that if such a thing as that had been prescribed there would not have been any further training, that crews would have had to stand by so as to be available, and that planes would have had to have been kept warmed up? In other words, if a high condition of readiness had been prescribed, the training would have to be suspended?

A. Yes.

65. Q. Did you find the condition of readiness which was prescribed at the time sensible and appropriate with respect to the missions that lay before those planes at the time?

A. Yes, for normal conditions that was the suitable state of readiness. In other words, it was suitable from the point of view of interference with operations. I think the Army, for instance, were consulted with as to how much interference with their operations would certain degrees of readiness create.

66. Q. I assume, then, that this Naval Base Defense Air Force was not what is called a firm force, that is to say, that it was standing by twenty-four hours a day subject to orders in connection with defense? It was not that kind of force, was it?

A. It was not.

67. Q. It became a force, as you described it, only upon an alarm for a drill?

A. Alarm for a drill, yes.

68. Q. And an alarm which was based upon an immediate present emergency of an attack?

A. An actual emergency, yes. It came into being in an actual emergency.

69. Q. Or if you received a positive directive, which itself in turn was based upon known information of the imminence of an attack? That is the other one, isn't it?

A. If information was the basis on which it should come into being, then, the orders should come from the higher authority. The question is, Who has the information and what is it?

[679] 70. Q. You had planned with the Army that upon the Naval Base Defense Air Force becoming a force certain preliminary steps and orders would be quite automatic; am I correct in that?

A. This did not take effect until later on, after an effort was made to change the situation or the understanding of the Army in connection with it. In other words, when it was necessary, in actual emergency, for it to go into effect, the idea was that it should go into effect without having to get higher authority to put it into effect. In other words, bomb dropping would put it into effect. The reason for endeavoring to get this question straightened out with the Army was to try to prevent what one time did happen, where the word had to be received from the high Army Command before they could go into action in this force. I prepared a letter on this subject and recommended that it be sent by Admiral Bloch to General Short.

71. Q. And it was sent?

A. Possibly with some corrections or changes.

72. Q. The thing you wished to do was done?

A. Yes.

73. Q. Now, if there was to be undertaken a daily reconnaissance in advance of war and in advance of positive information of the imminence of an attack upon Pearl Harbor, such a reconnaissance would have to be each day and continual, would it not? That is the best way, rather, to do it?

A. It certainly would have to be many hours before the attack.

74. Q. Just in the absence of two features, sir? In the absence of positive knowledge of the imminence of an attack upon Pearl Harbor or in the absence of knowledge that an enemy was at that time at a particular place; and distance reconnaissance to be of use must be conducted each day over the whole period that you have concern about; is that right?

A. That is correct. You might find the definite answer to that question in the details of the battle of Midway.

75. Q. If that had been undertaken, let us say, on November 27 and continued thereafter, I take it, from what you have said, that training, intertype training, expansion training, matériel upkeep and things of that character would have been completely disrupted during the period that that reconnaissance was on; is that correct?

A. If the reconnaissance was made an all-out effort, yes.

[680] Examined by the court:

76. Q. Admiral, had this expansive training to which you have testified as being the primary mission been stopped, say, about October 16, 1941, what would have been the general effect on the war efficiency of the air units under your command on December 7?

A. In answering that question, I would have to consider the withdrawal of personnel by the Bureau of Personnel from our area in order to carry on the expansion of the naval aeronautical organization. I had recommended in this letter of January 16, to which I have pre-

viously referred, to stabilize personnel and leave them until we could get sufficiently manned to meet a war basis.

77. Q. My question is general. If you had stopped all expansive training on October 16, what would you have had in the way of a competent force?

A. A short period would have a small effect. I might say it would have an effect, depending on the time element. It is rather difficult to answer that question.

78. Q. If you had stopped this training and if you had used your planes for defensive purposes, such as daily scouting, would your force on December 1, 1941, have been as efficient and capable of operation as it would have been if you did not have this contingency?

A. No, it would not have been an efficient force. I should like to say that from December 7 on, for some time, all questions of training stopped, and two or three months after December 7 I began to receive pressure as to when and how much training I could do, because we were not able to do training in carrying out this all-out operation of reconnaissance.

79. Q. Reverting to your extended answer about the operation of planes on reconnaissance duties and assuming that you had stopped all training operations and established a continuous, long-distance patrol through 360 degrees beginning December 1, what would have been the probable condition of your planes on December 7?

A. They undoubtedly would have been in a condition where many of them would not have been ready for flight. I would like to add this answer. After December 7 we had what personnel we had prior to December 7. Then, we were reenforced by squadrons that came out from the mainland, so that after December 7, or shortly thereafter, when those squadrons arrived we had spare parts that could be taken from planes that were damaged to help in the maintenance and upkeep of planes, as well as having extra personnel in combat crews, because instead of having, we will say, one [681] crew per plane, we had about one and a half crews per plane later on on account of squadrons being transferred to me after December 7.

80. Q. My question also referred to the planes themselves. If you had that limited number of planes on a continuous search, how many of those planes would be still operating at the end of a week or ten days?

A. If we had replacement parts—

81. Q. Assuming what you had on hand at the time?

A. My estimate is that there would have been a considerable percentage out of commission.

82. Q. If you had conducted this long-range reconnaissance and if one of these planes had reported an enemy force on a certain course and speed, would you have had any aircraft which could have done anything about it?

A. I had this operational control over the Army bombardment squadrons—the heavy bombardment. Whether or not they could have hit the enemy is something I would not want to predict, but what was available was under my operational control to make the effort.

83. Q. I am assuming that they were discovered at a long distance away, which is the only reason for the long-range reconnaissance.

A. The B-17's were able to conduct a search with half a bomb load, if I remember correctly, up to 800 miles.

84. Q. Well, is it not a fact that unless the hostile carriers had been stopped in the act of launching the planes, the attack would have started in, and then it would have been a question of repelling the attack which was en route rather than preventing the attack?

A. Actually, hind-sight indicates we might have had information of it if we had reconnaissance planes spot them at sea, but they undoubtedly would not have been stopped.

85. Q. Was it not a historical fact prior to December 7, 1941, that no airplane attack was completely stopped once it had been launched?

A. I understood that is correct—You are speaking of carriers, I assume?

86. Q. Yes.

A. I understand that is correct, insofar as carriers are concerned.

87. Q. Admiral, covering the entire period of your duty in Hawaii, wasn't there inaugurated at one time and carried out a search of the area around Honolulu?

A. Yes, under special conditions and special orders.

[682] 88. Q. Approximately how many planes did you use in this daily search?

A. I'm not sure. I think it was somewhere between six and twelve to some distance like 300 miles.

89. Q. Was this search carried on daily and if so, when did the planes take off from Pearl Harbor and return to Pearl Harbor?

A. As I remember, during the period when the search was ordered they took off in the early morning.

90. Q. Before daylight?

A. Probably day was breaking.

91. Q. And when they returned?

A. They returned after completion of their search, which meant a flight of about 650 miles, I believe, which would mean approximately five and a little over hours afterwards.

92. Q. Approximately when did this daily search start and when did it end, as to period of time?

A. It is very difficult for me to remember details. I remember it was when Admiral Andrews was in command of the scouting force.

93. Q. But, generally speaking, do you remember when it was discontinued?

A. I think it was discontinued at some time prior to July, 1941.

94. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, discontinue this search, or was it discontinued prior to his taking command?

A. I think it was discontinued after he took command, but I am not positive.

95. Q. Referring to this question of search and distance reconnaissance, did you at any time have occasion to discuss with the Commander-in-Chief the possibilities of such a daily search and the planes that you had to accomplish such a search?

A. No, I don't remember any detailed discussion with him in connection with such a plan.

96. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief at any time suggest to you or direct you to make a plan for such search covering any sector around Hawaii?

A. When he directed me to report to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and prepare these air defense plans in conjunction with the Army, the idea was to bring about an effort in some coordinated fashion with the Army, and I was [683] expected to make plans so far as the forces that I commanded were concerned. Therefore, in connection with my plans, I did have search plans.

97. Q. Did you discuss these plans with the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force?

A. Whether or not I discussed them with the commander personally, I do not remember. I have discussed many things with him and particularly at the very beginning of the effort to bring about this joint agreement with the Army Air Force in Hawaii, but all my plans and directives were forwarded to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, as he was my immediate superior in connection with these operations.

98. Q. Well, under those conditions at any time did the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force discuss with you or direct you to make available planes for distance reconnaissance?

A. No, I do not remember his doing that at all.

99. Q. Would you have looked to him to give you a directive for such an activity?

A. I would have looked to him or to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for a directive to put into effect and start operations in connection with reconnaissance.

100. Q. Did you report to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force daily the number of planes which could be made available for search?

A. No, that was my business, and I did not make such report.

101. Q. As we understand, at no time was there any consideration given to a search of a partial sector of 360 degrees around Hawaii or the entire 360 degrees; is that correct?

A. There was no discussion in connection with that—I assume you are speaking about prior to December 7?

102. Q. That is right.

A. Prior to the discontinuance of the search that was referred to previously as having been ordered, that search, as I remember it, covered a constantly changing sector.

103. Q. In your testimony, Admiral, you have stated that you considered that if an attack were made by an enemy, it would come as an air attack; is that correct?

A. That the most probable attack would come by air.

[674] 104. Q. In view of that and having in mind the assistance in defense of the Pearl Harbor area, did you consider that a daily search would add to the security of the Pearl Harbor base?

A. Undoubtedly a search would have added to the security of the Pearl Harbor base. The question is when to put such search into effect.

105. Q. But you did have enough planes to make a search daily of a part or sector of the 360 degrees without seriously interfering with your upkeep; is that correct?

A. Out of the number of planes that were on Pearl Harbor, certainly a portion of those could be used for any purpose, search included.

106. Q. On Sunday, December 7, was the usual routine of training employment, etc., going on, and was there any reduction in this training activity by reason of its being Sunday?

A. I would like to give you the summation of squadrons and the situation. There were seven planes in the air conducting search between 120 degrees to 170 degrees to 450 miles from Midway.

107. Q. Were those the Midway planes?

A. Those were the planes that were out there in connection with the security of a task force that was bringing about a reenforcement by marine planes at Wake. Four planes were on the surface at Midway, armed with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minute notice. By the way, these planes took departure at 10:30, after information of the attack, and covered the sectors from east towards north. There were twelve planes of VP-11 ready for flight on four hours notice.

108. Q. At Pearl Harbor?

A. On Oahu. VP-12 had six planes ready for flight in thirty minutes' notice and five planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-14 had three planes in the air on security patrol, armed with depth charges; three planes ready for flight on thirty minutes' notice and four planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-22 had twelve planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-23 had eleven planes ready for flight on four hours' notice. VP-24 had four planes in the air conducting intertype tactics with submarines and one plane ready for flight on thirty minutes' notice. Some time about March 1, 1941, I put the Patrol wings on a seven-day operating schedule, arranging details as to when squadrons would have a day off. Sunday was a working day the same as other days. There was this factor in connection with the Sunday work. The commanding officers [685] were instructed to permit personnel to attend church conferences.

109. Q. But there was no let-down in activity in your command by reason of its being Sunday; is that correct?

A. That is correct. I am looking at a schedule dated 25 November 1941, and this particular schedule indicates operations every day, some squadrons being off certain days. On Sunday, December 7, there was one squadron particularly, which had returned from Midway, having been away for quite a while on rather strenuous work also at Wake, and that squadron was left off duty. Therefore, on December 7 I would say that perhaps one squadron more than usual was off duty.

110. Q. Was there at one time an inner patrol consisting of short-legged planes searching daily the inner areas around Oahu?

A. Prior to December 7?

111. Q. Not immediately prior, but wasn't there one?

A. I'm not sure—not under me, anyway.

112. Q. Well, was there any inner patrol, say, of twenty-five, thirty, or fifty miles around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7?

A. No. After December 7 I did take on the inner patrol with the small planes and even organized and commissioned the unit from those planes obtained from the ships that had been damaged.

113. Q. But there were short-legged planes available at Pearl Harbor on December 7 for such a patrol?

A. No, those planes that were there were assigned to surface ships and may have been on the beach at Pearl Harbor for certain purposes but under the control of the ship's organization to which they were assigned.

114. Q. Did the Army have any planes of this nature which could have been used for this inner patrol?

A. None that they thought were suitable, because they had objected to sending planes out to sea and were loath to do so.

115. Q. Do you know of any time during your service at Hawaii when the Army did have light planes used as an inner patrol around the entrances to Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I don't remember anything about the Army having taken over that job or having had any activity in connection with it prior to December, 1941, or even subsequent to December, 1941.

[686] 116. Q. In your estimate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor or on Oahu was possible did you at any time look into the question of the efficiency of radar installed on Oahu?

A. I knew that the Army was setting up its organization and was installing some sets. General Davidson at some time prior to December 7 made a trip to the mainland primarily to get information with reference to radar organizations and equipment. There was a lieutenant by the name of Taylor, I believe, who had had experience with the British in connection with their interceptor command duties. He was in Honolulu at some time shortly prior to December 7 and had been working in some liaison capacity with the Army interceptor command, which had the radar installations under its control, so that I was slightly informed about their situation.

117. Q. With your knowledge of radar immediately prior to December 7, did you or did you not consider that if properly used it would be an important factor to you in any steps you would take to defend Oahu from plane attack or for the security of your own force?

A. Radar was not in general use prior to December 7. A great deal of effort was being made by everyone concerned who felt that they needed radar installations to get their ships equipped with radar, but there was lacking a great deal of positive information in the service in general about the capabilities of this radar with which we were expected to equip our ships. I remember speaking particularly to Admiral Halsey about it. He was very much interested in getting his carriers equipped with radar. The information from radar would not have benefitted my particular command. It would have had considerable bearing on the interceptor or pursuit command which had control of the fighter planes and also for the anti-aircraft guns, but my particular command, which belonged to the duties of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, involved the patrol planes, which could not have done anything, particularly against a carrier, although we were planning to use them to bomb, if necessary. It came up as quite a moot question whether it was just sacrificing the planes to use them as bombing planes against a carrier.

118. Q. You do not mean to state in your reply that if you had received advanced warning of this attack, you could not have taken steps to have saved a great many planes which probably were destroyed otherwise; isn't that correct?

A. I doubt it very seriously, because the patrol planes are very large. To move them, there must be a concrete surface on which to put them or some very hard surface, or else put them in the water. The question of dispersion of planes had been given considerable thought—that is, patrol planes. The question is how to disperse patrol planes and what do you gain from dispersing them? You can put a patrol plane perhaps where it may not be seen, [687] but the question is, How long would it take to get it in the air from that place? Therefore, it was a give and take proposition, considering the space available to put these planes and the time element involved in connection with delaying operations. Even after December 7 we found it absolutely impracticable to disperse patrol planes other than the way we were doing it prior to December 7. I felt that perhaps anchoring these planes out for dispersal purposes might be a good plan. Buoys were put in Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe for that purpose—not all planes but a portion of the planes. They did not happen to have any planes at the buoy at Pearl Harbor on that day and perhaps it's a good thing. They did have some at the buoys at Kaneohe, and all those planes were sunk and completely ruined. Some of the planes on the beach were damaged too badly to be put in commission, but many of them were put back in commission.

119. Q. Did you have any information on the morning of December 7, 1941, as to the interception of enemy planes?

A. Interception of enemy planes?

120. Q. A notice that certain enemy planes were coming in prior to the action of the bombing attack?

A. No, I did not; I had no information.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

121. Q. Admiral, just so I understand about the estimate which is contained in the document you read before: I take it that was at the time your estimate of the eventuality that might occur at Hawaii if Hawaii were attacked?

A. Yes.

122. Q. That is to say, if Hawaii were attacked, the most logical form of attacking was by aircraft?

A. Correct.

123. Q. That was not your estimate of where the Japanese would strike in the event of war?

A. No, that is not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese. This estimate was prepared because we were endeavoring, at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to work out a plan for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

Examined by the court:

124. Q. Admiral, in your familiarity with the general condition in the Pacific, did you make, either mentally or otherwise, an estimate as to the probability of an attack by Japan on Oahu?

A. Not actually, no.

[688] 125. Q. Did you think that they would not attack Oahu as a surprise opening to this war?

A. I did not expect, as a probability, that an attack would be made on Oahu as the opening event of a Japanese-United States war.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 12:40 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 28, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

MONDAY, AUGUST 28, 1944.

[689]

TWENTIETH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the nineteenth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate has certain documents that he would like to introduce into evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

The court then, at 9:40 a. m., took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

[690] The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 691 through 732, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[732-A] The court then, at 4:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., August 29, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944.

[733]

TWENTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the twentieth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 734 through 762, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

[762-A] The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[763] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present occupation?

A. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Washington, D. C., special assistant to the Secretary of State, Department of State.

2. Q. What was your position between 1 October and 7 December 1941?

A. I was an adviser on political relations, Department of State. Examined by the court:

3. Q. In this position, Doctor Hornbeck, were you kept fully informed on matters pertaining to the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. That would depend on the definition of fully, but for practical purposes, I should say, yes.

4. Q. Did you see the important dispatches that came in and went out to Japan during that period?

A. Practically all; that is, State Department dispatches.

5. Q. During this period, did you have occasion to confer with officials of the Navy Department on matters pertaining to these relations?

A. I talked occasionally with some friend among the officer personnel of the Navy. I should not say that I had occasion to confer. It is largely a question of how you define the word "confer".

6. Q. Well, were there frequent conferences at which representatives of the Navy and the State Department were present?

A. There were conferences. There were frequent conferences in the office of the Secretary of State, which dealt with matters of various regions. When the Far East region was involved, I was often present but by no means always.

[764] 7. Q. So you did attend some of these conferences?

A. I attended a certain percentage.

8. Q. Could you state the names, as you remember, of the principal officers of the Navy who were present at these conferences?

A. Well, I remember particularly Admiral Richardson was present at some earlier conferences. Admiral Stark was present at some. Captain Schuirmann was present at some. You mean this limited period from October?

9. Q. Yes.

A. That is all I remember for that period.

10. Q. Could you state briefly, please, the progress of these negotiations between Japan and the United States during this period from October to December 7, 1941, generally speaking?

A. By the end of October, it had become patent that we couldn't have a meeting of minds, couldn't reconcile what the Japanese asked of us with anything that we could commit ourselves to. Early in November the Secretary came to the conclusion that the question could not be solved by diplomacy. The Japanese representatives began pressing their proposals, and ultimately, I think on the 20th of November, they submitted a brief paper which they wanted this government to consider. That paper had in it things that were impossible for us to agree to. There were then conversations which the Secretary had with various officers in this government and with various representatives of foreign governments. On November 26, I think it was, the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador and his associate, Mr. Kurusu, a paper—two papers, in fact, one of which contained an outline of the type of agreement that we would be willing further to discuss. The other was an explanation of that, and stated that this was in the nature of the kind of a thing that we could discuss toward

continuing the conversations. At about that time, I think on the next day, the Secretary for the second time said that this thing could not be settled by diplomacy, but he still entertained a hope that the Japanese might come forward with something further in reply to these two documents of November 26 (or 27th). Then I should have to refresh my mind as to what happened between the Secretary of State and the President immediately after that, but from then on until December 7, there were those steps that the President took, sending a message to the Emperor of Japan. For any details, I would have to go back to the record. That is all set out, however, in the State Department published documents.

11. Q. So in your opinion, the possibility of arriving at [765] an agreement tended to worsen from October on—October 1941; is that correct?

A. May I answer that without saying, "Yes," or "No"?

12. Q. Yes.

A. It became more clear that the Japanese would not accept what we could accept. There is another way of putting that. It needs to be kept in mind all the time that the Japanese had come to us proposing a diplomatic settlement with regard to matters in the Far East. There was no necessity that there be any diplomatic settlement. The only thing that was needed for keeping peace in the Far East was for the Japanese to keep within bounds, but they wanted to get from us an assent to the program of conquest on which they were engaged in the Far East. Therefore they came to us as the petitioners for agreement, and, as I said, it became more and more evident that they would not agree to reasonable things in our eyes, and therefore there couldn't be any agreement. That didn't necessarily mean that we couldn't get along without an agreement.

13. Q. Referring to this note of 26 November, which the Secretary handed to the representatives of Japan, which is a matter of record before this court, was there a conference held prior to the delivery of this note or subsequent thereto, with officials of the Navy Department, say with Admiral Stark or with other officials?

A. I would have to look at the record of conferences to be able to place one within that date.

14. Q. You haven't that record here?

A. I can't answer that, no.

15. Q. But this note was generally discussed, and it was public at that time, wasn't it—I mean the fact that it had been sent?

A. Within two or three days it was public.

16. Q. But you don't remember at any time discussing this particular paper with the Chief of Operations, or any other officer of the Navy Department?

A. My personally discussing it with him?

17. Q. Yes, or having knowledge of it.

A. I have no memory of having any discussion of it directly with the Chief of Naval Operations.

18. Q. And this same answer would apply to the Secretary of the Navy, with reference to the discussion?

A. The same answer.

[766] 19. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, after the delivery of this note of 26 November, did you consider this note and its contents such

that there was little chance after that of reaching any agreement with Japan?

A. No, I did not so consider it; that is, I did not consider that the chance was affected by this note.

20. Q. In other words, on November 26 or, say, November 26, did you consider, or did you not consider, that the negotiations had failed?

A. I considered that we were no nearer to an agreement than we had been for a long time.

21. Q. Referring to this note, page 811, I believe it is, of this document, "Peace and War", which document is before this court for reference, and in paragraph three, which reads: "The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China." In your opinion, or can you express the opinion of the State Department that this statement precluded the acceptance of any agreement between us as proposed by the United States to Japan, along this line?

A. If that had been a proposal initiated by the United States, I should have said, probably; but it must be taken into account that the things that had to be considered were the Japanese proposals to us. The Japanese were making demands that we agree to certain things that they wanted. In that particular document, we were putting before them a statement of the kind of things to which we could and would agree.

22. Q. Did you consider this note to be an ultimatum to Japan?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. Of course, the same applies to paragraph four of that statement where it states: "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking," which is line with paragraph three. I suppose your reply in reference to that paragraph would be the same as to paragraph three?

A. I should like that with the other.

The proceedings following, pages 767 through 772, have, by direction of the Court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[772-A] The court then, at 2:55 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., August 30, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

AUGUST 30, 1944.

[773]

TWENTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Armiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-first day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The proceedings following, pages 774 through 792 inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[793] Reexamined by the court:

107. Q. Admiral, the following is quoted from the report of the Roberts Commission: "Responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Nazi methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war." Were you also aware of this?

A. We always considered that possible, yes.

108. Q. In view of that, did you consider the Hawaiian area a possible or probable point of attack as a Japanese method of opening a war with the United States?

A. I did consider it a possible spot.

109. Q. Did you consider it probable?

A. I considered it possible. The information which we had did not indicate its probability.

110. Q. What was the quickest form of communication which could have been used by Naval Operations on the morning of December 7 to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. It would have been the telephone. I am just assuming that the telephone would have been normal. I can't say whether we would have been held up by the telephone, but I assume it would have been by telephone.

111. Q. Other testimony has indicated that it would be naval radio. How would you compare naval radio with telephone?

A. Well, naval radio when you are pushing it is awfully fast, but it requires coding and decoding, and I am thinking of the fastest way which I could have gotten it through and that is by telephone.

112. Q. Does the court understand that your first knowledge that a conference with the Secretary of State had been requested by the Japanese diplomats to take place at 1 p. m., December 7, was derived from General Marshall's telephone conversation with you during the forenoon of December 7, 1941?

A. Whether he gave it to me first or whether I had gotten it from Schuirmann, with whom I was talking at that time, I am not exactly clear. I think I had it when Marshall called. We were talking it over.

113. Q. When you finished your conversation with General Marshall, having cognizance of the message he was sending to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, why did you not send a message of similar import to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet by the fastest method available?

A. Well, I have stated that that is one regret that I have—that I did not telephone that message.

[794] 114. Q. How did you mean your message, which has been referred to as the "warning message" of November 27, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to be interpreted by him with reference to the words "warning message"?

A. Are you referring to the words "war warning"?

115. Q. How did you mean those words to be interpreted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet when he got it?

A. It meant to me—I had assumed that it would mean to him—imminence of war, that now we had to look out. At last everything had lead up to this climax, and this was a warning for war.

116. Q. Then, why did you not add the words "Hawaiian Area" along with the other areas which you specifically mentioned?

A. I gave him, as I gave the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, the indications from the best intelligence we had as to where the blow was most likely to fall.

117. Q. Admiral, did you not state in earlier testimony that you considered that the specific areas mentioned did not necessarily exclude the Hawaiian area?

A. I did, and in my earlier dispatch of the 24th I stated that. I deliberately wrote into that dispatch myself the words "in any direction."

118. Q. And did you at that time, on November 24, have in mind that it would strike Hawaii?

A. Not that it would but that it was possible and that Hawaii should be on guard. The dispatch also, as you will recall, went to the Canal and to our West Coast commands.

119. Q. There is testimony before the court that in 1941, in the months before December 7, priority had been given the Atlantic area over the Pacific area with reference to rectifying deficiencies in ships, personnel, matériel, and so forth; is that correct?

A. My answer to that is that we used what we had to meet the urgencies of the situation as we saw it. It was not a case of one over the other. It was the case of what was confronting it and what to do with what we had.

120. Q. Well, didn't the Atlantic have any priority over the Pacific? If you had things which you could not give to both, would you give them to the Atlantic?

A. It would depend on what they were and what ships were involved.

121. Q. How was it working?

A. It is covered in correspondence which is in the record. For example, we were escorting. We had had two destroyers hit in the Atlantic, and sound gear might have been considered more important for them at that time than it would have been if it was a case between certain submarine [795] detection gear for them and the Pacific. When it came to personnel, so far as I can recall, the treatment was pretty much equal. We were shy all around. We just did what we considered to be best, and nobody was satisfied and I least of all.

122. Q. With reference to personnel, there has been testimony in the record that the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Area were not in an efficient condition for war because of the shortage of personnel, matériel, and equipment and that the Pacific Fleet was being used to a certain extent for training personnel, which were then taken and transferred to the Atlantic; is that correct or do you care to comment on that?

A. Regarding the first part, it is my opinion that the Pacific Fleet was in a fine state of efficiency, as I would have expected it to have been under the able leadership of its commander. Regarding the transfer of personnel from the Pacific Fleet for the Atlantic Fleet to the detriment of the Pacific Fleet, I do not think it was done. We were transferring from both for the extremely heavy production program which was coming along, but the Pacific Fleet was, not only from what Admiral Kimmel wrote but from others, in a high state of efficiency in gunnery. I believed its morale to be good, and I was delighted with the work that was being done out there.

123. Q. In the critical weeks, or perhaps days, immediately preceding December 7 if the Navy Department had considered an attack on the Pacific Fleet as probable or even possible, what action would you have taken with reference to tightening up on espionage in Oahu and on facilities for getting information valuable to Japan out of the Island?

A. Well, to have gone the limit and to have stopped communications between Japanese officials in Hawaii and Tokyo might have precipitated what we were trying to avoid, and it would have been necessary to go the limit, I take it, to stop that sort of thing. We stopped Japanese ships going through the Canal. We stopped our ships from taking their regular routes and routed them to the southern. We lost only one ship, and we took a chance on her to get the last few marines out. To have gone further than the steps we did take and to have intercepted what they did get might have precipitated it earlier. Whether or not it would have been a good thing to have done I am not prepared to state.

124. Q. Was Japan doing it from her side?

A. Not that I know of. I think we were in constant touch with Grew.

125. Q. Wouldn't you have considered the stoppage of Japanese ships through the Panama Canal and the breaking of Japanese relations on a parity with stopping communications from Honolulu to Japan?

A. We didn't think so. We knew it was touchy, but [796] we did it in such a way that it was camouflaged to some extent.

126. Q. If, after sending your message on the 27th of November, the Navy Department had considered that conditions were so critical that war was perhaps in the offing, why didn't they disapprove the sending of a carrier and planes to Wake Island after the report had been made to you that the carrier was sailing on November 29?

A. I did not think that inconsistent in any way with the war warning. That a task group which was fast and able to take care of itself in the open sea—

127. Q. The testimony indicates that the carrier carrying those planes which could not be used was handicapped in the war task. She was used as a cargo carrier for planes.

A. I don't know how many of her own planes she had. She probably had some. In an emergency the cargo could have been dumped overboard, and, in any event, it was along toward strengthening the position in the Pacific and a chance which was considered favorable to take.

128. Q. But if you had had the idea that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor, it would not have been sound to have carriers withdrawn from the area of Hawaii and to have used them as transports to Wake, would it?

A. If you set the question up that I knew an attack was coming on Hawaii at a definite time.

129. Q. No, we are speaking of a possibility, and you say there was a possibility of an attack in the immediate future on Hawaii. Now, having that in mind, you are cognizant of the withdrawal of a carrier used more as a cargo ship than as a carrier because of the mass of planes on board. You withdraw that ship and send her to Wake and withdraw one of the means of not only protecting Pearl Harbor but of getting information in advance of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, I would not say that it was particularly stopping the information in advance. As I recall—and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, who is here, can testify—there was a broad coverage to that movement, which in itself was somewhat of a sweep, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, from the dispatch I sent, he had no objection to it. It was generally strengthening the position. We couldn't stop everything. We couldn't say with a dead certainty that the thing was going to happen, and it was in line with defense.

130. Q. Is it not directed in the Rainbow Plan that this plan was to go into effect upon the declaration of war or upon the orders of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir.

[797] 131. Q. Under the critical conditions existing at the time, will you comment on why a directive was not sent to place it in operation immediately on December 6 or the early morning of the 7th or prior to that?

A. I commented on that before. It might have precipitated war had it been put into effect, and it is a pretty difficult thing for the Navy to do or for our country to do—to take the initiative in what appears to be or certainly would be interpreted as an aggressive move toward Japan. The United States certainly was not united, by any means, for war in the Pacific until Pearl Harbor united it.

132. Q. However, the fact that you were executing Rainbow would not have been general information. It would have been simply secret information to the Fleet and to the Navy. It would not have been apparent to the public or even to Japan, because when you give an execute on Rainbow Plan that execute is just as secret as Rainbow Plan. I do not quite understand your answer that by giving the execute on Rainbow we would be disturbing Japan.

A. The plan which was in execution would have become known to the Japs and would have been so reported. I may be wrong.

133. Q. Were you in accord with the directive which required that no movement be taken which might excite the populace or excite Japan?

A. In general, but there is a wide degree of interpretation as to what might incite, and there is a point of judgment there. Certainly we couldn't take a chance of being shot with our hands in our pockets, and I think Marshall's dispatch made that plain. As to the rest of it, you may recall a couple of years earlier the wide sweep for days in the San Pedro area when we thought there were Jap submarines operating off there. It was common knowledge and was common talk in the papers, but it was considered necessary. I would have done what I considered necessary.

134. Q. Admiral, we have had your opinion expressed several times about the possible point of attack by Japan in opening a war. What was the general opinion of your advisors in Operations on this question with particular reference to an attack on the Hawaiian area?

A. So far as I know, there was no dissent from the dispatches which had been sent that Hawaii was a possibility and that the information we had lead to the belief that the Philippines, Guam, and the Kra Peninsula would be struck, because there were definite indications to that effect.

135. Q. I take it that there was a difference of opinion between you and your officers in Operations on that point?

A. No, certainly not as to what we sent out. As to [798] the degrees of possibility, you probably can get that from them directly.

136. Q. The following is a quotation from the report of the Roberts Commission: "It seems that a sense of security resulted due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles and in the public press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East." May we have your opinion on that general statement?

A. Well, I have stated that I thought, from the information we had, that the blow would most likely fall in the Far East. I have also stated that it was a possibility that it might fall elsewhere. I have also stated that I thought we should be on guard not only in Hawaii but in the Canal and on the West Coast ports. I have also stated that I was surprised at the attack on Hawaii. I did not expect—or, at least, I had not anticipated—the Japs' striking all

the way across the Pacific from the Kra Peninsula to and including Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, there was the possibility and if the possibility existed, I felt that we should be on guard against it, and it was for that reason I sent these dispatches for action to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific as well as to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic. We could not say the attack would not develop there, but the evidence we had pointed to its being much farther to the westward.

137. Q. What do you mean exactly by the term "on guard"? Mentally alert or physically equipped and ready to prevent damage?

A. My feeling was indicated when I sent those words "war warning," and I pondered over that sentence whether they should be on the lookout for an attack, that it might come.

138. Q. Since there was a deficiency in materiel, equipment, and trained personnel, wouldn't considerable damage have been done in spite of their being on the lookout, other things being equal?

A. An air raid once started is awfully difficult to stop. It is almost certain that some of it is bound to get through. On the other hand, if Army fighters had had a chance at that raid coming in, I feel that it would have been considerably less effective than it was. I was surprised at the effectiveness of that raid.

139. Q. In that connection, if they had received three hours' advance information as to the possibility of a raid, your theory would have proved correct; is that possible?

A. If they had had word which convinced them that an air raid was coming in and that it was a probability three hours before, I feel that the story might have been very different, assuming, of course, they took action.

[799] 140. Q. By saying that the story might have been different you do not mean that there would have been no damage?

A. No, I do not. I covered that in a previous answer. A raid once started in force is very difficult to stop a hundred per cent.

141. Q. It would be impossible even now to estimate what the difference might have been?

A. Yes.

142. Q. Admiral, although we have used the word "possibility" many times in this connection, is it not a fact—and if it is not, the court would like to have an expression of opinion from you—that your opinion and the opinion of practically all official Washington was that the attack would not be in Hawaii but would be in the southern Asiatic waters?

A. Well, I hesitate to say about all official Washington.

143. Q. Well, those with whom you conferred?

A. Yes, I think that is probably true. There may have been certain individuals who held the possibility of an attack on Hawaii greater than others, but, generally speaking, I think your statement is true.

144. Q. Did your opinion and the opinions which you had accumulated here have any bearing on your not picking up the telephone on the 7th of December and telephoning the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific?

A. Not the slightest. I simply didn't think of it.

145. Q. In other words, you trusted the Army message completely?

A. Yes. You will recall I asked Marshall if he could get it through very quickly, and he said, "Yes, I can get it through just as quickly

as you can." I let it go. The telephone is purely hind sight with me as to wherein I was wrong that I didn't do more to alert them. If the blow had not fallen at 1300 on the 7th, we probably would not have thought of it. We would have had the dates of the 25th and the 29th, but here is something, looking back on it now, that did hook up, and we thought there was that possibility, and I regret that I did not pick up the telephone, regardless of secrecy, as things have turned out, and notified them.

146. Q. And paralleled it with Naval radio?

A. I regret that.

147. Q. That is all post Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

[800] 148. Q. The things you are expressing now?

A. Yes, it is all hind sight, and it is a search of my own conscience as to what I might have done.

149. Q. Did you confer with the Secretary of the Navy on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, at any time?

A. I think not. Of course, I saw him later on all day. I don't remember just what time I saw him. The time there in that whole picture is a little confused except for the message to which we had just referred as to when I saw the Colonel and acquainted him with what we had or what we had done and what had happened.

150. Q. You do not remember whether you discussed your conversation with Marshall with the Secretary prior to the attack?

A. No, I don't definitely. I assume if the Colonel came in, I told him, because I kept him rather fully posted.

151. Q. Did you discuss it with the Under Secretary or see him here?

A. I don't recall his being here in the morning. Everybody came in after 1300.

152. Q. Did you consider the advisability or otherwise of keeping the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet informed in detail of the progress of events and of allowing him to evaluate the information for his own purposes rather than to give him a comprehensive statement based upon your own evaluation, upon which an interpretation different from your own might be placed?

A. No, I didn't. It was our job to evaluate. He had his own job, and we sent him a mass of stuff which was coming in here for him to sift out. I didn't consider it. I thought it was the Department's job. I endeavored to keep him informed of what I thought would be most useful to him in the main trend.

153. Q. Is it not correct, recognized military procedure to furnish commanders in the field with full information rather than mere evaluation?

A. Well, I don't know. It was not here.

154. Q. The idea being, of course, that the man on the spot is the best judge of the relation of the information in its application to his circumstances.

A. Well, we left it to the man on the spot as to what to do after we had given him the picture as we saw it, and we thought the picture we gave was sound. Subsequent events proved them to have been pretty sound.

[810] 155. Q. Is it or is it not a fact that at no time during the year 1941 did the United States have at its disposal sufficient

trained personnel and war equipment to meet a possible threat in one ocean much less simultaneously in both?

A. That is correct, and on that basis as to what we had WPL 46 was drawn.

156. Q. Wasn't the training program which was in effect in both oceans part of an effort to rectify this deficiency?

A. Yes, I think everything possible was being done afloat. I had perfect confidence in all three commanders-in-chief afloat.

157. Q. The court understands that after sending your so-called "war warning" message of November 27 you sent no directive as to action to be taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Did you consider that he was already authorized to suspend training operations in his discretion and that such suspension was justified in the light of existing circumstances and in view of the existing deficiencies elsewhere?

A. I did after that warning. As far as I was concerned, anything he wanted to do was all right, unless he sent me something of which the Department might have disapproved. As far as I was concerned, he had a free hand.

The court then, at 12:25 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[802] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, and an interested party, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the court (Continued):

158. Q. Admiral, you stated this morning in reply to a question about shifting the Fleet from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco, during this very critical period, the latter part of November 1941, that this was out of the cards. We presume insofar as you are concerned; but you added, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific had authority to shift the Fleet, is that correct?

A. Well, I didn't mean to convey by that that he had the authority to come to the West Coast. I meant that he had a free hand in what to do with the Fleet in the Hawaiian area. I would have considered that he wanted to come to the West Coast he would have asked permission.

159. Q. But in view of the conditions existing at that time, you didn't consider the shifting of the Fleet; is that correct?

A. I did not consider shifting the Fleet to the West Coast; that is correct.

160. Q. Was there any discussion as to the shift?

A. I think not.

161. Q. I think this is clear in the record, but just to repeat, perhaps, when this message of 27 November was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific—the message that you called the "war warning message", and a similar message was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaii—

the Commanding General in answer to that stated that he was on Alert No. 1, and that, in other words, his reply showed Alert No. 1 was alert against sabotage. Did you have any knowledge of this reply or did you discuss that with any Army official as to the interpretation that the Commanding General, Hawaii, had placed on this message?

A. I had no knowledge of it until after December 7.

162. Q. In the light of existing circumstances, existing at the time of the critical period between 27 November and [803] 7 December 1941, it is possible a wholesale exodus of the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor might be interpreted by the Japanese as an aggressive move on the part of the United States, and possibly precipitated action by the Japanese?

A. It might have been so considered, and it might have precipitated action.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

163. Q. Admiral, you were asked this morning whether or not you considered the note of November 26, that was handed by the State Department to the Japanese a very important note, and you answered, "Yes." Now when you were explaining to the court whether you meant by that it was an important note in the sense that it meant negotiations with Japan were continuing, or was it important in the sense that it indicated that this was a final clearance of the record; what was it you meant?

A. What I meant was that it indicated the final clearance of the record.

164. Q. With respect to the movement of planes to Wake by carrier, concerning which you had sent the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific about the same time as the war warning dispatch was sent, isn't it true that the planes which were being ferried to Wake were twelve fighter planes, and that it didn't necessarily require that any of the carrier's complement be left behind at Pearl Harbor?

A. It is true—that is, twelve carrier planes, and in my reply this morning I said I wasn't sure, and am not now, if any reduction was made in the carrier's planes. The twelve fighters could have been used as fighters. I doubted if they displaced very much, if anything. They may actually have added to the carrier's complement, and to that extent I would say probably did not weaken her in any way.

165. Q. Did you consider the trip of the carrier to Wake in any way impaired the ability of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to carry out long-range reconnaissance?

A. No.

166. Q. Admiral, did you see the Secretary of the Navy after the attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941?

A. I did.

167. Q. Did you see him during the days intervening between Sunday, December 7, 1941, and his investigation trip to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

168. Q. You are familiar with the information that on [804] 7 December, the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State at 1300, for the purpose of delivering a note, are you not?

A. Yes.

169. Q. At any time on Sunday, December 7, after the attack, or at any time during the period intervening between that time and his trip to Pearl Harbor, did the Secretary of the Navy ever mention to you his having received on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, at the State Department, a memorandum of this information concerning the Japanese Ambassador asking for a conference, and did he ever mention to you that there was pinned to this memorandum a note to the effect that 1300 was dawn at Pearl Harbor or midnight at Manila, and that an air raid on Pearl Harbor was indicated within a few hours?

A. He did not.

170. Q. Did he ever say anything to you which might have indicated that he had such information prior to the attack on 7 December?

A. No, he never did, and I feel reasonably certain that had he had such information, he certainly would have acquainted me with it. Moreover, I feel that if he had the information, he would have probably asked me why I didn't act on it. Colonel Knox didn't mince words, and if that information had been available to us at that time and not sent to Pearl Harbor, I think he would have impressed it on me in a way that I never would have forgotten it.

171. Q. Between 7 December and the time he left for Pearl Harbor, or any time after that?

A. Yes.

172. Q. Along the same line, Admiral, I'd like to read from the record page 566, question 182, and 183:

182. Q. Specifically, did the deficiency in information which the Navy Department was furnishing him have any effect on what actions he took or might have taken with respect to possible action by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area?

A. Yes. I would like to state, for example, that a few days after Pearl Harbor the late Secretary of the Navy Knox arrived in Pearl Harbor to conduct an investigation. He was with Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and I believe Admiral Bloch all morning. I wasn't there, but I was invited to join them at 12 o'clock for lunch. After I arrived I believe I remember the exact words of Secretary Knox. Present at this conference were Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Pye, Admiral Bloch, General Short, Captain Beatty, who was aide to the Secretary, and I. Secretary Knox said, "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" We all answered in the [805] negative. He stated, "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th." 1 p. m. in Washington was about 7:30 in Pearl Harbor, shortly before the attack. He said, "I know that that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." Now, had we had that information on Saturday, the 6th of December, it would have been very valuable. The Army received that message on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor. The Navy never did receive it. The Commander-in-Chief had no message on the order of that mentioned by Secretary Knox.

183. Q. Did Secretary Knox say when this information first became available?

A. My recollection is on Saturday, the 6th of December.

Did Secretary Knox ever mention to you the fact that he knew on the 6th of December, as distinguished from the 7th of December when you first learned of this message, the fact that he knew that the Japanese Ambassador was to ask for an appointment with the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock Sunday?

A. He did not.

173. Q. Do you feel that if he had had that information, he would have brought it to your attention?

A. I certainly feel that he would have.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

174. Q. Referring to one of the questions asked you, Admiral, did you know whether or not the report that General Short made to the War Department subsequent and as a result of the message to him under date of 27 November was ever sent to the Navy Department—in particular, the War Plans Division of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. No, I don't. My earliest recollection of that is at the time of the Roberts Commission.

175. Q. You said this morning in substance that if the Army had had more fighter planes in the air Sunday, 7 December, the results of the Jap attack might have been mitigated to some extent?

A. That's right.

176. Q. On the 26th of November, in a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific—this dispatch is Exhibit 18 in the record—you stated: "OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and [806] a similar number at Wake, provided you consider this feasible and desirable." When you sent that message, when you took the action stated in this message, did you have in mind the possibility of the effect of more pursuit planes to which you made reference this morning?

A. The answer I made this morning was that if the Army had word that an attack was coming in and if they had used the fighters they had to intercept it, that the damage resulting from the Jap attack would probably have been far less.

177. Q. Diminution of the number of fighters that they had had by fifty would have reduced the effectiveness of their defense, would it not?

A. If the planes had been taken from Oahu without replacement, it would have.

The proceedings following, pages 807 through 808, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[809] Examined by the court:

186. Q. Referring to this memorandum which has been mentioned in testimony here which the Secretary of the Navy had, noting that 1 o'clock, 1 p. m., was dawn at Honolulu and midnight in Manila, did you discuss this, or did this fact come to you, or did you consider this fact on Sunday morning, December 7?

A. Taking the first part of your question, yes. I never heard of the memorandum until my present visit to Washington. Of course, when we talked of the possible coincidence of 1300 with an attack, although the message contained nothing regarding an attack or where it would fall, naturally I made a quick mental guess of what time it would be in Pearl Harbor, which was 0730.

187. Q. But this did not influence your decision to confer with Admiral Kimmel as soon as possible?

A. By telephone, no, it did not. I didn't think of the telephone. We thought only in terms of the radio. I say, "we." I did not, and nobody else mentioned telephone to me.

188. Q. These questions are in order to clear the record. In previous testimony, when this note of the 26th of November—the note of

the Secretary of State to the Japanese—was handed to the Japanese, this question was asked you—were you familiar with this note? You said in substance, “this is the first time I have ever heard of this note.” This is the note from the United States Government to Japan. It seems now the statement has been made that you considered this note as more or less the final culmination of these negotiations.

A. Well, since then my attention has been called to the note and I have read it and I now know all about it. At the time the question was asked me, I hadn’t seen it and did not know about it. I also believe that I stated that the general tenor of it might have been discussed with me, as a result of the question you asked me this morning regarding Admiral Schuirmann, but when the question was first asked me, I want to make it plain—I did not recall it.

189. Q. The question was asked, having knowledge of the testimony in which you were shown the note and asked to read it, and after you had read the note, you said, “No,” you had no knowledge of it, and this was the first time you had any knowledge of it—and that is why this question was asked—in order to clear the record.

A. Well, it was certainly the first time I had ever read it.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to [810] examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as interested party.

The court then, at 2:25 p. m., took a recess until 2:35 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Latchat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

[811] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

The proceedings following, pages 812 through 815, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[815-A] The court then, at 2:45p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., August 31, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

AUGUST 31, 1944.

[816]

TWENTY-THIRD DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, and his counsel.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-second day of the inquiry was read and approved.

One of counsel for an interested party was called as a witness, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Royal E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the year 1941?

A. I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations until the last two or three days of 1941. I do not recall the date on which I was detached as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, what duties had been assigned you by law, regulation, or superior authority?

A. There were no duties assigned to the Assistant Chief [817] of Naval Operations by law or by regulation. The duties of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations were prescribed in Office Orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. They were also described in a general order which established the Joint Board, of which the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations was a member. The duties prescribed in the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations I have not seen for some time, so I cannot quote them exactly, but in general they required the heads of the different divisions of Operations to take up matters of policy with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations. He had general charge of the administration of the Office of Chief of Naval Opera-

tions. In carrying out those duties, during the time that I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I endeavored to relieve the Chief of all of the details and onerous part of his duties that I could. Once he had established a policy, I endeavored to carry out the details, to sign correspondence in regard to it, to release dispatches in regard to it. However, if anything came in of which I thought he should have knowledge, I told him about it.

4. Q. Did you also act in an advisory capacity to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, the Chief of Naval Operations often asked my advice, and on many occasions I considered it necessary to offer advice.

5. Q. Generally speaking, to what extent do you feel you knew what matters were transacted in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I knew in a general way what was being transacted in all of the sections of Operations.

6. Q. In matters which mutually concerned the State Department and the Navy Department, did you feel that you were in general familiar with what was going on?

A. In general, yes.

7. Q. Were you familiar with the sources of information available to the Chief of Naval Operations on political and military matters as they related to Japan?

A. In regard to political matters, I knew that the Chief of Naval Operations had a very close touch with the State Department, both by his personal contact with the Secretary of State, and other officers in the State Department, and through his liaison officer with the State Department, Captain Schuirmann. He received copies of the dispatches received by the State Department from our ambassador in Japan. We also received messages received from secret sources which bore on the political situation. In regard to the military situation, the amount of information regarding the military situation was not very much. For years it had been difficult to obtain any [818] information regarding the military situation, particularly in regard to the naval situation; and in some cases it was almost impossible to obtain the information as to where Japanese ships were. Two units had been set up—I don't know when—one in Cavite, and one in Pearl Harbor, with the object of obtaining information regarding the whereabouts of Japanese ships through radio intelligence and radio direction finders; and that, during the last part of 1941, was practically the only source of information that we had regarding Japanese ships, and it was in many cases not complete. Occasionally we got an intelligence report from the Chinese which gave the location of ships sighted in China, and occasionally we got a bit of information from the British or other nations.

8. Q. Do you feel that you were acquainted as a matter of general principle with this information when it arrived in the Navy Department?

A. In regard to the political information, yes. In regard to the military information, no,—I mean naval and military—because the mechanics for obtaining the military information were very complicated and only the results or the estimate made, after the receipt of bearings and analyses of radio traffic had been made, were given from

time to time to the Chief of Naval Operations. Those estimates were usually made in the War Plans Division, which followed the situation as best they could from the more or less meager information which was obtained.

9. Q. Did you see these evaluations or estimates that were finally produced as a result of receiving all this information in the Navy Department from whatever source it might have originated?

A. I don't know that I saw them all. I used to examine the plot in the Ship Movements Division on which the location of Japanese ships and other Axis ships were plotted. Whenever there was a significant move, I believe I was informed by Admiral Turner or by the Office of Naval Intelligence, but I did not see the daily intercepts on which this information was based.

10. Q. Will you state in general what was the method of processing information that came in through these sources or through the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I do not know the details of how the information was handled in the communications office before it was presented to the Director of Naval Intelligence and to the Director of War Plans. As I have stated before, the information, when it was received, was evaluated and prepared in the form of memorandum estimates of the situation and were given to us when there was any significant change of which we should be informed. Also the positions were plotted on the Operations [819] plotting sheet when they knew where anybody was.

11. Q. What I am trying to get at specifically, Admiral, is did you see these final evaluations or estimates after they were made in War Plans or by the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

A. I saw some of the estimates on some occasions. At the Secretary's conferences in the morning, the question of the location and dispositions of the Japanese Fleet, the German and Italian Fleet, as we knew it, were sometimes presented either by the Director of Naval Intelligence—sometimes the Director of War Plans would comment on them. Political developments were discussed at various times. There was no set routine method by which the information, either political or military, was processed daily or at any routine time. It was distributed and given to the officers when there was anything important enough to give.

12. Q. Do you recall Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who appears to have had some liaison duties in this connection?

A. Yes, I recall an officer who had liaison duties in this connection, and I believe the officer who used to bring messages to me was Lieutenant Kramer.

13. Q. How did the Chief of War Plans Division assist the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of the Chief of Naval Operations' duties?

A. The duties of the Director of the War Plans Division are enumerated in the Office Orders to which I have referred. From memory, the orders required the office of War Plans, as a primary duty, to prepare war plans, to review the contributory plans which were submitted to the commanders of fleets and naval districts. The Director of War Plans was also a member of the Joint Board. Admiral Turner, who was then Captain, who was the Director of

War Plans, conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval Operations on both the political situation and on the military-naval situation as he saw it, and kept him advised.

14. Q. Do you know whether the War Plans Division maintained a current estimate of the situation as it related to the Japanese-United States relations?

A. It made a current estimate, or it kept a current estimate of the military-political situation. To what extent it kept a political estimate my recollection is not so good, except that I do recall that Admiral Turner conferred frequently with Admiral Stark on the political situation, also accompanied him to various conferences from time to time in the State Department, on the political situation. In general, you can say that the War Plans Division did keep in touch with the political situation.

[820] 15. Q. As you look back on these circumstances and these estimates, how do you characterize them from the standpoint of their accuracy and helpfulness to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. As I stated in answer to a previous question, the military-naval information was meager, and there were sometimes differences in the opinion of the agencies who collected the information. The Navy Department itself had no other means outside of the two agencies for collecting naval information except an occasional dispatch from the British or the Chinese. That information, incidentally, was always available at the same time to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The CNO's contact with the Secretary of State should have given him the most accurate information regarding the political situation that anybody could have had.

16. Q. Do you feel that you were acquainted with the major problems of the Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, as they related to personnel, matériel, and operations?

A. Yes, in a general way, although I was more acquainted with the details of operations than I was with the details of personnel and matériel. I might add in amplification to my answer to the question regarding the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations that I had no original cognizance of any matter, that all original cognizance was taken up by the Chiefs of Sections. I only endeavored to keep in general touch with the whole thing, and to assist the Admiral as I could in taking the load of details off of him.

17. Q. During the period 1 October, say to 7 December 1941, what did you consider to have been the paramount mission of the United States Pacific Fleet?

A. The Pacific Fleet was assigned certain tasks in the current war plan. The war plan, of course, was not to be executed until there was a declaration of war or until a message had been sent executing the war plan. Until that was done the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet, as well as all of the other fleets of the United States, was to prepare to carry out their tasks which were assigned in the plan, which included training and preparation of subordinate plans to carry out the war plan, also getting the ships in the best material condition, making alterations to them to bring them up to date. In general, to prepare for war.

18. Q. Did any development of United States-Japanese relations take place prior to 7 December 1941, which caused a change in this peace time mission that you have just described?

A. From what date?

[821] 19. Q. Any time prior to 7 December of that year,

A. On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to all commanders-in-chief which stated that the diplomatic relations or negotiations with Japan had ceased, that he thought war was imminent, and that dispatch was prefaced by the words, "This is a war warning." From that time on, it seemed to me that the mission of all fleets was to get ready for war—that the training and material preparations were of secondary importance to security and deployment for war.

20. Q. While we all know that the air force of the Pacific Fleet was a part of the Fleet, and what you have previously testified as to the general mission of the Fleet in war time probably did apply as well to aircraft as to ships, but I want to bring out specifically what your opinion was to whether or not the mission of the air force of the Pacific Fleet was any different from that of the ships constituting the fleet?

A. Since the air force of the Pacific Fleet was a part of the Fleet, I consider that in general the tasks of the air force of the Pacific Fleet would have changed in the same manner as the ships, except that there were certain parts of the air force of the Pacific Fleet that were to be used in connection with the coastal defense, or frontier defense, of the Hawaiian District.

21. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, what was your view of the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack on the United States in the Hawaiian area?

A. It was always a possibility.

22. Q. What was your view during this same period of the possibility of a surprise attack on the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. It was a possibility.

23. Q. What was your view at that time of the possibility of a surprise torpedo plane attack on the ships of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. It was a possibility, and it occurred.

24. Q. From your discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations during the latter part of the year 1941, did he express to you at that time his views of the possibility of a surprise torpedo plane attack on ships of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. The first time of which I have any recollection, and of course it is now hindsight, was that a letter was prepared in the War Plans Division of Operations, to the [822] Secretary of War, in which was enumerated the various forms of attack that might be made on the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor, and among those was a torpedo plane attack, a bombing plane attack, and others. Admiral Stark most certainly must have discussed that letter with the Secretary before it was signed, and I do know that there were discussions at Joint Board meetings regarding the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor, subsequent to the time this letter was dispatched and

subsequent to the time that the Secretary of War's reply to the letter was received.

25. Q. Do you know if there was any consensus of opinion in the circle of officers in the responsible positions in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations or in the Navy Department, who had any decided views on the possibility of a surprise torpedo plane attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor about this time, during 1941?

A. I think it was considered by officers in Operations that a torpedo plane attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor was a possibility.

26. Q. Can you recall whether or not this matter was discussed with frequency?

A. I can't remember how often it was discussed, but I do recall that after the receipt of the reply of the Secretary of War there were discussions regarding the security of ships at Pearl Harbor. The thing that I recall most is arguments about balloon barrages and the use of smoke; but I do recall the question of security did come up from time to time—but how often and just when, I do not now remember.

27. Q. Had the question of anti-torpedo nets been discussed in connection with the protection of the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. There was correspondence with the Bureau of Ordnance which was transmitted to the Fleet, regarding torpedo nets and the depth of water in which torpedoes launched from planes could run.

28. Q. Can you recall whether or not the matter of supplying anti-torpedo nets for the protection of ships in Pearl Harbor was pressed by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. Without looking up the correspondence on the matter, I recall at the moment that inquiries were addressed to the Fleet, or possibly to the 14th Naval District, regarding the use of torpedo nets to protect ships moored at Pearl Harbor from airplane torpedoes. At first I believe that the Bureau of Ordnance was of the opinion that the water in [823] Pearl Harbor was too shallow for torpedoes to run, and also there was objection from Pearl Harbor—I do not recall now whether from the Fleet or from the 14th naval district—that torpedo nets were objectionable from the standpoint of making it difficult for ships to get clear of the nets in going out in an emergency, also that they would interfere with the take-off of seaplanes in the very restricted areas of the harbor. I also recall that at some subsequent time the Bureau of Ordnance modified their previous estimate regarding whether or not torpedoes would run in waters as shallow as that in Pearl Harbor; and their second estimate was more or less to the nature that it was possible for torpedoes to be launched successfully, provided they had a sufficient distance to run in which to arm themselves. I can't be definite on these things, because I haven't examined the correspondence recently.

The proceedings following, pages 824 through 842, inclusive, have, by direction of the Court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[843] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

118. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not there was a scrambler telephone in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations which connected with the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the period between 27 November and 7 December, 1941?

A. I have no knowledge that there was any telephone of that character installed in the Chief of Naval Operations office on or prior to December 7th. So far as I know of my own knowledge the scrambler telephones were not connected with Fleet commanders until sometime after the first of January.

119. Q. Were there any so-called scrambler telephone facilities in Washington which would have been available to the Chief of Naval Operations had he desired to call the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor?

A. I understood that the War Department was connected with scrambler telephones with all of their Department commanders overseas and with their principal commanders within the United States. Whether they were corps area commanders or Army commanders, I am not certain.

120. Q. Would you tell the court whether or not you considered this means of communication a secure means of communication?

A. I have a scrambler telephone on my flagship at the present time and have had since early in 1942. I was informed, in regard to its use, that it would probably defy an amateur but that an expert could read the scrambled telephone conversation without difficulty.

121. Q. Do you know whether or not you or Admiral Stark, or both of you, had information of this type with respect to scrambler equipment before 7 December 1941? That is, specifically, did you have any information bearing on the security of the facilities between the War Department and the Commanding General in the Hawaiian Area?

A. The exact moment at which I learned that a scrambler telephone was not a secure means of transmission I have forgotten. I probably knew it when I was in Washington.

122. Q. Do you recall whether the Office of Chief of Naval Operations made use of scrambler facilities much at that time?

A. As far as I know, the Navy Department did not install scrambled telephones until sometime early in 1942.

123. Q. And didn't make use of the War Department's facilities at that time?

A. So far as I know, Admiral Stark did not, prior to December 7th or prior to my detachment, use the scrambled telephone in the War Department. Whether anybody else in [844] the Navy Department used it, I don't know.

124. Q. Admiral, I hand you Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46, and ask you to refer to Articles 3721 and 3722, and to read those two articles to the court?

A. (Reading):

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2;

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan.

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task.

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

125. Q. I refer you now to Page 7, Articles 0222 and 0223, and will ask you to read those two articles to the court. That is Exhibit 4, which is WPL-46.

A. (Reading) :

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. [845] 0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof.

126. Q. Referring to Article 0222. Would you explain why it was that mobilization of the Fleet was not ordered prior to 7 December 1941?

A. There were two principal reasons why mobilization, according to the provisions of this plan, was not directed prior to the 7th of December. One was, as stated in the subsequent part of the plan, the Fleet was practically mobilized during the latter part of 1941. Every ship that could be gotten ready was being commissioned, and as far as ships and planes were concerned, the Fleet was mobilized as much as it could be. There was another very definite reason, and that was the one to which I have referred before, that this government did not wish to take any action which could be construed as an overt act by this government leading to war, and mobilization has always been recognized as one of the steps preliminary to war and that usually prior to a declaration of war. There are also some other reasons. There were certain provisions which could not be carried out legally until war was declared.

127. Q. Referring, then, to Article 0223 on the same page. Would you explain the reasons for not executing WPL-46 in part prior to 7 December 1941, or not ordering the execution of WPL-46 in part prior to 7 December?

A. I can't now think of any reasons why it should not have been done. On the other hand, I can think of no reason why it should have been done. May I amplify that by saying that I can think of no technical or mechanical reasons so far as putting the Plan in operation was concerned as to why it should not have been done, nor can I think of any reason why it should have been done. The reasons for not directing the mobilization or a partial mobilization were, as I have stated in the answer to the previous question, the Fleet was already mobilized for all practical purposes, and the other reason for not ordering the mobilization was political.

128. Q. Admiral, do you think that the plan as it was written was designed for partial execution? Perhaps I can state what I am driving at in a different way. Do you think that the war warning dispatch was more likely to get the results which the Chief of Naval Operations wanted than would an order to partially execute WPL-46?

A. The intent of the war warning dispatch was to place everybody on the alert and to indicate to them that the Chief of Naval Operations then considered that war was imminent.

[846] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

129. Q. Who prescribed the policy, Admiral, that the first overt act should rest with the Japanese?

A. I'm quite certain that that was a policy of the State Department, but whether they received their directive from a higher authority I am unable to state.

130. Q. Was that policy of not having the United States commit any overt act, or the first overt act, related in any way to the lack of dissemination of some information to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I think not. I think the reason is the same reason as I have stated before, viz, to keep the record clear and to put the onus for the declaration of war on the Japanese.

131. Q. I'm afraid you didn't quite get the question, Admiral. Was this policy of extra-ordinary caution that the United States not commit the first overt act in any way related to the fact of not disseminating certain information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I don't see any connection.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

132. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibits 54, 55, 45 and 49, and ask you if those are the letters that you were speaking about in your direct testimony on the subject of torpedo nets? Are those the letters that you had reference to this morning?

A. Yes, they are the letters to which I referred.

133. Q. Just one other question. In WPL-46, Sections 0221 and 0222, Exhibit 4, it is also provided that a preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. No such orders were given during the period up to December 1941, were they?

A. The period of strained relations had been going on for a long time. It was getting worse. On October 16, when the dispatch regarding the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was sent to the three commanders-in-chief, that dispatch contained these words, "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." The dispatch of November 27th stated, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." I consider that those two directives taken together constitute the part of 0221 which states that "certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations."

[847] 134. Q. You were not familiar at the time, were you, Admiral, with what Admiral Stark wrote on, I think, the 17th of October as to his interpretation of the October 16th message which he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I saw some of Admiral Stark's personal letters to the various commanders-in-chief. Whether I saw that particular letter before

it was sent, or a short time after it was sent, I do not now recall. The first definite information of seeing that letter was since I have been counsel for Admiral Stark. I probably did see it.

Examined by the court:

135. Q. If the correspondence in question were handed you—it now being Exhibit 38 before the court—will you kindly read the reference to Admiral Bloch's question?

A. It is the second paragraph of the October 17th letter to Admiral Kimmel, from Admiral Stark, Exhibit 38 in evidence (reading):

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by the court (Continued):

136. Q. Admiral, you have spoken of the areas of possibility of attack. In fact, if we remember correctly, in a part of your testimony you said that an attack on Hawaii was possible. Now, referring again to this war warning: Did you or the Office of Operations think that an air attack or other form of attack was probable on Hawaii or Oahu?

A. Answering first for myself, I did not think that an air attack on Hawaii was probable. I did think that whenever war came and regardless of how it was precipitated, that there would be numerous submarines around Hawaii, on the line of communications between Hawaii and the West Coast, possibly on the West Coast, and I expected that there might be raids against the outlying islands in the 14th Naval District.

[848] 138. Q. In view of this, Admiral, did you think that the probable attack, if any, in the Hawaiian area and especially Pearl Harbor, would be confined to an attack other than that of air?

A. I did not expect that the attack on Pearl Harbor or Oahu would be an air attack. I expected that any attack that might be made on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian group would be other forms of attack—submarines, or raid by surface forces.

138. Q. You have spoken of conferences in the Secretary's office relative to the political as well as naval situation vis a vis Japan. Do you remember if in any of these conferences the question of unity of command of Hawaii was brought up?

A. No. Questions of that kind would ordinarily not have been brought up at a gathering of this kind, because here gatherings were purely for the purpose of acquainting those present with the political and military situation, and they included such officers as the heads of bureaus and others who had nothing whatever to do with questions of that kind. I think it was not the proper place to bring that up.

139. Q. We are not referring to that specific type of conference, but we understood that from time to time you were in on conferences with the Secretary and Chief of Operations regarding the general situation; is that correct?

A. When I spoke of conferences in the Secretary's office, I referred without exception to the morning conference which was held for the benefit of everybody in the Department. I was not referring to a special conference for a particular purpose.

140. Q. Well, at any time was this question of unity of command ever discussed by the Chief of Operations with you as to a possible action of placing unity of command in effect in Hawaii?

A. I recall no conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Secretary was present, where that subject was discussed. In drawing up the war plans, there had always been the question of command relations as between the Army and Navy. I think the Navy would have agreed to unity of command in any area had it been vested in the Navy, and the Army would have agreed to unity of command in any area had it been vested in the Army, but I don't know of any occasion where those two points of view could have been reconciled. I am certain that the Navy would not have agreed to unity of command in the Hawaiian area under the Army.

141. Q. Are you familiar with the Army and Navy Joint plans for defense of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor?

A. Do you mean the provisions in Joint Army and Navy action, or do you mean the specific subordinate plans which were prepared in accordance with the war plan?

[849] 142. Q. No, Joint Navy and Army action.

A. Yes, I am familiar in a general way with that.

143. Q. In that plan, who do you consider was responsible for the defense of Oahu and Pearl Harbor?

A. May I read from the pertinent parts?

144. Q. I am asking your opinion.

A. There is no question about it. The Army was responsible, under Joint Army and Navy action, for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base.

145. Q. Admiral, you stated this morning, referring to the war warning dispatch of November 27, that after this war warning dispatch was sent, that you considered that this dispatch of 27 November changed the status in that training and materiel were secondary to training for war; is that correct?

A. As I recall the question, it was phrased in this manner—was there anything after the 27th of November which changed the mission of the Pacific Fleet? I do not think that is the meaning that I intended to convey.

146. Q. In general, then, if I may put it another way, did you think this dispatch of 27 November, having been sent, would change the general policy of the Fleet in its training, as existed prior to the receipt of this dispatch?

A. I considered that the receipt of that dispatch would require additional tasks by the Fleet; that is, security of itself, readiness for any eventuality, and to that extent training or other readiness might have to suffer to some extent. I do not wish to give the impression that all training should have stopped or all efforts to increase the

materiel readiness of the ships should necessarily stop; but in order to do things of that kind, the training which had been carried out might have to suffer to some degree.

147. Q. Do you consider that the dispatch of OpNav to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, as of October 16, implied the same in that regard as this war warning message?

A. The dispatch of October 16 had directed the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to make certain dispositions and it is my recollection that he informed the Chief of Naval Operations of what dispositions he had made and which were considered satisfactory.

148. Q. But did you consider after November 27 that additional measures should be taken, in addition to what he had already reported?

A. I considered that after November 27, that any measures necessary to be on guard against any eventuality—that is of security of the Fleet—were then of primary importance; and those measures applied not only to the [850] Pacific Fleet but the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets as well.

149. Q. Did not the war warning message enjoin the assumption of a state of readiness to conduct offensive operations in accordance with WPL-46?

A. That dispatch stated: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." There were numerous tasks assigned in WPL-46, some of which were offensive, and some of which were defensive.

150. Q. Would you expand the meaning of the term, "defensive deployment"?

A. If I may read from the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet, the following tasks are defensive in character:

- e. Defend Samoa in category "D".
- f. Defend Guam in category "F".
- g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

That last phrase might be considered as offensive. Another task was to (reading):

- h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
- i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces.
- k. Route shipping of associated powers within the Fleet coastal zones.

All of those tasks are defensive in character. The deployment to carry them out would have been the movement of the ships to carry out those tasks.

151. Q. But they do involve movement of ships. The word "deployment" involves that.

A. But also for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, it might require the stationing of patrols or the moving of aircraft squadrons to outlying islands, the stationing of submarines to detect the enemy's approach. All of such things might be termed "defense deployment."

152. Q. Admiral, on the morning of 7 December, was there any discussion as to 1 p. m. of that date being dawn at [851] Honolulu and midnight in Manila?

A. I do not recall any discussion regarding time until after we had received word that the attack had been delivered on Pearl Harbor, and then figured out what time it had been delivered.

153. Q. Do you remember about the hour that Admiral Stark entered his office on the morning of 7 December?

A. I do not remember the exact hour.

154. Q. Do you know the approximate time that he came in?

A. No, I do not remember the time that he arrived at the Department that morning.

155. Q. Referring to this note of November 26, which the Secretary of State is supposed to have handed the Japanese representatives, were you familiar with that note at that time, or immediately subsequent thereto? This note was presenting the position of the United States to any future agreement.

A. On November 27, a dispatch was sent to the commanders of all fleets stating that negotiations with the Japanese had terminated. I presume, without a definite recollection of what transpired—I do not know that I was told in detail what had transpired—I believe that dispatch was sent because of the delivery of the Secretary's note to the Japanese, which could not be accepted by the Japanese. I am not able to determine how much of it I knew at the moment and how much of it I have learned since. I cannot differentiate between my knowledge of the two times.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel to an interested party.

The court then, at 2:15 p. m., adjourned until 10:15 a. m., Saturday, September 2, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 2, 1944.

[852]

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., September 2, 1944.

The court met at 10:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Commander Harold Bieseimer, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-third day of the inquiry was read and approved.

The court then, at 10:20 a. m., took a recess until 10:25 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present duty.

A. George C. Marshall, General, Chief of Staff of the Army.

2. Q. What was your station and duty during the year 1941?

A. Washington, Chief of Staff of the Army.

[853] 3. Q. How long have you been performing this duty?

A. Since the first of July, 1939.

4. Q. Were you acquainted with the professional qualifications of Major General Short, who was assigned to the duty of Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during the year 1941?

A. Yes.

5. Q. What was your estimate of his qualifications for the position he held?

A. Very superior officer.

6. Q. As Chief of Staff during the year 1941, had the military problems connected with the defense of Oahu and Pearl Harbor been brought to your attention?

A. They had.

7. Q. General, I am going to show you Exhibit 9, which is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, under date of January 24, 1941. This letter sets forth the Navy's view regarding some of the major problems connected with the defense of Pearl Harbor. I ask you, were you made familiar with the contents of this letter shortly after its receipt in the War Department?

A. Actually, I returned from one of my inspection trips the morning the letter came over my desk, with the proposed reply to be submitted to the Secretary of War. The reply was not satisfactory to me, for the reason that it offered no help for some time to come; and I felt, speaking very frankly, that the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in view of our tremendous shortages, was putting the Secretary of War in a very embarrassing position, and that under the circumstances we had to do something drastic to meet the situation. Therefore, I started in that morning, on my return, in relation to this letter, to see what things we might do without too ruinous results elsewhere. Do you wish me to go ahead?

8. Q. Yes, sir, go ahead, General.

A. I talked to General Arnold about the air part of the requirements; and at that time they had in Hawaii a small number of planes—50 fighter planes that were quite obsolete of vintage, and only 10 P-36's, which while more than an obsolete plane today and inferior to Japanese planes of that date, was the best we had, largely, in our air service. We arranged to take from our squadrons in the United States 36 of these planes, which reduced most of our fighter squadrons, if not all of them, down to two or three planes. That is my recollection at the time; and to that extent almost stopped training. I talked to Admiral Stark over the telephone [853-A]—I had to find out if we could get a carrier to take these planes out, because we had to take them down, pack them, and ship them, and it was the definite procedure. This occurred, as I recall, about the first week in February, 1941. I might add that we had a more modern plane, a P-40, but it was inadvisable to send out that because it had some deficiency in the engine which was producing a great many forced landings, and they thought that it would be a bad plan to have them in Hawaii with the over-water work, and they would have too many losses for peacetime operations. Some P-36's were sent on this carrier, which also took some marine equipment and some other equipment, and brought the Hawaiian Department at that time in February up to fifty P-36 planes. Further, I had General Arnold see the president of the Curtiss Plane Company, which was making the P-40's, and was bringing out a more modern, reliable-type, and he had him down here to see if they could turn out these planes at an earlier date than was then on the schedule. Whoever was the head of the Curtiss plant at the time did not feel that they could change the production program. When General Arnold reported this, I had him go to Buffalo and see the Curtiss people personally, and talk to a number of men in the plant as well as, of course, the president. They put on a sort of inspirational campaign there and moved their program up, I think, four weeks, maybe five. Meanwhile, I talked to Admiral Stark about an additional carrier, and he had, I think some naval requirements in relation to a carrier

if it came to the coast, and a particular time when it had to come if it was to come, which was March 15. Therefore our deadline at the Curtiss Plant was March 9, and they made it. We got the planes to San Diego and sent out these, the first of our most modern fighter planes, the P-40. I think it was 50 of these planes. However, that may be determined by the record. Furthermore, we went into the question of additional material—anti-aircraft, that nature. The reply of the Secretary of War gives what we said could be done in that relation. Now regarding the entire matter, at that time Hawaii was far and away the most heavily provided installation of ours in or out of the country, for defense. It had had first priority in the Army for years, and as to the number of troops and as to equipment, it was far beyond anything else we had. We had nothing in Alaska, and we were trying to provide something for Anchorage vicinity and Kodiak Island, and the Panama defenses were very seriously deficient. I would say off-hand if Hawaii was measured at that time as 100%, Panama was about 20%; so we had, aside from our commitments in the United States, to build up in Panama, and to make a complete start in Alaska. Along with that, a matter that pertains to this and was one of the personnel factors, was the fact that if we took this matériel away nobody could train; therefore, there was no expansion. Therefore we couldn't create units. Our great dilemma at that time was taking away the fighter planes, we couldn't have combat fighter training adequate to the needs. When we put additional aircraft into Hawaii, we, [854] denied ourselves a very large training base for the tremendous expansion of some, I think, about 5000% that we were confronted with, so it was not only the ordinary consideration of availability of equipment, but it was the fact that we couldn't create an Army if we had nothing to train with. Of course, we had the same difficulties with ammunition, and again there we gave to the Navy the priority on the anti-aircraft, because they had to be prepared to go to sea on a moment's notice, which resulted in our own availability being so seriously reduced that we sent our anti-aircraft and some of our other units—particularly anti-aircraft—in the Tunisian campaign, deplorably deficient in their ability to shoot, because they had no ammunition with which to conduct practice in this country, because the priority had to go to the Navy, and those proportions to Great Britain and others to save the various crises throughout the world. All of that related to this letter. Does that answer your question?

9. Q. It does, very well, General. I would like to ask you further, if that takes you up to about the end of the year 1941, so far as the augmenting of aircraft in Hawaii is concerned?

A. There was additional aircraft sent to Hawaii the minute the quantity production came into being. I didn't refer, as I should have in my previous answer, to the fact that in the Philippines we had little or nothing in the way of aircraft. We didn't push the Philippines at all. We denied the Commander in the Philippines increases because we couldn't jeopardize things here at home and Hawaii for something at that distance, and we were also considering the Atlantic side and considering the threat of all the fifth column movement in Latin America, and the approaches of the Germans through Casablanca and Dakar, with ominous forebodings that we had in regard to that region; so we

came to a time between this February period I spoke of and December 1941, when we turned to shipment to the Philippines to try to give them some adequate defense. I think the first materiel shipments of any kind went—were actually started—in about April, and those were some pursuit planes that we got out there, and then we began to send a few other things. It was not until the latter part of August that we started the big planes through to the Philippines—the four-engine bombers—and then we were accumulating supplies to try to put them in a state of defense that would deter Japanese action to the south of the Philippine Archipelago. I might add that it had been the desire—it was pressed by Admiral Stark on several occasions, on numerous occasions—to have us increase the garrison, the strength of our Army, in the Philippines. I think the general expression that I used in declining to agree with him in that action was that what we sent to the Philippines was seed corn, and that left us nothing back here at all—if we sent [855] the regular troops we had literally nothing for any expansion, and we had to send regular troops. There wasn't anything else we could send. We had a great many limitations on personnel at that time, but the main factor was the complete lack of adequate equipment, and until we had quantity production in full blast for a period of time, we were estopped from making these various moves; so this letter from the Secretary of the Navy was a very difficult one for the Secretary of War to answer, as it only related to one place, and that place was the one spot where we had done more during the preceding years than at any other place.

10. Q. You have touched, General, on the subject of antiaircraft guns in the Hawaiian area, and what you did immediately after the receipt of the Secretary of the Navy's letter, Exhibit 9, which you were shown. Would you briefly carry us through the year 1941, of the efforts of the Army to bring its anti-aircraft groups up to requirements?

A. There had been ordered for Hawaii 110 3-inch, 144 37-milimeter, and 516 50-calibre. This project was about four-fifths complete in 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and about one-fifth complete in the lesser calibres, by December 7.

11. Q. State what the general requirements were in the Hawaiian Department for pursuit ships and long-range bombers?

A. The Hawaiian project called for 148 pursuit planes. The Air Force Commander asked for 180 long-range bombers. Our shortages prevented our reaching any such figures. In May, 1941, we had considered the B-17's a major objective. Our records show that on December 7 there were 12 B-17's, 99 P-40's, 46 P-36's—the last two being pursuit planes—in Hawaii. These numbers were attained, to a great extent, by stripping the squadrons in the United States.

12. Q. What service was charged under current orders, plans, and joint agreement, for the defense of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor?

A. The Army was to hold the land, seacoast, and air against attack. The Joint Coastal Frontier Plan of April, 1941, stated the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, should provide for beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor and the Navy and Army installations of Oahu, as well as for anti-sabotage measures and aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands.

13. Q. Can you state what the Navy responsibility was in connection with this plan?

A. The Navy was charged with certain security measures which included the maintenance of long-distance plane patrol and searching operations, establishment of inshore patrol, destroyer patrol, boom patrol; the organization of minesweeping patrol; the organization of an air striking force to search for an attack hostile surface ships; the organization of air defense groups for the control and distribution of anti-aircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

[856] 14. Q. During the year 1941, were there frequent conferences between yourself and Admiral Stark on questions affecting the defenses in the Hawaiian area?

A. Yes.

15. Q. What can you say of the freedom of discussion of these problems and the spirit of cooperativeness between the Army and Navy, as you saw these matters?

A. The discussions were entirely free. The desire, certainly between Admiral Stark and myself, was pronounced along the line of cooperation. At the same time when you came to these things you found within the machine all sorts of difficulties which are inherent in the present organization, with which I am not at all in agreement.

16. Q. What is your knowledge of the spirit of cooperation between the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in relation to military matters of mutual interest in the Hawaiian Department during the year 1941?

A. At my end of the line it appeared that they had an excellent understanding. I have here a letter from General Short, of February 1941, to me personally. He says: "Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both approachable and cooperative in every way. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and aircraft." On the 14th of April, again, "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our air and antiaircraft defense." Now, that letter I replied to on May 5, "It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation." Later, reporting on recent maneuvers, General Short stated in a letter on May 29, "The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise.

17. Q. In the light of all you now know, have you any criticism to offer of this cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?

A. I know of nothing. I might say in that connection that when that tragedy occurred, my whole attention was turned to other things from that instant, and I didn't see a record or look at a thing until, as a matter of fact, the last day or two, trying to get something for this board—so I haven't probed into the matter. I was busy with something [857] else. That was water over the dam.

18. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, and I mean by that, say the last three or four months prior to that time, what was the state of development of the aircraft warning system in the Army in Hawaii? I mean as judged by present standards.

A. The equipment was the best available, and has not been greatly improved since. I make that statement with some hesitancy. It was provided for me, and I assume it is correct. Twelve detector stations were projected for the Hawaiian Department; three fixed and six mobile had been shipped by December 7, 1941. I have not the dates of the arrival of the installations, but the structures in which they were to be installed were under the urgent requirement of being completed in June. It should be easily possible to obtain the dates of the receipt and installation in the Hawaiian Department, or here in the War Department. With further reference to the matter of radar, or the air warning service. In August of 1940 the War Department approved a plan for complete air warning service for Hawaii, for five mobile and three fixed stations, which was later increased to six mobile and six fixed stations, the increase being agreed to on May, 1941. Preliminary arrangements in 1940, looking toward installation of the detector stations, were going forward when General Short took command on February 7, 1941. On March 6, General Short, in a personal letter, emphasized the need for expedition in setting up the aircraft warning service and stated that, "in the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the need for it is now here." He went on to say that difficulty had arisen with the Interior Department in obtaining the authority to set up the detector station in the national park of Halekulai. That particular difficulty was settled in May, 1941, but only after I had personally taken it up with the Interior Department. In preparation for the aircraft warning service in the areas to which it was assigned, a course of instruction in air defense tactics and doctrines was conducted by the Air Defense Command in April, 1941. The course was based upon the lessons learned by observers in England, and on the experience of the Air Defense Command during the exercises in the northern United States in January, 1941, and represented the latest thought on air defense, including air warning service plans and operations. On March 5, 1941, I wrote to General Short stating that I "would appreciate your early view of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with reference to the defense from air attack," and that it was highly material for representatives from Hawaii to be present to observe air defense exercises planned for the west coast in the spring. General Short answered on March 15, outlining the situation in his department in re- [858] gard to air defense in some detail, and stating that he proposed to send both General Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, and General Gardner, Commanding the Hawaiian Coastal Defense, or as alternates their executives. This letter I answered on March 28: "Anti-aircraft and aircraft warning service matériel to meet your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: 16 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, December 1941; 115 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, February 1942, and a blank number of 50-calibre guns." (The number is missing from the record here) "4 SCR No. 268 radar, in April of 1941; 5 SCR No. 270; and 3 SCR No. 271, in April and May 1941. I am hopeful arrange-

ments for materially augmenting your anti-aircraft artillery to provide for full strength of units of armament available to you can be made. Coastal artillery reinforcements will be held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute." I might insert there that as we took them out of the United States, we lost the power of training people. That is the reason we were hesitating between the shipment of it and the proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their executives, to the west coast defense exercises. Due to various reasons the exercises were postponed until Fall.

19. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, had you given any consideration to the matter of effecting unity of command in the Hawaiian area?

A. Yes, almost continuously.

20. Q. Had you discussed the matter with Admiral Stark or other responsible naval officers, and if so, what were the results?

A. We discussed it on a great many occasions, and these discussions usually developed a multiplicity of complications. I recall that I first proposed a unity of command under the Navy in Alaska and the Aleutians, as a first step toward getting straightened out in Hawaii and the Panama Canal. In each case, there were always so many minor objections or complications that we failed to arrive at a decision. I might say always that under unity of command, you can get immediate agreement if the other fellow exercises the command, and that refers to the British and ourselves also; and that is something I have become somewhat of an expert in dealing with all over the world. But it is the minor objections that create the great difficulty, because there are a multiplicity of those. However, in my opinion they were always exceedingly minor, and the great practical factors are hidden behind this screen of complications, suspicions of one service of the other. Stark and I were pretty much in agreement all the time, but in great departments like the War and Navy Department, you don't do things like that by ukase.

21. Q. I refer you to the publication, "Joint Action of Army and Navy 1935," with special reference to section 3, [859] article 31, subparagraph (D), the last sentence of which reads, "Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force." We have had in this court some difficulty of understanding what this General Headquarters Air Force is and what it was to be used for.

A. The G. H. Q. was established in March 1935. It was the air force in the continental United States. In June 1941, when the Army Air Force was created, the G. H. Q. Air Force became the Air Force Combat Command, under the Commanding General of Army Air Forces. It was comparable to the present Army Air Force organization in the United States. I was not here at the time it was created, but the purpose was to bring all the combat air forces together under one control in the continental United States in order to develop efficiency in operations, in maintenance, bombing, and everything of that sort. General Andrews was made the head of it, and created as a beginning, really, the technique of handling large air forces.

22. Q. In the event of an emergency, such as arose in the latter part of 1941, could any of this General Headquarters Air Force have been made immediately available in the Hawaiian area?

A. Well, we were making it available in pieces all the time. We were taking planes from it and we were taking personnel from it, but the air force, as a tactical organization, was a continental United States establishment, and I might say that the grief at the moment was that we were wrecking it for the overseas theaters, and our daily struggle was meeting the recriminations of the commander of G. H. Q., who was being denied the necessary matériel and personnel to operate.

23. Q. Then am I to understand that in case a sudden emergency arose in the Hawaiian theater, it would not be possible to transfer a large part of that force out there in order to meet such an emergency?

A. Not at that time, because they didn't have the planes or the personnel or the state of training. I might add that before the situation in the various parts of the world grew very critical, this was a highly-trained unit, but the minute we started expansion and sending planes here and sending planes there and all, we for the time being largely wrecked the G. H. Q. air force.

24. Q. From your knowledge of the situation as it existed in 1941, at what time during the year, or in reference to what political event, can you state that relationship with Japan approached the critical stage?

A. Well, I would have to answer that, I believe, by saying that our relations with the Japanese appeared to [860] degenerate progressively throughout 1941, as indicated by the succession of actions taken. One of the early decisions of the War Department, and the Navy Department, too, I believe, was to take all of the women and children out of the Philippines. That was in February, I think, of 1941. We did that because of the growing storm in the Pacific. Another was the fact that I succeeded in getting authority to double the size of the Philippine Scouts. That was in January or February, 1941. Another indication was our refusal to permit the men to return home at the end of two years, and to hold them in the Philippines. These things just grew from one period to another, from the indications, which were from a multiplicity of sources.

25. Q. It is the understanding of the judge advocate that your answer is that this situation became progressively worse, and you don't feel able to put your finger on any one event, and say that was the start of a critical situation?

A. Well, I might be correct to say that in July and August the situation became conspicuously critical. That was the time, as I recall, of the enforcement of the economic sanctions against Japan, and apropos of that, on July 7 and again on July 25, the Army Overseas Command was warned of these developments.

26. Q. Can you state whether or not at any time during the year 1941, you felt that war between the United States and the Imperial Japanese Government was imminent?

A. Yes. I thought for some time that war was imminent; and our state of mind in that period—I am referring now to both Stark and myself—was to do all in our power here at home, with the State Department or otherwise, to try to delay this break to the last moment, because of our state of unpreparedness and because of our involvements in other parts of the world.

27. Q. Did you lay any special emphasis, after forming this opinion, on augmenting the defenses in the Hawaiian area?

A. We did everything possible consistent with the meeting of the other demands of greater urgency, such as those of the Philippines, I spoke of, and the Panama Canal and Alaska.

28. Q. As of the time you considered war imminent, what was your estimate of the probable intention of the Japanese, or was that a changing situation?

A. The information that we obtained from the Japanese actions in China, and particularly as they approached Indo-China, as well as from our most secret sources, pointed to an evident intention to move into Thailand, whether to pass on through or whether to pause there was a matter of conjecture. It seemed to us that they were definitely going to take some action to cut the Burma Road, possibly closing the port of Rangoon. It seemed evident to us [361] that Malaysia—the Malay-Kra Peninsula—was very definitely threatened. It was plainly evident to us that they were accumulating supplies to go into Indo-China, and apparently were going into Thailand. We had no specific indications that I recall at the moment, of their intentions regarding the Philippines other than those which automatically suggested themselves to us geographically. I recall that in November, possibly in October, we had reports of movements of convoys down the coast of Indo-China, and as these movements accumulated, it was quite evident they were on the verge of very definite action. I think I am sure the record shows that the Chiefs of Staff, or rather the Joint Board, proposed that any movement of the Japanese out of 10 north would be considered as leading to war, because we felt that if they entered the Gulf of Siam, there could be no other possible interpretation of what they were doing or what they had in mind. As I recall, we had no indication of any Japanese plans in preparation for an assault on Hawaii. I recall that, I think it was in August, that we discovered that all Japanese shipping on the east coast of the United States had been directed to proceed immediately to the Caribbean, through the Panama Canal, certain boats on certain days, and finally sizeable numbers of boats in a very short period of time. Just what that meant we didn't know, of course. Since the canal has been developed we have always thought of sabotage there as being our greatest menace, and this had that possibility connected with it; so the President authorized the closing of the canal to such traffic, and it was closed, the records will show when that was. I don't remember. So there were these various indications, in addition to those that came out of the diplomatic conversations, which plainly indicated a crisis approaching, and which we were most anxious to stall off in some way or other until more equipment, matériel, and trained men, were available. I recall, I think, in early September, Mr. Hull at a meeting with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, at which Admiral Stark and I were present, asked Admiral Stark and I how soon we thought we could be in a sufficiently strong posture of defense in the Philippines. We had just begun to move sizeable quantities of equipment to the Philippines, really, in August; we were just getting started. We were collecting this material as it came from the first quantity production and endeavoring to get the ships to furnish transportation. I gave him a date of either December 5 or December 10, 1941, I have forgotten just which—as being the earliest moment that we could hope to have any reasonable defense. Admiral Stark felt

that on the naval side he couldn't be adequate far into January or early February, 1942. What actually happened, so far as the date that I had hazarded in September, was that two things intervened and very much delayed procedure. One was that heavy bombers, to which we attached great importance at that time—there was a delay in delivering from the plants, but what was far more serious, after they were delivered— [862] and we had 45 to follow the original 35 accumulated on the West Coast—adverse winds to Hawaii at a period when they were not normally expected kept those planes on the ground there, I think, three weeks. As a matter of fact, the initial squadron arrived in Hawaii in the middle of the Japanese attack to add to the complications of the moment. The other was that we had great trouble in getting ships. At that time we couldn't commandeer things the way we could the day war was declared. We had already taken in a great many passenger vessels from various runs, which was creating, according to statements of the Under Secretary of State, as I recall, a very embarrassing situation throughout Latin America, as we were cutting down on all their ordinary shipping; and we had to get those vessels—I believe Matson line vessels—or we couldn't carry out our purpose. We finally succeeded in getting the shipping, but we were about three or four weeks late in getting through the various moves, governmental and otherwise, to make that shipping available—and as the records, I believe, show, at sea at the time of the crisis, when it should have completed its voyage before that time.

[863] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

29. Q. Did you, prior to December 7, 1941, consider that the Japanese might make a surprise attack on United States territory without a prior declaration of war?

A. Do you mean by United States territory Hawaii, the Panama Canal, and Alaska?

30. Q. Any United States territory.

A. I was always in fear of that.

31. Q. Did you have an estimate as to what territory would be the objective if they should deliver this form of attack?

A. We thought, as I recall at the time, that the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and to the Philippines before Hawaii.

32. Q. From the information that you had between the specific dates of November 28 and December 7, 1941, what was your estimate of the situation as to the intentions of the Japanese with respect to delivering a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area?

A. As I recall, we had no Army indications—and I am quite certain we received no report from the Navy—which showed a threat against Hawaii. We did have, as I previously mentioned, indications of a very curious procedure in the Panama Canal. We did have very serious threats in the Far East which might immediately relate to the Philippines and certainly were directed farther south. I don't recall any specific indications regarding Hawaii. I do recall, within forty-eight hours after the attack of December 7, we obtained certain messages that came in late, which very plainly showed what was probably going to happen.

33. Q. In the light of developments to date, what is your opinion of the soundness of the Japanese decision to make this surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, a surprise, if it is successful, is a triumph; if it fails, it is a catastrophe. This was a success. We have several problems like that in the conduct of the war at the present moment.

34. Q. What was the paramount mission of the Army Air Force in the Hawaiian Department during the year 1941?

A. To defend the island of Oahu against attacks by enemy aircraft, in cooperation with the Fleet aircraft, and to attack hostile vessels. That is set forth in Field Orders No. 41, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, on the subject of Army Operating Defense Plans as of April, 1941.

[864] 35. Q. Did you have any peace time missions, such as training the Army Air Force, during this period of time?

A. I presume they were at that all the time. I recall bringing up with the air people at one time the sending of new heavy bomber pilots out there to fly these reconnaissance flights, because we had such few planes in the United States, and they were burning up their engines, particularly the previous summer when they flew from June to some time in August in heavy reconnaissance—I think they were B-18s at that time—out to sea to Hawaii; so I would say that training was going on all the time.

36. Q. Do you consider during the critical period preceding December 7, 1941, that you were in possession of most of the available political and military information so far as Japanese-United States relations were concerned?

A. So far as I was familiar with important political and military information available to the State, Navy, and War Departments.

37. Q. What is your view of the cooperation of the Army and Navy in the exchange of intelligence in Washington during the critical period preceding December 7?

A. The exchange of intelligence is much more accurately complete today than it was. Our field intelligence agencies were not nearly as well coordinated as they are today. I think that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy. That is the case so far as I can find in the records. We received intelligence from naval sources but did not, as we do today, receive detailed information regarding Japanese naval movements or deployments. In other words, what we did not receive as a matter of routine then was the movement of Japanese naval craft.

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is in evidence before this court and is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of 28 November 1941, purporting to quote an Army dispatch which was sent to the Commander of the Western Defense Command. Were you familiar with that part of this dispatch in which the Navy set out what the Army sent to its commander?

A. This message which you have handed to me quotes an Army message to the Western Defense Command. A similar message was sent to the Hawaiian Department, the Panama Canal, and to the Philippine Department of the Army. I personally was absent from the War Department from about noon of the 26th until the morning

of the 28th, and the message of the War Department is dated the 27th. General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division at that time. I believe stated that I did not see the message. I personally have a distinct recollection that I did see it. It may have been either before it was sent in its final draft or upon my return to the War Department on the morning of the 28th. My recollection [865] is stimulated by this portion of the message: "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." I have a very clear recollection of that. It was the instruction of the President. I also have a rather clear recollection of the following sentence: "This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action which might jeopardize your defense." My dimmer recollection is that I discussed that with General Gerow. He thinks I did not see the message. I may not have, but my recollection is quite clear in relation to the President's instructions, because as I recall that, they came to me personally, and therefore I would have had to translate this into this message rather than General Gerow, who would not have known.

39. Q. This message contains the injunction: "Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." What did you expect these Army commanders to do with respect to the directive? Did you expect them to make long-range reconnaissance flights with bombers?

A. I am having difficulty in answering that, because I don't know whether I'm talking from hind sight or not. The message, in part, had to be written around the directive that we were to avoid an overt act and at the same time provide for the necessary security measures. They had plans out there as to who was to do what, and, as I say, I don't know whether I am talking from hind sight or foresight. The point is that we wanted to make clear that we were not restricting them in their security measures, and reconnaissance, of course, is the foremost security measure.

40. Q. In reply to one of my former questions, I believe you included in your answer a statement to the effect that the President directed that these measures be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population; is that correct?

A. I don't recall that. I don't recall that that was the President's direction. It may have been; I don't recall. It may have been ours, meaning the War Department's. I might say, in connection with all of this, that we started with these alerts about 1907 and went through a series of them in the Philippines and so on. I think in 1913 when I was there we moved the troops to Corregidor. The orders were to occupy Corregidor under the pretext of maneuvers. This thing has been going on through the years. The pretext of maneuvers was, as in this case, not to alarm the civil population. As I recall—and I may be wrong in this—the State Department was very desirous that we do nothing to upset the apple cart in the middle of these negotiations. We were hoping that they could stall any precipitate action by the Japanese of a war-like nature. That is my recollection, and I am hesitant about expressing that. That is my dim recollection. I would like permission of the court to include in the record here a letter that I wrote to General Short on February 7, 1941. [866] Perhaps it is already in the record. I wrote the

letter on February 7, 1941, in which I informally expressed my own personal views. I said:

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today. However, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course, the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us; there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—He had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we have obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

[867] The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the president will release our estimates.

However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited materiel we have, for Alaska, for Panama, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over [868] appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 868 through 884, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[885] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 1:00 p. m., took an adjournment subject to the call of the president.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 9, 1944

[886]

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR,
Territory of Hawaii.

The court met at 10:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Bieseimeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and ~~an~~ counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-fourth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

The court then, at 10:40 a. m., took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. C. H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff of Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. Q. Will you state the duties you were performing in the latter half of the year 1941?

A. War Plans Officer on the Staff of Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet.

[887] 3. Q. As War Plans Officer under the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, was it your custom to maintain a current estimate of the situation on Japanese-United States relationships?

A. No formal written estimate was maintained.

4. Q. Did you maintain some sort of mental current estimate?

A. Yes, and there was a vast amount of information with regard to that situation maintained in the files.

5. Q. Would you say in a few words, in general, what the estimate of the situation was about the first of October, 1941, if you remember?

A. The relationships between the United States and Japan were considered strained, and a possibility was estimated that the United States and Great Britain might become involved in a war with Japan. About that time, however, it was considered at least a possibility that the Japanese might become involved in a war with Russia, and it was our estimate that in that event the United States would not become so involved. We also estimated that conflict between Japan on the one hand and Great Britain and the Dutch on the other was distinctly possible without the United States becoming, initially, involved.

6. Q. I show you Exhibit 13 before this court, Admiral, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of October 16, 1941, of which the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet is an addressee, and ask you to just read it to yourself, please. Were you familiar with this dispatch in the neighborhood of 16 October, 1941?

A. I recall this dispatch and about that time was doubtless familiar with it at that time.

7. Q. Did the receipt of this dispatch change in any material way the estimate of the situation that you described a moment ago, that you had as of about 1 October 1941?

A. I would say that it tended to confirm the belief that I had just expressed, but that it increased the probability in my mind that we might become engaged or might become a belligerent.

8. Q. What was your estimate of the possibility of a Japanese attack in the Hawaiian area as a result of the information you received in this dispatch?

A. I don't know that this dispatch alone resulted in any conclusion, but certainly about that time—possibly earlier, possibly somewhat later—I felt that sabotage or submarine attacks were a distinct possibility in the Hawaiian area.

9. Q. What form of attack did you consider that the Japanese would deliver in the event that they did make any attack in the Hawaiian area at this time?

A. Submarine.

10. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941, what was your estimate of [888] the possibility of an aircraft torpedo attack on ships in Pearl Harbor?

A. Up to the time of the actual attack, I considered the probability very remote.

11. Q. Will you state what fundamental considerations determined this view?

A. There had become increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward the Kra Peninsula, of the concentration of troops in the South China Sea area, and in the movement of combatant ships from the Empire to the South. While not recalling now any specific letters or dispatches, my general recollection is that some of the warnings from the Navy Department indicated possibility hostilities breaking out in that area, and the possibilities of an attack on the Philippines, or the movement of Japanese forces into Halmahera. The possibility of an air attack in the Hawaiian area by Japanese forces had been given consideration, and the probability of it was greatly discounted because of the distance involved and the logistic problems that would have to

be met; that although torpedo attacks within the Pearl Harbor area had been considered, particularly after the British attack on the Italian Fleet in southern Italy, I deemed it doubtful that such an attack could be successful in Pearl Harbor, partially because of the depth of war, partially because of the short distance the torpedo would have to run, and partially because of considerable confidence in the AA defenses against torpedo planes. I did not believe that we could effectively make a profitable attack against the Japanese homeland by such means, and I did not believe that the Japanese could successfully inflict great damage upon us.

12. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 17, which is Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 27 November 1941, and ask you if you will read it to yourself. Will you state at about what time the contents of this dispatch came to your attention?

A. It must have been the 27th of November, possibly the 28th. I do not recall the exact date.

13. Q. Will you state what action, if any, the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet took on the receipt of this dispatch?

A. Discussion took place between the Commander-in-Chief and his principal advisers, of his staff, of which I was one. I do not recall who else may have been brought into the discussion; but in any event, the determination was made that the directions were largely in effect already. It was about this time, however, and either in connection with this dispatch or with others received about this time, that defensive aircraft was sent to Wake and Midway, being transported by carriers. I recall that special injunction was given to the forces then at sea, to be particularly alert with regard to detection of submarines, and I believe that it was in connection with this dispatch that directives were issued to depth charge any submarine contact believed to be hostile. The practice was initiated about this time of furnishing the Commander- [889] in-Chief, either daily or every other day, a recommendation as to the specific action to be taken in case hostilities broke out within the ensuing 24 hours. While I cannot say definitely, it is my impression that the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier was verbally directed to be particularly alert against sabotage. It was shortly after receipt of this dispatch that a discussion took place in Admiral Kimmel's office between him and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with regard to the utilization of Army aircraft from Oahu to strengthen the defenses of Midway and Wake. There was also discussed a proposal to utilize some of the troops from Oahu to replace the Marine Defense Battalion units at those two places.

14. Q. Can you state whether any consideration had been given at this time to the desirability of clearing Pearl Harbor of all United States ships?

A. I think not. Consideration was given to moving all combatant ships from Pearl Harbor as early as possible if hostilities commenced, but not as a defense measure, but toward a movement to initiate offensive operations towards the Marshalls. They thought to initiate matters toward putting into effect the War Plan as promptly as possible.

15. Q. Do you feel that this dispatch, Exhibit 17, that you have just read, added anything to your information on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan, that you didn't have prior to its receipt?

A. It indicated that the probability of war was increasing.

16. Q. What did the words at the beginning of this dispatch, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," mean to you?

A. It would be difficult to say what my mental reaction was at the time, but certainly it indicated to me that the authorities in Washington believed there was great probability of the United States and Japan becoming engaged in war with each other.

17. Q. This dispatch also contains the words "An aggressive move is expected by Japan within the next few days." What did these words mean to you in reference to the imminence of war between the United States and Japan?

A. Just what the words said.

18. Q. Can you recall what your estimate of the situation was as to the Japanese objective of attack against the United States, if one were made?

A. I felt the greatest probability of attack would be in the Philippines, but felt that it was possible that raids might be made against Wake and possibly but less probably, Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered.

19. Q. Did this dispatch indicate to you any possibility of an attack further eastward than Guam? [390]

A. I considered it unlikely that there would be an attack further eastward than Guam, except as I said, possible raids on Wake or Midway. I would like to add that we felt submarine attacks within the Hawaiian area, or even toward the Pacific Coast, were highly probable.

20. Q. I show you Exhibit 19, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 28 November 1941, and purports to quote a dispatch the Army sent to the Commander Western Defense Command. I ask you to read this dispatch to yourself.

A. I recall having seen this dispatch before.

21. Q. I will ask you, Admiral, did the information contained in this dispatch, although it is merely quoting an Army dispatch, have any influence on your estimate of the situation, in view of its directive to conduct reconnaissance?

A. No, with the addressees for that dispatch, I considered the reconnaissance to be expected would be that by aircraft who would look for submarines or a possible cruiser that might be there for a hit and run action.

22. Q. Did you or did you not at this time consider the advisability of conducting a long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu?

A. Yes, not only at this time, but had the greater part of the previous year. The matter was discussed in conjunction with the various dispatches that came in about this time, of increasing the search from Oahu and various factors were weighed—the availability of patrol planes, the status of the training of those planes, the employment which they might be called upon to carry out, the offensive operations laid down in the War Plans, the importance of covering the surface ship training areas against submarine attack, the necessity for supplying personnel for new squadrons, and various factors of that nature. From time to time during the preceding year or two certain long-range searches had been made from Oahu, but always through narrow sectors because of the limited number of planes available, or of plane

crews available. These sectors had been rotated from day to day. After due consideration, it was determined that the searches would not be initiated. It was my opinion that they would be largely token searches that would give only limited effectiveness, and that training would suffer heavily and that if we were called upon to conduct a war, that we would find a large proportion of our planes needing engine overhaull at the time we most required their services. At any rate, the matter was given considerable thought, and the searches were not established. I should say in this connection that I do not recall any formal conference or detailed conversation with the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, although it is highly probable that the matter was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer, Captain Davis, the Aviation Officer, and myself; but what I have just outlined expresses my personal views, and the discussion that we had within the War Plans section as to whether or not to make any recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief with regard to utilizing available patrol planes for long- [891] range search. We were of the opinion that the danger of a raid in the Hawaiian area was not very great, and were most anxious to get all patrol planes that we could in readiness to move to the Midway-Wake area, to support offensive operations which we anticipated might be necessary in the near future, in the event of war.

23. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 19, which you have before you. Admiral, there is an injunction in this dispatch, although it is addressed to Army Command, which directs that Operations be conducted so as not to alarm the civil population. Did this consideration not to alarm the civil population have any bearing on any action that you took about that time in regard to reconnaissance or other war preparations?

A. I think not.

24. Q. I show you an exhibit, which is Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of November 26, of which the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet is an addressee, and which has reference to transferring of planes to Wake. Can you state what your views were at that time on the imminence of war between the United States and Japan as a result of any information contained in this dispatch?

A. There were a number of dispatches, including this one, received about the same time, and whatever views or ideas resulted, probably came from the series of dispatches and all the attendant background; but the question of moving Army planes into this advanced area was given extensive consideration, and the determination was made that the defensive planes should go into Midway and Wake, and that it was preferable to send Marine planes. It is probably not worth while to discuss here the considerations that prompted the decision to use Marine planes. I should say, however, that it was only the lack of facilities at Wake that had prevented defensive planes being placed there earlier; and that it was about this time that the situation was regarded as so serious that it was felt the time had come when other handicaps must be accepted and some planes for defensive purposes put in Wake, because we anticipated operating a number of patrol planes from the base if war should start, and we felt it imperative that they had some protective fighters there.

25. Q. Did you feel there was any danger in sending a carrier to this area at this time, in view of all the information you had on the imminence of war with Japan?

A. We felt that there was a possibility that the carrier might encounter a Japanese combat craft, and that some clash might result. It was one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships attached to the task force, that included the carrier, behind, so that the slower speed of the battleship would not handicap the carrier with its attendant light forces. I might add that when this carrier was sent to [892] Wake, a squadron of patrol planes was moved there in advance of the carrier to maintain a search over her path of advance and of the surrounding area while she was discharging her planes. Because of the inability of Wake to sustain any considerable number of planes for any but a brief time, that patrol squadron was withdrawn immediately after the carrier had discharged her planes to Wake. The possibility of a fight was realized, and considerable discussion was had with Admiral Halsey as to what reduction, if any, of the carrier group might be necessary in order to carry the Marine planes. It was determined, however, that the effectiveness of the carrier would not be unduly reduced since only twelve fighters, Marine fighters, I believe, were to be left at Wake. It was believed that if chance encounter occurred, that it would likely be with a raiding force rather than with a very strong enemy force, and that the speed and capabilities of the carrier and its light forces would permit us to profit rather than to lose by such contact as we thought might occur.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, withdrew.

[893] 26. Q. There has been some comment in the press since this court of inquiry has been convened, Admiral, which is to the effect that the Navy Department or some other persons in authority had directed the United States Pacific Fleet to be in Pearl Harbor over the period in which the Japanese attack took place. From your own knowledge of the directives to the Pacific Fleet and as to the reasons for their being in any particular place, will you state whether or not the Fleet was operating under any orders other than your quarterly schedule?

A. The Pacific Fleet, as a whole, had been in the Hawaiian area for well over a year prior to 7 December 1941. The presence or absence of any units from Pearl Harbor at any particular time was entirely in the hands of the Fleet Commander. There was no directive received to have any portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time in question.

27. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet receive any information after the 27th of November, 1941, which indicated that Japanese-United States negotiations were still being continued? I would remind you that the dispatch of 27 November stated, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased."

A. I don't recall any subsequent dispatches indicating a resumption of negotiations.

28. Q. Did you have any information from any other source that negotiations were continuing?

A. I don't recall now, but it is my recollection that the press may have so indicated, but frankly I don't know.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

29. Q. Admiral, do you still remember what WPL-46, Rainbow 5 meant? Do you remember the documents?

A. In substances, yes.

30. Q. Do you recall, during the weeks preceding 7 December 1941, whether or not you feel that the forces available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet for his initial tasks under that plan were sufficient or otherwise?

A. There was, of course, keen realization of all deficiencies, real and fancied. We were lacking in amphibious craft and felt in need of various other vessels, but none the less, I felt that the forces we had available could be used with a considerable degree of effectiveness to carry out the mission of WPL-46.

31. Q. Do you recall if WPL-46 was written with the expectation that we or the Japanese would initiate a Pacific war?

A. Doubtless the Japanese.

[894] 32. Q. Now, in regard to your own plan contributory to Rainbow 5, the Pacific Fleet WPL-46, was it contemplated as that plan was prepared and subsequently studied that any part of it, or even all of it, would ever be executed prior to the start of actual hostilities?

A. I think not, but without refreshing my memory as to just what was in that plan in detail, I hesitate to give a positive answer.

33. Q. Assuming that you see no reason to make any change in that answer, do you recall how it was proposed to alert the ships of the Pacific Fleet, including all of the task forces, when the situation became tense and war seemed to be imminent?

A. Probably by dispatch.

34. Q. You mentioned that the practice was discarded of letting the duty officer, I believe, have notes as to what to do if war occurred in very short notice. Can you tell us what was provided in the way of alerting the Fleet under the command of the Pacific Fleet Commander?

A. While a copy of the notes to which I have referred was given to the duty officer, they were primarily for the Commander-in-Chief himself. Either the Commander-in-Chief or I or Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer, or, more frequently, all of us were in immediate touch with the office, and it was not contemplated that anything so important would be left entirely in the hands of the duty officer. Those notes to which I have referred may or may not have included the sending of a notification to the Fleet of hostilities. Very possibly they did as something of a check-off list.

35. Q. But you do not remember any specific method, which was in mind in the offices of the Commander-in-Chief, of alerting the Fleet at very short notice?

A. I think not, because we doubtless considered axiomatic that it would be done by an urgent dispatch. I have taken this question to mean—means of apprising the Fleet of the commencement of hostilities. If, however, it meant advising the Fleet that the situation was tense, that had been done for some time. In fact, I do not now recall when the Fleet was, to all intents and purposes, on a war footing, whenever ships left the harbor. Certainly when Admirals Halsey

and Newton moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of marine aircraft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again entered port. The ships in training in the Hawaiian area had long since carried on provisions for water-tight integrity and for certain watches far more rigorous than would have been carried on in normal times. In point of fact, I recall that discussion was had after the receipt of the message of 27 November as to whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in the training and [895] operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well in hand and would, in effect, be a message to keep doing what you are doing now. To the best of my recollection, the only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for possible enemy submarines.

36. Q. Then, Admiral, would it be correct to say that no partial execution of the Navy Department's WPL-46 or of your own contributory plan was necessary during those last few days in order to put the Fleet upon a war footing?

A. Without reference to the publication in question, I would say that the Fleet was on a war footing.

37. Q. I hand you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is an OpNav dispatch of 3 December 1941, advising that the Japanese were taking certain steps toward destroying codes and ciphers, etc. Will you read it and please note that the last sentence which was scratched off there was not received by you? Do you remember having seen that dispatch?

A. Yes, sir.

38. Q. Was that a particularly significant piece of information to you at the time?

A. Yes, I felt that that message, more definitely than anything that had gone before, indicated the probability of a war with Japan that would involve the United States.

39. Q. Admiral, recalling the conversations upon the receipt of that message, insofar as you can, can you state whether or not the reaction which you have just expressed was prevalent on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief and in the Commander's-in-Chief own mind?

A. I don't know that I can. In the early days of December certainly the general thought within the staff—and I believe in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief—was that war was extremely probable, although many of the discussions still indicated some doubt on the part of some individuals as to whether the Japanese would initially take the Philippines or whether some overt act of a minor nature might be seized upon to bring about a state of war.

40. Q. Going back to the proposal from Washington to send Army planes and troops into Midway and Wake, do you recall whether, in regard to the carrying on of your own work, those instructions in any way weakened what was said in the war warning message?

A. No, as far as I was concerned, it did not weaken the war warning message. My views remained the same in that connection, but because I considered that the outposts of Wake and Midway were highly important for us and might be subject to attack, I felt that it was a most inauspicious time to effect a change and was

rather surprised at what I regarded as a lack of appreciation on the part of the Navy Department of the importance of those places and of the [896] serious weakening of their defenses that would necessarily result from such a change at that time.

41. Q. Wasn't the change, however, considerably a matter of reinforcement rather than substitution? To refresh your recollection, I will show you dispatches, exhibits 18 and 40.

A. Partially, yes, but it would have involved a mixed command, and some of the ground units to support planes were, to the best of my recollection, already in those advanced positions.

42. Q. Also is it not a fact that no directive was contained in those dispatches? It was a proposal and a request for advice; is that correct?

A. That is correct, and the recommendation was against the proposals and the recommendations were accepted. In connection with the possibility of reinforcements, however, it was agreed that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would prepare and equip certain units along the lines of marine defense battalions, so that they could be moved forward. At the time these proposals were made, the Army had no organization in the Hawaiian area that combined the various elements for small garrisons, such as constituted a marine defense battalion.

43. Q. Admiral, if you can recall it well enough, will you state what your opinion was during the last half of 1941 as to the advisability of basing the Fleet in Hawaiian waters?

A. It was a moot question. I personally felt that the Hawaiian waters were the proper place to base the Pacific Fleet.

44. Q. Where did the real responsibility actually rest for the defense against air raid attack on installations at Pearl Harbor and on ships berthed in the harbor?

A. On the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

45. Q. Were you in any way familiar with the ability of the Hawaiian Department during, say, November, 1941, to defeat an attack through the air?

A. I had some general familiarity with the scheme of defense and, on the whole, personally felt that it was pretty good. I had at one time made a tour of the defenses of Oahu, including the anti-aircraft defenses, and attended a presentation on the subject by general Gardner, who at that time was charged with the AA defenses. I knew that radar had been installed since my inspection and that additional guns and communication facilities had been installed. I had never felt that AA guns could give immunity, and although there was definite need, as expressed by the Commanding General and by Admiral Kimmel at one time or another for additional air power, I believed from my limited knowledge that danger was not very great from enemy aircraft.

A. No, sir, I did not.

[897] 46. Q. I have a hypothetical question which I should like to ask you because of your very long and exceedingly varied experience in Hawaii and its waters. On your assumption that you had known, in early December, 1941, what would be the actual performance of the Army, in the light of what did occur, what would have

been the correct measure for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to have taken as regards the disposition of his Fleet?

A. On the assumption that some few days before the arrival of enemy forces in this area I had been aware that they were en route to attack and on the assumption that I knew at that time that the AA defenses would not be effective, either because of not being manned or because of lack of proficiency, I should certainly have had the harbor clear of ships; but if I had had knowledge of such an approach and had known beyond doubt that the AA defenses would have shot down every plane that arrived before they could get in and attacked, I would also have had the Fleet at sea in an endeavor to get them in a position where they would inflict damage on the attacking forces.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[898] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

47. Q. Admiral, in answering the hypothetical question, would you mind distinguishing, or stating, whether your action would have been the same regardless of whether or not a state of war existed?

A. In the general strained situation that existed at that time I would not only have recommended, I would have urged that we take the action which I have outlined. There would, in point of fact, of course, have been time to apprise the Navy Department that such action was being taken, but it would certainly have been unwise, even under our Constitution, to defer action.

48. Q. This assumes, however, that the warning came to you in time for you to vacate the harbor and make the proper dispositions outside. Would not that have required that you have advance information for a considerable time ahead and which would, in turn, require some intelligence?

A. Unquestionably.

49. Q. On the evening of December 6th, had a long-range search been in effect, and had a detachment of carriers been sighted at a distance, say, of 700 miles standing toward Hawaii, what steps could the Commander-in-Chief have taken, either offensive or defensive, to prevent an enemy carrier attack on Pearl Harbor at that time?

A. He probably could not have prevented the attack. He doubtless would have sent the ships in Pearl Harbor to sea to intercept the enemy, if possible. He doubtless would have diverted the two carrier task forces that were then at sea enroute to Pearl Harbor to intercept. He doubtless would have had the shore based aircraft of his command made available to the Sea Frontier Commander in accordance with the existing plan. But I might add that in my opinion had that been done, our losses might well have been more serious than those that actually occurred.

50. Q. Well, would not the shore based aircraft to which you refer be the planes which had located the hostile vessel? In other words, were there enough planes to have made this long-range search and also have some back in Pearl Harbor to take the air?

A. Doubtless the patrol planes would have been out for search the next morning, even though the crews had been employed the day before, and single double crews were not available for planes, some of the patrol planes would have been inoperative the day before. There were also here, I believe, some small number of Marine planes and it is probable [899] that there were a few carrier planes shore based. The total number, however, would have been small. On the other hand, of course, the Army planes, too, would have been alerted and undoubtedly would have done some damage to the enemy but that damage, in my opinion, would have been principally by Army fighters to enemy attacking planes, and I doubt very much if the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously.

51. Q. Now, in your previous testimony concerning the inadvisability of conducting this long-range search, were you not referring to the patrol planes attached to the Fleet?

A. Yes. All patrol planes were attached to the Fleet, but either by the Pacific Fleet War Plan or by the Navy Department's plan, I do not recall which, there was a minimum number of patrol planes that were to be left at all times under control of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier Commander.

52. Q. Is it not a fact that the planes that were left under the control of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier Commander were not the same ones each day? In other words, they were not under his exclusive control every day; they still continued to be Fleet planes made available to him in emergency?

A. That is correct. Admiral Bellinger, commander of the Fleet Air Wing, operated in something of a dual capacity and the planes were, to the best of my recollection, rotated.

53. Q. Then is it not a fact that it is not the function of the Fleet or of the units thereof to provide its own protection while within the limits of a permanent naval base?

A. In general, yes. But the Commander-in-Chief is always concerned over the safety of his forces, and in Pearl Harbor he felt that responsibility of repeatedly urging strengthening of defense in particular which he regarded as necessary.

54. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that he was forced to a make-shift arrangement because of the inadequacy of the forces supplied the commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier? In other words, had this deficiency not existed he would not have been under the necessity of having undue concern?

A. Yes. If he had been satisfied that all defenses were ample he would not have felt called upon to make improvised or supplementary arrangements.

55. Q. Admiral McMorris, did you feel, after conferring from time to time with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, that he was kept fully and adequately informed of the conditions existing in Washington relative to the status of Japan and the United States subsequent to 27 November 1941?

A. I was not then, nor am I now, in position to judge the adequacy or fullness of the information that was supplied. Such information that was received was taken at its face value and the presumption was that we were being furnished such information as was available that would assist the Commander-in-Chief to carry out his duties.

[900] 56. Q. Did you have any information as to Japanese carriers being in the Marshall Islands at about the latter part of November or the first part of December, 1941?

A. No.

57. Q. Were you, in your position as War Plans Officer, familiar with what had been done on the Island of Oahu regarding radar equipment and installation of radar?

A. Not in any considerable detail. In fact, I was not as concerned as was the Commander-in-Chief and possibly some other officer on the staff as to the adequacy of the local defenses. It may be that because my own interests and duties lay in other fields but I knew that the radar equipment had been very materially improved during the course of 1941.

58. Q. Were you familiar, or did you hear of any reply made by the Army to the dispatch from the War Department similar to the one sent by the Navy Department as of November 27th to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not now recall.

59. Q. Was it general information in the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that a squadron of plans had departed from Hamilton Field on 6 December for Oahu?

A. Certainly several of the senior members of the staff were aware that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that time.

60. Q. Did you at any time in your War Plans or in your considerations think that Japan would make a surprise attack by air on the Island of Oahu or on Pearl Harbor?

A. I did not.

61. Q. And from your testimony the court presumes that you had in mind the expression of the staff's opinion that if any attack occurred it would be by submarine?

A. I felt that the only serious danger to the Fleet in this area was by sabotage or by submarines.

62. Q. Admiral, because of your close association with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet just preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, will you state your opinion as to the personal and official relations between the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the commander of the Hawaiian Area, and the cooperation that existed between them?

A. I felt that the relations between the two were cordial and cooperative. The Commanding General was frequently in conference with the Commander-in-Chief; sometimes only with the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff; sometimes with other flag officers present, including the commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and various flag officers from the Fleet. In the development of plans for local defense and of plans for utilization of Fleet units in port for local defense, there may, from time to time, have been differences of opinion, but the relationships were habitually pleasant. For instance, in late November or early December [901] when discussion was taking place with regard to re-enforcement of Midway by moving Army troops from this area to Midway, the Commanding General very positively expressed the idea that Midway would then, of necessity, be under the command of an Army officer. The Commander-in-Chief considered that a naval officer should continue in

command. It is my recollection that each of those officers made such recommendations to their respective departments, but there was a free interchange of views, a difference of opinion, but no friction or unpleasantness in regard thereto.

63. Q. Referring to the conferences between the two officers, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and with special reference to the dispatches of October 16 and November 27, were conferences frequent on these messages coming in at various times?

A. I don't remember particular conferences following particular dispatches after this lapse of three years, but I do remember participating in numerous conferences between those two officers during 1941 up to and including the last critical days preceding the war.

64. Q. Did you detect in the attitude of either Admiral Kimmel or General Short any lack of interest in the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibilities assigned for the joint defense in view of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action between November 27 and December 7?

A. No, I did not detect any lack of such interest. There was, to my mind, a general feeling of mutual confidence and respect, and a proper regard on the part of each for the duties and prerogatives of the other. As can well be understood, the greatest difficulties envisaged were with regard to communications, and while certain arrangements had been made and promulgated between the Commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and the Commanding General with regard to communications and exercise of control, the defenses were still being improved and arrangements made as to command posts, and interchange of information and so forth were still being developed.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy:

65. Q. Admiral, in connection with the War Plans: I think the observation was made that when the War Plans were executed it was planned that a certain minimum number of patrol planes would be left here at Pearl Harbor for that sort of work; is that correct?

A. That is my recollection, that War Plans called for the greater part of the patrol planes operating directly under the Commander of the Fleet being advanced to the Wake-Midway area for certain operations, but that there was a minimum number that were to be left under the control of the sea frontier based on Pearl Harbor.

[902] 66. Q. And that would be when the War Plans were executed?

A. That is correct.

67. Q. And War Plans were not executed up to December 7th?

A. That is correct.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 4:10 p. m., took a recess until 4:20 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 903 through 910, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[910A] NOTE: The witness on the stand at this point is Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy.

[911] Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, known as the War Warning dispatch. Will you state what your own reactions were when you first saw that dispatch?

A. It is pretty hard to remember your exact reactions after the passage of so many months, but as I recall it, it seemed to fit in with the picture as we saw it from the various reports—from the China coast, from the C and C Asiatic, and from other secret sources, regarding the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed to the south. Movements of troops, tanks, and amphibious boats, landing craft, transports, and naval vessels, were all sighted—forming and moving to the south. The use of the words “Kra Peninsula” fitted in with some information from secret sources regarding intrigues in Malaya, and the attempt on the part of the Japanese to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand, so that Thailand could then call the British an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and making air bases in the Kra Peninsula available, maintaining their position and carrying out any further operations along Malaya if planned.

39. Q. I show you that same document, Exhibit 20; when you saw that, Captain, were you in any way influenced while you were evaluating what it said, by what you had seen in the local press or heard over the public radio?

A. I believe that no one can read these highly important messages that deal with the nation, and hold them alone in the mind, without listening to the local press and radio regarding negotiations under way, or without regarding news commentators' think-pieces. I wouldn't say the news or the radio influenced me, but I think it would have an influencing part on one's judgment.

40. Q. During the last two weeks, say, before 7 December 1941, did you hold any personal apprehension of an attack upon Hawaii similar to the one that did occur on 7 December?

A. I don't believe I did.

41. Q. Had you at one time studied the document, or a publication, issued by the Japanese Navy, secret probably, in which they talked about such an attack?

A. Yes, I translated a noval published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money in the Diet, in which they discussed the great Pacific war, and wherein an attack on Pearl Harbor with carriers, battleships, and cruisers was academically discussed. I showed my translation of this to Admiral Kimmel, and the matter had been discussed at some time. The time that I showed it to Admiral Kimmel, however, was, I believe, three or four months, possibly, before December 7.

[912] 42. Q. Did you receive any information in the latter part of November concerning the reported presence of two or more carriers in the Marshall Islands?

A. Yes.

43. Q. Had you ever had any information of, say equal value to that, previously, which showed carriers as far from the homeland as that?

A. Yes.

44. Q. Do you recall when, and where they were?

A. Late May and early June, 1941, I reported to the Commander-in-Chief that there were good indications that part of the Japanese Navy was holding maneuvers in the mandated islands, and that some carriers were present, and that the maneuvers would extend into the Marshall Islands, but the main base would probably be at Truk.

45. Q. Concerning that information about the two or more carriers in late November, was its receipt somewhat concurrent with the date of the war warning message?

A. I believe that information, plus information from other sources at the same time, was the source of the war warning message, since the war warning message followed those very closely.

Examined by the court:

46. Q. Captain, you stated, I believe, your interpretation of this war warning message of November 27; from this war warning message and your information at that particular time, where did you think Japan was going to attack?

A. Thailand, sir.

47. Q. Did you think it at all probable that Japan would attack the Hawaiian Islands either by carrier or otherwise?

A. The matter was under considerable discussion, hinging on whether or not Japan could afford to leave the Philippine Islands on their flank. I was inclined to believe they could not afford to leave the Philippine Islands on their flank; and in the course of these discussions I expressed the opinion that, after the Japanese forces had been sighted by our search planes from Manila—these Japanese forces were sighted off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam—that the war warning message therefore was being brought out by the presence of these forces in the place where we had every intelligence indication to show they were going to be there. Therefore, the situation was unfolding in accordance with the evidence. I believe Admiral Kimmel made the decision to count all submarines in this area as enemy, as a precaution based first on intelligence, second, on reconnaissance, and third, on a summation of the whole picture.

[913] 48. Q. And did you so report your estimate to the Commander-in-Chief—this estimate that you just expressed?

A. I did, sir.

49. Q. And do we glean from that in your opinion an attack on Pearl Harbor was remote?

A. I thought the possibility at that time was remote. It was a capability of the Japanese, but the possibility of its execution at that time was considered remote.

50. Q. In your studies of the Japanese character and the translation of your book, what opinion or estimate did you form as to the possibility of a surprise attack without a declaration of war?

A. As one of their capabilities, and which had historically been seen before.

51. Q. And did you think in all probability they would follow their historical movements, as to surprise attack?

A. Aside from these capabilities, we have to consider his forces available. On 1 December 1941, at Admiral Kimmel's request, I submitted to him my estimated locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy. After I had drawn this message and had it typed, more recent information at hand caused it to be changed in red; and it showed available in the Empire, 4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home area. This force was but a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from our sources of information. To go back to the translation of the book, the Japanese in this translation, stated it would be a very dangerous venture—that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers, battleships, and cruisers, would be a very dangerous venture, fraught with the possibility of considerable losses; and with Japan staking its national existence on this move to the south which had been its lifetime policy, it could not afford to gamble the defenses required to maintain a long-time war by the sending of some of these 4 carriers, 6 battleships, and 4 heavy cruisers on a raid wherein the Empire was completely denuded of vessels. That was, generally, the line of my reasoning.

[914] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

52. Q. Referring again to this critical period of November 27 to December 7, were you impressed with the importance of guarding against sabotage in these islands in counter distinction to an outside attack and how did you place them in order of priority?

A. Continental naval districts, plus Guam and Samoa, were warned against sabotage, and I did not receive any distinct impression that warnings against sabotage were underlined. My concern was only with the Fleet itself, and I left the matter of local sabotage in the hands of the District Intelligence Officer.

53. Q. Well, was there any discussion in higher authority, to your knowledge, as to the importance of guarding against internal sabotage here?

A. If there was, I was not present.

54. Q. Were you at any time familiar with the note of November 26, handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese officers in Washington, as to the decision of this government toward Japan?

A. As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief was at no time apprised of the details or outline of the negotiations that were being carried on in Washington.

55. Q. Are you familiar now with that note of November 26?

A. I haven't seen it, sir.

56. Q. As intelligence officer, is it your opinion that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept fully informed as to what was going on in Washington relative to Japan, which knowledge would have had any influence upon his action in this area?

A. I can answer that by quoting, as I recall, Admiral Kimmel's words, "I wish they would let us know more what is going on back there." I myself feel that the Commander-in-Chief should have been kept more fully aware of the broader pictures concerning the national destiny.

57. Q. Aside from the national destiny, do you feel that he could have been kept more fully informed?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. In view of the knowledge up to the present time and if that knowledge had flown to him from Washington, do you feel he would have had a clearer picture of the situation as regards Japan?

A. I feel, with the additional information, he would have had a clearer conception of the state of affairs versus Japan.

[915] 59. Q. Well, even with that additional information which he might have received, would that have had any effect upon his preparations for a surprise attack by air without a declaration of war?

A. I can't say that it would or would not, but it is my opinion that it would not have greatly changed the present state of mind of the American people of which we were a part.

60. Q. Wasn't the trend of the information, as time went on, merely to the effect that war was becoming more and more imminent?

A. War was becoming more and more imminent.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 916 through 918, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

[919]

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR,
Territory of Hawaii.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Bieseimeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-fifth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

The court then, at 9:45 a. m., took a recess until 9:50 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, pages 919-A through 930, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[931] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station?

A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service Force, Pacific.

2. Q. Will you state what duties you were performing during the year 1941?

A. Commander Base Force, United States Fleet.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Admiral, for the month or perhaps two months preceding December 1941, will you state in general what specific duties you had?

A. I was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, charged with the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet, assisting Commandant 14th Naval District with services in Pearl Harbor and, as necessary, to the outlying island bases of the 14th Naval District. I was in command of Fleet security measures until relieved by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in the latter part of 1941—August or September. We had specific orders from the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet to cooperate fully, placing whatever services were in the base force at the disposition of the Commandant 14th Naval District as were necessary to support the Fleet, and support and construct outlying island bases; also Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval Shore Patrol.

4. Q. You were aware, were you not, of the increasingly critical state of negotiations with Japan during these two months, of October and November?

A. I feel that I was fully aware of this situation as described to the commanding officers of the Fleet here. Admiral Kimmel kept us fully informed at all times.

5. Q. You were also informed, were you not, of the provisions of WPL-46?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Were you also familiar with the preparations that were being made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as preliminary to the execution of tasks assigned in that document?

A. Yes.

7. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support that was provided was adequate for the support of those operations?

A. They were not adequate in all types of naval auxiliaries. I have here Base Force schedule of employment, second quarter of 1941, which itemizes the ships of my command [932] at that time. Realizing the size of our Fleet, it would have been inadequate to support advances forward. I served with three Commanders-in-Chief up to December 7, 1941: Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. Navy; Admiral Joseph Richardson, U. S. Navy; and Admiral Husband Kimmel, U. S. Navy—all of whom had made every possible effort to increase the Fleet auxiliaries; and referring to the Base Schedule of employment for the second quarter of 1941, it will be seen that a number of Fleet units were being added to the Fleet—a number of auxiliary Fleet units were being added to the Base Force, but had not yet reported.

8. Q. Do you not consider that it was the understanding of responsible officers that it was the inability of the national government to supply these deficiencies in the short time that they had available?

A. Definitely so, sir.

9. Q. With particular reference to fuel, were the supplies in Pearl Harbor adequate for the support of a Fleet based solely on Pearl Harbor?

A. Entirely adequate, sir.

10. Q. There was no trouble about the supply from the mainland to Pearl Harbor?

A. The best answer to that is that our storages here were almost filled on December 7, 1941. We had received excellent assistance from

the Commandant of the 12th Naval District, to whom vessels had been made available for filling our fuel supply at Pearl Harbor. I refer to diesel, gasoline, aviation gasoline, and fuel oil. The real shortage in storage at that time existed only in aviation gasoline, but the Commandant of the 14th Naval District took very prompt action in obtaining certain civil tankage which we rapidly filled.

11. Q. How many tankers did the Base Force have at its disposal for use in connection with the Fleet operating from Pearl Harbor?

A. There were eleven tankers attached to the Base Force; four of the Kanawha type, 14 knots, about 40,000 barrels; three of the Ramapo type, 10 knots, about 65,000 barrels; four of the new Cimarron class of Fleet tanker, 18 knots, 105,000 barrels—total, eleven tankers.

12. Q. Were any or all of these tankers equipped for fueling vessels at sea?

A. All tankers were equipped for fueling vessels at sea and had had considerable experience in fueling all ships. The new Cimarron class of Fleet tanker had proved very adaptable and was an excellent type of tanker for this work, able to fuel from four stations at one time.

13. Q. Do you consider that the eleven tankers under your command were sufficient to have supplied the Fleet if the [933] Fleet had vacated Pearl Harbor, in addition to keeping the Pearl Harbor supply up?

A. Eleven tankers alone were not sufficient for the needs of a Fleet operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor, particularly if carriers and cruisers and destroyers operated at high speeds. None of the tankers would have been available for keeping up the Pearl Harbor storages. The eleven tankers would not have been sufficient to have maintained the Pacific Fleet in this area on a campaign into the Western Pacific. There were in the Atlantic the approximate number of tankers that there were in the Pacific, and four of them were also of the new fleet tanker type. Had they been rushed into this area, with the limited number of carriers we had at that time in this area, with that assistance we could have supported the fleet probably as far as Wake. There were only three provision ships in the Pacific, two, the Arctic and Boreas, capable only of about 10 knots; the Bridge, capable of about 12 knots. These three would have been hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the Pacific Fleet as it existed at that time. The first of the new 15-knot provision ships of the Aldebaran type was on her way, but arrived after December 7. There was assigned to the Base Force at that time only one ammunition ship, the Pyro. There were assigned two AKS of Fleet issue store ships, the Castor, the Fleet sea-going type, and the Antares, which could have been used only between Pearl Harbor and the mainland, due to the fact that her speed was around 9 knots. There was one hospital ship, two repair ships, and two fleet salvage tugs.

14. Q. That answer, I take it, Admiral, which is rather complete, refers to only supplying the Fleet in advance movement, without taking consideration into the logistics, particularly between the mainland and Pearl Harbor?

A. That is correct, sir.

15. Q. Admiral, in view of the logistic requirements as you have stated, did you have the ships available to supply this Fleet if an-

chored in the Hawaiian Islands at another place than Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, the Base Force had supported the entire Fleet anchored in Lahaina, and by making use of the facilities of the 14th Naval District, could easily have supplied the Fleet in any other Hawaiian anchorage with almost the same facilities as here, except for fresh water and for hospitalization.

16. Q. You stated that you were familiar with the general policy of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and we presume that you were also familiar with the strategical set-up and information regarding Japan.

A. Yes, Admiral.

17. Q. Did you form in your own mind an opinion as to the possibility of attack on these islands by Japan?

[934] A. I believed that some day war with Japan would come, and at no too-far-distant date. I am one of the people that were deceived by the envoy of peace in Washington, and I did not believe that Japan would strike while the envoy of peace was in Washington. I did not believe that Japan could get a fleet of carriers and the necessary supporting ships across the ocean to attack Pearl Harbor as they did, with the complete secrecy and surprise as they did. I had formed the opinion that our intelligence would undoubtedly have caught that. Once before the Fleet went on a war footing because certain units of the Japanese carrier and submarine force had disappeared. That led me to believe that we were following Japanese forces very carefully. Everybody in Pearl Harbor under Admiral Kimmel's command was making every possible effort to be ready for any eventuality. As Calhoun, I did not expect any attack on Pearl Harbor at the time. It came at a time when I did not expect it at the time, or in the immediate vicinity of that time; although I knew from conferences with Admiral Kimmel, which I attended daily, that the situation was very strained, and that we were all supposed to be ready for any sudden orders or emergency that might arise. We were not on a war footing in Pearl Harbor, inasmuch as liberty was permitted over week-ends. We were not in the higher conditions of readiness, and the security patrols of which I was in charge up to the time I was relieved by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, were based on the acts of irresponsible nationals in committing sabotage, rather than any direct attack by a national. Those security orders had been in effect in the Fleet since the arrival in May of 1940, and the basis on which they were issued was to secure the Fleet against the acts of irresponsible nationals; although in the preamble to these instructions, various forms of attack on Pearl Harbor were discussed as possible.

[935] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

18. Q. Were you familiar with the dispatch received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific from OpNav on November 27 and known as the "war warning" message?

A. I was present in Admiral Kimmel's office when that was read to every flag officer in this area who was not absent with one of the task forces which were always at sea.

19. Q. How did you interpret that dispatch?

A. I will have to answer that I interpreted that dispatch in accordance with other information which we had also received from the Department. Whenever the Commander-in-Chief complained about men and ships being taken away from him—and as I was Fleet Personnel Officer, I was the principal complainer—he was told on one occasion that he was lucky to be in the Pacific and not to have the trials and tribulations of the Atlantic and the Asiatic and that he would continue to lose men and ships. I had formed the opinion, from information that I had gathered, that we were to consider the situation in the Atlantic and Asiatic more serious than here. I gained the impression from the war warning telegram that if negotiations in Washington fell down completely, that then trouble with Japan might ensue.

20. Q. From this dispatch, Admiral, of November 27 did you form any opinion as to where Japan would strike in the event of war with Japan?

A. I was definitely of the opinion that war would start with Japan by an attack on the Philippine Islands with everything the Japs had and that they would take that quickly before we could get there with help.

21. Q. Did you have any idea here that Japan would strike by air on Pearl Harbor at that time?

A. I did not, sir. Admiral Kimmel gave all of us flag officers every bit of information he had. I am positive of that. We met in conference every morning, and as I was not a Fleet Task Force commander, I was never at sea and was always at the conference. I missed very few, if any. I have repeatedly heard Admiral Kimmel ask Admiral Halsey, Admiral Pye, Admiral Downes, Admiral Leary, Admiral Draemel, Admiral Calhoun, and Admiral Furlong if they had any constructive suggestions or criticisms to offer on the conduct of training of the Fleet, plans of the Fleet, and preparations for the use of the Fleet; and I am certain that any such suggestions from the responsible commanders in this area would have been welcomed by Admiral Kimmel. We all sat together; we all had the information, and, speaking only for myself, I did not expect an [936] attack. I would not have hesitated to go to Admiral Kimmel with any suggestion, no matter how radical, had I felt it necessary, and I am sure that Admiral Kimmel would have listened carefully to anything I had to say, as I would have done with any of the others. He made it very clear that he wanted his commanders to speak out loud in the meeting. I attended all conferences right up to and including December 6, and there was certainly no belief in that conference of any attack being imminent. I was absent from Pearl Harbor on the night of Saturday, December 6, and returned in the early morning of the 7th, which speaks for itself. Naturally, I would not have left if there was in my mind the slightest question of an attack.

22. Q. Having attended these conferences, Admiral, and being familiar with the information at hand, do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept thoroughly informed by Washington or that there was any information in Washington about which you afterwards learned that would have assisted him in making a better estimate of the situation between November 27 and December 7, 1941?

A. I am only aware officially of the information I heard at Admiral Kimmels conferences. There are many rumors of information that

existed, but I have no official knowledge of that and can only say that having been allowed to read most of the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, I believe that I knew all the information that Kimmel received. If there was other information, I am not aware of it. If it did exist, it never officially reached the lower echelon of command of my rank.

23. Q. Admiral, will you, in brief, give us your opinion as to the personal and official relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and the cooperation which existed between them during the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, with a special reference to the time from November 27 to December 7?

A. One of my duties, given me by Admiral Kimmel, practically made me an assistant to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and because of my logistic duties and the fact that the Navy had agreed that we would care for all aviation gasoline, I was continually in touch with the Army. I knew General Short well. I knew him personally. Naturally, I was intimately acquainted with Admiral Kimmel. I believed at that time—and nothing has caused me to change my mind since that time—that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on perfectly good terms of cooperation and mutual friendship. On the Joint Frontier Coastal War Plans, which were the plans drawn up by the Army and the 14th Naval District for the defense of this area and for what participation the Fleet might have to take, if they happened to be here at the time, I know that Admiral Kimmel, through his representative, Admiral Bloch, had come to very [937] satisfactory arrangements with the Army. As to the period from November 27 to December 7, I feel quite sure there was no difference there between the previous periods. I had been present on a number of occasions when General Short and Admiral Kimmel and the higher ranking officials had conferences and discussions, and I never at any time saw anything that lead me to believe that there was other than complete cooperation. I am a little more familiar with the cooperation which existed between the 14th Naval District and the Army because of my work with Admiral Bloch, and I am certain that they were working as a team.

24. Q. Do you know whether conferences between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were rare or frequent, especially after the message of November 27 was received?

A. I don't know. I have no knowledge as to whether they were frequent.

25. Q. It has been stated officially, "the attitude of each"—Admiral Kimmel and General Short—"that he was not required to inform himself and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." Can you comment on that from your first-hand observation of their work together in the common interest?

A. Without hesitation or qualification, based on my knowledge, any such statement is not founded on fact.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

26. Q. Admiral, as one who is familiar with WPL-46, you are also familiar, I assume, with the initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by WPL-46?

A. Yes.

27. Q. You have outlined to the court the deficiencies in training which existed at that time. Regardless of those deficiencies, would you say that the training was adequate to support the Pacific Fleet in its initial tasks as outlined in WPL-46?

[Notation in margin:] H B.

A. Yes. I want to qualify that answer. There might have been a good deal of living on dry provisions. Had there been engagements and wounded, hospital facilities would have been very meager. If salvage were to be performed, our equipment and vessels were very small and would not have been capable of major salvage operations. The entire situation would have depended on the speed that would have been required in that initial task had the enemy imposed his will on us.

[938] 28. Q. Having in mind the limited nature of the tasks assigned to WPL-46, it would have been possible to carry them out with what you had?

A. Yes.

29. Q. I should like to show you Exhibit 20. This is the dispatch of December 3 with respect to the burning of the codes. I ask you whether or not that dispatch was brought to your attention at the time it was received?

A. I have a pretty good memory. I don't remember ever having seen this dispatch.

30. Q. Do you recall having had that information which is contained in that dispatch brought to your attention at one of Admiral Kimmel's conferences?

A. I don't remember.

31. Q. Admiral, I believe you have testified that after the war warning dispatch had been received by the Commander-in-Chief you did not consider that the Pacific Fleet was on a war footing. Would you care to elaborate a little on that and tell the court whether or not there were any discussions at that time as to whether or not the Fleet should go on a war footing and what considerations governed the not putting of the Fleet on a war footing at that time?

A. The Commander-in-Chief discussed with the officers of the Fleet—and I feel quite sure it was definitely stated that similar discussions were held with the Army—as to the patrols that were being flown. The task force commanded by Vice Admiral Halsey was at sea, and the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor and could have, in a very short time, been ready for its initial tasks. I repeat that nobody expected war immediately. If any expectation existed, it was not manifested either by the Commander-in-Chief or by the high command of the admirals here in Pearl Harbor, and I believe that everyone felt that the training, the amount of fuel, and the logistic support which existed at Pearl Harbor made the Fleet ready to comply with this initial task in case a notification came for them to do so.

32. Q. Admiral, as I understood your testimony, in answer to questions by the court, you stated that you were familiar with the war warning dispatch?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. And that you considered it to mean that if negotiations with these peace envoys broke down, trouble might ensue?

A. That is correct.

34. Q. I should like to show you Exhibit 17 before this court, which is the so-called "war warning" dispatch, and ask you to state, if you will, what you considered the first sentence of the dispatch to mean: "This message is to be [939] considered a war warning," and also what you considered the phrase to mean: "Negotiations with Japan have ceased"?

A. In addition to this dispatch, we had also received—just how Admiral Kimmel received it now I don't remember—an order that U. S. naval forces were not to commit any overt acts. My memory has evidently played me false, as I thought that was a part of this dispatch. I considered this dispatch, when read to me, to mean that the Navy Department in Washington believed that the situation was not bright. I did not believe from this telegram and from the previous information that existed—and I must connect that with this dispatch—that any attack would be made except against Manila, and I am quite sure that in this war warning telegram the specific localities mentioned are those in the East, and the only United States possibility mentioned is the Philippine Islands. In connection with other information which I had received officially, I felt that Washington considered the Atlantic and the Asiatic as the hot spots where immediate trouble might start. I did not consider that this was a war warning for the Fleet here at Pearl Harbor to go into Condition One and to remain on a war footing, for if these negotiations did break down, the first attack would undoubtedly mean the Philippine Islands.

35. Q. Doesn't that dispatch state, "Negotiations have ceased," thereby not leaving that to any interpretation by the commander here?

A. Yes.

36. Q. To whom is that dispatch addressed for action?

A. Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, CincLant, SpeNavO.

37. Q. It was considered here that when a dispatch was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific saying that it was to be considered a war warning, it did not necessarily mean that the Fleet here would have to go on a war footing or that war was imminent?

A. That was Calhoun's impression, and from what I gathered, actually being present at this conference where this telegram was read, it was the impression of the other officers there. I knew that a cross section of the best naval talent in the world was sitting in that room when this telegram was read, and the general impression of that cross section of naval talent, which cannot be denied, was not to put the Fleet in immediate battle stations as battle conditions. I feel certain that they expected that the attack, if any came, would be against the Philippine Islands.

The court then, at 11:55 a. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[940] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were

present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

The witness requested permission to elaborate on an answer made to a question asked him.

The court stated that permission was granted.

The witness stated as follows: I would like to enlarge on some of the answers to the questions that you asked me just previous to the recess. There is no doubt that having looked over the list of Fleet auxiliaries that exist today and considering their construction periods that it was the effort of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1940 and 1941 that, with the splendid cooperation from the Navy Department, resulted in an early flow of those ships into the Fleet almost immediately after Pearl Harbor and a continual flow of them since that time; that while those ships were possibly not immediately available, evidently they had been planned for and steps were being taken to send them to the Fleet, and it was because of those steps that we have them today in sufficient quantity where I can say that we are prepared to support the Fleet anywhere, any time. In regard to war footing or war preparations of the Fleet, I realize that I am testifying before a Naval Court where we all speak the same language, but that my statements may not be understood outside of naval circles. This Fleet was on a war footing and had been for some months ready to conduct any ordered sortie where 24 to 36 hours advance notice was given. Before the war warning telegram came, orders had been issued that the moment a task force returned to this port they were to be boarded by fuel, provision and maintenance officers; that they were to be fully fueled, they were to be fully provisioned, and the same with ammunition. If they stayed in port any length of time their commanders had orders to request that the small oil barges come around and top them off so that they were practically filled with fuel at all times. I meant, when I said "not on a war footing", we did not take any of the prescribed conditions of readiness for battle, nor were any of those conditions for readiness prescribed in the security orders; but at the slightest knowledge that an attack was coming, those steps could have been and would have been [941] easily and readily taken. To have placed the Fleet in battle condition would have interfered with the orderly system of strenuous training which was in effect. Each task force, as it went to sea, conducted target practices and maneuvered in every way possible to improve its battle condition. That is what I meant by not being on a war footing. I should have said we were not on a battle footing but we were on a war footing and had been for some time. The Fleet was ready to execute the preliminary maneuvers of the existing war plans and WPL and sufficient auxiliaries did exist for the ordered deployments had they come. However, the total capacity of the tankers available to the Pacific Fleet was 760,000 barrels of fuel oil and in the first nine days after Pearl Harbor we pumped into the Fleet 750,000 barrels. That is what I meant by the fact that the tankers would not have been able to take care of the Fleet away from Pearl Harbor if any amount of high speed steaming had been conducted.

Cross-examination by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, (Continued) :

38. Q. One further thing in connection with the dispatch of November 27th, the so-called war warning dispatch. You have amplified your answer to that and explained to the court what you meant by the Fleet being on a war footing, but I believe that I am correct in saying that nothing that you have said by the way of amplification changes your previous answer which indicated that the Fleet instituted no additional measures after receipt of the dispatch of November 27th to put it in a greater condition of readiness for war?

A. I am aware of a certain happening, the details of which I cannot state, but I do know that certain air patrols were instituted somewhere around the first or second of December, or maybe earlier, above those that had been in effect previous to that time. I am aware of the fact that there was discussion by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bellinger—he is the one that I am certain of—as to the fact that these new orders placed into effect would fly every plane capable of making a search up to the limit of endurance of planes and pilots. That was done, either after November 27th or just before that time. The details of that, I don't know, but I do know that such an order was given.

39. Q. That is the only additional security measure of which you feel you have any knowledge?

A. That is correct, sir.

40. Q. Admiral, I believe you testified in your direct examination that from time to time you, as personnel officer of the Fleet, had asked for additional personnel, and I believe you said made the squawks about personnel, and that word had been received by the Commander-in-Chief that not only were these deficiencies not to be made up but that it might be possible that additional personnel and ships would have to be [942] taken from the Pacific Fleet for other purposes. Is that correct?

A. That is my absolute recollection of the facts. Exactly how that was received I do not know, but I am certain that in conference with Admiral Kimmel, then Captain W. W. Smith, Captain McMorris, we discussed the fact brought about by ordering away our only two salvage tugs which, after they started for the Coast and we complained so bitterly, were turned around and brought back; that if they took ships from us and if they took men from us by continuing to have us send our replacements for new crews without replacing them, the Fleet would soon be in a bad way.

41. Q. I also understood that you felt that you were acquainted with the details of the correspondence that flowed between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark during the period, say, six months previous to 7 December 1941?

A. That is right.

42. Q. Were you aware that at any time during this period Admiral Stark assured Admiral Kimmel that he was contemplating taking no further forces from the Pacific Fleet?

A. I know that, but whether I knew it after December or before, I can't state. I think it was before. I feel sure it was before. If I am allowed to say what I feel, I can't state under oath definitely whether it was before or after but I think it was before.

43. Q. May I show you Exhibit 12 before this court, which is a letter dated 23 September 1941, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, and ask you to look at the second full paragraph on page 2, and see whether or not that refreshes your memory. Do you remember seeing that letter at the time it was received by Admiral Kimmel?

A. I saw a similar paragraph to the one marked, either before December 7th or shortly after. I would have to look at this whole letter to tell you whether or not I saw the letter.

44. Q. What I am getting at, Admiral. I don't think that is necessary unless you particularly want to. What I am getting at is, whether or not you felt, prior to 7 December 1941 that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific had been assured by the Chief of Naval Operations that no further units would be taken from the Pacific Fleet other than those contemplated by WPL-46?

A. I believe that I had that information before December 7th.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

45. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the time that the orders were given by Admiral Kimmel, if they were given, as to the depth bombing of submarines in the vicinity of Oahu?

A. I had been relieved as Commander Base Force of the [943] security patrol, but I am aware of the fact that orders were issued that the destroyers of the security patrol should, if they contacted a submerged submarine in the restricted sea area, stick with it, attempt to identify it, attempt to make it come to the surface, but if they knew beyond any reasonable doubt that there was a submarine down there not one of our own, that they would attack it with depth charges and destroy it. I also know that the security patrol, while previously ordered to have their guns loaded just before December 7th—maybe a month—received orders that guns were no longer to be loaded but they were to be handy and in the ready ammunition boxes. There wasn't any question about the fact that if they had encountered a Japanese submarine out here that they were to destroy it; not in my mind.

46. Q. With your knowledge of the conditions of the Fleet as regards security matters between November 28th and the 7th of December, do you know of any other possible security measures that could have been taken than those that were in force and effect at that time?

A. I do not, considering that I had read the joint coastal frontier plans—I think that is the proper designation—and knew that the Fleet was to be called upon only if present in port to use its anti-aircraft guns on an attack if so requested by the Army Command. I believe that by flying the additional patrols which I knew Admiral Kimmel ordered—but just how or what I can't state—he was doing everything that he could do. I made no suggestions to him for increased alert and I would have felt perfectly free to do so if I had had the mentality or the thought or the idea that anything else I could suggest would help.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Re-examined by the court:

47. Q. Admiral, you were the Fleet Personnel Officer. Will you state in general the officer and enlisted personnel situation from the standpoint of adequacy of numbers, ratings, and permanency; that is, the need for furnishing personnel to other commands?

A. The adequacy of ratings was excellent due to the fact that very little advancement occurred. The minute they took any petty officer from you, you had the petty officer material ready for replacing them. There was a long waiting list, particularly for chief petty officers, waiting to be rated, but because of the numbers of personnel allowed in the Navy and in the Fleet at that time, the vacancies did not exist. Ships of the destroyer class were then woefully under-manned. Maybe we didn't know it then but we do know it now, due to the fact that because of the assigned complements, even though the complements were filled, they could only, under battle conditions, probably man 75 per cent of their stations. The tankers could not possibly have fueled at sea [944] and be ready for any form of defense. The tanker crews have almost been doubled since pre-Pearl Harbor. The destroyer crews have almost been doubled. The permanency of personnel was fair. We sometimes lost men, and the Fleet was never in excess, more rapidly than we got replacements, but at that time, with the assigned complements, I again repeat that ratings didn't bother us. We had a long waiting list for promotions. Officer personnel, I can give my opinion on and definite facts as to the Base Force. I was not Fleet Officer Personnel Officer. The auxiliaries of the Base Force had all the officer personnel that they could possibly need or use. As to the rest of the Fleet, I heard in Admiral Kimmel's conferences of various types that they would like to have more officers and men, but as to the details of the officers, I do not know. The base force officer personnel was sufficient as to rank and permanency. Enlisted men in the Base Force was sufficient as to rank and permanency, except the tankers would have been under-manned for sea cruising with a task force. That knowledge is hindsight. The Fleet was never in excess and always 5 to 10 per cent short of the enlisted men allowed. The state of training of the men was excellent. Their morale was, in my opinion, extremely high. I saw Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December from a grandstand seat in an auxiliary that apparently was in no danger; was not subject to attack, and the way the personnel conducted themselves that day speaks volumes for the training and the fighting heart that had been instilled in those men by their responsible commanders.

48. Q. Admiral, having been security officer, did you feel that adequate security measures had been taken by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District who, I understand, relieved you, for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir, and if I hadn't thought so I wouldn't have hesitated for one moment to go to him, and I know that he would have gladly entertained and considered any information or advice I had to give. I was fully conversant with the orders that he issued after taking over from me, and the orders issued by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District were a little bit more warlike than those issued by myself as Commander Base Force. Again I repeat, mine were issued based entirely on the acts of irresponsible nationals and the fact that nationals would not attack the Fleet at Pearl Harbor or the Fleet

at sea, but when the Commandant of the 14th Naval District took over, that shade of distinction was a little bit broadened and it was more of a warlike security measure than had been in existence when it was handled by the Base Force; considerably more so.

49. Q. Do you consider that the lookouts and all for the entrances to Pearl Harbor were adequate and on the alert?

A. Definitely so, sir.

[945] 50. Q. You are aware of the fact that a submarine entered on the morning of the 7th into Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; a midget submarine.

51. Q. And is it your understanding that there was no report of that midget submarine until it got well inside the harbor?

A. It isn't a question of understanding. I definitely feel sure it would have reached me because I had many mine craft and tugs to go after them. I had no warning that a submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed me that they had fired on a midget submarine and sunk it on the other side of Ford Island.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he though should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated as follows: I regret that I did not carefully distinguish between war footing as I considered the Fleet on December 7th and just prior to that and what it is today. Today there are conditions of readiness maintained at all times. Certain watches man guns, and battle stations are partially manned. Task Forces One, Two and Three, which composed the Pacific Fleet, were continually making sweeps, cruising and training. One task force was always at sea and it was relieved by the second, which meant that for short periods two-thirds of the Fleet was at sea. They steamed in all-together battle conditions, darkened fleet, ship, and everything as exists today. They were ready to fight had they been attacked. Here in Pearl Harbor, I meant that after the war warning telegram we didn't go to general quarters at daylight and then follow it up by setting certain conditions of readiness as is done in the Fleet today, but I do consider that we had been making strenuous warlike preparations ever since the day in 1940 when we were told that the Fleet was not to return to the Coast but would remain in the Hawaiian Islands. The Fleet was training for war and preparing for war in every way they knew how. That includes urging the proper building of auxiliaries, the extension of storage facilities at Pearl Harbor in which Commander Base Force was interested, and arrangements such that NTS and WSA would assist in the logistic supply of the Islands and necessarily of the Fleet. I would like to correct any impression that I gave that the Fleet was not ready for war, and by stating that we were not on a war footing, I meant that we had not [946] assumed or taken conditions of readiness for battle stations, and that only. I do consider that the Fleet was ready for war and could have, in a very short time, due to the continued logistic

preparations that were made, have been ready for the necessary sorties and placed into execution advanced deployments that would have been called for by placing the WPL into effect.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 2:15 p. m., took a recess until 3:00 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reported.

[947] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. C. W. Nimitz, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of the year 1941?

A. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Admiral, in testimony before this court, reference has been made to shortage of personnel, officer and enlisted, in the Pacific Fleet, and of the drains made from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet and to new construction. Will you briefly describe the situation as it existed during 1941, prior to December 7?

A. The statement which I will make will have to be in general terms, as I do not have access to records or figures or percentages. The year 1941 was characterized by a great expansion in the Navy, particularly in the naval air arm. Training activities were greatly expanded. Large drafts were made on the Fleet in both oceans for personnel to assist in the training, and for trained personnel to form the nuclei of ships and units being placed in commission. Large numbers of transports were being taken over by the Navy and Navy-manned. Every effort was being made to bring back into active service all officers and men on the retired list and on the Fleet Reserve, who were capable of performing active duty. In spite of the reserves which we had available, it was necessary to call on the fleets in both oceans and in about the same ratio, although the Pacific Fleet was slightly favored, for officers and men to man the new ships. There was a constant struggle between the desire to maintain a stability of personnel in the Fleets and a desire to man new construction. Inasmuch as the country was not yet in war, and inasmuch as it was vitally necessary to strengthen the fleet for new construction, ships nearing completion—considerable numbers of officers and men were drained from the fleets. The Asiatic Fleet did not participate in this furnishing of men, and was kept practically up to strength, although there were some few officers and men even from that Fleet. To the best of my recollection, in about December of '41, the ships were fully manned as regards numbers of officers and about 90% manned as regards numbers of men. There was, however, a high proportion of reserve officers in the officers' rosters of all ships, and

a large proportion of the men were relatively untrained, having had anywhere from a month to something under two months of training at training stations. The rapidly expanding training system, particularly naval air stations, [948] absorbed large numbers of trained aviators to keep the training program going. I would like to add that at this time, about December of 1941, prior to the 7th, there had been an increase in the anti-aircraft batteries of our combatant units, and steps were already under way to provide the necessary personnel for these batteries, so the 90% figure includes personnel for those batteries and included enough men to man anti-aircraft batteries almost on a watch-and-watch basis. Since December 7 there has been a tremendous increase in the anti-aircraft armaments of all of our ships, which has greatly increased the numbers of men aboard ship.

4. Q. Admiral, do you consider that during this time, the principal activity of the United States Fleet was centered in the Atlantic, as to actual active conditions?

A. In my capacity, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, I was not concerned with the operations of the Fleet, but I was aware of the fact that withdrawals had been made from the Pacific Fleet into the Atlantic Fleet, particularly one division of battleships, three in number; some destroyers, number I don't recollect—but there had been a number of withdrawals. I am not a good witness as to the relative importance of the two areas, except that the fighting was actually going on in the Atlantic at that time and was not going on in the Pacific.

5. Q. Admiral, would not suspension of training activity have had a serious effect upon your ability to supply personnel to new construction?

A. It would have been impossible to produce trained aviation personnel without the training activities centered ashore. It was possible, of course, to train deck hands by taking men newly inducted and placing them aboard ships and requiring ships to do the training, but the general preparedness efforts would have been considerably retarded.

None of the interested parties desired to cross-examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: "None except to offer the suggestion that the Bureau of Navigation records will contain a very complete story of the efforts that were being made at that time to obtain personnel, and the efforts were very strenuous."

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 3:20 p. m., adjourned subject to the call of the president.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 13, 1944

[949]

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY

NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR,
Territory of Hawaii.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Bieseimeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), interested party and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-sixth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 950 through 987, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of National Security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[987A] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 2:45 p. m., adjourned subject to the call of the president.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

[988]

TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY

FEDERAL BUILDING,
San Francisco, California,

The court met at 2:30 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy, Commander of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of July and 7 December 1941?

A. I was Director of War Plans in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. Will you state in general language what your relations with the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of your duties were as Chief of the War Plans Division?

A. I was one of the five or six major assistants below the Assistant Chief, and my official and personal relations with Admiral Stark were very close. A great many [989] of the projects which the Department had in mind were referred to the War Plans Division for comment and recommendations so that the War Plans Division was cognizant of most of the things that went on in the Department.

4. Q. Did your duties include being a sort of a professional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations on matters pertaining to military operations?

A. Yes, particularly with regard to preparation for war and with regard to future operations and with regard to relationships with the Army and to some extent, with the State Department.

5. Q. The United States, by an executive order, in July, 1941, froze Japanese assets in the United States. What were your views at that time as to probable Japanese reactions to this executive order?

A. I will say this: That that order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on my part. I heard it mentioned but it more or less came out of a clear sky. I do not know just how much Admiral Stark knew about it in advance. I had expressed the opinion previously, and I again expressed it, that that would very definitely bring on war with Japan. There was no possibility of composing matters after that unless Japan made a complete backdown, which it was very apparent she was not going to do.

6. Q. You have stated that you thought there would be a war with Japan. Do you mean by that, a Japanese-United States war?

A. Yes.

7. Q. I show you Exhibit 13 which is in evidence before this court, and it is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October, 1941. I will ask you to examine it and state whether you were acquainted with this dispatch at or about the time of its release?

A. Yes, I wrote the dispatch. It had some slight changes in it but I wrote it and presented it to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by them it was, as I recall, presented to the Joint Board and the Joint Board, I don't believe, took any official action on it as a serial before them, but approved it.

8. Q. This dispatch sets out, as you will note, that there is a possibility that Japan may attack the United States and Great Britain. Upon what considerations was this conclusion predicated?

A. By that time British and United States relationships had become very close and I know nothing about what assurances were given by the President to Great Britain, but I was convinced then that if Japan attacked Britain in the Far East that the United States would immediately enter the war against [290] Japan. The Japanese for some years before 1941 had apparently determined that they were going to drive Britain out of the Far East. I believe that a certain section of the Japanese hierarchy were very anxious to keep the United States out of the war, that is, keep the United States from assisting Great Britain, but many of the moves that had been made against Japan during 1940 and '41 were made by the United States. The whole political situation, their interest in the Philippines, convinced me that war would be not far off and that it would be against the United States and Great Britain.

9. Q. You speak of a war between the United States and Japan. Had you formed any estimate as to what nation would take the initial step towards this war?

A. Yes. It was absolutely certain that the nation that would take the initial steps would be Japan. There was no desire in the United States political circles to declare war against Japan unless she did something which was impossible to accept. Great Britain had her hands full and we would, I am quite sure, have gone on indefinitely if Japan had not attacked us.

10. Q. Had you made any estimate of where such an attack might be made?

A. Yes. In January of 1941 we issued a War Plan based on the situation called Rainbow Three, and that was not a joint war plan because we couldn't get the Army to go in with us on it at that time and we had to get a plan out. That plan issued at that time—and we saw no reason later to change it—envisaged a major attack, a major line of effort of Japan against the Philippines and either Borneo or Malaya; ultimately both, depending on the direction or the strength that they had available. At the same time we issued that war plan we prepared a letter for the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and stated that we considered that any attack of that nature would almost surely be accompanied by an attack on the Hawaiian Islands and the Fleet of one or more forms of attack—air, submarine, Fleet, or a combination of any of those. That letter went out signed by the Secretary of the Navy, as I recall it, in January of 1941; went to the Secretary of War who agreed with it; and letters derived from those two letters were sent out to the Commanders-in-Chief, but the major concept of the war as given in Rainbow Three was an attack on the Philippines accompanied either with Malaya or Borneo.

11. Q. I show you Exhibit 9, Admiral, in evidence before this court, which is the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941. I ask you to examine it and state whether or not that is the letter to which you have just referred?

A. That is the letter.

[991] 12. Q. Exhibit 9 bears date of 24 January 1941.

A. That is the letter you were speaking of.

13. Q. The letter that you have just examined. You were previously being questioned with reference to Exhibit 13, which was the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October 1941. Was it your view at this time in October that the same considerations governing Japanese action might still be maintained?

A. Yes.

14. Q. Can you recall whether or not you had any discussions or conferences with the Chief of Naval Operations at that time in which these views were discussed?

A. Do you mean in which these same considerations were brought up?

15. Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

16. Q. To-wit, the possible objectives of a Japanese attack in the event of the Japanese taking war-like action.

A. Those questions were continuously under discussion from the time—probably had been before, but from the time I went to the Department in October of 1940, until the time of the Japanese attack. The pros and cons and the methods and just how the Japanese would do that were under discussion all the time in my section, and between myself and Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and immediate members of his staff.

17. Q. Exhibit 13 directs, in effect, that addressees take due precautions, including preparatory deployments. What was desired to be conveyed by this directive "take due precautions including preparatory deployments"?

A. Our preparatory deployments were intended to include sending submarines out to the westward along approximately the 180th meridian. There was no such order given, of course, but that was our intention, to send some out just east of the Marshalls, to have the Fleet at sea, or part of it, a considerable part of the time to the westward of Hawaii and up generally in a supporting position for Midway and Wake and covering positions for Palmyra and Johnston, and it was expected that they would be in a position from previous deployments so that we could get warning of any attack that was coming so that they could take measures against any Japanese force that came in. As I recall it, as a result of that dispatch, or shortly afterwards in any case, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet issued the order that Japanese submarines would be attacked by our forces if found any place in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. I don't know whether those orders were issued in detail; we didn't see them.

[992] 18. Q. This dispatch of 16 October also contains the directive to take precautions as will not constitute provocative action against Japan. Do you know who was responsible for those words being in the dispatch?

A. I was.

19. Q. For what reason were they placed in the dispatch?

A. The State Department and the Navy Department, I think, were in accord that we should get as much time as we ourselves could to prepare in a material way for the war. We had finally been able to get appropriations that would assist in a material way very much better, and we had also opened up the enlistments again and we wanted to be in better shape so that we could carry on the war more effectively. Now, in addition to that there were conversations going on constantly with the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be possibly a solution so that there wouldn't be any war and that was the desire of the government, that we not get into war with Japan at that time. Therefore, we did not want our Fleet, for example, to cruise over near the Marshalls and assume a threatening attitude. We didn't want them to arrest all the known disloyal elements in Hawaii and we didn't want to send any submarines out near the Japanese islands. It was an attempt to retain the peace as long as possible and to make sure that when war came that it would be initiated by Japan and not by the United States.

20. Q. At the time of preparing this dispatch of 16 October for release, had any consideration been given to the advisability of shifting the base of the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor to another area?

A. The question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast of the United States had been discussed more or less continuously from the time the Fleet stopped out there in Pearl Harbor after conclusion of the spring maneuvers in 1940. There were reasons unconnected with the war which made it desirable to have the Fleet back on the Coast. One of them was because of better logistics and better contentment of personnel; and then there was the very troublesome question of whether or not the Fleet, being in Hawaii, would not cause a very unfavorable reaction in the Japanese and directly lead to war rather than to prevent it. In other words, some people in the Department and the government felt that we could bluff Japan. Other people felt we couldn't bluff Japan and that question came in. The matter

of moving the Fleet back to the Coast was put up to the President several times after I went to the Department and each time the decision was made to retain it out there, except that a scheme was worked out so I think a fourth or a third of the Fleet would come back to the States for repairs and for liberty and leave for the personnel.

21. Q. Those were the considerations that had governed the basing of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor for a long period of time, but I am asking you specifically as of 16 October and thereafter, had any consideration been given to the advisability of changing the base of the Pacific Fleet [993] in view of the impending diplomatic developments?

A. No. By that time I believe that everyone in authority in Washington was convinced that the Fleet ought to remain based on Pearl Harbor; war was too imminent.

The proceedings following directly hereafter, Pages 994 through 1008, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[1009] The court then, at 4:25 p. m., took a recess until 4:35 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding and continued his testimony.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

113. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that in the half year, perhaps longer, prior to 7 December 1941, there had been discussions between the War and Navy Departments concerning the principle and the application of the principle of unity of command. Would you state for the court what the situation was immediately prior to 7 December 1941 with respect to these discussions concerning unity of command?

A. The discussion had never reached a conclusion. Therefore, the situation on December 7 was one of cooperation between the two services.

114. Q. Would you suggest the reasons why there had not been any conclusion at that time?

A. We had been unable to arrive at any other agreement than of leaving the command set-up as it had been before. There were never any very clear, explicit proposals for placing one service under the command of the other. There had been a great deal of discussion, but rather vague in nature. It was a new idea. I don't believe there was any position taken by either Department along a firm line. That is to say, there were some people in the Navy Department who wished to see some kind of a unity of command. There were some in the War

Department. There were others in both departments that felt that the existing system was as good as anything that we could get up. There had been, specifically, proposals made by the Navy Department with regard to Hawaii and Panama, and the Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier, and I don't remember whether that proposal, which was a paper draft in my office, brought the Philippines in it or not. The proposal was gone into in considerable detail that the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier would be under the Army, that the Caribbean would be under the Navy, but that document had not been accepted by the War Department. We had made a considerable number of changes in it. We were approaching a solution, I believe, but it had not been arrived at, as I recall.

115. Q. Prior to 7 December?

A. Prior to 7 December.

116. Q. Admiral, during the six months preceding 7 December 1941, did you feel that your office and the other units of [1010] Office of Chief of Naval Operations kept the Commander-in-Chief of all three Fleets, the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Asiatic, fully informed of diplomatic and military developments so far as you knew them, with particular reference to relations between Japan and the United States?

A. Yes, we did, principally through the medium of official letters written in the personal form, exchanged between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations and by means of rather frequent visits by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and infrequent visits to Washington by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. We sent one or two officers out to Hawaii and on to Manila with instructions to talk to the Commander-in-Chief and acquaint him with the views of the department on the diplomatic and military situation.

117. Q. I gathered from your direct testimony in this connection that you and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations considered that on 7 December 1941, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet had received adequate directions to prepare himself for war, from the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, without regard to other information which may or may not have been made available to him?

A. Yes.

118. Q. Adverting for a moment to the British staff conferences, I think you stated that you felt that if Japan attacked Great Britain in the Far East, that the United States would join with Great Britain; do you know of any commitment made on behalf of the United States during these staff conversations or at any other time to the effect that if Great Britain were attacked by Japan in the Far East the United States would come to the assistance of Great Britain?

A. There was no such commitment specifically. We were asked by the British to make such commitments, and particularly with respect to the Asiatic station. We were unable to make any such commitment because unless we ourselves were attacked it would require an Act of Congress to enter the war. However, we believed, particularly toward the end, that we would enter the war if Great Britain were attacked in the Far East.

119. Q. Do you know whether or not the feeling in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations was conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not know; I think not.

120. Q. When did you become head of War Plans in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral?

A. October 23, 1940.

121. Q. During your tour of duty in that capacity, what effort was made by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, through the War Plans Division, toward the production and dissemination of a war plan which was definitely realistic [1011] and had in mind the forces available to the United States for the prosecution of the war?

A. On October 23, 1940, the only War Plan in existence was the Orange War Plan, which was most unrealistic. There was a memorandum or letter in rather general terms, written by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, concerning his movements and tasks in the case of war with Japan. I immediately started the preparation of a War Plan which was known as Rainbow 3, and was put out, I believe, in January 1941. The War Department would not agree to making that a joint plan, although they indicated that they would in general terms go along with that plan, so that was purely a naval plan, based on the concept of Japan attacking the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies and Hawaii, and it involved sending a detachment of the Pacific Fleet out to join the Asiatic Fleet. That plan was thoroughly discussed by the principal officers in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and with one or two members of the General Board, and agreed on and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. We undertook during January discussions with the Army on what was called Rainbow 5. A lot of work had been done on Rainbow 4, which was practically a purely defensive plan for South America, and with ourselves fighting Germany and Japan, but that was dropped because it was not realistic. The discussions of Rainbow 5 had not proceeded very far before the opening of the conversations with the British, which was in February of 1941. Rainbow 5 was in reality the implementation of the agreements which we made with the British during those conversations. As soon as we got out Rainbow 3, War Plans made recommendations which were approved to immediately start moving ships and men and materials to positions envisaged by Rainbow 3. As soon as Rainbow 5 was produced, which was—I think we issued that in May of 1941—we again tried to implement that plan by putting the forces where they were called for and deployment was made, practically completed, in August of 1941. However, a change had occurred in which we were required to move an additional number of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic because of proposals for certain operations in the Atlantic with respect to Germany. I would like to add that some of these vessels that went to the Atlantic were sent back to the Pacific, and on December 7, 1941, the deployment was substantially in accordance with Rainbow 5—WPL-46.

[1012] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

122. Q. In your opinion, then, Admiral, was WPL-46 a realistic war plan?

A. Yes.

123. Q. Do you consider that subsequent events during the first year of the war changed your estimate of the plan at all as to its being a realistic war plan?

A. No. It must be understood that a war plan issued by the Department is substantially the initiation of war, the opening steps with major tasks that go into the far future but without any detailed tasks except for the opening movements.

124. Q. Admiral, I would like to read you Article 0222 from Exhibit 4, which is WPL 46. This article reads as follows: "Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war." Would you explain why mobilization was not ordered prior to 7 December 1941?

A. It is not practicable in a democracy, in my opinion, to mobilize without the authority of Congress, and the authority of Congress to mobilize would be tantamount to a declaration of war. That matter of mobilization had appeared in great detail in previous war plans. This was put in to try to make it realistic but with the knowledge that the chances were that no order would be given. As a matter of fact, however, the Navy—and to a large extent the Army—was mobilized. We were at our war stations. Reserves had been called into service and mobilization, so far as the Navy was concerned, would have accomplished exactly zero. The only thing that we could have accomplished by mobilization would have been the taking over merchant shipping and taking over direct control of the ports, but that again is not within the power of the executive; unless you are actually in war you cannot take over property without the authority of Congress.

125. Q. Referring now to Article 0223 of Exhibit 4, WPL-46. I would like to read that article: "This plan may be executed in part by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed or accepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof." Would you explain why it was that partial execution of WPL-46 was not ordered prior to 7 December 1941 by CNO?

A. Execution of any part of WPL-46 would have constituted an act of war which the Chief of Naval Operations nor the President were authorized to commit. That particular paragraph was put in there because it might well have been that we would have gone to war with Germany—that is, the United States against Germany—without going to war with Japan. Therefore, when WPL-46 is put into effect, or when any part of it is put into effect, that is war, and we felt that there was a decided possibility that we would go to war with Germany without at the same time going to war against Japan.

[1013] 126. Q. Do I understand, then, Admiral, that the partial execution mentioned in this article contemplated war with Germany and not war with Japan, rather than partially executing the war plan with respect to one of those possible enemy powers?

A. That is correct.

127. Q. Do you recall when merchant shipping was diverted from the Central Pacific, Admiral?

A. Yes. I do not recall the exact date. It was, I believe, the latter part of October, 1941.

128. Q. Would you explain why it was that the Chief of Naval Operations ordered that diversion of merchant shipping from the Central Pacific?

A. The Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that war was coming. We were shipping out to the Philippines extremely valuable cargoes in the form of troops, guns, and airplanes. We needed those men and that equipment in the Philippines very badly and we were afraid that these ships might be attacked by the Japanese. Some of the ships were Dutch and the seizure of the Dutch ships by Japan would have created a very difficult kind of a problem. So that those ships, first, were diverted and then, on the formation of the Tojo cabinet, we felt that war was very close and the Chief of Naval Operations diverted the ships down to the south so that they would not be captured.

129. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, informed of this action by the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, I feel quite sure they were. The order was issued written by Admiral Ingersoll, and my recollection is that both of them were informed.

130. Q. Admiral, did you think during the year 1941 that the diplomatic and economic steps taken by the government of the United States were kept in step with the state of preparedness for war at that time; that is, our country's state of preparedness for war?

A. Yes, in general.

131. Q. Do you know of any steps taken by the Navy Department during the last half of 1941 to have the United States-Japanese negotiations so conducted that the Army and the Navy would have a chance to better their war preparations?

A. That particular point came up several times at conferences between representatives of the State Department and the War and Navy Departments. On several occasions Mr. Hull specifically asked if the two departments wanted time to better their readiness for war, and the answer every time, even up to the last, was in the affirmative. The Departments wanted the war with Japan put off as long as it could be put off so that we could be in a better position.

[1014] Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

132. Q. Admiral, in your recent testimony you have indicated that you believed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet up until 7 December 1941 had been given all the information and directives and so forth that he required to go ahead with his various duties in connection with the war plans. In your testimony at that time did you include in your general analysis of what had been given to him that he was continually receiving the special information that had been discussed previously at this meeting but which is recorded separately?

A. Yes, but I believe now, and I believed then, that he was kept adequately informed by official communications to him.

133. Q. Do you know that the official communications to him which included a great many letters in a personal form, that the details of this special information were included in those letters to the same

extent as the particular documents in which this information was contained ?

A. I believe that he received adequate information in official communications to him, and that no more was necessary. The tremendous number of details that were in this separate information were, in my opinion, not necessary for a proper understanding of the situation and for the conduct of the war.

134. Q. But do you consider that none of that information would have assisted him in his evaluation of the situation from time to time?

A. No.

135. Q. Then some of that information would have helped him in determining the situation as it changed?

A. I don't know whether it would have helped him, or not.

136. Q. But at least it was not given to him in detail?

A. I don't know that to be a fact.

137. Q. Do you know whether it was given in detail in this official correspondence to which you have just now referred?

A. It was given in sufficient detail, and in my opinion, much of our estimate of the situation was based on reading the newspapers and of public statements issued by the Japanese government, and of specific movements that the Japanese were making in Indo-China and here, there, and the other place. That information, in my opinion, on the whole, was far more valuable in making up your mind as to the situation. It was to me a great deal more valuable than all the other types of information that were obtained.

138. Q. Then you expected, as head of the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, that the Commander-in-Chief should keep readers of the public press so that they could get their information as to what was going on?

A. I expected him to read the newspapers, yes.

[1015] 139. Q. In this connection, reading the newspapers, were you aware from the newspapers that the negotiations with the Japanese were continuing, apparently on the surface, after the 29th of November, 1941, until the 7th of December, 1941?

A. Yes, there was something in the papers every day about it.

140. Q. Was that matter discussed with the Chief of Naval Operations as to what information was received from newspapers and otherwise?

A. I think not.

141. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations use the newspaper publications for coming to a conclusion as to what our relations with Japan were at that time?

A: Presumably he did. I don't know what he used; everything that he did use.

142. Q. In connection with keeping the Commander-in-Chief informed of the situation from time to time, are you familiar with a joint memorandum that was prepared by General Marshall and the Chief of Naval Operations to the President in regard to the preparation of the Navy and the Army of the United States to meet the Japanese situation as it was developing?

A. I would like to refresh my memory with it.

143. Q. Yes. I show you Exhibit 39-A, which is the memorandum dated November 5, 1941 addressed to the President on the subject of

the estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation, and I direct your attention particularly to the last sentence thereof.

A. Yes, I remember this. It was prepared in the War Department and some changes were made—it was discussed between the War Plans Division and some changes were made and submitted. Now, what was the question?

144. Q. I direct your attention to the last paragraph and ask you to read specifically what is recommended. Read it into the record, please.

A. (Reading:)

Specifically they recommend that the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved; that material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces; that aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent; that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

145. Q. In connection with this exhibit and referring to the note of the United States to Japan of 26 November 1941, did you consider, when you became familiar with that note, that the note was, in effect, an ultimatum in that it contained conditions that would be wholly unacceptable to Japan?

A. I did not consider it an ultimatum.

146. Q. Did you expect that the conditions set forth in the note of 26 November 1941 would be accepted by Japan?

A. No.

[1016] 147. Q. What action by Japan did you expect?

A. My previous testimony said that in my opinion that note was delivered by the State Department purely for the purpose of continuing conversations with the Japanese as long as possible, and represented a more or less final view of the State Department as to the conditions necessary for continued peace and agreement with Japan.

148. Q. And then you expected that the continued peace would be disrupted upon the reply to that note?

A. I don't believe that I thought anything about it in that connection because I knew a war was coming in just a few days.

149. Q. You will observe that the note of November 26, 1941 was approximately 20 days after the joint memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Had any material progress been made in those intervening 20 days that were so extensive as to have placed the United States in a much better position to carry on the war that appeared at that time to be so close.

A. The policy of the government was to delay war with Japan as long as possible.

150. Q. But did you think that the United States was prepared—

A. Twenty days delay was that much delay and by that amount we were better prepared.

151. Q. But did you think that these 20 days were going to bring the state of preparedness of the United States to such a point that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, for instance, could carry out its war plans any better than they did before?

A. I don't get the sense of the question. I couldn't predict, for example, at the time of this other occurrence, that we were going to war in 20 days, or 10 days, or any other number of days. The policy of

the government was to delay war with Japan as long as possible. What I thought about it had no bearing.

152. Q. But isn't it a fact that within 20 days after a formal memorandum was given by the Chief of Naval Operations that no ultimatum should be delivered, that a note was actually sent to the Japanese, the conditions of which you believed they would not accept?

A. No note ever given by one government to another, probably, in general terms, ever is acceptable at first. That was an effort to prolong the negotiations. I'm not defending that note in the slightest degree. I had nothing to do with the note and the note was sent. I saw a draft of it before it went, a preliminary affair, and that was somewhat changed, but then it was sent without further reference to the Navy Department.

153. Q. Do you know whether Admiral Stark saw that draft before it was sent?

A. I do not know.

[1017] 154. Q. Did you feel at the time of November 26, 1941, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared to carry out the missions as required by the War Plans?

A. Yes.

155. Q. Do you consider that it was to be carried out as more than just an initial attack, or a continued operation?

A. Whose operation?

156. Q. A continued operation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. If you will read that letter you just referred to, you will find there that our attitude was a defensive attitude to be taken; it was a defensive attitude. We were not in position to make an offensive movement at that time and I considered then, and consider now, that the means he had at hand he was able to put up a defense and continue defensive operations.

157. Q. Do you consider that his operations were only to extend to the Hawaiian Islands, Wake and Midway without any movements whatever toward the Marshalls or other islands in the Central Pacific?

A. He was not in a position, he didn't have the material to attack the Marshalls with the idea of holding them and it would have been, at that stage of the game, a very bad move, and the Department had no intention of making any such suggestions. Whether he could make raids there was something else. That was up to the Commander-in-Chief to work out a scheme and make a proposal, the same way as is done at the present time. But he was in a position to undertake the defense of that area and of the Pacific Coast.

[1018] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

158. Q. Do you recall expressing before the Roberts Commission any belief that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was perfectly familiar with all of the intelligence information, including the special intelligence to which reference has been made in this testimony?

A. I don't recall specifically making that statement. I probably did, because that was my belief.

Examined by the court:

159. Q. Admiral, did you consider that negotiations and conversations were going on between the Japanese representatives and our State Department between 27 November and 7 December? Did you know this to be a fact or not?

A. I think there were one or two visits to the Department by the two Japanese ambassadors during that period, but my recollection is that for the last five or six days there were none.

160. Q. Did you from time to time accompany the Chief of Naval Operations to the conferences at the State Department?

A. Yes, sir, I usually attended the State Department conferences.

161. Q. Was any statement made at these State Department conferences about Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii would be attacked suddenly?

A. Never hear of it before until it came out in the papers.

162. Q. You speak of this October 16 incident and your idea of deployment of the Pacific Fleet to the westward and the dispersal of submarines. Was any specific intimation given to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, as to such plan you had in mind: The deployment of that fleet or the dispersal of submarines?

A. During the fall—I have forgotten the date—of 1941 the Commander-in-Chief and some of his staff visited Washington for the purpose of discussing the entire situation. During that time I talked to the Commander-in-Chief and to his operations officer at some length. We exchanged views on what would be the proper method of conducting the initial phases of the war. I don't recall the details of the conversation at all. I presume I expressed the view that is expressed here, which was what I held at that time, that it would be impossible for us to undertake for a considerable period of time any offensive against territory and that we recognized [1019] the desirability of getting more ships from the Atlantic and putting them over there and that some would be moved there, but at that time we could not do anything more.

163. Q. You testified here that at that time and subsequent to October, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had issued an order to attack submarines to the westward; is that correct?

A. No, sir. He issued an order, as I recall it, that submarines in and near the operating areas around Hawaii would be attacked, and actually there were, I believe, two attacks made on sound contacts.

164. Q. Wasn't it immediately prior to 7 December 1941 when these actual attacks were made?

A. I think he issued that order after the receipt of either the November 24 or November 27 dispatch.

165. Q. But prior to that time did the Chief of Naval Operations approve the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation to attack submarines? Did he approve it or disapprove it?

A. He approved that order issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

166. Q. This was subsequent to 27 November?

A. That is my recollection.

167. Q. But prior to November 27, 1941, did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific make any recommendations or requests that he be allowed to attack submarines in this immediate operating area?

A. I don't remember. I don't remember that.

168. Q. Did the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Operations recommend at any time in the last six months of 1941 a shift of the Fleet to the West Coast?

A. The Commander-in-Chief recommended on several occasions that the Fleet be moved to the West Coast. On two or three of those occasions the Chief of Naval Operations took the matter up with the President alone. Now, I don't believe that the Chief of Naval Operations made a specific recommendation to move them to the coast. He discussed it with the President, and the President would not approve the idea. Does that answer the question?

169. Q. Yes, only in your answer you refer to the Commander-in-Chief. Which Commander-in-Chief?

A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

170. Q. Do you refer to Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Richardson?

A. Both. Both of them made that same recommendation, as I recall.

171. Q. With respect to the war warning message of November 27, we understand that you wrote that message, discussed it with the Chief of Naval Operations, and that it was sent with your recommendation?

A. Yes, sir.

[1020] 172. Q. Why was it in that message the Hawaiian Islands were not included as a possible objective for Japan?

A. The objectives which were put in there were the strategic objectives. We did not believe that Japan would launch an amphibious attack against the Hawaiian Islands.

173. Q. Did you think that Japan would launch an air attack against the Hawaiian Islands?

A. I thought it was one of the possibilities.

174. Q. Did you think it was a probability?

A. Yes.

175. Q. Were you surprised on the morning of the 7th when Japan made an air attack on the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Not the least.

176. Q. In other words, you felt an air attack was coming about that date?

A. That an attack was coming, and I was not at all surprised at the air attack. I knew our carriers were out, and with the warnings which had been given, I felt we would give them a pretty bad beating before they got home by our shore-based aircraft and by our carriers.

177. Q. Well, if you felt this so strongly, Admiral, did you discuss this probability with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I don't want to give a false impression. The matter of the attack on Hawaii was part and parcel of the whole war situation. We had done what we could to take precautions against the attack carrying through. The order was issued to deploy the Fleet in a defensive deployment.

178. Q. You said an order was given to deploy the Fleet in a defensive deployment?

A. Yes, sir, that is in the war message, and if we had not anticipated an attack, why, no such order would have been given—a major attack with their fleet. The order was given for the purpose of detecting at a distance. A specific warning against a particular thing at that time was against policy, and I agree with that policy. To add to that answer and to show my state of mind on the thing, we had out there a

circular letter, which was a defensive arrangement of the steps to be taken to defend the Fleet, both in harbor and at sea. When Tojo's cabinet fell, I sent out to my office for that order and read it over very carefully to see whether something ought to be added to it. At the time we sent the war warning, I sent for it again and studied it over to see if there was something that ought to be done that was not being done by existing orders, and after reading the thing over, I felt that, in general terms, it was an adequate order.

[1021] 179. Q. Did you feel that the Fleet should be deployed and take defensive formations in these areas on October 16, when the cabinet fell?

A. Yes, as soon as they could make the necessary arrangements. Naturally, it would take some days to get the fuel together and make the necessary arrangements.

180. Q. And you felt the same way on the 27th of November?

A. Yes, sir.

181. Q. Suppose the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific—

A. One other addition to that. Defensive arrangements on October 16 also involved increasing the defenses at both Midway and Wake, and we immediately went to work to build those defenses up and did build them up to some extent.

182. Q. Well, if the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific had had in mind the same plan that you had regarding the dispersal of the Fleet and the deployment of the Fleet at sea on October 16, would it or would it not have been possible to have maintained that Fleet without ever entering Pearl Harbor?

A. You said "dispersal of the Fleet."

183. Q. Yes.

A. I never said dispersal of the Fleet. I said deployment of the Fleet. I think it has a different connotation. Yes, I think they could have kept the Fleet at sea with only occasional returns in small numbers to Pearl Harbor.

184. Q. Were you aware of the fact that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet had his Fleet divided into really three parts?

A. Yes, sir.

185. Q. And were you further aware of the fact that at certain intervals one part or two parts of that Fleet would return to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir.

186. Q. Did the Chief of Naval Operations approve that Plan? Was he cognizant of it?

A. He was cognizant of it. I don't recall any details of the discussions. It was mentioned. Of course, that wasn't too much under me. It was Operations, Ship Movements, and the Assistant Chief's of Naval Operations business. I know he knew about it and made no change in it.

187. Q. Were any suggestions made as to following your plan with respect to the disposition of the Fleet and maintaining them at sea rather than coming into port at certain intervals?

A. Well, I expected some of them would come into port at certain intervals. That plan of dividing it into three parts and rotating them seemed to be generally satisfactory.

[1022] Q. But that plan did not keep all the Fleet at sea, did it?

A. No.

189. Q. It left some of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, and I think that some of them would have had to come there from time to time. I think they could have stayed out a good deal longer than they were doing.

190. Q. You spoke of an officer's being sent to Pearl Harbor to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with conditions. Was any officer sent out there to acquaint him with the conditions subsequent to the sending of the war warning on November 27?

A. No, sir, not that I know of.

191. Q. You spoke of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, being aware of the fact that if Japan attacked Great Britain, the United States would aid Britain?

A. No, sir, I did not make that statement. The question asked was, Had he been acquainted by the Chief of Naval Operations with that opinion? My answer was, "I do not believe he was so acquainted."

192. Q. You spoke also of depending upon the newspapers to give the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information. Are you of the opinion that our Commanders-in-Chief of our different forces, well separated from Washington, should be dependent upon the press for their information and their estimate of the situation in order to make their decisions?

A. I certainly believe they should take the reports that are made into consideration in their estimate of the situation. As I said before, that is where we get a very large part of the information. There was very little intelligence information as to the prospective moves by Japan, but when a cabinet falls, when somebody of a particular character is put in the cabinet, when the cabinet issues a statement, when conferences are held in forming the cabinet, and when they go into Indo China and other places, why, all that information is certainly of unlimited value—far more valuable than all this other stuff.

193. Q. Did you or did you not know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had information regarding the delivery of this note of 26 November to the Japanese?

A. I don't know whether or not he knew it.

194. Q. Did you feel that this note was a very important document?

A. No, sir.

195. Q. If the note of November 26, with its stipulations with respect to Japan's reverting to her status quo prior to the capture of Manchuko, had not been delivered and had not been given to Japan by the United States, in your opinion [1023] would the time of war been deferred or not?

A. Its delivery, in my opinion, actually had no effect whatsoever on the situation, because they were already on the move.

196. Q. And the contents of the note had no effect on the situation?

A. None whatever.

197. Q. In view of your statement that you thought that war was going to happen in a day or two subsequent to November 27, did that have any bearing on the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, plan to send a carrier to Wake at about 29 November?

A. The matter of putting increased defenses on Wake was taken up, as I recall it, immediately after the Tojo cabinet was formed, and we sent some additional anti-aircraft guns out at that time to Wake. We wanted to get planes there. The field had not been ready. We asked

them to rush the field, and the Naval Coastal Frontier was putting every effort out there to get the field ready—I am wrong about that. The field had been in commission for, I guess, about two months. We did not have the planes. We did not have the fighter planes to put out there. I believe that was it. We were doing everything we could to get as much strength there as possible. Now, sending those planes and the men out there on the carrier was the best way to do it, and that was part of the deployment.

198. Q. But in view of the fact that you anticipated an air attack on Hawaii about that time, did you realize that Hawaii and its immediate vicinity was devoid of carriers on 7 December?

A. No, I thought that that carrier had gotten back before that. I believe that there was a delay of a couple of days in her getting away from the date originally set, and my impression was that she had gotten back, but I do not believe that they were devoid of carriers. There was one carrier out there—two carriers at sea at that time, one of them without its planes.

199. Q. Did you feel, in knowing the strength of the Pacific Fleet, that there was a sufficient number of patrol planes to patrol properly and to have distance patrol around the Hawaiian Islands?

A. We did not believe that there were enough planes to create a fully satisfactory defense or that there were the proper types of planes. We were constantly urging the War Department to increase their airplanes out there and their anti-aircraft, and they were doing, I believe, as much as they could, considering all other matters.

200. Q. Having full knowledge of the strength of the Pacific Fleet and the surroundings as of December 7, do you think that the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor could have been averted?

A. I do not think it could have been averted. If met [1024] with the force that we had at hand there, I believe that a good many of their planes could have been destroyed. I think the destructive effect could have been considerably lessened, but I don't believe that the attack could have been stopped from coming in, except by luck.

201. Q. If those carriers which launched the planes in the attack had been discovered by a patrol plane, did we have anything in the Pacific Fleet to destroy those carriers at that time in their immediate vicinity?

A. No, sir, there was nothing up there. It was always recognized, I think, by people who have concerned themselves with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands that the northern flank on Oahu is a very weak place. We put the defenses on the southern islands and to the westward, but the northern flank is devoid of outposts, and unless outposts had been stationed out there to cover that flank with scouting planes, or by a scouting line, why, it is very easy to get in there undetected.

202. Q. Under the conditions you were operating on December 7 for the deployment of the Fleet, did we have any ships to even form a scouting line and in enough capacity with respect to speed and gun fire to destroy carriers in that area?

A. You can destroy carriers with cruisers. They are faster with the cruisers. We can catch up with them. We can discover them. If some ships had been deployed to the northward, there would have been a considerable better possibility of detecting them to the north-

ward and westward—a considerable better possibility of detecting them at a distance and attacking them by shore-based aircraft and bringing our carriers in also to attack.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 6:00 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., September 16, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 16, 1944

[1025]

TWENTY-NINTH DAY

FEDERAL BUILDING,
San Francisco, California.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.

Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party.

Counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), interested party.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-eighth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The proceedings following, pages 1026 through 1051, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[1051-A] The court then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned subject to the call of the president.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 21, 1944

[1052]

THIRTIETH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Bieseimer, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the twenty-ninth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Admiral James O. Richardson, U. S. Navy, retired. I am assigned to duty in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and by him assigned to three or four other jobs.

2. Q. What duties had been assigned to you, since attaining Flag rank, other than the one just stated—during the year 1940? What duties were assigned you during the year 1940?

A. Well, at the beginning of 1940 I was in command of the Battle Force, United States Fleet, and on the 6th of January 1940, I relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet; and on the first day of February, 1941, I turned over command of the Fleet to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, whose title then was Commander-in-Chief [1053] Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Did you at any time while Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet maintain an aircraft patrol in the Hawaiian area, which was adequate in spacing and radius to detect an approaching combat force having as its intention the delivery of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No, if you mean by the delivery of an attack one that was designed to take place around 8:00 o'clock in the morning.

4. Q. Did you, while Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, initiate any kind of an aircraft patrol, and if you did, will you state the kind of patrol and why you did it?

A. Any testimony that I might give would be of a general nature, because after three and one-half years, it is impossible to remember details; and furthermore, specific detail, original evidence, is available in the records of either the Fleet or the Navy Department. Upon arrival in the Hawaiian area, as a part of the Fleet exercise and in conformity with the long-established practice, anti-submarine patrols, close-in air patrols, and long-range air patrols, were established. These patrols were primarily to simulate war conditions, and the distant patrol was neither adequate in spacing or radius to detect with certainty a force approaching the Hawaiian Islands with the intention of delivering an attack near dawn. At the conclusion of the Fleet exercises, in May 1940, I received from the Chief of Naval Operations a dispatch directing me to announce to the press that the Fleet would remain in Hawaiian waters at my request to carry out exercises which I had in mind. Being uncertain as to the duration of our stay or purpose for which we were retained, practically the same patrols that had been established in connection with the Fleet exercises were continued, and as time passed and no information was available as to the probable duration of our stay, and in view of the fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible outbreak of the war in the immediate future, these patrols were continued, sometimes in modified form, depending upon the number of patrol aircraft available. At one time this distant patrol was designed to cover adequately and with respect to spacing, a given sector of the circle, and was daily rotated so that during a short period of time the whole circle was covered—but the whole circle, particularly that part of it to the eastward, was not covered. Near the end of my period of service in command of the Fleet, we planned a change in the character of the distant patrol, with the intention of restricting it to adequate coverage of the operating areas, with small planes covering the sortie and entrance of the Fleet. I cannot state with certainty whether this modification was placed in effect before I was relieved or after I was relieved, but I know that it was the intention of my relief to continue the same kind of a patrol that I had in existence when he relieved me.

5. Q. Did you, while Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, as a matter of policy or otherwise, reduce the period which ships of the Fleet might stay in Pearl Harbor for overhaul and recreation? [1054]

A. I can cover that only in a general way. When the Fleet arrived in Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, I believe the latter part of April, a part of the Fleet was stationed in Hawaii, known as the Hawaiian detachment. In view of the fact that there was great uncertainty as to the probable length of the stay of the whole Fleet in the Hawaiian waters, the Hawaiian detachment remained in its existing relation to the Fleet and carried out its schedule as arranged before the arrival of the main Fleet, and that part of the Fleet spent almost every week-end in Honolulu, in accordance with plans previously arranged. The Battle Force remained a majority of the time away from Pearl Harbor, basing largely on Lahaina Roads, and returning to Pearl Harbor periodically for replenishment of stores, supplies,

and recreation. Near the end of my tour of duty, due to the increasing number of warnings, I decided not to permit any of the heavy ships to anchor outside of Pearl Harbor, and if outside, they were to remain under way. Likewise, near the end of my tour of duty, a plan of operation was prepared under which one-third of the Fleet would be at sea, some of the ships would be on the West Coast, and the others would be in Pearl Harbor undergoing overhaul. At times, the number which I cannot recall, there were more ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor while I was in command than were actually present the morning of the attack. I am not positive as to the date on which this new plan went into effect, but it is my impression that it went into effect after the Christmas holidays in early January, 1941.

6. Q. Will you state in a general way what the demands were which had been made on you by the Navy Department, during your tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief, for training personnel for new construction and for other purposes?

A. While I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, the Navy Department was never able to provide more than 85% of the complement required to man the ships, and no demands were made upon me for training the men that I had, but men that I needed in the Fleet were detached for the purpose of training other people.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

7. Q. Admiral, upon your arrival as Commander-in-Chief of [1055] the Fleet in Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, do you remember the number of planes available to the Fleet for patrol duty, for distance patrol?

A. I have no idea; it would be pure guess-work.

8. Q. The patrol which you inaugurated, which you had kept going in the Hawaiian area, do you remember the approximate sector which was covered by this air patrol?

A. Well, the sector which was primarily covered more adequately and more frequently than any other sector was from about 170 degrees to the westward to about 350 degrees.

9. Q. Isn't it true that the sector covered by this patrol was primarily in the western semi-circle, especially to the southwest?

A. Southwest, yes.

10. Q. Do you remember how far this patrol extended?

A. To the best of my memory, it was 300 miles. I think on one occasion, when the Commanding General received an order from the Chief of Staff of the Army to alert his command against a possible overseas raid, that the radius of that patrol might have been extended. In addition, we established a dawn and dusk patrol.

11. Q. In other words, in establishing this patrol, you had primarily the idea that if an attack would come, it would come from the westward rather than from the north or northeast; is that correct?

A. Well, I had in mind that if an attack should be delivered, the most probable point of approach would be to the southwestward, but

of course the patrol was not established or continued entirely as a means of security. It was partly for the training of the people under my command, and also an effort to impress upon the officers and men of the Fleet the necessity for preparing for war, which I believed was impending.

12. Q. You say that you received an increasing number of warnings at that time. When you received this warning, what condition of readiness did you place the Fleet in?

A. Which warning do you refer to?

13. Q. You stated here that you received an increasing number of warnings.

A. I made no change, but by the end of the period of my command, about all of the precautions that could be put in effect and continue in operation were in effect, including steaming of ships darkened at night; but the warnings which I received were not official. They were not clear-cut; they were not definite. They were in personal letters, the general tenor being—"I hope you will keep ever present in your mind the possibility that we may be at war tomorrow."

14. Q. When did these frequent warnings start, Admiral, [1056] approximately?

A. The first warning that I recall did not come from the Navy Department. It was this warning that came from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and that was received as nearly as my memory serves me, on the 19th of June, when I was in Lahaina in 1940, and the Commander of the Hawaiian detachment, at the request of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District established or increased the patrol in existence, and established a dawn and dusk patrol. I reported the receipt of this warning by the Commanding General, and asked the Chief of Naval Operations for information regarding it. I received no reply. I had a patrol plane come out and take me into Pearl Harbor where I had a conference with the Commanding General, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and I am not positive whether the Commander, Scouting Force, was there or not; but I asked the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether or not this dispatch was a drill or a real, honest-to-goodness warning. He stated that he had no idea, that he was acting as though it were a real warning of an impending attack.

15. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you did take precautions in view of these numerous rumors; regarding ships at sea, what state of readiness did you place the ships in, upon entrance to Pearl Harbor?

A. Before I left command of the Fleet, I was doing everything I could, including the sweeping of the channel with a—

16. Q. I know you did. But what condition of readiness were these ships in when they entered Pearl Harbor and tied up to the dock, as to a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Any reply that I would give to that question might later be disclosed to be entirely inaccurate. If you will seek the original evidence—

17. Q. Well, the court would like to know what orders you gave as to ships actually tied up in Pearl Harbor, as to continuous manning of their guns, and ammunition at guns, or whatever other means you took to defend or help defend ships in Pearl Harbor against possible attack.

A. I do not recall that any time, either entering Pearl Harbor or while in Pearl Harbor, I issued any order requiring the guns to be manned or the ammunition to be at hand; but there was a plan worked out by my direction under which the ship in a berth was assigned a certain part of the overhead space to cover with anti-aircraft guns in case of an air attack.

18. Q. Did you have at that time any orders issued as to the action to be taken in case of attack by air on the ships in Pearl Harbor?

A. That is another question about which my memory is [1057] wholly inadequate, if it is essential information, because the record would show the published record—but my recollection is that the Commandant was informed as to what ships would cover various areas in view of the fact that he might be the senior man there, and he was primarily charged with contact and relations with the Army. I think it possible that he was informed as to the area of the heavens to be covered by certain berths, and I am not certain whether he was charged with the responsibility of directing them to open fire. I do not know.

19. Q. In view of these increasing number of rumors which you speak of, did you anticipate an attack by air on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, or did you think that there would be an attack by air on Pearl Harbor, as an opening war effort on the part of Japan?

A. I do not believe that I thought so during the period while I was in Command of the Fleet.

20. Q. You speak of anchoring ships at Lahaina Roads; did you consider Lahaina Roads as a safe anchorage for the ships in the face of the very critical situation existing between the United States and Japan?

A. No, and I so informed the powers that be.

21. Q. In considering the Hawaiian area, what was the safe anchorage existing there for the Fleet?

A. There was no safe anchorage, but the one that offered the greatest degree of security was Pearl Harbor.

22. Q. So Pearl Harbor was the only anchorage there available for the Fleet with any amount of security; is that correct?

A. Yes.

23. Q. Admiral, during the time you were in the Hawaiian area, and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, did you consider the basing of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, and did you make any specific recommendations to the Navy Department as to the proper base in the Pacific, at which in your opinion the Fleet should be placed?

A. I made such representations both unofficially, orally, and in writing, and I happen to have one.

24. Q. What were they, please? What were the recommendations?

A. Well, I have one in my pocket, if you want it.

25. Q. Briefly, just generally—just state it, if you please?

A. Well, I stated that the operating areas were not adequate, either for surface ships or air; there were no air [1058] fields adequate to care for the planes that were on carriers, and could not be trained from the carriers because of the shortage of fuel. The only safe anchorage was Pearl Harbor, and it was entirely inadequate to handle the Fleet; the distance from the West Coast increased the cost

and the delay and the difficulty of maintaining and supplying the Fleet; that there were no recreational facilities; that in time of peace the men and officers could not see any reason for remaining for such a long time away from home; that they were two thousand miles nearer a possible enemy; that we were unprepared to undertake offensive operations from Pearl Harbor, and that if we were involved in war, it would be necessary for us to return to the West Coast for stripping and mobilization and preparation for war; and that our presence in the Hawaiian area, when we were absolutely not trained, couldn't make any military people believe that we were planning offensive operations.

26. Q. Where did you recommend that the Fleet be based?

A. Normal West Coast bases, except a detachment to remain in Pearl Harbor that could be adequately cared for by the facilities there.

27. Q. Did you consider the Fleet mobilized at this time?

A. Mobilized?

28. Q. Yes.

A. No. It wasn't adequately manned, wasn't properly trained, wasn't fully equipped.

29. Q. Did you consider that those things were necessary for mobilization?

A. It is a part of it.

30. Q. Admiral, did you receive orders at any time to keep the Fleet more frequently in Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

31. Q. Did you at any time fail to comply with Presidential orders to keep the Fleet more frequently concentrated within Pearl Harbor?

A. During my period as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, I received no orders from the President or any of his subordinates as to the number of ships I would maintain in Pearl Harbor at any time.

32. Q. Did you ever hear, or did it come to your attention, that such a policy of keeping the Fleet concentrated in Pearl Harbor, was insisted upon by the Japanese Government?

A. I have heard of many lies, but I believe that that escaped my notice.

33. Q. You have stated that you recommended that the Fleet [1059] be based on West Coast ports. Do you know the reasons for the final decision of keeping this Fleet based on Pearl Harbor, and in the Hawaiian area?

A. Yes.

34. Q. Will you please state it?

A. For the restraining influence it might exercise on the action of the Japanese nation.

35. Q. While you were in the Hawaiian area as Commander-in-Chief, did you feel that you were kept fully and completely informed regarding any negotiations, conversations, or otherwise, between the United States and the Japanese Government?

A. I knew that I received practically no information along those lines, except what I acquired over the radio or in the public press.

36. Q. Did you request such information?

A. Yes.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[1060] 37. Q. At this time and in view of these rumors of a possible war with Japan, what was your estimate as to a surprise attack on Hawaii? Did you believe that the Japanese would make a surprise attack, and if so, how?

A. While I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet I was primarily concerned with the possibility of an attack by submarines.

38. Q. In other words, you considered that the means of attack would be by submarines rather than by air?

A. Yes, although in a statement, in a letter prepared which is before the court, presenting the inadequacies of the defenses of Pearl Harbor, I did point out and particularly stress the inadequacies with respect to anti-aircraft defense, and we did consider at one time the advisability of establishing a balloon barrage, abandoning the idea, so that we were not entirely without concern over the possibilities of a surprise air attack.

39. Q. While you were Commander-in-Chief of the Hawaiian area, did you dispose the Fleet or any ships of the Fleet as a possible scouting force or means of information through surface craft as to the possible approach of Japanese ships?

A. No.

40. Q. Were the ships of the Fleet at that time confined to drill, operations, and training alone in preparation for war?

A. Yes, and training of men.

41. Q. But there were no submarines or other ships placed to reconnoiter or to cover the surface approach of ships?

A. No effect was made to secure by surface ship or sub-surface ship, strategic information or to cover the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

42. Q. And this air patrol which you speak of was, as you have stated, used primarily as training for the patrol planes; is that correct?

A. I would not say "primarily"; in part.

43. Q. Well, did you feel that this air patrol was of any great value, as such, to you in protecting the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, but I was in the position of being repeatedly warned that we might be involved in a war, and from 20 years study of the Japanese I felt certain that the war would come as a surprise, and therefore I felt that I had to maintain some semblance of a patrol consistent with the means available to do it.

44. Q. But it wasn't a complete control?

A. It wasn't complete and it wasn't adequate, as I have already stated.

[1061] 45. Q. Admiral, just in line with that, you stated that you cannot, from memory, give the number of patrol planes that you had during the latter part of your command, but did you have enough to have a 700-mile distance reconnaissance on the entire 360 degree arc?

A. By no means, and I believe that the number that I had previously had available had been reduced by the detachment of one squadron for the Asiatic Fleet.

46. Q. That was later in the year 1941?

A. While I was there.

47. Q. Admiral, suppose this reconnaissance patrol had sighted the Japanese detachment standing toward Pearl Harbor. Were you either in position to stop them or had you means to stop them, or could you have stopped them under existing conditions?

A. Well, my recollection is that none of the planes was armed and certainly they could not have stopped them.

48. Q. Did you have a striking force available which could have been sent out in time?

A. No indeed.

49. Q. If you had had one would you have taken action to stop them?

A. I would have obeyed what I conceived to be the intent of the leadership of this country. I would have done nothing until I was attacked.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 10:30 a. m., took a recess until 12:00 noon, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

[1062] A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present position?

A. Joseph Clark Grew; residence, Washington, D. C. My present position is Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

2. Q. What position did you hold during the year 1941?

A. During 1941, up to December 7th, I was Ambassador to Japan.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Mr. Ambassador, there is information before this court which alleges that on or about January 27, 1941, you transmitted information to our government that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor. Is that correct, sir?

A. Admiral, the information which I then transmitted was in the nature of a rumor that had reached me but a rumor which came from sources which I considered reliable.

4. Q. Did these rumors persist? Did they continue, with special reference to an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. So far as I can now recollect, that was the only occasion on which I received a definite intimation that there might be, in case of war or in case of a break between Japan and the United States, an attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not recollect other occasions on which Pearl Harbor was mentioned in that connection.

5. Q. Subsequent to this date, that is, January, 1941, and subsequent to this report which you made to the State Department, did you, prior to December 7, 1941, make a similar report as to a possible or probable attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. In the further reports which I made between January and December, 1941, I do not recollect that Pearl Harbor was actually mentioned, although I sent a number of reports warning our government that Japan might strike with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.

6. Q. Such a report as that was made by you on or about November 3rd?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. In making this report that Japan might strike with dramatic or dangerous suddenness, did you have in mind at that time the area or the position which she would strike with dramatic and dangerous suddenness?

A. No, sir, I did not, specifically, and in one of my reports to our government I stated that our government [1063] should not depend upon me to tell them where and when Japan might strike because I would not know, the Japanese being past masters at secrecy.

8. Q. The information before this court also alleges that on or about November 17, 1941, you warned our government that Japan might attack us by a surprise in regions not involved in the China-Japanese conflict. Is that correct?

A. Admiral, may I refresh my memory by looking at the document in question?

9. Q. Please do.

A. May I read you the first paragraph of the report which you have in mind, namely of November 17?

10. Q. Yes, sir.

A. This is a close paraphrase of the telegram which I sent to the Department of State on that date: "The Ambassador, referring to his previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, emphasizes the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. He is taking into account, therefore, the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative."

11. Q. Did you have in mind, sir, that the surprise and initiative would take place in the south, the Philippines, or in the Dutch Indies, or did you have in mind that they would advance their activities to the eastward in the Hawaiian area?

A. This, of course, is a matter of opinion and recollection, Admiral, and I can't guarantee that I can recollect precisely what my thoughts were at that moment but I can recollect that in general I did not feel that we in the embassy in Tokyo would know in advance where Japan might strike and it was perfectly possible, in our opinion, that she might strike anywhere, including the areas to the South. We did not rule out the possibility of a strike on Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies. We felt that a blow might occur in any direction.

12. Q. But in this connection did you rule out the Hawaiian area, and did you confine your estimate or the conclusions of your estimate to the southern area, that is, to the Dutch East Indies, et cetera?

A. In my estimates, Admiral, I avoided indicating that I believed there might be a blow in any specific direction because I didn't know and I had no evidence to justify the expression of an opinion to that effect. So, therefore, my estimates in that respect were entirely of a general nature; not of a specific nature.

[1064] 13. Q. Did you feel, Mr. Ambassador, that the Japanese would strike before a declaration of war?

A. Yes sir, I did, and I based my then opinion on the fact that Japan had, in the Russo-Japanese war, struck in precisely that way, and in the case of another war would be very likely to adopt precisely the same tactics.

14. Q. While you were Ambassador to Japan, were you aware of any so-called Korean Independence Group, and the fact that they had another group there known as the Korean Underground Group, which supposedly had plans or intended plans of Japan in any declaration of war?

A. May I ask what kind of plans you have in mind, sir?

15. Q. We have in mind, sir, the possible plan of movement or a plan of attack on a certain government. Great Britain, the United States, for instance. It has come to the attention of this court that it was reported that these Koreans, this underground movement, did have some secret information as to what the intentions of Japan were.

A. No, sir, I had no evidence to that effect.

16. Q. Did you have any knowledge that about 72 hours prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the Australian Government had advised or was advising our government as to a possible aircraft carrier task force of Japan approaching Pearl Harbor, or headed in that direction?

A. No, sir, I did not.

17. Q. Similarly, there was no such report or information coming to you about 48 hours prior to this attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. There was not.

18. Q. And similarly, 24 hours, of course, the answer would be the same?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. Did you have, sir, any reliable information, secret or otherwise, as to the movements of the Japanese Fleet in any direction?

A. It is very difficult for me to answer that question precisely, Admiral, without refreshing my memory on the point that you raise. I did, from time to time, receive indications that the Japanese Fleet was moving in a given direction, or was present at a given place. But as I say, I cannot now recall specifically what that information was.

20. Q. When did you consider that the relations with Japan, after these numerous conferences and negotiations, had ceased?

A. That what had ceased, sir?

21. Q. The negotiations with Japan.

A. I did not consider that they had definitely ceased until 3 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor when the foreign minister, Mr. Togo, asked me to come to his office, [1065] and at that time he stated that as the conversations between the two governments had failed in making progress, the Japanese Government had decided to—I have forgotten what word he used now, but the meaning was that they had decided to call them off, to break them off. That, however,

had been done before, at the time the Japanese had sent their troops into Indo-China and the conversations had been resumed thereafter.

22. Q. Did you consider that the negotiations had ceased about 27 November 1941?

A. No, sir, I did not.

23. Q. Were you kept informed as to the continuance of these negotiations and conferences between November 27th and December 7th?

A. I was kept informed of all of the official conversations that took place in Washington. I cannot now recollect whether I received reports during that particular period, or not, but I am inclined to think that I did. I am inclined to think that I continued to receive reports of such conversations up to the end.

24. Q. During your tenure of office in Japan, you were aware, of course, of the general mind and feeling of the Japanese people. Were there any strong expressions of opinion in Japan objecting to the maintenance of our Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

A. You refer to official expressions, or informal expressions?

25. Q. I would refer to both, if you may answer, please?

A. So far as I can recall, no official, or at least no formal official representations were made to me in that connection. I think it is possible that in the course of conversations with certain Japanese officials, they may have expressed the hope that our Fleet would eventually move into the Atlantic away from the Pacific because its presence in the Pacific was used by what they called the Jingoos in Japan to stir up anti-American feeling. But I'm afraid my answer to that question must be indefinite, Admiral, because I have no precise recollection.

26. Q. That is quite a good answer, sir. From your estimate, Mr. Ambassador, and being thoroughly conversant with the conditions in Japan, when did you think, or when did you make any estimate as to a possible time of attack by Japan against either Great Britain or the United States?

A. Of a specific date, you mean?

27. Q. Of a general date.

A. No, sir, I did not. I knew for many years that Japan was preparing for whatever might happen but I do not think that any time I felt that I could put my finger on any [1066] particular date when such an attack would likely come about.

28. Q. In view of the conversations which took place in Washington between November 27th and December 7th, 1941, did you feel that war was extremely imminent and that some act by Japan would take place in the immediate future?

A. Admiral, I would rather go back a little further than that. In a telegram which I sent to the Department of State in early November, I think probably it was my telegram of November 3rd, I said the sands were running fast. That meant it was an expression of my opinion that something might break at any moment but I do not recollect that I felt that that danger was necessarily any more intense during the period mentioned than in the period directly preceding that time.

29. Q. In other words, prior to 7 December 1941, immediately prior to that, you did not change your opinion?

A. I did not. I had no evidence to justify changing my opinion in that respect.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

30. Q. I have a document which is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet under date of February 1, 1941. It purports to quote information which, under date of 27 January 1941, the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department. I would ask you to examine the quoted part of this document to see whether or not it contains the substance of a report that you, in fact, made?

A. That, in general, is the substance of my report, although it is really a paraphrase of the actual text. I think my memory has played me false here. I said before it was the Portuguese Minister as being the source of my information. It states here "the Peruvian Minister." I think that is accurate.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

31. Q. Mr. Ambassador, going back to your dispatch of 27 January 1941 concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. If you feel free to do so, will you elaborate upon your answer and give the source of the rumors and information which caused you to send that dispatch?

A. Yes, sir. The dispatch states: "A member of the Embassy was told by me"—this is a close paraphrase—"----- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that source was the Peruvian Minister, a man in whom I had a considerable degree of confidence.

32. Q. Do you recall any other source that came to you [1067] with this information about that time or just previously, to the same effect?

A. I do not recall any specific source. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic. I do not now recollect that that precise report came to me from any other source.

33. Q. But as to that, you did give it a rather high evaluation in your own mind; is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer, Admiral, but I will say this: Although my Peruvian colleague labeled the report as fantastic, I still considered that it was of such utmost importance that I could not afford to regard it as fantastic, and for that reason I passed it on to the Secretary of State. I don't think I can go further than that in answering your question.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Real Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

34. Q. Will you refer to Page 137 of the second volume of Foreign Relations, Mr. Ambassador. This is a letter written by you under date of February 26, 1941 to the Secretary of State: "Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the Counselor of the Embassy had on February 14 with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the substance of which was reported to the Department in the Embassy's 230, February 14, 8 p. m. The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct

and sparing of words. Upon listening attentatively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question 'Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war with the United States?' Mr. Dooman replied, 'The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question.' I then skip a paragraph and come to the last paragraph, Mr. Ambassador: "I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval." Are you at liberty to tell the court, Mr. Ambassador, what information or instructions the Embassy had which was the basis of Mr. Dooman's conversation with Mr. Ohashi at that time?

A. I think, sir, that it is stated here that Mr. Dooman had just returned from a leave of absence to the United States [1068] and I am inclined to think that his talk with Mr. Ohashi was based on his estimate of public opinion in the United States and what he had picked up here in general, rather than upon any specific document or instruction from our government. I'm afraid I'm not in a position to tell you exactly what Mr. Dooman said. Mr. Dooman, himself, probably would be in a better position than I to do that, although no doubt the record is available.

35. Q. But there appears on the next page, page 138 and page 139, a copy of the memorandum prepared by Mr. Dooman covering that incident. I read one sentence on Page 139: "If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States." That is referring to communications of Britain in the Southwest Pacific. Do you recall whether, subsequent to that time, the 14th of February, you received from the State Department any amplification or qualification of further information along that line?

A. I do not recollect, sir, whether I did or not. I could not answer that question without exploring.

36. Q. I call your attention to Page 553 of the same volume which is a memorandum prepared by the Secretary of State under date of the 16th of August, 1941, and I quote one of the sentences toward the bottom of the page. This was a memorandum of a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. "I said"—that is, the Secretary of State—"as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent." Do you recall receiving any information from the State Department as to that conversation, Mr. Ambassador?

A. I cannot recall that specific report at this moment, sir. I was in general informed of the conversations as they came along. I cannot specifically remember that particular report at this moment.

37. Q. Well, in general; can you remember any information received from the State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with Japan if [1069] Japan was at war with Britain in the Pacific?

A. I could not answer that question, sir, without exploration.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[1070] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel was present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, residence, and present assignment?

A. Maxwell M. Hamilton. I have no permanent residence in Washington at this time, because I just came to Washington. I am temporarily residing at the Presidential Apartments, 1026 16th Street. I am Foreign Service Officer, Class 1, assigned to the Department of State.

2. Q. What position did you hold in the latter part of 1941?

A. Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State.

3. Q. If your duties or responsibilities brought you in contact with matters of interest to the Navy Department during the latter part of 1941, will you state what those duties or responsibilities were with respect to the Navy Department?

A. I know of no expressed order of the Department of State, defining with any precision, or defining at all, the duties of the Chief of the Division with respect to the Navy Department. Consequently, the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs with respect to the Navy Department are of a general character. For as long as I have been associated with the Department of State the Division of Far Eastern Affairs has had a tradition of close cooperation with the Navy Department in the interchange of information considered by either department to be of concern or interest to the other.

4. Q. There is testimony before this court that you at times, at least, performed the function of a liaison officer between the State Department and the Navy Department and that your contacts were, in general with Captain, now Admiral Schuirmann. Is this information correct?

A. It depends on the definition of liaison officer. As Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs I had rather frequent contact with Admiral Schuirmann, then Captain Schuirmann, who was in the central division of the Navy [1071] Department. Do you want me to state what those were?

5. Q. If you please.

A. In 1941 my recollection is that my relations with Captain Schuirmann related largely to operational matters, and by that I mean specific questions which came up for decision, which involved both matters of foreign policy and naval policy. My recollection is that Captain Schuirmann was not, in his relation with me, nor was I, in relations with him, the liaison officer for the interchange of general information. At certain specific conferences held in the office of the Secretary of State, at which there were present higher officers of the State Department and of the Navy Department, Captain Schuirmann and I both were present. I may say I have known Captain Schuirmann for a good many years. I had contacts with him when he was on duty in the Navy Department some years previously, at which time he also functioned in contact with the Department of State.

6. Q. During the last half of the year 1941 was there a system set up in the State Department for informing the Navy Department on matters pertaining to United States-Japanese relations?

A. During the latter part of 1941 there were in existence in the State Department several procedures for communicating information to the Navy Department. One of these procedures was the Office of Liaison, which was charged with communicating copies or paraphrases of telegrams, as we call them, or dispatches, as you call them, or mail reports to the Navy Department which were deemed to be of interest and concern. In addition, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of some telegrams and mail reports from the Far East, those deemed to be of interest and concern, to the Navy Department. A further procedure was that of a direct conference and consultation among the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of War and the Navy, some of which were attended by other high officers of the State and Navy Department; conferences between the Secretary of State and Admiral Stark and General Marshall; meetings of the War Council and then meetings of the Cabinet itself.

7. Q. In a general way, were you familiar with negotiations which were taking place between the United States and the Japanese Government during the period from about 15 October to 7 December 1941?

A. Yes.

8. Q. Did you at any time during the year 1941 transmit any information to the representatives of the Navy Department which had to do with a surprise Japanese attack on the United States in the Hawaiian area?

A. The Far Eastern Division sent paraphrased copies of the telegram from Ambassador Grew to the Department of State on January 27.

[1072] 9. Q. What year?

A. 1941, to ONI and MID in strict confidence.

10. Q. Do you recall any other information which you communicated to the Navy Department on the subject of the intentions of the Japanese to make an attack on the Hawaiian Area?

A. No.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

11. Q. Mr. Hamilton, were you, acting in the capacity which you have mentioned in the State Department, familiar with all information, super secret and otherwise, flowing into the State Department regarding the United States-Japanese situation?

A. I think so. There may have been some confidential information furnished the Secretary of State or Mr. Welles in reference to the disposition of our armed forces in the Far East which, at times, I may not have been familiar with.

12. Q. Was this information transmitted to the Navy Department?

A. I thought you were inquiring about information which came from the Navy Department to us.

13. Q. No, was the independent information received by the State Department transmitted to the Navy Department?

A. I'm sorry; I don't understand.

14. Q. For example, you speak of a message or communication from Ambassador Grew as of January 27, 1941.

A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. Was that information transmitted to the Navy Department?

A. Yes.

16. Q. Similarly, was information, or the substance of it, gained by you through that source or otherwise transmitted to the Navy Department?

A. In general, yes, sir.

[1073] 17. Q. In other words, you kept the Navy Department informed as to this situation?

A. Yes, sir. I personally did not. It was done by one of the three procedures which I have mentioned.

18. Q. Are you familiar with the note of 26 November 1941, which was handed to the Japanese representatives by the Secretary of State?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. Was a copy of that note or the substance of it sent to the Navy Department?

A. We have no record of all the itemized steps in the discussions with the Japanese at that period.

20. Q. Was that note discussed with representatives of the Navy Department?

A. During that period there were almost daily conferences between the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of the Navy and War, or with Admiral Stark or General Marshall or General Gerow. I was not present at those discussions.

21. Q. So you do not know whether or not that note was discussed?

A. I know, from the very definite reports made to us by the Secretary of State prior to and immediately following such conferences, that it was his desire and intent, which he carried out, in his judgment, to communicate the substance and the text of documents. Some documents were given to the Navy. As far as my understanding goes, they were available for examination by the Navy and War Department officers. We have no record with regard to the question of the actual passing of each document.

22. Q. Did you attend any conferences where the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, were present discussing any over-all picture of the situation between Japan and the United States?

A. I attended none where the secretaries were present. I have attended some where Admiral Stark was present.

23. Q. About what time? Do you recall?

A. I have a record of it here.

24. Q. You may refresh your memory.

A. (Referring to paper) On November 21 there was a conference with the Secretary of State, at which Admiral Stark, General Gerow, and Messrs, Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Ballentine were present.

25. Q. What is the date?

A. November 21, 1941.

[1074] 26. Q. Do you know what was discussed at that particular conference?

A. Not with any precision. It was the general diplomatic and military situation in the Pacific, and on November 24, 1941—No, I was not present at that. I was not present at the conference on November 25 among the three secretaries. There were meetings of the war council on November 25 and 28th, at which I was not present.

27. Q. From the period of November 27 to December 7 were conferences and negotiations continuing between the State Department and the Japanese representatives?

A. There were some meetings. My recollection is that they met—I don't know the last date—with the President on one occasion. It is in this book, if you care to have me refresh my memory. I don't recall exactly. My impression is that they did continue but not on the subject of this communication of November 26, 1941—on the general subject.

28. Q. The communication of November 26 was simply a step in the negotiations; is that correct?

A. From our point of view, it was a general summing up of the situation as of that time.

29. Q. When did you consider that negotiations between the United States and Japan had ceased?

A. I personally or the State Department?

30. Q. You in your capacity in the State Department?

A. November 26.

31. Q. But you just stated that there were negotiations subsequent to that date.

A. Yes, sir. There was an extreme, bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might be continued after November 26, but the estimate

of the Secretary of State, as expressed to me and to others at that time, was that the conversations in the diplomatic effort virtually reached a conclusion, and from that point on the matter was one for the Armed Services.

32. Q. When the note of November 26, 1941, was presented by the State Department officials here, did you have any estimate of the time that it would take to get a reply to that note?

A. No, sir.

33. Q. Did you feel that when you received your reply that that would end the negotiations or that there would be a continuance of the negotiations after the reply?

A. I thought there was no chance of receiving a reply of a character to make possible a continuance of the negotiations.

[1075] 34. Q. Was that an assumption based on the contents and the requirements of the United States Government as announced in that note?

A. It was based on the record of the Japanese negotiators and the position of the Japanese Government.

35. Q. Were you present in the State Department on the morning of December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

36. Q. Were you there when the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy conferred with the Secretary of State?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. Were you at that conference?

A. No, sir.

38. Q. Did you discuss with anyone from the Navy Department what they were going to bring out at this conference on the morning of December 7?

A. What the Japanese would bring out?

39. Q. No, what would be the subject of discussion on that morning?

A. Among the three secretaries?

40. Q. Yes.

A. No, sir, not specifically. I did not know that there was to be a conference.

41. Q. Did you have any specific information on the morning of the 7th which you transmitted to the State Department relative to this conference?

A. No, sir.

42. Q. From your general observation and study of the Far Eastern situation, did you form any conclusion as to the possible time of attack contemplated by Japan?

A. No, sir, I did not expressly. My judgment was the judgment of the Secretary of State: If some diplomatic arrangement couldn't be worked out with Japan, she would continue with her course of armed aggression. As to when and where, I had no idea.

43. Q. Did you feel, in your study of the Far Eastern situation, that there would be a certain area in which Japan would be the aggressor or would make an attack?

A. As nearly as I recollect my opinion some time ago, I felt Japan was definitely bent on moving southward. I did not exclude from my estimate an attack on the United States or American possessions.

[1076] 44. Q. Did you feel in your estimate at that time that there would be a surprise attack to take the place of a declaration of war or a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war?

A. I know that the opinion expressed by the Secretary of State was that the Japanese were likely to use the element of surprise. I had no opinion on the subject.

45. Q. Did you consider the probability of an attack on Hawaii?

A. I wasn't sufficiently trained in military tactics or strategy to have an opinion.

46. Q. We are not requesting an answer from the standpoint of a tactician or strategist, but as a result of your general information, your study of the Far Eastern situation, and your knowledge of the proposed intent of the Japanese Government, did you feel that their attack, if any, would be to the southward, toward the Dutch East Indies, or otherwise; or did you feel that there was a very good probability of their attacking the Hawaiian Islands?

A. I had no opinion.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

47. Q. I understood you to say that you were at the State Department on Sunday morning, December 7?

A. That is correct.

48. Q. But you did not attend the conference among the three secretaries?

A. That is right.

49. Q. Did anyone attend that conference other than the three secretaries?

A. Not so far as I know. It was not customary, and I do not think anyone else was present. There were a number of us in the outer office waiting to confer with the Secretary of State when the conference broke up.

50. Q. When did the conference break up?

A. I couldn't give you the exact hour. I have no precise recollection. We were waiting at least an hour.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[1077] The witness stated that he had nothing further to say. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. H. H. Smith-Hutton, Captain, U. S. Navy, Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

2. Q. Will you state what your duties were in the year 1941?

A. I was naval attache at the American Embassy in Tokyo.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Captain, as naval attache were you not part of the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. While in Tokyo during your tour of duty as naval attache, did you have difficulty in obtaining information concerning Japanese military and naval activities?

A. Very great difficulty, yes, sir.

5. Q. Were you able to obtain during the month of November any information at all which indicated a movement, other than a movement, which is well known to have been started, toward southeast Asia?

A. No, sir.

6. Q. Did you get any information of any tangible character during the month of November or early December, 1941?

A. No, sir. During that period I made a trip to Western Japan, to the inland sea area, in an effort to observe all that was possible from the places where I was allowed to visit, but during that entire trip I saw no naval craft and received no information which would indicate any movement by the Japanese Fleet.

7. Q. You heard no conversations on the part of the Japanese which you thought might be of value?

A. None, sir.

8. Q. The newspapers gave you none?

A. The movements of naval and military units did not appear in the Japanese press.

[1078] 9. Q. When you received information during your tour of duty in Japan regarding Japan or the Japanese Fleet or its movements, how did you transmit that information to higher authority?

A. By Japanese cable to the 4th marine radio station in Shanghai, which re-transmitted it to Washington or to Manila.

10. Q. In other words, you transmitted your information direct to the Navy Department through that means of communication?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. Did you parallel this by reports to the Ambassador?

A. Yes, sir, and by written reports to the Navy Department by the diplomatic pouch.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, withdrew.

[1079] 12. Q. In your knowledge of the movements, insofar as you were able to ascertain, of the Japanese Fleet, did you at any time feel that there would be an attack on the Hawaiian Islands or Pearl Harbor?

A. There were, of course, for a period of more than a year, various rumors as to what the Japanese might do; but there was no information reached me, or as far as I know, any other American official in Japan, which would indicate that the Japanese contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor.

13. Q. Did Ambassador Grew depend upon you for information regarding movement of ships or the general situation as pertains to the Japanese Navy?

A. He expected me, as Naval Attache, and as Senior Naval Adviser, to keep him informed of any developments as regards the Japanese Navy.

14. Q. Did you keep conversant with other information that he had from other sources as to such activities?

A. In general, yes, sir. The Ambassador kept all of the senior members of his staff informed of the important communications received from Washington, or important information which he received from Tokyo. I am not certain, sir, that I received all that the Ambassador did, but I believe that he took me into his confidence as much as he felt I needed to be in his confidence.

15. Q. In the latter part of 1941, did you, from your own estimate and your own knowledge of the situation, feel that war was imminent?

A. I felt, sir, that the Japanese were going to make an attack in Southeast Asia. That was brought out quite clearly from reports which we received from time to time from our officials in Shanghai, in Hongkong, and in the Philippines, and it appeared as though an attack on Thailand would be made. It was, however, only by inference that we felt that it might possibly involve our own country. Since July of 1941, when we placed an embargo upon various commodities going to Japan, we felt in Tokyo that the Japanese would make some effort to relieve the critical economic situation that would confront them if that embargo were effective for a long time.

16. Q. Did you form any estimate as to when they would attack?

A. From the information which I had, sir, and of course I received only the information which came from certain units in China, it was impossible for me to arrive at any such estimate.

17. Q. Did the attack on Pearl Harbor come as a surprise to you?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. In any of the reports that you made to the Navy Department during the month of November and early December, 1941, were you able to give anything in the way of information [1080] as to the situation, militarily and naval—or did you state that you had no information?

A. After I returned from this inspection, or a trip to Western Japan, sir, I reported that I had seen in the harbor of Hiroshima approximately thirty-five Japanese transports at anchor there; and I don't recall the exact date, but I could find the message, sir, in which I reported that my movements in Japan and the movements of my subordinate officers, were so restricted in that I had to report to the Japanese Navy Department every time I left Tokyo, that it would be impracticable for me to give an estimate as to Japanese intentions, based on my own observations, and on the facts as I saw them—and I implied, sir, that if Washington were depending upon me to keep them informed as to Japanese naval movements, that I felt that I could not comply with any instructions that I might receive in that regard.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

19. Q. Captain, this is a document of which the court has taken judicial notice, a State Department publication—"Peace and War." Are you familiar with it?

A. Yes, sir, in general.

20. Q. On page 113 appears a passage which concerns a report that Ambassador Grew made on 27 January 1941, in which a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is mentioned. Do you recall being in any discussion concerning that before the dispatch was sent?

A. No, sir, not before the dispatch was sent, because as I recall it, the Ambassador was reporting what one of his staff had learned from

a diplomatic colleague. Subsequent to the transmittal of this dispatch, I did have occasion to discuss it with the Ambassador and various other members of the Embassy staff.

21. Q. Do you recall what your own evaluation of that information was at the time?

A. We evaluated it as a rumor, sir. We felt that for a period of approximately three years the Japanese had observed the greatest secrecy in their military and naval movements, and we felt that in case this were a plan on the part of the Japanese, that it was highly improbable that it would have any current circulation among diplomatic circles in Tokyo. We gave it a low evaluation at the time, sir.

22. Q. You say you are familiar with that document?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. Have you noted any other similar report of any naval information appearing in that document?

A. None I recall, sir.

24. Q. Have you any idea why that, which you say is in [1081] the rumor class, should have been given such prominence in that publication?

A. No, sir. I feel that the statement at the time; that is, the report at the time, received comparatively little notice. I can't understand why it should receive any particular prominence now, sir, except for possible reasons unknown to me.

Neither the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), nor the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. I show you a document; can you identify it?

A. I identify this as a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated February 1, 1941, duly authenticated under official seal, having been prepared at the request of the judge advocate.

The letter, a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, dated February 1, 1941, duly authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, copy appended, marked "EXHIBIT 67."

2. Q. Will you read the entire document, please?

A. Yes, sir.

The witness read the document, Exhibit 67.

[1082] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.

The judge advocate stated that he had no more witnesses.

The court then, at 2:40 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow, September 22, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 22, 1944

[1083]

THIRTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward G. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Bieseimeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the thirtieth day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Thomas Withers, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Portsmouth Navy Yard.

2. Q. Will you state what duty you were performing during the latter part of the year 1941?

A. Commander Submarines, Pacific.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Admiral, as Commander of Submarine, Pacific, will you please state to the court very briefly the daily activities of these submarines during the latter part of the year 1941?

A. The submarine force in general at that time—the [1084] submarines under my command in the Pacific—were training for war. The training had been changed very much from the ordinary peace-time training, so that they were very busy training for war purposes. During the month of November, 1941, some submarines were sent out for observation purposes and to be in position in case war should come. On December 7 I remember, for instance, that there were two vessels, the TROUT and the ARGONAUT, off Midway, and two off WAKE, the TAMBOR and, I think, the TRITON. They were there to observe and report anything, and should hostilities start, of course, to be in a position to get anything they could.

4. Q. What was the general position as to scouting, observation, or otherwise, other than these submarines off MIDWAY and WAKE? Was there any line of submarines, or any submarines sent out, to cover the surrounding area of the Hawaiian group?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. How were these submarines employed at this time—I mean your general employment of submarines?

A. Other than those four that I have mentioned, there was one division on the West Coast.

6. Q. We are speaking particularly of the submarines at the West Coast.

A. One of the divisions that belonged to Hawaii that was on the West Coast had completed overhaul; on the 7th of December they were about one day away from Pearl Harbor. The other submarines—one or two may have been in Pearl Harbor in overhaul at different times. The others were more generally over at Lahaina or in that area in training.

7. Q. How many submarines were in the Hawaiian area at that time, based on Pearl Harbor—the approximate number?

A. I don't remember, but probably about twenty-four.

8. Q. What was the total number of submarines under your command?

A. Probably I am mistaken about the twenty-four. Probably about eighteen.

9. Q. That was the number based on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

10. Q. And what was the total under your command?

A. About thirty-two.

11. Q. And the organization?

A. I'm sorry I don't remember; but there were six S-boats that were under my command, but they were on the West Coast. They were in other places.

12. Q. What was the condition of readiness of the submarines?

A. The submarines were ready for war.

[1085] 13. Q. Was there any special condition of readiness for the submarines while in port at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, there was nothing. They were loaded with torpedoes, and as much of their supplies as they could take, other than the fresh stuff, and were ready for war; but there was no other particular readiness, as I remember.

14. Q. In your schedule of employment, Admiral, what was the proportionate number of submarines in Pearl Harbor, and the proportionate number operating at sea?

A. Generally, about one-third in Pearl Harbor.

15. Q. Overhaul and repairs and upkeep?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. Were you present at Pearl Harbor on about 27 November 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

17. Q. Were you cognizant, or did you have information regarding, a message received from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific, known as the "war warning message."

A. I know of one such message, yes, sir.

18. Q. I show you Exhibit 17. Will you please read that message and state whether or not you have seen it, and about the time you saw it?

A. I think this was the message; I think this is the message that I know of. I am not sure. It was either this message or one similar, that I saw, knew about.

19. Q. Were you present at a conference held by the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific on or about 28 November 1941, when this war message was received?

A. Yes, sir.

20. Q. Will you please state briefly any matters pertaining to this conference, of which you have knowledge—those people who were present, and the discussion?

A. At the time of this conference I had gone into Honolulu, from Pearl Harbor, and I got out as quickly as I could when I received a message. I think I was the last Flag officer to arrive at the conference, and if I remember, all other Flag officers were already there.

21. Q. Admiral Kimmel had called this conference?

A. Yes. Admiral Kimmel handed me this dispatch to read. I read it, and he said, "What do you think that means?" I said, "I think it means war." Then I think Admiral Bloch, who was present, sort of made fun of me; I had that impression—asked me what I would do, would I sink ships? And I said I would sink ships if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back.

[1086] 22. Q. Did you notice General Short at this conference?

A. No, sir, he was not there. There was another thing happened at this conference, that impressed me at the time. About the time that I completed my statement about sinking ships, Captain Davis, who was on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, came in, and Admiral Kimmel asked him if he had seen General Short, and he said, "Yes," that he had. He asked him what he said, and he said that, "Somebody is drawing a long bow."

23. Q. Was there any order by the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific to sink ships within five hundred miles of Hawaii?

A. Not that I knew of, sir.

24. Q. Did you have any orders, as Commander Submarine Force, to take offensive action against any enemy ships in that area?

A. No, sir.

25. Q. In your general estimate of the situation, having been present, and I presume keeping in touch with general conditions vis a vis Japan, did you anticipate an attack on Hawaii, or did you think there would be an attack on Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir, but I had thought that beforehand, so this simply confirmed what I had thought before that. I had warned every one of my commanding officers when any submarines went on any trips, other than the usual training trips, that I expected hostilities to start before their return.

26. Q. What form of attack did you think would take place, if it took place?

A. I didn't go that far into it, sir. I never came to a decision in my own mind about that.

27. Q. Were you kept generally informed as to the existing conditions there, as Flag officer?

A. Well, I knew from general information that we were close to war. In fact, I had felt that for months, but I got no specific information from time to time.

28. Q. In your organization, were your submarines at that time assigned to task forces, and at any time did they operate as task forces in conjunction with other ships of the task?

A. Yes, sir, for training.

29. Q. Will you state generally the set-up in that respect?

A. Well, for the first time in all my experience in submarines, we had plenty of other ships to operate with. We had destroyers to attack our submarines; we acted as targets for the destroyers to search for submerged submarines; [1087] we made attacks upon the Fleet, upon units of the Fleet; we had airplanes to bomb our submarines, and they actually did bomb with little bits of bombs that were close enough that they told the submarines when the bombs were going off. We actually made one attack on the Fleet where we fired torpedoes at the battleships.

30. Q. All of this in preparation for war; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. Was this so-called training and task groups which you have described—had that been stepped up or increased in its intensity during the latter part of 1941?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. Up to December 7?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. On December 7, 1941, did you consider your forces ready and prepared for war?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Did you consider your submarines mobilized?

A. Yes, they were mobilized. There were, as I mentioned before, some boats coming to Hawaii—on the way to Hawaii from the West Coast—that had completed an overhaul.

35. Q. And what was the condition of personnel, as to complements?

A. It was excellent.

36. Q. And the numbers were sufficient, and there was a complete complement on board each ship?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. I'd like to advert to that answer of yours that you had not made any decision about the point of the attack that you expected. May I ask you to look again at that exhibit, the War Warning Message, Exhibit 17, and ask you whether the suggestion contained there about the Philippines made any impression on you?

A. Yes, sir; it did. I felt that attack might come anywhere, but I thought it would be on the Philippines; I thought the chances were much in favor of it being on the Philippines.

38. Q. Isn't that a reasonable interpretation of that dispatch, as it is worded, in the absence of any other locality being mentioned?

A. Yes, sir, because it mentioned other localities; it didn't mention Hawaii.

39. Q. How was your submarine force organized as to task [1088] forces, and as to operations with other forces?

A. Maneuvers were planned, and when the orders came out for

these maneuvers in which there were generally two opposing forces, submarines were assigned to one or the other force, and the submarines actually maneuvered and operated with that force. In order to prevent the artificiality that so often came into our maneuvers when submarines were included, I invariably consulted with the Task Force Commander of the force in which we belonged, and planned maneuvers with him, and submarines were used with these task forces as they might be used in actual war.

40. Q. Then separately, Admiral, did you have your submarines divided up into groups, as task groups of any description, insofar as covering the training and outside of these particular maneuvers which you mentioned?

A. No, sir; not other than our ordinary squadron and division organization.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

41. Q. Do you remember how many submarines you had actually available for war operations between 27 November and 7 December? Isn't it a fact that we sent a large number of submarines to the West Coast to get some extra distilling apparatus, or something of that kind?

A. Yes, they were sent to the West Coast for alteration and overhaul. One squadron of twelve submarines had been sent to Manila early in November, I think, 1941, and actually at Pearl Harbor at that time, or in the Hawaiian area, there was a small number. I have forgotten what the number was.

42. Q. Isn't it a fact that we had—I won't say difficulty—but that we even had to count a little bit to get the four submarines, the two to Wake and the two to Midway, on account of the shortage of submarines that were available, due to these that had to go back to the coast?

A. I think I always had four. At times I had to arrange the overhaul of those in order to have four long-legged boats ready for that duty.

43. Q. Now you have testified that you had full crews on your submarines and that they were well trained. Isn't it a fact that you were endeavoring to train relief crews at this time for the submarines, and also crews for transfer, and that you were unable to obtain a sufficient number [1089] of personnel to keep your school fully manned?

A. That is so, yes, sir.

44. Q. And did we not consider that we had a shortage of personnel in the submarine force in Hawaii at that time?

A. Yes, sir; I had an acute shortage and was complaining about it most of the time: In view of the proximity of war, I had made a study of what was to be expected in the way of submarine personnel requirements in time of war. I knew that I needed two reserve crews for each division of six boats. I also knew that there was a large submarine-building program, and that trained men would be needed for those new boats. We had established schools there at Pearl Harbor to try to train these men as well as we could, and I kept asking for men to keep these schools going to fill up these reserve crews. I got

some men, but most of them were recruits, which were not the material that we should have had for submarines, as the proportion of petty officers in the submarine is higher than in any other type of ship. We were very short of petty officers, and we didn't have enough men even with the recruits.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

45. Q. Admiral, Exhibit 52 before this court indicates that Task Force Seven, which was under your command, as Commander Submarines, contained 1 SM, 8 SS, 12 SS, 6 SS, 4 SS—looks like 31 submarines. I would like to know if you can tell me from your recollection how many of those were actually in the Hawaiian area during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941?

A. Your question indicates that there were 31 submarines assigned to Task Force 7, which was my command at that time, but Squadron 10, indicated here as 4 SS, was still in the United States; Squadron 8—I think 2 boats of that squadron had arrived in Pearl Harbor, as I remember; 1 division of the 6 SS boats was on the West Coast of the United States; and another division of submarines was on the way from the coast of the United States to Hawaii, on December 7. Actually, in Pearl Harbor on December 7, there were about four submarines—five submarines.

46. Q. The number was scarcely adequate to throw out a scouting line to protect the patrol ships and other craft?

A. No, sir; totally inadequate.

47. Q. You say you had five in Pearl Harbor; how many did you have in the Hawaiian area?

A. That is correct; that five was all that were there.

[1090] None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The pages following directly hereafter, pages 1091 through 1108, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[1109] The court then, at 11:10 a. m., took a recess until 11:20 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The court then, at 11:25 a. m., adjourned to 9:30 a. m., September 25, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 25, 1944

[1110]

THIRTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the thirty-first day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, was recalled as a witness by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

1. Q. Admiral Kimmel, after the receipt of Exhibit 17, the war warning dispatch of November 27, did you cause to be inaugurated in the administration of the Fleet the practice of preparing orders or programs to be inaugurated in the event of unexpected hostilities?

A. I did, and I have here two memoranda. One is dated 30 November 1941. It is a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, submitted by the War Plans Officer, and in it he has prepared and I approved the action which we would take in case [1111] hostilities should suddenly break out. I thought it was well to be prepared and ready to take action immediately. That I revised as necessary, and again on December 5, 1941, another memorandum which supersedes the first one, was prepared and approved and put in the hands of the Staff Duty Officer, the officer on duty there at my headquarters, so that he would know exactly what to do, and they could initiate action in case of an emergency.

2. Q. Are those two documents you have in your hand the two memoranda you have described?

A. These are the two memoranda.

The memoranda of November 30, 1941, and December 5, 1941 submitted by his War Plans Officer to him and approved by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, were submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, the memoranda were so received, copies appended, marked "EXHIBIT 69-A", and "EXHIBIT 69-B."

3. Q. Will you please read the memoranda, Admiral?

A. Yes.

The witness read the memoranda, Exhibit 69-A and Exhibit 69-B.

4. Q. By whom were these memoranda signed?

A. It was signed by McMorris; the second copy was signed by McMorris. It was put in the hands of the Staff Duty Officer as a reminder of what to do. Of course, nothing would have been done without my approval, but it was a check-off. That is what it amounted to.

5. Q. Admiral, did you receive copies of any of the information contained in any of the documents contained in Exhibits 63 or 64, between November 1, 1941, and 7 December 1941?

A. None of these messages contained in Exhibits 63 or 64 were supplied to me.

6. Q. Did you receive any of the information contained in those messages, other than that might be inferred from the dispatches you received, of November 24, November 27, and December 1, which are in evidence?

A. I received none.

7. Q. Did you or your staff or the staff of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District have any facilities, materiel or personnel, for the processing of information contained in Exhibits 63 and 64?

A. We did not.

[1112] 8. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify it.

A. Yes, I identify this as a letter signed by Admiral Richardson, and directed to the Chief of Naval Operations, with regard to Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG, and it is dated January 25, 1941. In the last paragraph of this letter it states that, "This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his as well as my own views."

The letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated January 25, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, description appended, marked "EXHIBIT 70."

9. Q. Will you read, Admiral Kimmel, paragraph 7, (A), (B), and (D), and paragraph 10.

A. (Reading:)

In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material cannot but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are (a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port. (b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrons. (d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

(10) This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

10. Q. I show you a document and ask you if you can identify [1113] it, Admiral.

A. This is a letter written by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of 24 July 1941.

11. Q. And does it have an enclosure?

A. It has an enclosure of a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated 24 July 1941, together with enclosure of letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, description appended, marked "EXHIBIT 71."

12. Q. Will you read, Admiral, the third paragraph of the enclosure of Exhibit 71; that is, from the copy of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

A. (Reading:)

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

13. Q. I hand you a document and ask you if you can identify it, Admiral.

A. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated 2 August 1941, together with enclosure, which is a copy of a letter written by the Chief of Naval Operations to then Captain Charles M. Cook, Junior, who was in command of my Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, at that time. It is dated 31 July 1941.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated August 2, 1941, with enclosure of

a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Captain Charles M. Cook, Junior, dated July 31, 1941, was [1114] submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) offered in evidence for the purpose of reading pertinent extracts therefrom.

There being no objection, it was so received, description appended, marked "EXHIBIT 72."

[1115] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

14. Q. Will you read, Admiral, from Exhibit 72, the second postscript of the letter enclosure, which was a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Captain Cooke?

A. (Reading):

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all. Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

15. Q. I show you another document, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it?

A. Yes, I identify this as a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic; Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, dated April 3, 1941. This is an official letter.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic; and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, dated 3 April 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, description appended, marked "EXHIBIT 73".

16. Q. I ask you to read, Admiral, from Exhibit 73, the last paragraph, No. 12.

A. (Reading):

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

17. Q. I show you another document, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it?

A. This is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated November 7, 1941. This is a personal letter.

[1116] The personal letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated November 7, 1941, was submitted to the judge advocate to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,

U. S. Navy (Ret), offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such parts as may be pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received, description appended, marked "EXHIBIT 74".

18. Q. Will you read, Admiral, the first paragraph of this letter?

A. (Reading):

This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in fine fettle. Ok on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?!

19. Q. The letter of October 22nd is Exhibit 14, Admiral, the letter which you wrote outlining to the Chief of Naval Operations the dispositions that you had made in response to his dispatch to you of October 16th?

A. That is correct. The dispatch of October 16th told of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet. As a result of that dispatch I made certain dispositions in the Fleet. On October 22nd I wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations informing him of exactly what I had done. In the letter of November 7th, he answers and states that the dispositions I reported in my letter of October 22nd are O. K.

20. Q. And the letter of November 7th is Exhibit 74 that has just been offered?

A. That is correct.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

21. Q. Admiral, I refer you to Exhibit 74, which is the letter of 7 November 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, and ask you to read, in addition to the two paragraphs which you just read at the beginning of the letter, the last paragraph of that letter?

A. (Reading):

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worse and worse"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret) did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[1117] Examined by the court:

22. Q. Admiral Kimmel, the memoranda which you introduced this morning and was read before this court as of November 30th: Were they in the form of orders or directives, or simply for information of the watch officer on duty?

A. They were simply for my information, the information of the War Plans Division, and the watch officer on duty. They went no further than that. It was on the off-chance that something might happen.

23. Q. Is it true that you felt that you were not required to inform yourself of the means undertaken by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with reference to defenses of Pearl Harbor and the defenses of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. No. I think the evidence before this court indicates that I took a great interest in the defenses of the Hawaiian Department and did inform myself.

24. Q. In view of the evidence before the court in which you state that you did confer with General Short on defenses, did you consider that between the dates of November 27 and December 7, 1941, the situation was so critical that you should confer further with him, and did you do so?

A. To the best of my recollection I conferred with him four or five times during that period, and during those conferences, some of which lasted two or three hours, we reviewed every phase of the situation that existed.

25. Q. Do we understand that this has particular reference to the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and the days following?

A. Yes, sir.

26. Q. You are familiar, Admiral, with the operating orders of the Fleet immediately prior to your taking over command in February, 1941. Could you state briefly the [1118] changes you made in fleet operations immediately subsequent to your taking over command and during the succeeding year?

A. Immediately on taking over command I made no changes in the operating plans for the Fleet. My predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had established the two task force principle, one out and one in, which we kept in effect for about two months. At the end of that two months I changed to the three task force plan, all of which has been presented to this court. I did that because I was assured by various subordinate commanders that they were not getting enough time for upkeep and for the changes which were required in the material changes in the ships. The other changes that I made during the year had to do with some changes in target practices, some in ship organization in which we put the four-section watch in general use in the Fleet, the orders in regard to readiness of the batteries, particularly the readiness of ammunition on deck in the ready boxes. We went into the question of loading bombs on planes, both on board ship and on the air fields, and we took steps to supply bombs which did not exist in the Hawaiian area when I took over. I can recall no very drastic change in the Fleet operations. We did initiate and consummate the question of air coordination betwixt the Army and Naval air forces on shore in Hawaii. We drew in all loose ends in regard to the Fleet's part in the defense of Oahu and in the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, and all the security measures required therefor were put into this order 2CL-41. I think nothing comparable to 2CL-41 existed prior to my taking command, although certain features that were later contained in 2CL-41 were in effect prior to my taking command.

27. Q. During this time did you give any consideration to changing the training of the Fleet and disposing it in some defensive disposition to the westward of the Hawaiian Islands, or not especially "defensive" but for information and security for Hawaii?

A. I gave a great deal of consideration to all matters of that kind and all the steps that we could take to be effective could not be continued indefinitely. There had to be some time limit. When I first took command of the Fleet we were undergoing a scare, an emergency, and we had had a warning dated January, 1941, in which the terms "if war should eventuate we will do so and so". I wanted to continue the training of the Fleet as long as I could. Had I stopped the training in January and had gone out to full security measures, we

never would have had the Fleet training, it just couldn't have been trained under those conditions with the large influx of new men that were coming into the Fleet. And all the time I was considering when to institute these stringent security measures. I put into effect all the security measures that I thought we could put into effect, and still continue the training at anywhere near a satisfactory condition. When these warnings came of November 27th, and prior thereto, they followed a pattern that had continued for some time. I felt that before [1119] hostilities came that there would be additional information, that we would get something more definite, and when the attack came without this information, of course I was inclined to blame myself for not having been much smarter than I was. But when I found, some time later, that the information was, in fact, available in the Navy Department; that the information which, if it had been given me, would have changed my attitude and would have changed the dispositions, I ceased to blame myself so much.

28. Q. Admiral, what information do you refer to in your statement?

A. I refer to the information that was contained in Exhibit 63 in particular.

29. Q. Had you had this information, Admiral, what would you have done, and what orders would you have given relative to the Fleet?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer at this time. It is something after the fact, but the least that I would have done had I had this information would have been to thoroughly alert all shore-going activities in the Hawaiian Islands, including the Army. I would have, in all probability, had the Fleet put to sea, and in general I would have had them take a station probably 300 miles west of Oahu in an intercepting position for any attacking force that would come either to the northward or to the southward. But I would have had to consider the question of fueling these units of the Fleet. I couldn't have put them too far from Hawaii and I would have put them just far enough so they couldn't be readily located. I was torn betwixt a desire for the security of the Fleet and for preparations to make the initial moves in case of war with Japan. I was in a very difficult position in any event. Any Fleet which sits and waits to be attacked labors under an enormous handicap. However, briefly, I think it is fair to state now that I would have alerted everything on shore to its maximum that could be maintained over a long period. I would have instituted the reconnaissance to the best of our ability and I would have had the Fleet put to sea.

30. Q. You state that you would have alerted the Army. Did you have any authority to alert the Army?

A. No. I mean by that that I would have urged them. No, I had no authority over the Army, none whatsoever.

31. Q. You have stated, Admiral, in this connection and in referring to certain information which you did not have, that you did not have any knowledge whatsoever of the contents of the note of November 26, 1941, which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese representatives. Is that correct?

A. That is correct. And I had, on several occasions, pointed out to the Chief of Naval Operations, and through him to the Navy Depart-

ment, the fact that it was essential [1120] that I be kept informed of these developments, and I recall that in February of 1941 Admiral Wilson Brown told me that there was some question in the Navy Department as to who was to supply me with intelligence information and that he, in going from one place to the other here, had, as I recall it, gotten some idea that communications thought that ONI was doing it and ONI thought communications was doing it. Anyhow, there were two agencies that were mixed up in it. I wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations at once, dated sometime in February—it is around here somewhere—in which I called attention to this report that Brown had given and told him I was disturbed by it and I thought it ought to be remedied here in the Navy Department. I subsequently received a letter from him in which he said that he had gone into the matter and I was getting all the information.

The court then, at 10:55 a. m., took a recess until 11:10 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the court (continued):

32. Q. Continuing, Admiral, regarding this note of 26 November, did you read that note prior to this time?

A. I have read the note now, but I had not seen it prior to 7 December 1941, nor did I know that any such note—I mean that any note containing any such terms had been given to Japan.

33. Q. If you had had any indication that there would be a reply to this note in a comparatively short time would this have in any way changed your orders regarding security measures for the Fleet?

A. Everybody is wise after the act. I don't want to be misunderstood, but I feel and believe that had I known the contents of this note and the fact that, as has been testified before this court, the Navy Department generally thought that it would prove entirely unacceptable to the Japanese Government, as I myself undoubtedly would have felt at the time, I am sure it would have affected me and my outlook on the situation very considerably.

[1120A] The pages following directly hereafter, Pages 1121 through 1123, inclusive, have, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[1124] 42. Q. Admiral, having in mind the testimony which you have just given and your stating that you would take the Fleet to sea, and in view of the fact that you have previously stated that you feared a submarine rather than an air attack, will you please state now how you would have disposed your Fleet and whether you would have had sufficient defense for the Fleet against a large submarine attack by the enemy?

A. I made this statement to the best of my present belief. From what I knew at the time prior to December 7th, I probably would have taken the Fleet to sea. You must remember that the efficiency of the Japanese Air Force was, I think, a surprise to the Navy Department as well as to the people in Hawaii. We had on the ships no adequate antiaircraft defense. That applied particularly to the battleships and more particularly to the short-range weapons. The destroyers were somewhat better, as were the light cruisers. The heavy cruisers were poor in that respect. We had three aircraft carriers, and at the time of the attack they were pretty well scattered over the Pacific Ocean. We had one of them on the Coast. In the event of an attack such as was delivered at Hawaii, together with submarines—and I have reason to believe that a great many submarines were in the Hawaiian area at the time of the attack—it is well within the realm of possibility that had I taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater than they actually were from submarine and air attack. However, you must also realize that you presuppose then that they would have found our Fleet and that they would have been able to deliver an attack. It is not impossible that, had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese would not have attacked at that time at all. They might have deferred the attack. We all know how difficult it is to locate a Fleet at sea, particularly if they do not want to be located. All this is in the realm of conjecture, but I think it is fair to say that there are some things to be said for keeping the Fleet in port, and the only change we would make would be to go to a little higher state of alert than we had at the time. I think that I would not have done that. I think that I would have taken the Fleet to sea. You gentlemen are quite as competent as I am to say what should have been done under the conditions that existed at Pearl Harbor at the time and in a better position now than I was when I was sitting on the lid out in Pearl Harbor, because you know more about the Japs.

43. Q. The question was intended to convey the idea: What could have been done rather than what would have been done? What were your capabilities? What line of action was open within your limits?

A. I think one general line of action was to take the Fleet to sea. The other line of action was to keep it in port.

44. Q. If you had increased the alert, would that have done any more than man a few anti-aircraft guns?

A. At best, it might have manned a few anti-aircraft guns, and it might have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.

[1125] 45. Q. I was speaking of the Navy rather than the combined forces.

A. That is right, but those forces had to have some warning, you know. They were good for only an hour in the air, as I recall, and fifteen miles from land, as testified by the Major General commanding the Hawaiian Air Force.

46. Q. You are speaking of Army fighters?

A. Yes, pursuit ships, I think they call them.

47. Q. It has been testified here that prior to your assuming command there were reconnaissance planes used on patrol in certain sectors around Oahu. Did you discontinue this patrol?

A. To the best of my recollection, the patrol, as such, was not in effect when I took command of the Fleet. A patrol covering the

operating area was in effect, and I continued that patrol. In any event, I thoroughly considered the question of running patrols, and I had to make a decision between training and the running of patrols. I was told by the commander of the patrol planes, and also by the Army, of their training difficulties. In addition to that, we did not have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long period of time, and a patrol out to 300 miles or less is of very doubtful value, particularly against air raid. I even go so far as to say that a 300-mile patrol, guarding against an air raid, is almost useless. That was my opinion then. I have had no reason to change it. Of course, any patrol run has some value. I will admit that as far as surface ships are concerned.

48. Q. Were those patrol planes and those planes based on shore Fleet planes under your direct operation?

A. Yes.

49. Q. And you assumed the direct responsibility of employing them, either in protection of the operating areas of the Fleet or for reconnaissance?

A. Yes, I do with the proviso that the Commandant of the 14th District was charged with the execution of that part of the plan which required the search, and he always had the right to request these planes and to request that searches be made. He did that on one or two occasions, and I ran the searches for a couple of days. However, I want it clearly understood it was my responsibility and that I did give the orders to the planes.

50. Q. The court understands, then, that the planes under your command at this time were used in conjunction with the Fleet to protect operating areas and in training in preparation for war; is that correct?

A. Yes, and we believed that by my doing so we were employing them to the very best advantage.

[1126] 51. Q. Admiral, if you had a reconnaissance in effect, even at 700 miles, and had to meet a strange force, did you have any way to stop that force from delivering an attack?

A. I did not, except by the means you know about. I could have, if I had located the force, used all the planes available to attack. Of course, had the patrol planes, plus all the Army bombers, been out on search, we would not have had any striking force left, and you must remember, sir, that almost day by day we were promised additional planes, so that we thought this was going to be improved, particularly in regard to Army bombers.

52. Q. You did not, as we understand it, have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack?

A. Well, we had two carriers that were in areas where they could have been very useful. One of them was 400 miles southeast of Midway, and one was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, and had we known the location of the enemy, we could probably have delivered a very effective attack, first, with one and, then, with the other. The LEXINGTON was full of fuel or practically full of fuel. She had run only from Pearl to the position where she was, but the ENTERPRISE was pretty well down in fuel.

53. Q. You are speaking of this particular time?

A. Yes.

54. Q. I am speaking, in general, of the situation which would warrant your holding the forces in readiness.

A. We would have been torn between a desire to hold in readiness and get them full of fuel.

55. Q. Is it not a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid you must know in advance that the carrier is on its way?

A. Yes, I think so.

56. Q. And within the narrow limits of its time of arrival at a certain place, presumably on a dark circle and in a general sector within narrow limits?

A. I think that is true, and what you say is multiplied every time you reduce the forces waiting for them. To fuel your forces, the more necessity there is to know when the carrier is coming. We have seen time and again—if I read the newspapers correctly—how our own Navy has gone in and made attacks on Japanese-held positions at Saipan, Palau, and Manila, to cite the ones within the last three or four weeks. They have in each case effected what amounts to a tactical surprise, and I can understand perfectly why they have. They have been at war for nearly three years, and what is so often overlooked in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair is that we were still at peace [1127] and still conducting conversations, and there were limits that I could take with planes and aviators. We were still in the peace psychology, and I myself was affected by it just like everybody else. I had been very seriously criticized by local papers for killing too many aviators, anyhow. I had told Bill Halsey that nobody regretted killing them anymore than I did, but we simply had to do certain things. We had to learn how to do it, and I think we did learn a great deal.

57. Q. Had you sighted that force at the outer rim of a distant patrol and, in accordance with your directive, let them make the first war move, could you have done anything other than to alert your command?

A. Admiral, I could not have done anything under the orders which I had at the time, and had I attacked the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu, I would have violated my orders, just as I violated them when I gave the order to bomb the submarines in the Hawaiian area. I again don't know what I would have done, but if we had sighted anything 700 miles from Oahu, I think I would have found some means to handle the situation, insofar as the forces I had available would have permitted me.

58. Q. Admiral, it has been testified to that on or about 1 December 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, issued a bulletin which set forth the activities of Japan at that time. It is further understood that this bulletin was mailed to officers in key positions on or about 1 December. Did you receive that bulletin, and if so, will you please state the information contained therein.

A. In the first place, this ONI bulletin, dated 1 December 1941, was received in my office and was called to my attention, I think, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I cannot be positive as to that, but I can be positive that the essential information contained in that bulletin in regard to the Japanese situation was in accordance with the information which we had available at my headquarters.

59. Q. And what was that information?

A. The part to which I referred was this paragraph "C", "The Japanese Naval Situation": (Reading from Exhibit 57) "Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper [1128] form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic Coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

60. Q. Admiral, it has been noted in the testimony that in correspondence with the Navy Department you invited attention to Army radar installations on Oahu and the importance of their installation being made as soon as possible; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, I think on several occasions I called attention to it.

61. Q. Were you familiar with the radar installations and the radar available to the Army on Oahu?

A. In general terms, yes. I never saw the radar installations of the Army, but I was informed they were getting along pretty well. They had delays of this and that, and as I have testified to here, I was under the impression they could give us a coverage up to about 150 miles, possibly 200. I got that from General Short, and, as a matter of fact, they did state they picked up these planes at 132 miles.

62. Q. Did you at any time request General Short to expedite these fixed installations and did you at any time stress upon him the importance of these fixed installations with respect to the informing of the approach of possibly enemy planes?

A. I did not write any letters to General Short on the subject that I can now recall, but I am quite certain that in many conversations which I had with General Short I did stress the necessity for an aircraft warning system, as well as for all other elements in the defense of Pearl Harbor. I think the court will recall the testimony of General Marshall that he was writing Short to calm Kimmel down out there and not ask for so much.

63. Q. Were you familiar with the hours of operation of these radar sets?

A. No. In general, I knew that they were being manned during a greater portion of the day. I didn't know the exact [1129] hours.

64. Q. Did you ever discuss with General Short the importance of having these radar sets manned prior to and immediately subsequent to dawn of each day?

A. I think we discussed the time when an attack would be expected, yes, and in the joint estimate of the situation that time is set forth. I do not recall that I thought it necessary to discuss this with General Short, except in general terms, anymore than I did a great many other details.

65. Q. Did General Short at any time report to you verbally or otherwise that he was in great need of experienced operators for radar and request you to furnish some from the naval forces?

A. I knew that he was in need of experienced operators, and we did everything we could to assist him in training his radar operators, both before and after he received his equipment. That testimony has been given before this court, I think, in considerable detail. General Short never requested me to supply him with any naval operators to be used in the operation of his radar in Oahu, and, so far as I am aware, he made no such request of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

66. Q. Did he ask you for liaison officers and did you furnish them?

A. He asked me for a liaison officer in July, 1941. I answered his letter promptly and detailed my communications officer, Commander Curtis, to act as liaison officer for that purpose. That was the only letter that I received from General Short asking for liaison officers to be detailed, and as I answered it promptly, I thought the matter was covered completely. The liaison officers, about whom General Short, after Pearl Harbor, spoke about and about whom there has been considerable testimony, were in reality watch officers to stand watch in the communications center, and I would not have recognized the term "liaison officer" if I had heard about it. However, the proper individual to supply him with such liaison officers was Admiral Bloch, and he normally would have made his request on Admiral Bloch for such liaison officers or watch standers in the office. I have been informed that prior to December 7, 1941, General Short did not, in fact, make a request on the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such watch officers. That you will have to get definitely from other sources. We stood ready to supply General Short with some type of watch officers when he requested them, and I think there is no question but that they would have been supplied if he had requested them. You must realize that this was the Army's function, and we butted in a good deal trying to help them.

[1130] 67. Q. While it was an Army function, wasn't it essential for a Navy man to be at the center to screen out Navy planes for any information that might come in?

A. I think it is desirable, but I don't think it was essential. I think it could have worked another way, and they could have got this information where the planes are. Just because this man has a naval uniform, he could not, by any God-given faculty, tell where the Navy planes were. He would have to get that from the Navy, who had sent the planes out, and I think an Army man could have done it just as well.

68. Q. Wouldn't a Navy man have been better informed as to where to send the information and where to get the information?

A. Probably, but I don't think it is a sine qua non.

69. Q. Did you detail Commander E. J. Taylor to assist the Army in this set-up?

A. Yes. I have forgotten who came to me. One of my staff, as I

recall it now. They said they wanted Taylor over there because he had some experience, and General Martin, I believe, asked for him. I said, "Certainly. I will be very glad to send him over to help in any way I can," and I had Taylor in and talked to him.

70. Q. Did you consider the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Admiral Bloch, as the officer more directly concerned with handling radar matters with the Army, or did you consider it a direct function of your and your staff?

A. I knew Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle all matters in connection with that. My staff and I wanted to assist him in any way we could and to assist the Commanding General, also.

71. Q. But you did consider radar as an essential part of the defense of Oahu and also essential for the partial defense of the Fleet while in port; is that correct?

A. It was a thing that should have been pushed to the limit, and whether you can go so far as to say that it is absolutely essential or not, I don't know.

72. Q. It is one of the essentials, then?

A. Yes, it is one of the essentials.

73. Q. Admiral, did you in any way ignore the defense measures for the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and sacrifice them to the training of the Fleet?

A. No, I took the measures that I deemed were justified on the information I had. I was, of course, influenced in putting into effect the security measures in the way they would affect the training of the Fleet.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[1131] 74. Q. Did you at any time discuss with General Short the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the means and the plan which he had or proposed for intercepting such an air attack?

A. I discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with the Commanding General on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many times, but several times, during the year I was out there, and we put the defending planes or other elements into operation. Both Admiral Bloch and I had discussed the various features with the Commanding General. The details at all times I tried to leave to Admiral Bloch. I did not wish to encroach on his part of the job, and I took particular pains to keep Admiral Bloch informed, and I think he as well, took particular pains to keep me informed of the things he thought would be of interest to me. I think it is fair to state that we discussed the subject exhaustively and our principal concern at all times was the few forces we had to meet an attack.

75. Q. This may be a repetition of a question. Were you familiar with the reply which General Short sent to the War Department about 28 November, in reply to the war warning message, regarding his stage of alertness against sabotage?

A. He did not supply me with a copy of his answer, but I had a copy of the message, and I knew that he had replied. He had replied to two messages on the state of alert that he took, one of which was a brief message and one of which was in detail.

76. Q. Where you aware of the fact that the Army, in its general conception of defense of Hawaii, had in mind primarily internal sabotage?

A. In general, yes; all the messages stressed that, you see.

77. Q. And did you know that the Army had so arranged and parked its planes, in accordance with this thought of internal sabotage?

A. I didn't know the method they used to park the planes at the time. That was something that I didn't think was my business.

78. Q. You stated in your testimony that you were of the opinion that in the event of an air attack on Oahu, it would come about dawn. Did you ever give consideration to placing all available planes in the air each morning, by reason of this probable attack?

A. No, I didn't. We gave consideration to all those things, but I did not think the time had arrived to take any such measures as that.

[1132] 79. Q. Why wouldn't any time during an emergency be a time to start that? Why wouldn't any time during an emergency, when you were receiving all these messages that might be considered warning messages, be the time to put that into effect?

A. These emergencies were continuing all the time, and we couldn't do these things indefinitely, because of the personnel. We didn't have enough personnel trained, the matériel wouldn't stand it. I doubt if we had enough gas to keep all these planes manned all the time. There were great difficulties there. I don't know about the gas, but the personnel and matériel were inadequate. Most of that would have developed upon the Army, and they were reporting to me that they were in a very bad case as to both matériel and the state of training of their personnel. I considered it impracticable. In any event, with the limited time in the air of these Army pursuit ships, I think that subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, I have seen a report which states that they tried to put their pursuit ships into the air and after a few days they stopped it entirely, because they just couldn't do it.

80. Q. Couldn't keep it up, you mean?

A. Couldn't keep it up.

81. Q. Admiral, we are speaking more particularly of the planes in the Fleet, and the planes of the Fleet based on shore. You did have a number of PBY's, did you not?

A. Yes.

82. Q. Based on shore. And the question was mainly asked as to your consideration of putting these planes in the air.

A. I misunderstood your question to that extent. I was thinking more of the fighter planes, Army pursuits. It would have been possible to put some of those planes in the air, but I doubt whether it would have helped very much. Those PBY's are not very maneuverable, and they are vulnerable to attack. They were never intended for bombing missions, nor for fighters. I will put it this way: If we considered the situation such that we should have put them in the air, we wouldn't have used them to be in the air at dawn, waiting for attack; we would have had them out searching if we had put them out at all. I think that is a fair statement.

83. Q. But you would have put them out prior to dawn; is that correct.

A. Yes, sir, probably.

84. Q. What other planes did you have there besides these PBY's you speak of?

A. What others?

85. Q. Yes.

A. A few Marine planes, and that is all. All the [1133] carriers were at sea; we didn't have any of those.

86. Q. But if you had a few hours' advance information as to a probable attack, you would have put all of these planes in the air?

A. That is another thing, yes, indeed; I would have started out to find the people that were coming in. I would have used everything.

87. Q. There has been quite a little testimony here in which there has been mentioned "appropriate defense deployment." What is your conception of appropriate defensive deployment, as applied to the Fleet under your command, and under existing conditions about the latter part of November '41?

A. The first time that term was used, as I recall it, was in the dispatch of October 16, in which a defensive deployment was spoken of. I reported in my letter of 22 October exactly what I considered that to mean, inasmuch as I told the Chief of Naval Operations what I had done. I think you will recall that. I placed a couple of submarines off Wake and a couple off Midway, and took six or seven other steps which I can get out of that letter more accurately than I can give you now, and having received an approval of that on November 7 in a letter, I thought when I got the message of November 27, that I would continue the motion, as it were, and that that was what the Chief of Naval Operations meant. I thought I was justified in assuming that.

88. Q. What else could you have done?

A. I don't know.

89. Q. Testimony here has revealed that the carrier ENTERPRISE was returning from Wake, and the LEXINGTON was on its way to Midway.

A. That's correct.

90. Q. Had you known of a probable break within ten days or two weeks after the note of 26 November was delivered, would you have recommended this operation for these two ships?

A. I think maybe the break alone, I might have considered it worth while to take a chance and let them go, because they were a fast force and could get away, and had within themselves, each one of them, considerable fighting power; but had I thought that there was a very good chance of an air attack on Oahu at the time, I might have had a different idea about it.

91. Q. What did the escort of these ships consist of?

A. Three heavy cruisers, and a squadron of destroyers, each one.

92. Q. Under your orders, were they proceeding under war conditions?

A. Oh, yes.

[1134] 93. Q. In all respects?

A. Yes, sir. I think when Halsey went back to the ship—he has told me since—he armed everything and told them to sink every Japanese ship that they found.

94. Q. The operating schedule which you issued about September '41; was that a classified document, secret, confidential, restricted?

A. Confidential.

95. Q. In view of the fact that two of three task forces were scheduled for upkeep in Pearl Harbor during the period which includes 7 December, is it possible that Japanese agents might have had access to this operating schedule?

A. Oh, I think it is possible, yes.

96. Q. If they had had access to it, might there have been a basis provided for the time of attack?

A. I think so, yes. We took all the steps that we considered practicable at that time to keep this thing from circulation, but people talk; and they have got to know when they are going to come in port and when they are going out. I went to great lengths on occasion to keep things secret, and went over to the club and had a Navy wife tell me all about it. We have all been through that.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

97. Q. You were asked, Admiral, concerning the feasibility of having all the planes in the air. I am assuming that means both Army and Navy planes, in the morning twilight. Could that be done in a manner without alarming the civil population or disclosing the intent of operations, both of which features were specifically forbidden in the Army message, dispatch, of 27 November?

A. I think there is no question but what if we had put all the planes in the air each morning at daylight, that it would very materially have alarmed the civil population.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

98. Q. Wouldn't the movement of the Fleet in and out of the Harbor alarm the population to that extent?

A. I don't think so.

99. Q. Why? With the number of planes you had, wouldn't [1135] the population have thought it was training, just the same as taking the ships in and out?

A. The movement of the ships in and out had been going on for some time. It was a part, you might say, of the routine operations out there. Putting all the planes in the air at daylight would have kicked up a rumpus. All of the aviators would have been talking about it. All of their families would have been talking about it, and that every one of the planes had to go in the air. I think there is no doubt but that it would have alarmed the civil population. It would have been quite different from what we had been doing.

Recross-examined by the judge advocate:

100. Q. You have testified, Admiral, that you did not receive the information that was contained in Mr. Hull's note to the Japanese Government under date of 26 November 1941, and you have testified what you would have done with the Fleet had you had that information. Now the judge advocate would like to have you state what information was contained in this note of November 26 regarding the

situation between the United States and Japan, that was not contained in Exhibit 17, wherein the Chief of Naval Operations told you that "negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased?" In other words, what would the note of 26 November have conveyed to you, had you known it, that the Exhibit 17, under date of 27 November, did not convey?

A. Well, without looking into the exact wording, which you know, the note, as has been testified to by a good many before this court, was a veritable ultimatum; and the terms of this ultimatum were such that it was known that the Japanese would not conform to it, and that they were forced to do something. When you force a man to do something, why you put him in a place, as Mr. Hull testified—in a "mad-dog position." He's got to do something.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as interested party.

The court then, at 12:20 a. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[1136] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, dated November 28, 1941? If so, please produce it.

A. I am. I produce a photostatic copy of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, date time group 282054, duly authenticated under official seal, dated 28 November 1941.

The certified copy of a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, date time group 282054 was submitted to the judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 75", copy appended.

2. Q. Please read the dispatch.

The witness read the dispatch, Exhibit 75.

3. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of copies of dispatches 280627, dated 28 November 1941, 300419 dated 30 November, 1941,

212155 dated 21 January 1941, and 070645 dated 7 December 1941? If so, please produce them.

A. I am the authorized custodian of photostatic copies of the dispatches mentioned, duly authenticated under official seal, and I herewith produce them. They were assembled under one certificate and for easy reference have been numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 within the certificate.

The duly authenticated copies of dispatches 280627 dated 28 November 1941, 300419 dated 30 November, 1941, 212155 dated 21 January 1941, and 070645 dated 7 December 1941 were submitted to the judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, [1137] Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence.

There being no objection, they were so received, marked "EXHIBIT 76", copies appended.

4. Q. Please read these dispatches.

The witness read the dispatches, Exhibit 76.

5. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of CinCPac dispatch 292350 dated 30 November 1941, and Chief of Naval Operations dispatch 301709 dated 30 November 1941? If so, please produce them.

A. I am the authorized custodian of photostatic copies of these dispatches duly authenticated under official seal. These two dispatches are covered by one certificate and for easy reference these dispatches have been numbered 1 and 2 within the certificate.

The duly authenticated copies of CinCPac dispatches 292350 dated 30 November 1941 and 301709 dated 30 November 1941 were submitted to the judge advocate, to the other interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret) offered in evidence.

There being no objection, they were so received, marked "EXHIBIT 77", copies appended.

6. Q. Will you please read these dispatches?

The witness read the dispatches, Exhibit 77.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, requested permission to introduce a series of additional personal correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, during the year 1941, which had not been previously introduced.

The judge advocate objected unless it were shown that the documents were pertinent to the inquiry.

[1138] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: It has a material bearing in this respect: As it now appears there is testimony in the record to the effect that Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel rather regularly. The record, however, discloses only certain letters that have been taken from time to

time and put into the record. It doesn't disclose any regular writing on the part of Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. We don't propose to read into the record from these letters but we do want them in the record with their dates to show the regular sequence of Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel over the period of a year.

The court stated: Yes, but everything that has been introduced by Admiral Kimmel was introduced for the purpose of reading certain parts therefrom, which was done. You have the same right, but to just tack things on the record without using them in any way is not permissible.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: It is usable in this respect: That unless you have all the letters before you, you can't tell whether Admiral Stark did, in fact, write to Admiral Kimmel regularly over a period of years.

The court stated: You must get somebody to testify to that effect, if it is desired that they be introduced for any particular point, or read any part you want; but just to tack something on there, we can't allow that. We won't accept them in that form. They must be introduced for some purpose; I mean, reading from them or reading all of them, but just simply adding them on to the record, that is not permissible. You can put yourself on the stand if you want to and state that these letters cover a certain period, if that is your idea, and go ahead and put in the record that there was an indefinite number of letters written back and forth.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: Mr. President, it isn't for the purpose of just making the exhibits in the record more voluminous. It is for the purpose of showing that there was a definite regularity of letters. They are introduced for a purpose. They are introduced for the purpose alone to show that there was a definite pattern to Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel during the year, that is, that he regularly wrote those letters.

The court stated: All right; then put somebody on the stand to testify to that effect.

[1139] The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated: It has been testified to but we submit the letters themselves are the best evidence.

The court stated: The objection is sustained.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) was recalled as a witness by the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the court:

1. Q. Admiral Bloch, it has come out in this testimony before the court that you had the power under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to request patrol planes for reconnaissance. Will you please state to the court if and when you made such requests and how these planes were employed?

A. I think I made a request in June, 1940, from General Herron, who came to me and told me that he had received a dispatch from the War Department. He was Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. He came to me and stated that he had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, United States Army, to the effect that he must be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation. When he came to me I informed him that I had no patrol planes for that

purpose, and suggested that he go with me to the senior officer present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, who was then Commander, Hawaiian Detachment. We went on board Admiral Andrews' flagship and General Herron explained the matter, and Admiral Andrews instituted a dawn to dusk patrol service, informing the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, of the circumstances. Admiral Richardson was at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in, and I think he related the rest of it in his testimony, that he discussed the thing with Vice Admiral Andrews and General Herron and myself and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department and asked them about it, and the Navy Department never replied to him. Now, I don't know how long they continued that dawn to dusk reconnaissance. The second time that I recall was sometime in the summer of 1941; I don't remember the exact date. It was caused by some intelligence information that I had received and I thought that it would be advisable to make a long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit, that is, a medial line of a [1140] sector pointing to Jaluit, and I think it was 15 degrees on either side. I went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put in this service. I don't remember the number of miles the search went out; I think it was 500 miles; I'm not sure. However, it was in effect and the purpose of the search was to detect movements of Japanese submarines or any other Japanese ships in the direction of Hawaii from Jaluit. Now, if there was any other time that I made a request, I don't recall it. I felt that I had a right, as every other subordinate of the Fleet had, of going to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, whose office door was always open, and make any recommendation that I saw fit, but I knew that any recommendation must be backed by good reason; I must have a good reason for the recommendation.

2. Q. But you considered, did you not, that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had left the matter of reconnaissance to you and that you would make application for planes in case you thought it advisable?

A. No, I didn't have any such understanding as that. I knew that I had a right to recommend reconnaissance when I had a good reason for recommending it, but I didn't feel that the Commander-in-Chief depended on me to make a recommendation before he would make a reconnaissance. I felt that he might initiate one himself on somebody else's recommendation, or on his own initiative.

3. Q. But you didn't feel that it was your province to take the initiative in making recommendations as to reconnaissance?

A. Only when I had good reason.

4. Q. What planes, if any, were assigned to you for routine tasks as Naval Base Air Defense Officer?

A. I was not the Naval Base Air Defense Officer. I was the Naval Base Defense Officer and I had no planes assigned to me as a firm force.

5. Q. How many planes could have been assigned to you in case of an emergency?

A. Well, in case of activation of the Naval Base Defense Force, which was only in case of drill or in case of an actual attack, all available planes were assigned, but that was only in case of an attack or in case of drill.

6. Q. All available Fleet planes; is that correct?

A. All available shore-based planes. That included patrol planes and whatever happened to be on Ford Island.

7. Q. But all naval shore-based planes were made automatically available to you upon an air-raid alarm; is that correct?

A. Yes; they were made available to Admiral Bellinger who commanded the Base Defense Air Force.

[1141] 8. Q. It has been testified that they were made available to you as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

A. They were made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which was commanded by Admiral Bellinger and not by me. I was Naval Base Defense Officer and Admiral Bellinger was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

9. Q. That is rather confusing to the court. Will you explain this set-up? We have never gotten straight on that yet. You were in command and you were not in command. I mean, there is a certain distinction there between Naval Base Defense Air Force and Naval Base Defense Force.

A. There was no Naval Base Defense Force mentioned in Admiral Kimmel's order. I was called the Naval Base Defense Officer. The air force consisted of all shore-based naval planes or Fleet planes there. They were only under my supervisory control. Admiral Bellinger was loaned to me by Admiral Kimmel as Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force and he commanded the air force and his operation order was a part of Exhibit 53. It is very clear what he did.

10. Q. Was he subject to your orders in any way while that force was acting as defense?

A. He was subject to my orders insofar as related to readiness of the planes. I was supposed to assign the condition of readiness of the planes to this air force. I was supposed, in case of an air raid, to sign the air raid alarm. I was supposed to see that they launched the search and attack, and that was all provided for by frequent drills which made all this automatic. In other words, I had supervisory control—and that is so stated in Admiral Kimmel's order, that I was in supervisory control. I was also in supervisory control in exactly the same way of the Army-Navy Air Defense. Now, that was assigned to me by Admiral Kimmel and that circular doesn't mean that I had any command functions in the Army when I had that supervisory control of the Army.

11. Q. In case of alarm or attack, did you tell him how to search?

A. No.

12. Q. You had no control over that?

A. I had control over it if I wanted to change it, but he had practically autonomous control over the air force. He was the Air Force Commander. I had the whole thing and he had the air part of it, a task group under me, and the drills had been conducted and he had his search arrangements made and he went out without any further orders from me, just as soon as the air raid alarm sounded.

13. Q. But did he decide as to the area of search or as to the composition of search, or anything like that? Was he a subordinate of yours to such an extent that you could [1142] give him orders in directing him what to do?

A. I could give him orders and the Commander-in-Chief could

give him orders, but Admiral Bellinger was a flying officer, he was a rear admiral in the Navy, he had drilled this thing, he had search arrangements made, and he went out on search in his group.

14. Q. But as a matter of fact, he was under your command on that search?

A. I could give him orders, unquestionably. I don't think there is any use to discuss that. Any orders I would give him, he could accept. I don't think there is any question about it, but he was in command of the Air Force.

15. Q. While he was doing that, he was really in the set-up of the Air Base Defense?

A. He was the Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

16. Q. You were the Naval Base Defense Officer and had him under your control?

A. That is correct. And when the order came out, I issued an operation plan, and I gave him as one of the task groups and told him to get out his order and I approved his order.

17. Q. He was very definitely under your command, then?

A. Well, the reason I brought the question up was to be technically correct in accordance with the existing orders. The existing orders said that all these planes were under my supervisory control. When the order was issued to put this Base Defense Air Force under the whole thing in accordance with 2CL, I got out an operation plan. The operation plan sets out the various task groups. It gave Naval Base Defense Air Force (Admiral Bellinger in command) and all the rest of it. And then they all had orders calling their attention to this 2CL, and that they were to submit their operation orders, which they all did, and Admiral Bellinger submitted his too.

18. Q. Did you understand the Commander-in-Chief held you responsible for the plan and the operation of these planes?

A. No, I didn't understand that.

19. Q. In other words, your subordinate had the responsibility, although you were in command of the subordinate?

A. That is correct.

20. Q. Suppose you had had planes of your own which, as I understand it, is part of the defense of a permanent naval base: Would you not then have had direct charge of those planes?

A. I would have had an air officer in command.

[1143] 21. Q. You would probably have had an air officer?

A. I would have had an air officer and he would have been in command of the task group in my district and he would have run them subject to my orders.

22. Q. Isn't it a fact that in the chain of command from the top down that the top is in command?

A. Oh, yes; I don't think there is any use to argue about that.

23. Q. Still leaves a lot of doubt, though, the way you have expressed it.

A. In what respect, sir?

24. Q. As to whether or not you had command of that air force when they were placed under you?

A. Well, they were only under Admiral Bellinger as a Naval Base Defense Air Force when they were activated, and they were only activated, while I was there, for drill and for that one time when we

were attacked; those are the only times. Every time they went out to drill we simulated conditions. Very frequently Admiral Kimmel had a carrier out there and would send planes in. Admiral Bellinger drew up his search plans and he had his search plans made for this thing to go out, and he had his operation order and I approved his operation order, and I accepted the responsibility for approving his operation order. It was full and complete.

25. Q. You couldn't have done that unless he was under your command.

A. I will admit he was in my chain of command, but the order didn't say it. It said "supervisory control".

26. Q. Suppose Admiral Kimmel had taken every vessel of the Pacific Fleet away from Pearl Harbor and left only the PatWing Two, or whatever you call it; and you, being the senior naval officer present then, had received some information which indicated that something ought to be done with regard to the use of planes: Would you then have given direct orders to Admiral Bellinger?

A. Yes, of course, if everybody else had gone away and I was the senior officer present in the Fleet. In that case I was the senior officer present in the Fleet and I was senior to Admiral Bellinger and I could give him those instructions.

27. Q. I think what the court is trying to develop is the question of whether or not you were in a position to have judged from circumstances whether or not a direct order to Admiral Bellinger to modify his operation order was demanded?

A. I don't know of any correction that was needed in Admiral Bellinger's operation order. I don't know whether I'm quite clear on what you mean.

[1144] 28. Q. When something comes up that isn't covered by the operation order, some rumor or some report that you get yourself before anybody else does.

A. Yes, but I think the misunderstanding is based on something else which is a little deeper. Take for instance an air attack comes in on Pearl Harbor and the air raid alarm is sounded either by radar warning or whatever. The Base Defense Air Force is activated at once. Admiral Bellinger is in direct command of them. Now, the fighter planes go out and join the Army fighters to fight these bombers that are coming in; and the search and attack group, which is Admiral Bellinger's force over the sea, is joined by the Sixth Army bombers and goes out to find the carriers. Now, they will go to the carriers. If they have a radar indication or radio direction indication, they are told where that is and Admiral Bellinger takes them there. If, on the other hand, they have no knowledge of where this attack may be, as was the case on December 7th, they must make a 360-degree search, for which he had a plan. Does that clarify the situation?

29. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the arrangement which was in effect was a make-shift one caused by the fact that you had no patrol planes with which you could make reconnaissance, that duty being the one with which you were charged?

A. Yes. I had no patrol planes for distance reconnaissance, so consequently Admiral Kimmel had a make-shift arrangement whereby he would furnish patrol planes to the Base Defense Air Force for

reconnaissance in case of air attack to locate carriers. It was also for the further purpose of supplementing the deficiency in Army fighters. The Army was responsible for all pursuit plane operations, that is, fighter operations fighting attacking bombers.

30. Q. Then is it not a fact that because of the deficiency in the equipment supplied you, the Fleet was forced to participate in its own defense while in a permanent naval base?

A. Yes; deficiency in Army equipment and Navy equipment.

31. Q. But Admiral, even though you state that no planes were supplied you directly, there were planes under Admiral Bellinger which would have been under your control had you requested them and the Commander-in-Chief had approved; is that correct?

A. If I had requested it, I assume Admiral Kimmel would have done it.

32. Q. If you had anticipated an air attack on Pearl Harbor at any time by reason of information that you had received, would you have felt at liberty to have immediately ordered Admiral Bellinger to take a certain course of procedure as to reconnaissance or as to search?

A. No, not for a protracted daily reconnaissance. For [1145] a protracted daily reconnaissance over a period of time I would have had to see Admiral Kimmel in advance and get his authority because if I instituted any such thing contrary to his decision—which he made on November 27th that he would not make any distance reconnaissance—and upset his complete operating schedule, I would have needed his authority to do it so I could not put any protracted reconnaissance plan into effect without his authority.

33. Q. Did you ever make any recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief to make a distance reconnaissance?

A. Only the occasions which I have told you about, and in this particular case between October 15th and December 7th, I had no information anything different from Admiral Kimmel's. We had the same information. I couldn't possibly arrive at any different conclusions with him.

34. Q. Will you please state to the court, Admiral, the orders, if any, which you gave to anyone on the morning of December 7th at the time of this attack?

A. Well, I think I enumerated them in my previous testimony. I know I gave orders to flood the drydock, that is, the No. 1 drydock. I also gave orders to flood the floating drydock. I gave orders about certain tugs; I have forgotten the details of them. The air raid alarm, I also gave the orders that that was to be sounded when I knew about the attack, and it was sounded. I also gave an order about sending a dispatch out to all ships and all stations about an air raid being in effect, and the location of it. There were innumerable orders that I gave in the course of the attack that I can't recall what they were.

35. Q. You gave an order to close the gate, didn't you?

A. The order to close the gate was given by the Captain of the yard who was charged, by me, with the operation of the gate, and he gave the order to close the gate. He sent it out at any rate.

36. Q. Did your intelligence officers have any means of obtaining information from certain messages or regarding certain messages that have been presented to this court?

A. They had no equipment and they could not do it.

37. Q. Were these Marine Corps anti-aircraft defense guns manned at the time of attack on December 7th?

A. I have ascertained that at that time there were three, 3-inch, 50-calibre guns, and five, 50-calibre guns in the Navy Yard belonging to the Marines. By agreement with the Army, they were to be turned over to the Army when the Army deployed their guns, and the Army started deploying their guns immediately on the attack and these guns went out with them.

[1146] 38. Q. Weren't they used there on the station?

A. No, they were turned over for the Army to control and everything. The Army had complete cognizance of all shore-based anti-aircraft weapons.

39. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the radar set up by the Army on the Island of Oahu?

A. Generally speaking, yes.

40. Q. Did you confer with the Commanding General, General Short, as to the equipment, its efficiency of operation, and so on?

A. I talked to General Short. I can't recall any conferences that were especially directed toward the radar but I knew from General Short, and I also knew from members of my staff who were in contact with the members of General Short's staff, what the conditions were.

41. Q. Did you know that they were deficient in men to efficiently operate this radar equipment?

A. General Short wrote me a letter and told me that he was having difficulty training his operators and asked if I would arrange with Admiral Kimmel to have his operators sent on board ship, and I took that up with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel took them to sea with him and trained them.

42. Q. Did he ever ask you or request of you additional operators or liaison officers?

A. He never requested additional operators from the Navy and he never requested any liaison officer from me. Now, on this question of liaison officer, it seems to be somewhat confused. This liaison officer was a watch officer. He was a man who sat at a telephone and talked, got information, and if in a center, the interceptor center, telephoned in to the Harbor Control Post in the naval district, and from the information he gave us we were supposed to claim our own aircraft and we were supposed to claim our own ships in case it was a surface target. In that category of watch officers there was not only a naval officer there; there were at least 6 or 7 Army watch officers too.

43. Q. Where?

A. In the interceptor center standing watch. One of them came from the ground troops; another one, I think, came from the bomber command; another one came from civilian air defense; another one came from something else, I've forgotten where. There were five or six other people there who were in the same position of this naval officer and when anything was sighted on the surface or in the air it was sent out by all these people to the various commands to see if they could claim it. Now, on the mornings of December 6th and 7th, nobody had anybody there. None of the Army watch officers nor the Navy watch officers were there because the Army never asked for them to come.

[1147] 44. Q. Wasn't that a matter of routine procedure to have these officers there, or was it on account of being Sunday morning that they weren't there?

A. No, it wasn't on account of Sunday morning. In the joint agreement in regard to this anti-aircraft warning service, it was stated that when the warning service was established, that is, when it was finished and ready to go, that we would furnish this man and it had never been established and General Short testified before this inquiry that it had never been established and it wasn't established until December 7th.

45. Q. In other words, on December 7th and prior thereto, it was in a preliminary state and was not officially established as to routine?

A. It was in a very formative state. As a matter of fact, on December 4th or 5th—I don't remember which—General Davidson, who had charge of this and who had been in the United States to find out how to do it, just returned two days before the attack on Pearl Harbor with the information of what he wanted to do.

46. Q. It has been mentioned in the testimony by certain officers that there was quite a little information regarding the Japanese situation in the newspapers. Did you receive or can you remember whether or not you received any accurate information in the newspapers, and whether or not you depended on newspapers to form your estimate at that time?

A. Well, I read the newspapers, two of them in Honolulu—one morning and one afternoon—good papers. I listened to the radio broadcasts, not only the Hawaiian but the Mainland broadcasts when I could get it. I did everything in my power not to be influenced by what I heard or read, but I was influenced. I was subconsciously influenced and couldn't avoid it. I didn't know I was but I realize now that I was.

47. Q. How were you influenced?

A. Well, for one thing, I read in the newspapers—I think on Friday or Saturday, December 5th or 6th, 1941—that the President of the United States had written a note to the Emperor of Japan in which he was imploring that further negotiations be had and that this thing be smoothed out and one thing and another. I had not other background than what I read there in the paper and I didn't know whether to believe it, or not, but actually I find that I believed that this thing was going to have some effect.

48. Q. In what way?

A. I believed that the Japanese Government would take no action such as it did on the 7th of December when the head of another nation was actually sending them a telegram one or two days ahead, you know, asking for more time, and all that business.

[1148] 49. Q. Did you have any information as to the background which led up to the President's letter to the Emperor of Japan? Had you sufficient information from the Department to give you a background for that diplomatic information?

A. I had no information. I didn't know until April 5, 1942, that there had ever been a note of 26 November. I learned it when I joined the General Board, I think it was on April 5, 1942.

50. Q. From your best knowledge, there was no notice of it or reference regarding it in the Honolulu press?

A. If there was, it made no impression on me. I have no recollection of it.

51. Q. If you had known of this note of November 26th, and had you been familiar with its contents as you probably are now, would that have had any bearing on your estimate of the situation?

A. Of course I don't know. That is a very hypothetical question but I don't see how anybody who had any knowledge of Japanese-American diplomatic history could possibly avoid forming a very definite conclusion that the United States note to Japan was very extreme when it demanded that Japan recognize Chiang Kai-shek, that they get all Japanese out of China day after tomorrow. You must understand that that is a very serious situation, particularly to put up to an Oriental nation.

52. Q. In other words, had you known of the contents of this note it may, in all probability, have had a very marked bearing on your ideas as to the situation?

A. Well, I can't discuss myself singly in this thing because I feel that my contact with Admiral Kimmel was so complete and, you might say, continuous, that any bit of information like that we took over to him and we discussed it and he had a very competent staff. I had no staff to speak of—one or two people—and we would discuss this thing from A to Z. I have no doubt we would have discussed it with General Short before much time had passed. However, all of it is hypothetical and I am just telling you what I think would have taken place.

53. Q. Were you aware of General Short's ideas as to internal sabotage on the Island of Oahu?

A. Well, of course, I knew General Short and the Army at large had very much fear of sabotage. They were responsible for all anti-sabotage measures taken outside the Navy Yards. They had their water-works and the power plants, telephone plants, all of those things, and they considered that a very serious obligation. I felt that they felt very keenly their responsibility in that regard. I also felt that they were invasion conscious. Most of their maneuvers were patterned towards the repulsion of overseas invasions.

[1149] 54. Q. Did you know that his planes and so on were grounded and placed in accordance with his ideas against sabotage?

A. No, sir, I did not know it.

55. Q. I would just like to have this question of the inshore air patrol cleared up in my own mind. I understand that that was in charge of the Army?

A. That is correct.

56. Q. Is it not a proper charge for the Navy?

A. I think it should be.

57. Q. Did you not request sea planes for that purpose and have them refused?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. Isn't it true, Admiral, that in the instance which you speak of in 1940, that the senior officer present at that time conferred with the Army and that the Army did have and did detail an inshore air patrol of 25 miles and 50 miles at the entrance of Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir, I don't know that.

59. Q. Do you remember how long this so-called distance patrol by PBY planes was continued?

A. You mean the one where General Herron asked Vice Admiral Andrews?

60. Q. Yes.

A. To the best of my recollection it was three days. Admiral Richardson discontinued it when he returned from sea.

61. Q. Wasn't it started again afterwards?

A. I don't know.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret) stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The judge advocate stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

[1150] The witness resumed his seat as an interested party.

The court then, at 2:55 p. m., took an adjournment until 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, September 27, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

SEPTEMBER 27, 1944

[1151]

THIRTY-THIRD DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The court met at 10:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

Captain Harold Biesemeier, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate, and his counsel.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Counsel for Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

Rear Admiral Husbands E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, and his counsel.

The record of the proceedings of the thirty-second day of the inquiry was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel to the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

1. Q. Do you have in your possession certain letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, written during the year 1941?

A. I do. I have in my possession a file of photostatic copies of personal letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, consisting of ten letters, as follows: January 29, 1941; April 4, 1941; April 19, 1941; April 26, 1941; May 15, 1941; May 24, 1941; June 26, 1941; July 3, 1941; July 25, 1941; and August 21, 1941.

None of the parties to the inquiry nor the judge advocate [1152] desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel to the judge advocate.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire any more witnesses.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following statement: We now would like to have Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, and Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. Navy, available as witnesses.

The judge advocate made the following reply: The judge advocate presents to the court, for prefixing to the record, a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, dated September 22, 1944.

The judge advocate read the letter, original prefixed hereto, marked "D".

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following statement: We have no further witnesses.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire any more witnesses.

The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate feels that the court will remember the numerous instances in the earlier stages of the proceedings when the interested party, Rear Admiral Kimmel, stated in the record that certain documents in the files of the Navy Department were being denied him and this denial in effect not only prevented a proper presentation of the evidence that he felt should be presented to the court, but also would prevent the court from arriving at a full finding of the facts it was directed to inquire into. The judge advocate at this time requests a categorical statement for the record from Admiral Kimmel, as to whether there are now any documents that have been denied him for presentation to the court.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, [1153] U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following reply: Admiral Kimmel has been supplied with all the documents requested in the statements referred to by the judge advocate, and possibly in letters, that we have been assured are available in the Navy Department. We call attention to the fact that there was one document which would normally go in Exhibit 63, of which evidence has been adduced showing that at one time it was in the Navy Department, but it is no longer present.

The judge advocate made the following statement: Other than this one document that you have just mentioned, is it the judge advocate's understanding that you have got all other documents and correspondence from the files of the Navy and Navy Department that you desire for presentation to this Court of Inquiry?

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following reply: We have received all that we have requested.

The page following directly hereafter, page 1154, has, by direction of the court, been extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

[1155] Neither the court, the judge advocate, nor any party to the inquiry desired any more witnesses.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested Party, submitted a written statement, which statement was read and is appended.

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested

party, submitted a written statement, the reading of which was begun.

The court then, at 12:30 p. m., during the reading of the statement of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The reading of the statement of the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), was resumed and completed, and a copy thereof is appended.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, submitted a written statement, which statement was read and is appended.

The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate has presented to this court all the evidence that he can find that he feels bears on the subject matter under inquiry. This evidence is very voluminous and has been, for the most part, duplicated in many ways, so that the facts, he feels, are firmly impressed in the court's mind, and he therefore does not feel that it would serve any useful purpose for him, at this time, to make any argument based on these facts.

Neither the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy; the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret); nor the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), desired to make any argument.

The record of proceedings of the thirty-third day of the inquiry was read and approved.

The inquiry was finished, all parties thereto withdrawing.

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44. P31: P31 pt. 33

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO


PART 33

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

Printed for the use of the

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

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PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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17	111 through 128.
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19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
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34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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[a]

[SECRET]

**Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. N.**

[1]

INTRODUCTION

This summary will point out what we consider to be the most important aspects of this Inquiry insofar as they affect the interests of Admiral Stark, designated an Interested Party by this Court. It is not our purpose to comment on testimony developed by this Inquiry which affects only one or more of the other persons designated as Interested Parties.

I. MOBILIZATION FOR WORLD WAR II

1. Mobilization meant building up the forces and distributing them, prior to hostilities if possible. On 7 December 1941 there were shortages of ships, planes and personnel, in the Pacific Fleet as well as in the other Naval Commands. We have had shortages at the beginning of all our wars.

2. Beginning soon after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, we began the time-consuming task of building up our Naval Forces and they were very considerably increased by the end of 1941. The testimony concerning Admiral Stark's part in this effort is brief but, with what is common knowledge, does indicate his zeal and his accomplishments despite the difficulties which always attend such progress during peace. The overall result was, to state it conservatively, a much higher degree of readiness, in late 1941, than had been the [2] case in our previous naval war history. Moreover, every ship available had been placed in commission.

3. The Distribution of Forces among the various Naval Commands was Admiral Stark's responsibility subject, however, to concepts and policies either passed to him from higher levels or which resulted from cooperative agreements with our Army. The entire world theatre had to be considered and the available forces spread in two oceans, even if in spots they thus appeared to be thin. Some mention has been made of the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic during 1941. It must be remembered that 1941 began as a critical year in the European phase of the war and any realistic plan had to take into account the fact that our help in the Atlantic was deemed essential to stave off the defeat of Britain, a defeat which would probably have been disastrous in the European theater and also have seriously hampered our ability to successfully defend ourselves against the Japanese. The testimony indicates little if any fault in the overall distribution of our available forces, and indeed, no authoritative criticism on the point seems to have come from any source. The distribution which was in effect was realistic, as fitting

the situation of late 1941. Mobilization was, in fact, as nearly complete as any effort of the Chief of Naval Operations could make it.

4. The War Plans of 1941 were likewise realistic. Those Plans were no longer development projects but were tailored to correspond to the forces available. Insofar as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the initial tasks fitted the offensive power of that Fleet. However, as long as peace endured [3] we could not use that power offensively, because the Government had decided, as a matter of policy, that we would not commit a first overt act. The Japanese had the initiative. Therefore, our forces which were within reach of the Japanese, anywhere, had to expect attack—with or without a prior declaration of war—and their security, while in such situation, had to be the primary consideration. These considerations of security have not been shown to be incompatible with maintaining a suitable readiness of our forces to execute the War Plan.

5. How the security of the exposed forces was to be guarded, Admiral Stark left to the several Commanders-in-Chief. He did not attempt to tell them how to accomplish security and he did not harass them by calling for reports on what they had done or why they had not done something else. Such had long been Admiral Stark's command method. It was not questioned by the several Commanders-in-Chief prior to 7 December 1941—in fact, CINCPAC pointed out (in Exhibit 33) that because of the time and distance factors involved, the Navy Department was not always too well informed of the local situation, "thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions."

II. INFORMATION AND DIRECTIVES

6. Pursuant to his policy of informing the Commanders-in-Chief of broad policy and objectives, Admiral Stark devoted considerable personal effort and [4] time toward informing the CinC, Pacific Fleet, of his conception of our situation vis à vis Japan. Our position was uncertain, in varying degrees, right up to the closing months of 1941 and was more or less bound to be so because of the nature of our governmental processes. However, Admiral Stark employed much effort toward opening his mind to the Fleet Commanders, and keeping them in touch with our policies and the current situation in the Pacific as he viewed it. Those views proved to be generally correct and, even today, appear to have been properly set forth.

7. As regards the flow of information to CinC, Pacific Fleet, from the Department's machinery, by employing routine methods: Such information as concerned Japan is properly divided into two categories:

a. The first constituted the primary function of the Navy's Intelligence agencies and concerned the strength, disposition and activities of Japanese forces. That class of information was always scant but such as was obtained was known to Pacific Fleet Commanders. As a matter of fact, one of the principal gatherers of such intelligence was stationed in Pearl Harbor.

b. The other category originated in Japanese political and diplomatic sources and was mainly gathered by joint effort of War and Navy Departments. The volume of such intelligence was very great and only a fraction carried significance of direct naval or military

value. It was not routine to transmit this class of information, from day to day, as it came in, to the CinC, Pacific [5] Fleet. Certain items of it have been brought before this Court and many questions put with the indicated intention of proving serious failure in duty by the Chief of Naval Operations in not transmitting this category of intelligence to CinC, Pacific Fleet, as the various items became available. In studying the items of this category which are in the record, it is well to keep in mind that one, or several of them, lifted from their place amid a great number can, in the light of hindsight, be made to appear far more significant than would have been the case at the time.

c. To have transmitted even a fraction of this category to Fleet Commanders, as a matter of routine, was quite inadvisable for two reasons: Personnel was limited and more important work would have been displaced. Such practice would have tended to compromise intelligence agencies which were a highly important part of our preparations for war. The information and directives which were sent did reflect intelligence from such sources.

8. Admiral Stark did keep CinC, Pacific Fleet, informed of the gradual deterioration of our relations with Japan throughout 1941 and, in late November, he warned both the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific of the probability that we ourselves would be one of the objectives of a Japanese surprise attack which was then expected. He gave out all that was known of the disposition of Japanese Naval units. He indicated in his despatch of 24 November 1941 that Japanese forces might make a surprise aggressive movement *in any direction*. He issued an unequivocal war warning in good time—on 27 November 1941. In [6] this despatch, he stated: "This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan * * * have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." He pointed out that the Japanese distribution indicated an *amphibious expedition* against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, which was all that was *new* concerning Japanese dispositions. That estimate of objectives did not cancel out the despatch of 24 November 1941 in which Admiral Stark warned of a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*. Thereafter, he gave CinC, Pacific Fleet, most significant information and directives concerning the destruction of codes and cyphers. These despatches represented the best judgment of the CNO and his principal advisors and were based on the best intelligence available. Subsequent events proved the information and conclusions given in these despatches to be correct. They did not specifically predict an attack in the Hawaiian area. There was not sufficient basis for such prediction, for the amphibious expedition in the Far East was not pointed at Hawaii. However, its composition did not include all the Japanese Fleet.

III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEARL HARBOR

9. It is entirely clear that, under the policies of many years, and as laid down in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", the Army was fully responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air attack. That responsibility extended not only to the permanent installations at the base, [7] but also to ships within the Pearl Harbor area. The Naval Base was and still is the seat of our

power over the Pacific and in the last analysis the Army forces, Oahu, were stationed there for its defense—and for that alone.

10. In January, 1941, the Navy Department (in Exhibit 9) pointed out to the War Department considerable deficiencies in the Army's readiness to meet its commitments for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack. The War Department (in Exhibit 24) acknowledged those deficiencies and undertook to remedy them. At that time, both the Army and the Navy were cognizant of the material and operational developments whereby the British had defeated German air attack upon England. Those developments did include close-in defense by anti-aircraft artillery, but the main feature was fighter aircraft, made effective by radar and the directive control of the fighters from the ground. By those methods, all of which had been disclosed to the U. S. officers in England, a relatively small force of fighter planes had repeatedly broken up heavy German bombing attacks. The same methods are still in use today.

11. For the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack, the Navy's sole responsibility was to support the Army's effort through the use of such elements as happened to be available, whether belonging to the local defense forces or units which were parts of the Pacific Fleet itself. Since Pearl Harbor was our one large navel base in the Pacific, some units of the Fleet were normally expected to be present. The defense of the Pearl Harbor Area, and of any Fleet units which happened to be there, against air attack, was not a direct responsibility of the Navy which had no authority over the [8] main defensive agency—the aircraft warning system, the fighter planes and their direction in combat.

12. Even had no important Fleet units been in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, there were plenty of lucrative targets for the Japanese aircraft. For example, the Court will have noted the location of the fuel tanks, up-hill from the all-important Submarine Base. The testimony shows that those tanks were practically filled to capacity (4,000,000 barrels). They could have been blown up and fired by a very few planes attacking unopposed. The Court can estimate how long our effort in the Pacific might have been delayed if the Japanese raid, on 7 December, had found no Fleet units present and had been directed against various Pearl Harbor installations on shore.

13. There was, from early in 1941, nothing new about defense against air raids by means of fighter aircraft made effective by radar and a ground control system. Such defense is comparatively simple, requires only a small number of personnel, is self-contained and is adaptable for readiness round the clock because it has only one single, well-defined function. The elements for such defense became available on Oahu in the summer of 1941, and they were supplied for the one purpose of defense against an air raid. The evidence discloses that there was nearly complete failure by Army Fighter Planes to oppose the attack of 7 December.

14. Counsel submits that whatever may have been Navy failures, on or before 7 December 1941, failures in judgment, of commission, or of omission, [9] all of those failures combined constitute something quite minor as compared with the failure of the Army Interceptor Command on Oahu.

H. R. STARK.

[1] Statement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, before the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigating the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, read before the Court on 27 September 1944.

It is not necessary for me to make this first part of my statement to the members of this Court. However, since the rumor has been widely circulated during the last two years and a half that I was a friend or intimate associate of the President of the United States, I desire to take this opportunity to place on the record a categorical denial of that story. The only meetings I ever had with the President, prior to my official visit to Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet in June of 1941, approximately six months after my appointment, were in the course of official routine duties and occurred more than twenty years prior to my taking command in the Pacific. During more than forty years of service in the Navy, I have never sought or owed advancement to any political connection of any nature or description.

The following are the circumstances in connection with my retirement. I set them forth because this matter has been so frequently misrepresented in the press.

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U. S. N., Commandant 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., had telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the [2] Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for retirement.

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me.

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, I stated in part: "I submitted this request solely to permit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the

interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment."

The approval of my request for retirement included the statement: "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

[3] I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court Martial at some future time.

When I took command of the fleet, it was based in Pearl Harbor. The decision to base the fleet there was made prior to my taking command. I do not propose now to debate the wisdom or unwisdom of that decision. The reason assigned for the presence of the fleet in Hawaiian waters by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to Admiral Richardson dated 27 May 1940 (Exhibit 26) was, "the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japanese going into the East Indies." My predecessor, Admiral Richardson, took up all phases of the decision to base the fleet in Pearl Harbor with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.

That decision, however, created fundamental problems for my consideration as Commander-in-Chief, among many other problems with which I had to deal.

There were certain weaknesses in Pearl Harbor as a fleet base. They were well known to the Department. They had been pointed out by Admiral Richardson both to the Navy Department and to the President. On my own official trip to Washington in June of 1941, in conversation with Admiral Stark and the President, I pointed out the following facts:

1. The fleet base at Pearl Harbor, due to the congestion of ships, fuel oil storage, and repair facilities, was exposed to attack, particularly from the air.

[4] 2. The single entrance channel, which must be used by all ships, exposed them to submarine attack.

3. The danger of blocking this single entrance channel must be constantly considered.

4. In case of attack by air or otherwise with the fleet in port, it would take at least three hours to complete a sortie.

5. That Pearl Harbor is the only refueling, replacement, and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area.

6. That ships must spend considerable time in Pearl Harbor for these purposes, for relaxation for the crews, and to complete the considerable number of alterations and additions required due to war experience.

7. That the only real answer was for the fleet not to be in Pearl Harbor when the attack came.

I mention these matters to indicate the basic problems created by the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor. It is not possible to draw a comparison between the security of such a base immediately prior to the out-break of hostilities, and its security in war time. After hostilities commence and the fleet is not restricted by any policy of waiting for the potential enemy to commit the first overt act, our own offensive operations afford a large measure of protection to the base. In peace time the condition and movement of the fleet at Pearl

Harbor could scarcely be concealed from the watchful eyes of enemy agents. The very topography of Pearl Harbor and the large Japanese population of the islands created that dan- [5] ger. Once the fleet was placed there, for the assumed purpose of exerting a deterrent effect upon Japan, it was not maintaining a consistent policy thereafter to weaken the fleet, visibly and plainly, by diversion of powerful units to the Atlantic.

Other Harbors besides Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands could not be used because of their extreme vulnerability to submarine attack. About a month before I became Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored at Lahaina because he considered it was no longer safe against submarine attack. I fully agreed with and continued in effect this policy.

Apart from the inherent handicaps of Pearl Harbor as a base, there were obvious deficiencies in the equipment necessary for its protection. The postulate in Joint Action Army-Navy 1935 (Exhibit 6), was "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. *The fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base.*" Unfortunately this was the merest theory in Pearl Harbor in the year 1941. The efforts made by me and my predecessor to strengthen the base defense are a matter of record in voluminous correspondence with the Department which is already before this Court. Time and again there were pointed out to the Navy Department in Washington, the weaknesses in the Army's equipment and material available for the exercise of its specifically assigned and assumed functions of base defense. The letter of January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70) addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, written by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, and prepared as stated therein [6] with my collaboration, in paragraph 7 (a), (b), (d), emphasizes "the critical inadequacy of AA guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor." "the small number and obsolete condition of land based aircraft detection devices ashore." The letter stated that "it is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program and material aid to Great Britain." Again in my official letter of 26 May 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 33) in paragraph 5 (b) I said, "The defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes and radar equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over continental and expanding Army needs."

The deficiencies in the equipment which the Army needed to exercise its proper functions in the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, pointed out by Admiral Richardson and myself during the year prior to December 7, 1941, had not been remedied at the time of the Japanese attack.

One important and necessary element in the ability of the naval forces to exercise their appropriate duties in connection with the defense of the base was patrol planes. Plans of the Navy Department provided that ultimately there would be supplied to the Pacific fleet sufficient planes to cover operations of the fleet, with planes based

on Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Oahu, and still have a sufficient number to establish a continuous search around Oahu when the fleet was [7] operating in distant waters. My recollection is that the plan allocated approximately 108 patrol planes to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such searching and defensive operations as came within his sphere and also allocated more than 160 patrol planes for the use of the fleet. These patrol planes were to be based on outlying islands, which we were developing as rapidly as conditions permitted to insure an adequate supply of fuel, bombs and other ammunition for patrol planes operating therefrom. In addition, our seaplane tenders would permit the supply of seaplanes from any harbor where they could be landed and refueled. The total number of patrol planes assigned to the Pacific fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District on December 7, 1941, was 81.

Perhaps of more interest to this Court than our many deficiencies in equipment for base defense, were the plans made for the best utilization of what we had. There has been introduced in evidence Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL41 (Exhibit 8) originally promulgated about two weeks after I took command, and revised under date of October 14, 1941. A study of this letter shows our plan for berthing ships in Pearl Harbor by sectors so that they would develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector consistent with the total number of ships of all types in port. The same security order designated the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense Officer. His selection as Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely in harmony with the general purpose of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan worked out by the General commanding the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. [8] By joint agreement between the War and Navy Departments (Exhibit 6) and by the provision of war plans and existing instructions, the Army was charged with and made responsible for the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. No orders or instructions issued at any time lessened or mitigated the Army's responsibility for such defense. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was charged with the direction of the naval force made available by me to assist the Army. The Army did not have a sufficient GHQ Air Force available to assume fully its responsibilities. The Commandant was charged with the coordination of the naval force with the Army effort to defend the fleet base at Pearl Harbor.

As a part of the plan for coordinating the Army and Navy activities for the defense of the base, there was approved on April 2, 1941, a plan dated March 28, 1941, entitled, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan," (Exhibit 7). This plan dealt with joint air operations, joint communications, joint antiaircraft measures and joint use of munitions. There was also promulgated on March 31, 1941, Addendum 1 to Naval Base Defense Air Forces Operation Plan No. A-1-41 signed by the Major General who commanded the Hawaiian air force and the Rear Admiral who was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. (Exhibit 53). This document was followed by Addendum II Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 dated April 9, 1941 (Exhibit 53, Document 6). The plans for joint air operations by the Army and Navy in Oahu constituted in the minds of the Navy Department an outstanding example of prog-

ress in coordination between the services. Since these plans have been introduced in evidence before the Court, it is hardly necessary for me to describe them in detail. Copies of these documents were promptly furnished the Navy Department and were accepted.

[9] As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I had a fleet to prepare for war. I had an international situation, always of grave portent, to evaluate. It was my task to meet each situation which presented itself within the broad reaches of the Pacific and deal with it by appropriate action.

One of my principal concerns was, of course, the men and ships of the fleet. After all, one does not train ships, but rather the men who man the ships. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the look-outs, to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary, and numerous other billets had to be trained before they were competent. A breakdown or inefficiency in any one of these categories might well be very costly, in time of war. Constantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. At times during my tenure as Commander-in-Chief, as high as 70% of the men on board individual ships had never heard a gun fired. Considerably more than 50% of the officers were newly commissioned.

One great handicap was the constant and very large turn-over of enlisted men and officers. This was caused by the necessity of sending trained men to new construction and the expiration of enlistments, which necessitated the supply of large numbers of untrained personnel. This situation extended up to and including December 7. The situation was thoroughly presented to the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of May [10] 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33) entitled, "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." I refer the Court to paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of that letter wherein this condition is exhaustively treated. The training program extended to the air arm of the Navy. For example, we were directed to transfer about twelve trained patrol plane crews per month to the mainland.

As to the fleet, itself, on December 7, 1941, the Naval forces of the Pacific Fleet were inferior to the Japanese Navy in every category of fighting ship, inferior in cargo and troop transports and in tankers and other supply vessels. This fact was recognized in Washington. The joint memorandum of 5 November 1941 to the President signed by both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, a copy of which is in evidence (Exhibit 39A), states unqualifiedly that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet. As I read that memorandum the inferiority of the Pacific Fleet was the basic reason supporting the ultimate recommendation that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan.

Specifically, there were only 11 tankers in the entire Pacific. We were particularly deficient in land-based and carrier-based planes. The Japanese at the outbreak of hostilities had between 11 and 15 aircraft carriers in commission and operating, 4 or 5 of which represented converted merchant ships. We had 3 carriers in the Pacific. Although the battleships of the fleet were of approximately the same

age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, they were particularly deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons. In general, all ships in the fleet were woefully deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons as [11] we had been unsuccessful in producing in quantity enough anti-aircraft artillery for mounting. This last mentioned deficiency we were engaged in remedying at the time of Pearl Harbor, but our task was only 10% completed. Anti-aircraft control gear for these and larger guns was not adequate. Our surface gunnery and our surface weapons because of constant care and attention were in excellent condition.

There was an imperative need for an extensive training and target practice program for every ship's crew and every plane crew. By the early spring of 1941, target and base facilities to permit the prosecution of an intensive fleet training program had been transferred from the West Coast to Hawaii. To tow the considerable number of target rafts, to transport the utility and transport planes, and to bring the other training auxiliaries and fleet fueling facilities from the West Coast to Hawaii especially when we were short of auxiliary vessels was, in itself, a major task. Nor was the training program permitted to go on without diversion of sizable fleet units to other theaters. In May and June of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four 10,000 ton light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, six transports, with practically all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small transports and some other small craft, were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The details of this transfer must have been quickly known in Japan. This transfer took away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet, and resulted in a very substantial reduction in the potentialities of the Pacific Fleet. This same action which [12] took all the transports and the trained marines from the West Coast, left us only the marines required to man the outlying islands plus the garrison at Pearl Harbor.

By December 7, 1941, some additional marines had been trained at San Diego and one transport out of a total of four under conversion on the West Coast had been commissioned. The training of marines in landing operations had of necessity been incomplete and their equipment was entirely inadequate.

When I was in Washington in June, 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic on additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made.

In carrying out the training program, it was necessary for me to have precise and accurate knowledge of the appropriate time to interrupt training by making strategic dispositions. The international situation was grave from the moment I took command. I had to consider at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the fleet of long periods of watch standing in port in peace time and the result that such demands might destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to attain.

Admiral Richardson has testified to the frequent communications he received from Washington emphasizing the possibility of war. (See, for example, Exhibit 76, Document 3). My official correspondence from the Chief of Naval Operations, which is before the Court, in effect plots a graph of recurrent tension in the international situation

from February on. It is studded with expressions that, "what will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess"; "that peace hangs by a slender thread"; [13] "that the situation is serious." An "open rupture" was described as a possibility on July 24 (Exhibit 71); the situation was described on July 31 as continuing to deteriorate (Exhibit 72); on September 23rd the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me that "conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse." (Exhibit 37). It was never expected that these insistent, ominous predictions required, each time they were made, an abrupt discontinuance of essential training measures for all-out security dispositions. Any such action would have seriously interfered with training and in a relatively short time, reduced the efficiency of individual ships to a dangerous degree. In fact, in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) the Chief of Naval Operations cautioned specifically, "I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into War.

I expressed my own needs to the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of May 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33), in which I stated "Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his present course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessities for intensive [14] training of a partly trained fleet must be carefully weighed against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventualities." I concluded with the suggestion "that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I fully expected to receive such information. I now believe that this record will show the failure of the Navy Department to inform me of known "impending eventualities" in the week immediately preceding December 7. I shall discuss in more detail hereafter, my own estimate of the situation made at the time in the light of the information which was given me prior to the attack.

The fleet was divided into three main task forces and the schedule of operations required at least one task force at sea at all times, available to strike in the event of surprise. Often two task forces were at sea at the same time but never three except for concentrated fleet maneuvers. Each of the task forces had its mission and training was conducted with a view to its attaining maximum efficiency, in carrying out its mission. However, it was necessary to afford time in port for all ships in order to provide for the overhauling of machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for action against the enemy. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short-range anti-aircraft guns, aircraft detection devices, look-out equipment, splinter protection, additional personnel accommodations

and other alterations. It was also necessary to limit operations to the availability of replacement fuel. We were applying to the Fleet the lessons of war which were being supplied us. Each installation and alteration, whether it was splinter protection, degaussing, or the installation of listening gear, required work on the ship in port.

[15] Naturally the ship's force was engaged in many tasks of installation, repair and alteration to the limit of their capacity while in port. It was my policy to prevent breakdowns rather than run the risk of breakdowns, and to have the Fleet in the best material condition possible at the outbreak of hostilities. It goes without saying, of course, that the necessity for refueling in port in and of itself, prevented keeping task forces at sea at all times. The eleven tankers were required to operate continuously between Pearl Harbor and the West Coast in order that the fuel at Pearl Harbor should not be depleted.

Submarines constituted a menace in the operating area around Hawaii. During the first week of February and the first week of my command of the Fleet, a submerged submarine contact was reported about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours after which contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in our operating area around Hawaii. I was directed by despatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three mile limit.

[16] A similar contact in approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers engaged in trailing were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted. During the ensuing several months there were several more reports of strange submerged submarine contacts in the Hawaiian area. As late as 23 September 1941 (Exhibit 12) the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to me in part, "the existing orders, that is, not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat, conclusive evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step." Such conclusive evidence was not obtained until the attack of December 7th. However, upon receipt of the despatch of November 27, 1941 (Exhibit 17), I issued orders to depth bomb all strange submarine contacts in the Fleet operating area and informed the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch and letter of the action I had taken.

On October 16, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me the despatch which has been introduced in evidence before the Court (Exhibit 13). This despatch indicated a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia; a possibility that Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain. It directed me to take due precautions including such preparatory deployment as would not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

[17] I particularly invite the Court's attention to the directive in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13). I urge a comparison of

this directive with the language contained in the later despatches of November 24th and November 27th (Exhibits 15 and 17). The admonition against disclosure of strategic intention and provocative action contained in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13) has its echo in the despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on November 29 (Exhibit 19) directing my attention to the Army despatch which stated, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and which required that measures taken should not alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The despatch of October 16th spoke of "preparatory deployments." The so-called War Warning of November 27th directed an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46".

Upon receipt of the despatch of October 16th, (Exhibit 13) I made the following dispositions; I continued to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway; despatched 12 patrol planes to Midway and two submarines to Wake to arrive on October 23rd. I despatched the *Castor* and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores. The *Curtis* was to arrive at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs. I prepared to send six patrol planes to Midway from Pearl Harbor. I despatched additional marines, to Palmyra. Admiral Pye who was on the West Coast, making a cruise, was placed on 12 hours notice after 20 October. I had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. [18] I put some additional security measures into effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor and delayed the sailing of the *West Virginia* until about 17 November when she was due to go for an overhaul at Puget Sound.

All these dispositions which I made as a result of the despatch of October 16 were specifically brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October which is in evidence. (Exhibit 14.) In a letter of November 7th, the Chief of Naval Operations specifically approved these dispositions (Exhibit 74). This specific approval of my dispositions makes it unnecessary for this Court to consider whether they conformed to what Admiral R. K. Turner testified he thinks the Department intended me to do after the October 16 despatch.

In the despatch of 16 October 1941 I was formally advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. That phrase was given a definitive meaning in the Chief of Naval Operations letter to me of 17 October 1941, (Exhibit 38) in which he said, "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and in the message merely stated the possibility." To me that meant that when the word "possibility" was used, its connotation was limited—and that, when used, the meaning of the Chief of Naval Operations was that "possibility" was not "probability."

The despatch of October 16th indicated a strong possibility of a Japanese attack upon Russia. In this connection my correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations shows that the Department had envisaged such a Japanese movement as [19] possible as early as the summer of 1941. At that time I repeatedly endeavored, without success, as my letters show, to find out the probable attitude of the United States in the event of Russo-Japanese hostilities.

On November 24th (Exhibit 15) I received a despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which is before the Court, which stated that the chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful, and that in the Department's opinion, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. However, in a letter of November 25th (Exhibit 16), to which the Chief of Naval Operations added a post-scrip after a presumably informative conference with the President and Mr. Hull, he stated, "I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China-Burma area as the most likely." And the Chief of Naval Operations added, "I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be 'anything'."

I interpreted the *possibility* of attack on the Philippines and Guam in the same vein that I had been advised the word was used in the despatch, viz, a possibility but by no means a probability. The letter of 25 November (Exhibit 16) fortified my belief that this interpretation was correct. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified that he did not intend that I should discontinue the training program for "all-out" security [20] measures upon receipt of the despatch of November 24. (Exhibit 15) (See Record, pages 50-53).

I was completely out of touch with the details of the negotiations proceeding between the Japanese representatives in Washington and our Government. The Chief of Naval Operations in a letter of October 17, 1941 (Exhibit 38) had told me that the Chinese incident was "The stumbling block." In a letter of November 14 (Exhibit 39), the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall which advised against direct armed United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan," (Exhibit 39A). This represented my general information as to how much of a "stumbling block" China might prove to be in the negotiations. I did not know at that time, nor did I learn until I read the official published State Department papers long afterwards, that the outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan handed to the Japanese ambassador by my Government on 26 November contained the following passages under steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capitol temporarily at Chungking.

These passages in the note of November 26 were most significant. It is not within my sphere to decide whether [21] they are consonant with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to the President, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. The historians of the future may ponder the question of whether diplomacy took a more venturesome approach than the judgment of the military deemed prudent. Suffice it to say that I did not know of the delivery of this significant document of No-

venber 26th to the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States, and because I did not know this, the Japanese had vital information originated by my own Government which was denied me. Consequently, any possible logical connection in the sequence of events between the note of November 26th and the so-called "War Warning" of November 27th (Exhibit 17) was lost to me.

The so-called, "War Warning" of November 27th has been introduced in evidence before this Court (Exhibit 17). I ask the Court to view it not with any meaning attached to it by hindsight after the event, but as it would appear to a responsible Commander at the time it was received. In the first place, it will be noted that the despatch states at the outset that the negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilizing of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased. In the second place, it will be observed that the time for expected Japanese movements is stated to be "within the next few days" and the territory against which such movements are directed is specifically stated to be "the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and possibly Boreno." In specifically mentioning these places as objectives of a Japanese amphibious expedition, the Department appeared to be limiting [22] the phrase in its despatch of November 24th which mentioned as a possibility, "a surprise aggressive movement *in any direction*." The only American Territory against which Japanese operations are expected is the Philippines. I was not in a position to evaluate the probable American action in the event of initial Japanese attack was made against Dutch or British Territory. Any commitments made by the United States with regard to the protection of the territories of these nations were not known to me. From the Chief of Naval Operations' post script to his letter of November 25th (Exhibit 16) I gathered he had no more definite knowledge in this respect than I did.

I did not know of the conversation of Mr. Dooman, the Counsellor of the United States Embassy at Tokio, with Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, relative to what the United States would do if Japan attacked Singapore. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan Vol. II, p. 137). I did not know of Ambassador Grew's statement to Mr. Matsuoka on February 15, 1941 (ibid 138). This information was in the State Department on March 17, 1941. I was likewise denied the information of the statement by the Secretary of State to Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 16, 1941, that "this Government could not remain silent in the face of such a threat, —," (ibid 553). I was also denied whatever information was behind the despatch from Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations of 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 76, Document 4) sent to me for information and received after the attack, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic had learned from Singapore that the United States had [23] assured Britain armed support under several eventualities, but concerning which the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet had not been advised.

My reaction and the reaction of my staff to the so-called "War Warning" of November 27 was naturally affected by two despatches from the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibits 18 and 40), sent about the same time, which together with similar despatches from the War

Department to General Short, proposed the relief of the garrisons at Midway and Wake, with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes on the islands by Army Pursuit planes. Exhibits 50 and 51, my personal and official letters to the Chief of Naval Operations of December 2, 1941 contain a clear contemporaneous account of the problems involved in this proposal. These letters show that the Army's despatches to General Short went beyond the suggested reinforcement by the Army of the Marine garrisons, and indicated that the Army would take over the defenses of the islands. The despatches from the War and Navy Departments indicate that the exchange of planes and troops was of an urgent nature. This proposal did not originate with me or with General Short. The members of my staff did not know why the exchange had to be made. Obviously the sending of some fifty per cent of the Army Fighter Pursuit strength on Oahu (as was proposed by the War and Navy Departments) affected materially the defensive strength of Pearl Harbor. It appeared to us at the scene, that such a proposal would not be made by the Departments in Washington, if they anticipated the imminent impact of hostilities upon Oahu. Moreover, the proposed relief of the Marine Garrisons by Army troops necessarily entailed disruption of the defense of those islands during the entire time that one [24] Garrison was preparing to depart and the other becoming installed. The Army had nothing comparable to a Marine Defense Battalion so that the Army Garrison would have had to have a new table of organization. Likewise, Marine and Army Fighter Squadrons were differently organized. The proposed change which emanated from Washington, on or about the time of the despatch of the so-called "War Warning" did not simply entail a change of personnel; it involved also a complicated logistic problem.

Furthermore at Wake there were no harbor facilities. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships practically in an open seaway. Wake was the most westerly and advanced of the two islands. Such an operation had no protection from the elements. The defense from enemy action could not be more ineffective.

It seemed to us that a project of this nature would not have been planned or proposed by responsible authorities in Washington under any situation where the defense of Pearl Harbor was a matter of immediate concern. We recommended against sending the Army Fighters to the islands; first, because once landed, they could not be removed and; second, because at conferences on the subject, Major General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, informed us that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land.

On November 29 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me, as an information addressee, a message (Exhibit 19) which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch to General Short, of November 27 which General Short had previously [25] brought to my attention. This despatch stated that "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, with only the barest possibility of resumption." It stated that "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." It insisted that measures be taken, should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The Chief of Naval Operations added to the substance of the Army

message of November 27, direct instructions that, WPL52 is not applicable to the Pacific area and the further direction to "undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an over act." It reiterated the need for preparation to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan.

The recurrent note in these Army and Navy despatches of caution against alarming the civil population, of emphasis upon the necessity that the Japanese commit the first overt act tended to create a state of mind which prevented any action except that consistent with a passive defense. I still had no explicit authorization to depth bomb submarine contacts in the fleet operating areas. Indeed, under a literal interpretation of our orders, if a Japanese naval force were to be encountered at sea, we were, in effect, directed to wait until they opened fire.

The "few days" stated by the Navy Department on November 27 to be the time for an aggressive move by Japan went by without event. The negotiations which on November 27th were stated to be terminated, and on November 29 to be terminated with the barest possibility of resumption, were in fact resumed. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that the negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after [26] November 29. I took into account this public information as to diplomatic development in the absence of more authoritative information. Indeed Admiral Turner testified that the Navy Department anticipated and expected I should.

In fact, I now know that the Japanese were continuing negotiations only as a device to cover up their plans. In fact, the Japanese considered that the negotiations were ruptured after the American Note of November 26. The real situation was then known to the Navy Department in Washington. But I was never advised that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese trick, as official Washington knew it to be. The public resumption of negotiations after the despatch of November 27, which was predicated on this termination naturally affected my evaluation of the international situation. It suggested a mitigation of the emergency which prompted the so-called "warning." In a public address in London on December 8, 1941, Mr. Churchill stated: "Japanese envoys Nomura and Kurusu were ordered to prolong their missions in the United States in order to keep conversations going while the surprise attack was being prepared, to be made before the declaration of war could be delivered." As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was not permitted to know what Mr. Churchill apparently knew, and the Navy Department certainly knew, that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese stratagem.

The denial to me of knowledge of certain material facts, is not cited as an excuse for inaction on my part after November 27th, for I was by no means inactive after November 27th. After full consultation with my staff—all experienced and responsible officers—I undertook to comply with the directive [27] to make an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

I took the following action, on receipt of the so-called "War Warning." I ordered to Wake one Patrol Squadron, then at Mid-

way, and it proceeded on 1 December conducting reconnaissance sweep enroute. Patron at Midway was replaced by Patron from Pearl and left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting a reconnaissance sweep enroute Johnston and enroute Johnston to Midway. This squadron made daily search from Midway on three, four, five and six December. I sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF squadron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landing planes at Wake on 3 December. The Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes. Patron at Wake was then withdrawn; it conducted reconnaissance sweep enroute Wake to Midway and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor. The Lexington proceeded to Midway with VMF squadron departing Pearl 5 December. It conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes enroute, and was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke. The Burroughs was despatched to Wake with additional forces and supplies including Radar, but was short of Wake when war broke. She departed Pearl 29 November. I directed daily reconnaissance flights of VP planes, based on Pearl Harbor, to cover the fleet operating areas and approaches thereto. I also issued an order that any Japanese submarine found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be depth bombed, and so informed the chief of Naval Operations, as I have previously noted. Submarine patrols were continued at Wake and Midway.

[28] It is almost unnecessary to point out that the Department knew the operating schedule governing the particular time our three task forces were in and out of port. The Department at no time prior to December 7, criticized my dispositions or indicated that I was not complying with its wishes. These dispositions were calculated to strengthen our outposts to the South and West against the time when they should face the call of all-out hostilities.

Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, (who were in command of the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake) were empowered to take appropriate action against any hostile attacking planes.

Beginning latter part of November, a memorandum to show what the initial steps would be were war to come was kept up to date. The last provision was made on the 5th of December and was gone over by me on the morning of December 6th. These memoranda outlined steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war and are in evidence before the Court as Exhibits 69A and 69B.

On 30 November, I received a despatch (Exhibit 76) stating that there were indications Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.

On 3 December the Department sent a despatch stating that it had received highly reliable information that certain Japanese consular posts were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers. This despatch (Exhibit 20) was not a clear cut warning of any Japanese intention to strike the United States. It stated that the Japanese instructions were to destroy "most" of their codes—not all their codes, a point noted by me and my staff at that time. It was entirely consistent [29] with routine diplomatic precautions by Japan against the contingency that the United States and Britain might declare war against her and take over diplomatic residences if she took

aggressive action against the Kra Isthmus. The significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by the publication of this information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu. Both Admiral Pye and Admiral Smith testified that they read of this fact in the press before the receipt of the despatch from the Navy Department. The wide publicity given this certainly removed it from the category of secret intelligence information.

On 6 December, the Department sent a despatch authorizing the destruction by the outlying Pacific Islands of secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency," (Exhibit 22). In the report of the Robert's Commission this despatch is mentioned, and a significant word is added in this paraphrase of the despatch in the Commission's report. That word is the adjective "tense", modifying the noun "situation". The adjective "tense" was not in the original despatch sent to me.

In no despatch sent to me was there any warning of a probable or imminent air attack upon Pearl Harbor. The "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations," issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated on page 1, "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand." The same publication on page 9, under the heading, "The Japanese Naval Situation", stated definitely "the major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." Intelligence available to me located other Japanese [30] carriers in waters far distant from Hawaii. We knew that a raiding expedition would have to leave Japanese waters approximately two weeks before they could make an attack on Pearl Harbor. From our information therefore we had every reason to believe that the attack would not be made at the time it was made.

At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese inflicted upon the United States a tactical reverse. But Japan made a fatal strategic blunder. Had they sought to accomplish their program of Southern expansion, without frontal assault upon American interest or territory, American entry into the war might have been in doubt for some considerable time. Our people were not united upon the issue of the advisability of American entrance into the world conflict. The blow at Pearl Harbor instantly unified the nation. It precipitated the nation into the world conflict. In the long run, it was bound to be a colossal blunder from the Japanese viewpoint. Responsible officers in the Pacific could not entirely exclude from their minds the fatal long term folly of such action by Japan. This was a factor that we discussed and weighed with other elements in evaluating the situation as Admiral Pye testified. This did not diminish our war readiness but it was bound to be a factor in any sober estimate of the situation. We did not know, of course, that Mr. Hull had told the Navy Department on or about December third, that he considered that the Japanese were in an irrational, mad dog state of mind.

From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, General Short and I conferred frequently. Present at these conferences were Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, my Chief of Staff; Captain C. H. [31] McMorris, my War Plans Officer; Captain Walter S. DeLany, my Operations Officer; and Read Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commandant 14th Naval District. Others who were probably present were Lieutenant Commander

Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, and Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, an assistant War Plans Officer in Charge of Marine Plans for outlying islands; also Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy, my Aviation Aide; Rear Admiral Calhoun, Commander of the Base Force; Major General Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force; his aide; and General Short's aide.

Our relations then, as ever, were cordial and cooperative. One of my first acts after my appointment as Commander-in-Chief was to make a call upon General Short to establish our relations on that firm and friendly basis which characterized them throughout our tenures of office. On the afternoon of November 27th the Army despatch from the Chief of Staff to General Short was delivered to me by Captain J. B. Earle, USN, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff. On the same afternoon, I caused to be delivered to General Short a paraphrase of OP NAV secret despatch of that date. On November 28th the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed. We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably and Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order named. In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii. I believe that at the conference of November 28th, some discussion arose as to what action the United States would take in case the Japanese attacked [32] Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and Malaya without making war upon the United States. We knew that Admiral Hart's staff in the Asiatic had held staff conferences with the British and the Dutch and that information had been exchanged. However, we had not been informed of what action was to be taken in case the British and Dutch were attacked and the Philippines were not attacked.

I was very much concerned over my orders not to take any hostile action and the emphasis placed upon this in both messages. I realized the enormous handicap this placed upon the Fleet. We had known many instances of the swift and deadly action of attacking aircraft both from the incidents in actual war abroad and in our own maneuvers. All of the information given us by the Navy Department and our estimates led to the conclusion that an air raid on Pearl Harbor was neither imminent nor probable. General Short and I had many times discussed the possibility of a surprise air attack against Pearl Harbor. We made frequent representations to Washington pointing out the inadequacy of the forces furnished to repel such an attack. Washington evidently discounted heavily the probability of an air attack against Hawaii for the means supplied to repel such an attack were inadequate up to and including December 7th.

Of course, it must not be overlooked that General Short's total concerns and duties did not completely dovetail with mine. General Short was not charged with any joint responsibility with me for the operation of the Pacific Fleet. So far as the Navy's part in supporting the Army's defense of Pearl Harbor detailed plans were made by the Naval Base Defense Officer.

[33] Among the topics which were discussed at the conference with General Short to which I have referred, in addition to the despatches of November 27th were the following:

1. The defense of Pearl Harbor.
2. Garrisons and reliefs for the outlying islands.
3. The transfer of fighter pursuit planes to the outlying islands.
4. The transfer of flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines by way of Midway, Wake, Port Moresby and Darwin.
5. The development of alternative land plane route to Australia via Palmyra, Canton, Christmas, Samoa, Fiji, Noumea.

With regard to the defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, the evidence before this Court shows that the estimates and operating plans approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch had set forth in detail the steps to be taken by the Army and the Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor. The responsibility was fixed and the various elements of the Army and Navy knew their assigned tasks. The only action required was a decision to take one of the alerts or conditions of readiness. All available forces were to be employed.

So far as the Army was concerned I knew in general the measures adopted by General Short as a result of the despatch of November 27th. General Short had orders to report in detail to the Chief of Staff the measures he had taken. He did this. I knew he had orders to make such a report. General Short went on his alert No. 1 and I understand that through his liaison with the 14th Naval District, the Navy had formal information that he was on such an alert.

For the sake of rounding out the picture, the Court will note that on November 28th, General Short was sent a message [34] by the Adjutant General directing in effect that all necessary measures be taken to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage. The War Department knew he was on an alert against sabotage. Undoubtedly General Marshall satisfied the Robert's Commission by explaining, as he did before this Court, that General Short's reply to the War Department's despatch of November 27th was stapled to a message from the Philippines, which was on top of it, that he initialed the reply from the Philippines but did not initial the reply from General Short which he could not recall seeing. (See Record of this Court, p. 880). Under these circumstances, nothing is more fantastic than to attempt by some obscure reasoning to fasten upon the Comander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet some criticism because General Short prescribed the form of alert which appeared to be required by his orders and with which the War Department was perfectly familiar and I might add, the Navy Department as well.

The Robert's Report specifically charges that General Short and I failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27th and to adopt and use the existing plans to meet the emergency. And again, "It was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of (the Commanders) not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities." I solemnly deny the truth of these charges. I am satisfied that the evidence before this Court establishes beyond doubt the inaccuracy of those charges. In fact the Court will find that the Roberts Report itself contains findings on this subject which are self-contradictory.

[35] General Short had every reason to know with reasonable accuracy the operation of distant air reconnaissance from Oahu. General Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force received a daily availability report of Navy planes and made a similar report to Admiral Bellinger. There were only six Army bombers on Oahu capable of performing distant reconnaissance, a fact specifically called to the attention of the Navy Department by me in a despatch of November 27th (Exhibit 76, Document 4). The Navy carried out a daily reconnaissance of the operating areas which was well known to General Short and Admiral Bloch.

On March 31, 1941, appropriate representatives of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands in cooperation and coordination of their activities, had executed a plan for the AIR DEFENSE of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 53). This plan, Addendum I, to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, specifically discussed the possibility of a hostile air raid at dawn. Under the heading, "ACTION OPEN TO US" there is the following decision:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable, but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure can not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this decision. They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.

[36] There was no intelligence in the messages of November 27th or in later messages available to me and General Short to indicate that "a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time limits." (Exhibit 53, Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.) Our estimate of the situation, made after frank and full discussion of the intelligence we received with our staffs at the meetings I have referred to, was that an air raid on Oahu was neither probable nor imminent. The appropriate representatives of the Army and Navy in Hawaii had by a coordinated decision made months before, concluded that distant air reconnaissance through 360° could not be undertaken. The factors underlying this decision with respect to material and personnel had not changed. We had no basis for altering it on and after November 27th.

I knew the Army's portable radar sets were operable. Some months before General Short had informed me that he could give an all around coverage of at least 150 miles and probably 200 miles. The Army's aircraft warning service including the information net was still incomplete on December 7, 1941. Public telephones and special temporary communication methods were usable but slow and inefficient.

The failure to man the radar after 7:00 A. M. Sunday, 7 December was apparently due to a peculiar lapse. Prior to that date, these temporary stations had been working from about 4:00 in the morning carrying on training operations for the greater part of the day. Of course, the maintenance of aircraft warning service was specifically the Army's function. The unfortunate last minute deviation from

the apparent Army routine with respect to its operation was unknown to me.

[37] *Distant Reconnaissance:* To insure Pearl Harbor against a surprise attack from airplanes based on a fast carrier, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require about three times this number. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. 100 patrol planes would be required for the pool for this dawn patrol. This dawn patrol is necessary because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter, daily, many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Roughly speaking, in a 360 degree search of 800 miles radius in the Hawaiian area we cannot count, on an average, of more than a seventy-five percent coverage.

Any distant search which we could have made over an extended period would have been incomplete and ineffective.

The Roberts Report charges me with dereliction of duty for failure to operate a distant reconnaissance. Vice Admiral Bellinger has testified exhaustively on this subject. To discuss it in detail would involve repetition of statistics of available planes and operational problems now in evidence before the Court. Now it will suffice to say that Admiral Bellinger, charged with the direct responsibility of this phase of the Navy's participation in that defense, testified that with the material and personnel available any adequate search was impossible for more than a few days. For a period of ten days, as from 27 November until 7 December, approximately 30 planes were available for a 700 mile daily search—not an 800 mile search. This could at best cover about one-third of the 360 [38] degrees of the circumference. Such a search would be ineffective. Having covered the operating areas by air patrols, it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff, to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans. I deny that the charge in the Roberts Report is supported by any rational and intelligent evidence before this Court.

I wish particularly to invite the attention of the Court to Fleet letter 2CL41 of 14 October 1941 (Exhibit 8). This letter deals with the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. It provides for all foreseeable contingencies. This, and other official documents, provided for the use of all available forces, both of the Army and the Navy in case of an attack on Pearl Harbor. As Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet I appreciated thoroughly the inadequacy of the forces available to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. By my orders, all naval forces in port at the time of an attack were made available and allocated to add to the forces defending Pearl Harbor.

I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a nature that I felt training could still continue. I felt that I was en-

titled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak of war. I am convinced now that my estimate based upon the intelligence received was correct.

[39] An attempt is made to read into the phrase "War Warning" a significance broader than the specific intelligence which the message contained. I submit that it should not be construed as a "catch all" for the contingencies hindsight may suggest. The specific intelligence in the message did not indicate that an attack on the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. The rest of the dispatch after the phrase, "This is a war warning," at most states in substance that an attack is expected on the Philippines and some foreign territory in a few days. The edge of this message, so far as it affected the Philippines, was somewhat blunted by the passage of the few days without such an event and by the apparent continuing of negotiations during and after the next few days had passed.

The proper procedure for placing the fleets on a war basis is prescribed in Chapter II, section 2 of WPL46. This provides for mobilizing the fleet in whole or in part or for executing this war plan in whole or in part prior to a declaration of war. This prescribed procedure is definite and understandable, by all elements of the naval service. The prescribed procedure was not used prior to December 7, 1941.

In these circumstances I attempted to use the means at hand to take care of the most likely present dangers and the most probable future needs. I did not deem it wise, for reasons, I have pointed out at length, to expend at that time the limited number of patrol planes available in partial and ineffective distant reconnaissance. An attack in the localities indicated in the dispatch would require practically all types except submarines and I therefore directed extreme vigilance against submarine attack in the Hawaiian area. The promptness with [40] which the ships opened fire the morning of the Seventh speaks volumes for the readiness of the fleet in port.

In brief, in the light of the information I had, and the means at hand, I adopted the measures I did, not lightly, but in the exercise of my most considered judgment, supported and sustained by a group of distinguished and experienced officers who represented a cross-section of the best naval brains in the world. The subsequent accomplishments of these officers demonstrates their outstanding abilities.

So far, I have analyzed my actions in the light of the information which was available to me. But the Pearl Harbor incident can not be understood or accurately depicted without an account of the information which was available in the Navy Department and not given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

I knew nothing of the American note of November 26th to Japan. I did not know that the terms of that note were considered by some of the best informed officers in the Navy Department, to be utterly unacceptable to the Japanese, prior to any indication of the Japanese attitude after its receipt.

I was told on November 27 that "negotiations have ceased". However on November 28 a weaker statement of the status of negotiations was sent me by the Navy Department. This was the quotation of the Army dispatch, setting forth that "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with *only the barest pos-*

sibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue." From this point on, I was left on my own by the Department to get such information about official conversations with Japan as I could from the press and radio—a source which the Director of War Plans, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has testified he [41] deemed to be one of my most valuable sources of information regarding enemy "intentions and movements".

Contrast the information available to me in the Pacific, in this connection with the information available to responsible officers in the Navy Department in Washington, indeed with the information available the President and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

[a] Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N.

[1] For these many days all of us have been striving to reconstruct the facts surrounding an unique event in the annals of the military history of our country—the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor early in the forenoon of December 7, 1941. It was a surprise to the nation. It was no less a surprise to every witness who has appeared before this Court.

The reconstruction of the situation, undertaken more than 2½ years later, is difficult. That it has been accomplished at all and so well reflects great credit on this Court and its Judge Advocate.

In attempting to assemble in proper relation parts of documents and recollections of varying degrees of clearness, our task has been far simpler than that of this Court. For the task of the Court is to fit all these pieces of evidence together so that the Court's findings will reconstruct the situation as it existed, and not as it may now appear to have been. Hindsight, acquired after the event, cannot be permitted to influence the factual reconstruction. Speculation now, 2½ years later, as to what any one believes he would have done at the time, should not distort our perspective.

It is quite certain that there is not a man in this room, who, granted the choice, would not have cheerfully traded his life to have prevented—indeed, even to have minimized—the tragic events of that forenoon. I do not believe that there was a naval officer of high or low rank at Pearl Harbor who would not have made the same choice.

Any criticism or blame, if there be any, must be predicated upon this difficult reconstruction which has been derived from memories blurred by the many war problems and circumstances occurring since December 7, 1941. It goes without saying, that the findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which leads exclusively to and is consistent with but a single conclusion. We know the evils of drawing a critical inference from conflicting and unclear evidence, or in using one inference to support a further inference which then is not supported by any proof at all. Your report will be public opinion; public opinion can strip an individual of his reputation and his honor.

Hence, the preparation of your report is a serious duty and when completed and approved the Service, and ultimately the public, will recognize that “the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on; nor all our piety nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all our tears wash out a word of it.”

[2] How then can we best aid the Court? Probably by attempting to recapture in proper perspective the condition of things at the time. It was 1940. The greatest military holocaust of history was blazing in Europe. The United States was formally at peace; but concerned by the repercussions from the dictators' victories in Europe, it had thrown, into this maelstrom on the side of those resisting the dictators, its full weight and such legislated help and resources as it could give or lend. The point of anxiety was Europe. The Japanese

American political and military situation then was not materially worse than it had been for some time—nor was it worse than it was to be at various times during 1941.

At that time, Rear Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. There, he was the head, as he was during the entire period, of the large and expanding industrial and service establishment at Pearl Harbor, confronted with administrative problems measurable only by the size of the enterprise and the tempo of its expansion. The United States Pacific Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.

The Army defenses of Oahu and the naval base, and the naval local defense forces were inadequate. They continued to be inadequate until after December 7, 1941.

Recognizing that he independently could not correct the situation, and that remedies could only come from an informed higher authority, the Commandant 14th Naval District on December 30, 1940, by confidential letter, communicated with the Navy Department, via the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson.¹ In considerable detail, he reviewed the matter of defenses of Pearl Harbor, pointed out its many substantial deficiencies, and recommended increases in types and numbers of A. A. guns, pursuit and patrol planes, vessels, and other craft for local defense forces, required for an adequate defense. He suggested in effect that in the high level discussions on this subject with the War Department nothing be done which might in any way destroy the cooperation between the Army and Navy in Hawaii.²

Not only were Rear Admiral Bloch's recommendations approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, but Admiral Richardson on January 7, 1941, vigorously endorsed them [13] to the Navy Department.³ It was following receipt of this letter that the Navy Department apprised the War Department of the gravity of the situation as to the defenses at Pearl Harbor in its letter of January 24, 1941.⁴ This was answered by the War Department February 7, 1941.⁵ And while the specific enumeration by the Commandant 14th Naval District of defense material required was not set forth in this high level correspondence, nor categorically insisted upon by the Navy Department,⁶ the representations of the War Department in this regard were accepted by the Navy Department.

So that the matter of the conditions of defenses at Pearl Harbor would not be minimized or unconsciously deferred in the high command because of the increasing gravity of European events, Rear Admiral Bloch from time to time during 1941 set forth in communications to the Navy Department, through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet the material and personnel conditions as he saw them, and requested remedial action.⁷ Admiral Kimmel saw to it

¹ Exhibit 28—Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCUS: SEE paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

² Exhibit 28—Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCUS: SEE paragraph 11.

³ Exhibit 28—First endorsement by CINCPAC to Com 14 Confidential letter of 30 December 1940.

⁴ Exhibit 9—Secret letter dated 24 January 1941 from Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

⁵ Exhibit 24—Secret letter dated 7 February 1941 from Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy.

⁶ RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 743 to 760, page 172 to 175.

⁷ Exhibit 41—Confidential letter dated 7 May 1941 from Com 14 to CNO copy to CINCPAC: SEE paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6.

Exhibit 42—Secret letter dated 20 May 1941 from CINCPAC to CNO referencing among others Com 14 confidential letter of 7 May 1941 (Exhibit 41), Com 14 secret letter of 13

that this information and these recommendations went on to the Navy Department, with realistic and vigorous endorsements of the senior officer present, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.⁸ Consequently, the Navy Department was fully aware of the deficiencies in the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District and the [14] seriousness of the situation in general.⁹

This effort of the Commandant 14th Naval District to get that which he could not obtain independently is summed up in his letter of October 17, 1941, where he enumerated the meager local defense forces at hand, and recalled the British statement of the causes of their 1940 disasters epitomized as "too little—too late".¹⁰

It is significant that, right in the midst of the receipt of the dispatches, sometimes characterized as "warnings," namely those of October 16, November 24, 27, and 28, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District also received from the Navy Department under date of November 25, 1941, a reply to the Commandant 14th Naval District's October 17th letter, advising that there were no additional local defense forces available for the 14th Naval District—no surface craft—no aircraft.¹¹

It thus appears that, notwithstanding his efforts during the year to and including December 7, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District had as local defense forces: 4 old destroyers—which were being used on inshore patrol; 4 small minesweepers—which were engaged in sweeping channels; 3 Coast Guard cutters—which were engaged in patrolling off Honolulu in addition to performing their regular Coast Guard duties; and the old SACRAMENTO, which had neither fire power with which to fight nor speed with which to run.¹²

Reverting now to early 1941, a series of war plans were developed and issued by the Navy Department in cooperation with the War Department. These plans beginning with Rainbow 1, revised in particulars which do not concern us here, became Rainbow 5—WPL-46.¹³ To insure complete understanding, the Navy Department sent an informed officer out to Pearl Harbor and Manila so that the commanders-in-chief of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets would see and understand this war plan eye to eye with the Department.¹⁴ To be sure, this plan has little application to the Commandant 14th Naval District except in certain particulars.

May 1940, Com 14 secret letter of 31 October 1941 and Com 14 confidential letter of 30 December 1940 (Exhibit 28).

Exhibit 46—Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC together with first endorsement thereto of CINCPAC to CNO.

⁸ Exhibit 42—described in note 7 supra.

Exhibit 46—described in note 7 supra.

Exhibit 44—Annual report of CINCPAC to Secretary of the Navy via CNO dated 15 August 1941: SEE at page 20 under paragraph (3) "Hawaiian Area"—"Pearl Harbor"—subparagraphs a, b (1) (2) (3). (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 768, page 177).

Exhibit 10—Memorandum for Admiral Stark, signed H. E. Kimmel, dated 4 June 1941, copies to General Marshall, Admiral King, Admiral Towers: SEE paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 70 and 71, pages 28 and 29).

⁹ Exhibit 45—Confidential letter dated August 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC.

Exhibit 47—Secret ltr. dated 25 November 1941 from CNO jointly to CINCPAC and Com 14 referencing among others Com 14 secret ltr. of 17 Oct. 1941 (Exhibit 46).

RECORD, witness KIMMEL—Q. 350 and 351, page 861.

¹⁰ Exhibit 46—described in note 7 supra.

¹¹ Exhibit 47—described in note 9 supra.

¹² RECORD, Witness STAR—Q. 774 to 776, page 180;

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 352, page 861;

Witness BLOCH—Q. 9, 10, 11, page 386.

¹³ Exhibit 4—WPL 46

¹⁴ RECORD, Witness Stark—Q. 17, page 16.

[5] In the first place the plan provided a particular and definite procedure to be followed by the Navy Department in case of strained relations, whereby mobilization or partial mobilization might be effected prior to actual hostilities without authorizing acts of war by naval forces.¹⁵

The direction of mobilization or partial mobilization during a period of strained relations is an important means of effectuating the transition from peace to a war footing. By such directive for mobilization or partial mobilization, M-day is designated. Furthermore, many subsidiary plans become operative automatically on M-day.¹⁶

It now appears extremely unfortunate—that for reasons best known to the Navy Department, which was in possession of all available political and military information and intelligence—the established and well understood procedures for meeting conditions of strained relations between the United States and Japan, for designating M-day, and for placing all concerned on a full war footing,¹⁷ were not used.¹⁸ And yet, strangely enough, there have been implications during this inquiry that, because of these strained relations, and notwithstanding that only fragmentary information was available in Hawaii, nevertheless those in Pearl Harbor should have done those things which better informed higher authority did not find expedient to do.¹⁹ Howbeit—at no time prior to December 7, 1941, were these understood procedures used; the Rainbow plans were not executed; and M-day was not designated.¹⁸

In the second place, prior to December 7, 1941, it was necessary that local plans based upon the basic war plan be prepared and issued. In addition, by virtue of the general Army-Navy agreement for joint defense embodied in the publication Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935,²⁰ it was necessary that local plans based upon it be prepared and

[6] issued. We have found that both of these requirements were accomplished by the joint promulgation in April 1941 of JCD-42 by Lieutenant General Short on the part of the Army and by Rear Admiral Bloch on the part of the Navy.²¹

It may be well to bear in mind that plans or no plans, whether executed or not, it had been, was then, and continued to be at all times the undiluted primary responsibility of the Army to defend and protect Pearl Harbor, from land, sea and air,²² so that the fleet might be rested, refitted, refueled and provisioned in security. It was never more than a limited responsibility of the Navy to support the Army with what it happened to have present at the base in case of attack.

¹⁵ Exhibit 4—WPL-46: SEE Chapter II Section 1 "Execution of the Entire Plan," paragraph 0211 a and b, page 6; SEE also Chapter II Section 2 "Execution of a Part of This Plan," paragraphs 0221, 0222, 0223, page 7.

¹⁶ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 780, 781, 782, page 181.

¹⁷ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 38, 39, 40, page 19; Q. 41, page 20.

¹⁸ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 44, page 21; Q. 387, page 102; Q. 799, page 184.

Witness DELANY—Q. 51, page 504.

¹⁹ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 783, page 181; Q. 792, page 182; Q. 131, 132, page 797.

Witness INGERSOLL—Q. 127, page 845.

²⁰ Exhibit 6—Publication "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935."

²¹ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District", original April 1941: SEE paragraph 2, "Basis", page 2.

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 211, page 260.

²² Exhibit 6—"Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935"—SEE paragraph a (2), heading "General Functions of the Army in Peace and War."

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 45, page 227.

Witness STARK—Q. 824 and 825, page 188.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 7, page 385 (A).

Witness MARSHALL—Q. 12, page 855; Q. 34, page 863.

To return, this plan JCD-42 was based upon and was in conformity with the Rainbow war plan.²¹ And, as we have seen, it encompassed those principles and measures stated in Joint Action which had applicability to the defense of the Hawaiian area.²² JCD-4 set forth with particularity the individual tasks of the Army and Navy, the joint ones, and the particular defense measures which each service engaged to perform *if, as, and when* this plan JCD-42 was executed.²⁴ So in this matter, the Commandant 14th Naval District fully satisfied the local burden indicated in both the war plan and Joint Action in respect of the preparation of local plans. Local plans had been prepared.²⁵

[1] And now a third consideration. Were they proper plans? Most assuredly. They were approved by Lieutenant General Short, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department²⁶—and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet—Admiral Kimmel.²⁷ They were then transmitted to the Navy Department, and the joint air defense plans were so well regarded that they were sent out by the Department to other commands.²⁸ These plans were not materially changed after December 7, 1941.²⁹

The activation of JCD-42 was contingent upon the designation of M-day or the agreement of the local commanders. And like the war plans, JCD-42 could be executed by the common action of the War and Navy Departments.³⁰

And that brings us to a fourth consideration. It has been implied in some of the questions asked before the Court that the local commander of the Navy ought to have placed JCD-42 in execution prior to December 7, 1941. Now, when it is considered that, notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have executed the war plan in whole or in part which would have automatically executed JCD-42—but did not do so—and notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have designated M-day which would have automatically executed JCD-42—but did not do so—and notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Department could have independently executed JCD-42³¹—but did not do so—it is obvious that no responsible person in Hawaii would have reason then and there to place JCD-42 in execution. And when we go down the chain of command as far as Rear Admiral Bloch, in view of the command relations existing at the time in Pearl Harbor, and in view of the circumstances just reviewed, any implication that he ought to have, or could have, put JCD-42 in execution is not reasonable. And the same can be said for establishment of unity of command for which [8] a well understood *modus operandi* had been promulgated.³²

²² Aside from comparison of Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7, SEE also RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 200 to 208, page 259.

²⁴ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, described in note 21 *supra*: SEE—For Army see paragraph 17, page 9; for Navy see paragraph 18, page 10.

²⁵ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, described in note 21 *supra*.

Exhibit 23—containing annexes to JCD-42.

²⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 15, page 211.

²⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 96, page 302 at 6th line from top page 303.

²⁸ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 68, page 28; A. 268, page 82.

²⁹ RECORD, Witness KITTS—Statement page 527.

Witness SHORT—Q. 87, 88, page 234.

³⁰ Exhibit 7—JCD-42: SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8.

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 212 and 213, page 260.

³¹ Exhibit 7—JCD-42: SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8.

RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 777 to 782, page 181.

Witness SHORT—Q. 212 and 213, page 260.

³² RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 67, page 27 and 28, specifically paragraph 9 b (1) (2) and (3), page 28; Q. 73 and 74, page 29; Q. 817 to 823, page 187 and 188.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 75 to 77, page 296.

Witness SHORT—Q. 7, page 220.

Witness INGERSOLL—Q. 140, page 848.

Now a fifth consideration. In anticipation of possible execution of these plans, there was a need for drills, the correction of defects, and the making of improvements. Furthermore, material deficiencies must be noted and competent authority informed of conditions, to the end that corrective action could be initiated. This was done.³³ In similar anticipation, cooperation between Army and Navy should be genuine and complete. This it was.³⁴ Each of these things were continuing procedures—not only at the level of Rear Admiral Bloch, but in the higher and lower naval commands in the Hawaiian area as well.³⁵

This brings us to a sixth matter. On July 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a directive³⁶ whereby certain organizational and command relations were changed. This resulted in a number of things, the most important being, first, notwithstanding General Order No. 143 establishing the organization of the naval forces, the Naval Coastal Frontier forces would not be formed;³⁷ and, second, in addition to General Order No. 142, under which the Commandant 14th Naval District became an officer of the fleet under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch as the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and the local defense forces became subject to the [9] orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet "in all circumstances."³⁸ The net effect of all this was that if there had existed a suggestion that, in defense and military matters, Rear Admiral Bloch had a status independent of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, there was no doubt that from the date of the directive, July 1, 1941, he was a direct subordinate³⁹ of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from February 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, except for a few days in the summer and early fall, was physically present and ashore at Pearl Harbor.⁴⁰

While, as we have seen, JCD-42 was never made operational prior to December 7, 1941, and as the expression "distant reconnaissance" does not elsewhere appear in the documents before the Court, it may be discussed here. We should keep clearly in mind that in no directive or executed operational procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was there any duty or responsibility prescribed in relation to Rear Admiral Bloch in any capacity to conduct "distant reconnaissance." "Distant reconnaissance" was set forth *only* in JCD-42 as a measure to be undertaken *if, as, and when* JCD-42 became operational.⁴¹

³³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 18, page 388.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 80, 81, 82, 83, page 592.

³⁴ RECORD, Witness DELANY—Q. 68, page 507.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 23, page 936.

³⁵ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 72, page 232; Q. 183, page 257.

Witness ROCHEFORT—Q. 5, page 471.

³⁶ Exhibit 4—WPL-46—(appearing as 9th page from cover page—not numbered). Directive dated July 1, 1941 from CNO to Distribution List for WPL-46—serial 071912, subject "The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers."

RECORD, Witness STAR—Also appears: Q. 111 and 112, pages 39 and 41.

³⁷ Exhibit 4—Described in note 36 supra: SEE specifically at paragraph 4, first sentence, of CNO directive dated July 1, 1941.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 324, page 358.

³⁸ Exhibit 4—Described in note 36 supra. SEE: specifically at paragraph 3 of CNO directive dated 1 July 1941, which by its terms puts into effect at that time certain parts of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4), and specifically those concerning command relations in Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, at pages 36 and 37, which are paragraphs 3241 and 3242 as applies to Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Exhibit 1—General Order No. 142.

Exhibit 2—General Order No. 143.

³⁹ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 17, page 388.

⁴⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 261 to 266, pages 349-350.

⁴¹ Exhibit 7—JCD-42—SEE paragraph 18 i, page 10, providing for "distant reconnaissance" which by paragraph (2), middle of page 8, becomes operational on M-day or when the plan or part of it was executed.

The essence of the "distant reconnaissance" matter is this.⁴² Rear Admiral Bloch as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Naval Base Defense Officer, or under any of his titles, did not have and never did have any long range planes under his direct command.⁴³ While he had requested a firm force of patrol planes in order that his local defense forces might be adequate to the tasks with which they would be confronted,⁴⁴ he never did get them.⁴⁵ The only [10] planes suitable for distant reconnaissance existent in the Hawaiian area during the entire period in question prior to December 7th were 81 patrol planes encompassed in the Fleet Patrol Wings ONE and TWO and at the same time comprising Task Force NINE, plus 6 or 8 Army B-17's.⁴⁶ The Army bombers never were under Navy command⁴⁷ except for drills, because the shift of those B-17's from Army to Navy command under plans approved by higher authority never was to occur, unless and until the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was to become an actual force in being under Rear Admiral Bellinger as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, *at the time and only at the time* that the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated.⁴⁸

The naval patrol planes—the 81—not all of which ever were at any time simultaneously capable of "distant reconnaissance"—were a part of the fleet. As such, they were under the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger, either as Commander Patrol Wing TWO or as Commander Task Force NINE. Except upon activation for air raid drills, those planes never became a part of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. It had never been planned or intended that activation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force should occur, unless and until there was a hostile air attack,⁴⁹ or until there was positive information of the immediate imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor within narrow time limits, i. e., "threat of hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action."⁵⁰ Prior to December 7, 1941, there never was an attack, nor did [11] there exist positive information of the immediate imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor.⁵¹ Thus, prior

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 312, page 356.

⁴² RECORD, Witness BELLINGER—Q. 2, page 660 to 664.

Witness McMORRIS—Q. 22, page 890.

⁴³ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 775, page 180.

⁴⁴ Exhibit 46—Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC: SEE paragraph 4.

⁴⁵ Exhibit 47—Secret letter dated 25 November 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC and Com 14: SEE paragraph 5 (e).

⁴⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 23, page 222 at lines 18 to 21, page 223; Q. 65, page 230.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 43, page 583.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 46, page 676.

⁴⁷ RECORD, Witness PHILLIPS—Q. 52, page 483.

Witness SHORT—Q. 59, page 230.

⁴⁸ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 5 and 6, page 575; Q. 37 to 39, page 581-582.

⁴⁹ Exhibit 8—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941.

Exhibit 23—Enclosure B "addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41", SEE page 4 at Section IV, heading "Action Open to Us", paragraph (a) and page 5 at paragraph (e), also pages 5-6 at Section V, heading "Decisions" paragraphs 2 (a) (1) (2) and 2 (b) (1) (2)—(Note same document appears in Exhibit 53).

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 57, page 289—last sentence bottom of page.

⁵⁰ Exhibit 23—Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, JCD-42: SEE Article II, paragraph 2, page 1.

RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 77, page 591; Q. 85, page 592.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 66 to 69, page 678.

⁵¹ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 601, page 154.

to December 7, 1941, except for simulated emergencies, that is drills, the Army bombers and the naval patrol planes were never a part of any continuing firm Naval Base Defense Air Force.⁵² Hence, except for drills, these planes capable of long range reconnaissance were never under Rear Admiral Bellinger in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.⁵³ Consequently, neither he nor the planes were ever under command of Rear Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer or under his command in any capacity, except at planes.⁵⁴

For these same reasons, the smaller aircraft, the short legged planes, the remaining naval shore based aircraft, had a similar status, and were circumscribed by the same restrictions of activation and employment in the naval Base Defense Air Force as were the long range planes.⁵⁵

Prior to December 7, 1941, there never were enough planes, crews or spare parts, to establish and continue a daily distant reconnaissance over a protracted period.⁵⁶ Furthermore, high authority had put all the available long range naval planes in Task Force NINE some weeks prior to December 7, 1941, under Rear Admiral Bellinger.⁵⁷ Task Force NINE had been assigned directly certain missions, one being "to conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in order to improve security of fleet units and bases."⁵⁸ High authority had approved the [12] operating, expansion training, intertype training, and upkeep schedules for the period on and after November 15, 1941, for these patrol planes;⁵⁹ high authority had decided not to interrupt training,⁶⁰ and had determined, and I quote, that "a continuous patrol over long periods of time was out of the question."⁶¹

"Distant reconnaissance", insofar as Rear Admiral Bloch is concerned, under whatever title you consider him, can be summarized thus:—he had no planes for distant reconnaissance, and he had no surface vessels to accomplish it otherwise.⁶² Having no information over and above or differing from that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁶³ he had no basis for dissenting from the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief in regard to distant reconnaissance. Fi-

⁵² RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 69 to 72, page 398–399.

⁵³ RECORD, Witness BELLINGER—Q. 2, page 660.

⁵⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 297, page 354.

⁵⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 14, page 277; Q. 73, page 295; Q. 290 to 294, page 353.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 113, page 685.

⁵⁶ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 156, page 329; Q. 286 and 287, page 353.

Witness DELANY—Q. 25, page 499.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 59, page 538.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 44, page 583; Q. 72, page 590.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 36, page 672.

⁵⁷ Exhibit 52—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 dated October 31, 1941, effective 15 November 1941: SEE page 2, heading "Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)".

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 272 and 280, page 351.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 125 to 130, page 599.

⁵⁸ Exhibit 52—14CL-41—described in note 57 supra: SEE top of page 3.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 285, page 352.

⁵⁹ Exhibit 52—14CL-41—described in note 57 supra: SEE at page 4, paragraph 11.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 288 and 289, page 353.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 131 to 133, page 600.

⁶⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43 at page 285, last sentence of answer; Q. 295 and 296, page 353.

⁶¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43, page 284, at line 8 of answer.

⁶² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 310, page 356.

⁶³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 35 and 38, page 281; Q. 102 to 104, page 304.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 38, page 393; Q. 39 and 44, page 394.

nally, Rear Admiral Bloch had neither authority,⁶⁴ nor reason—there being no hostile air attack nor positive information of the imminence of one within narrow time limits⁶⁵—to independently direct the activation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force contrary to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁶⁶ or the requirements of the operating and training schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who was the immediate superior in command.⁶⁷

And that brings us to the matter of conditions of readiness for both ships and aircraft. While something more will be said later about it, we do know this: first, existing conditions of readiness conformed to the state required by operating, training, upkeep and employment schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, [13] and were sensible and appropriate for these purposes;⁶⁸ second, a protracted state of complete readiness to meet a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor would have completely disrupted training, upkeep, and maintenance;⁶⁹ and third, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had made and maintained unaltered his decision to make no changes in his schedules and to continue such training.⁷⁰ Without quibbling as to whether Rear Admiral Bloch's authority was that of "advising" or "prescribing" conditions of readiness,⁷¹ he neither possessed any information or intelligence over and above that possessed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁷² who was present at the time; nor did he possess information or intelligence that would lead, or for that matter logically should have led, him to differ from the decisions made.

And here it may be well to examine the matter of the submarine reported by the WARD immediately prior to the air attack on December 7th. First, there had been many false contacts in the Hawaiian area. Next, on 27 November 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had directed the depth charging of any submarine running submerged outside the sanctuaries and not accompanied by a surface guard vessel.⁷³ The WARD was operating under such orders.⁷⁴ Finally, no one ashore prior to the air attack knew whether a real submarine had actually been seen, nor did anyone ashore know whose submarine it was. Nor did anyone ashore know if the submarine had attacked the WARD, or whether pursuant to standing orders the WARD had made a sound contact and had depth charged the area.⁷⁵ The later information from the WARD that it was towing in a sampan [14] to Honolulu did not contribute to clarifying the occurrence. Now, what was done about it? The WARD's message

⁶⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 411, page 374; Q. 446, page 380.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 89, page 402.

⁶⁵ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 601, page 154.

⁶⁶ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 77, page 400.

⁶⁷ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 135, page 600.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 7, page 665; Q. 54 to 61, page 677.

⁶⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 19, 20, 21, 22, page 390.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 102, page 547.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 91, page 594.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 65, page 678.

⁶⁹ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 90, page 593.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 25, page 669; Q. 64, page 678; Q. 75, page 679.

⁷⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43 at page 285; last sentence of answer; Q. 295 and 296, page 353.

⁷¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 45, page 285; Q. 46, 47, 48, page 286; Q. 365 to 368, page 364 and 365.

⁷² RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 600, page 154, line 13 of answer.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 90 at last sentence, bottom page 300.

⁷³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 46, page 395.

⁷⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 173, page 332.

was transmitted to the headquarters of both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District. A senior officer of the 14th Naval District went to headquarters to investigate and verify the situation, and in accordance with doctrine, immediately sent the ready duty destroyer to back up the WARD. Before the situation could be clarified, the air attack was on. The soundness of the "doctrine" was proven, inasmuch as the ready duty destroyer while proceeding out of harbor sank an enemy submarine.⁷⁵ On this matter of the WARD's contact, it is certain no one could have done more and it is probable some might have done less. But you can be sure that, at that time and upon the facts then at hand, no one reasonably would have or should have been expected to sound an air raid alarm.

There has been testimony concerning letter 2CL-41, revised, of October 14, 1941,⁷⁶ which in various places mentions the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commandant 14th Naval District as Naval Defense Officer. Terming Rear Admiral Bloch "Naval Base Defense Officer" does not make his duties something more than or different from the particular duties as stated in 2CL-41.⁷⁷ The expression "Naval Base Defense Officer" is just a name, and abbreviating it to initial letters as N. B. D. O. neither expended nor contracted the duties of Rear Admiral Bloch.

When we consider the particular provisions of Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41, revised, and what was done about them prior to December 7, 1941, the essential facts are these:⁷⁸

As to paragraph 3 (A), "Continuous Patrols,"—To the extent of material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did administer and furnish the instore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor patrol.⁷⁹

As to paragraph 3 (B) (3)—To the extent of material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did operate the mine sweepers.

The discussion of torpedo baffles may here be mentioned. This subject was [15] considered fully both in Pearl Harbor and in the Navy Department. On the basis of the best technical advice available in the Department—which in effect was that aerial torpedoes could not be successfully launched in depths obtaining in Pearl Harbor—the action taken by those at Pearl Harbor seemed correct at the time.⁸⁰ The Department was informed of that action. It is safe to say that, if the Navy Department at any time prior to December 7, 1941, had known that aerial torpedoes could be successfully launched in Pearl Harbor, or had believed that baffles were advisable,

⁷⁵ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 86, page 401; Q. 94, page 403.

⁷⁶ Exhibit 8—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2LC-41 (revised) dated 14 Oct. 1941.

⁷⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 11, page 276.

⁷⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 18, page 388 to 390.

⁷⁹ RECORD, Witness PYE—Q. 9, page 418.

⁸⁰ Exhibit 49—Confidential Letter CNO to CINCPAC, copy to CINCLANT, CINCAF, dated 15 February 1941.

Exhibit 54—Confidential Letter CNO to Commandants of Naval Districts, copies to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 17 February 1941.

Exhibit 55—Confidential Letter CNO to Commandant of Naval Districts, copies to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 13 June 1941.

RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 41, page 394; Q. 139, page 410.

Witness PYE—Q. 83, page 436.

Witness DELANY—Q. 15, page 498.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 22, page 669.

the Navy Department would have directed their shipment and installation.⁸¹

Reverting to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (a) of 2CL-41, "Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack"—This was effectuated by an agreement in regard to the use of Army planes by the Navy and naval planes by the Army in case of attack, which agreement was implemented by holding frequent drills, determining difficulties, and applying remedies. Further, any Marine anti-aircraft artillery present was made available to the Army, under the designated Army command.⁸² The Army was assisted in their training of aircraft warning service men by sending them to the Fleet for instruction.

Rather confused mention has been made of some kind of Navy liaison officer in connection with the air raid warning service, which was a responsibility of the Army.⁸³ General Short asked the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for such a liaison officer on August 7, 1941, and on August 19, 1941,⁸⁴ Commander Curts was designated as such [16] liaison officer. In addition to that, we know that Commander Taylor transiently present, was detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with the Army on aircraft warning system matters.⁸⁵ Finally, the provision for a Navy liaison officer that Lieutenant General Short had written in his tentative operating procedure never became effective because the system was never officially established,⁸⁶ nor did General Short ever order it established. In this matter of a Navy liaison officer—who was only a facility for the exchange of information⁸⁷—sight should not be lost of the fact that several liaison officers from the various Army commands were required to be present when the AWS was established,⁸⁸ and we know positively that on December 6-7, 1941, none were there.⁸⁹ The only Army officer on duty that morning was a then First Lieutenant Tyler, who, inexperienced and without benefit of instruction from the Army, had been stationed in the Army's aircraft warning service information control center, for the second time in his life—for a few hours self-training.⁹⁰ The plain fact of the matter is that the Army's AWS was in a very limited training status, and not at all on an operating basis up to and including December 7, 1941.⁹¹

Reverting to 2CL-41, paragraph 3 (G) (6) (b). "Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced"—Actually the matter of shore based anti-aircraft guns was the exclusive responsibility of the Army.⁹² However, in carrying out his coordination duties, about February 20, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District had a conference with Lieutenant General Short and emphasized the necessity of emplacing the mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. On February 23rd,

⁸¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 65 and 66, page 291 to 293.

⁸² RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 194 to 197, page 258.

⁸³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 344, page 360.

⁸⁴ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 222 to 230; pages 261 and 262.

⁸⁵ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 11, page 611; Q. 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, page 622.

⁸⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 233 and 234, pages 262 and 263.

⁸⁷ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 74, page 620.

⁸⁸ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 19 and 21, page 612.

⁸⁹ RECORD, Witness TYLER—Q. 14, page 447.

⁹⁰ RECORD, Witness TYLER—Q. 7, 11, 14, page 447; Q. 36, 37, page 450; Q. 69, page 453.

⁹¹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 27, page 224; Q. 105, page 238.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 24, 25, page 391.

Witness TAYLOR—Q. 80, page 621.

⁹² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 343, page 360.

the Commandant 14th Naval District was informed by the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department that Lieutenant General Short had given orders that the mobile anti-aircraft artillery be kept in place as close to their point of emplacement as possible, having due regard for the ownership of land. In [17] the intervening period until October, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally examined the plans for the location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be emplaced, particularly those that were to be sited on naval reservations. Subordinates of the Commandant 14th Naval District were in constant touch with Army representatives, endeavoring to have guns emplaced. Actually, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy was making plans to mess and quarter Army gun crews on naval reservations so that Army objections would be removed.⁹³ At some date between October 15th and November 1st, or thereabouts, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally talked to Lieutenant General Short about this matter. General Short advised that he could not emplace these guns for several reasons, namely, the sites were not on Government land, their communications would have to be out in the open—usually in cane fields and irrigation ditches—and subject to deterioration, and that it would be extremely difficult for the personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. There were approximately 30 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in fixed emplacements, about 20 of them being in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.⁹⁴

As to paragraph 3(G) (6) (c), "Exercise supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy"—The matter of joint air operations has been heretofore discussed in detail. In addition—the Commander Patrol Wing TWO was a flyer, was senior aviation officer present ashore, and as such, understood all the technicalities and was qualified to command aircraft forces. Control was exercised through him and coordination with the Army was planned and practiced in drills. Detailed operating plans were prepared.⁹⁵ Drills were held, difficulties discovered, and improvements made.

On paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (1), "Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense by advising the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain"—In addition to the previous remarks on condition of readiness—We know that arrangements for antiaircraft [18] fire had been established by the Fleet;⁹⁶ sector and sector commanders had been designated.⁹⁷ Furthermore, as to general conditions of readiness during the period prior to December 7, 1941, they were as we now know something higher than Condition III.⁹⁸ It was believed by the Commander-in-

⁹³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 24 and 25, page 417.

⁹⁴ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 2, 3, 4, 5, page 412, 413.

⁹⁵ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, Annex VII.

⁹⁶ Exhibit 53—Operational Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941: SEE Annex B, Base Defense Air Force Plan.

⁹⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 18, page 278.

⁹⁸ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 346, page 360.

Witness PYE—Q. 11, page 419; Q. 21, page 422.

Witness KITTS—Q. 77, page 523.

⁹⁹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 19, page 278.

Witness PYE—Q. 14, page 419; Q. 15, 16, page 420; Q. 18, 19, page 422; Q. 66, page 433.

Witness KITTS—Q. 11, 12, 13, 14, page 513.

Chief, Pacific Fleet, to be sufficient.⁹⁹ Communication channels had been provided whereby this measure could be quickly effected. Anti-sabotage measures had long been in effect. Having no information other than that had by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and having no information that would lead the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to differ with the decisions in this respect made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, no change in existing conditions of readiness was advised.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (2), "Hold necessary drills"—Drills were held weekly until autumn, when they were changed to be held every two weeks and in these bi-weekly drills arrangements were made to always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to bi-weekly drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army participation and also, due to their frequency, there were absentees. The bi-weekly drills were always arranged well in advance and insured the Army participation and everybody being in each drill.¹⁰⁰

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (3), "Giving alarms for: attack, black-out signal, all clear signal"—Procedures had been established and drills had. All signals were contained in the communication annex to the operating plan.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (4), "Informing the task force commander at sea of the type of attacking aircraft"—This was practiced in all drills and a communication channel was provided for the purpose.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (5), "Arranging communication plan"—A communication plan was promulgated prior to December 7th, and was used in drills.¹⁰¹

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (6), "Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed"—the air alarm signal prescribed was contained in the communication plan.

[19] The remaining occasions in 2CL-41 where either the Commandant 14th Naval District or the Naval Base Defense Officer is mentioned, have no bearing on the matter in hand, because those instances were not responsibilities and could not become responsibilities until an attack in fact had taken place. We know that at the time of attack they were done in the way and at the time they should have been.¹⁰²

That these duties of coordination and preparation were conscientiously attended to is made quite evident from the testimony¹⁰³ and plans promulgated on this subject which are contained in Exhibit 53.¹⁰⁴ And these had the approval of Rear Admiral Bloch's immediate superior in command, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,¹⁰⁵ on the spot at the time.

⁹⁹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 27, page 280; Q. 143, page 326.

¹⁰⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 74, page 296.

¹⁰¹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 28, page 225.

¹⁰² RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 23, page 390.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 57, page 586.

¹⁰³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 15, page 387; Q. 16, page 388.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 48 and 49, page 944.

¹⁰⁴ Exhibit 53—Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941.

ANNEX A—Inshore Patrol Plan.

ANNEX B—Base Defense Air Force Plan with Addendum I, Joint Estimate. Addendum II, Aircraft Readiness.

ANNEX C—Anti-aircraft Defense Plan.

ANNEX D—Harbor Control Post Plan.

ANNEX E—Communication Plan.

¹⁰⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 202, page 338-339.

In connection with this assigned task of Rear Admiral Bloch, which Admiral Kimmel has summarized as "coordinating the naval effort with the Army,"¹⁰⁶ there is considerable and detailed testimony as to the cordial, frequent and intimate conferences and discussions on matters of defense that took place during the period between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short and their respective staffs.¹⁰⁷ There is no gainsaying the fact that each headquarters knew its opposite problems, conditions, policies, and views.¹⁰⁸ Frequently, Rear Admiral Bloch was present at such conferences,¹⁰⁹ or if not present was presumed to be later informed of what was considered pertinent to him.

[20] By close and frequent personal contact¹¹⁰ and exchange of information with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch naturally came to know his wishes, policies, views and decisions as to the current tasks and problems.¹¹¹

The measure of performance of Rear Admiral Bloch's duties and responsibilities can best be summarized in the words of the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I quote: "was in general satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief . . . If it had not been so performed, I would not have hesitated at any time to call his attention to the fact."¹¹² . . . under the handicaps which he was laboring, I considered his performance of duty highly satisfactory."¹¹³

On December 7, 1941, the practical planning, the training and the drilling, all designed to assure that the initiation of defense measures would be automatic¹¹⁴—the development of a high state of discipline and morale—and the material upkeep—each paid substantial dividends.

And that brings us to one final thing that might pertain to Rear Admiral Bloch, namely the various dispatches of the Navy Department from October 16, 1941 on. While they were not all addressed to him, he did see them or come to know of their contents. Others did the same.¹¹⁵ In discussing these dispatches in relation to Rear Admiral Bloch, the question may be asked: Why did not Rear Admiral Bloch interpret these dispatches differently from the others at Pearl Harbor? Disposition of this question has been made amply by evidence before this Court. In the first place, there was nothing in these messages which so much as implied an air attack on Pearl Harbor, for the very good reason that even the originators of the dispatches had no such suspicion.¹¹⁶ [21] In the second place, although other specific

¹⁰⁶ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 386, page 369; Q. 392, 393, 394, page 370, 371, 372.

¹⁰⁷ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 10, 11, page 221; Q. 124, 125, page 242; Q. 152, page 250.

Witness PYE—Q. 111, page 441.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 39, page 282; Q. 40, page 283; Q. 380, page 367.

Witness PHILLIPS—Q. 32, 36, page 481; Q. 154, page 494.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 52, page 536.

¹⁰⁸ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 40 and 42, page 283; Q. 69, page 294; Q. 106, page 304; Q. 229, page 344.

¹⁰⁹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 8 and 9, page 220.

¹¹⁰ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 32 to 34, page 392.

¹¹¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 250 to 262, page 348 to 349.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 60 to 63, page 397.

¹¹² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 44, page 285.

¹¹³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 471 and 472, page 384.

¹¹⁴ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 84, page 592.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 70, 71, 72, page 679.

¹¹⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 240 to 259, page 348 to 349.

Witness PYE—Q. 63, 64, page 432; Q. 77, page 435.

¹¹⁶ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 142, 143, page 799.

Witness INGERSOL—Q. 136, page 847; Q. 137, page 848.

Witness MARSHALL—Q. 31, 32, page 863.

geographic objectives are mentioned, never in any dispatch is the Hawaiian area so designated. Nor do the dispatches designate M-day, nor do they direct total or partial execution of the Rainbow plan. So far as Rear Admiral Bloch was concerned, it is beside the point that during the critical period before December 7, 1941, there existed in the Navy Department a considerable volume of positive, specific information, because the Commandant 14th Naval District never received any such information. None of the dispatches to Pearl Harbor gave sufficient information upon which evaluations could be made and all evaluations sent by the Navy Department related to either general possibilities, or specified the scene of probable Japanese activities to be in the Far East. The Commandant 14th Naval District's opinion was that an air attack by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area prior to a declaration of war was a remote possibility,¹¹⁷ and he believed that attack would be made in order of probability as follows:¹¹⁸ (1) submarine attack against ships in operating areas, security against which was in effect; (2) blocking Pearl Harbor entrance channel, security against which was in effect; (3) laying magnetic or other mines off the entrance channel and in the approaches to the entrances to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu, security against which was in effect; (4) sabotage, security against which was in effect. As to surprise air attack prior to the declaration of war, he considered it a remote possibility,¹¹⁷ and even for this he had prepared defense plans and held drills. And finally, Rear Admiral Bloch lived in the same atmosphere, saw the same conditions, was at the same remote distance, had the same horizon and had the same dependency upon the Navy Department.¹¹⁹ He had neither information nor prophetic vision that would lead him to any different opinion from that of his immediate superior in command, nor from that of Lieutenant General Short, nor that of the informed task force commanders, nor of those of responsible officers on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.¹²⁰

[22] I have addressed myself to the consideration of all those matters which, as far as I can recall, might, however remotely, be associated with Rear Admiral Bloch. If during your deliberations some question arises which touches upon him, I feel assured that you will be able to satisfactorily dispose of it from the evidence before you. During the period in question Rear Admiral Bloch did not seek to avoid responsibilities which were his. He does not do so now. With what he had at the time, Rear Admiral Bloch did all that anyone could do. Of the courses of action open to him, he took those prompted by good judgment—and he fully and conscientiously performed his every duty.

C. C. BLOCH.

¹¹⁷ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 40, page 394; Q. 136, 137, page 409.

¹¹⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 138, page 409.

¹¹⁹ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 141, page 410.

¹²⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 112, page 306; Q. 151, page 327; Q. 456, page 381. Witness DELANY—Q. 9, 10, 11, page 497; Q. 62, 63, 64, page 506.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 35 to 40, page 533-534; Q. 91, page 545; Q. 153; page 561.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 133, 134, 135, page 409.

Witness McMORRIS—Q. 18, page 889; Q. 61, page 900.

Witness LAYTON—Q. 40, page 911; Q. 47, page 912; Q. 70, page 917.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 21, page 935; Q. 31 and 34, page 938; Q. 37, page 939.

[TOP SECRET]**RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY**

**TO INQUIRE INTO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ON
PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON 7 DECEMBER 1941**

24 July 1944

NOTICE

The pages included in this binder are classified as "Top-Secret" and by orders of the Secretary of the Navy are not to be inserted in the original record nor is the information contained therein to be released to any person whatsoever, until specific authorization has been granted for such insertion or such release by the Secretary of the Navy. This action has been taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

Extracted part of the record containing proceedings relative to a statement by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), page 58-A.

[58-A] With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following statement: In the report submitted by Admiral Hart I learned—that is, in the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, on page 429—that he knew of a special Japanese code by means of which, on or about December 4, 1941, he learned the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States.

The statement was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that the evidence referred to might be introduced before the court in the regular manner.

With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that his purpose in making the statement was only to show the reason why he had been endeavoring to obtain access to the secret messages in the Navy Department, and to appeal to the court for assistance in obtaining such access.

The judge advocate withdrew his objection.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 159-A through 162.

[159-A] 633. Q. On or about November 12, 1941, did you receive information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as an absolute immovable deadline for the negotiations then being conducted between Japan and America?

A. No; I don't remember that. I remember something about a date and then postponing it, but the details of that I have forgotten,

and I have not refreshed on it. There was, I believe, a postponement, but I have forgotten the deadline, and remember only that there was a deadline.

634. Q. Would it refresh your memory if I told you that Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, testified before Admiral Hart on Page 358 of the transcript of the record—

A. What record are you referring to?

635. Q. The Hart record.

This question was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that it was an attempt to show in the form of a question that there was certain evidence before the Hart examination, what the evidence was, and the fact that the evidence was given under oath.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), replied.

The court announced that the objection was sustained.

636. Q. You say, Admiral, that you did have some information relative to the fixing of a deadline on Japanese-United States negotiations?

A. I recall, but rather vaguely, something about a date having been set and then having been advanced, but it is not clear in my memory.

637. Q. Have you any recollection as to when you received that information, within reasonable limits?

A. Some time, I would say, after the middle of November, but I do not recall when it was. I would say some time from November on.

638. Q. Do you recall whether it was prior to your dispatch of November 24?

A. No, I couldn't remember a date. I wish I could. I don't recall it.

639. Q. You cannot identify it with reference to that incident, that is, the dispatch of November 24?

A. No; I am just hazy on it.

[160] 640. Q. How did you evaluate that information which you did receive about the dead line?

A. I don't recall just what impression it made at that time.

641. Q. Do you recall whether it indicated aggressive action on the part of Japan against this country?

A. No; I don't recall that.

642. Q. Do you recall having any discussion over this information with anyone outside the department?

A. No. I have stated that the matter is hazy in my memory, and I have no distinct remembrance of the matter at all, except that some such thing came up.

643. Q. Do you recall whether you then considered it an important item of information?

A. No; I can only repeat that the whole incident is hazy in my memory.

644. Q. You do recall that the information you had fixing a dead line was subsequently extended to another date?

A. That is about what I remember. There was some talk about a dead line, and then about its having been extended. That is about the extent of it. I'm not just clear on the thing.

645. Q. Do you recall whether you personally sent any information to Admiral Kimmel concerning this item of information?

A. I don't recall that I did.

646. Q. Do you recall whether you directed any of your subordinates to do so?

A. The entire incident, including what I did or may not have done remains hazy. I don't remember the issue clearly at all, or the action taken.

647. Q. I am only trying to assist you.

A. I wish I could help you, but I just don't recall it. That's about where it winds up. I mean, I don't recall it clearly.

648. Q. You do not recall whether or not that indicated in your mind offensive action by Japan in the Southwest Pacific?

A. My memory with regard to the thing and conclusions and so forth, if any, does not carry to the point of anything definite. I recall some such incident, and that's about all.

[161] 649. Q. What was the stimulating motive on your part in sending to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch of November 24?

A. The dispatch states very clearly: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements, their naval and military forces, indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction"—

650. Q. Do you recall what the statements of the Japanese Government were to which you made reference?

A. I have already testified that I don't recall them.

651. Q. On November 26 did you receive intelligence indicating a Japanese intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States?

A. No, I don't recall that.

652. Q. You have no recollection of that whatever?

A. No.

653. Q. Between December 1 and December 4 did you receive information that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States and maintain peace with Russia?

A. Not that I recall.

[161-A] 654. Q. Do you recall the phrase "Winds Message"?

A. I don't recall that at that time. I don't recall such a message.

655. Q. Do you recall such a message at any time?

A. During the period you mention I don't recall such a message.

656. Q. Do you recall it at any time?

A. If you will produce the message, I don't know whether it would serve to recall my memory or not.

657. Q. Would the production of the message assist you in refreshing your recollection?

A. I don't know. I don't recall having seen the so-called "Winds Message" or having heard of it at that time.

658. Q. Well, do you recall having seen or heard of the "Winds Message" at any other time?

A. I don't recall ever having seen it.

[162] 659. Q. Do you recall having participated in any discussion concerning the Winds Message then or at any other time?

A. Not the slightest recollection of a discussion of the so-called Winds Message.

660. Q. Do you recall having heard the phrase "Winds Message" in connection with Japanese-United States relations during the period of two weeks preceding December 7, 1941?

A. No, I do not.

661. Q. Do you recall having had any conferences or discussions with Admiral Ingersoll concerning the Winds Message?

A. No.

662. Q. Do you recall having received any information during the first three or four days of December, 1941, indicating that Japan would attack both the United States and Britain and maintain peace with Russia?

A. No.

663. Q. No information or discussion of that whatever?

A. Well, we discussed every phase of that situation. If you mean with reference to any document, I don't recall it. We had been discussing for a year the Russian situation and as to what would happen. There was guess work.

664. Q. Do I understand you to say that you never heard the phrase, "Winds Message" as applied to United States-Japanese relations during the month preceding December 7, 1941, until I mentioned it a few moments ago?

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of the so-called Winds Message for a month preceding Pearl Harbor or any time around that time.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

This line of questioning was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that there is no evidence laid before the court of anything with reference to a Winds Message.

The interested party, Read Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), replied.

The court announced that the objection was overruled.

665. Q. Consequently, of course, having no knowledge yourself about it, you sent no word to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, nor to anyone else.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Page 164-A.

[164-A] 666. Q. Admiral Stark, during the two weeks prior to 7 December, 1941, do you recall any information of a false weather broadcast in plain Japanese language emanating from Japan as a signal for an attack on the beginning of war by Japan against the United States?

A. No, I do not recall anything of that sort at that time.

667. Q. Do you recall during the week prior to 7 December, 1941, receiving information that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was reporting twice daily the number of American warships in Pearl Harbor and the berth at which they were located?

A. No.

668. Q. You remember receiving no such information?

A. I do not recall receiving any such information.

669. Q. Or anything of that character?

A. No, I don't recall it.

670. Q. During the week preceding 7 December 1941, do you recall Commander McCollum originating and presenting to you a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel which was never sent?

A. No, I don't recall it.

671. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Commander McCollum the middle or latter part of the week preceding 7 December 1941 relative to a dispatch which he had drafted to Admiral Kimmel concerning information received in Commander McCollum's division?

A. No.

672. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Commander McCollum during the week prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, I do not at this time. I do not recall it.

[209-A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann:)

89. Q. Along in the middle of November, do you recall receiving from Naval Intelligence any information relative to the establishment of a deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United States?

A. I don't know whether the information came from Naval Intelligence, or where it came from. I remember the question of various deadlines on occasions, yes, sir. I don't know whether the information came to me from Naval Intelligence, or what the source of the information was. I do remember that we had information that deadlines had been established.

[210-A] 98. Q. Now, what was the information that was communicated to you relative to the deadline?

A. I don't remember the exact information that was communicated on the deadline.

99. Q. Would it have been that November 25th was regarded as a deadline for all negotiations between the Japanese and the United States?

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

Examined by the court:

100. Q. Does this cover the same line of questioning that you made your objection to this morning?

A. That is correct, sir.

101. Q. Do you mean your personal security, or—

A. I mean the security which is vital to the furtherance of the war effort of the United States.

102. Q. Vital to the war effort at that time, or at present?

A. At present.

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

[211] Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) (Continued):

103. Q. Do you recall whether you had information from Naval Intelligence that the deadline originally determined or fixed, was extended at some later date?

A. That is the same line of questioning and the same objection to it.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), stated as follows: I feel that Admiral Kimmel is entitled to have indicated on this record the fact that he seeks information from this witness, not once but as to the several items of information; that the cross-examination of this witness is being precluded to Admiral Kimmel on that ground and I see no way of accomplishing that other than by asking several questions on different lines of information more or less on the line that I asked Admiral Stark yesterday afternoon.

The court announced that in view of the fact that this line of questioning has been objected to by the witness on the ground of security to the war effort at present, that that line of questioning cannot be pursued; that the court had no objection to putting in all the questions desired.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated that he wanted to ask enough questions to ascertain the specific information which he was being denied.

The court granted permission to ask further questions.

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had information that the deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United States was extended to the 29th of November?

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

105. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 26 November you received information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that it had specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States?

[212] The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The judge advocate objected to this question on the ground that it went beyond the scope of the direct examination.

The court announced that it recognized that fact, that it was not cross-examination on the direct examination, but in the interests of saving time, if there was no specific objection, the questioning may continue; but that the witness's claim of privilege to this question was honored and that he need not answer the question.

106. Q. During the early part of December, December 3rd or December 4th, do you recall receiving information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that Japan would wage an offensive war against both the United States and Britain?

To this question the judge advocate made the following objection: I must object to that question on the ground that counsel is getting into the record the specific sort of information that he is trying to get, although he knows that it is objectionable on two grounds, one of them being national security, and the other being that it is beyond the scope of the direct examination.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), replied.

The judge advocate requested that the court be cleared.

The court was cleared.

The court was opened.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

The witness announced that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

107. Q. On December 4th or 5th, do you recall receiving information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was furnishing Tokyo with information as to the number of United States warships in Pearl Harbor, and their location in the harbor?

The judge advocate objected to this question on the same grounds as before.

[212-A] The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

[251-A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Lieutenant General Walter E. Short:)

163. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch number 472, that you have given considerable testimony on, what was the next information you received that indicated that there was any change in the worsening of relations between Japan and the United States?

A. Seven hours after the attack, at 2:58 p. m., on the 7th.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Page 314-A.

[314-A] 18. Q. Did you know of a definitive date fixed by Japan for the conclusion of diplomatic relations with the United States?

A. Yes, there were various dates; the first one, November 25, the second one November 29, and thereafter there was no definitive date.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Page 318-A.

[318-A] 43. Q. Did you discuss with Admiral Stark the definite date which you have stated as November 25, and later November 29, of termination of diplomatic relations with Japan?

A. I have no definite recollection of having discussed the question with him. I knew he was informed of it and there may have been discussions as to the significance or what significance would be attached to it.

44. Q. When the note of 26 November 1941 was presented by the State Department to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the Japanese government, was there much discussion in the Navy Department and those concerned regarding that note?

A. The note of November 26th?

45. Q. Yes, sir.

A. As I recollect, there was discussion, and the general effect was that this would be entirely unacceptable to Japan.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Page 320.

[320] Examined by the JUDGE ADVOCATE:

1. Q. Admiral, an official State Department document entitled "Peace and War" has been taken judicial notice of by this court of inquiry. There has been read into the record by a previous witness a section of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the Under Secretary of State (Welles), the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) and Mr. Kurusu of December 2, 1941. I would ask you to look at this note and then I shall ask you a question. Having read this portion of the document which relates to a statement made by Mr. Welles to the Japanese Ambassador, and a partial reply of the Japanese Ambassador, I will ask you to state whether or not prior to 7 December 1941 you had any knowledge of this conversation as reported in this document?

A. I do not recall that particular conversation. I do recall, as I have testified, some conversations on the subject of Japanese strength in Indo-China.

2. Q. My understanding is that you have no present recollection of having knowledge of this particular conversation prior to December 7, 1941?

A. That is correct.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Admiral, it has been testified before this court that there was a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Do you have any knowledge of this date?

A. I have previously testified that my dispatch of 27 November was based on information which I had to the effect that negotiations with Japan had ceased.

4. Q. The testimony to which the court refers is that subsequent to 26 November 1941 or about that time there was a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations, which date, at first, was 25 November, 1941; then later 29 November, 1941. Were you aware of these dates?

A. I do not recall specifically these dates. I do recall, although my remembrance is rather hazy on it, that there was a date mentioned which was later postponed. I don't remember the original date or just what the postponement was.

5. Q. As we understand, you stated that there were no negotiations between Japan and the United States representatives in Washington subsequent to 27 November 1941 and up until 7 December 1941. Is that correct?

A. I stated that I did not recall any. Subsequent to that statement counsel for one of the parties showed me a note which had been dispatched to Japan which I had not seen but which made it evident that conversations were still going on.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits), and

testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Pages 691-732, inclusive.

[691] The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate has requested the introduction of certain documents into the record. If there be no objection to the introduction of these documents, they should be offered at this time.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared at the request of the judge advocate of this court? If so, produce it and state what it is.

A. I am. I produce the file of copies, duly authenticated under official seal, of documents on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, which was made and assembled at the request of the judge advocate of this court.

The file of copies of the documents was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following objection: We object to bringing those documents in on the ground that the use which may be made of them in these proceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the documents themselves may contain but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance that wide publicity of parts of even all of these proceedings will not eventuate.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

None of the other parties to the inquiry made objection to the introduction of the documents. They were received in evidence, marked "EXHIBIT 63", for reference, description appended.

2. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared at the request of the judge advocate of the court? If so, please produce this file.

A. I am. I produce another file which contains certain dispatches—copies of certain dispatches—duly authenticated under official seal, which are on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., which was assembled at the request of the judge [692] advocate of this court.

The file of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, repeated the same objection he had heretofore made in the matter.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

None of the other interested parties made objection to the introduction of the file of documents consisting of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal. It was received in evidence, marked "EXHIBIT 64", for reference, description appended.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness for the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of documents which is Exhibit 63 before this court, and refer you to document No. 7 in this file, and ask you if you recognize it, and if so, state what it is.

A. I identify it to the extent of stating that it is a decoded translation of a message originating in Tokyo addressed to the Japanese Embassy, Washington.

2. Q. Will you read the document, please?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokio.

To: Washington.

5 November 1941.

#736

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

[693] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

3. Q. I ask you, Admiral, if you have ever seen this document, or had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I was aware of the fact that such a message had been received and that Kurusu and Nomura had instructions to wind up conversations on the 25th of November.

4. Q. Adverting to this document, you will note that the document speaks about the signing of "this agreement". Do you know what the words, "this agreement" refer to?

A. I presume that they referred to an agreement which was under discussion between the State Department and the representatives of the Japanese Government at that time.

5. Q. If you know what this agreement was, will you so state?

A. As I would interpret it, it would be instead of "this agreement", "an agreement". I don't know whether it is the translation. That is the way I would interpret the message. I do not know what this agreement was.

6. Q. What agreement was under discussion at the time this dispatch was written which involved the State Department and the Imperial Government at Tokyo?

A. There were conversations then in progress which are matters of public records whereby the United States and Japan were attempting to reach some agreement whereby their differences in the Pacific could be ironed out.

7. Q. The date of origin to this dispatch as read was 5 November 1941. Do you know from your duties as liaison officer in the Navy Department whether or not this dispatch or the substance thereof was communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. From my own personal knowledge, no. The system was that the material of this nature was delivered by a representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence who was, I believe, at the same time liaison with the Division of Naval Communications. I do remember that I knew that there had been certain dates set for the completion of the conversations then in progress, and that the State Department did know of these dates. May I add, as a possible assistance to the court, I believe the person best qualified to answer the questions as to who received the information contained in the exhibit, and the time it was conveyed to them, is Commander Kramer, as it was not my responsibility to either convey this information to anyone else, including the State Department.

[694] 8. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 11 from Exhibit 63, and ask you if you can identify it.

A. I can identify it to the extent that it is a similar translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese representatives in Washington, dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941, as shown on the photostatic copy.

9. Q. Admiral, I ask you to read this document to the court.

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
#612.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.* You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relation by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

10. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document or had you been apprised of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I had seen the document or not. I knew this information was in the Navy Department and [695] I don't remember specifically the phrase, "after that things are automatically going to happen", but it is possible that I did see the document. Having examined these documents, in the last couple of weeks, it is hard for

me to tell just when I did see them or whether I saw them at all; but I did know that this information was in the Department.

11. Q. Can you state whether or not in the performance of your duties in the Navy Department, you showed this message or communicated the contents thereof to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, I did not communicate it in the ordinary discharge of my duties. I would not be the one to communicate it.

12. Q. I show you a document from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Toyko to Washington, a circular number 2353, and ask you whether or not you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

13. Q. Will you please read the dispatch.

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: Kitanokaze KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

Voice broadcasts.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.

**North wind cloudy.

***West wind clear.

[696] 14. Q. Had you, prior to 7 December 1941, seen this document or had you been appraised of its contents?

A. To the best of my recollection, which is quite hazy on this particular message, I did know that a message of this nature was in the Department.

15. Q. Did you have any communications with the Chief of Naval Operations with reference to this message?

A. No.

16. Q. Admiral, I show you a document, No. 16 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. Yes, I recognize it.

17. Q. Will you please read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

1180. (Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure

and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[697]

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

1180. (Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1).

18. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had you been apprised of its contents?

A. I don't remember. I probably had been apprised of its contents.

19. Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing the contents of this dispatch that was just read, with the Chief of Naval Operations, prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

20. Q. Admiral, I show you document No. 17 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo.

21. Q. Will you read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

[698] 1189. (Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

ARMY 6896 25441 Page 1. SECRET

SECRET

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

ARMY 25441 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

22. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember. I believe I was acquainted with the contents of the dispatch, whether I learned it from the State Department or by seeing the dispatch. It reports a conversation with Mr. Hull.

23. Q. In your previous testimony, when you were on the stand before, I believe you were asked a question about a note presented by the Secretary of State to the Japanese diplomats on November 26, 1941. Do you recall any such testimony?

A. Yes.

[699] 24. Q. After having read this dispatch, do you identify the contents of this dispatch as being similar to the note which Mr. Hull presented the Japanese diplomats?

A. Apparently so. Possibly information could be obtained by comparing that with the copy of the note.

25. Q. Do you recall having discussed the subject matter of this dispatch with the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not remember specifically, but I believe that I probably did inform Admiral Stark that a note was being dispatched to the Japanese, and its contents.

26. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 18 from Exhibit 63 which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, No. 844. Do you recognize it as such?

A. This is from Tokyo to Washington, correct.

27. Q. I ask you to read the document.

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 28, 1941.

#644.

Re your #1189*.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.

Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

The man is the Navy Minister.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^b S. I. S. #25435, #25436.

28. Q. Admiral, adverting to the dispatch you have just read, can you identify from any date on here, to what the dispatch you have just read refers—to what subject matter does it refer?

A. Undoubtedly it refers to the dispatch of November 26.

29. Q. And that is identified how?

A. By reference to 1189; also its contents.

30. Q. I ask you, did you see this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember; it probably was.

31. Q. In that event you probably do not remember whether you had any conversations with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject matter of this dispatch prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

32. Q. Adverting to the fourth sentence of this dispatch, which I will ask you to read to the court—

A. (Reading:)

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.

33. Q. What is your interpretation of this sentence as regards the Japanese intention as to the negotiations at hand?

A. I interpret it to mean that they are going to reply to the American proposal, but the reply will be such that no further negotiations will take place.

34. Q. And how do you interpret by the clause, "negotiations will be de facto ruptured"?

A. I suppose it, translated—the negotiations will in fact be ruptured. Either that or that they are temporarily—probably in fact ruptured, or temporarily ruptured.

35. Q. I show you Document 19 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 857, and ask you if you identify it as such?

A. Yes, I identify it as such.

[701] 36. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

29 November 1941.

#857.

Re my #844.*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 nov. 1941 (S-11)

37. Q. Had you seen or had you been made acquainted with the contents of this document No. 19 prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I was aware that they were told to make another attempt.

[702] 38. Q. Can you recall whether or not you communicated this dispatch or the subject matter of its contents to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No. I would not be the one to communicate the contents.

39. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 21 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington. No. 865, and ask you if you identify it as such?

A. I identify it as such.

40. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

1 December 1941.

865.

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.

**JD-1: 6710.

***Not available.

41. Q. Admiral, I ask you if you had seen or been made acquainted with the contents of this dispatch you have just read prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not remember; I probably was.

[703] 42. Q. I show you Document No. 22 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30, 1941, and ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

43. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

November 30, 1941.

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United

ARMY 6944 25554 Page 1.

[704] States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days has it become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

44. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember. I probably was.

45. Q. I show you a document No. 38 from Exhibit 63 which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 901, and ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

46. Q. I ask you to read the document?

SECRET

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#901.

Re my #844*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts

* See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

[705] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

47. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document prior to 7 December 1941, or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I knew on the morning of the 7th that such a message had been received.

48. Q. Did you have any discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations about the subject matter of this dispatch prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I believe, as I related in my previous testimony, somewhere around 9:30 we discussed the question that this note was to be delivered that day to the State Department. Whether we discussed the actual contents of the message, I do not remember.

49. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 39 from Exhibit 63 which purports to a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington under date of 6 December 1941, numbered 902. I ask you if you recognize this document as such?

A. I recognize the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington.

50. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902 (Part 1 of 14.)

Separate telegram.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that [706] the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET

From: Tokyo

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902. (Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish-

ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they [707] enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an [708] equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902. (Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and [709] in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902. (Part 6 of 14.)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principal of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[710] From Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 4, 1941.

902. (Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

[711] The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-14 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 10 of 14.)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great [712] Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country ----- (45 letters garbled or missing) ----- been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -----es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#902. (Part 11 of 14.)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality in treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six coun-

tries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n---- (50 letters missed) ---sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#902. (Part 12 of 14.)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The [713] attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#902. (Part 13 of 14.)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD: 1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as".

**Probably "China, can but".

[714] From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

7 December 1941.

#902. (Part 14 of 14.)

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase, "VERY IMPORTANT".)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-

ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

51. Q. Admiral, adverting to Document 39 which you have just read: I ask you to note particularly for the record that the date upon which the first 13 points of this dispatch were translated in the Navy Department?

A. All 13 parts were translated on December 6, 1941. The hour is not shown. Part 14 was translated on the 7th of December, 1941, according to the photostatic copy.

52. Q. Is the hour of the translation shown?

A. The hour of translation is not shown.

53. Q. I ask you, adverting to these first 13 points of Document No. 3 of Exhibit 63, whether or not you had been made acquainted with the contents of these first 13 points on 6 December 1941?

A. I was not acquainted with the contents on the 6th of December, 1941.

54. Q. When did you first become acquainted with the substance of these first 13 points of this Document 39?

A. I don't remember when I read, or if I read the message in its entirety. I knew on the morning of December [715] 7th that a sharply worded note or reply to the State Department's note of November 26th was in the Department and was scheduled for delivery, or that the Japanese Ambassadors had been requested by the Japanese Government to deliver it at 1:00 o'clock that afternoon.

55. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with the subject matter contained in Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63?

A. I do not remember, but the earliest that I could have possibly been informed of it was between somewhere around 9:00 or 9:30 on the morning of 7 December.

56. Q. Did you become acquainted with all 14 parts at or about the same time, or the subject matter of all 14 parts at or about the same time?

A. I cannot say. I cannot recollect but to the best of my recollection I did not read the note in its entirety that day. The extent of my knowledge was that the sharply worded note had been received, which was due for presentation to the State Department that day.

57. Q. In connection with this sharply worded note of which you speak, did you interpret this note as being connected with any other exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries, the United States and Japan?

A. I naturally assumed that it was a continuation of the previous series of notes which had been exchanged during the course of the conversations which had extended over a period of a month or so.

58. Q. That being the case, this sharply worded note would be in reply to what United States note?

A. The last United States note, I believe, of any importance, was dated November 26th.

59. Q. I show you Document 41 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907. Do you identify this document as such?

A. I identify it as a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907.

60. Q. Will you read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 7, 1941
 #907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., [716] on the 7th, your time.

JD-1: 7143

42—text of Japanese reply.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

61. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with this document or the contents thereof?

A. I received information which was probably based on this document that the Japanese were going to present their reply to the State Department at 1:00 o'clock December 7th, at about 9:30 December 7th.

62. Q. Where were you at the time you were apprised of the contents as you have just testified?

A. I was somewhere around the CNO's office. I believe that I saw Commander Kramer and he told me verbally that such instructions were in.

63. Q. Did you communicate this information to the Chief of Naval Operations at about 0930 on 7 December 1941, or at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Whether I personally conveyed it, I do not know. I met or was in Admiral Stark's outer office, I believe, when he came in, and I may have told him the message was there or the officer who ordinarily delivered them, Commander Kramer, may have been there with the message itself. However, I believe at about that time he received the information contained in that message.

64. Q. I show you Document No. 46 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu numbered 123. Do you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, 123.

65. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 2, 1941.
 J-19.
 #123. (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets.

[717] NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 27065 8007 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the circumstances of the receipt of Document No. 46 which you have just read, by the Navy?

A. None except that appearing in the note, "This message was re-

ceived here on December 23rd", and that it was translated on December 30, 1941.

The court then, at 3:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

67. Q. Admiral, when you were before the court previously you testified, as shown on page 217, Question 144: "Did you consider at that time that this note of 26 November was an ultimatum to Japan? Answer: To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note were such that there was no hope in anybody's mind—at least nobody with whom I discussed the question in the Navy Department—that the Japanese would or could under the circumstances agree to the terms of the note." Since that time, Admiral, there has been considerable discussion about this note, and on occasions it has been referred to both by counsel and by the court and by witnesses before the court as an ultimatum. I hand you a volume entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", of which this court has taken judicial notice. I ask you to notice particularly Document 257, which is the note of November 26 handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura, and also document 258, which is the oral statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador at the same time.

The witness looked at the volume referred to.

68. Q. Have you finished, Admiral?

A. Yes.

[718] 69. Q. Having had a chance to look at these two documents again, isn't it true that the tone of the oral statement and of the note handed the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State is not threatening in any respect and that it is not to be considered an ultimatum?

A. Well, since the term "ultimatum" is apparently connected in popular mind with a threat of action if terms are not accepted, this may be an unfortunate choice of words. Taking into account the background information which has been now introduced in evidence in the form of these messages that the Japanese Ambassadors had to end the conversations on the 29th, as far as I can remember, the general impression of the Navy Department was that the terms of the notes would prove unacceptable to the Japanese, and that there probably would be a discontinuance of the conversations, although the note and the oral statement of the Secretary still left the gate open in case the Japanese desired to surrender some of the principles for which they had stood.

70. Q. Admiral, is it correct to say that when this note was presented the State Department may have considered that negotiations had about ceased but that, nevertheless, this note which they presented on the 26th was not to be considered an ultimatum in the sense that that term is popularly used?

A. As the term is popularly used, as implying a threat, it is not an ultimatum. I believe "ultimatum" actually means an end to negotiations rather than any implied threat that there will be force used as a result of such end.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

71. Q. That note, however, in Section 2, paragraph 3, proposed that the Government of Japan would withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and Indo-China?

A. That is correct.

72. Q. It was not anticipated in the Navy Department or anywhere else by high authorities that that provision would be acceptable to Japan, was it?

A. Not so far as I know, no.

73. Q. Paragraph 4 of Section 2 provided: "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking." That was the Chiang Kai-Shek government?

A. That is correct.

[719] 74. Q. It was not anticipated that that situation would be acceptable to Japan?

A. Not so far as I know in the Navy Department. However, the note speaks for itself.

75. Q. Document 46 of Exhibit 63 was the last numbered message which you read at the suggestion of the judge advocate, being a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu. I now ask you whether you can identify Document 40.

A. Document 40 is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo dated November 18, 1941, and translated on December 6, 1941.

76. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.^d

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance

^a Available in MC code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

[720] 77. Q. That would indicate that it was translated on the 6th of December?

A. That is correct.

78. Q. Were you aware of the translation of that message on the 6th of December?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I was not. I do not remember having seen the message prior to December 7.

79. Q. I now call your attention to Document 37 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether you can identify it?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 18, 1941, and translated on December 5, 1941.

80. Q. Will you read it?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (8)

* Probably means Mamala Bay.

81. Q. That indicates that it was translated on the 5th of December?

A. Yes.

82. Q. Were you aware of the receipt of the information in the Navy Department on or about December 5?

A. No, I do not remember having seen that information. I might have received information that the Japanese Consul was asking about the location of United States ships. Since it was not a direct question of State Department information but more or less military, or State-Navy information, I may not have.

83. Q. I now ask whether you can identify Document 36 of Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941. Date of translation: 12/5/41.

[721] 84. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19).

#122

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7066 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

85. Q. That was translated on 12/5/41, which, I assume, means the 5th of December?

A. Correct.

86. Q. Since that is not a direct message concerning the State Department, I presume that you did not have specific information of it at the time it was received?

A. That is correct.

87. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 24 in Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 15 November 1941, translated on December 3, 1941.

88. Q. Will you read it, please?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu (Riyoji).

15 November 1941.

(J19).

#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6994 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

89. Q. Were you aware of that?

A. No, sir, I was not aware of it, to the best of my knowledge.

90. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 10 of Exhibit 63?

A. This is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 16, 1941, and translated November 17, 1941.

91. Q. Will you read that document, Admiral?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

[722] From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 16, 1941.

#—

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,^a and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

^a For Part 1, see S.I.S. 24877. For Part 2, see S.I.S. 24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24375 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

JD-1: 6553 ARMY 24878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

92. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 13 of Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 19, 1941, and translated on November 26, 1941.

[723] 93. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "Nishi".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

94. Q. Did you have knowledge of that at or about the time of its translation?

A. I had general knowledge that such a message had been received in the department. I am extremely hazy on whether the voice broadcast mentioned in the message was received and if there was an agreed-upon translation of the broadcast or when the broadcast was received, if it was.

95. Q. Do you now have any memory of whether the broadcast message referred to was received in the Document you just read, Document 13 of Exhibit 63.

A. Nothing but hearsay knowledge. I understand a broadcast was intercepted.

96. Q. Do you remember now whether you knew of it prior to December 7?

A. To the best of my recollection, a broadcast was received, but there was a lack of agreement among the intelligence people concerned as to whether that broadcast was the one described in the message; either that or that there was a lack of agreement among the Japanese intelligence people as to the translation of the Japanese phrase contained in the broadcast.

[724] 97. Q. Do you recall when that was?

A. I don't remember.

98. Q. I now show you Document 26 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether you can identify it?

A. The message is from Tokyo to Hsingking, dated 1 December 1941, translated on December 4.

99. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsingking.

1 December 1941.

#893.

----- In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ----- in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as

having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

[725] 100. Q. That indicates it was translated on the 4th of December?

A. That is correct.

101. Q. Were you aware of the information in that message on or about the date of its translation?

A. I do not remember the message specifically, but I probably was aware of it.

102. Q. Do you remember the information in it?

A. No, I don't recall of having had previous knowledge of the information.

103. Q. I ask if you can identify Document 42 in Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Budapest to Tokyo, dated December 7, 1941, and translated on December 7, 1941.

104. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

IA.

104.

Re my #103.*

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

105. Q. That was translated on the 7th of December?

A. Yes.

106. Q. Did you see this message, Admiral?

A. I do not remember having seen that message until considerably after December 7.

107. Q. How would the American minister on the 6th of December know about war breaking out?

A. I have no idea how he would know that war was going to break out on the 7th. If I were evaluating the report, I would evaluate it as a guess by the man reporting. I haven't the faintest idea how he would get such information.

[726] 108. Q. You don't know of any direct dispatch from the American Minister to Washington?

A. No, sir.

109. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether you can identify that?

A. It is a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations with the information addressees: Commandant, 16th Naval District; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant, 14th Naval District, dated 28 November 1941.

110. Q. I ask you to read it.

A. (Reading:)

From: CINCAF.

Date: 28 November 1941.

Decoded by P R WHITE.

(Addresses for action:) OPNAV.

(Addresses for information:) COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN.

(Date time group:) 281430. (Deferred precedence.)

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X higashi higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX American higashi no kaze kumori XX England X nishi no kaze hare X unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

111. Q. I show you Document 3 or Exhibit 64 and ask you whether you can identify it.

A. It is a message from the Naval Attaché at Batavia to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 5 December 1941.

112. Q. Will you read it?

A. (Reading:)

From: Alusna Batavia.

Date: 5 Dec 1941.

Decoded by KALAJIDJIAN.

Paraphrased by PURDY.

[727] (Addresses for action:) OPNAV.

(Priority:) RRRRR.

(Date time group:) CR0222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States: North wind cloudy Russia: West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[728] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. Admiral, you stated that Commander Kramer was the liaison officer between ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations; is that correct?

A. For this certain type of material; he delivered it as a special precaution.

114. Q. Was there anyone else in the Department of Naval Intelligence who had similar information as to time and place of delivery of such messages?

A. Not that I know of. Possibly Captain McCollum but I believe, in my opinion, he would not have the exact facts.

115. Q. Admiral Wilkinson was the Chief of ONI at that time; is that right?

A. That is correct, sir.

116. Q. Is there any official record kept in Naval Intelligence as to time of receipt and time of delivery of such messages as these to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I have been unable to locate any such record.

117. Q. You don't know whether one exists or not, though, do you?

A. No, sir. I have had a search made for such a record and can located none.

118. Q. In that message, your No. 11, which contains the phrase, "Things are going to happen automatically", did you give any special significance to this phrase, or did you hear it discussed?

A. As I remember it, there were discussions as to what in the world this phrase meant as to what things were going to happen automatically. It is difficult to reconstruct now but at that time, as I remember, the general thought of people whom I came in contact with was that if the Japanese moved they would move into Indo-China, Malaya, and perhaps the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines.

119. Q. These messages to which the judge advocate referred, regarding some of which he asked you if you knew or had any knowledge or whether or not Admiral Stark had any knowledge of the specific question, in some instances you said you did not know; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

[729] 120. Q. In other exhibits, he did not ask you that specific question. Now, taking all of these messages which were received from November 26 to December 7, at any time during that period did you discuss any message or any of this situation viz-a-viz Japan with Admiral Stark?

A. Yes, sir. I did discuss the situation but when it came down to pointing out certain messages, you ask if I made a particular point of discussing that particular message with the Admiral and I just don't remember.

121. Q. Well, in your discussions with Admiral Stark these messages evidently were the basis of the discussion weren't they?

A. The basis of discussion were the contents of these messages, plus what information we were getting from the State Department as to what was going on here. As you will note, the substance of many of these messages we might have already received before we got the message.

122. Q. But as a general rule, the contents of a great many of these messages were the subject of discussion; is that your answer?

A. Yes.

123. Q. On the morning of 7 December when you entered the office of the Chief of Naval Operations—and as the court remembers the testimony you entered that office about 9:30; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

124. Q. (Continuing.) —was Admiral Stark there at that time?

A. I believe I waited for Admiral Stark; waited for him to come down. I may have gone down to Communications to see if anything had come in during that time.

125. Q. He did, or you did?

A. I did.

126. Q. And what time did he arrive, to the best of your recollection?

A. To my best knowledge, about 9:30.

127. Q. When you arrived at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had you been informed as to the contents of the message which outlined the reply of the Japanese to be delivered at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th of December?

A. No, sir. When you say "the contents", I did not read the message.

128. Q. That is why I said "contents".

A. Yes. I did know, or was verbally informed, that this message was in and that it was a very sharp note.

[730] 129. Q. And were you informed that this message was a reply to the message of 26 November?

A. I believe so; yes, sir.

130. Q. And did you so inform Admiral Stark when he came in that that was the information you had?

A. Yes, sir.

131. Q. So Admiral Stark, when he came in and you met him, was informed as to the general situation up to that moment?

A. He was informed of that general situation. I think shortly afterwards—speaking again from memory—that Commander Kramer—when I say "shortly", it may have been half an hour or 45 minutes—delivered to him what they call "the book", which was a book of messages received from this source the previous night.

132. Q. In other words, a complete file of what had happened since he had seen the book; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

133. Q. Was that book of files or messages which Kramer brought in, prior to his telephonic communication with General Marshall?

A. I'm not certain whether it was, or not, but I think when he telephoned General Marshall, or General Marshall telephoned him, that Admiral Stark knew that a sharp reply was being delivered to our note of November 26th, and that it was timed for delivery—that the Japanese had instructions to request the Secretary of State to deliver the note at 1:00 o'clock.

134. Q. Was this message received on 6-7 December in reply to the message of 26 November, received by the Army simultaneously with its receipt by the Navy?

A. I am unable to say about that.

135. Q. In other words, what I am trying to ask is, did the Army have the same information that you had on the morning of 7 December?

A. I'm positive that it did.

136. Q. In these messages which have been introduced by the interested party, linked with the messages which were previously presented by the judge advocate, and having all of that information contained therein in your mind, did you feel that on 6-7 December the Japanese were going to attack this country without declaration of war?

A. No, I did not. I described the general feeling that everybody recognized that there was a very tense situation; that diplomatic relations were in danger of being severed, but that a severance of diplo-

matic relations did not necessarily mean that war was going to result. I cannot speak for anybody else but my own opinion, I must admit, was that Japan would go her own way in East Asia and would put up to the United States the onus of using force to oppose her, and in the light of subsequent events, maybe a [731] concentration on that idea—

137. Q. None of the information received in these messages changed that opinion with you; is that correct?

A. Well, certain of the military messages weren't received; also, some of them came in very late, those received on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th. I had never seen the so-called war warning before it was sent out but I did know or was told that one had been sent out. Those things, coupled with the message that General Marshall was going to get off—which unfortunately never arrived until too late—seemed to be about everything that could be done.

138. Q. Well, your estimate as of the morning of the 7th: did that change your viewpoint which you had had prior to that time, the information that you had, say, up to 10:00 o'clock on the morning of the 7th of December?

A. Not necessarily that Japan was going to attack the United States in the immediate future.

139. Q. In your opinion, were there continual negotiations and conversations going on between November 27th and December 7th as evidenced by these reports and these messages?

A. Well, having the background information that is revealed in the messages on the 27th of November, wherein they said the relations were de facto, or ruptured, plus my belief that the note that we dispatched on the 26th would be totally unacceptable, I thought that the small conversations that would continue to go on were just for the purpose of the record, just to keep the subject boiling rather than with any hope of getting anywhere.

140. Q. But in your opinion there were important messages sent back and forth between Tokio and this country between 27 November and 7 December; is that correct?

A. I don't recollect off-hand but I don't recall any what I would term important. All the messages were important but there were no important changes in the negotiations. They had received our note on the 26th and we were awaiting a reply.

141. Q. You include in your statement the messages received on 6-7 December?

A. The message received, naturally, on 6-7 December was a very important message.

142. Q. In your numerous conferences as you have stated, with the State Department officials, did you bring back to the Navy Department or to the Chief of Naval Operations, or messages which would be relayed to him, the thought of the State Department or any considerations which you thought were important for the Chief of Naval Operations to have?

A. Yes, sir.

[732] 143. Q. And during this period from 27 November to 7 December, that was daily conveyed to him; is that correct?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, sir.

144. Q. Have you any idea as to what the State Department thought as to the possible attack without declaration of war? Was that ever expressed?

A. None other than the conversation with Mr. Hull which I have previously related in which he said these people might bite anyone but I didn't at that time take it to mean that he was talking about striking without declaration of war, although that is susceptible to that interpretation.

Recross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

145. Q. In forming the estimate that you did no the morning of 7 December as to the probability of what Japan would do, you did not have available to you the information contained in the messages read this afternoon relative to the inquiries from Tokyo to Honolulu concerning the United States warships at Pearl Harbor, and the answer of the Japanese consul to Tokyo in response to those messages, did you?

A. No, sir. If I did, I didn't evaluate it.

146. Q. I understood that you didn't see those messages if they came in?

A. I don't believe I saw them, no.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

147. Adverting to Exhibit 63 and the documents which you read to the court therefrom, and particularly adverting to those documents which treated of subject matter relating to negotiations between the Japanese and the United States which these dispatches indicate the Navy Department had: Can you recall whether or not in your capacity as liaison officer between the State Department and the Navy Department you conveyed this information as a matter of general principle or rule to the State Department? In other words, did you keep the State Department informed of what the Navy Department had in the way of information relating to the negotiations between the Japanese and the United States?

A. The same book that was delivered to Admiral Stark, or certainly the messages bearing on diplomatic relations, were always delivered to the Secretary of State.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve; Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits); Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy. Pages 734-762, inclusive.

[734] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communications.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7 December 1941?

A. I was the Senior Watch Officer of the watch maintained in OPNav 20GW; the primary duty of this was the decrypting of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.

3. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court. Exhibit 63 contains some forty or fifty documents. Will you tell the court if you have recently examined the documents contained in this exhibit?

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not in detail; but still I have looked at them in a general way.

4. Q. Are you, in a general way, acquainted with the information that is contained in these documents?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

5. Q. In the performance of your duties between October 1 and 7 December 1941, were you at that time acquainted in a general way with the dates and times in these documents, when they received in the Navy Department?

A. I am acquainted with the dates and times by merely the raw material. It wasn't part of my duties to inspect the finished product. They were available at the time, but normally I didn't have time to see them. I was interested particularly in the ones that applied to the cryptographic system and I did see those. I am familiar with the time that the raw material came in before processing it, the time it was received from our various points throughout the world.

6. Q. You mean by processing exactly what?

A. Decrypting, the various processes that we had to go through in order to make the information available.

7. Q. Adverting to the document, that is, Exhibit 63, with which you say you are in a general way familiar, will you tell the court what the set-up was in your division as regards the translation of these documents?

A. I think possibly in order to give the story on that I should go back to the interception of traffic, because it is all more or less linked from that point on. The Army maintained a series of interception stations. The Navy had the same. The Army intercepts were cleared through the War Department, and the Navy intercepts were cleared through the Navy Department. The division was made on the basis of [735] cryptographic dates. It was necessary to do some checking for that. The Army was responsible for the even dates. The Navy was responsible for the odd dates. The cryptographic date was merely the date it was intercepted: the filing time in the dispatch was something that had to be established. Each service would then translate its own traffic. That is, the Navy would translate the traffic of odd cryptographic dates, and the Army would do the same thing with the even dates, so translation was based—was divided—upon the cryptographic date of the material.

8. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 63, I ask you if there is not noted on the bottom of these documents the date on which translation is purported to have taken place?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not the dates so inscribed on these documents is the actual day of the month that it was translated, or does this date also relate to the cryptographic date—was that the word you used?

A. No. My understanding of all those documents—which weren't prepared in my section—has always been that the date is the actual date of translation. The date appearing at the top is the cryptographic date.

10. Q. Have you recently examined any memoranda, logs, or records prepared at the time of the receipt of these documents, which show the dates and times these documents were received in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not all of the documents in detail. I have on certain ones.

11. Q. I show you a document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court, and which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington containing some fourteen parts. Will you state whether you saw this document prior to 7 December 1941, and if so, under what circumstances?

A. I saw some of the parts; I did see all of the raw material. I was present while the finished product was being made up, and I can't say in detail that I have seen all fourteen parts, but I was present while they were being processed, and I was present while they were being written up in the smooth form.

12. Q. Can you state from your examination of these official documents or records, what was the chronological order of arrival in the Navy Department of the documents that composed document 39 of Exhibit 63, to which you have just adverted?

A. I'd like to make one correction to my answer to the previous question. I did not see part fourteen. I think [736] we should consider this 902, from this point on, as possibly two separate dispatches. I did not see part fourteen; that came in after I left. Now, I have the parts grouped in the order that they were received from the interceptor station at Bainbridge Island, Washington. They came into Washington, D. C., by teletype. Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 arrived here at 1649 GCT on December 6, Greenwich time. That is the time shown on the dispatches; and incidentally, part two was from Cheltenham, Maryland, and sent in, and I did not know which actual part was used. Nine and 10 were received sometime after 1649 and sometime before 1951, both GCT—I can't establish the exact time on December 6. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1951 GCT on December 6. Now, part 14 came in sometime in the morning of December 7. The time that it was intercepted at Station S was 0305 on the 7th, GCT. That would place it about five minutes after 3:00 in the morning of the 7th, Washington time. Now that material was sent in by teletype and with the punched tape, so there was some time taken at the other end to punch the tape so that 60 words could be sent and reduce the cost of line charges; and there may be twenty or thirty minutes required to do that. My reason for saying that it arrived before 7:00 o'clock, the work sheet for this particular document, part 14, shows that it was processed by an operator that went off watch at 7:00 o'clock. That was the time we changed watches, and the work sheet bears his initials, so it was received before 7:00 o'clock.

13. Q. You say part 14 was processed prior to 0700, Washington time, on 7 December 1941. Will you state in detail what you mean by this part 14 being processed?

A. Well, yes, this part fourteen did not require translation; these dispatches were in English. However, there were certain symbols that were used for punctuation, and the dispatches required writing up in smooth form before being passed on. That was done with the first thirteen parts. I don't know whether it was done at the time

with the fourteenth part. I wasn't here at that particular time. I wasn't on watch at that particular time.

14. Q. In cases before you have mentioned GCT. Will you convert it into Washington time for the purpose of clarifying the record.

A. Assuming that Washington was on plus-5, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be 1149 Washington time. This will be on the 24-hour basis. I won't indicate a. m. 1149 on December 6. Parts 9 and 10 were received after 1149, Washington time, and before 1451, Washington time. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1451, Washington time.

15. Q. You have stated that part fourteen was received in [737] The Navy Department at or around 0305, Washington time, on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. Sometime after that and before 0700.

16. Q. Do the records show what happened to this part fourteen after its arrival in the Navy Department? I mean, as to the time that it was processed, for example.

A. Yes, the logs will show and the work sheets will show the initials of the operator that processed it.

17. Q. This message was not translated, you say?

A. No, sir, it didn't require translation.

18. Q. What service processed the document, that is, part fourteen, the Army or the Navy?

A. I can't answer that. I really don't know. The Army had a translator on duty that night, apparently by a pre-arrangement with the Navy, and anything that arrived during the night of the 7th—was to be sent over to the Army. Now, I don't know whether part fourteen was sent over to the Army.

19. Q. Can you state whether part fourteen was completely processed and ready for delivery in your section on the morning of 7 December, and if so, at what hour?

A. Our part of the processing was completed before 0700. I don't know when the smooth translation was made up. I have talked to the watch officer at that time, and he informs me—and he is in Washington at the present time—that the material was all handed to Commander Kramer between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning. That is the part fourteen. We haven't covered the first thirteen parts, which were in Commander Kramer's hands at between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock, p. m., on the previous evening, of the 6th, Washington time.

20. Q. You don't know of your own knowledge what happened to these processed documents after they came into the possession of Commander Kramer?

A. Commander Kramer had been pressing us for the documents all afternoon. He was there while they were being processed and as soon as the last one was finished he put them in a brief case and left the Navy Department.

21. Q. You don't know, of your own knowledge, where he went to deliver these processed documents?

A. No, sir, I do not,

22. Q. I show you document No. 41 from Exhibit 63, and ask you to examine it. Can you state what time this document arrived in the Navy Department in its original form?

A. It arrived, as far as I am able to reconstruct the situation, at the same time that part fourteen arrived—in the same teletype transmission. It was their custom to send in batches of messages; sometimes it would be a single one, sometimes it might be five or six. The number assigned to [738] this—station serial number of Station S, assigned to this part—is No. 381. The number assigned to part 14 was No. 380, and from examining the copies of the original teletype, I am fairly certain that they both were in the same transmission, in arriving here in Washington.

23. Q. Can you state whether the records show the time that document 41 was finally processed in the Navy Department or the War Department, as it might have been done?

A. That, too, was processed before 0700. It was processed by the same man that processed part fourteen, and as I recall seeing the work sheet now in possession of the Army sometime ago, it had a priority sticker attached to it, and was sent over to the Army. I have since talked to Lieutenant Commander Perring. When he relieved the watch at 0700 on the morning of the 7th, the watch officer told him that the Army had some material over there and he went over and picked it up. They were in the Munitions Building at that time.

24. Q. Is this officer a Lieutenant Perring?

A. Lieutenant Commander Perring.

25. Q. Is he on duty in Washington now?

A. He is on duty in Washington, yes, sir.

26. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether a document, 41, was processed and ready for distribution at 0700 on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir, according to the records. I wasn't there.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

27. Q. On Saturday night, were you on duty?

A. I was on duty from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th.

28. Q. How many copies did Lieutenant Commander Kramer take with him when he left on the errand of distribution?

A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I don't even know the number that was customary to make up. That was a different section. I am not familiar with the number that he normally made up.

29. Q. And you didn't supervise the preparation of the copies?

A. Oh, incidentally, we had some help from the Army, some typists, and to rush up the material back and forth, I knew it was being typed up, but that is all I know.

30. Q. I call your attention to document 38, of Exhibit [739] 63, which was read in evidence yesterday. Can you tell when that document was ready for delivery, in the form in which it there appears?

A. No, sir; I haven't been able to obtain the work sheet on that. I can tell about when it came in, but I can't give the whole story on that particular dispatch. The work sheet is in the custody of the Army. I think I may be able to place it with respect to some of the others, however—say, with part fourteen. That was intercepted at Station S at 0720 on the morning of the 6th.

31. Q. Is that Greenwich time or—

A. That is Washington time.

32. Q. But you can't reconstruct when it was processed here?

A. No, sir; without the work sheet. As a matter of fact, I don't know whether we processed the document, or the Army did.

33. Q. Now will you look at document 13.

A. I don't have any particular information on that one; I haven't covered this period at all.

34. Q. Do you know whether the execution of that document was received, and when?

A. I did not see the execution of that document. At the time apparently it just by-passed me, and an effort was made to keep those things as quiet as possible. It is quite possible that it came in and I didn't see it. I didn't have it at the time. I might say, however, that our watch was looking for the expressions in the news broadcast. It didn't come in while I was on watch.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

35. Q. In order to clear up this dispatch, 39, does the court understand that the thirteen parts were received in English?

A. Yes, sir.

36. Q. And you received those at 2:51 p. m., Washington time, on 6 December.

A. Yes, sir; we had all thirteen parts in by 1451 on 6 December.

37. Q. And all in English?

A. Oh, no; I am afraid I am giving the wrong impression. There was English under encipherment, and they enciphered what they required. That was English, rather, and the Japanese under the encipherment—so it took considerable time to process them.

[740] 38. Q. When were the thirteen parts in English readable and ready for somebody to see?

A. I would say that processing was completed sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 and that the finished documents were ready between 8:00 and 10:00 p. m., Washington time, on the night of the 6th. They were in Commander Kramer's hands at that time. Commander Kramer was there during the whole time the information was in the process of being processed. He was there when I came on watch, and I imagine he stayed all day, although I don't know. He was there right up until 9:00 o'clock, supervising the preparation of the documents.

39. Q. And the part 14 was processed and ready by 7:00 o'clock Washington time on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir. To clear that, It had been deciphered and was reduced to English in the copies—that is, in the work sheet form. I have no knowledge of the smooth copy as you see it here, or whether it was made at that time.

40. Q. Now this No. 38, which gives information as to when this note is going to come through; that was received and processed and ready on the morning of 6 December?

A. Yes, sir. As I say, the Army has the work sheet. I haven't seen it, but in all likelihood it was processed, because we had whatever cryptographic information we needed to do the work, and the Army had it similarly; and I am fairly certain that it was.

41. Q. The only thing we are trying to get straight is that on the morning of the 6th you got notification here of that on the 6th—our 6th, this note would come through, a final answer to the note of November 26?

A. I didn't have that information myself.

42. Q. It is a matter of record?

A. It is a matter of record. Yes, sir; that is an Army translation. The Army apparently processed that; they translated it. I don't know when the information was made available to us.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement:

I would just like to ask that anything I said be given the same handling, as far as security is concerned, as the original document.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[747] The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I identify it as a file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission at the request of the judge advocate of this court. It is certified over the signature of the Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official seal, assembled on August 18, 1944.

The file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission, on August 18, 1944, certified over the signature of the Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 65," for reference, description appended.

2. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's

monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather [742] messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

(Signed) T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

SECRET

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUP REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF
BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

SECRET

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE
WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GM, December 4, 1941.

[743]

SECRET

"Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN

CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM
SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

SECRET

*"Document No. 4**English*

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Romaji

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI
KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI-
AGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU
NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE
MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness; the witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

[744] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Captain, please state your name, rank, and present station?

A. L. F. Safford, Captain, United States Navy, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the second half of the calendar year 1941?

A. I was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications. The Communications Security Section included security proper, that is, codes and ciphers, and surveillance over their use. That also included Communications Intelligence. The name was used in peace-time purely to mask the major mission of the section, which is collecting information from enemy or prospective enemy nations through their communications, and most of our effort was concentrated on Japan at that time. I was in charge of the intercept stations, direction finder exchanges, and decrypting units.

3. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this examination. Can you identify that document?

A. I can identify it.

4. Q. Captain, what is the tenor of this message that you have before you?

A. That the Japanese government would announce to their diplomatic officials overseas a prospective break in diplomatic relations or war against the United States, against England, including the Netherlands East Indies, and against Russia, by means of false weather reports broadcast in the middle and at the end of their daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts.

5. Q. On what date was this information translated and available in the Navy Department?

A. November 28, 1941.

6. Q. Was any other confirmation of the establishment of that code by the Japanese received in the Navy Department?

A. We received confirmation a few hours later from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station who had received it from the British at Singapore. We received double confirmation about the 4th of December from the Dutch at Batavia. They gave the information to Consul General Foote, who sent it to the State Department. They also gave it to Colonel Thorpe, the senior military observer, who passed it on to the War Department via the Navy Department and the naval observer in Batavia.

[745] 7. Q. Sir, I hand you Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64 before this examination. Are these the confirmations about which you have just testified?

A. They are two of them. The message from Mr. Foote is not here.

8. Q. Is the first of those from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet?

A. The first is from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. And the second is from Colonel Thorpe, originated from Batavia.

9. Q. Captain, I invite your attention to the fact that in the message which was intercepted here, that is, Document 15 of Exhibit 63, and in the message from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Document 2, Exhibit 64, there is a discrepancy in the code words which would indicate a break with the United States. Can you explain that difference between the two codes? I specifically refer to the point that in the intercept from Tokio received in Washington, a United States-Japanese break would be indicated by "Higashi No Kazeame". In the version received via CinCAF, this same meaning would be expressed by "Higashi No Kaze Kumori". Is there any significance to this difference in the last word of the code message?

A. There is no significance; only an indication of an error in coding. The coding officer left out a whole line with reference to Russia. The first part ties it together where it says "Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England", and in the second part where it describes the Japanese language in the Morse code broadcast, there is no reference to Russia at all except the last word, which is "Kumori".

10. Q. In other words, Captain, the point of my last question is this: There were only three sentences that were being looked out for; that this apparent discrepancy in the CinCAF dispatch was understood here

and that was not a separate sentence that was being looked for at that time?

A. That is correct. It was only a mistake and the Dutch version clarified it in case there had been any question in our minds.

The court then, at 10:45 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel; except the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[746] Examination by the judge advocate (continued):

12. Q. After the receipt of these three dispatches about which you have testified, what steps were taken by the Communications Intelligence Unit in Washington to monitor Japanese broadcasts to intercept any possible use of this code?

A. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor the Japanese stations for the prospective winds message. We sent teletype instructions to our intercept stations at Bainbridge Island, Washington, Winter Harbor, Maine, and other East Coast points, to guard for this message and send it in. Bainbridge Island was ordered to send in all plain language intercepts by teletype. We also sent a radio message to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts giving them the latest information we had on Tokio's broadcast schedules.

13. Q. In other words, Captain, were the C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and at Cavite also monitoring for this broadcast?

A. They were also monitoring. They were listening for the voice broadcasts. Our stations in the continental United States were listening for the Morse broadcasts. At the time Bainbridge Island was guarding the Trans-Pacific telephone circuit both ways and that tied up both recording sets and they could not listen for the voice broadcasts.

14. Q. When was the first information received in the Communications Intelligence Section here in Washington of the Japanese using this code?

A. My first information was in the morning of Thursday, December 4, at 8:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Murray, I believe—possibly Lieutenant Commander Kramer—came in with a yellow teletype sheet in his hand and he said, "Here it is", and he held it up. This was typed in Japanese language, and had the significant words of the winds underscored, and below was a translation in pencil, and the translation said "War with America; War with England; and peace with Russia", to the best of my recollection after almost three years. I have never seen a copy of this translation since about the 15th of December, 1941.

15. Q. What intercept station had received this information that you saw that morning?

A. I believe it came from one of the East Coast stations, but we cannot run that down because all the messages from all these East

Coast stations have been destroyed. Bainbridge Island files were intact for this period and Bainbridge Island is eliminated.

[747] 16. Q. Were there any confirmations of the interception of this type of message from any other sources, either Navy, Army, or other Federal agencies?

A. No. I have a vague recollection of a second winds message but was unable to find any trace of it up until the time that I testified before Admiral Hart's investigation. Since then I received word that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted a winds message at Portland, Oregon. I saw the message itself for the first time this morning and I do not recognize it.

17. Q. Captain, I hand you Exhibit 65 before this examination, which are copies certified under seal of the Federal Communications Commission of the intercept of the Winds message which they conveyed to the Navy Department. Were you familiar with this prior to December 7, 1941?

A. If I was I have completely forgotten it. The F. C. C. had the telephone number of the G. W. watch officer and it is possible that one of my subordinates made arrangements with Colonel Guest at the time the F. C. C. were requested to monitor this message. I do not recall any of the documents which I see here in Exhibit 65.

18. Q. Concerning the messages as conveyed by F. C. C. as shown by this certified copy, Exhibit 65: What meaning as regards a break in diplomatic relations between any one of the three nations concerned is shown there?

A. Document No. 2 on December 4, 1941, would indicate a break with Russia. Document No. 3 on December 5, 1941, would also indicate a break with Russia. Document No. 4 on the early morning of December 8—that is about 10 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor—would indicate a break with England.

19. Q. Is it shown anywhere in these messages received from F. C. C. that a break of relations between the United States and Japan was anticipated?

A. Not in these F. C. C. documents.

20. Q. Adverting back several questions to your answer that you saw on the morning of December 4th an intercept of the use of the winds code which clearly indicated a break in relations between the United States and Japan, Great Britain and Japan, and no break with Russia. Are copies of these intercepts now on file in the unit of which you were the head?

A. They are not on file. Repeated search has been made since middle of November, 1943, and no trace of them could be found. The Army have been requested to furnish copies and repeated search by the S. I. S. has also failed to reveal a single copy.

21. Q. Do you have any explanation for their absence or do you have any information as to where they might be since they are not in files of the C. I. Unit?

A. I made many discreet inquiries. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood states that he knows their disposition but [748] did not care to tell me. I also know what happened to the Army copies, through very second-hand and devious sources.

22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of

4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of the code originally which would indicate that a use of that code would indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations?

A. The Dutch translation said "war". The Japanese language is very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpretations or translations on the same message. In very important documents it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent translations and the differences were sometimes surprising; that is, a difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war plans.

23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which is an English language translation of the Dutch intercept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this code would indicate "a war decision" which is the wording used by the attaché in Batavia?

A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. East wind rain—war with United States. 2. North wind cloudy—war with Russia. 3. West wind clear—war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quotation from the Dutch translation.

24. Q. In other words, the state of the record based on the information you had was that two sources indicated that the use of that code would be a break in diplomatic relations, and to others indicated stronger language such as "war decision"?

A. Yes, and we also had to take into account Japanese psychology. They had a gift for understatement and the language officers who lived in Japan could interpret the meaning of a message better than people who were not familiar with the Japanese mentality.

25. Q. Captain, from your own personal knowledge, to whom in the Navy Department was the information in regard to [749] the use of the winds code distributed? I refer to the information that you have just testified about that you knew about and saw on the morning of December 4th?

A. I'm very certain that an immediate distribution was made to the regular people before 9:00 a. m., that morning, that is, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Communications for his information, so he could keep track of what we were doing, the assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and of course, the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, copies were sent to the State Department, to the White House, and to the War Department. This same message was also included in the routine distribution, which was made around noon each day. Kramer can tell that exactly. I can't.

26. Q. Just to clarify the record, Is your last answer from your own personal knowledge, or from what was told you by other parties?

A. I know that Kramer made an immediate distribution that morning and I know what officers saw these messages every day. It is possible that any individual may have been absent from his office and might not have seen that message early in the morning.

27. Q. Was this information, to-wit, that an intercept of an execution of the winds code had been received, passed to either the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or the Combat Intelligence Unit of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor?

A. It was not.

28. Q. Was any attempt made so to do?

A. There was.

29. Q. Will you testify what you know from your own personal knowledge as to any attempt that was made to disseminate this information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval District?

A. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, Commander McCollum, wrote up a long message about 4 or 5 or 6 pages long, approximately 500 words, giving a complete and brief and very forceful summary of developments up to that time, up to 4 December, 1941. I saw this message in the afternoon of the 4th. I was in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications; had submitted several dispatches to him for release or for reference to higher authority. All these messages were based on the presumption that war was imminent, and the information taken from the winds message. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, came in with this message and he gave it to Admiral Noyes and said, "I have a message here for the Commander-in-Chief which I wish you would read." Admiral Noyes said, "That's fine; I have several going out there [750] myself I would like you to see before they go out and I want to get them out this afternoon." They exchanged messages, and as Admiral Noyes finished a page he handed it over to me and I read it. I just happened to be there by chance. It was a very complete summary of what had happened. It began with the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in July. It mentioned the evacuation of Japanese Nationals from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It included the fact that diplomatic relations were at an impasse; that neither party would yield, and it had a direct reference to the winds message, I believe a quotation, and said that we considered that this was the execute of the Japanese war plans, the signal of execute of the Japanese war plans; that we expected that war was imminent. Exactly everything I cannot recall at the end of nearly three years but I do know it was very complete and that nothing important had been left out of it. McCollum had been working several hours on it and had done a very thorough job. When they got done looking at it, Admiral Wilkinson said, "What do you think of it, Lee?" And Admiral Noyes said, "I think it's an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson said, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man and may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this information and I am going to send it if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then took the message and left, and I presume went to Admiral Ingersoll

to have the message released. I left Admiral Noyes' office a few minutes later. The exact time is associated with other messages which were sent at that time, or a few minutes later, and I do have the filing times with me.

30. Q. Captain, is your answer that that message was not sent? Am I correct in saying that this message was not sent?

A. That message was not sent but I did not even suspect it had not been sent until November, 1943.

31. Q. Are you aware of the existence of a copy of that rough draft anywhere?

A. So far as I know there is no copy in existence.

32. Q. What other information, if any, was received in the C. I. Unit in Washington prior to the evening of December 6th that indicated a break in relations between the United States and Japan?

A. On November 5, 1941, Tokio sent Ambassador Nomura a dispatch "JD No. 6254" stating that it was absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month, and added "of utmost secrecy".

[751] 33. Q. I hand you Document 7 of Exhibit 63. Is this the message to which you have just referred?

A. It is.

34. Q. Please continue with your answer.

A. The day before Tokio had sent JD No. 6248 to Nomura stating that counter-proposals would be given in Tokio No. 726 and 727, and added, "Conditions both within and without our empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort. The success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan". On November 12th, Tokio informed Nomura in JD 6415, "The United States is still not fully aware of the exceeding criticalness of the situation here. The date set in Message No. 736 is a definite deadline. The situation is nearing a climax. Time is indeed becoming short." On November 17, Tokio told Ambassador Nomura in JD 6638, in reply to a long message from him in which he begged Tokio to at least wait a month or two to get a clear view of the world situation. "The fate of our empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. There will be no change."

[752] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

35. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 10 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. It is.

36. Q. Please continue.

A. On November 22 Tokyo advised Nomura in JD 6710: "There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th."

37. Q. I hand you Document 11 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you refer?

A. Yes.

38. Q. Please continue.

A. On November 24 Tokyo advised in JD 6744: "Advise Nomura the time limit set in my number 812 is in Tokyo time." On November 26

in JD 6801 we learned that Tokyo advised Nomura: "Should negotiations collapse, we will completely destroy British and American power in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions." This is a circular. It was sent on November 14, 1941. We were delayed twelve days in getting this information. On November 28 we learned in JD 6890, which is a translation of a Washington-Tokyo telephone conversation: "A crisis does appear imminent regarding negotiations. Do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand, and the Army is champing at the bit." This is from Kurusu to Yamamoto in Tokyo. On November 26 we learned of a Washington-Tokyo telephone conversation. On November 26 in JD 6891 Kurusu and Nomura, in commenting on the American note which Secretary Hull had delivered to them that date, stated: "Our failure and humiliation are complete."

39. Q. I hand you Document 16 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. It is. Have you got 6898 on November 28?

40. Q. Yes.

A. On November 28 we received information contained in Document 18 of Exhibit 63, which I identified. On December 1 in JD 6942 we received information of Germany's promise to aid Japan in case Japan would declare war against the United States. On December 1 in JD 6943 Tokyo advised Ambassador Oshima in Berlin: "The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is." [753] That is December 1, and the message was dated November 30, 1941. On December 1 we also received the information contained in JD 6944, which I believe you have.

41. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 22 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. Yes. On December 2 in JD 6974 we learned that Hsingking advised Tokyo: "In the event that war breaks out with England and the United States, persons to be interned: British Nationals, 339; American citizens, 81; Nationals of Soviet observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American learnings are to be suitably taken care of."

42. Q. Captain, in your future answers please limit yourself only to the documents which gave new and additional information regarding a possible war with Japan or a possible break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. On December 1 in JD 6983 Tokyo advised Washington to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious—

43. Q. We have that. I hand you Document 21 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the dispatch about which you are testifying?

A. It is. Do you have 6984?

44. Q. No, sir.

A. On December 1 in JD 6984 Tokyo advised: "The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed

to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan."

45. Q. Was there any indication of which one of the code machines was being destroyed there?

A. It was very definite to us. It is describing technical terms. On December 2 in JD 6985 Tokyo sent a circular message to consular officials all over the world establishing a hidden-word code for use after they had destroyed their other code books and normal telegraphic communications were not available. The message itself was dated November 27. We were five days late in translation. On December 3 we learned from JD 6991 that Tokyo had told the Consul General in Honolulu: "Make your ships in harbor, report irregularly but twice a week."

46. Q. I hand you Document 64 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you refer?

A. It is. On December 3 we learned in JD 7017 that Tokyo had instructed Washington to burn all codes except two, stop using the machine and destroy completely, destroy all message files and all secret documents. The message was dated the 2nd. On December 4 in JD 7029 we learned that Tokyo had instructed the consulate in Honolulu to investigate bases in Hawaiian reservation. The message was dated November 20.

[754] 47. Q. Please continue.

A. On December 5 in JD 7063 we learned that Tokyo instructed Honolulu to report ships in Pearl Harbor and Maunalua Bay and so forth. That message was dated November 18.

48. Q. I hand you Document 37 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the message of November 18 to which you just referred?

A. It is. On December 5 in JD 7086 we learned that Tokyo had instructed Honolulu: "In the future, report even when there are no ship movements." The message was dated November 29.

49. Q. I hand you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the message of November 29 to which you have just referred?

A. It is. On the 4th of December in JD 7092 Tokyo instructed Hsinking: "Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. Great care should be taken not to antagonize Russia." That was sent December 1. On December 6 in JD 7111—I think you have that—Honolulu reported on naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

50. Q. Yes.

A. That takes me through the afternoon and evening of December 6.

51. Q. In addition to the foregoing, was there any information available to the Navy Department indicating the imminence of hostilities, as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations prior to the evening of December 6, 1941?

A. We regarded the breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan and active hostilities as being synonymous, going on Japan's past record. We began standing continuous watches on the Japanese diplomatic watches the 1st of February, 1941 as soon as we had enough officers and men to do it, because we expected that the break would come over a week-end, the way all Hitler's coups had been made in Europe against the British and other European cabinets, and we did

not want to be caught off guard. We knew it would take two or three months until we got into an efficient watch list. When the break actually came, it was just one more week-end as far as the men on watch were concerned.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark. U. S. Navy:

52. Q. When Lieutenant Commander Kramer left your unit to distribute information, with how many copies of such information did he start?

A. Normally he had only one copy which was showed but not [755] given anybody. The one exception to that, which I know of, was on the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, when he made numerous copies, so that each party concerned could be given a copy. We always gave two copies of everything we had to the Army to handle their own filing and distribution. The Army gave us two copies, one for file by JD number and the other for distribution and file by dates.

53. Q. You implied in your testimony that you gave high evaluations of the news coming from Batavia concerning the Winds Code. How long had you been giving that evaluation as to what came from Java?

A. That was the only message we ever received from Java.

54. Q. You stated at the end of your direct examination that the feeling in your unit was that a severance of diplomatic relations was equivalent to a declaration of war. Will you expand that answer a little more and tell us why you had such an interpretation?

A. Historically speaking, Japan commenced hostilities against China in the Chinese-Japanese war—I think in 1890—without any formal breaking of diplomatic relations. The attack on the Fleet was itself the severance of diplomatic relations. The same thing occurred at Port Arthur at the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Because we were largely influenced by people who lived in Japan and studied the language out there, we had no faith in the Japanese at all and considered them a very tricky, underhanded bunch of dirty fighters who would try to hit us behind our back if they could.

55. Q. You stated that in your unit a message about the severance of diplomatic relations was akin to the signal to execute the Japanese war plans. Upon what reason did you base that?

A. For one thing, we were largely influenced by the importance that Admiral Wilkinson attributed to it before it came in. We had all manner of things pointing up to the beginning of the war, including the messages which I read off. The last one came in just about the same time as the message from Hsinking, telling them, above all, not to antagonize Russia and referring to the possibility of war against England and the United States. There were the messages to Berlin, but all these things pointed, more or less, to promises, but there was nothing specific in regard to time other than this ultimatum or the time limit of the 29th. The Army people expected that we were going to be hit on the 29th or 30th. They were very positive and could not understand why they waited that long. We figured that they had some complicated move involved. It was all a question of timing, and they would somehow have to give a signal [756] to execute, and this was one way to give it. There was no way we could see for

giving this information to the consuls. We thought it meant more than to the consuls and that it was going to the military force. It was our belief and that is all we had.

56. Q. Then, that feeling was not so much contained in your unit as it was the feeling of the Director of Naval Intelligence?

A. We thought it was his feeling. We thought it was McCollum's feeling and it was our own. We shared that view.

57. Q. Do you recall Commander Kramer's ever leaving your unit with one or more documents when he was about to present to higher authority the feeling that a signal for the execution of the Japanese war plans had been given?

A. Yes, sir, I believe that he left twice that day, once early in the morning to take that around at least as far as Admiral Wilkinson, and he may have been asked by Admiral Wilkinson to carry it farther. Then, again he made his regular distribution trip on which he took it to everybody and ended up by giving it to the aide of the President.

58. Q. Were those words used?

A. No, sir, we were very careful not to intrude our opinions upon things we were reporting. As for the set-up of the war plans: Communications obtained this information, and it was the duty and responsibility of Naval Intelligence to collate it and disseminate it, and we felt that we would have been over-stepping the bounds if we attempted to put our interpretations in.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

59. Q. Do you know what your unit did Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7?

A. I know that very well, because I talked with all the officers who were on watch during that period, as well as seeing the written record.

60. Q. Will you tell the court, in general, what your unit did on the 6th and 7th of December in regard to this matter?

A. On a week-end traffic usually fell off to nothing. On this week-end we handled about three times the normal messages for a busy day. The most important was a very long, 14-part message which contained the Japanese declaration of war, which was delivered Sunday afternoon around, I believe it was, 2:15 or 2:30 p. m. to the Secretary of State. We had the first thirteen parts of that and had them translated or decoded by 7 p. m. Saturday night, December 6, 1941. Then we spent about two hours making smooth copies and numerous [757] other copies. The Army came over and helped us. They did some of the translation and also furnished a copy. The Army was given three copies about nine o'clock. At nine o'clock Kramer got on the telephone and told Admiral Wilkinson what he had and asked for instructions. Wilkinson told him to come right out and leave a copy at the White House en route. That was done. Kramer went out to Admiral Wilkinson's, and I believe Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining the Naval Aide to the President. He got a station wagon, stopped at the White House en route, and left these copies with the White House Aide. At the time, the President was entertaining and could not be seen immediately.

The judge advocate objected to the answer of the witness on the ground that it was hearsay.

Examined by the court :

61. Q. Is that an official report?

A. That is what Kramer told me officially as his commanding officer, to account for his movements. I asked him some very searching questions.

The judge advocate withdrew the objection.

62. Q. Continue with your answer.

A. As well as I can recollect, Admiral Wilkinson telephoned to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and also to Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans. I know that Admiral Turner was informed that night. My recollections have been hazy. He may have been a guest of Admiral Wilkinson, and Kramer may have sent Admiral Turner a copy of the message, and Turner may have talked to Stark over the telephone. I asked Kramer about the Secretary of State, and he said that he understood that Colonel Bratton, or somebody else in the Army, had delivered to Secretary Hull a copy of the message by 10:30 and that Secretary Hull called Secretary Knox and Stimson on the 'phone and made appointments for them, plus Kramer and Bratton, to be present at a conference in the State Department in Secretary Hull's office at 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. They all attended. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. on December 7 to see if part 14 had come in or any other news. Then he went home and left word he was going to be down early the next morning, because he had instructions to give these documents to Admiral Stark in his office at 9 o'clock. About 4 or 5 a. m. December 7, 1941, two other important messages came in by teletype from the West Coast. One was part 14 of the long message which was a declaration of war. This was decoded immediately and was ready for distribution by 7 a. m. of December 7, 1941. [758] The other message was Tokyo's serial No. 907, and when decoded it proved to be in Japanese. That was sent over to the War Department for translation about 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941. The translation came back from the War Department a little after 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. That was the message which instructed Kurusu and Nomura to deliver the declaration of war to the Secretary of State, if possible, at 1 p. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Washington time. Specifically, it was to deliver Tokyo serial No. 902.

63. Q. That was the message of which there were fourteen parts?

A. That was the 14-part message.

64. Q. Do you know anything about the dissemination of the 14th part and the second message to which you just referred that came in on the morning of Sunday, December 7?

A. Kramer came into the Navy Department somewhere about 8 a. m., by the recollection of himself, December 7, 1941, and took that message—and there were some other inconsequential translations at the same time, plus the other 13 parts—up to Admiral Stark's office first. He either gave them to Admiral Stark personally or left them with his aide. My memory is not clear on that point. Then he went to the White House and left a copy with Admiral Beardall, who was at the White House. Then he went to the State Department and arrived in time for his 10 a. m. appointment with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Colonel Bratton was there, and so was Secretary Stimson.

The judge advocate moved to strike from the record the testimony of this witness relating to information which had been told him.

The court announced that it did not sustain the motion to strike out the testimony.

65. You may proceed.

A. Kramer delivered the material and stayed a few minutes and then went back to the Navy Department. About the time he got back, the translation of Tokyo's serial No. 907 came in, which Kramer saw immediately was very important. There also came a message in the hidden-word code, which I have referred to and which was translated very hurriedly. The translation, as circulated, said, "Relations with England are not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste, as I discovered later, they left out one of the hidden words, and the message should have read—

[759] 66. Q. What was reported to you?

A. Those two messages were redistributed immediately by Kramer. He first went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There was a conference in progress there. He gave them to Admiral Stark's aide. Then he went to the White House and gave them to the Aide of the President. Then he got to the State Department, arriving there about 11 a. m. and gave copies to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy; and to the copy he gave the Secretary of the Navy there was a note appended which stated the time of delivery was sunrise in Honolulu and nearly midnight in Manila, and it undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours.

The judge advocate moved that the entire answer to this question be stricken from the record on the ground that it is hearsay.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, joined in the motion.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge what you have stated in that answer?

A. I only know from what Kramer told me.

The court announced that the motion to strike out the answer was sustained.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

68. Q. Captain, from your general knowledge of messages received and passing through your office, did you have the impression and did your office have the impression that they were important messages being received from sources, subsequent to November 27, which had a direct bearing on this war condition you mentioned?

A. Yes, sir, they were.

69. Q. You said that the messages were distributed when they were received. Did you have a list of distribution in your office, or did you know where those messages or copies of messages were being sent?

A. There were written orders confining the distribution of these messages to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the Far Eastern [760] Section, plus the cryptanalysts and the translators working on them. If anybody else in the Navy Department saw them, it was done on the orders of higher authority.

70. Q. Have you any knowledge that any information concerning the messages which you have outlined was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. The only information sent him was with reference to the Japanese destroying their code machines.

71. Q. The message of December 1, which contained an important message to Berlin stating that war with the United States and Great Britain might come sooner than expected, was not sent?

A. That was not sent.

72. Q. As information to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Neither to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet nor the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

73. Q. Has it been customary at any time within your experience in Communications or in the Navy Department to find that a message has been taken out of the files or has been misplaced from the files?

A. It has not. A great many messages and other material were misplaced during frequent moves consequent to the growth of the Naval Intelligence organization, but subsequently, I think, everything was located or accounted for, and this Winds Message is very conspicuous by its absence.

74. Q. You know of no other messages which have disappeared similar to this one?

A. No other message that I knew about and wanted have we failed to find eventually. In some cases it took two or three months and they were found.

75. Q. Has a diligent search been made for these messages?

A. A diligent search was made by 20-G, and later I borrowed the files where they should have been. Commander Lynn assisted me, but we couldn't find any trace of them.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

76. Q. Captain, can you find the communication which you had in reference to orders to Japanese diplomats to destroy their codes? Can you get that?

A. Here it is; December 1 is the first one.

[761] 77. Q. The substance of that information was what?

A. (Reading) "The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The machine at Batavia has been returned to Japan."

78. Q. You had another one prior to December 3 on that same subject?

A. Yes. That one was the first. On the second one—a similar message was sent, but in more detail, to Washington.

79. Q. I call your attention to Exhibit 20, the communication of December 3, 1941. I observe that Exhibit 20 states that only some of the codes and some of the material is being destroyed. That was not your information at the time, was it? Your information at the time was that all the codes were being destroyed?

A. I did not write this.

80. Q. I am not asking you that.

A. The exhibit you refer to is incomplete and ambiguous.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

81. Q. Captain, some of these documents of Exhibit 63 bear a stamp like the one on No. 1 and a great many have no stamp whatever. Will you explain to the court the significance of that stamp and what the omission may mean?

A. I cannot explain what the stamp means or the significance of the stamp or the lack of it. Kramer might be able to.

82. Q. Captain, referring again to No. 39 of this exhibit, which is the 14-part message of December 6, will you glance at it and explain why you repeatedly refer to that dispatch from Tokyo as a declaration of war?

A. Tokyo serial No. 901 stated that their 902 in English would be the answer to the American note of November 26, 1941. Up to this time, the language implied had been very courteous. Because of the harsh and abusive language used throughout this, there was no doubt in the minds of the men who were on watch at the time that the Japanese meant war and that this was their declaration.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[762] The witness made the following statement: The translation date of JD 7469 is December 15, 1941. The message itself was dated December 11 and gives Tokyo's explanation of the presentation of serial No. 902 and the fact that they considered it their declaration of war.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Doctor Stanley K. Hornbeck. Pages 767-772, inclusive.

[767] 24. Q. Do you remember receiving, or having knowledge of, information on 26 November 1941, setting forth the Japanese official views as to the successful outcome of the agreement under consideration between the United States and Japan?

A. I think we had something on that from intercept material.

25. Q. Did you know the source of this information?

A. I knew the approximate source, at least.

26. Q. Between the dates, November 27 and December 7, 1941, were negotiations continuing with Japan?

A. Well, there was some further conversation, and then there was the President's message to the Emperor, but that is all in the record, also.

27. Q. But there were conversations and parleys going on in that period of time?

A. Yes.

28. Q. Did you, being aware of that information that came in to you, or flowed into the State Department during this period, November 27 to December 7, consider that information, received at that time, had an important bearing on the negotiations?

A. During those few days?

29. Q. Yes, sir; that is, practically subsequent to the note of 26 November.

A. I doubt whether it had.

30. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 7, which is now before this court, and which purports to be a communication from the Japanese Government dated 5 November 1941, to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and which urges the agreement be completed by November 25, '41, will you please state whether or not you had been informed of the contents of this document, and about the time you received this information?

A. I have no recollection of having seen this particular document.

31. Q. And naturally you would not know whether or not the State Department had discussed it with the officials of the Navy Department, including the Secretary of the Navy?

A. No, sir.

32. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 18, which is now before this court, which document is a communication from the Japanese Government to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and which sets out views as to the de facto termination of negotiations, would you please refer to this document stating whether or not you have seen it, or whether or not [768] you had been informed as to its contents?

A. Yes, sir, I think I had seen that document.

33. Q. Do you remember, Doctor Hornbeck, about the time you got that information or saw it?

A. No, sir, I could not say when. These things were coming to us with reasonable promptness at that time, but I couldn't possible say at what moment I had seen it.

34. Q. You know approximately what is the date of the document?

A. The document is dated November 28.

35. Q. You couldn't have seen it prior to the 28th, could you?

A. That is clear.

36. Q. Isn't this very important information which showed the trend of events and really showed rather concisely the position of Japan?

A. Had the United States been in the position of the affirmant, that is, of the party pressing for an agreement, I should say, yes. Inasmuch as the United States was not in that position, it was Japan that was pressing for the agreement, I should say this does not give a clear indication.

37. Q. But in your opinion, by reason of this telegram and other information at that time, were the negotiations in de facto terminated on the date of that telegram, 28 November 1941?

A. I should say the telegram indicated that there would be no further negotiations.

38. Q. During the period 26 November to 7 December 1941, did you keep familiar with information being published in the press with relation to the progress of negotiations between Japan and the United States?

A. Far more so, I think, than the average reader; yes, sir.

39. Q. Could you give in general your thought of this, I mean as your memory serves, as to what this press information consisted of?

A. Well, the press was discussing the question of the meaning of

the latest developments, the developments between the 20th and the 26th. In some parts of the press they were talking of the possibility of war. Editorial writers were discussing the wisdom or the unwisdom of the position which had been taken by this Government in delivering the note of the 26th. I do not remember that there was any definite trend or any definite balance of opinion or prognostication or of speculation. It was still a scattering thing.

[769] 40. Q. At what time did you become familiar with the note which was the Japanese reply to the note of 26 November to them?

A. Well, their official reply was made on December 7.

41. Q. Did you have any information prior to the handing of this note by the Japanese to the Secretary of State, as to the contents of this reply?

A. My recollection is that we had intercept material on that subject.

42. Q. Was there any conference held with naval officials on the morning of the 7th, in regard to this reply, prior to its actual delivery?

A. To my recollection, there were naval officers at the Department that morning when I went down at about 10:30.

43. Q. Did you attend the conference?

A. No, sir.

44. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the officers who were there?

A. No, I couldn't tell you that.

45. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, in the general set-up of the State Department relative to conferences and so on, who was the representative, the State Department official, who actually handled these matters with the Navy Department, as to the delivery of information, as to the flow of information between the two departments, the liaison?

A. There had been set up an arrangement whereby Mr. Welles and the Chiefs of Staffs met from time to time.

46. Q. Pardon me, by "Chiefs of Staff" you mean?

A. I mean Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations; and there were periods in which they met frequently, and periods in which they met rather infrequently. Sometimes I was informed of their having had a meeting and what had transpired. Sometimes I was not. Mr. Welles would be the only man of our establishment who could tell you how often those meeting had been held or could give you any record of dates and so forth. Other than that, there were these meetings in the office of the Secretary of State, where, at times, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were present, and then there would be officers of the Navy and of the Army, and sometimes some of us in the Department were called in and sometimes it would be one group, sometimes another group, depending on what parts of the word or what problem was being discussed. Those were the principal [770] points of contact there at high level. I have never known what officers of the Department, or of your department, or the War Department, actually engaged in the physical handing back and forth of telegraphic and other material at a much lower level.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[771] 47. Q. Aside from the actual handling of information, dispatches and so on, was there any representative of the State Department which acted as liaison officer with the Navy Department? In other words, in discussing certain matters which would be carried to higher authorities, the Secretary of State, for instance?

A. Well, in a later period. I do not think it was in the case as it was in 1941. Mr. Orme Wilson was the liaison officer of the Department of State with the Navy Department and the War Department.

48. Q. I am speaking for the purpose of exchange in dispatches and information of that kind. In other words, suppose the State Department receives an important dispatch relative to Japan, and similarly, suppose the Navy Department receives it. Now, was there an official in the State Department who said, "This is important for the Navy," and the Secretary of State has this man to confer with the Navy and see that this dispatch is transmitted to the Navy?

A. I had always understood there was some man engaged in that, but who it was I do not know. Mr. Hamilton would probably be able to tell you. Officers immediately attached to the Secretary of State and officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs gave instant attention to this matter.

49. Q. Mr. Hamilton isn't here, is he?

A. No.

Neither the judge advocate nor the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

50. Q. I understood you to say, Dr. Hornbeck, that in the days following the 26th of November after the delivery of the note that day, there were newspaper discussions concerning the note and its contents?

A. I think so.

51. Q. Isn't it true that that note was released to the news press for the first time on the 7th of December, in the afternoon? I read a paragraph from "Foreign Relations", Volume 2, of which this court has taken judicial notice, page 793, a statement by the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941. I read the third paragraph: "I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peace settlement covering the entire Pacific area which I handed to Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941." Does that refresh your recollection as to when that statement, the note of November 26th, was released to the press?

A. That relates to the text. The text was released on December 7. But on evening of November 26 the press was informed that reply had been made. On next day, in a conference with the press, the Secretary stressed the gravity of the [772] situation both in Europe and in the Far East. During the next few days, in conferences with the Secretary and with the Under Secretary, and in their contacts with diplomatic missions, the correspondents continued to

ask questions about developments in the 'exploratory conversation' and about various features of the international situation, especially about American-Japanese relations; and the press, piecing bits together and making surmises and engaging in speculation, discussed a variety of possibilities and made comments from many angles. They talked about the American-Japanese exchange of communications rather than about the exact contents of the communications. I do not recall that what appeared in the press indicated any special, new or peculiar trend of thought beyond giving evidence of an increasing realization that this country was confronted with a very serious problem in our foreign relations both in Europe and in the Far East. In the news as such, President Roosevelt's return to Washington, statements of Japanese officials, and developments in and around Indo-China were among the important items.

52. Q. Does that appear in either "Peace and War" or the book entitled "Foreign Relations?"

A. No, I think not.

53. Q. That is, the release that was prior to December 7th and following the 26th of November?

A. It may or may not have been a release but there was a press conference in which the press was informed of the general situation.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which he had not fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 774-792, inclusive.

[774] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. There is evidence before the court that an established procedure in the Navy Department had been set up whereby certain classified information was delivered to you as Chief of Naval Operations daily. Will you state, briefly, what this procedure was during the period from about November, 1941, to 7 December, 1941?

A. The procedure of giving me classified information, generally, was that of bringing it to my Flag Secretary, Commander Wellborn, who would bring it in to me, although at the time if I were free, it might have come in directly by the officer who brought it, in Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. Who was the officer that normally brought it from Naval Intelligence?

A. Kramer.

3. Q. Was the information that was delivered to you by the office of Naval Intelligence evaluated before it came to your hands, or not?

A. Sometimes information was evaluated, and sometimes dispatches may have come to me direct before I received the evaluation; but

there was a running evaluation kept by those agencies who were in Operations who were designated to do it.

4. Q. What agencies in Operations were designated to evaluate intelligence for you?

A. The Office of Naval Intelligence, and also War Plans; also they were usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

5. Q. If information arrived in the Navy Department outside of office hours was there any established procedure for getting it to you at the earliest practicable moment?

A. Yes, there was. It would go to the watch officer, Operations Watch Officer, who in turn, using his judgment, would send it to the duty officer, who was usually a Captain out in town who was regularly designated. He in turn would exercise his judgment as to whether or not I was to be called and given the information.

6. Q. Was the system of distributing military intelligence in the Navy Department during the critical period preceding 7 December 1941, such that you feel that you received all important information on Japanese-United States relationships?

A. I felt that I was receiving it.

7. Q. I show you document No. 11, of Exhibit 63, which purports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 November. Before 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I do not recall exactly this message, but I undoubtedly— [775] ly was acquainted with it, either as it is, or brought to me and talked over verbally.

8. Q. It bears translation date of November 22, 1941. Can you state when it probably came to your knowledge in the routine course of office procedure?

A. Well, it might very well have come on that date or the day following, which would have been the 23rd.

9. Q. Did you send the substance of this information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 24th, which very well may have been based upon or certainly had taken into consideration this Exhibit.

10. Q. The word "agreement" is used in this document, No. 11. What agreement in your opinion was there being discussed?

A. I would say that it was the agreement pending between the negotiators for Japan and our State Department.

11. Q. Did the deadline of 29 November, as stated in document No. 11, have any special significance to you?

A. The date of 29th of November and the previous date of the 25th, did have a significance, as a break in the negotiations might come at that time. I may state that I did not send, as noted from our dispatches, information to either of the Pacific commands, as to the specific dates given herein. I had become leery of dates. We had sources of information which looked authentic, from time to time, as to when Italy would come in, and frequently they were changed. If I had set a date of the 25th, for example, and nothing happened on the 25th, it would have, in my opinion, been bad ball. Again, if I had sent a date of the 29th, which I could not be sure of it, and it must be

remembered that this message had to be evaluated not just as it stands but in connection with a lot of other information—but if I had sent that date of the 29th and nothing had happened, again it would probably have weakened the dispatch which we did send, and which, in my opinion, covered the situation. Judging by what is now perhaps hindsight, I am glad that I did not include the dates.

12. Q. Of what dispatch are you speaking, Admiral, in your answer to the question?

A. I am speaking of our dispatch which was sent on the 24th.

13. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, Admiral, and ask you if this is the dispatch to which you refer as bearing date of 24 November 1941?

A. Yes, and I may state further that in our dispatch [776] of three days later, any reference to specific dates was left out, and we confined ourselves in that later dispatch to the expression, "In the next few days." That is the dispatch that was sent on the 27th.

14. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, in evidence before the court, and ask you if this dispatch is the one of 27 November 1941, to which you refer in your last answer?

A. Yes.

15. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, and point our document 15 contained therein. This document 15 has been popularly referred to in testimony as the "winds code." Had you seen this document, or had you been informed of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. As I have previously testified, I do not recall having seen this document. I assume that if received it was evaluated. It adds nothing to my dispatch of the 27th. It covers the cutting off of international communications. I stated in my dispatch of the 27th that negotiations had ceased. Certainly I do not think this dispatch would have strengthened my dispatch of the 27th; it might possibly have weakened it.

16. Q. I show you document No. 18 from Exhibit 63, which states in substance that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941—or did you see this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I may have seen it, or its evaluation. He had already covered it. It added nothing to what I had already sent in the dispatch of the 27th.

17. Q. Did you inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the contents of this document?

A. No, nothing in addition to what I had sent on the 27th.

18. Q. Document No. 18 speaks of "negotiations." What negotiations, in your opinion, were being referred to therein?

A. Negotiations between the representatives of the Japanese Government and our State Department.

19. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63. This document sets out in substance the Secretary of State's note of 26 November 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the subject matter contained therein, on [777] or before 7 December 1941?

A. I have previously testified that I did not recall seeing the document. It may very well have been discussed.

20. Q. Had the Japanese made a reply to the Secretary of State's note of 26 November? That is document 17—prior to 6 December 1941?

A. No.

21. Q. Adverting back to the words in the document, 18, which you testified to in the question before this—"with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days." What views did you think they would referring to in that document, by the views of the Imperial Government?

A. I assume that it was the views of the Imperial Government, which were to be sent.

22. Q. And these views of the Imperial Government—would they be in reply to this note of 26 November?

A. Yes, that would be my interpretation.

23. Q. The language of document 18 is that with the receipt of the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Is not this statement in your opinion tantamount to an assertion that negotiations were broken as of the time of making the document?

A. I would say, as I now see it, looking at this dispatch, yes; but I would also state that our dispatch of the 27th had also so stated. It will be recalled that the dispatch of the 27th stated negotiations had ceased.

24. Q. Your dispatch of November 27 is Exhibit 17, is it not?

A. Yes.

25. Q. This document, No. 18, was translated on 28 November 1941. That is more than a week before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor, is it not?

A. Yes.

26. Q. Between 28 November and 7 December 1941, were any directives for fleet dispositions made?

A. No directives additional to the directive contained in our dispatch of the 27th.

27. Q. Were any additional security measures directed by the Chief of Naval Operations during this period of time, [778] as they applied to the United States Pacific Fleet or the Hawaiian area?

A. No. The code message was sent, regarding destruction of codes, but nothing else as regards security.

28. Q. You have testified that the language of document No. 18, which is to the effect that on receipt of the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured—that looking back on it you considered that they were then ruptured as of the date of the dispatch?

A. Yes.

29. Q. Was there any reason why the United States Pacific Fleet should not have been immediately moved from Pearl Harbor?

A. Do you mean as to any reasons why I should not have moved it?

30. Q. That is correct, Sir.

A. Well, if I had ordered the Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, I would probably have had to have given a destination, as for example, bringing them back to the coast, something which I just considered out of the cards. But I left matters of this sort to the commanders in the field. I had two fleets in the Pacific. One in the Asiatic, and one in

the Hawaiian area, and I left it up to the commanders on the spot as to what to do, after I had given them the information that I had, my interpretation of it, and the directive contained in the dispatch of 27 November.

31. Q. I show you document 21. from Exhibit 63, which states in substance, that "they are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Had you seen this document, or had you been advised of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not recall having seen this document in just this form, but it may very well have been discussed at that time. I might state in general in connection with these dispatches—this document, for example—it is just one of a great many that were coming in along with a lot of other material. It was physically impossible for me to read them all or to see them all. Some of them I saw directly. Some came to me with evaluations. Sometimes some came to me with a general picture—sometimes orally, sometimes on a written memorandum. To take a single dispatch with a specific question, we may read into it now, in the light of hindsight, what we couldn't see then. We didn't have hindsight to guide us, and we had to evaluate without it. I can only say I [779] was in complete touch—at least that I assumed I was in complete touch—with the broad general trend; that our conclusions we aimed to keep the commanders in the field advised of, we did not send them every specific document. I think to have done so would have been prejudicial to the larger picture. For example, a good deal has been stated as to what happened between late November and December 7. We unquestionably were continually talking things over, but I should like to state that no evaluations or opinions were brought to me as a result of the study by those whose business it was to study everything which came in, which in any way altered the considered opinion and directive which we sent out on the 27th. On the contrary, as I have testified before, what was highly confirmatory evidence to me was the burning of the codes, and again our action in our dispatch to Guam and again to CinCPac on this subject, showing that we had not changed in any way our opinion regarding the message of the 27th—but if anything were strengthening it.

32. Q. In several instances in your answer, Admiral, you referred to your dispatch of 27 November. Do you mean Exhibit 17?

A. Yes.

33. Q. The document 21, about which you have been testifying, states: "We are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Who was this message set out in document 21 from?

A. It is from Tokyo to Washington, and I assume that "we" means the Japanese.

34. Q. Did you advise the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the substance contained in document 21?

A. No. As I have stated, it added nothing, in my opinion, to what had been sent. It was typical of Japan to carry on material of this sort right up to rupture.

35. Q. Referring to document 11, about which you have testified, which was received on or about 22 November, 1941, and which sets out that the absolute deadline for the negotiations was 29 November; also the statement contained in document 21, which was received in

the Navy Department about 1 December, 1941, and which asserts that "we are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing"—how did you evaluate the information that they were simulating a continuance of negotiations after a deadline for concluding them had passed?

A. Well, I think I have already answered that question. They may have changed their date again. We had the deadline of the 25th passed. We had the deadline of the 29th passed; and as I have stated, it was typical of them to keep talking [780] and giving an idea that negotiations might be continuing right up to the point of rupture. This in no way changed the estimate which we made, that negotiations had ceased, or alters what we had sent in any respect.

36. Q. Referring to document 38 of Exhibit 63, translated on December 6, 1941, which sets out in substance that a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November will be sent on December 7. That is to be kept secret and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message. Had you seen this document or had you been made cognizant of its contents prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I do not recall seeing this document. However, I again would point out that we had covered the contingency in our dispatch of the 27th.

37. Q. Referring to document 39 of Exhibit 63, this document contains fourteen points which are apparently in reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November, 1941. The draft indicates the first thirteen points to have been translated on 6 December 1941. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, see this document, or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I had not seen it, and I haven't the slightest recollection of having seen its contents. The message which was sent by the Army on the forenoon of the 7th, of course, covered it, so far as its general effect was concerned, and to that extent I was familiar.

38. Q. A witness before this court testified at great length concerning a memorandum which had been prepared by Commander McCollum. This was about a five hundred word summary of his own estimate, probably, of the military situation that existed on or about 4 December, 1941—up to the time of 4 December 1941. The witness stated that this summary had been passed along in the echelon through Admiral Noyes, who was then the director of Naval Communications, who had made the comment that he felt that "to send it to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet would be in effect an insult, that he believes that this 500-word summary of the estimate of the situation was carried by Admiral Wilkinson further up the echelon of command, and that later he discovered that the dispatch so prepared had never been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet—some months later he discovered that this dispatch had never been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet." Do you have any knowledge of this dispatch that the witness was talking about?

A. No.

[781] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

39. Q. Exhibit 13 before this court, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October 1941 directs, among other things, "Take

due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan"; and Exhibit 19, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of November 28, 1941, purports to set out a dispatch from the Army to Commander, Western Defense. In this dispatch there appears the language: "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent." In your dispatch of 16 October 1941, Exhibit 13, and the Army's dispatch which was quoted to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Exhibit 19 of 28 November, was it your intention in your injunction with regard to alarming the populace as set out in these two dispatches should be a continuing one?

A. The dispatch of the 16th of October was still in effect. The dispatch of 28 November was a dispatch of information to CinCPac. It was to our coastal forces giving them information which their Army opposite had and directing them, in case of hostilities, to carry out their part of WPL-46. I gave no directive regarding reconnaissance measures in that dispatch. I was quoting a dispatch of the War Department to the Commander, Western Defense Command.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

40. Q. I call your attention, Admiral, to Document 24 of Exhibit 63. That, in substance, was the inquiry or request from Tokyo to Honolulu to make reports relative to ships in Pearl Harbor. That appears to have been translated on December 3rd. Did you see that document on or about December 3rd?

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. We knew and had long known that the Japs were reporting a great mass of information and assumed that every move we were making in that area or on the Pacific Coast or in the Far East was known, and we had already sent our dispatch giving the gravity of the situation.

41. Q. Will you look at Document 36. That is another document from Tokyo to Honolulu relative to ships in Pearl [782] Harbor and was translated on the 5th of December. Did you see that on or about December 5th?

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. As I have stated, these reports were evaluated, taken into consideration with everything else. I may have had conversations on it but it in no way changed anything I had sent. It affirms the other dispatch for negative information.

42. Q. Now, will you look at Document 37 of Exhibit 63. That is a request from Tokyo to Honolulu for information as to particular areas in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, and Manila Bay.

43. Q. That was translated when, please?

A. That was translated on the 5th.

44. Q. Did you see that document?

A. I do not recall it at this time.

45. Q. Well, do you recall any discussions about the information contained therein?

A. No, I do not. They may have taken place but I do not remember discussing this message.

46. Q. Will you look at Document 40, please, in Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, I have it.

47. Q. That is information from Honolulu to Tokyo relative to the movements of American warships in Pearl Harbor, the courses taken and speeds maintained, is it not?

A. Yes.

48. Q. When was that translated?

A. That was translated by the Army on the 6th of December.

49. Q. Do you recall seeing that document?

A. No, I do not.

50. Q. Or learning of the information contained therein?

A. No, I can't recall that document at this time.

51. Q. I call your attention to Document 2 in Exhibit 64, which was a dispatch from Chief of Asiatic to yourself under date of 28 November?

A. Yes.

52. Q. Did you receive that dispatch?

A. No. This again refers to the winds message which I do not recall. I note, however, that it was sent to Com16, C-in-C Pacific, and Com14, so that it may possibly have accounted for my not seeing it because it had already been sent to the Hawaiian area, but I have no clear recollection, as I have stated before, of the winds message.

[783] 53. Q. Now, will you look at Document 3 in Exhibit 64. This is a dispatch from Alusna, Batavia, to OpNav under date of 5 December and is a general reference to the winds message?

A. Yes.

54. Q. Did you see that dispatch to you?

A. No, I do not recall any dispatches in this connection. Our dispatch—of course, again referring to our own war warning—had been sent. That fact, together with the fact that this dispatch had been sent to the Hawaiian area, was known in the Far East and may have accounted for its not having been brought to me, and again it referred to rupture of relations in the original one which was presented to me this morning.

55. Q. Document 3 from Alusna, Batavia, puts a different interpretation on the message, referring to war rather than a break in relations?

A. Yes, it does; from Alusna, Batavia.

56. Q. Not having seen any of the first part of the winds message, I assume you heard nothing of anything connected with its execution?

A. No, I have no recollection of it.

57. Q. Referring back to these documents relative to the ships in Pearl Harbor and information back and forth between Honolulu and Japan: Was any information concerning that sent by you to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. No I think not.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

58. Q. Admiral, with reference to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which you read: You say that a copy of it had gone to Com14?

A. Document No. 2 here. It was from C-in-C, Asiatic Fleet, to OpNav, info Com16, CinCPac, Com14. It is one of the winds messages.

59. Q. But you are unable to say in that connection as to whether or not Com14 was ever informed by anyone of the execution of the winds message; you don't know that?

A. No, I do not.

The court then, at 10:53 a. m., took a recess until 11:10 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

[784] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the court:

60. Q. Admiral, you have testified to the general effect that there were many, many messages—and I think you used the expression “thousands of messages”—coming into the Department, and that you naturally couldn't remember or take cognizance of all of them, but weren't many of these messages simply routine things?

A. Weren't many of them what, sir?

61. Q. Weren't many of these messages that you say were coming in daily, routine messages?

A. Yes.

62. Q. Now, weren't some of them perhaps of unusual importance?

A. Yes.

63. Q. What orders had you issued by which these could be distinguished so that certain ones could be brought direct to you without waiting for an evaluation, and to whose judgment was that left?

A. Well, I don't recollect having issued any orders but it certainly was the understanding that if there was anything important or demanded immediate attention, I assume that it would have been brought to me.

64. Q. Who, down the echelon of officers in Operations immediately below you would have the authority to decide whether a message could be stopped before it got to you, or whether it had to be taken to you? It wasn't left to the Communications Division itself, was it? Who would have that authority?

A. Well, messages might have been handled by Admiral Ingersoll. He had full discretion to answer what he saw necessary. When messages went to War Plans where they were evaluated I was in constant touch with War Plans. Intelligence was in much the same condition, and I just felt that they were keeping me informed or bringing me really important messages.

65. Q. Well, specifically, referring back to the one question asked you in which the question covered a long dispatch of 500 words or so which had been prepared by Communications and which, the testimony showed, they considered of intense value and that it not only served the purpose of giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific

[785] Fleet the evaluation of dispatches that had come in over a period of time, in other words, bringing him up to date with the conception you had; and further, it served the advantage of filling a blank of messages that perhaps never got to him; if that was so important in the opinion of the people who prepared it and it got up as far as Admirals Wilkinson and Noyes, who would have stopped that message from coming to you to decide whether it should go to the Commander-in-Chief, or not, in view of the importance given it a little further down the echelon?

A. I don't know. It may have been gone over with War Plans and have been decided—I am not saying whether rightly or wrongly—that the situation had been covered, or it might have been talked over between War Plans and Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall the slightest recollection of ever having seen or read that message.

66. Q. Well, it never got to you?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it did not.

67. Q. If it got to you and you didn't send it, was it because somebody above you stopped it?

A. No, sir. No, I would have accepted the full responsibility.

68. Q. In that file of documents in Exhibit 63, there are many messages which would seem to cast the shadows of what's coming, and it is your testimony that you have no recollection of ever having seen any of the ones we have shown you. Now, are we to assume that it is a matter of recollection, or that you never saw them?

A. It is a matter of recollection. For example, I would like to quote a paragraph in my letter to Admiral Kimmel a month before Pearl Harbor, written on November 7th, and after looking at some of these dispatches and assuming that they were talked over, they undoubtedly had a bearing on this. I quote, "Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before. It continually gets worsen and worsen. A month may see literally most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever, particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good." Then again, I think the dispatches we did send reflect the information in some of the dispatches which were brought to my attention this morning and which, while I don't clearly remember the dispatch as I see it, they were undoubtedly subjects which we were talking about and which I think my letters and dispatches did cover. It is nearly three years, and to pick out a single dispatch and recognize it as is, unless it is something very outstanding, is difficult. Again, with reference to the material which was brought together after the dispatch of the 27th, my feeling is that if there had been anything brought to me which in any way altered what I had said, I would have remembered it and would have changed it, but we had a big area on our hands. The Atlantic was in a turmoil, if you remember, about that time. I was continually being [786] pressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic because he lacked forces. Along late in October and early November, as I recall, we had three ships sunk. We were at our wits end for escort vessels in the Atlantic. I was being pressed to bring escort vessels from the Pacific into the Atlantic. Colonel Knox pressed me for it, and I resisted. There is one other point in that connection which I might

bring up with reference to the transfer of vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic, a question which was asked me by Admiral Kimmel's counsel and which seemed rather strange that I might not have remembered because he put the question so clearly, but that was with reference to taking three more battleships from the Pacific into the Atlantic, and that Admiral Kimmel, when he was here in early June, went to the White House and got this straightened out. I wrote Admiral Kimmel on the 25th of May, which was very close to his arrival here, that we had no intention of taking anything further from the Pacific Fleet. I confirmed it in September. In the memorandum of November 5th, we again reiterated our adherence to the plan and the only suggestions of possible transfers were those in accordance with WPL-46, which was another division of heavy cruisers and which didn't take place at that time.

69. Q. Well, Admiral, that is all very pertinent, but my line of questioning is entirely on the question of these various messages and whether or not they got to you and the evaluation and so forth.

A. Well, my feeling was that my letters and my dispatch covered in general the dispatches which had been sent.

70. Q. Well, it doesn't even mean that; it means about the messages getting to you. I am trying to find out where they were stopped before they got to you, in view of your statement that you have no recollection of seeing them. The court wants more information now at this particular point and we are trying to bring out the procedure for these messages and why they didn't get to you, if they didn't.

A. Well, some of these messages, as I stated, I think their meaning has been covered by what I wrote or what we put in dispatches. I may have seen them. I may have talked over their substance. They may have been brought to me for evaluation. I feel they were covered. But to look at a single dispatch and definitely recall that dispatch at that time is difficult. Nevertheless, some of those that I say I can't recall specifically having seen have been covered.

71. Q. Well, with the danger of war hovering around, wouldn't messages that were intercepted from a government with which our relations were getting in a very critical condition have been of sufficient importance that those [787] down the echelon of command should have had orders that all of those dispatches should come to you? I am not questioning your not having issued the order but I am trying to find out if any such directive or orders were issued?

A. I don't recall having issued any orders as to a line of demarcation. It was just procedure that anything of importance would have been brought to me.

72. Q. Admiral, is it correct to state that each day a booklet or a compilation of all of these secret messages having an important bearing on Japan were brought in to you by either Commander Kramer—as I understand, he was probably the liaison officer—or some other officer?

A. The general routine, as I recall, on important messages of that nature, was that they would be brought to my office. If I were busy they might be left with Wellborn to bring in to me as soon as I was free.

73. Q. But they were brought in, weren't they?

A. Yes, I assume that anything that was set up as of sufficient importance down the line for me to see was brought in. I either saw them

or saw their evaluation or talked them over. Many were brought in.

74. Q. Weren't all of them bearing on this question brought in? I don't mean routine messages, but messages of importance bearing on the Japanese situation which, we understand from testimony before this court, were daily brought in to you by an officer for your perusal. Is that not correct?

A. Important messages were brought in to me by an officer.

75. Q. Then in that event if they were brought in, did you look at them?

A. Yes, if they were brought in to me, of course.

76. Q. Then if that is the case, you were conversant, or should have been, with all important messages that came through daily; is that correct?

A. Yes, but again, what may appear important now may not have at that time to those who were to bring it in to me, if they considered it had been covered in some other way. I can't say that everything was brought in. I endeavored to cover that in the general statement.

77. Q. But in all of this time did you consider the relationship between this country and Japan of primary importance to this government?

A. Yes.

78. Q. Therefore, you naturally would take an interest in the dispatches relative to Japan; isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

[788] 79. Q. And you would have kept yourself informed as to those conditions?

A. Right.

80. Q. That leads to this question of this note which was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese on 26 November which set forth the conditions under which the United States would consider an agreement or further conversations with Japan. Had you ever heard of that note? You said that you didn't see it, and one time in your previous testimony you said you had never heard of such a note. Is that a correct assumption?

A. Well, I didn't see it. I don't recall it. Its contents may have been talked over but as to the specific note sent on the 26th, I don't recall it. I was given to understand that negotiations had ceased. This may have been talked over or mentioned to me by Admiral Schuirmann—then Captain Schuirmann—but I don't recall as I saw it when it was brought to me here.

81. Q. As you see it now, however, that was probably a very important note, wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was a very important note.

82. Q. A most important one?

A. It was a summary and a set-up that did not, in my opinion, in any way change the thought that we had and that we had been given to understand that negotiations had ceased. Marshall put it "practically ceased". It was my opinion they had ceased and my opinion was borne out and I was in close touch with Mr. Hull.

83. Q. Admiral, with all of these secret messages, these very secret messages which flowed in to you from 27 November to 7 December, didn't you conceive by those notes that this activity was continuing and that the negotiations and parleys were still going on?

A. I didn't consider that anything I saw gave any hope of a renewal of negotiations or that led me to the slightest conclusion that what I had said, namely, "negotiations have ceased", that that statement was incorrect. We were talking things over constantly but I had nothing to the contrary, and as I have stated, what does stand out in my memory is the confirmation of it.

84. Q. Referring to the night of 6-7 December, and the morning of 7 December; in your testimony you stated that your information was confined to the fact that a note was to be delivered at 1:00 o'clock the next day?

A. Yes.

[789] 85. Q. And that is all you knew about it. The note or the answer to the note of the Secretary of State to Japan of 26 November was received in the Department on 6 December in the afternoon, was translated, 13 parts, and was distributed—according to testimony—at 9:00 o'clock p. m., or 2100 on the night of 6 December; is that correct?

A. Well, I assume that it is.

86. Q. Did you see those?

A. No, I did not.

87. Q. In other words, you had no information whatsoever, with all of this coming in, regarding what was going to be done at 1:00 o'clock on 7 December, except that that note was going to be delivered; is that correct.

A. That is correct. When I got in the office, I learned that Sunday morning.

88. Q. But when you arrived in the office Sunday morning, 7 December, weren't you informed upon your arrival as to the receipt and translation of this answer to the note of 26 November?

A. Well, the outstanding thing in my mind that morning is that the Japs were to deliver a note which shut things off, and the time of 1300 sticks in my memory. I don't remember the conversation about the rest of it.

[790] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

89. Q. You do not remember Admiral Schuirmann's coming in to report on this to you?

A. No, I remember very clearly talking to Admiral Schuirmann about the picture and about the one o'clock business, but just what the thirteen points gave, I have no clear remembrance. We realized it was a turn-down, but what it was I don't recall. The outstanding thing that stands out in my memory is that things were off and that Mr. Hull was to be told at 1300.

90. Q. When Admiral Schuirmann arrived at your office, you do not remember whether he gave you a full picture of things which happened up to that time?

A. He may have.

91. Q. It is reasonable to suppose that he did?

A. Yes, it is reasonable to suppose that he did, if we were talking there.

92. Q. With reference to those secret messages sent from Honolulu to Japan and from Japan to Honolulu asking about the ships in harbor

and where the ships were anchored, all of which came in here on December 5—

A. Yes.

93. Q. Didn't those messages impress you with the fact that something was going on specifically relative to Honolulu?

A. They were specifically with regard to Honolulu. Of course, we knew the Japs had intensively, for years before the present war, been getting everything they could from anywhere, including diagrams of underground lines on the West Coast, but those particular messages did not impress me with the necessity of sending anything beyond what I had sent—if I saw them. I do not recollect just what we talked over with reference to them or having seen the specific dispatches.

94. Q. Don't you think at that time that Japan's asking Honolulu for specific information regarding ships had a very definite bearing on Honolulu?

A. Well, if you take the message in the light of hind sight, standing out by itself and coupled with everything, and again if you forget the fact that we had said that war may be expected within the next few days or that Japan may make an aggressive movement, well, then that stands out quite clearly; but if you take the fact that it was routine for the Japs to report practically everything—and we knew that they were reporting practically everything— [791] it might not have had the same significance at that time which can be read into it now.

95. Q. In your opinion, would it have been of value to send those messages to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific for his evaluation?

A. I do not know just what they would have meant to him if he had gotten them, in addition to what we had sent.

96. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them?

A. I don't know; I can't tell what his reaction would have been.

97. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them, since you didn't know how he would take them, and let him make his own evaluation?

A. We had made our broad evaluation of the picture and had sent it. Whether or not this additional information would have been useful to him, I am not prepared to state.

98. Q. But with this information coming in on December 5, as it did, specifying the getting of special information regarding Honolulu, did it occur to any one of your subordinates that they may be planning to strike by air or some other means on Honolulu? Didn't it emphasize and bring out prominently the Hawaiian area?

A. There was no evaluation and no recommendation to make regarding the transmitting of this information.

99. Q. I refer you again to this Winds Message. Your recollection is that you never heard of any message, regardless of its name, "Wind" or otherwise, to the effect that a message from Japan had been intercepted, showing conclusively that at some time in the future they were going to send out a secret execute for conditions for breaking off diplomatic relations or designating war with the United States and Great Britain; is that correct?

A. I stated I have no recollection of it.

100. Q. You realize that was a very important message in the light of present conditions?

A. I may question the statement that it was a very important message. Except for the Batavia end of it, the reliability of which I could not say, the Winds Message spoke of breaking off negotiations, and we had covered that.

101. Q. Are you aware of the fact that information was received that there were different interpretations and different translations wherein the breaking of diplomatic relations was interpreted by some as war?

A. I am not, but with regard to the war part of it, we had stated that Japan might make an aggressive movement within the next few days—in a late November dispatch.

[792] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

102. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 15 in Exhibit 63, which establishes the Winds Code, and I will ask you to say what the document shows with respect to the date of translation?

A. The date of translation is November 28, 1941.

103. Q. Is it true, then, that that document was not available to the Navy Department until after CNO had sent this dispatch to CincPac, saying that negotiations had ceased?

A. That is true.

104. Q. There seems to be some confusion as to whether you received on the night of December 6 information to the effect that the Japanese ambassadors would ask for a conference with the Secretary of State at 1300, December 7. In order to clear up the record on that point, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to state what that document shows as to the date of translation?

A. December 7, 1941.

105. Q. Did you have any information on the evening or during the night of December 6 and 7th to the effect that the Japanese ambassadors would ask the Secretary of State for an appointment at 1300, Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note?

A. No, not at that time.

106. Q. You had no information concerning that appointment until you arrived at your office about 10:30, I believe you said, on Sunday morning?

A. That is correct.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 807-808, inclusive.

[807] 178. Q. I just want to be quite certain about this Saturday situation. As I understand it, at no time on Saturday, the 6th of December, did you know, either directly or indirectly, by telephone or visual examination, or otherwise, that there was in the Navy Department thirteen parts of a Japanese message that was at some time to be delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States Government?

A. That is correct. I did not know it.

179. Q. And that at no time on Saturday, the 6th of December, did you know, directly or indirectly, or by telephone or otherwise, that the Navy Department had information that the precise hour of delivery of the message, of which the thirteen parts constituted a portion, was to be sent shortly, within the next day?

A. No, I did not know that.

180. Q. You had no information concerning that on Saturday?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

181. Q. Admiral Stark, the documents, the messages contained in Exhibits 63 and 64—those are the secret messages—I take it none of those were sent, as far as you know, to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, other than the one you mentioned this morning?

A. You mean contained in that Exhibit 63, or 64?

182. Q. Of the ones that you have looked at in that Exhibit—none of those was sent to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District except one that you mentioned this morning?

A. I think that is correct. Without checking back, I assume it is correct.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

183. Q. Did you ever see the report that Secretary Knox made to the President after his return the week following 7 December, after his return from Oahu?

A. I remember his report? Do you mean the report that was subsequently published?

184. Q. No, I don't think it was published. It was introduced as an Exhibit before the Roberts Commission.

A. I don't recall it at the moment. I think I saw it. I mean if it was introduced in the Roberts Commission I probably saw it.

185. Q. Assuming that in that report of Secretary Knox to [808] the President, he stated that the War Department, as distinguished from the Navy Department, sent a special war warning to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Saturday night, the 6th of December. Have you any information as to where he might have learned that—"he", Secretary Knox?

A. No. I remember his published report. There was quite an article published by him in the press. As to the official report, of course I knew his thought. He talked it over with all of us, but to your question, I do not remember any such information.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 812-815, inclusive.

[812] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve, presently assigned to the Naval Communications, Naval Operations.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was the watch officer for Op 20-G.

3. Q. Were you on watch on Op 20-G on the night of December 6, 1941?

A. No.

4. Q. What time on the morning of December 7, 1941, did you come on watch?

A. At 7 a. m.

5. Q. I hand you Document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Can you identify this document?

A. Yes, I recall this document.

6. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that this document is in 14 parts. At the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock in the morning of December 7, 1941, were you advised as to the disposition that had been made of the first 13 parts of this dispatch?

A. They had been previously delivered to Commander Kramer during the evening of December 6.

7. Q. Had part 14 been received and delivered to Kramer at the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock?

A. No, it hadn't.

8. Q. What stage of processing was part 14 in at the time you came on watch?

A. Part 14 was completed and ready for delivery to Commander Kramer at 7 a. m., December 7.

9. Q. At what time was this part 14 delivered to Commander Kramer?

A. It was delivered to Commander Kramer between 9 and 10. I don't recall the exact hour, but it was between 9 and 10, December 7.

10. Q. Was that the time of his arrival at 20-G?

A. Right.

11. Q. I hand you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 before this examination. Can you identify this dispatch?

A. Yes, I can identify that dispatch.

[813] 12. Q. Had that message been received in 20-G at the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock?

A. No, it hadn't.

13. Q. At what time was that message received?

A. About 7:15 a. m., December 7, 1941.

14. Q. From what source was it received at 7:15?

A. From the Army translator.

15. Q. Had the Army initially intercepted that message or had it been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy?

A. It had been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy.

16. Q. When you came on watch at 7 o'clock, was any report made to you of the fact that this message was then in the hands of the Army for translation?

A. Yes.

17. Q. Was it reported to you at what time it had been received in the Navy?

A. I can't recall exactly. It was during the mid watch of December 7, 1941.

18. Q. After you received this message from the Army translators at approximately 7:15 a. m., December 7, 1941, what disposition was made of it?

A. It was held in abeyance until Commander Kramer arrived.

19. Q. Under the then existing instructions in the section of Communications on which you were on watch, was any other procedure possible?

A. No, that was our general order: to deliver all translations to G-Z, that is Commander Kramer and his group, if there were any of them there. Of course, that morning he was the only one available.

20. Q. Did you have any authority to go over their heads in their absence if urgent information was received?

A. No authority.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, N. S. Navy (Ret.):

21. Q. I call your attention to Document 15 of Exhibit 63. Some witnesses have referred to that as the Winds Message. Do you know whether any execution of that document was received by the Navy Department?

A. I have no knowledge of anything in regard to the execution of this particular message. I knew of it but of no execution.

[814] 22. Q. As far as you knew?

A. That is right. As far as I was concerned, it had not been executed. I had never seen any execution.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

23. Q. Was there any provision for communicating with Commander Kramer in his absence and advising him that an important message was ready for delivery?

A. He had been advised by telephone by the previous watch officer, Mr. Brotherhood.

24. Q. That this particular message was ready?

A. The Winds Message or the other?

25. Q. No, the other one.

A. Yes, he had been advised of that.

26. Q. You state that there was no provision made, in the case of the absence of Commander Kramer, for you or any of your officers to go direct to some higher authority?

A. No, there was no provision.

27. Q. No matter how urgent the message was, it had to await delivery to Commander Kramer?

A. In some cases we couldn't tell the urgency, because being in Japanese, it would have to go through a translator, and since the Army was the only one who had translators on at that time I had no power to go to anybody else.

28. Q. Were these Army translators physically in the Army War Department or here?

A. No, they were actually in the other building in the War Department.

29. Q. In the War Department building?

A. That is right.

30. Q. Was Commander Kramer the only man in that section who could handle a message of that sort. In other words, if he were out

of town for a week, would you have to hold the message until he got back?

A. No, there were other officers who could act. He was the only one in this particular case, and he had been there until midnight watching this stuff come out and was fully cognizant of what it was. He had seen the first 13 parts.

[815] 31. Q. The fact that he was the only one to handle it that night was because he had handled it until midnight and had went away for a little rest, I asume, and he was the one selected because of the continuity of the whole affair?

A. Yes, because of his tie-up with the State and the rest of the Navy Department.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy. Pages 824-842, inclusive.

[824] 29. Q. You have testified, Admiral, that you remember an officer in the Navy Department by the name of Kramer, whom you believe was the officer who processed the information between the Office of Director of Naval Communications and the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Did you, as a general rule, see the information that this officer brought for the Chief of Naval Operations? In other words, did he show it to you as a matter of custom?

A. Yes. I recall, of course, definitely, that an officer, Lieutenant Kramer or some other officer in a similar capacity, frequently, possibly almost daily, brought a small sheaf of dispatches to my office. Sometimes there were only a very few messages and at other times there were quite a number. By "quite a number", I mean maybe 20 or 30. These messages were of every conceivable character. Some pertained to the United States-Japanese diplomatic relations and other pertained to Japanese relations with other capitals. There was sometimes information regarding Japanese merchant ships and numerous other subjects. Whether these were all of the messages that were received by this means, I do not know. These messages, so far as I know, were shown or were given to one of the aides of the Chief of Naval Operations, to show to Admiral Stark. I believe they were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy, possibly to the Assistant Secretaries, although I am not certain on that point. They were also, I believe, shown to the President and to the Secretary of State, possibly to other officers in the State Department. They were shown to the Director of the War Plans Division, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, and I think Captain Schuirmann also saw them.

30. Q. I am interested in particular as to whether or not you, as a matter of custom, saw these dispatches when they were delivered by Lieutenant Kramer or any other liaison officer detailed by the Director of Naval Communications.

A. I saw a number of dispatches almost daily, as a matter of routine, but whether or not they were all the messages that were received in this manner, I do not know, or whether they were only selected messages.

31. Q. Admiral, I show you document 11 of Exhibit 63, which purports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 November. I would ask you to examine this document and state whether on 7 December or prior thereto, you had seen it or had been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I cannot state definitely whether or not I saw this message. The date, November 29, rings no bell in my memory.

32. Q. Can you state whether or not you had been informed of its contents?

A. I do not recall now of being aware that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to set a deadline on any date.

[825] 33. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds code." State whether on or before December 7 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of this document?

A. Yes, I had been. I remember a message of this character.

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within your cognizance?

A. This document bears the inscription, "translated on November 28." According to the system, I probably saw that on the following day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was received, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message, that there was some difference of opinion among the translators as to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did know definitely that they were setting up a code to be used in a weather broadcast.

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?

A. No, I don't remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called "winds" message?

A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that some time I did see the messages [826] which were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7, I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December, 1941.

43. Q. I show you document 18 of Exhibit 63, which states in substance, that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." "However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I may or may not have seen it. In the dispatch it bears the date of translation of November 28. If I saw it, I saw it on November 29. On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commanders of all fleets the war warning message which stated that negotiations with the Japanese had broken off. This dispatch merely confirms that, but tells them to keep up a pretense.

44. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether the information contained in this dispatch was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. It was not transmitted.

[827] 45. Q. Adverting to document 18, what negotiations in your opinion are being referred to in this document?

A. They refer to the negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese Ambassador.

46. Q. I show you document 17, Exhibit 63. This document sets out in the substance the Secretary of State's note of the 26th of November, 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the subject matter it contained on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. My answer to the question is similar to the foregoing one. This

document bears the date of translation of the 28th of November. If I saw it at all, I saw it on the 29th. I do not recall. However, this document simply relates what the Secretary of State had told the Japanese Ambassador, and the date of the dispatch from the Japanese was the 26th of November. It simply was confirmed by the Navy Department's dispatch of the 27th, which stated that negotiations with the Japanese had stopped. This simply recounts terms which Japan could not accept, probably we knew they would not accept when it was submitted.

47. Q. Adverting to the words in document 18, which I quote, "With the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days,"—what views did you think were being referred to in this document?

A. As I do not recall definitely whether or not I saw the document, I don't know what views were being referred to.

48. Q. Between the date of 28 November 1941 and 7 December, were any directives for security of the Fleet issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. May I see the exhibit which contains the war warning?

49. Q. Yes, sir.

A. On the 27th of November, a dispatch was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. This dispatch contained the words, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46". Except for those words, I do not recall that any dispatch directing that specific security measures be taken was sent.

50. Q. I show you document 21 from Exhibit 63, which states, "We are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Had you seen this document or had you been advised of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I may or may not have seen this dispatch. It bears the date of translation of December 1. If I saw it at all, I probably saw it on the 2nd of December. I do not now recall the particular thing in the dispatch; that is, "that we are advising the press and others to state that negotiations are continuing." I do not recall seeing the part about the President's return to the capital.

[828] Q. That being the case, you probably have no recollection of whether this information was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet?

A. In my recollection of the dispatches that were sent to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet as well as Asiatic Fleet, I do not recall a dispatch along these lines being sent to either of them.

52. Q. Adverting to document 38 of Exhibit 63, which was translated on December 6, 1941, and which sets out that a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November will be sent on December 7, that it is to be kept secret and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message, had you seen this document 38 or had you been made cognizant of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I saw this particular dispatch or not. It refers to the very long message which I did see very late on December 6 or very early in the morning of December 7, and whether or not I saw this dispatch I do not recall.

53. Q. Well, now, the message refers to a reply which is to be sent on 7 December. Were you on the alert prior to 7 December for some incoming message that would set out the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull's note of 26 November?

A. Some time during the night of December 6-7, there was brought to my house a very long message from the Japanese Government to the Ambassador in Washington, which set forth the Japanese position. The message was not complete, and I believe that the last part of the message was missing. Whether or not I saw this preliminary message at that time or not, I do not recall. The long message was a re-statement of the Japanese position and contained nothing new in it at all, except the tone was a little bit different.

54. Q. I believe my question was, Admiral, were you on the alert for this long message by virtue of any notice you had had prior to its receipt.

A. No.

[829] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

55. Q. I believe my question was, Were you on the alert for this long message by virtue of any notice you had had prior to its receipt?

A. No.

56. Q. You have testified that you did see a rather long dispatch. Did you say it was on the night of December 6?

A. It was some time during the night of December 6 or 7th. I don't know whether it was before or after midnight.

57. Q. You do not mean the night of December 7?

A. It was some time during the very late evening of December 6 or the early morning of December 7. Whether or not it was before or after midnight, I don't recall.

58. Q. You have also testified that, as you remember, the latter portion of this rather long message was missing?

A. As I remember, the officer who brought the dispatch to the house stated that there was a part of the message missing. I think he told me it was the latter part.

59. Q. Did the tone of this rather long message which you say you received on the night of 6th-7th of December, 1941, indicate a friendly or conciliatory spirit on the part of the Japanese?

A. No, because it merely confirmed the whole course of negotiations from the very beginning. This message was nothing but a smoke screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the record.

60. Q. Did you have any opinion at the time you saw this dispatch that diplomatic negotiations were then broken off officially?

A. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, negotiations with the Japanese had stopped about the 27th of November.

61. Q. I do not think your answer is responsive to the question.

The question was repeated to the witness.

A. On December 4, or just prior to December 4, we knew instructions had been sent to Japanese missions in various countries to destroy their codes and ciphers immediately and to destroy confidential publications. That was an indication [830] that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off in the very near future. As I did not

know when this note was to be presented, I did not know exactly when diplomatic negotiations were going to be ruptured.

62. Q. When you saw this long message and the tone of the note which the message contained, did you not at that point think that diplomatic negotiations were then officially broken off, as contrasted with other information which you had had previously and which you knew had broken them off de facto?

A. I could not tell when the Japanese were going to inform the State Department that they had broken off diplomatic relations. This long dispatch simply indicated the situation was very, very tense and that the break might come at any time, which we had previously stated some time ago to our Fleets.

63. Q. A witness has stated in testimony substantially that Commander McCollum, who was then on duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had prepared about a 500-word summary of the international situation as it had developed up to about December 4, 1941. He further stated that this message was presented, along with a number of others, to Admiral Leigh Noyes, then D. N. C., who made a comment when this long message was to be released to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet something to the effect, "I think you are insulting the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief. He is a busy man." The testimony shows further that this long summary of information was passed somewhere up the echelon of command. Admiral Stark testified that he had never seen this dispatch before its release. I am asking you, Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, can you recall whether or not such a summary was presented to you on or prior to December 7, 1941, for release to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not recall any such alleged message, nor do I recall any circumstances of the incident which you have related.

The court then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

[831] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

64. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was available in the Navy Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor any information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed by his government to seek an appointment with the Secretary of State at 1300 Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note? tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.

A. Yes, some time on the morning of December 7 I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State that afternoon, but just what hour I heard it and just how I heard it, I don't recall now.

65. Do you know from whom you first learned it?

A. No.

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not Commander Wellborn, the Flag Secretary, was in the office on the morning of December 7?

A. Admiral Stark's aides were usually in the Navy Department whenever Admiral Stark was there, and I don't recall whether Captain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.

67. Q. I suppose you do not recall Lieutenant Commander Smedberg or Captain McCrea?

A. No.

68. Q. Do you know with whom Admiral Stark discussed this information that morning about the Japanese Ambassador's appointment?

A. At some time he told me he had discussed this matter with General Marshall during the forenoon of December 7, but just when I learned that I don't recall now.

69. Q. Do you recall his mentioning anyone else with whom he discussed it?

A. No.

70. Q. Did Admiral Stark mention to you during the morning of December 7 or at any time immediately thereafter that he had received this information about the prospective appointment the night of December 6?

A. No.

71. Q. Did he tell you when he did first learn of it?

A. No, I don't recall that. Of course, we learned of the attack at Pearl Harbor that day, which practically took everything out of our mind as to what had happened in regard to hours and minutes, and I don't recall that now.

[832] 72. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63, which is the document instructing the Japanese Ambassador to submit to the United States Government the reply of the Japanese Government to the United States note at 1300 on the 7th of December. Will you please look at that document and tell the court what it shows as to the time of translation?

A. This document bears the date "translated 12/7/41."

73. Q. And was it an Army or Navy translation?

A. I presume it is Army, because it bears the word "Army" with the No. 7145.

74. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that Colonel Knox on his visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack told certain members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that this information concerning the prospective appointment was available to him (Colonel Knox) on the night of Saturday, December 6. Did you ever hear, either from Colonel Knox or from Admiral Stark, any indication that Colonel Knox knew of this information on the night of December 6?

A. I have no knowledge that Colonel Knox ever saw the dispatch.

75. Q. Do you have any knowledge of his ever having this information, whether or not he saw the dispatch?

A. I have stated, in answer to one of my questions, that dispatches received from this source were shown to the Secretary of the Navy. If that dispatch was included in one of the folders which were shown to various officers in the Navy Department, he might have, as a matter of routine, seen it.

76. Q. Did you ever hear Admiral Stark mention that he had heard Secretary Knox say that he knew of this prospective appointment on the night before, that is, Saturday night?

A. No.

77. Q. I assume that you, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, received much of the same information which the Chief of Naval Operations received, particularly with respect to estimates on the Far Eastern situation and intelligence concerning it; is that correct?

A. With regard to military and naval information, I think I received practically the same information that the Chief of Naval Operations received. With regard to political information, that which I received, in many cases, was second-hand, because the Chief of Naval Operations saw the President and the Secretary of State personally. I never attended those conferences, and what I knew about such conferences was what he told me. He probably had more information regarding the political situation, from first-hand knowledge, than I did.

[383] 78. Q. But you usually knew what Admiral Stark knew concerning these conferences which he attended? He usually recounted them to you?

A. I felt Admiral Stark kept me informed of everything that I should know. I do not recall anything now that I thought he should have told me that he did not tell me.

79. Q. Admiral Stark has testified that he does not remember seeing many of these documents which are included in Exhibit 63 in the form presented here. Your testimony is much to the same effect concerning certain of these documents. Do you consider the fact that you did not see these documents in the same form in which they are now presented to you particularly significant?

A. I am not quite sure that I know what you mean by "in the same form."

80. Q. They have been shown you as documents which are part of that exhibit. You say that you do not recall having seen them as a message in that form. Do you consider the fact that you did not see them, perhaps, in the same form as they are now presented to you particularly significant? Would you have gotten that information in other ways, for example?

A. Those messages which I saw, which were received from the source about which you are speaking, were typed on flimsy paper or were carbon copies of messages typed on flimsy paper. May I see the exhibit?

The witness was handed Exhibit 63.

A. These messages appear to be in the form in which I saw them, and the first message I turn to bears my initials, so I must have seen this particular dispatch in this form.

81. Q. Admiral, what I mean is that you have testified and Admiral Stark has testified that some of those messages shown you this morning you do not recall having seen at the time. Is it possible, however, that the information which is contained in those messages might have come to you in some other way, as, for example, the morning conferences in the Secretary's office or reports of memoranda made by the head of War Plans or ONI; so it is not particularly important if you did not see the basic information from which those estimates were drawn?

A. I see what you are driving at. As I stated before, I am not certain that I saw every dispatch which was received from this source. It is not particularly significant that I either did not see them or that I do not recall them, because [834] during the course of any one day there were hundreds of dispatches regarding every conceivable subject—our own operations, administrative dispatches. There were written reports of every character, not to mention the pounds of correspondence. There was a conference in the Secretary's office each morning at which the whole world situation, not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and the Far East was explained. There was a discussion following these presentations, which was usually made by the Director of Naval Intelligence, in which the situation as of that day was threshed out. So it is quite probable that some of these dispatches might not have been shown to us, or if they were shown to us, we did not consider each one individually, because we knew we would get the general tenor of it after it had been evaluated by the sections of War Plans, Communications, and Naval Intelligence, who were charged with the details of such matters.

82. Q. It has been testified that, with the exception of the information concerning the destruction of codes, concerning which a dispatch was sent on December 3, none of the information which is included in Exhibit 63, which you have before you, was sent to CinCPac. Did the Navy Department ordinarily send all the information received of this type to CinCPac or any other of its commanders-in-chief?

A. No, the information was not sent in this exact form to any of the commanders-in-chief. I know it was the aim of the Chief of Naval Operations to keep the commanders-in-chief informed of the situation as he saw it. Some of it he did by personal letters and from time to time he sent dispatches which related to the international situation and to the military situation. I think it would have been an unusual burden on Communications in general and on the staffs of the commanders-in-chief to have had to translate all of these messages, and I think that there were better facilities in Washington for evaluating the messages than there were in any of the Fleets. I know that would be the case in the Atlantic Fleet today if I had to receive all these things. I have neither the staff nor the facilities for evaluating information of that kind. I think that the summaries which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations with regard to the political situation—and most of these dispatches do refer to the political situation—were accurate.

8. Q. Do you feel that you were reasonably well informed during the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, with respect to the Japanese situation either through seeing these basic sources of information or through the estimates which were given you by War Plans and Intelligence?

A. I have answered that same question in considerable detail in regard to the political situation and in a different [835] degree as to the military-naval situation. Yes, I think I was as well informed as it was possible to be informed, generally speaking.

84. Q. Did you concur in the dispatch of November 27, which is known as the "war warning" dispatch and which was sent by the

Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic?

A. This dispatch was prepared by Op. 12, which means it was prepared in the War Plans Division. I remember distinctly that this dispatch was under discussion, and I remember particularly the use of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered as a war warning." Words of that kind had never been used in any dispatch before. The words which have been inserted in pencil in this dispatch are in my handwriting, and I am absolutely sure I concurred in this dispatch, and I know it was released only after I knew Admiral Stark had concurred and approved of every word in it.

85. Q. Was any information brought to your attention during the period from November 27 to December 7 either from sources outside the Navy Department, such as the State Department, for example, or from C. N. O. subordinates within the department, which indicated to you that the war warning dispatch and the directive which it contained should be modified or strengthened in any respect?

A. The tenor of this dispatch was never modified by any subsequent dispatches nor was it relaxed in any way. The only subsequent information which I considered important and which was sent to the commanders-in-chief was the one on December 3 informing them that the Japanese diplomatic missions had been directed to destroy their codes and ciphers. That message and the "war warning" message, I thought, were the two most important messages which were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations, and they are the two which I remember very distinctly.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

86. Q. I show you Document 24 in Exhibit 63 and ask whether you recall seeing that or learning of its contents? Document 24 is one of those from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ships in Pearl Harbor.

A. No, I have no recollection of ever seeing that dispatch.

87. Q. Or learning of its contents?

A. I am not certain whether I learned of its contents at some time after December 7 or not. I recall being very much surprised when Mr. Knox returned from his visit to [836] Honolulu and said that the Japanese aviators had little maps which showed the location of the ships, which indicated that they must have known where individual ships were moored. I remember being astonished by that exhibit which he brought back.

88. Q. You do not recall having seen Document 24 prior to December 7 or having learned of its contents?

A. Definitely not. Whether I saw it later or whether I was told about it, I do not recall now.

89. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63, which is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ship movements. I ask you whether you saw that on or prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. No.

90. Q. You did neither?

A. No. I would not have attached any particular importance to this dispatch regarding movements, because it was so easy to see what

movements were being made in the Hawaiian Islands that I presumed they were being made as a matter of routine anyway.

91. Q. I call your attention to Document 37 from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated on December 5, relative to locations of ships in Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document on or prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. I do not remember this one at all. Area "N" rings no bell in my memory.

92. Q. It appears to have been translated on the 5th of December.

A. The document states that it was translated on the 5th of December, and, according to the system, unless it was taken around especially, it would have been seen by those to whom it had been shown on the 6th.

93. Q. I call your attention to Document 40 from Honolulu to Tokyo, translated on December 6, which reports courses and speeds of American war ships coming into Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. I am absolutely positive I never saw this document before this moment.

94. Q. Was there any record kept of who did see these documents which were carried around by officer messenger and shown to you and to various other people who have testified?

A. I don't know. I have apparently initialed some dispatches. I note my initials on one of them in this [837] exhibit. I also recall that when a dispatch was brought to my house, I was required to sign that I had seen it, and I think I recall having signed for the dispatch which was delivered at my house on the night of December 6-7.

95. Q. It was one which was taken around and shown, as I understand it?

A. I recall definitely having seen that particular dispatch. It was usually my custom to put an "I" on messages that I saw.

96. Q. At what time did you get to the office on Sunday morning, December 7?

A. I do not recall now the exact hour at which I arrived at the Navy Department on the morning of December 7. I had gone to the Navy Department every Sunday morning for the last year, and I probably got there somewhere between 8 and 9 o'clock. The exact hour I do not now recall.

97. Q. Do you recall how long after you got to the Navy Department you were apprised of the information in these dispatches which were available that morning?

A. Are you referring to the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their message to the Secretary of State at a particular time?

98. Q. Not only to that but also to the 14th part of the long message which you had seen the night before?

A. I don't know at what time I became aware of the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to see the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that day. I do not recall whether or not I discussed the long message with Admiral Stark that morning. I do not recall that I ever saw the 14th part or the last part of the very long message.

99. Q. Do you recall whether there were discussions about the Japanese situation shortly after you arrived in the Department that morning?

A. I do not recall that I had any discussions with anybody regarding the Japanese situation that morning until I was informed by Admiral Stark that he and General Marshall had discussed the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to present their reply to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that afternoon.

100. Q. Do you recall whether you had been in conference with Admiral Stark on that morning prior to his telling you that?

A. I don't recall now whether I saw Admiral Stark before he told me that or not. I probably saw him coming into the office—I couldn't have helped it—but what he [838] said prior to that I don't recall now.

101. Q. You have testified in direct examination that these documents, the character of which are in Exhibit 63, were, as a matter of routine, shown to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans officer, the Director of Naval Intelligence, possibly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and possibly to Captain Schuirmann, who is now Admiral Schuirmann. Have I mentioned the complete list?

A. I admire your memory. I think you have enumerated every person I stated.

102. Q. Do you know whether the information was also shown to the War Department?

A. I am quite certain that it was, but I don't know what officials in the War Department received such dispatches. As I recall now, the messages received in code were translated on one day by the Navy Department and on the following day were translated by the War Department, and they were charged with keeping the other department informed of what had been received and translated. Just what the process of distributing these messages to the War Department was I don't know. It wasn't my detailed responsibility to see that that was done.

103. Q. If my arithmetic is correct, the list I have enumerated comes to either nine or ten, the difference being my doubt as to whether the Assistant Secretary received one.

A. I think I said secretaries.

[839] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

104. Q. And yet it was the specific policy of the Office of Naval Operations to deny this information to responsible commanders-in-chief in the Pacific and in the Asiatic; is that correct?

A. I did not say it was the policy of the Navy Department to deny this information to the commanders-in-chief in the Pacific. I stated that it would have been a burden on communications to have transmitted every dispatch of this character to have transmitted every dispatch of this character which was received to the commanders-in-chief afloat.

105. Q. If a selected process had been used the burden on communications would have been correspondingly relieved, would it not?

A. That is correct.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

106. Q. In that connection, Admiral, may I show you, please, Exhibit 17, which is the war warning dispatch dated November 27, 1941. You mentioned that the pencil marks on the document are in your handwriting, sir?

A. The pencil insertion of the word "Thai" and all that follows, beginning "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. Copy to War Plans Division, War Department" are in my handwriting.

107. Q. And this word "probably" that is stricken out, is that your handwriting, sir?

A. I can't identify a straight line as being done by me, and I do not remember having struck it out.

108. Q. To complete the document which has not yet been read in evidence because it has only at this point been identified, is the last passage to the November 27th message which reads, "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." I invite your attention to Exhibit 20, Admiral, which is the December 3rd dispatch. Can you recall whether the last line was stricken out by yourself or someone else, or do you know anything about it.

A. Unfortunately, the punch has gone through the number indicating the Office of Operations in which this dispatch originated, but due to the fact that it has typed "Released by T. S. Wilkinson" it was undoubtedly prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I remember this dispatch very clearly. It is perfectly obvious that the words which were stricken out were not desired to be sent. I released this dispatch and just the reason for not wanting to send those words I do not now recall but looking at the [840] dispatch now, the directions to burn codes at the places mentioned, which included Washington, Manila and London, did not necessarily mean that "From foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." It was simply confined to giving them the definite information that the codes were to be destroyed in those places.

109. Q. Admiral, sir, in connection with that last line, and in relation to the message, would it be a fair statement that that line that was stricken out amounted to an evaluation of the message?

A. All I can see now is that we did not want those words sent at that time.

110. Q. Would the words "From foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia" indicate an evaluation of the other information that is in it?

A. I have stated that it was not necessarily the correct evaluation to be placed upon the destruction of codes in the places enumerated in that dispatch.

111. Q. Admiral, just one other question, sir: Was there anything in this message that evaluated that information? It was just the raw information, was it not, sir?

A. The inference to be inferred from this dispatch was that Japan was assumed to be at war with Britain, the Dutch, and the United States, because they were directed to destroy their codes at places in the countries of those nations, including the capitals. The capital of Holland was then in the possession of the Germans.

112. Q. Do you recall, sir, whether or not the information that was in the possession of the Navy Department at the time when this December 3rd message was written, was to the effect that the Japanese instructions were to burn, as I recall, all their codes and destroy their cipher machines? Do you recall whether that was the information on which this was based? That is, this document only says "some of their codes" and I don't think it means their machines.

A. That dispatch was undoubtedly prepared from information received from the secret source about which we have been talking for some time. Whether it is an exact quotation of a Japanese dispatch, I cannot tell without seeing the dispatch on which it is based.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. Admiral, with reference to your answers in which you stated that the breaking off of negotiations, and so forth, simply confirmed your previous information. In that connection you also referred a number of times to "indicated war was imminent". Isn't the breaking off of negotiations an indication of imminence of breaking out of war, in your [841] opinion?

A. Not necessarily, but the fact that the Japanese were massing large numbers of ships in Southeastern China, in Formosa, and in Hainan; that they had large numbers of landing craft there, indicated that they were getting ready for a military movement of large proportions. At just what time we received information that those forces were on the move to the south I cannot now recall but it was within the week prior to December 7th. They were followed by planes from the Asiatic Fleet around the southeast corner of Siam and we were not sure when they got there just what direction they would take, whether they would go up into Siam proper, or whether they would go towards the Kra Peninsula. It was also quite evident that if the Japanese were going to go to war with the United States the Philippines were a probable objective. We expected that Guam would drop like a ripe plum.

114. Q. Just to complete that picture, would a movement in the South Pacific around Thailand and the Gulf of Siam area and so forth necessarily mean war with the United States? In your opinion, I mean.

A. The fact that we expected it would be war with the United States was indicated in the dispatch which told them to destroy their codes in Washington. The political and military situations were in perfect concert, which indicated that they were going to go to war with us shortly. That was the estimate made by Admiral Stark on the 27th of November and proved to be true.

115. Q. Well, can you state, then, if that was Admiral Stark's opinion why did he merely emphasize a message by calling it a war warning and then naming certain areas in which they might attack and he did not name the Hawaiian area? And further, why he didn't definitely stop with "this is a war warning" instead of complicating it by referring to certain areas and leaving out the Hawaiian area?

A. There was placed in the dispatch that there were certain objectives in the Far East which we felt were reasonably certain would be objectives because the massing of ships and troops in that area indicated that there was an aggressive movement in that area. We

had no definite information of an aggressive movement in any other area.

116. Q. I am putting so much emphasis on this war warning message because you have put so much emphasis on it. Don't you believe that if they were so certain of their estimate it would have been better to stop and say "War is imminent; this is a war warning" and forget everything else where they were going to operate?

A. That was the intention of the war message, that he wanted to state that he felt war was likely to come at any moment. On the other hand, there was a wish not to take any step on the part of the United States which would provoke war with Japan.

[842] 117. Q. Well, the message I speak of, if you had simply stopped with "This is a war warning", that wouldn't have started anything necessarily, any more than the one that was sent?

A. So far as I know, Admiral, no commander-in-chief afloat ever told the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch or otherwise that he didn't understand any of the directives that were sent to him or he never asked for an amplification or elaboration on any of the instructions that he received. In the absence of any such you could only assume that they were understood.

Extracted testimony of General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army. Pages 869-884, inclusive.

[869] 41. Q. After November 6, 1941, when did you have information that negotiations, so far as the Japanese were concerned, had been terminated?

A. On the morning of November 27 the Secretary of State, as I recall, told General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division of the War Department, that the conversation had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. I was out of the city at the time and did not reach the War Department until the following morning, November 28. I assume I was given this information at that time.

42. Q. Did you, after the release of the dispatch which is referred to in Exhibit 19, send a further directive as to the action to be taken in the Hawaiian Department relative to any security measures there?

A. Yes, on December 7.

43. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 before this court and ask you if that is the directive to which you refer and which you sent on December 7, 1941?

A. Yes. However, the message was sent from a longhand pencil draft of mine. This is a formal copy of the latter, typed.

44. Q. Then, between the time of your dispatch, which is Exhibit 19 and at which you have just been looking, and the dispatch of December 7, 1941, you had sent no directives as to security measures in the Hawaiian area?

A. On November 28, 1941, two additional measures warning against the possibility of sabotage were sent to the Hawaiian Department, one to the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, the Western Department, the Panama Canal—That, of course, includes Alaska—and the other to the Army at large in the continental United States as well as overseas. The first one was sent by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Sherman Miles, which went to the various overseas Western Defense Commanders, and was a reminder of the

sabotage problem. I didn't see that myself until, I think, the time of the Roberts Commission. The other message which went to the continental United States, as well as overseas, had been prepared by General Arnold's staff, and then the G-2 staff involved themselves in it to make certain it clearly stated the case, and it was sent, but it related to sabotage, suspicions or beliefs, that occurred here in the United States rather than overseas and perhaps of German or Japanese origin. The Air Corps at that time felt they were having accidents to planes which could be explained only by some form of sabotage, and they felt that they had fairly concrete evidence of this. Therefore, those were two War Department messages which I personally was not involved in, but mine was sent on December 7.

[870] 45. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63, which purports to state the deadline of November 29, 1941, as being absolute for signing the agreement. State whether you saw the contents of this document, or had been informed of the subject matter contained therein, on or about November 22, 1941, the date when it was purported to have been translated.

A. I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers. The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain, however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers at the time. I learned finally what had happened was that in order to safeguard this material, they would keep one record, which was their basic paper, in the Intelligence or G-2 section. The result of that has been that the duplicate copy comes to me. All of those have been destroyed. Therefore, on those particular papers there is no existing record of my initials on any of them, because they had only one paper which they received and destroyed each day, as they do now. I see them each day and then they are destroyed. In this case I am not certain that I saw or knew about this message.

[871] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

46. Q. This document mentions 29 November as an absolute deadline for signing the agreement. Did this absolute deadline have any special significance to you at that time?

A. Well, to go to the original date, which I think was November 25th, we conjectured at that time what that meant, and the only solution that could be offered—which was not accepted; it was merely considered—was that that was the anniversary of the signing of the anti-Comintern pact and that they wanted the negotiations to get cleared to a certain point in relation to the renewal of that pact. However, when the message came in to which you just referred, and gave a new date, that, of course, brushed aside, apparently, the possibility that these dates referred to anything of that nature, and left us with merely a guess as to how critical the matter was. I might interject now and say that when the final message came in that indicated the 7th, and an hour, that, of course, was quite a different matter. That was a specific hour of Washington time, as well as a day. That meant something, somewhere, very definitely was related to that hour. There was no doubt in our mind about that.

47. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63 which transmits Mr. Hull's note of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese government. Were you shown this document, or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or about the date of its translation, which is set out as 28 November, 1941?

A. I do not recall.

48. Q. I show you Document No. 18 of Exhibit 63, which is purported to have been translated on 28 November 1941, and which sets out in substance that with the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days the negotiations will be ruptured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that negotiations are broken off. Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or before the day of its translation, 28 November 1941?

A. I have no recollection of seeing that specific message but I am reasonably certain that I must have seen it.

49. Q. The message says "with the views of the Imperial Government which are forthcoming." What did you consider those views were that they were going to send?

A. I don't know quite how to answer that at the moment. I know what they are now and I don't know what I thought.

50. Q. In the dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department concerning which you have testified already and which expressed the view that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated for all practical purposes, did the language of Document 18 contain that view on the progress of negotiations?

A. I don't recall that.

[872] 51. Q. It is noted that these views, which are, "To terminate de facto the negotiations will be sent in two or three days." Did you consider the de facto termination of the negotiations had any connection with the Japanese military operations?

A. I imagine that I did.

52. Q. Do you recall whether or not you associated that with any particular operation?

A. No, other than we had definite evidence of what appeared to be to us hostile preparations in the Far East.

53. Q. Did the words "These views which are to be sent in two or three days" have any significance in connection with the expected reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November?

A. I don't recall.

54. Q. Do you recall whether or not before 6 December 1941 you were on the alert for the receipt of any views or a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November?

A. I have no definite recollection. I presume that I was because this thing was going along all the time.

55. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 which is purported to have been translated on 28 November, 1941. This document has been popularly termed in circles where known as the Winds code. Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or about the day of its translation, that is, 28 November 1941?

A. My very dim recollection is that that was referred to in a Joint Board meeting. I'm quite certain that I was aware of it; I'm quite certain of that.

56. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 receive any information which put any part of this code in effect?

A. I don't recall that.

57. I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63. This document contains the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November 1941. Will you state when you first saw this document or were made aware of its contents?

A. I went to the War Department on Sunday morning, December 7th. I don't just recall at what time. And I was given this document. I read it through, naturally carefully, and some parts of it several times to get the full significance of it. As I finished it I found another page which was the message referring to 1:00 p. m. Incidentally, I was told that that had been monitored at 6:30 that morning, Western Time, Northwest, the Puget Sound area, I believe. But I did not reach that until some 10 or 15 minutes after 11:00, I think, I spent quite a long time reading this thing. It is quite a remarkable document. Therefore, I lost quite a lot of time reading that. I will go ahead with the procedure if you want me to.

[873] 58. Q. Please continue. I think that will be better.

A. So I called up Admiral Stark on the 'phone—he was at his desk—and proposed that we send a message. One or the other of us always tried to avoid, to safeguard the codes, both sending a message about the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. At first, he thought it might be inadvisable; that they would be confused with too many of these messages. I then wrote out in longhand the message that you have here, and just as it was leaving the room he called me back and asked me if I had sent any message yet, and I said it was just going, and he said he would like to have added to it the usual thing, "Notify naval opposite." So I added that to it and sent it in that form with Colonel Bracken, I think his name is, who is the man who has charge of these special papers. When he came back I queried him as to the time of dispatch and all. I didn't get a very clear understanding of the thing so I sent him back with Colonel Bundy, who was the member of the War Plans Division who was in charge of matters pertaining to the Philippines and Hawaii and Panama. He and Colonel Bundy then went back to the message center, the coding room, and came back—I've forgotten what time they came back—and told me. It had to do with how long it took to deliver the message, and as I recall, when they came back they said it was 30 minutes, or that it took 30 minutes and it would be in the hands of the recipients. At that time there was something still further unclarified to me so I had them return the second time—which meant the third time for Bracken—and they came back and answered me, apparently, to my entire satisfaction. At least I understood what the thing was. The actual time, I think, of the departure of the message was about noon, something of that sort, Washington time, and I believe the records will show that it reached Hawaii at 7:32, I think on the morning of the 7th. I have no time for the reading of this big long document, or the time I talked to Stark. The interval between the talks with Stark couldn't have been over two or three minutes because it was a very short message and I wrote it off in long-

hand. I think I have some notes here. It says, "And at 11:45 Eastern Standard Time, Admiral Stark asked that the various Army commanders who had received the message be instructed to convey it to the naval opposites" and it was sent to that effect. It was received in the message center at 11:50 and it was sent by radio to all points except Hawaii and they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station; therefore, they sent it on a straight Western Union circuit into San Francisco and they had something out to Hawaii. I didn't know that until afterwards. It went everywhere else on straight Army radio without any delay. They couldn't raise Hawaii by the radio. It went everywhere else, the Philippines it went right through; Panama and San Francisco, but they couldn't raise the Hawaiian station for some reason [874] on the radio. They then sent it through the Western Union through a connection they had into San Francisco. They can tell you out there what happened; I don't know. This is pure hearsay on my part. I know at the time I was told they had a teletype from the Western Union station in Honolulu to the Commanding General of the Army forces, but that didn't function.

59. Q. Did I understand you to state, General, that you had not received any part of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note, that is, the 14 points, until Sunday morning, January 7, 1941?

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

60. Q. General, you have before you Exhibit 63, the document that contains the various documents that you have been looking at. I want to ask you some questions about that. I take it that you are familiar in a general way with the type of material that is contained in that exhibit, whether or not you are familiar with the exact messages that are in there, I don't know, but you are familiar with the general type of information?

A. Quite familiar.

61. Q. You are familiar with the fact that during the period immediately preceding 7 December those messages indicate that they were broken partly by the Army and partly by the Navy; that there was a joint arrangement in existence between the two services that, I believe, one day the Army broke them and the next day the Navy broke them?

A. I don't know about that but I know they were both involved in it.

62. Q. And that they had a method for exchanging the information that they got from the messages which each service broke?

A. I believe so.

63. Q. Now, would you tell the court how the messages were handled in the War Department as nearly as you can, from their initial breaking and translation by the S. I. S? In other words, we have had explained to the court here by the Navy representatives how these things were handled in the Navy Department and I think it would help to establish the picture.

A. You will have to get one of the people that handled it. I get it in my hands under a special cover. I read it and sign it and it is taken out very specially and nobody else sees it, and then it goes back to its source. I couldn't give you the minutia of its arrangement, but it would be very simple to have someone come in and report on it.

[875] 64. Q. Do you understand that all the messages that are received of this type are brought to you personally for inspection, or is there some screening that is set up some place in the War Department where they decide which of these messages are considered important enough for you to be bothered with or for you to see?

A. know that there is screening at the present time because I have directed it.

65. Q. Do you recall what the situation was before December 7th?

A. I don't recall at that particular moment what it was. In other words, it was entirely too voluminous for me; I would retire as Chief of Staff and read every day.

66. Q. You have no present recollection as to what the situation was at that time?

A. I know they were too long; there was too much of it.

67. Do you recall whether prior to 7 December these messages were being passed to the appropriate field commanders who might be concerned with the subject matter?

A. I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of it. As I understood it at the time, the source of most of these came in from naval monitoring stations. I had thought at the time that the commander in the Philippines and the Commander in Hawaii got part of the information because the monitoring stations are there. I have been told since, I believe, that they did not, but that is a matter of fact which conjecture on my part isn't suitable testimony.

68. Q. More specifically, then, General, did you decide when you saw a particular message, or did you feel called upon to decide when you saw a particular message, whether or not it should be passed to an appropriate field commander, or where the messages only passed to you for information and whatever decision should be made in that respect made by some one of your subordinates?

A. Well, you are going now into the whole operation of any commander. I see the thing. These people make proposals. Again I direct without waiting for the proposals. That would apply in this particular case. They go through the things very carefully and accurately because they are concentrated on everything that pertains to this particular thing. I am related to that and also the matters on the Hill and to matters all over the world. In an example I have just testified to here, I read the message and wrote the reply immediately. I didn't consult anybody other than Admiral Stark about that. It was perfectly clear-cut. I knew what should be done immediately. The preceding message that we sent of November 27th which I stated General Gerow thought that I did not see, I'm pretty certain I did not see it, and I'm reasonably certain that I was concerned in the drafting of the message of warning, the alert, because that would be something that would indicate to me that very positive action was necessary. Now, the very positive action [876] probably would be done in the War Plans Division, General Gerow for example, or I might act direct or they might bring it to me. The same thing applies to your question about screening. They go through all of it. I can't possibly do that. And they bring to me the most essential portions that refer to things that are of a critical nature. If they fail, why, I change the man, that's all.

69. Q. General, I call your attention to Document 40 of Exhibit 63, which contains information sent from Kita, in Honolulu, to Tokyo, dated November 18, 1941, and showing on its face that it was handled by the Army and was translated on December 6, 1941, and I ask you whether or not you recall having seen that message prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I am not certain but I think I saw this message after the event.

70. Q. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, General, which is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated November 18, 1941, bearing the notation that it was handled by the Army and was translated on 5 December 1941. Do you recall having seen that message prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't recall that.

71. Q. As I understand your testimony, then, General, in most cases involving material of this type, the decision as to whether it should be passed on to the appropriate Army commander might have been your decision in some cases, or might have been the decision of the Chief of War Plans Division, I believe you said, or some other appropriate subordinate whose duty it was to read and evaluate these messages?

A. Normally, it wouldn't be his decision but it would be his proposal to me for me to approve.

72. Q. And did you personally approve those proposals? That is, in the event that it was decided to send a message to the appropriate field commanders forwarding this information, did you personally approve the forwarding of that message, or was it just sent in your name as is ordinarily the case?

A. Well, that isn't an ordinary message, as a rule. I should imagine that in most instances, I did. Of course, I was away a great deal myself. I might add that I was traveling about 60,000 miles a year then and I was traveling a great deal. We were making an army.

73. Q. Then does it sum up the situation accurately, General, to say that the information of this type and the other information which you had in the War Department on 27 November was considered by you to be generally summarized and sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in your war warning dispatch of 27 November? That is, that that dispatch reflected the entire picture that you had at that time, including information of this type, and other elements?

A. I wouldn't say that it reflected the entire picture. [877] It gave the state of a crisis and the direction for action.

74. Q. In that sense, though, it did reflect certain information which you had in the War Department but had not passed on in its original form to the Commanding General?

A. That's it.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

75. Q. On the 6th of December, Saturday, General, were you acquainted with the fact that Japan had sent to her ambassadors 13 of 14 parts of a message or note to be delivered or transmitted at some later date to our Secretary of State?

A. I do not recall that I was aware of such information.

76. Q. There has been evidence adduced before this court indicating that information to that effect was available in the Navy Department in Washington in readable English and smooth form not later than

9:15 to 9:30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, on Saturday, the 6th of December. If you did not get the information on Saturday, the 6th of December, General, that would be due, would it not, to some failure in the echelons of command in transmitting the information to you?

A. I couldn't say that offhand. It would depend on where I was, which I do not recall on that particular Saturday. I might have been quite a number of places. I don't know now where I actually was. I have this recollection of the day of December 7th: that when I came to the War Department I was told by the officer in charge of this special type of information that they had been working all night, as I understood him to express it at the time, on this matter; that the deciphering had taken a long time; that quite a bit of the Japanese deciphered thing was sent over to the War Department to be translated into English, and as I gathered at the time—I am just speaking from a dim recollection of that time—this had gone on during the night; the deciphering had been done on the Navy side but the translation into English, on account of the length of this thing, had bogged them down and they had called on the War Department's similar agency to assist in the translation from Japanese into English. Then, as I said, this final message—I am merely giving my recollection now—had been monitored at 6:30 that morning on the West Coast; I presume Washington. That, again, had to come in, be deciphered and be translated. I got the impression at this time that they got all this thing together and they sent for me. As I recall, I had been horseback riding and I came in immediately after the ride and went straight to the War Department and ran into this long message. That is my only recollection of the affair.

[878] 77. Q. I have only asked about Saturday at the moment. There has been evidence adduced before this court that the underlying language of the long message which was to be delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to our State Department was English rather than Japanese.

A. I don't know about that. I would suggest this: You are asking me to guess about something that I have not the facts concerning and I have not investigated and we have the officer that knows and you can call him here and he can testify.

78. Q. I have only been trying to direct my questions generally to the time when you acquired a knowledge.

A. Mine was very specifically on Sunday morning.

79. Q. And you had no knowledge of the fact that another message was coming designating the time of delivery, on Saturday?

A. That is my recollection.

80. Q. And you have no recollection of where you were on Saturday night?

A. No, I haven't.

81. Q. Whether you were at home, or whether you were in the Department, or where you were?

A. I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this instant.

82. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether you talked to Admiral Stark on Saturday?

A. Saturday evening?

83. Q. Yes.

A. I have no recollection whatever of that. The probability is that I did not.

84. Q. There is evidence before the court that the full 14 parts of the long message to which you have made reference and a shorter message indicating 1:00 o'clock as the time of delivery had been processed and were in smooth, readable English form before 8:00 o'clock on Sunday morning, 7 December. Can you fix more definitely the hour that you learned of those facts?

A. No, other than the time that was given here that I spoke to Admiral Stark over the 'phone would have to be used as the finish of the affair and then we would have to estimate how long it took me to digest this thing before I came to this 1:00 o'clock affair at the end of it. I read fairly rapidly. This was a most unusual message, of course. I recall distinctly re-reading parts of it and reflecting on it when I was reading, but I think I read much more rapidly than the average man. That is all I could give you on it, which would indicate that probably [879] I arrived there about half-past 10:00; I'm just guessing.

85. Q. Well, assuming the fact to be as I stated of the evidence here, General, that this information was available to the Navy Department by 8:00 o'clock, what is the explanation for there being a 2-hour delay of that information getting to you?

A. All I can think of at the moment is that if it came across—when it did come across—the officer who was in charge of it, because it was very secret, whether he sat down and read it before he gave it to me. If he did, you would have to add on his time of reading on it.

86. Q. In your conversation with Admiral Stark—this is after you had finished reading it, you called him as I understood it?

A. I called him on the White House 'phone.

87. Q. (Continuing.)—did Admiral Stark in any form of words inquire of you as to the rapidity of the means of communication that were available to you for the transmission of this message?

A. No, our conversation was very brief and entirely confined to whether or not the message should be sent, and then to having it referred to the naval opposite.

88. Q. There was no conversation in which you in effect said that you thought you could get it out as quickly as the Navy Department?

A. None whatever.

89. Q. Prior to the sending of the message that you dispatched, or that was dispatched by the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, among others, on the 27th of November, had you learned of the delivery by the State Department to the Japanese Government of a diplomatic note dated the 26th of November? It is a long document.

A. Yes. I don't recall. I imagine I knew something about it. I don't recall.

90. Q. You have no recollection as to whether you then regarded that note as an ultimatum, or not?

A. No.

91. Q. Did you learn from the Navy Department of the dispatch sent by it—the Navy Department—on the even date, that is, the 27th of November, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. What is the question?

92. Q. When did you learn from the Navy Department the fact that they had sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 27th of November?

A. I don't recall that.

[880] 93. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conversation with any Navy people about it, about the coincident message?

A. I don't recall that. I wasn't here on the 27th, for one thing.

94. Q. Or the 26th?

A. I left the War Department about noon of the 26th and didn't get back to the War Department until the morning of the 28th.

95. Q. Do you recall any conversation with the Navy Department on the 26th about sending some message of that character?

A. No, I don't recall any specific conversation about it. I don't mean to imply that I didn't have it; I just don't recall it.

96. Do you recall having any conversations with Admiral Stark relative to the diplomatic note of the 26th of November?

A. I don't recall that.

97. Q. Either one way or the other?

A. No.

98. Q. You made a joint recommendation to the President with Admiral Stark including, among other things, the affirmative recommendation that no ultimatum should be sent. That is in evidence here. It was dated, I believe, on the 5th of November. Did you regard the note of the 26th of November as sympathetic and parallel with your joint recommendation to the President?

A. I don't recall.

99. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Admiral Stark on that phase of the case?

A. No, I don't. I must explain to you gentlemen, if I saw these things I saw them this morning. It is a long time.

100. Q. I am talking about this diplomatic note.

A. Yes. Well, I am talking about this thing. My reminder was this morning. Some things I have a very clear recollection of, and others I do not.

101. Q. Do you recall seeing the answers that General Short sent to your dispatch, or the War Department's dispatch, of the 27th and the subsequent one on the 28th?

A. No, I don't know about that. What actually shows, so far as we can determine, is that the reply from the Philippines and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were fastened with one of these staples that go through. I initialed the one from the Philippines which was on top, and I did not initial the one from Hawaii. This was the one I was referring to (indicating).

[881] 102. Q. You don't recall having seen that (indicating)?

A. Well, I am explaining. I have no recollection one way or the other. The message in the records came with a staple fastened to the one from the Philippines, and this was on the bottom. I have initialed the Philippines one but I haven't initialed this one. The trouble in this connection is, I had a conversation regarding its meaning with Colonel Bundy, who is the officer in charge of that thing, I think the afternoon of December 7th after we knew the attack was on; that is my recollection of it. My recollection of that is, Bundy was explaining his interpretation of the message. The unfortunate part of the thing is that he was killed right after that when I sent him out to Hawaii. He left about two days later, I think, and was killed en route out there, so I don't recall this and I am confused in the conver-

sation that I had—I'm pretty certain after the event—in relation to what I might have been thinking about before the event.

103. Q. Do you have any recollection of knowing between the 27th of November and the 7th of December what precautions General Short had actually inaugurated?

A. No, I don't recall that. I was away two or three times in that particular period and the War Plans people were checking all these things from the various departments that came in.

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conferences with Admiral Stark in that 10-day period from the 27th of November until the 7th of December?

A. On any subject?

105. Q. Well, on any subject in connection with the Pacific and Japanese situation?

A. No, I don't. I suppose the records would show. We were having very frequent meetings of the Joint Board and he and I were having even more frequent meetings and were talking over the telephone almost every day.

106. Q. You were both members of the Joint Board?

A. Yes. He was the senior member.

107. Q. Well it is your recollection that during the days that you were in Washington in this interval from the 27th of November to the 7th of December that you did confer with Admiral Stark?

A. I couldn't say that I did every day, but we were in frequent conference and had a habit of telephoning almost daily about this and that. I might add also that we were going to frequent meetings with Mr. Hull.

108. Q. Do you recall whether any of these talks that you had just prior to the 7th of December with Admiral Stark dealt with the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier?

A. No, I don't recall that. I might say that my recollection would be that we thought they had been working on [882] defense plans in Hawaii through the years. They had just reached what seemed to be a very workable arrangement and the normal assumption would be that they were pretty well coordinated. Our great problems were out in the Philippines where the means were no slack that it was quite a problem what they were going to do out there.

109. Q. But you have no recollection of any specific talk one way or the other?

A. No, I have not.

110. Q. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Stark at any time relative to the transmission to the responsible commanders in Hawaii of any of the information contained in Document 63?

A. I don't recall that.

111. Q. One way or the other, or do you recall that there was none?

A. I don't recall that there was any conversation of that nature.

112. Q. Do you recall whether you and Admiral Stark at any time shortly prior to the 7th of December conferred relative to the impact of the information contained in Exhibit 63 on the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier?

A. I don't recall that.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. None of the evidence that has been presented before this court indicates that the attack on Pearl Harbor was other than a surprise. Does the court understand that the attack came as a surprise to you?

A. Yes.

114. Q. General, could you express to the court your general opinion as to the probability of attack by air on Hawaii on December 7th as you gathered from general conversation here. In other words, what was the general opinion as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu?

A. Well, in the first place, as far as I can recall my conception at the present time, which was partly in the letter I showed you in February, I had thought the possibilities in Hawaii in the way of attack were a combined sabotage and air attack, and I assumed that air attack was much more easy to deal with than the sabotage attack because unless we were all disposed in advance to meet the latter, it meant a deployment of the troops. In a way, it is very hard to maintain deployments over a long period of time, although they had made very intricate plans for managing it. To go further, it appeared to me, as I recall at the time, that [883] there was a strong probability—really a certainty—that there was a definite evil intent immediately in the cards in the Far East. There could be little doubt about that. The question was, When it would blow, or explode; to what extent it would be on this infiltration basis where they would virtually surround the victim with all their arrangements before they pounced. By that I mean, it was not beyond the possibilities, considering what the Japanese had already been permitted to do, and our own limitations at the time, that they might go into Siam and just set up all the rear and dominate the whole Malaya Peninsula even up to Rangoon. Whether or not they were going to make an open assault immediately was a matter of conjecture. But to our minds that was a certainty. I referred earlier in my testimony to the indications of a peculiar nature with relation to the Canal. We always felt a great sensitivity with regard to the Canal and hearing something very peculiar merely fortified us in our fears always that again you could commit a sabotage act there that would be quite fatal to us for quite a time. But those things took priority, in my opinion, to the probability of the attack on Hawaii. We had there, as I say, more resources than we had anywhere else, and they had labored long, and apparently diligently, over various plans and preparations of one kind and another.

115. Q. On the morning of December 7th, General, in your phone conversation with Admiral Stark relative to sending this message to Hawaii, did Admiral Stark impress upon you, or did you impress upon him, the urgency of quick transit of this message?

A. No. I think that was implied in what we both said. The only issue between us at the moment was whether we would confuse these people still further inasmuch as there had been so many messages sent, and the decision was that one should be sent immediately and I

don't know how long it was between our two conversations but I should imagine it was about three or four minutes when he came back and the message was then leaving the room, which indicated the immediacy of the action. As I told you, he was leaving the room when I called him back, because I had written it very hurriedly in longhand after I spoke to Admiral Stark the first time. I took, I should say, from the time I read the message until I wrote the message I sent, I don't imagine there was more than five or six minutes involved, including my conversations with Admiral Stark.

116. Q. Did you consider the proposed severance or the contemplated severance of the diplomatic relations practically a declaration of war?

A. My recollection of that today is that I was not [884] certain of that. They have so many devious ways of doing things nowadays that whether or not their first move would be an out-and-out act of war was not any certainty in my mind. I was certain that they were going ahead in the Far East but whether they would do it overtly or whether they would do it over some severance of diplomatic relations or moves of that kind, I wasn't clear in my mind. I might say that we had had a number of discussions, particularly Admiral Stark with members of the State Department and with the President at which I was present, with relation to the imposing of economic sanctions against the Japanese, particularly in regard to fuel oil and gasoline, and it was the opinion that if you moved so far you provoked them to the point where something overt would happen right away. I musn't speak for him but this was discussed by him very often as to what would happen if you caught them on the fuel oil business cold; whether or not they would be provoked into action, all of which meant, in my mind, whether they moved directly—as they did—or whether they moved more circuitously under the cover of various diplomatic ruptures and things of that sort.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior (relative to introduction of exhibit); and Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. Pages 903-910, inclusive.

[903] Robert D. Powers, Jr., counsel for the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and was warned that his oath was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate:

1. Q. I hand you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I can. It is a copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Com16 for action; and to CinCPac and Com14 for information.

The only authenticated copy of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Com16 for action; and to CinCPac and Com14 for information, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 66".

SECRET

A. (Reading:)

Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

From: OPNAV.

Date: 3 December 1941.

Action Addressees. To: CINCAF.
COM SIXTEEN.

Info: CINPAO

COM FOURTEEN.

Priority.

Date time group: 031855.

Text: Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy purple X all but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

[904] A witness called by the judge advocate, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. I am Intelligence Officer, Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of October and 7 December 1941?

A. Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Will you state in general what were the sources of information available to you during that time?

A. The main sources of information were from Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, who forwarded us reports from naval observers, naval attachés, other competent observers, State Department, consular agents. Also from Chief of Naval Operations via Office of Naval Intelligence or Office of Naval Communications certain highly secret information under the classification of communication intelligence. Also local reports from the local district intelligence office here regarding local security conditions; through liaison with British Intelligence of the Secret Intelligence Service; intelligence as to Japan's activities in the Far East. Also from the commandants of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Naval Districts and Panama Sea Frontier regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels; reports also from the Commandant of the Third Naval District regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels. I think that is all.

4. Q. What method did you employ in passing this information along to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I passed it to him by hand.

5. Q. Was this information that you received evaluated before you passed it to him, or did you give it to him direct in the form in which received?

A. I gave it to him in the original form. If the original message were an intelligence report and it was long, I would write a short brief of it, appending that to the original report.

6. Q. I show you Exhibit 66, which has just been introduced into evidence before this court and ask you to read it to yourself. Will you state whether you saw the contents of this message on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I did.

7. Q. Did this message have any special significance to you when you read it?

A. This message, like many others received at that time having to do with the Japanese activities, could only be read [905] and considered along with the rest of them as it tended to indicate Japan's intentions and activities.

8. Q. The fact that the message mentioned destroying a certain type of machine, did that have any special significance to you?

A. Only insofar as I knew that was the cipher machine.

9. Q. Did it have any more significance to you by designating a machine by this particular name than if it had been any other sort of a cipher machine?

A. I asked the security officer, Lieutenant Coleman, who had come from Washington, just what was meant by the word "purple machine" and he explained that it was an electrical coding machine, roughly similar to the type we used, that was used in the passing of messages between Japanese consuls and diplomats and the home office. The word "purple" was to designate the type of the machine as an improvement over the old one called the "red".

10. Q. Then am I to understand that the fact that they used this particular name had no special significance to you regarding the security of the type of messages it was designed to handle?

A. Well, we know that the Japanese Navy had an electrical coding machine, that the Japanese naval attaché had a coding machine, that this was a diplomatic coding machine, and therefore the diplomatic machines were being broken, or destroyed, but other than the fact that it was a diplomatic machine, no, it had no special significance.

11. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether or not you had seen this document on or before 7 December 1941, or had you been informed of its contents?

A. I did not see this original document. The message we received stated this same thing in substance but to my recollection this exact document was not translated verbatim. The use of the winds and the code for relations was in the message but the verbatim, word-for-word, was not as we received it in the telegraph.

1. Q. What, to your own knowledge, was done to intercept the broadcast which used the words to execute this code?

A. Upon receipt of this, Commander Rochefort, who headed the Com14 intelligence unit, placed special watches on all the Japanese weather and news and other broadcasts, both in the Japanese and English language, and told them to maintain communications with

him by telephone and to call him the instant one of these code words was heard and he was to call either myself or Admiral Kimmel in person in case I happened to be away. He would call me if I were there. Also the intelligence officer, who at that time was monitoring certain news broadcasts, was inferentially warned to watch for any weather reports being put on the end of news broadcasts and to inform him or me—that is, Rochefort or myself—of any such appendage or insertion in a regular broadcast.

[906] 13. Q. Did you ever receive any information prior to 7 December 1941 which executed any portion of this document 15 that you have just read?

A. We did not.

14. Q. Prior to 7 December 7 1941 were you aware of any messages sent between the Hawaiian Islands and the Japanese Government which contained military information relative to the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor or the location of ships there?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. I show you Documents 36, 37 and 40 of Exhibit 63 which are communications between Japan and the Japanese authorities in Honolulu and which either request or give information concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. I will ask you to look at these documents and state whether or not you had seen them or been appraised of their contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I will state categorically that none of these were received here, nor were we appraised of their existence.

16. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 did you have any other information other than Exhibit 66 which I showed you first concerning the Japanese destroying codes and confidential documents?

A. On 5 December we received word from the naval observer at Wellington that the Japanese consul at Wellington was destroying his codes and had sent a code word to Tokyo in compliance with instructions.

17. Q. Was this information given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. It was.

18. Q. Do you recall whether any evaluation was placed on the significance of this directive?

A. The significance of these messages was considered along with other messages during that period and were the subject of discussions in the Admiral's cabin. I presumed that when he discussed it with the War Plans Officer and others that it was a matter of discussion because after receiving that he had various officers in for a conference. One particular point of this was the destruction of codes and ciphers, the ones in Hong Kong, Singapore, Wellington, as well as Batavia. I believe, were included along with London and Washington. This seemed to indicate that Japan was preparing for any or all eventualities and at that time we had received messages from the British and from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula scheduled for about 1 December. This seemed to dovetail with the information received and its evaluation, and while all possibilities were not ruled out, it fit like a glove.

[907] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

19. Q. I show you Document No. 2 of Exhibit 64, concerning the winds code, being a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Did you have that at about the same time you had had that other document that was shown you in your direct testimony?

A. It was about the same time; yes, sir.

20. Q. When you examined the two together, did it leave any uncertainty in your mind as to the mechanism of that code which the Japanese were setting up?

A. None whatsoever.

21. Q. Did you at that time take it to mean that one of those code words, say the one which referred to us, was the equivalent of informing the Japanese that they were at war with the United States, or in a state of somewhat lesser importance?

A. It is rather difficult to recall my exact impression but as I recall it now I believe it was more than a rupture of diplomatic relations had taken place and that necessarily, anything else could happen.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[908] 22. Q. Exhibit 66, which you have just been shown, carries the initials, LFS. Do you know who that would be?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. Who?

A. I believe that is Captain Safford.

24. Q. Did you know at the time or did you think at the time that this purple cipher mentioned would be one of their very high class ciphers?

A. Yes, carrying as it did the material from Embassies and Counsel General to the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and vice versa, it was considered to be a high class cipher.

25. Q. Knowing the Japanese as of course you do, was it not rather an extreme measure to destroy anything as expensive as one of those machines?

A. The thought of the cost did not enter my mind. I rather thought that since the one from Bangkok had been removed, it was due to their forces being there; while the ones in Hong Kong, Manila, and Washington, and London, could not be physically transported without some danger of compromise. We know that they take elaborate precautions to move these into foreign countries.

26. Q. Captain, do you know whether or not your opposite number in the Army was obtaining from the War Department any information derived from sources like these that we have been discussing?

A. I do not know, sir. He at least did not pass any on to me, or to Admiral Kimmel, to my knowledge and I am sure that if any were passed on to Admiral Kimmel, I would have seen them. The liaison between the G-2, Hawaiian Department, was maintained through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Railey, who, when he established the liaison, said that he was doing this on the instructions of G-2, since the air force and the Navy would operate in the closest conjunction while the Army was a defensive garrison. Colonel Railey passed on to me no such information, and since I did inform him of the contents, in general, of some of this highly secret information, I feel positive in my mind that had he known it,

he would have informed us; and therefore he had no such source of information available.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy; (Ret):

27. Q. Did you know prior to 6 December, 1941, that any unit of the Navy Department had intercepted the execution of the winds message?

A. I did not.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[909] Examined by the court:

28. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the operations of the F. B. I., and Intelligence Service here in Honolulu, during that period of time?

A. I was kept apprised of the general situation ashore, inasmuch as it influenced the security of the Fleet, which was here based. I knew in general their set-up, how they operated, and the general situation, but did not concern myself with details.

29. Q. Do you know of any restrictions placed on the Japanese representatives or Japanese officials of Honolulu, as to the transmission of messages to Tokyo?

A. To my best knowledge and belief, there were no such restrictions at any time.

30. Q. Was there any information—or were any means of obtaining information through the F. B. I., or otherwise, as to the messages flowing to Tokyo from Honolulu?

A. The F. B. I. wouldn't be a party to that, because it is against the laws of the United States. I know that there had been attempts made through various high officials, Naval, Military, and civilian, to obtain files of Japanese outgoing and incoming messages that were handled on American communications systems, and I know that it was refused in many cases. I know in some cases it was done with special permission of some very high authority. I understand that attempts were made locally here to obtain these messages.

31. Q. What I want to know—was this information obtained and in your hand or anyone's hands here in Honolulu?

A. There was no information obtained from any sources, of the Japanese Consul General, or others here—none to my knowledge at all.

32. Q. In other words, you had no information as to what action was being transmitted from the Japanese officials or otherwise here in Honolulu, to Tokyo?

A. No, sir. We had no information. Attempts were made to get it.

33. Q. We have had introduced in this testimony that certain messages were received in Washington whereby the Japanese requested information as to the number of ships in Pearl Harbor, and also the entrance of ships here. Were you familiar with those messages?

A. Not until after December 7.

34. Q. But you did not have them at the time?

A. I did not, sir.

35. Q. And they were not transmitted to you or to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific?

A. They weren't available, sir. They weren't decrypted [910] until after December 7.

36. Q. Does that include the so-called winds message?

A. No, sir, the winds message did not come locally. The winds message originated in Tokyo, saying that they would do a certain thing a certain place at a certain time.

37. Q. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet did not receive the winds message before December 7?

A. He knew of the winds message. These wind messages did not originate here in Honolulu.

Extracted testimony of Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. Pages 916-918, inclusive.

[916] Reexamined by the judge advocate:

61. Q. You have testified that you did not feel that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had been kept as fully informed as he might have been, in view of the information which you know now was in Washington. Will you tell us some of the information which you think would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific at that time had he known it?

A. I know that there were certain de-crypted messages in the War Department and in the Navy Department in Washington, which by themselves do not mean so much, but, added together, would certainly be more of a warning toward this locality than we received in any other message—the ones you showed me, plus the ones not introduced in this court and which are in the possession of the Army, I understand.

62. Q. Could you give briefly the information which these documents contained? What was the subject matter of them?

A. Further inquiries regarding ship movements in Pearl Harbor and stressing movements of aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor.

63. Q. Do you recall any others?

A. Other messages of the nature of those from the purple machine regarding the situation existing at that time.

64. Q. Could you be just a little more specific?

A. I am trying to phrase this but I can't. Without quoting a document, I can only say I have received the impression from certain documents which I know were available before December 7 that the phraseology of certain passages in there may be considered quite important had that material been at hand. For instance, there was one expression to the effect that Japan must have a settlement of the negotiations in Washington by the 25th and the fact that when the note from Secretary Hull was delivered, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany was told to call on Hitler and get Hitler's promise. The Japanese Ambassador to Italy called on Mussolini and received Mussolini's promise of full aid. Those were definitely warlike indications.

Reexamined by the court:

65. Q. Referring to your last answer, were any of these directed against Pearl Harbor particularly?

A. No, sir.

66. Q. You consider, however, that if they had them here, they would have influenced the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific?

A. I think it would for this reason: The Japanese is [917] an Oriental, and he is a great bargainer. We saw negotiations apparently broken down with Mr. Kurusu suddenly being rushed through so as to inject new blood. The negotiations, we were told,

had broken down and there was little possibility of their being resumed. Yet we have seen in the past that negotiations were resumed, and Japan devised some new formula, some new approach for a problem almost as insoluble as the one facing her then. We received two very fine estimates of the situation from Captain Creighton, the naval resident officer at Singapore, and from the intelligence officer of the Asiatic Fleet, in which they independently of one another, from their wide contacts in the Far East, came to the conclusion that war against America at this time would not be the Japanese decision, but, rather, they would cut across Thailand to cut off the Burma Road and Burma, which was, at best, unstable at that time, in an attempt to find a solution to the so-called China incident without involving America and Great Britain, if possible.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

67. Q. Would not the receipt of the execution of the Winds Message be one of the clues to which you have referred and which would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I feel positive that had one of the Winds messages execute been received, it would have been acted upon with rapidity and aggressively.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

68. Q. Will you state what action you believe would have been taken?

A. I believe all personnel would have been immediately recalled to their ships—This is my belief. I believe all vessels would have been ordered to be prepared to sail at the earliest possible moment. I believe that intense anti-submarine patrol and distant patrol would have been inaugurated. I believe the task force would have sortied and proceeded to sea to perform what missions under the War Plan the Commander-in-Chief deemed appropriate.

69. Q. This would have been upon receipt of the code message which said diplomatic relations with the United States were terminated?

A. Yes, sir.

70. Q. Didn't the "war warning" dispatch say practically the same thing?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge. The message said negotiations had ceased. The fact that negotiations were then [918] under way in Washington—and which had been under way since, I believe, April or May, 1941—did not necessarily mean that diplomatic relations were going to be ruptured or that a state of war was going to be declared to exist after a rupture.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[918A] The court then, at 5:25 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., September 11, 1944.

[919] Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 919-A—930, inclusive.

[919-A] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. F. M. Brotherhood, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R. At present, I am attached to FRUPAC under orders to return to Washington.

2. Q. What duty were you performing during the month immediately preceding 7 December 1941?

A. I was one of the watch officers in Op-20-G, in the office of Director of Naval Communications.

[920] 3. Q. I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Do you recall having seen this document prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I recall seeing the original of this document prior to 7 December.

4. Q. Do you recall on what date you first saw that document, or were informed as to its contents?

A. I don't remember the date.

5. Q. What is the best approximation you can give as to that date?

A. About November 30th.

6. Q. At the time you saw this document, was it made available to all of the watch officers in Op-20-G?

A. I do not know.

7. Q. As a watch officer in Op-20-G, what instructions were given to you with regard to procedure to be followed if and when any intercept of a Japanese message using this code was received?

A. I recall only that portion which ordered me to call Admiral Noyes on the telephone in the event that any intercept of this type was received.

8. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 was any message emanating from Japan received in Op-20-G in which this code was used?

A. I know of one that was at the time presumed to be in this code.

9. Q. When was that message that you speak of received?

A. I think of it as a Thursday night before Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. Sir, for the sake of the record, will you compute the day of the month that that Thursday night before Pearl Harbor would have been?

A. The 4th of December.

11. Q. During what hours on the evening of 4 December 1941 were you on watch in Op-20-G?

A. From 4:00 in the evening until midnight.

12. Q. From whom did you receive a message containing these code words? Relate the details pertaining to the receipt of such message.

A. In the course of the evening of December 4th I received a telephone call from the Federal Communications Commission from an officer whose name I don't remember. Unfortunately I don't remember at this time the text of the dispatch but I know what it did not say. I recall, in receiving it, that there seemed to be something missing from what I was looking [921] for and that is, he gave me the first

portion of it. I asked him if there was not more and I made a pencil note of the transmission as he gave it to me over the telephone only for my own records so that I would give it accurately to Admiral Noyes. When I say that the text was not what I was looking for, I mean that it did not contain the phrase in Japanese Higashi no Kazeame, which, to me, would have indicated that diplomatic relations severance, followed by war, would come to the United States. I remember this because of the feeling of relief that I had that it was not that. Immediately upon receipt of this telephone conversation through the very secret channel that we had set up for the purpose of transmitting this information I was able to reach Admiral Noyes by telephone and gave him the dispatch as I had it, and he said to me words which indicated to me that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction and thanked me, and at this time I don't remember whether he gave me oral instructions to ask the F. C. C. to continue to look. That part of it I don't remember. From this distance it seems to me that I called the F. C. C. later, though what I said at that time I don't remember. Those are the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the winds message referred to in this document.

13. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 2 of Exhibit 65 before the court. Can you identify this document as being the information which was passed to you by telephone on the evening of 4 December 1941 from the F. C. C.?

A. I have just said that I had forgotten the text. If I had been asked to quote the text of this dispatch I would have been unable to do so. However, I will say that this appears to me to be the text of the material that I received over the telephone from the Federal Communications Commission.

14. Q. Sir, I ask you to refer again to the first document which you were handed, Document 15 of Exhibit 63 in connection with the document which you now hold, Document 2 of Exhibit 64: Taking those two together, what information is conveyed with regard to a break of diplomatic relations between Japan and any other nation in this intercept message, Document 2 of Exhibit 64?

A. I remember what it meant to me without referring to this document. I will say that it conveyed the impression that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States but with the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that that is what caused Admiral Noyes to say that the wind is blowing from a funny direction.

15. Q. Commander, a few minutes ago, you testified that you made a written memorandum of the oral telephone conversation with an official of the F. C. C. Do you have any information as to whether or not the F. C. C. followed up that telephone call with a confirming letter or memoranda at any time subsequent to the evening of 4 December?

A. I don't have any recollection of such a confirmation.

[922] 16. Q. Was your pencil, written memoranda made a part of the files of Op-20-G at that time?

A. I don't know that either.

17. Q. Do you recall what disposition you did make of your memoranda?

A. Yes. I left it on the —well, we will say on the desk of the watch officer. I turned it over, in fact, to the succeeding watch officer.

18. Q. Since that time have you had any occasion to look in the files of Op-20-G to locate your memorandum or any other written memorandum pertaining to the receipt of the message about which you have been testifying?

A. No.

19. Q. I hand you Document 3 of Exhibit 64 before the court which, according to this exhibit, was intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2130 on the evening of December 5 and which according to the exhibit, was communicated to the Army. Will you look at this document and say what break in diplomatic relations is indicated by that code message?

A. It would indicate to me that the relations had been broken, or were about to be broken with the Soviet Union.

20. Q. In other words, this Document 3, received a day later than the one which you received over the telephone on the 4th, is merely a repetition, in substance, of what had been received on the night of the 4th pertaining only to the Soviet Union?

A. As I see it here, it would appear that way.

21. Q. Do you know whether or not this second intercept pertaining to a break with the Soviet Union was ever received in Op-20-G?

A. I do not.

22. Q. In addition to the intercept pertaining to the Soviet Union about which you have been testifying, did you ever see any other intercepts using the so-called winds code in Op-20-G?

A. No.

23. Q. Did you ever have any information of the receipt of any additional messages?

A. No.

24. Q. Under the set-up in Op-20-G at that time, would it have been likely that you would have known, either by seeing official reports or by informal information from the other watch officers, of the receipt of any additional messages using this code?

A. Very likely.

[923] 25. Q. Will you elaborate on that and give reasons for that last answer?

A. I was part of the group that had the duty of reporting any such message as this. I was one of the three officers who, in the course of a day, would have cognizance if such a message had come in. Further than that, had the message come in while I was not on watch, it seems to me that it would have passed down the chain of the watch officers to the responsible party. Further, my associations with the other watch officers was so close that had there been any rumor of such a dispatch I believe I would have heard about it.

26. Q. Do you know of any attempts that were made to notify the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the receipt of a message utilizing the winds code?

A. I do not, except that Admiral Noyes said he would see that the proper people were informed of this intercept.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :

27. Q. Was this message that was received from the F. C. C. given to you in the Japanese language, or in the equivalent English translation?

A. It seems to me that it was given to me, Captain Lavender, as it appears here, in the testimony.

28. Q. By that, I take it, then, that it was given to you in English terms, English words?

A. It seems to me that it was.

29. Q. When you received this dispatch, were you completely satisfied, then, when receiving it, as you remember it, in English terms, as to the translation?

A. I was completely satisfied that I had gotten it correctly and I understood it.

30. Q. Did you at that time communicate with any of the other officers who might be familiar with that system, or a verification of the translation?

A. Captain Lavender, our instructions were very explicit. The person to whom I was to report had sufficient information of what we could expect to receive so that I think had it come in Japanese or English, the recipient of my telephone call would have understood without the assistance of a translator.

31. Q. But did you verify in any way the meaning of the dispatch as it was given to you?

A. Only by consulting the memorandum of instructions which had had been given to me.

[924] 32. Q. What other officers did you refer to when you said there were three officers that were doing routine duties, rotation duties similar to yours?

A. Their names, Captain Lavender?

33. Q. Yes.

A. Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; Lieutenant Commander Murray, whose initials I don't remember; and Lieutenant Commander Brown. I don't remember his initials.

34. Q. What were your relations with Commander Kramer?

A. Commander Kramer was the officer in charge of the translation section of our group. My relations with him were friendly.

35. Q. I mean your official relations. Do you know what duties Commander Kramer was performing in December, 1941?

A. He was in charge of the translation section of our group, as I have said.

36. Q. Did you consult with him at all on the translation of this dispatch?

A. Not at the time, Captain. Commander Kramer had been pretty busy and he was home getting some needed rest.

37. Q. Did you ask the Federal Communications Commission to send you a confirmation copy?

A. I don't recall.

38. Q. Do you recall whether or not you considered at that time that this message was of some importance?

A. I recall that I considered it of considerable importance.

39. Q. And you made only a memorandum of that message and turned it over to your relief without making any other copies?

A. According to my instructions, I did.

40. Q. Who gave you those instructions?

A. There was a written instruction signed by a responsible officer in my section. I don't recall whether it was Commander Kramer, or whether it was Captain Safford.

41. Q. Do you recall whether the officer that gave you the information over the telephone, that is, in the Federal Communications Commission, mentioned the Japanese words at all?

A. I don't remember that he did.

42. Q. Did you know any Japanese at that time?

A. I knew pretty much the material that was covered in this dispatch. I knew some other diplomatic Japanese.

[925] 43. Q. It has been indicated that there has been no trace of the original message as recorded by you, or any confirmation copy, in the files of the Navy Department. Can you account in any way for the inability of the Navy Department to produce this dispatch?

A. I can account for it from my own viewpoint only and that was, we were instructed to pass the word orally. This matter at the time was considered of greatest urgency and the most important single job we had to do. Each of us was very anxious to be sure that nothing happened to our carrying out our orders. I know this because it was talked informally with the other officers involved since that time regarding this dispatch. For my part, when I received it, my orders left me no alternative but to make my telephone call to Admiral Noyes at once. I was not in the position, nor was I expected, to evaluate or pass on the worth of the contents of this dispatch. I was simply ordered to see that it was speeded on its way.

44. Q. And you were ordered to see that it was speeded on its way and emphasized as to speed and emphasized as to oralness but not emphasized as to any record that would be kept of such an important message?

A. As to the matter of record, I don't believe we were instructed to make a record.

45. Q. Now, coming to the morning of 7 December, what watch did you have?

A. The morning of 7 December I came on duty at 12:01 a. m., and remained until relieved sometime after 7:00 a. m.

46. Q. Do you recall what dispatches came to your attention during that watch?

A. I recall one particular dispatch. There were a number handled by that watch.

47. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was the 14th part of a 14-part dispatch intercepted between Japan and the ambassador in Washington that was received at that time?

A. Ever since December 7 there has been a question in my mind whether there were 13 or 14 parts. May I refer to the part that you call "14" as the last part?

48. Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

49. Q. Did you receive during that watch a dispatch indicating the time of delivery of all of the parts of that long dispatch to the Secretary of State?

A. At the time I didn't recognize it as such a dispatch, except there was, to me, a certain indication that there was some urgency in connection with the long diplomatic message.

[926] 50. Q. Will you state how the two dispatches just referred to were handled, and trace them in their delivery and distribution as far as you know of your own personal knowledge?

A. The first dispatch which was mentioned, the long diplomatic message, was perfectly clear to me. It was in English and when I finished with it, except for making a record, it would be ready for dissemination through the customary channels. At the time of December 7th we were sharing the work on this diplomatic traffic with the Army. The message regarding time of delivery was in Japanese. It required the services of a translator. I have tried since December 7th to remember whether or not the Army translator was on duty at the time. The reason for that is this: I know the translator was not present at the Navy Department, and for the reason that we were sharing the duties on this diplomatic traffic we worked on odd and even days. At this time I don't remember whether the odd day of the week or the odd day of the month was the Navy's day of duty, or the Army's. I don't remember whether the Army translator was there that early in the morning—I will say by 4:00 o'clock in the morning—but in the exchange of traffic back and forth we made customary trips in which we carried this traffic over by hand ourselves. It was not trusted to an enlisted man, and I believe that prior to 7:00 o'clock on the morning of December 7th I had made one, perhaps two, such trips to the Army. It is quite possible that I would not know whether there was a translator on duty in the Army section because, as I say, these activities were veiled in so much secrecy that I knew very little about the personnel employed by the Army. So far as I was concerned, it meant carrying some documents over to a very impersonal receiver. Does that answer your question, Captain Lavender?

51. Q. Partially. I will bring the rest out by questions. How long did you remain in the Navy Department on the morning of 7 December?

A. I left sometime after 7:00.

52. Q. Did you leave before Commander Kramer came in?

A. I left before Commander Kramer came in, yes, sir.

53. Q. And you left the dispatches there for delivery to Commander Kramer, however?

A. Those dispatches which were supposed to be delivered to him, I don't remember, but I presume that I left them there for him.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

54. Q. Commander, referring to the testimony that you have just given: At the time you left the Department at 7:00 o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, had the English translation of the Japanese message which you had taken to the Army for translation been returned to you?

A. I wish I could remember that. I have tried to remember whether the original copy had come back, or not. I can't remember. I would like to know if anyone ever finds out.

[927] Examined by the court:

55. Q. Referring again to this winds message: Did you at any time discuss this winds message with Commander Kramer, or with Admiral Noyes?

A. Admiral, I delivered it to Admiral Noyes.

56. Q. By 'phone?

A. By telephone, yes, sir, and since that time I have not discussed it with him.

57. Q. Well, I am speaking of the immediate time of that date. Did you discuss it with him at that time, other than 'phone him?

A. No, sir.

58. Q. When this supposed answer of "execute winds message" came in—and you say that in accordance with your translation or the information you received, it meant that Japan was going to war with the Soviet Union—didn't that seem rather odd to you in view of the critical situation existing at that time between this country and Japan?

A. It did.

59. Q. Did you hear Commander Kramer or Admiral Noyes express any opinion as to the queer interpretation of this message?

A. Admiral, I testified as to something that Admiral Noyes said in regard to it; it is in the record.

60. Q. Were you present or did you hear while on duty there, that Commander Kramer came in with a reply to this question, that said "Here it is"; in reply to this winds message; or, "Here it is, we've got it"?

A. I don't recall that.

61. Q. You have been asked as to how these messages were handled. Now, referring to the winds message. Do you know how that was handled from your office and where it went to? Did it go to the Chief of Naval Operations, or where did it go?

A. I don't know that, Admiral. I only know as far as Admiral Noyes is concerned.

[928] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

62. Q. Were you by chance present when there was a summary of events or a summary of the estimate drawn up and presented to Admiral Noyes for his consideration, to pass on to higher authority?

A. No.

63. Q. Do you remember when you saw the English translation of part 14 of these messages received on the night of 6-7 December?

A. I think it took us about an hour to get that out, to break it out; seems to me we finished it and checked it for accuracy and possible mistakes by 4:00 in the morning.

64. Q. That was the last part?

A. The last part, yes, sir.

65. Q. The last part which came in was in the Japanese language and had been translated?

A. No, sir, that was in English. The last part of the long diplomatic message was in English.

66. Q. The last part that I referred to, you stated in your testimony was in the Japanese language. The other parts were in English.

A. I don't believe I said that.

67. Q. What did you say?

A. I understood Captain Lavender asked me about a dispatch stating that this certain long diplomatic dispatch must be delivered by a given time. If I didn't say that it was that dispatch that was in Japanese, I made a mistake, but I think I did. The long diplomatic dispatch of fourteen parts was in English; that did not require translation.

68. Q. The long part of the message; was that in English?

A. The long diplomatic message was in English.

69. Q. Now the short part was in Japanese, the short and last part?

A. Yes, they were not associated by number. They were only associated by inference.

70. Q. Now, what I asked you—the short part and last part that was in Japanese—when did you see the English translation of that?

A. I didn't see the English translation of the little Japanese dispatch until some time after December 7.

71. Q. Now referring to the long dispatch, do you know what [929] happened to that, where it went to—the long part of the dispatch? Did you have anything to do with the delivery of that long part of the dispatch?

A. Yes, sir.

72. Q. What did you do with it?

A. Those dispatches were carried over by us as officer messenger to the Army.

73. Q. War Department?

A. To the War Department, yes, sir; and I presume at that time—I don't remember, I haven't kept a diary—I presume I carried those over as it was my obligation to do.

74. Q. Did you carry them to any other place; did you carry them to the State Department?

A. No, sir.

75. Q. Did you carry them to OpNav?

A. Not me.

76. Q. What?

A. No, sir.

77. Q. You have stated that you know only few phrases in Japanese?

A. That's correct, sir.

78. Q. You are not a Japanese translator?

A. No, sir.

79. Q. And when these Japanese words came to you—the words of the wind messages—you took the translation as given you by someone else; is that correct? Did you take the word of the translator?

A. I took it as it was given to me by the F. C. C. It says here (indicating) it is in English. If you would have asked me, I would have been unable to tell you before I refreshed my memory. Admiral, I hope I have made clear that I was not entitled, nor was I expected, to evaluate the contents of any messages that would be delivered.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to recross-examine this witness.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

80. Q. Just to bring out my own understanding of some of your testimony, all parts of the long diplomatic dispatch that was received finally on 7 December were in English when decrypted?

A. I said that with this reservation in mind, that there is always at the beginning of one of these dispatches, whether in English or not, certain material that is necessary for the Japanese record. That was in their conventional method of representation, which was a sub-

stitution of cipher below the [930] cipher machine. There was that type of stuff at the beginning, but that had nothing to do with the context.

81. Q. But all of the part of that long dispatch that was to be delivered to the Secretary of State came out in English when it was decrypted?

A. It seems to me that it did.

82. Q. Did the other dispatch which was received at the time and that related to the specific hour at which the long dispatch was to be delivered—when that was decoded it came out in Japanese and required translation; is that true?

A. That is true to the best of my memory.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to recross-examine this witness.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

83. Q. I hand you document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court, which is a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 902, labelled at the top, "Part 1 of 14 parts." I should say document 39 covers all 14 parts of that. Is part 14 included in this that you have been speaking of as the long message?

A. It is.

84. Q. And what you speak of as the short dispatch is what?

A. This short dispatch carrying instructions to the Ambassador regarding the delivery of the long dispatch.

85. Q. And is this document 41 of Exhibit 63 the message that you referred to as the short dispatch?

A. That is it—41.

86. Q. Part 14 of document 39 of Exhibit 63—is this the part that you mentioned as coming in English?

A. This and others.

87. Q. Is document 41 of Exhibit 63, which you have referred to as the short dispatch giving instructions on the time of delivery—is that the one that you mentioned as coming in Japanese?

A. That is the one that I referred to as coming in Japanese.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. Pages 950-987, inclusive.

[950] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. I am at present attached at CinCPac. I just reported this morning to CinCPac.

2. Q. What duties are you presently performing other than this temporary duty?

A. I have been permanently attached to SoPac and have now reported to CinCPac and have not yet been assigned to duty.

3. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7 December 1941?

A. I was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, on loan to OP-20-G, Office of Naval Communications.

4. Q. Will you state the general characteristics of the duties that you were performing in that station?

A. I was head of the translation section of the communication security group. That consisted of translating all decrypted traffic obtained from intercepts and delivering it to the Office of Naval Intelligence and any persons in the Navy Department or outside of the Navy Department that the Director Naval Intelligence or the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy wanted delivery made to.

5. Q. Did you have any routine addressees to whom you were in the custom of delivering all traffic to?

A. Yes.

6. Q. Who were they?

A. We prepared 14 copies of every decrypted translation. Seven copies went to Army. The other 7 were for delivery to senior officers in the Navy Department and also to either the White House or State Department, the responsibility of which rotated between the War Department and the Navy Department. At the time referred to in your earlier question I had responsibility for delivery to the White House; Army to the State Department. The addressees in the Navy Department that normally got copies which I delivered were the aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty, or to the Secretary of the Navy directly; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the head of Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East section, then Commander McCollum; Admiral Noyes as Director of Naval Communications; Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans. Occasionally there were certain other individuals I was directed to show it to.

[951] 7. Q. I note that the specific addresses only add up to six.

A. The seventh copy was a file copy.

8. Q. This intercepted traffic: Was it passed along to the addressees as it was received, or was some sort of summary made for delivery?

A. A complete version of every message went into one of 6 separate folders, delivery being made several times a day, depending on urgency. Earlier in 1941 I had been in the habit of preparing a summary of all the traffic in the day's folder because of its volume. In this summary I briefed the subject of the message, asterisked it with one or two asterisks showing those things which were most important or of urgent character so that the senior addressees to which I delivered it could look through the summary to see what they would want to take time to see. The volume was so heavy that they rarely had time to look through the whole book, volumes running into sometimes as much as 130 messages in one day. I made a point of seeing that the more important ones were seen and read by the senior addressees that I delivered personally to. In some cases, of course, such as the Secre-

tary of the Navy, Captain Beatty would make actual delivery and consequently I do not know just what ones he read.

9. Q. Do I understand your responsibility then to have been that you had in your possession for the purpose of showing to addressees, all intercept traffic and it was a matter of the party's own decision as to whether or not he would look into all the dispatches that you had in your possession, or only to the ones that you had singled out as being of importance; is that correct?

A. That is, in general, correct, yes, sir.

10. Q. Was there any intermediary between you and the decrypting section of the Office of the Director of Naval Communications who made any decision as to whether or not the messages that were received were passed to you? I mean by that, did you have in your possession for delivery all the traffic that came in, or was there some sort of a separation process which enabled you to have only what was probably considered the more important ones?

A. Every bit of traffic that was broken down into Japanese plain language, or partly broken down from those systems and not completely recovered, was passed to my section for translation or further code recovery and for translation and distribution and writing up. The filtering process to which you referred might be intercepted as applying to the partially recovered systems which came in in considerable volume, some of which, however, could not be adequately broken down to get much intelligence out of it.

11. Q. Are you a Japanese language student yourself?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

[952] 12. Q. Did you yourself translate all dispatches, or how was that done?

A. I had a staff of civilian translators, professional Civil Service employees in the Navy Department. Those messages that were of high importance I normally glanced over in the nature of editing before they were typed up. Otherwise, the great majority of the material was translated by my civilian assistants. It was only an occasional message I translated myself.

13. Q. You have testified in effect—and I wish you would correct me if I put the wrong interpretation on your testimony—that there was no filtering process between you and the source of information. In other words, you had in your possession for delivery to addresses all information that was received?

A. I will have to repeat again a reference to the filtering process. When you use the statement "all information" there were many other messages which my section did not get which were in various states of recovery in the G. Y. section, in the decryption or cipher recovery section of Op-20-G, which I did not get or oftentimes got several weeks later. In other words, with the large volume of traffic coming in on a new system, it might be weeks before I would get material from that system. I would not get it until it was sufficiently broken down to start pulling intelligible information out of it.

14. Q. I am assuming, Commander, that there was a pool of intelligence information, and what I am trying to bring out—

A. Intelligence was the word I used. In other words, a sketchily recovered message, you might be able to translate to the extent of a phrase here and a word there, but it would not make sense

enough or would not warrant writing up for distribution to the senior officers in the Navy Department, so a message would have to be in a system that was sufficiently recovered to pull intelligible information out of it before I would get it for translation and distribution.

15. Q. I am assuming that you had such a pool of intelligible intelligence force available to you. Now, what I am trying to find out is, did you take all this intelligence and pass it along, or did you or someone else act as a filter to sort out the information that was passed along?

A. Because of the high volume that we got and the small number of translators we had—there were three at that time—it was not feasible or possible to translate everything that came to us. Consequently, we concentrated on the more secure systems which, in general, had the more important information in them. All the others were looked over and a brief summary made by the translators. Every one of those messages, before going into the file—in other words, before finally being disposed of—was looked at by me as a final check to see whether the information warranted being translated. Everything that was translated in full that warranted distribution was written up and distributed.

[953] 16. Q. That is what I am trying to get at: Who made the decision as to whether or not information that was received and that was translated and was intelligible from the translation should be passed from this pool to higher authority?

A. That decision was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In making decisions on most points myself, I was simply acting for the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and more directly for the head of the Far East section. That discretion was left to me but I made a point, on occasion, of taking those things up for final confirmation of my decision to Captain McCollum, as a rule. The occasions were rather rare, however.

17. Q. Then as a matter of, let us say, routine procedure, you had on the one hand a pool of intelligence information that had been received and had been translated and was understandable, and on the other hand you had 14 copies of information going up to higher authority everyday?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. As I understand it, you were the officer who, as a routine matter, made the decision of what matter you would take out of this pool and pass along to higher authority; is that correct?

A. That is, in substance, correct; yes, sir.

19. Q. And this matter that you passed along to higher authority, that is, your 7 addressees or 6 addressees, received this information from you directly from this pool as you selected it, without reference to, let us say the Director of Naval Communications or other persons in the Navy Department before you passed it along; is that correct?

A. That is not strictly correct, although in practice it often worked that way. As a rule, an attempt was made to bring the whole book to Captain McCollum as head of the Far East section, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence first because the director oftentimes made a point of taking that into the C. N. O. himself. It occasionally happened during 1941 that the Director would take an item into the

C. N. O. himself, but because of the large volume of that stuff through '41 it was left more and more to me.

20. Q. When you took this volume of traffic that you had assembled yourself, say to Commander McCollum, or to the Director of Naval Intelligence, did they ever detach any of the information, that is, weed it out and throw it away, or did they confirm what you had selected, or just exactly what was done when you referred it to these other people who, in a way, let us say, sat over you?

A. There was no eliminating of anything from this volume of traffic since each of the books were made up in the same way. Occasionally, however, the Director would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to the C. N. O., or the Secretary.

[954] 21. Q. You mean, then, that which you had indicated yourself as being of interest to these addressees?

A. Yes, sir, greater or less than I had indicated. That refers more specifically to the period when I was making the summary of the day's traffic. It usually ran two or three pages with from one to five lines in a summary of the subject matter of the contents of the message. In the case of the latter part of '41, however, because of the large volume again, I used a system of clipping the items of greater importance and actually showing the original translation to the Director.

22. Q. As I understand you, you say that you frequently made some sort of a summary of a subject matter of information and clipped it on to the file yourself; is that correct?

A. That was earlier in the year before the volume got so heavy that we couldn't take time for those summaries.

23. Q. What was your practice the latter part of the year, say the week preceding 7 December 1941? Did you make any summary of important messages at that time for the information of addressees?

A. No, sir, I did not, and had not been doing it since about the middle of '41, because of the very high volume of traffic concerned with the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. The volume was not only high, but individual messages often went to four or five or more, sometimes 15 typewritten pages. It was impracticable to summarize for that reason alone, but also because of the fact that those messages frequently had reference to half a dozen or more earlier messages, diplomatic notes, and so forth. Consequently, in preparing these books my principal objective was to get a brief reference foot-note for each one of those references or break out the originals of those earlier translations, attaching to those current messages, so that the book itself would be as complete as possible, as self-contained as possible, when these senior officers were looking at them.

24. Q. It strikes me, Commander, as a matter of a practical thing, that as the volume of dispatches or separate items increased, the demand for a summary would have been greater than when the dispatches were less?

A. I don't believe that was quite the case, since the earlier summaries were intended to weed out the more important items from a large volume of material covering the whole world. The greatest percentage of the traffic in the fall of '41 had to do with two main types of material: One was the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, and the other was the circuit from Berlin to Tokyo, because of the fact that

those two categories of traffic were being followed with considerable interest and detail by all the senior addressees, almost every message in folders in the latter part of '41 bore on those two subject matters, that is, Japanese relations with the Germans, or German information on their war in Europe being passed to the Japanese, or on the current negotiations going on in Washington in which all these addressees had a [955] direct interest, or hand. They therefore wanted to see those things as promptly as possible, particularly those bearing on the Washington negotiations, because oftentimes it was an item of information that we would be able to break down, have it translated, only an hour or two before the Secretary of State, for example, would be meeting the Japanese ambassador. Hence it was more important to get the material to those people promptly rather than to take time to brief these things, except to the extent of indicating the subject matter of references contained in those messages. Earlier in the year, to go back to those summaries again, it normally took from one to two hours to make up a summary, dictate it, that is, glancing through the book and dictating to the yeoman, followed by his immediately typing it up. That delay was just not permissible during the fall of '41 at many times.

25. Q. The judge advocate understands, and he asks you this as a matter of repetition, to make sure that the record is clear that you did, however, indicate what particular items of information that you were delivering were of importance?

A. That is true, yes, sir, by attaching clips to the messages in the folders that were of most immediate interest in the day's volume.

26. Q. Can you recall from your experience in delivering these dispatches to these addressees—and let us use as an example the Office of Chief of Naval Operations—did the Chief of Naval Operations as a matter of custom usually read the entire file of dispatches that you brought to him for his information?

A. The majority of times the folder was left with his aide. Just how much of that he read, I don't know, but in such cases I made a point of pointing out to his aide, his flag secretary, which were the things of most immediate importance or interest to the Admiral. Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral should see them at once, or as soon as possible. At other times when a particular hot item—if I may use that term—came in, I would request permission to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. That happened quite frequently during the fall of '41. By "frequently" I would say two or three or four times a week.

27. Q. Then am I to understand that your custom of delivering this file of information to the Chief of Naval Operations was by leaving it with his aide?

A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. But when you had items that you considered of great urgency you presented it to the Chief of Naval Operations direct; is that correct?

A. I arranged with his aide to take it directly in, yes, sir, and waited while the Admiral read it.

[956] 29. Q. I suppose if the Chief of Naval Operations were not in his office at the time you arrived to make a delivery, you would have left the information with his aide for later delivery; is that correct?

A. I would normally leave it with his aide for later delivery, yes, sir, but in the meantime, of course, I would have gotten it to the Director of Naval Intelligence and as a rule would indicate whether Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox had seen it yet, or not. Admiral Wilkinson would oftentimes then make a point of following it up to see that the Admiral got the word.

30. Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

31. Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

32. Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phrases of this code?

A. On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only in OP-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

[957] 33. Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

34. Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kazeame. I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

35. Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kazeame?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

36. Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

37. Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station.

38. Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it; is that correct?

A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

39. Q. Have you seen that communication since?

A. I have had no occasion to; no, sir.

40. Q. The question was, have you seen it since?

A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.

41. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 65, which is in evidence before this court. I will ask you to examine Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this exhibit and state whether or not you had seen or been informed of these documents on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I may have seen one or more of these messages, but since every one of these is of the nature I have earlier described, I didn't handle any of these. I know I saw one which I previously referred to, which was the first one of this category referred to. There may have been others of [958] the same nature come through handled as I indicated that first one was handled, but I have no recollection of such further messages.

42. Q. Can you recall in the distribution of the information which was your custom to do directly, whether or not any matter pertaining to these Japanese words had been taken by you to the list of distributees in the government in Washington?

A. Not by me, no, sir. Special arrangements, as I referred to earlier, had been made for handling this particular type of message.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdraw.

[959] 43. Q. Then adverting to Exhibit 65, which you have just examined, it is the judge advocate's understanding that you do not recall having seen any one of the documents concerned therein, although you may have seen them?

A. That is correct, yes, sir. In fact, I can amplify by saying that I believe I saw at least one and possibly more of those.

44. Q. Would you be able to state to the court which ones you think you saw?

A. I could not be certain; no, sir.

45. Q. I show you exhibit 66, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 3 December 1941, and released by J. R. Redmond, and having to do with the destruction of certain confidential matters; will you state whether or not you saw this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I drafted this message.

46. Q. That message refers to the destruction of purple machines in certain areas. Did that language, the destruction of a particular type of machine in certain places, have any special significance to you?

A. This particular message was not drafted as an interpretation of the decrypted traffic from which it was taken, but simply a brief of that traffic addressed to four addressees who were familiar with the character of that traffic, because of the narrow channel that this traffic, this Kopek message was confined to and the fact that only the addressees on that narrow channel would know what it meant. Normally, in fact I will go further by stating that almost without exception, this channel was not intended or used as a channel for interpreting that traffic. It was a technical channel. Any interpretation or evaluation would normally go from the Office of Naval Intelligence or War Plans, or the CNO's office.

47. Q. Will you tell the court what special significance this message should have to an addressee who understood it?

A. To the four addressees to whom it was sent, the interpretation would presumably be the same as I inferred personally when I drafted the message and indicated the desirability of sending it out; in other words, an interpretation that the destruction of codes normally preceded an intended break in relations or else a serious diplomatic crisis.

48. Q. It that all that message inferred?

A. The fact that only United States, British, and Dutch addressees were included as action addressees by the Japanese traffic, indicated that the nations referred to were very likely one or more of those two. By "indicated", I of course referred to my previous answer, as being the nations most likely involved in a probable diplomatic crisis, or actual break, or possibly even war.

[960] 49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is a dispatch from OpNav to certain addressees and also sets out information that the Japanese in certain areas are destroying codes and ciphers and burning important confidential and secret documents. I ask you if you were acquainted with that message on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I did see this message, after it went, however.

50. Q. Can you state what the purpose of sending Exhibit 66 was, when Exhibit 20 had been sent on the same day to practically the same addressees; in other words, is there anything added by 66 that was not sent in Exhibit 20?

A. Exhibit 20 was drafted, I believe, by then Commander McColm, head of the Far East section; and as an example of an interpreting message for this Japanese decrypted traffic being sent out, to which I referred a question or two before, this exhibit here, No. 66—the Kopek channel was purely the technical channel giving a brief of the actual decrypted traffic; 20 was the interpreting message from the Director of Naval Intelligence.

51. Q. Can you state whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had been informed of the information contained in Exhibit 66?

A. I can only state that I am almost certain he was. I can't swear he was, because I am not certain whether the folder with that particular message was shown him by myself or his aide.

52. Q. Do you have any recollection of a dispatch containing about 500 words which is purported to have been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and which dispatch was supposed to have contained a summary of information on late developments in Japanese-United States relationships, and which dispatch was intended to have been sent to certain addressees outside of Washington? I ask you, do you have any knowledge of such a document or dispatch having been prepared?

A. I first heard of that several weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I have never seen the message and have no first-hand knowledge of it.

53. Q. Do you have any first-hand knowledge of what happened to the message; that is, whether it was sent or whether it was not?

A. As I stated, I first heard of its existence only several weeks later and my information is rather sketchy in various ramifications of how it was handled.

54. Q. I am going to show you a series of documents from Exhibit 63, which relate as a matter of general information to [961] an exchange of dispatches between the Japanese home government and the Hawaiian area, and having to do with the location of ships, or a request for information concerning ships. The first is document 24. I will ask you if you saw it on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

55. Q. Can you recall whether it was referred to the Chief of Naval Operations or not at or about the time of its receipt?

A. Again I am not positive whether the Chief of Naval Operations actually saw it, but I know that it would have been in a folder that was left in his office.

56. Q. I show you document 36 from the same exhibit and ask you whether you saw that document on or before 7 December 1941.

A. Yes, sir, I saw this. I would like to remark on this as well as the previous message that it was not at all an unusual type of message. The same sort of things had been going to Japanese consuls and diplomatic posts all over the world for the past year or more. Furthermore, the United States Government had been sending similar sorts of messages through Navy channels, liaison officers, naval attaches, as well as via diplomatic channels to places where there were no naval representatives—watching ship movements. We know that with the abrogation or termination of the commercial treaty with Japan, and a short time previously with the closing of the canal to Japanese shipping, at about the time we know Japanese shipping was being recalled from the Atlantic, the Japanese were watching ship movements even more closely than they had before. These two messages you have shown me were somewhat more emphatic messages of that nature. Directives were going out from Tokyo periodically; that is, every few months, sometimes indicated as being the request of the Navy Minister, to watch ship movements. We know that the Japanese diplomatic service was doing it, and doing a conscientious

job on it. In fact, I recall the Japanese consul in Seattle stating in one report that he had gone down to the docks and seen certain ships, and so reported.

57. Q. I am going to show you document 39 from Exhibit 63. This document, or certain parts of it, is a message that has been testified was received in the Navy Department on the evening of 6 December 1941. In order to save a lot of categorical questions, I am going to ask you to relate in detail the information that you yourself know about this message from the time it first came to your attention until it was delivered to the various distributees in the government at Washington, to whom you usually made delivery.

A. I recognize this message as the one, the first [962] thirteen parts of which we received on 6 December 1941. I was about to leave the office the middle of Saturday afternoon, 6 December, when I made a final check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was anything apparently hot coming in, particularly in view of the fact that we had been expecting a reply for a week or ten days to the United States note of 26 November. In view of other developments that we had seen taking place in the diplomatic traffic and otherwise, it was apparent things were shaping up to some sort of a crisis—consequently, the reply should be coming through momentarily. At 3:00 o'clock on the 6th, the message was coming in—so I waited and held my team of translators there, and it turned out to be a part of the reply. We turned to, and by 9:00 o'clock Saturday, the evening of the 6th of December, had received, broken down, translated, and had typed ready for delivery, thirteen of those parts, several of them somewhat garbled. At 9:05 approximately, I phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his home, telling him in guarded language the nature of what I had and what I proposed to do with it. He confirmed, or rather, approved, my plan for distribution. I accordingly proceeded at once to the White House, left a folder with that 13-part message and one or two others with an aide of Admiral Beardall, who was aide to the President, with rather emphatic instructions to get to the President as quickly as possible. The President was entertaining at the moment. I then proceeded at once to Secretary Knox's apartment on Connecticut Avenue, and waited there while he read the message, the traffic. Mrs. Knox was also present, as well as a business associate, I believe acting manager of his newspaper, the Chicago Daily "News". After Secretary Knox read the material, we had a brief discussion in one corner, chiefly because there were a number of references to previous messages in that particular 13-part message, and I remember we discussed certain points about it. He made some phone calls, I believe to Mr. Stimson and to Mr. Hull; and after these calls indicated that there would be a meeting at the State Department at 10:00 o'clock the following morning, Sunday, and he wanted me there with that material and anything else that had come in. From there I went to Admiral Wilkinson's residence in Arlington, where I knew Admiral Beardall, the President's aide, also was at dinner, and was there until about 12:15, past midnight, while he read the material I had, and I indicated who had received it. Admiral Wilkinson made some phone calls which included, I believe, Admiral Stark, and I think Admiral Turner, though I am not certain. I had tried both of these officers' residences earlier in the evening—Stark and Turner's—but neither were at home;

and left Admiral Wilkinson's home about 12:15 a. m. December 7, and went back to the Navy Department about 12:30. My return to the Navy Department was for two reasons: to leave these folders under proper safeguards, safe, as well as to check up on any possible new traffic that might have come in, particularly part 14, which was still missing. Nothing [963] was in of importance at that time, so I went home. I would like to insert parenthetically in connection with that going home, that I was on tap any hour of the day and night by GY Watch Officers, for anything that appeared to be of interest. When we were expecting anything of importance, I made a point of instructing them to call me if messages with a certain originator, such as Tokyo or Berlin, had come in.

58. Q. Is it correct that you did not deliver the 13 parts of this message you have just been testifying about on the night of 6-7 December, to Admiral Stark?

A. I did not deliver that 13-part message to Admiral Stark the night of 6-7 December. I did, however, get the word to Admiral Wilkinson, as I stated earlier, and I am almost certain that Admiral Wilkinson was in touch with Admiral Stark or his aids, because at the time I left Admiral Wilkinson's home he indicated to me that I was to have all that material, as well as any new material that came in, ready for them in the Navy Department the first thing in the morning.

59. Q. It is my understanding that you had been expecting such a dispatch as this Exhibit 39 for some days?

A. That is correct, yes, sir.

60. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63, and ask you if you were familiar with that document on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I am almost certain that this is one of many that I did see. I cannot swear about this particular one, because it is of the same nature as probably 200 others of that form.

61. Q. As you inspect this document, is that the type of document that you would have normally included in your file to show to the distributees in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

62. Q. Adverting again to this message that started to come in on the evening of 6 December, and of which you received thirteen parts, will you state when you again became acquainted with any other matter that related to these thirteen parts—that is a continuation thereof?

A. I received no phone calls during the night, and consequently arrived at the Navy Department not before about 7:30 in the morning. At that time, other material was coming in. That was being translated, checked, written up, and at about 9:00 o'clock the 13-part message, together with the new material, was left at Admiral Stark's office, where there was apparently a meeting. My recollection is that it was about 9:00 o'clock. There was a meeting apparently gathering, not yet in progress. I returned at once to my office to finish preparation of the other folders and get together material for the Secretary, left the Navy Department about 9:30 to make delivery to the White House, for which the Navy Department was at that time responsible, and was at the State Department at about ten minutes to 10:00, waiting for Mr. Knox, to whom I [964] gave that

material. The material concerned in this particular folder was the thirteen parts received the night before plus one or two other ones, plus the fourteenth part, which had arrived early in the morning, plus one or two other ones. This particular delivery did not include the message directing delivery of their note to the United States at 1300. That had arrived at the Navy Department when I got back to my office, and was being translated.

The court then, at 11:00 a. m., took a recess until 11:10 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

[965] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

63. Q. You may continue with your testimony.

A. When I had returned to the Navy Department at approximately 1020, a message directing in rather emphatic language that delivery be made to the Secretary of State at 1300 had been received, together with a series of other messages, one of which directed final destruction of Japanese codes still on hand—those remaining after the earlier directive on the destruction of codes the week before. There was another message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed to the embassy staff, and one or two others of like nature. That material was delivered within ten to fifteen minutes to Admiral Stark's office—to the meeting then in progress. I then left, very much in a hurry, to go to the White House and to the meeting at the State Department to deliver that new material. The delay between the time I had returned to the Navy Department at 1020 and when I started delivery was simply a clerical detail entailed in typing and putting it in the folder. When I delivered this new material, including the directive of delivery of the Japanese diplomatic note to be made at 1300 to the State Department, I made a point of verbally inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved. The reason I did that was the fact that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, might not have seen at first glance the implications of the times. We had known that for some weeks passed the Japs were negotiating with certain elements in Thailand, specifically the Thailand Chief of Staff, with the view of forcing the hand of the Thai premier, who had stated earlier he was maintaining a neutral position and that if any nation, whether the Japanese or British, crossed his borders, it would mean that he would call on the other party to come to his assistance. The Japs came and apparently involved either a demonstration or an actual landing at Kota Bharu, just below the Thai border on the Malay pen-

insula. Because of the tactical terrain features there, it was expected that the British would cross the Thai border, heading for the rail center of Singora. With that expectation in mind, namely, of forcing the British to cross the Thai border, the Japanese, together with the Thai Chief of Staff, could force the premier to call on the Japanese for help, in line with his earlier statement of policy. In addition, we knew the way the United States-Japanese negotiations had been heading up. We knew that on 30 November the Japanese for the first time during 1941 had opened up on the subject and progress of these negotiations to the Germans, their allies. Up to this message of 30 November, the Germans had been kept largely in the dark, including the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, in Berlin. We received that message, I believe, either the 1st or 2nd of December and distributed it the same date. I emphasize that [966] message, because in that message there was one statement which, in translation, came very close to what we had used in our write-up of the message, namely,—and I quote—"that sooner than anyone imagined Japan would be at war with the Anglo Saxons." Subsequent to that we had the directive on the partial destruction of codes. We also had a rather urgent message around the 2nd or 3rd directing the Jap Embassy in Washington to have the Second Secretary Takahashi, as I recall his name, leave the country at once. We knew that this Second Secretary, ever since his arrival earlier in the spring, was an especially trained espionage man and he had a number of especially trained men with him. His chief concern during the summer was in setting up an espionage establishment in Latin America. The fact that he was directed to leave was a further straw in the wind. We made a point of seeing that he did not leave before the break. All these things, together with the sighting of a large movement of Japanese ships down the coast of French Indo China about Thursday, its subsequent sightings on Friday and Saturday, and its position on Saturday, December 6, approximately a day's run from Kota Bharu, added up in my mind, at least, to something more than coincidence. In other words, the directive for delivery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu. I simply pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary. I did not feel it necessary to point out such a thing to the officers of the Navy Department, since it would be quite apparent to them. From that point, there was no further traffic.

Examined by the court:

64. Q. Where did you go after you left the Secretary?

A. To my office. The remarks I made at the State Department were not to the Secretary directly—

65. Q. Are you speaking of Hull or Knox?

A. Knox. But to a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull and to whom I made similar remarks inviting attention to the importance of the material I was delivering; and it was this officer who took the folder into Mr. Knox, together with my remarks. I then returned to the Navy Department, and no further traffic on the Japanese system came in. I should amend that. No further traffic to Washington in the Japanese system came in.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

66. Q. Does the judge advocate understand that you delivered in person this document containing the information about the delivery of the Japanese note to the State Department at 1300 to the Chief of Naval Operations in person?

A. When I called at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations between approximately 10:30 and a quarter to eleven—I'm not certain of the time—a meeting was still in progress [967] there with probably fifteen officers present. I asked for Admiral Stark's aide, who came out. I told him I had something else that was highly important and handed it to him and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. What was that?

A. That included the message on the 1300 delivery.

68. Q. Who was it?

A. Admiral Stark's aide, Flag Secretary Wellburn.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

69. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if that is the message to which you refer in connection with delivering a diplomatic reply to the Secretary of State at 1300?

A. Yes, sir, that is. This particular message was translated by Army.

Examined by the court:

70. Q. Will you tell us what time it came to the Navy Department?

A. This was one which had been received by my office when I returned from the first delivery to the State Department and the White House at about 10:20, and I delivered them at about 10:30 to the conference then in Admiral Stark's office. This is the 1 p. m. message.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

71. Q. Do you of your own knowledge know at what time Admiral Stark first got the information contained in document 41?

A. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

72. Q. Would you mind repeating the statement which you just made off the record as to the delivery of this message?

A. As I stated, I have no direct knowledge of whether Admiral Stark had already received that information. It is possible, however, that he had, since the message was written up and distributed by Army. Consequently, General Marshall would very likely have received it some minutes before my office did and General Marshall might very well have 'phoned Admiral Stark.

[968] 73. Q. I direct your attention to Exhibit 63 in this proceeding and particularly call your attention to the fact on some of the documents contained in that exhibit there appears a rubber stamp and on other documents that rubber stamp is absent. On some of the documents which contain the rubber stamp there is a pencil mark surrounding certain of the figures. Will you explain to the court the significance or lack of significance of the stamp on certain of those documents? I am particularly interested in knowing whether or not it represents anything with respect to the routing of those documents.

A. That stamp was made up by my office at the time we stopped making summaries of the day's book around the middle of 1941. The

first two items in the upper left-hand corner are intended to mean a single or double asterisk. In other words, a single asterisk, as I earlier used, indicated an item of interest. A double asterisk indicated items of the highest interest or immediate urgency. "One" referred to Secretary Knox, "Ten" to Admiral Stark, "Twelve" to Admiral Turner of War Plans. I normally used that stamp when we were not too pressed for time. In the fall of 1941, however, there were many occasions when the urgency of delivery was greater than taking time to stamp the half-dozen copies to indicate interest. In other words, I made a point in such cases of verbally indicating interest. As a rule, those items would be only a few in a special, single folder.

74. Q. When there is a pencilled circle around the number, I assume that means that the message was delivered to the persons indicated by the circled figures; is that correct?

A. It indicates that of course, but it does not infer that other messages were not so delivered.

75. Q. With respect to the particular message, does it mean that it was not delivered to others than those whose numbers are circled?

A. No, it does not.

76. Q. What was the purpose of circling the numbers when you did use the stamp?

A. It was a matter of special interest or otherwise to those individuals. In other words, one message might be of much interest to Secretary Knox, who was following the negotiations with Japan very closely. Another message having to do with the change of the Japanese system might be of much interest to Admiral Noyes—the technical aspects of it. Another message might be of much interest to London, not only technical but those directly affecting London. It was purely a matter of interest.

77. Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, possibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States. Would you indicate to [969] the court why you phrased your answer that way, that is, indicating that it might mean any one of those three things rather than one of those three specifically?

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese language in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirection and by inference.

78. Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section could not have stated categorically that this message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.

79. Q. In connection with the 14-part message, did you consider the first 13 parts of the message, which you had received up to a particular point when you made your first distribution, particularly significant with respect to the imminence of war, or were you waiting for the information that might be contained in some subsequent parts before making that evaluation?

A. The tone of the first 13 parts was so much stronger than had been the tone of earlier Japanese notes that it was quite apparent that with the delivery of this note the Japanese had in view a termination of the negotiations which had been going on through 1941. Further than that, it was purely a matter of deduction.

80. Q. Would you say that you felt in your own mind that diplomatic relations were being ruptured until you had seen the 14th part of the message?

A. Even seeing the 14th part I could not state definitely that diplomatic relations were ruptured, only that the negotiations reaching an understanding with the United States on trade and so forth were being terminated.

81. Q. In answer to a question you related certain background which you had in mind when you called the attention of the Secretary, through the Foreign Service officer, to the time of delivery of this note. To whom had this information which you have recounted here been given so far as the higher echelons in the Navy Department were concerned, or was this merely a matter of your own personal background which assisted you in the work of your section?

A. Every message I referred to in my earlier statement had been delivered to all the six addressees that I referred to previously.

82. Q. But had the detailed background which you recounted here been assembled in a formal statement and presented, for example, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director [970] of Naval Communications, or the Chief of Naval Operations, or was this matter which you had gathered from these same dispatches?

A. These were simply matters that occurred to me on the way over to the meeting at the State Department at 11:00 o'clock. However, they were all matters of which the other addressees were fully cognizant, having seen the traffic concerned earlier as they were translated and delivered.

The court then, at 11:50 a. m., took a recess until 1:30 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[971] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

83. Q. Will you please give a very brief statement as to the reasons for the Kopek Channel and the limitations of the type of communications that were sent in that channel?

A. That code word "Kopek" was simply a code designator for material in a crypt channel having to do with technical aspects of

this decryption. Exchange was made in that channel only between the three stations, namely, Navy Department, Washington; Pearl Harbor, and the Asiatic Station in that channel.

84. Q. To what officers were these dispatches particularly directed in the various areas?

A. The purpose of having those stations set up where they were, more specifically at Pearl and in the Asiatic Station, was to service Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, delivery to those stations in that channel involved the presumption that the officers handling that material at those stations would supplement it with any local material they may have picked up by intercept and comparable decrypting activities there and furnish it to the flag officers concerned.

85. Q. I show you Document 38 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you saw this about the 6th of December, 1941, and if so at what time. This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long dispatch would be transmitted shortly and setting forth that a definite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch.

A. I believe that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, along with the first 13 parts.

86. Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your previous testimony as being some of the "other material"?

A. Yes, sir; that is correct.

[972] (sic.) that by stating that I am not positive that this is one of them, although it very probably was. I put it that way because of the fact that the existence of 14 parts of the message would be indicated internally in each one of the 14 parts, so having received just one part we would know there were 14 parts to it because it would be so indicated in that one part, but I believe this is one of the messages received the evening before.

87. Q. Will you give as best you can recall what you told the Secretary of the Navy on the evening of 6 December 1941 at the time that you delivered the first 13 parts of the long message and the other dispatches?

A. Initially I didn't tell him anything, other than to state in my earlier 'phone call and when I appeared in his apartment that I had something that appeared very important. He spent about 15 or 20 minutes reading the material I had and then some minutes more making 'phone calls. And then for about another 10 or 15 minutes there was a rather informal conversation, the first part of which was only between the Secretary and myself, and then later on we talked about diversified things not connected with this but the general political picture in which Mr. Knox and his manager of the Chicago Daily News also joined. The conversation in that more open discussion didn't concern this technical material so much because of the security aspects and the strictness we were under regarding handling and who should know about it. The conversation of mine with Mr. Knox chiefly concerned some of the references appearing and mentioned some of the previous points that were brought up in that long 13-part message.

[Notation in margin:] H B.

88. Q. Do you recall any particular evaluation that was given by the Secretary on these dispatches in the general relations between Japan and the United States?

A. No, I don't. He did not comment particularly on what his views were on the prospects of a break. In other words, that was in line with a characteristic of Mr. Knox, particularly at the end of about a year after he had first been shown this material and had been repeatedly indoctrinated—and I use that word advisedly—by myself and Admiral Wilkinson on the security features in handling this type of material. Mr. Knox was thoroughly conversant with this material and fully backed us up on any measures the Director of Naval Intelligence wanted to take relative to the security of that material. I would say it was with that security feature in mind that he did not express himself in the presence of that business associate of his, and possibly his wife.

89. Q. When you took this same material to Admiral Wilkinson, will you state as best you can recall what reaction or comments that he made on the reading of these dispatches?

A. I couldn't put words in his mouth. Nothing stood out particularly in the course of our conversation. It was obvious, though, that things were reaching a crisis and Admiral Wilkinson expressed himself along those lines as well as myself; that is, in the course of the informal conversation there was a general agreement on the fact that things were shaping up in some sort of a crisis so far as negotiations and [973] relations with Japan were concerned. Admiral Beardall was present, of course, too, and took part in that conversation as well.

90. Q. Who were at the conference in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I was so pressed for time that morning that I'm not certain just who was there. I have a general impression that when I made the hurried delivery at 9:00 o'clock that there was about 12 or 15 officers present. Most of the heads of divisions in the Navy Department and those that attended the Admirals' conference were there. I know that Admiral Wilkinson was there, and in fact I felt a sense of relief that he was there because I was able to deliver a copy of the thing to him and let him carry the ball with Admiral Stark as far as any further explanation or references were concerned.

91. Q. Do you know about what time Admiral Stark came to his office on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, 1941?

A. No, I don't.

92. Q. To whom did you actually deliver the dispatches on the morning of 7 December 1941 at the White House; that is, who received them?

A. I'm not certain of the name but it was one of Admiral Beardall's assistants in the situation room which he had set up around for the White House. I believe—I am again not positive—it was Lieutenant Commander Leahy who was senior assistant to Admiral Beardall.

93. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you have seen this dispatch before, and if so, when? This dispatch is from Tokyo to Honolulu and relates to the receiving of reports on ship movements and includes the instructions that Honolulu will report even when there are no movements.

A. Yes, sir, I received that.

94. Q. About what time did you see it?

A. The fact that the date 5 December is on here would indicate that I saw it that day; since it was a Navy translation it is one that I would have reviewed before it was written up.

95. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, which is a copy of a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports of ships in definite areas at Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether you have seen that dispatch before, and if so, when?

A. I believe I have seen this also, and the fact that the date 5 December is on this also would indicate that I received it or first saw it about that date. It is an Army translation.

[974] 96. Q. I show you Document 40 of Exhibit 63 which is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo giving the location of battleships and other ships in definite areas in Pearl Harbor on the date that the dispatch was sent, and also gives the courses and distances on such courses of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether or not you have seen this dispatch, and if so, when?

A. Yes, sir, I am quite certain I have seen this also. The only clue I have to the time I saw it would be the date appearing on this thing, namely, 6 December 1941. I might amplify further: This message, as well as those others you have shown me, was only some of quite a few of that category which had been appearing through the year. The Jap Consul had been reporting on our major unit moves about the training grounds in the vicinity of Pearl and any other information on our ship movements that he could get. Sometimes it was on the direction of Tokyo; sometimes on his own initiative.

97. Q. Were these other dispatches to which you have just referred gone into with such meticulous details as to the ships that were going to be in certain definite areas and a certain definite harbor at a certain definite time?

A. No, sir. This is the first one, I believe, in which specific areas in Pearl Harbor were mentioned. They had previously referred to the location of things by names of places such as Ford Island or the Fuel Dock, or things like that, rather than these specific, defined areas.

98. Q. Now, referring to your previous examination as to the interpretation of the winds message in which you have divided the possible interpretation into three general classes: strained relations, a break in diplomatic relations, or war. During the period of, say, from the 2nd or 3rd of December 1941 to the 7th of December 1941 wherein all of these dispatches indicated specific areas in which the Japanese were particularly interested, did you come to any particular deduction at that time as to which of the three meanings was really intended by the winds message?

A. The inference I gained from these was to the effect that the Japanese were concerned about locations of major U. S. Naval units. They had been similarly concerned, however, about locations, types and numbers of planes in the Philippines. They had been similarly concerned about almost all aspects of military establishments, forces and so forth in the Netherlands East Indies.

[975] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

99. Q. You have previously made reference to an intercepted dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin in which Tokyo had informed Berlin

that there would be war with the Anglo-Saxons in the immediate future.

A. The expression I used, which was the closest we could come to a precise translation of the Japanese, was, "Sooner than anyone imagines."

100. Q. In view of the dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin as to the proximity of war with the Anglo-Saxons, did that dispatch and these other dispatches just now shown you, lead you to any deductions as to whether the wind message really meant a strained relationship or a break in diplomatic relations or war—and the execution of that dispatch would bring about one of those three classes of decisions?

A. To go back first to my interpretation of the sense of that wind message, I did not mean to infer that there was any definite implication of war. What I did mean, what I think I stated, was that it implied a severe straining of relations, which could be inferred to imply as including an actual rupture of relations, or possibly even war. To come back to your specific question now, we knew they were planning something against Britain. I have already referred to the negotiations with the Thai people. We knew, too, that the Japs were very much aware of the fact we were doing a great deal for the British in their war and working closely with them. In fact, it was almost a joint front as regards negotiations with the Japs. That note that we had handed the Japanese on 26 November had only been given to them after consultation, with Japanese knowledge, with the Dutch and Chinese as well as the British. Consequently, the inference on this particular attention to ship movements in Pearl Harbor was that the Japs were very concerned about what action we were taking, where our Fleet might be, what action we might take in case the Japs did make a move against the British. There was no slightest indication at any time of any overt intentions directed against the United States, from this material.

101. Q. But you have testified that it was the first time that there had been any inquiry made as to the exact locations of certain definite ships and certain definite areas in Pearl Harbor, have you not?

A. It was the first time they had used that particular means of identifying areas. They had been getting information and asking for information not only about Pearl but other places—the locations of our ships.

102. Q. But it was the first time, was it not, that they had asked for it in such detail as in these dispatches?

A. Yes, sir, that is true of Pearl Harbor.

[976] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

103. Q. Referring to Exhibit 20, which is the December 3 message from OpNav to addressees, saying that certain codes were destroyed and also referring to Exhibit 66, which is from OpNav on the Kopek circuit saying approximately the same thing, I refer you to your testimony this morning and ask you if you did not say that in the OpNav message of December 3, it was an example of the evaluation of intelligence information?

A. I believe that is the expression I used.

104. Q. And in connection with that, in Exhibit 20 what portion of the message did you refer to as being an example of the evaluation; could you just repeat the words, or dictate the words?

A. I had nothing to do with the drafting of this message from OpNav. OpNav had been given the same information which I had sent in the Kopek channel, and O. N. I. in this case I happened to know Commander McCollum felt he was warranted in drafting a dispatch on the subject of this destruction of codes. I didn't see this message until some days later, as a matter of fact.

105. Q. Well, the point, Commander, sir—in Exhibit 20 what portion of the message were you referring to when you were referring to the evaluation?

A. Evaluation was perhaps not quite the right word. The more precise statement of their function in that regard would be that Intelligence sent it out as intelligence, rather than simply the technical channel of exchange.

106. Q. In the last portion of this document there are the words, which have a line drawn through them, which say, "From information infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." Would that be the language of evaluation of that information?

A. That of course is an evaluation of the information appearing earlier in the dispatch.

Examined by the court:

107. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge that Secretary Knox himself received the so-called 1:00 p. m. message while at the State Department, or that the oral interpretation of the situation of the time of delivery—that is, 1:00 p. m.—was transmitted to him personally by the State Department official mentioned?

A. I was not present, so I am not certain of my own knowledge, but as certain as I can be otherwise, because the Secretary to Mr. Hull, who handled that, had only about ten feet to go to deliver that message to those three secretaries sitting around the table there.

108. Q. I was wondering more as to the interpretation orally given about the daylight—the situation as to 1:00 p. m.—whether the man who translated it understood what it was about.

A. I explained that to him so that he would have the [977] picture.

109. Q. But it wasn't written down at all?

A. No, sir.

110. Q. That message was transmitted by the War Department?

A. Yes, sir.

111. Q. And the War Department had the same procedure that you did—they sent copies to the Navy Department, copies to the White House, and copies to the State Department?

A. No, sir. The War Department had responsibility at that time to the State Department, Navy Department, and the White House.

112. Q. So the chances are that that message was sent by the War Department to the Secretary of State at the same time it was sent to the Navy Department?

A. That is correct. Colonel Bratton was at the State Department at 10:00 o'clock with material for Mr. Hull as well as Mr. Stimson. He was again there about 11:00 o'clock—about the same time I was there with new material.

113. Q. So that if the note got to the Secretary of the Navy when he was with the Secretary of State, he perhaps had that at the same time you got it in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, all three secretaries got it about the same time.

114. Q. Commander, you have discussed these different supersecret messages flowing into the Navy Department and being delivered. Do you recall that you delivered personally any of these messages to the Chief of Operations and discussed them with him?

A. No, sir, I did not. I do know that it was delivered at about 9:00 o'clock on December 7, because I was just inside the door of Admiral Stark's office while his aide, Commander Wellborn, took the messages over to his desk.

115. Q. Did you see Admiral Stark at 9:00 o'clock in his office on the morning of December 7?

A. Admiral Stark was there with Admiral Wilkinson.

116. Q. At 9:00 o'clock that morning?

A. It was approximately 9:00 o'clock; I am not positive of that time.

117. Q. And at that time, at 9:00 o'clock, you delivered to his aide, and you are sure you say that Admiral Stark got them—the thirteen parts that you have been discussing; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

118. Q. Then at 10:20 when you came back, and you got this message of 1:00 p. m. time of delivery, you went in and delivered [978] that message—did you go and deliver that message to the Chief of Operations' office?

A. In that case I did not step inside the door, but Commander Wellborn came to the door and I handed it to him.

119. Q. Admiral Stark was there at that time?

A. I believe so, although I can't state positively he was at his desk or in there.

120. Q. In your activities in Washington as delivering these messages, did you at any time, or were you at any time present at conferences with State Department, War Department officials, and with the Chief of Naval Operations, discussing these secret and super-secret messages?

A. No, sir.

121. Q. Referring to the letter of November 26, which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese officials, were you fully cognizant of the contents of that letter?

A. Not until it was sent out in the Japanese circuit.

122. Q. When did it go out on the Japanese circuit?

A. I believe it was the 27th, sir; I am not certain.

123. Q. Did you deliver the substance of this message to the office of Chief of Naval Operations; was that in the daily reports going in to him?

A. I don't believe I ever saw the text of our message, Admiral.

124. Q. It was a plain language message as handed in English by the Secretary of State?

A. Yes, sir.

125. Q. And I asked you if you were familiar with the contents of that message.

A. By stating I knew of it on the 26th, I knew it had gone out—that the Japanese had transmitted such a message.

126. Q. And you were familiar with its contents?

A. Only in a general way, knowing the tenor of the negotiations of the previous week.

127. Q. From November 27 to December 7, did you consider, having been cognizant of these messages flowing in—did you consider that negotiations and conversations were continuing between the State Department and the Japanese representatives?

A. I knew some conversations were continuing, but we also had had a message from Tokyo in which Tokyo directed such conversations continue.

128. Q. To continue?

A. Yes, sir.

129. Q. Referring to document 7 of Exhibit 63, in which [979] Tokyo directs all arrangements for signing of agreement be completed by 25 November, are you familiar with that?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

130. Q. Was this message which you have in hand delivered to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

131. Q. Do you assume that he was cognizant of that message?

A. I assume that he was, yes, sir.

132. Q. Referring to document 11 of Exhibit 63, in which Tokyo regrets signing of agreement can't be made by 25th, are you familiar with that message?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

133. Q. Referring to document 16, from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November and translated on November 28, in which is stated that the Japanese Ambassador states that rupture of negotiations does not necessarily mean war between United States and Japan; are you familiar with that message and have you seen it before?

A. I am quite certain I have, yes, sir.

134. Q. Was that message sent to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

135. Q. You have already testified to document 17, from Washington to Tokyo, giving translation of note of 26 November, haven't you?

A. I believe that came up once before, yes, sir.

136. Q. Referring to document 18, Tokyo to Washington, translated 28 November, stating that Tokyo says the views of the Imperial Government will be sent in two or three days; are you familiar with that message?

A. I am quite certain I saw this too, yes, sir.

[980] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

137. Q. And this message was delivered to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, this would be one that was delivered, as all the negotiation messages were delivered, to the Chief of Naval Operations.

138. Q. In other words, there is no question but that all these important messages were delivered to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am certain as I can be of that, yes, sir.

139. Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some

future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?

A. Yes, sir.

140. Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply? In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer".

141. Q. Well, the execute of the message.

A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization were very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.

142. Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.

143. Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, "Here it is."

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

144. Q. You had that information then?

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

145. Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?

A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

146. Q. What did you do with it?

A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.

[981] 147. Q. Who handled it?

A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular plain language code because of his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night.

148. Q. When the original winds message was received, was that to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

149. Q. Were you familiar with the rapidity of means of communication between Washington and Honolulu?

A. No, sir, only in a general way from my general communication knowledge.

150. Q. While you were there suppose you had a very important message where the time element was of primary importance. Which way would you have sent it to reach Honolulu at the quickest possible time?

A. That would not have been a decision of mine, sir.

151. Q. Well, I mean in your general information; I know it wasn't your decision.

A. I knew there was the telephone.

152. Q. You were not familiar with the others?

A. No, sir.

153. Q. On the morning of December 7th when you arrived at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9:00 o'clock, as you have testified, was Admiral Wilkinson there?

A. Yes, sir.

154. Q. Did you acquaint him with everything you had up to that time?

A. Yes, sir, I gave him the folder, including the material of the previous night, and indicated that part 14 had been received and left the picture with him and did not take time to explain it to anyone else, since Admiral Wilkinson could do that.

155. Q. In explaining to the State Department official on the morning of December 7th your ideas regarding 1:00 o'clock time in Honolulu and 1:00 o'clock Asiatic, did that seem to impress the State Department official to the extent that you felt certain he would tell that to Secretary Knox?

A. I believe it did, yes, sir.

156. Q. When you arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's house on the night of December 6th, did you ask him if he had given this information with respect to the 13 points to the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone or otherwise?

A. I did not ask him, no, sir. Admiral Wilkinson, as head of Naval Intelligence, of course had the ultimate responsibility of getting it to the Chief of Naval Operations. I was a subordinate of his, and in these deliveries I was [982] acting as his subordinate, and normally always kept him apprised of who got it and attempted, as a rule, to get it to him at first. If he was not immediately available, I made distribution in any case and let him know.

157. Q. You testified that you telephoned Admiral Stark's house and found he was out?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

158. Q. When you went to Admiral Wilkinson we presume you told him that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark?

A. I told him Admiral Stark had not received it. In other words, that was a general practice, to inform each of the recipients who else had received it.

159. Q. When you informed Admiral Wilkinson that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark and found him out, did Admiral Wilkinson say he would call him?

A. No, he did not tell me, but he did make some 'phone calls.

160. Q. To whom?

A. I'm not certain.

161. Q. Reviewing your testimony of your daily routine in connection with the delivery of messages, is the court correct in understanding that each day when messages were received—and there were numerous messages—

A. Yes, sir.

162. Q. Continuing.) You took those messages to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, delivered them, and had marked or clipped those messages in their original translation as to their importance; is that correct?

A. That, in general, is correct. I did not actually use clips. In that case, only a few messages would be of importance; on some days folders were made up of the important ones.

163. Q. Were you familiar with the war warning message sent out by OpNav to the different forces on 27 November?

A. I did not hear about that until after the Roberts Committee. I am familiar, however, with a directive from OpNav to our attaches in Japan and China, as well as to the Governor in Guam, on destructing codes.

164. Q. That was sent sometime about December 3?

A. It was sent the day after we received the Japanese message on the destruction of codes. I think it was Thursday or Friday of that week preceding Pearl Harbor. I was in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted that.

165. Q. Can you recall, or could you let the court know, the name of that State Department official with whom you conferred on the morning of 7 December immediately prior to sending in your messages to Secretary Knox?

A. I can't be certain, sir. Two of the people that [983] took delivery for Mr. Hull had been especially indoctrinated by both Colonel Bratton and me over a period of time on security. One was named Stone and the other Brown. I don't recall, for the moment, the others.

166. Q. Subsequent to November 26, 1941, the date of the important note of the Secretary of State to the Japanese officials, were you and other in the Intelligence Department at the Navy Department awaiting and expecting a reply to that with interest?

A. Very much, yes, sir.

167. Q. In other words, that was the culminating point of the whole business. A note was sent to Japan, and this was going to be the answer?

A. At least my own feeling was that there would be no action taken until a reply came.

168. Q. During that interval there was expectancy as to this important answer?

A. Yes, sir. Of course, during that period of waiting these other developments took place; that dispatch to Berlin, the development in Thailand, and the destruction of codes. That was all during the period of waiting.

169. Q. The information received from Berlin and the dispatch to Berlin from Tokyo were all in your file?

A. Yes, sir.

170. Q. Those files were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, all those recipients received that. I might amplify my last remark by stating the White House was so interested in that particular message—

171. Q. What particular message? The reply message?

A. No, sir, the one to Berlin. (Continuing)—that on the Naval Aide's instruction I prepared a special paraphrased version of that for Mr. Roosevelt, which he retained; otherwise, neither the State Department nor the White House were ever permitted—I say that advisedly—to retain any of these dispatches.

172. Q. These super-secret dispatches?

A. Yes.

173. Q. Do you know whether the winds message or its execution, or either of them was transmitted in substance to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I don't know, sir.

174. Q. Are you aware of any cryptic messages or their contents, other than the messages with respect to the destruction of codes and so on, being transmitted by the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, between 27 November and 7 December?

A. I am not certain. There may have been one or two others but not more than that.

[984] 175. Q. You don't know of any?

A. No, sir, I don't know of any. If I looked through everything, I might be able to refresh my memory, but I don't know now.

Re-cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

176. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether or not you have seen this dispatch before? This is the message of 28 November from CinCAF to OpNav, information of Com16, CinCPac, and Com14, setting forth the net intercept translation received from Singapore concerning the winds code.

A. I believe I did see this.

177. Q. Does that message contain substantially the same information concerning the winds code which you had in your unit in Washington?

A. Yes, it does.

178. Q. That message shows on its face what addressees?

A. Action, OpNav; information, Com16, CinCPac, and Com14.

179. Q. What is the date of that message?

A. 28 November.

180. Q. Would you refer to Document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the intercept that you had in your unit in Washington, and state the date that message first became available to you in intelligible form?

A. I would have to depend on the date appearing on this—28 November.

181. Q. That is the same date as the date of the dispatch from CinCAF to OpNav to which you have just referred?

A. That is true.

182. Q. When you talked to the State Department official with respect to the message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver the note at 1300 and asked him to show it to Secretary Knox, did you do more than suggest to him that 1300 in Washington was dawn at Pearl Harbor and midnight in the Far East; that is, did you discuss with him any significance in that timing, or did you just ask him to inform the Secretary that those were the facts?

A. The expressions I used were that 1:00 o'clock delivery time in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before dawn at Kota Bharu. This State Department man was fully cognizant of the significance of that term "Kota Bharu", since he was seeing these dispatches every day. Furthermore, the information on the Jap convoy movement had been toward Kota Bharu around Indo-China, and was also definitely known among high officials in Washington.

[985] 183. Q. You did not suggest to him that 1300 Washington time was dawn at Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack at Pearl Harbor, or ask him to make that suggestion to the Secretary?

A. I did not.

184. Q. Before you went to the State Department that morning with the dispatch, turning over in your mind the background, had you had any discussion with anyone in the Navy Department, particularly in your unit, concerning the significance of this timing?

A. When that particular folder containing that message was being made up, I draw a little circle, as a navigator does, to figure out his hour angles and remarked at the time to some of the people in my office—no one in particular—that this 1:00 o'clock delivery time in Washington was just before dawn at Kota Bharu.

185. Q. You mean Kota Bharu, or Pearl Harbor?

A. Kota Bharu.

186. Q. Before dawn at Kota Bharu?

A. Before dawn at Kota Bharu. I was possibly more specific in stating that it certainly looked as though the Japs were going ahead with that planned enterprise down there.

187. Q. Did you have any thought from this material at that time that this meant a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. From this material which was normally the only source of information I had, there was not the slightest indication at any time to indicate a Japanese overt intention of attacking the United States. From that point of view, I had at various times while I was handling this material pointed out to high officials that this source of information was, of necessity, incomplete, that as far as it went it was highly valuable information, but it was not complete and therefore there might be other things going on of which we were not aware. That was repeated so frequently throughout the couple of years I was handling this material that it was almost automatically inferred. When a particular item of that kind was delivered you had to reach your own deductions and conclusions from just a possible thought fragment of the picture we had in this material. Only a percentage of this traffic was being broken, for one thing. Some days we did not have enough traffic to break a key. Some days keys in certain instances were not broken at all. That is just another item supporting the statement I made that the picture received from this source of intelligence was incomplete. It could, of course, be supplemented and oftentimes was displaced by actual courier crypts.

188. Q. Do you think the Chief of Naval Operations was cognizant of the limitations of this material?

A. I'm sure he was.

[986] 189. Q. And that he must rely on other sources for more precise information with respect to relations between Japan and the United States?

A. I'm quite certain he was.

190. Q. Did you have any discussion with Captain Safford on the morning of 7 December before you went to the State Department?

A. I don't recall any. I was pressed for time that morning making deliveries.

191. Q. How long were you in that section after 7 December 1941?

A. Until June, 1943.

192. Q. Did you ever hear Captain Safford express himself—and this answer I should like to have you divide between 7 December and subsequent to 7 December—as to whether the message concerning the delivery of the note definitely indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor at approximately dawn of December 7th?

A. I can almost positively state that no such statement was made to me or in my presence.

193. Q. Do you feel that if Captain Safford had such thoughts on this important matter you would have heard about them? In other words, were your relations with Captain Safford close enough that you might reasonably expect to receive such an expression from him?

A. I would say yes.

194. Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is", did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

195. Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

[987] 196. Q. To your mind it did not necessarily mean war?

A. Not necessarily at all.

197. Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either the "Winds" code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the message of execution?

A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the literal translation of these terms.

198. Q. Your section had no difficulty in making the translation?

A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language.

Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy. Pages 994-1008, inclusive.

[994] 22. Q. Were you a regular distributee of information received by way of communication intercepts?

A. Yes. I saw all such dispatches.

23. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch of 27 November 1941. I ask you to examine it and state to the court what connection, if any, you had in the preparation of this dispatch?

A. I prepared that dispatch after discussion of the situation with the Chief of Naval Operations and after we had received certain secret information connected with the activities of special Ambassador Kurusu.

24. Q. Will you state what you meant by the first sentence, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

A. I meant just exactly what is said, it is to be considered a warning of approaching war.

25. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to examine it.

A. Yes, I am familiar with that.

26. Q. Did you see this document on or about 22 November 1941, the date of its translation?

A. I saw it immediately after it was translated.

27. Q. This document contains the words, referring to the date November 29, "The deadline absolutely cannot be changed." What significance did these words have to you at that time?

A. That the Japanese were going to attack the United States or Great Britain, or both, on or about that date.

28. Q. There are also the words, "After that things are automatically going to happen". What significance did these words have to you at that time?

A. That movements of forces at this time were already under way and they could not be changed. The forces would not be recalled. We knew that they were already under way at that time. We knew that from sightings and from dispatches from China, that very considerable troop convoys were moving south. I think by then some had already moved into Indo-China. We knew that there had been a great activity in radio traffic over a period of two or three weeks and then suddenly at a date prior to this, the thing had ceased. It had been naval traffic and therefore we deduced that the Japanese Fleet had gone to sea. I don't recall the date of that.

29. Q. Can you recall seeing any intercept traffic between Berlin and Tokyo in which the Japanese government was alleged to have said, in effect, that there was going to be war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons sooner than any one thinks?

A. That strikes a familiar chord but I can't specifically recall any such dispatch.

[995] 30. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63. It contains the Secretary of State's note to Japan of 26 November 1941.

A. I remember that dispatch.

31. Q. Did this dispatch come to your attention on or about the date of its translation, which is set out in the lower right-hand corner as about 28 November 1941?

A. Yes, immediately.

32. Q. Did you know the substance of this note from any source other than this intercept, if you will remember?

A. As I recall it, Captain Schurmann, who then was head of the Central Division and was liaison officer with the State Department, brought this note over to the Navy Department from Mr. Hull to get Admiral Stark's advice on it. Now, there were several pages but I'm not too clear in my memory on the thing, but that is the way I remember it.

33. Q. Did you discuss the substance of this note of November 26, 1941 with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I did.

34. Q. Do you recall if he expressed any views as to its significance at that time, what it meant?

A. Well, he expressed the view that there wasn't any possibility that Japan would accept it.

35. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 17, which was that war warning dispatch: This dispatch contains the conclusion, "Negotiations with Japan have ceased". Upon what information was this conclusion based?

A. Mr. Hull told Admiral Stark over the inter-office 'phone, as I recall it—it might have been personally—that to all intents and purposes the thing was all over as far as negotiations were concerned. and I believe he said that he was not going to close them; he was going to keep them open, but for all useful purposes, why the thing was finished.

36. Q. And it is your recollection that Admiral Stark was in on this discussion?

A. Yes; I know he was. Mr. Hull kept Admiral Stark informed at all times. I don't know that he informed him of everything he knew but he kept him very well informed. Their relations were very close and cordial.

37. Q. At the time of drafting this war warning message of 27 November, what was your personal estimate of the Japanese intentions regarding a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area, if you had any?

A. I expected it. I expected they would make some sort of an attack on Hawaii.

38. Q. Was this estimate or expectation communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. It was communicated to him here. There is another dispatch dated two or three days before, November 24th I think, which warned against the matter and to take precautions. The Department—and the same applied to the War Department [996] was averse in being too specific as to what they believed might happen for the reason—wisely, I believe—that that might lead the Commanders-in-Chief not to guard other matters under their cognizance, and there were various proposals made in writing this dispatch and in the other as to how to be more specific about it, and it was decided that the Commanders-in-Chief had received full information as to what was in the minds of the Department, and therefore it was their duty to cover their entire field of responsibility.

39. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November, 1941, and ask you to examine it. Is that the dispatch about which you have just testified?

A. That is the dispatch I referred to. That dispatch, also, was discussed in the Joint Board. The Joint Board was holding almost daily meetings, as I recall it. Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred daily about the situation. The War Plans Divisions were in constant contact. I prepared that dispatch and it was changed in one or two particulars by Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark, and then was referred to General Marshall, and the War Department made a few changes in it, mainly along the line that I have mentioned, of keeping the thing from being too specific. By this time, why, I was personally convinced that they were going to go into Siam and also into the Malay Peninsula as the initial move and also attack the Philippines; that is, the major strategic moves. Whether that would be simul-

taneous, or not, or follow slightly after, I didn't know and didn't particularly care.

40. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states, "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." This language is omitted from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally?

A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "An amphibious expedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover the same kind of a subject, and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of amphibious forces but the movement of any forces.

41. Q. In the war warning dispatch of 27 November, there is the the directive, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment". What action was desired of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in complying with this directive?

A. To send scouting forces out of different kinds, to [997] deploy submarines in threatened directions, to put the Fleet to sea and in a covering position for the Hawaiian Islands and a supporting position for Midway.

42. Q. Were these expectations that you have just discussed contained in War Plans or in any other directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. Not in the detail that I have indicated, because the practice of the Navy Department was then and is now to give to the Commander-in-Chief a broad task, to provide him with sufficient forces or such forces and equipment and material as is available, and then to let the Commander-in-Chief do the work. Admiral Stark, in particular, was insistent that we not tell the Commander-in-Chief how to do his job.

43. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding, then, that with the information and directives contained in the dispatch of 27 November 1941, the Navy Department from there on expected the Commander-in-Chief to take appropriate action in view of the war warning expressed without further orders?

A. That is correct.

44. Q. At any time before 7 December 1941, did you believe an air torpedo attack on ships moored in Pearl Harbor was technically possible of accomplishment?

A. Yes. I always believed it was possible. There had been correspondence, there had been tests made by the Bureau of Ordnance and correspondence initiated by the Bureau of Ordnance and passed on by the Navy Department which, I think it was in the latter part of 1940 or the first part of 1941, indicated that in their opinion you had to have a 90-foot depth of water before you could make torpedos

successfully run. Well, that was quite true with American torpedoes, but I personally never saw any reason at all why torpedoes couldn't run in 10 feet of water, or maybe, say, 20 feet of water, dropped from airplanes. Now, the Bureau of Ordnance at a subsequent time conducted additional tests, and as I recall it, in June of 1941, a letter went out from the Department stating that they had now changed their mind on that and I think they said that torpedoes could successfully run in 60 feet of water, something on that order.

45. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to examine it?

A. Yes, I have seen that.

[998] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

46. Q. This document has been familiarly termed by witnesses before this court as the "Winds" code. Did you discuss this document with the Chief of Naval Operations at or about the time of its translation, as indicated on the document?

A. Yes, very briefly. I think the Chief of Naval Operations mentioned it. I think there was an instruction given to watch for those words.

47. Q. To your knowledge, were any of these code words in English or Japanese ever received in the Navy Department prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to my knowledge.

48. Q. There is evidence before this court that a Commander McCollum in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship over a period some time preceding the 3rd or 4th of December, 1941, which was for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a dispatch?

A. Yes, we had discussed the advisability of making such a summary, and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the various points and the details of the relationships and their intentions and so on. We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum—I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement—prepared a dispatch—I have forgotten its terms—and brought it to me to check over, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made suggestions of a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I don't remember just what was in the dispatch.

49. Q. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I don't know. We don't know at this time.

50. Q. To your knowledge, did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I don't know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness on the secret portion of the testimony.

[999] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

51. Q. Admiral, with regard to these intercepted dispatches, were you aware on the night of December 6 of any particular Japanese dispatches which were received in the Department and distributed? I refer particularly to a dispatch the 13 parts of which were received on Saturday afternoon and were ready for distribution at 9 o'clock.

A. That night?

52. Q. That night, and at the same time there was another dispatch which directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver this long dispatch, the first 13 parts of which I have just referred to, together with the rest of the dispatch, at an hour to be designated by a later dispatch. Do you remember having information on Saturday night of the coming in of that long dispatch and the fact that it was to be delivered at a date to be designated later?

A. I don't recall at the moment. I don't recall such a long dispatch.

53. Q. I show you document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is the long dispatch and is the reply of the Japanese to the American note of November 26.

A. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of December. I don't remember when I saw it.

54. Q. I show you document 38 of Exhibit 63, which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, in which instructions are given that the time of presenting the memorandum which I have just shown you, Exhibit 39, will be designated later in a separate dispatch. I ask you whether or not you saw that message and if so, at what time, to the best of your recollection?

A. I don't remember when I saw that. I saw it.

55. Q. Will you please state when you came down to the Navy Department on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. About 10:30 or 11 o'clock the Chief of Naval Operations called me up and said he had a matter concerning something which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet had written and wanted me to come down and see him about it.

56. Q. Were you in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations on that morning at about the time stated, 10 o'clock, and if so, what other officers were present at that conference?

A. I went into the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the exact time I don't recall. He showed me a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and told me to prepare a reply. In addition to that, he showed me a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the ambassador to present [1000] the 14-part note to the Secretary of State on that date, that is, on the 7th. I asked him what, if anything, had been done about warning the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet about this dispatch, and he said he had already talked the matter over with General Marshall and that General Marshall had sent a dispatch out immediately to the Army authorities in Hawaii as soon as he had seen this dispatch, inviting their attention to this matter. I don't recall the terms of the dispatch that he sent. I did not get there in time, anyway. Admiral Stark said that he believed

that the Commander-in-Chief already had the decrypted dispatch in his possession, because they were actually doing more of the decrypting in Pearl Harbor than we were in Washington.

Examined by the court:

57. Q. To which decrypted dispatch are you referring?

A. The decrypted dispatch about the time of presenting the long dispatch, and we felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was himself in possession of both those decrypted dispatches, because we got them from him—not decrypted. We decrypted these diplomatic dispatches in Washington, and my understanding of it is that in Pearl Harbor they decrypted the diplomatic dispatches and also the naval dispatches and made traffic analysis.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (Continued):

58. Q. Do you recall the particular hour at which the 14-part message was to be delivered to the Secretary of State?

A. I think it was to be delivered about 10:30 in the morning, but the Secretary of State told Admiral Stark over the 'phone that he had not been able to give the Japanese Ambassador an appointment at that time, and he had set it, I believe, for 2:30 in the afternoon Washington time.

59. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63, which may refresh your memory somewhat as to the time of delivery of these dispatches.

A. I can state from my own memory it was at 1 o'clock, but I believe the appointment actually was made for 2:30.

60. Q. Did the instructions for delivery of that dispatch at 1 o'clock p. m. Washington time have any particular significance to you at the time you learned it was to be delivered at that hour?

A. Yes, I thought the attack was going to come that day or the next. If I can amend it, I would say I thought the Japanese would make their attack on the British or the United States or both on that day or the day following.

[1001] Q. 61. Were you familiar while in Washington on your tour of duty in December, 1941, of the long distance telephones that were available for talking directly to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

62. Q. Had you used that telephone on any occasion to speak to persons at Pearl Harbor before?

A. I never had. I think the Chief of Naval Operations had, but we had all been warned by the Director of Naval Communications that in his opinion we could not depend on the security of that telephone. Therefore, it was not used by the Navy Department a great deal for secret matters. The War Department used it a great deal then and later, but the scrambler was not supposed to be secure. The one in use at that time was not supposed to be secure.

63. Q. You have testified as to the preparation of a reply to a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the preparation of which was assigned you by Admiral Stark on 7 December 1941. Did that relate to answering the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for information as to what assurances had been given Britain as to any armed support under conditions of several eventualities?

A. No, it related primarily to the question of whether the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, would remain in Manila at the out-

break of war with Japan, that is, whether he, with most of his Fleet, would remain in the Manila area at the outbreak of war with Japan or would send the Fleet to the southward initially and later proceed there himself.

64. Q. Did you have any information prior to 7 December 1941 as to a movement of Japanese carriers to the eastward from Japan?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

65. Q. Admiral, I may have misunderstood you, but this has to do with a remark I believe you made about the decrypting of dispatches at Pearl Harbor. My understanding is that all that was ever dealt with in the form of decrypted information at Pearl Harbor had to do with the location of ships and ship movements; am I not correct in that?

A. I don't know. On several occasions I inquired from the Director of Naval Communications as to whether or not in the case of a particular dispatch the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was getting that dispatch or whether we should not send him a dispatch and quote it. On every occasion I was assured that the Commander-in-Chief was getting as much as we were, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, he was getting it sooner than we were.

[1002] 66. Q. That came to you through a second party?

A. That came to me from the Director of Naval Communications. I don't know what the system was.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. In the further amplification of your reply concerning the significance of 1 p. m. time for delivery of the dispatch, you stated that you expected an attack by the Japanese against the United States or Great Britain, or both, on that day, December 7, or the next day. Would you say where you expected that attack to be delivered?

A. Yes, I expected a landing on certainly the Kra Peninsula, a landing in Siam and attacks of one nature or another, air probably, on the Philippines, because we had scouting planes out there, and some form of attack in Hawaii.

68. Q. But I do not gather, then, that there was anything specific in your mind concerning an attack against Pearl Harbor on that day or the next? No indication?

A. Nothing further than that the attack made by the Japanese in the East would be accompanied by one or more of the five forms of attack on our forces in Hawaii, which had been mentioned in the previous correspondence.

69. Q. Did you have knowledge of the dispositions of the Japanese Fleet to the extent that you were able to say whether you considered an attack at a distance across the whole Pacific Ocean to be within the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet, considering the other movements they had under way?

A. We did not know where the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was. Our deductions from what we had seen—not from decrypts but from what we had actually seen—were that there was to be a covering force generally in the Marshalls-Caroline area and that the so-called China Fleet, the Third Fleet, with additions of some sort, would carry on the naval missions in the China Sea.

70. Q. Were you familiar with the bulletin which the Director of Naval Intelligence issued as of December 1, 1941, which is quoted in the Roberts Report and of which this court has judicial notice, concerning the Japanese naval situation?

A. I have forgotten the terms of that dispatch.

71. Q. I refer you particularly to the last sentence (indicating).

A. I remember that and believe that I saw that before it was put out and concurred.

72. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the information available to the United States concerning the location of the Japanese Fleet was extremely vague?

A. I can't answer that categorically. "Vague" is a relative term. We had a great deal of information about the movements and operations of the Japanese. We never had enough, and we never do have enough.

[1003] 73. Q. Well, inexact and incomplete?

A. I will answer that it was incomplete.

74. Q. Admiral, speaking of these decrypted messages being at hand in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, do we understand that all these messages which had been decrypted and which are before this board, that you had the impression that all the information contained therein was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I had been informed that was the case by the Director of Naval Communications on several occasions.

75. Q. Was that the reason you did not inform the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet as to the contents of these messages?

A. Yes, sir.

76. Q. Was there any check made to see that the Commander-in-Chief had the same information in these decrypted messages he ought to have had?

A. I made none, except I brought the matter up with the Director of Naval Communications on several occasions. The first time was probably March or April.

77. Q. Who was the Director of Naval Communications at that time?

A. Admiral Noyes.

78. Q. The court is speaking of messages which have been reviewed here as super-secret messages and which you stated in your understanding were all decrypted in Honolulu.

A. That was my impression at that time. Now, I have been informed since then that the diplomatic messages were decrypted in Washington. Whether they were sent out to the Commander-in-Chief or not and whether he decrypted them, I don't know of my own knowledge. I understood he also decrypted them out there.

79. Q. That understanding came from Admiral Noyes?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. I refer you to document 40, document 37, document 36, and document 24 and ask if you at any time were cognizant of the contents of these documents?

A. I saw document 24. I don't remember document 37. I don't remember document 36.

81. Q. Did you have any information of them?

A. I would like to make a general answer to that question. I don't specifically remember any of these except 24, for the reason that we were getting these reports and had been getting them for months, and I would occasionally glance at them to see the nature of the information which was being sent by the secret agents, but I did not read all of them unless there was some particular thing that was necessary for me to see. [1004] Lieutenant Mott of the Office of Naval Intelligence would bring these dispatches around. There would be a great many dispatches, and he would mark the important ones. I would glance through and look at all the others and see if there was something I wanted to see, but to those movement reports, which had been going on for months, I paid no particular attention.

82. Q. We are well aware of the movement reports, but what we had in mind specifically was the dispatch which requested information from Honolulu as to the exact berthing of different ships in the harbor, which, according to testimony brought out heretofore, was a rather unusual dispatch.

A. No. 37 says, "Please report as to the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Pearl Harbor, Mamola Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto." It wants to know the vessels in Area "N" but not their exact anchorage.

83. Q. There is another dispatch requesting the exact berthing.

A. I don't recall seeing such a dispatch. Number 40—Area "A". A battleship, Oklahoma class, entered and one tanker left port, and then Area "C", but there is no exact anchorage. Area "A" and "C" I know nothing about.

84. Q. Admiral, in this proposed dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific about December 4, giving a summary of information which you stated you discussed with Commander McCollum and that you initialed, did you feel, in going over that dispatch, that this information would be valuable to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific for his information regarding the status as of that date?

A. My memory is quite vague on that subject. I remember at some time in that period discussing with Commander McCollum and reading a dispatch on that subject. I believe I initialed it and returned it to him and expected the Director of Naval Intelligence to send it, but I'm not too sure of it.

85. Q. Your initials would indicate that you concurred in sending it?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Referring to this so-called "Wind's" message, are we correct in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that message designating the objective of Japan?

A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall. I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: "The Winds message came in," or something of that sort.

87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and what it was interpreted as?

A. Yes.

[1005] 88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that, either from information from you or otherwise?

A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.

89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Not so far as I know. I did not participate in any such discussion. I assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had that.

90. Q. With reference to all of these super-secret decrypted message, was it your understanding, as War Plans officer, that the Chief of Naval Operations was fully conversant with all of them and their contents, and did you discuss some of them or all of them?

A. Frequently we discussed them. I believe he had a special folder with one set of them that was given to him. Then there was another folder that was carried around by Lieutenant Mott and shown to certain other officers in the Department.

91. Q. Did you discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations at any time the importance of transmitting the contents of some of these messages to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, sir. I discussed it on several occasions with the Director of Naval Communications and was assured that he had them.

92. Q. And you were assured that the Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages and had full information?

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Reexamined by the court:

94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an execute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of such high significance that action should be taken immediately to transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Friday there was a discussion between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general situation—

[1006] 95. Q. Friday, December 5?

A. Yes, sir. There was a discussion among the three of us, and we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

A. Yes.

97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you received information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after December 7, 1941, that you received that information?

A. I have never received such information. I have never been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypting the diplomatic dispatches.

Reexamined by the court:

98. Q. In your statement with respect to your conference with Admirals Stark and Ingersoll on 5 December you said that you felt that you had all agreed that the Commander-in-Chief had sufficient information; is that correct?

A. And directives.

99. Q. And directives?

A. Yes, sir.

100. Q. Principally, do we understand by that that the war message of November 27 was one of them to which you had reference with respect to directives and instructions?

A. That is one of them. There were quite a number of additional messages that went out about that time and for several days thereafter concerning the destruction of codes at the outlying islands and in China and so on, and then there was, I think, another message of about December 4. It seems to me there was a message of December 4 that may have been with respect to the destruction of codes. We sent some to the islands and some to the Commander-Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet information on all of them, except one or two that primarily concerned the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic.

[1007] 101. Q. But these messages you referred to were destruction of code messages, were they not?

A. Most of the messages I referred to were orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations for the destruction of our own codes. However, there were two other dispatches, Exhibit 66 and Exhibit 20, which informed the Commander-in-Chief that approximately December 1 these officials in London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Batavia, and Washington, have been ordered to destroy their code machines and codes.

102. Q. Admiral, in reply to your former question, where you stated in that and in this conference when you stated that you felt that you three officers—Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and yourself—felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had full information, did the fact that you felt that he had decrypted all of these super-secret messages have an effect upon your approval of that decision?

A. It wasn't so much that we were concerned about the information that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet had. We were concerned as to the instructions he had received for carrying on the war when attacked, and for taking on necessary precautionary measures. We felt that he had been kept informed continuously by the Department as to the major changes in the situation, and that we believed that he had as complete a picture of the situation as we had in Washington. It was always Admiral Stark's endeavor to keep them completely up to date in regard to the situation.

103. Q. But what we are trying to bring out is this: You had certain information in Washington, super secret messages which we have referred to in this testimony. Those messages gave certain information which would or would not have been valuable to the Commander-

in-Chief. In your testimony you stated that you assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages. Now we tried to ask you the question: that your assuming that he had decrypted these messages had a weight in your feeling that he had full information on the subject?

A. Probably it did, Admiral. I don't recall thinking of that particular point. Probably it did.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

104. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 22, and ask you if that is one of the messages from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet regarding the destruction of codes, to which you referred in your testimony?

A. That is one of them.

105. Q. Do you find anything in that dispatch which directs the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet or any other person to destroy codes?

A. No, there is nothing in that dispatch. My recollection is that there were one or more dispatches to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, concerning some of the [1008] islands—Wake, for example—which directed it. My recollection is that.

106. Q. I draw attention to this exhibit, that the origin number of that dispatch is 061743. What time was that dispatch originated, in Washington time?

A. I don't know. I had nothing to do with preparing that dispatch.

107. Q. Would it refresh your memory any to state that at the time of the origin of that dispatch those numbers referred to Greenwich civil time?

A. I saw the dispatch before it went. I had nothing to do with its preparation nor its sending.

108. Q. I will ask you if you can identify in this dispatch whether or not this dispatch was not sent in the lowest classification of sending dispatches, namely, deferred?

A. I don't know what precedence it was given. I had nothing to do with sending the dispatch.

109. Q. I invite your attention to the fact that on the blanks where "priority," "routine," or "deferred" may be indicated, that there are no X's or checks opposite either priority or routine.

A. What is the question, please?

110. Q. And then from that information, Admiral, you are still unable to state whether or not that dispatch was indicated as to be transmitted as a deferred dispatch?

A. I don't know the precedence it has. It has no marking. I had nothing to do with the preparation or sending of this dispatch.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

111. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that you recalled a communication, a dispatch, being sent to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in respect to the destruction of codes at Wake. I show you Exhibit 21 and ask you if that is the dispatch you had in mind.

A. No, this was with regard to Guam, and it is addressed to NavSta, Guam. My recollection is that a dispatch went to the Commander of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier concerning the destruction of codes on Wake.

112. Q. So such a dispatch as you recall might not have actually been sent? You wouldn't know, first-hand?

A. The answer is, my recollection is that such a message was sent.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy. Pages 1026-1051, inclusive.

[1026] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Senior Member, Board of Inspection and Survey, Pacific Coast section.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the dates of 15 October 1941 and December 7, 1941?

A. Director Naval Communications.

3. Q. Will you state in general the organization of your office as of that time as it relates to the function of checking and distributing intelligence information—the organization in general?

A. The handling of communication intelligence was a joint affair between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence, which of course are both divisions of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In general, the Director of Naval Communications was responsible for the mechanics of crypto-analysis, including interception which could be done by naval means, which amounts to intercepting radio transmissions. Crypto-analysis was carried on by the Director of Naval Communications with assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and when such intelligence as developed was turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence to handle according to their usual procedure. Not the usual procedure, because this particular form of intelligence was considered most secret—a much higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary designation, "Secret", due to the fact that it is useless if any inkling reaches the enemy of the fact that we are able in any way to read his communications.

4. Q. Did all intelligence information that was checked in your division pass through your hands before it went to other offices or echelons of command?

A. You mean my personal hands?

5. A. Yes.

A. No, my office was organized like any other office during the emergency. It worked twenty-four hours a day. At various times I had some other duty; someone else was acting head of the division. I was on two or three selection boards. Those were the main times I was away from the office.

6. Q. In the event of your absence from the office, what system was there to release information to other officers or higher authority?

A. In this particular respect you are speaking of communication intelligence?

[1027] 7. Q. Exactly nothing else, sir.

A. Under normal conditions, the Director of Naval Intelligence and I worked together. If one of us wasn't immediately available, the other one acted for him to see that action was taken; and if there was anything that was really hot, you might say, when either one of us was temporarily away, the next acting officer took over, and we had a 24-hour watch, both of us, which handled these matters continuously.

8. Q. Well, in the event that important information came into your office outside of the working hours of the Navy Department, when neither you nor the Director of Naval Intelligence would be in the office, what arrangements were made for the distribution of this information to other officers or higher authority?

A. There was a 24-hour watch of officers in my own especial watch, aside from the ordinary communications watch. Anything that came up that was considered important, during the night, the officer would call me and come up in an automobile to my house and bring me whatever the paper was, and if I considered it important enough I'd go with him to Admiral Stark's quarters or to Anderson or whoever it happened to be. In other words, we covered twenty-four hours a day according to the circumstances. It didn't often happen that things turned out that required that quick action, but that did develop several times.

9. Q. Adverting to this intelligence information that arrived in your office, did you filter out any information before it passed to higher authority, or did you pass along everything that came to your hands of that nature?

A. The material we had to work with, of course, consisted of thousands of messages, and the general trouble was to get action quickly enough to be of value, not to always be working from the bottom of the pile. The usual procedure, in the case of matter that was obviously inconsequential, was to lay it aside, and we never were able to keep up; we always had something to work on, because we could always work back into past history. It was all available to the representatives of the various offices concerned.

10. Q. Exactly what I am trying to get at, Admiral—who did this weeding-out process, of deciding what information was to be sent other officers or higher authority and what was to be kept on file in your office for future reference if that were required?

A. Well, the translators; only a few people read Japanese. The people who read Japanese, when they got as far as to see a thing was obviously something about an allotment for typewriters or something like that, they didn't go any further. It was impossible to cover everything, and when they saw a thing that seemed not to be worth while, they went ahead until they found something that seemed to be of value.

[1028] 11. Q. Having covered the field of when a message was not translated—in the event that a message was completely translated and made available, in the case of this type of message, did you or any other officer in the chain of command weed out any information from there on before it was passed on to other officers or higher authority?

A. No.

12. Q. Now this information that was finally collected and on which a decision was made to pass it on to other officers or higher authority, did you or anyone else that you know of evaluate this information before it went to an officer—say the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. No, the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a mentioned, was responsible for the finished information. It was turned over to him. I was responsible for the mechanics of obtaining it, and after that it was turned over to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who handled it personally, and we only had one book—one copy in a book—and he took that book to the people that he was directed to show it to.

13. Q. As the judge advocate understands the situation from Commander Kramer, who testified before this court in Pearl Harbor, the system was to take all messages that had been translated in the Communications Intercept Division directly to the distributees in the Navy Department and in the government circles without evaluation or without changing the messages in any way except that sometimes he put a note or a clip on important messages. As I understand your testimony now, it was to the effect that sometimes the Director of Naval Intelligence exercised the function of evaluating this information; is that understanding correct?

A. No, I didn't intend to say that. You asked me to say that the Director of Naval Intelligence did, and I wasn't in a position to say exactly what he did. The system was for him to take the book. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was his representative in my office, and he may have carried the book for him some times when he wasn't available—something like that, but generally, the Director of Naval Intelligence handled the matter very much himself.

14. Q. Well, do you know of your own knowledge, from having contact with that officer and with other officers in the Navy Department, whether it was the custom of the Director of Naval Intelligence to evaluate this information before he passed it along? Do you know that of your own knowledge?

A. It is my understanding that he did not, because as I understand it, it was taken immediately. As soon as possible after 8:30 in the morning I used to go over whatever was available, and we made it a matter of minutes to get it through the machinery.

15. Q. In other words, do I understand correctly, that documents were taken directly from the translators, or through [1209] you, to the distributees without delaying or evaluating the information and changing its form?

A. In general, we didn't have distributees. There was a copy in the book, and the book was carried around to the various people who were supposed to see the book.

16. Q. Commander Kramer told this court in Pearl Harbor there were seven copies made for the Navy Department and seven copies for the Army—that these copies were delivered to regularly designated distributees in the Navy Department, and delivered at their offices as a complete copy; is that your understanding of the method of distribution?

A. I think he is talking about a later date myself. I think probably it did develop into that as the war went along. The original plan was to have only one copy. It is true we had to exchange with the Army, because we worked together. We pooled our combined intercept resources, and each took a part of the material, and we exchanged copies.

17. Q. Well, is it your testimony, then, that prior to 7 December 1941, as you remember it, only one booklet or copy was made of decrypted traffic for persons in the government circles that the Navy was responsible for keeping informed?

A. Well, I wouldn't like to contradict Lieutenant Commander Kramer, because he was the one that did the work, and he probably has got a better memory than I have of that subject. I did not mean to convey the impression that only one copy was made. There were file copies, there were copies for the Army, but originally, a book was

made up with one copy to be shown to people outside the people technically concerned with obtaining the information.

18. Q. Would it be your answer, then, that distributees like Admiral Stark, the Secretary of State, and the President, and the Secretary of the Navy, would all see the same copy; is that the meaning you intend to convey by your answer?

A. No, I have to add the President and the Secretary of State; that is part of the seven. I thought you were talking about the Navy Department. I didn't realize you meant the other people concerned.

19. Q. Well, can you recall whether or not the distributing system required that a copy be left with the Chief of Naval Operations for his sole and independent use?

A. He didn't; that is not my memory. I thought the book was taken to him at that time.

20. Q. But you do not know whether he was left a copy?

A. No.

21. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November 1941, and has been [1030] popularly called by witnesses before this court the "war warning dispatch." Were you acquainted with the contents of this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. These are my initials on this draft; those are my initials.

22. Q. Were you present at any conference or discussion regarding this dispatch prior to its having been released?

A. As I remember it, Admiral Turner showed me the dispatch before he took it in for release. These are his initials. (Indicating.) These are mine. (Indicating.) It was prepared by Op12, which was War Plans.

23. Q. Do you know what was intended to be conveyed by the first sentence of this dispatch—"This is a war warning?"

A. I understood it to mean that there was a warning to the addressees that war with Japan was imminent.

24. Q. This dispatch also contains another statement: "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased." Do you know what information this sentence was based on?

A. I do not.

25. Q. Well, had negotiations as of 27 November 1941 ceased in fact?

A. I don't remember at this time on what information it was based; it wasn't based on any information that came through me. Whatever the statement was, I assumed at the time it was correct. I hadn't any doubt it was correct. I will be glad to express an opinion. It is purely my recollection—a general recollection; it may not be correct. I think that at that time Nomura and Kurusu stated that they were through. The United States hadn't accepted what they had proposed, and negotiations were supposed to be over. Afterwards, they were reopened, like all diplomatic situations; it was a case of bluff at the time—a diplomatic bluff in regard to the ceasing of negotiations, but that is purely my memory, and that wasn't anything that I had any official knowledge of.

26. Q. Whose duty was it in the Navy Department between 1 October and 7 December 1941 to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was supplied with all available intelligence?

A. Well, I should say it was the joint responsibility of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations and—intelligence is a pretty broad subject. It came from a good many sources; this particular thing must have come from the State Department in Washington. Primarily, the Director of Naval Intelligence is concerned with the dissemination of intelligence, but he is a subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations.

27. Q. Admiral, I will be a little more specific; as re- [1031]
gards the intercepted, decrypted intelligence traffic that was received in your office, who was responsible for seeing that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet was kept informed of information of an important character contained in this category?

A. As I mentioned previously, it came under the specific cognizance of the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations. We all worked together on this particular matter.

28. Q. I show you Exhibit 21. This is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of December 4, 1941, directing the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy all secret and confidential publications. Will you state the reasons that this dispatch was sent, if you know them?

A. This was one of a series of dispatches sent, directing the destruction of all secret publications in the Pacific that could be spared in view of the imminence of war. I prepared it. It was sent on the 4th of December. This is my handwriting (indicating); and I prepared this dispatch, which is one of some others.

29. Q. Imminence of war with what country, Admiral?

A. Japan.

30. Q. Could you set out in brief the information you had as of the time you prepared this dispatch that lead you to believe that a war with Japan was then imminent?

A. Well, I would say that there never was any question in my mind following the dispatch of the 27th of November, that the possibilities of war with Japan were strong.

31. Q. Did you base your dispatch then, directing the destruction of codes and ciphers in Guam, solely on the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November?

A. No, Admiral Turner and I discussed it, and we decided that the time had come when everything that could be spared had better be destroyed, because we didn't want to have our communications ruined by sudden attack.

32. Q. The judge advocate is trying to get a record of what your concept was of the imminence of war at that time—in other words, what facts, or upon what facts, did you base your opinion that this dispatch was necessary—the one of December 4, 1941?

A. The seriousness of the situation in the Pacific. I couldn't give you the exact items as they came up between the 27th and the 4th. Things had gotten progressively worse; this dispatch directed all possible confidential publications except those essential for current purposes and special intelligence be destroyed. You will notice the original dispatch as written said "for operations", and after we discussed it, we cut out that and said, "current purposes and special intelligence." Those were retained, and they were directed to be [1032] prepared to destroy the ones remaining. They would be prepared to destroy them instantly in event of final emergency. The same dispatch

was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. This one went to Guam.

33. Q. But you have not yet told us the developments since 27 November 1941, which made you think this dispatch was necessary? Between 27 November and 4 December 1941.

A. No, I don't think I could give you the exact sequence of events between those two dates. Ambassador Nomura, and I expect, Ambassador Kurusu, were in Washington, and the negotiations were apparently not proceeding well. There was no specific event that occurred on the morning of the 4th that caused me to send this dispatch.

34. Q. Who was responsible for the decision that the sending of this dispatch, Exhibit 21, was necessary?

A. Chief of Naval Operations. I prepared the dispatch, as released by Admiral Ingersoll. I sent it in to him. I suppose that he took it up, as it was customary for him to do before actually releasing after discussing things, with the Chief of Naval Operations.

35. Q. Did you initiate this dispatch?

A. Yes.

36. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding, then, that you prepared this dispatch for release by the Chief of Naval Operations because you then thought that such a dispatch was advisable?

A. Yes, sir. Is it perfectly clear that on these dispatches where it says, "released", that the authority who released the despatch in these cases is Ingersoll, who was Assistant Chief of Operations, and customarily did the signing of his name. He conferred with the Chief of Naval Operations, and I suppose got his authority before he released them. I did insist that any important dispatches should be released by the Chief of Naval Operations.

37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?

A. Yes.

38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was brought to your attention?

A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations to cover this point.

39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these [1033] steps to get intercepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words as set out in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in plain English?

A. They were not.

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I ask you whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in these documents prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.

A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.

41. Q. Either 2 or 3—either document?

A. No, sir.

42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in this winds code, of document 15, that you have previously been shown?

A. No.

44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

A. I do not.

45. Q. I would like to refer you to document 17 of Exhibit 63, which you have before you, and ask you whether you ever saw or had been informed of the contents of this document on or before 7 December 1941. This document is the Secretary of State's note of November 26, 1941.

A. I couldn't say whether I was familiar with this particular paper or not.

46. Q. Can you state whether you knew, on or after November 26, 1941, whether or not Mr. Hull had delivered a note to the Japanese diplomats in Washington with reference to the negotiations that were then in progress?

A. No, I couldn't answer that question. That is three years ago. I can't say on what day. This traffic which has my initials, and things that I prepared, I am glad to testify to, but I cannot say exactly when I saw or if I did see many [1034] of these hundreds of dispatches. No, I cannot state.

47. Q. Before 7 December 1941, had you been expecting to receive any information in the Navy Department with reference to the negotiations that had been in progress between the United States and Japan?

A. I don't understand that question.

At the direction of the court, the question was repeated.

A. During this period we were making every effort to obtain any information possible in regard to the United States-Japanese relations.

48. Q. We have testimony before this court, Admiral, from subordinates who were in your office as of this period immediately preceding 7 December 1941, that all personnel were on the alert for the receipt of some very important—or of a very important answer from the Japanese Government. Do you have any knowledge of this situation?

A. From the time of the 27 of November, gradually getting more acute, we were making every effort to obtain any information possible. I couldn't say that we expected any particular message.

49. Q. Or any particular information?

A. Anything that had to do with the relations between ourselves and Japan was of the highest priority.

50. Q. But were you expecting any information of importance immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese Government?

A. I might say we were hoping. I couldn't say we were expecting.
 [1035] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

51. Q. I want to show you Document No. 39 of Exhibit 63 and refer you to Parts 1 to 13 of this document and ask you whether or not prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 you had seen or been informed of the subject matter contained therein?

A. Not before the 7th of December.

52. Q. Will you state when, if ever, you were made acquainted with the contents of Parts 1 to 13 of this Document 39?

A. No, I couldn't say the day I saw it.

53. Q. Can you state where you were on the night of 6 December 1941, after working hours?

A. I was at my office until about 8:00 o'clock.

54. Q. Can you state where you were between 8:00 o'clock and midnight on 6 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I came back down to the office or whether I stayed at home.

55. Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6 December 1941?

A. That is my recollection.

56. Q. Nor at any time subsequent thereto?

A. No. As I remember it, the next morning, which was the 7th of December, I was down at my office about 9:00 o'clock. The conference was being held of Japanese representatives at the State Department. I imagine the note was delivered before the translation reached me.

57. Q. Were you present in Admiral Stark's office at or about 10:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I don't think so.

58. Q. I would like to show you Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63, and ask you to state whether or not this part of this document ever came to your attention, and if so, when?

A. This message wasn't translated until the 7th of December.

59. Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so, when?

A. I will have to say I don't remember.

60. Q. I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you were ever made acquainted with the contents of this document?

A. Yes.

[1036] 61. Q. Will you state when, and the circumstances surrounding it?

A. I could not, except to make the statement that I did not see it until after the 7th of December. It was handled by the Army, it was an Army message, and I have heard from my colleague, General Mobern, the chief signal officer of the Army, that that was the message which they tried to forward to Pearl Harbor and it was not received until after the attack. That is hearsay on my part.

62. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding from your answer that you did not see this document 41 at any time on the date of 7 December 1941?

A. Yes. I spent the forenoon of Sunday, the 7th of December, in my office on various important communication matters, one of which was caused by the reported sighting of a Japanese convoy in the Far East, and I was sitting at my desk at 1:00 o'clock when the report of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was sent out from Pearl Harbor. It was copied direct by the Navy Department and from then on the rest of the afternoon there were very many important communication matters going on. As to when I saw any one of these intelligence messages, I couldn't say.

63. Q. Can you recall ever having informed the Chief of the War Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the Navy organizations in the Pearl Harbor area were decrypting this Japanese diplomatic cipher about which you have testified in a number of instances this morning, and which is before you now in the form of Exhibit 63?

A. These messages we have discussed came in many different ciphers. I would never have made the statement that all ciphers could be translated in Pearl Harbor.

64. Q. Did you ever inform the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy Department?

A. No.

65. Q. Did the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, ever ask you or discuss with you whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was being kept informed on the latest intelligence information that was being received through your division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I saw Turner almost daily and we continually discussed the status of matters of interest to him. The work was broken up between different stations which he should have understood.

[1037] 66. Q. But can you recall whether Captain Turner of the War Plans Division had ever raised the question with you as to whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in this period preceding 7 December 1941 was receiving an adequate amount of intelligence information from the Navy Department?

A. So far as I know, Turner, Wilkinson and myself were in entire agreement. This was a matter of continual discussion among the three mentioned and so far as I know there was never any question of this agreement. I can only say that we conferred almost daily on the question of what was being done and I thought that Admiral Turner had a clear understanding of what was being received in Pearl Harbor, as far as we could tell, and what was not.

67. Q. From the testimony of Admiral Turner as he gave it on the stand yesterday, the judge advocate understood that witness to state that he had specifically asked you on one or more occasions whether or not this decrypted information that was received immediately prior to 7 December 1941 was being transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I ask you, Admiral, whether or not Captain Turner did discuss this matter with you?

A. I said I discussed it.

68. Q. Did he ask you that question?

A. It is my remembrance that Admiral Turner asked what was our set-up in regard to intercepted messages and it was fully explained to him.

69. Q. Was your explanation to Captain Turner that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was or was not getting this intercepted traffic?

A. The messages that are in this file and that we have discussed were sent in many different enemy codes. Some of them we could read; some of them we could not. Some days we could read them; some days we could not. There is no such thing as a simple answer as to what was or was not being received. There was an intercept station fully staffed at Pearl Harbor. They specialized in certain codes that were most easily intercepted by them. They forwarded it to Washington, what they were able to make out of their particular task, and the same was true of the Asiatic Station. But to say that any individual message was received, it was also physically impossible to exchange every message. Right here is about two days traffic (indicating Exhibit 63).

70. Q. Do you know how intelligence information was transmitted in the purple code? That is, by radio, cable, or what?

A. Usually by cable.

71. Q. Did the Navy have any facilities in Pearl Harbor for intercepting information sent in the purple code by cable?

A. At the time there were no legal facilities for intercepting cable.

[1038] 72. Q. Can you state whether or not the naval organization in Pearl Harbor was or was not receiving these purple code dispatches sent by cable prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

The court then, at 11:06 a. m., took a recess until 11:15 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued):

73. Q. Do I understand your answer to mean that they were not receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple code?

A. I should say they probably were not.

74. Q. Did you ever give Captain Turner, the Chief of the War Plans, any impression that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was getting information of the type contained in the purple code intercepts?

A. Not intentionally.

75. Q. On 7 December 1941 what was the quickest means of communication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Direct radio circuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief, if we could raise him; if not, through Com14.

76. Q. Was there telephonic communication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941?

A. Not direct.

77. Q. Will you state what circuits were involved in a telephonic circuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. There is a regular commercial telephone circuit from the United States to Oahu, but as I understood it, the nearest outlet was several miles from the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

[1039] 78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far Eastern Division in which there was a summary or résumé of intelligence information to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Operations.

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not.

80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department with regard to releasing this dispatch?

A. I cannot, I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except to see that they were properly released.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?

A. I do not.

82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence matters.

83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I couldn't say.

[1040] 84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would

be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was established?

A. No, I couldn't say.

85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the Navy Department files had failed to reveal a copy of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which that record would be kept?

A. If it was received by naval means, yes; if not, no.

86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?

A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval Intelligence.

87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the Director of Naval Communications?

A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such message was received by naval means.

89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on that subject?

A. That is right; yes.

90. Q. In your testimony before this court at the time that you were examining Exhibit 21, which was the dispatch from OpNav to Guam, directing them to destroy confidential publications, you used the expression in your testimony as being contained in this dispatch, "In view of the imminence of war." Is there such an expression in that dispatch?

A. There is not.

91. Q. I show you Exhibit 22 that is before this court which is a dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and ask you if you can identify this dispatch, and if so, the approximate time that you saw it, and whether or not you prepared the dispatch?

A. I did.

[1041] 92. Q. Did you prepare that dispatch at your own initiative, or was it prepared by one of your subordinates at his initiative?

A. I would say that I discussed this with Captain Safford in 20-G; as to whether I suggested it to him or he to me, I couldn't say. I discussed it with Admiral Turner, definitely, and with Admiral Wilkinson, and sent it in to the Chief of Operations for release.

[1042] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

93. Q. Do you remember whether or not the wording in this dispatch was the same as proposed by Captain Safford?

A. This is my writing here—that correction.

94. Q. Do you remember whether Captain Safford in discussing this dispatch with you desired to insert the words, "in view of the imminence of war"?

A. I have no such recollection. It might be.

95. Q. Will you please tell the court the Washington time of origin of this dispatch.

A. It would be 12:43 on the 6th.

96. Q. Will you tell the court in what classification that dispatch was transmitted as to priority of sending?

A. It was sent secret in ECM.

97. Q. The preceding question was meant to cover the precedence in forwarding the dispatch, that is, whether or not it was sent priority, routine, or deferred?

A. It doesn't show on the copy. As a matter of fact, messages are transmitted direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

98. Q. But was it not a rule in Communications at that time, in indicating the order in sending dispatches, that if there were "X" marks or checks against "priority" it would be sent in that category, that if the checks were against "routine", it would be so sent, but that if there were no checks against "routine", it would be sent deferred?

A. That was the routine.

99. Q. That was the procedure or rule at that time, was it not?

A. Yes.

100. Q. Then, this dispatch which you have referred to as being sent "in view of the imminence of war," was sent deferred as late as noon of the 6th of December; isn't that so?

A. That is not so.

101. Q. Why not?

A. Because I handled the message personally. The routine was as you say. I was Director of Naval Communications, and I sent messages simply when they were to go specially.

102. Q. After you directed that this message be sent was not its classification deferred, so that it could be delivered at nine o'clock the following working day without violating the communications regulations?

A. No.

[1043] 103. Q. Will you point out in this dispatch where you have directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy any codes?

A. It did not direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy his codes.

104. Q. Did it direct him to have any codes destroyed?

A. The wording was, "You may authorize the destruction."

105. Q. Did you consider that that was an order to destroy?

A. The Chief of Naval Operations did not desire us to use language to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that was not necessary. I drew this up for the release of the Chief of Naval Operations, and it met with his approval. (Reading) "In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize"——

106. Q. Couldn't the Commander-in-Chief in his own discretion do as much?

A. In an emergency, yes.

107. Q. Then, what was the object of this dispatch?

A. I should say the Commander-in-Chief would have hesitated to do it without some sort of directive from the Navy Department, and it was an appropriate authority to give him.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

108. Q. Referring to the radio communications system in effect between Washington and Pearl Harbor: How long should it take to uncode a 20-word, special priority dispatch and transmit it from Washington to Pearl Harbor, assuming no delay in reaching the addressee?

A. In the case of any special message, such as this one, if I was given the word in time by someone else who originated the message, in order to let me know it was coming or, as in this case, when I knew it was coming, the procedure was to have the message unciphered before its release, clear the Commander-in-Chief, set up the radio circuit, and just before the message was released it was transmitted. It took time to transmit the message.

109. Q. I was also figuring on the time for uncoding.

A. I handled all these special messages myself. Whenever they had to do with the war, that was the procedure we followed, and that was the reason for no priority appearing on that particular message. It was handled by hand. We also could not get the Commander-in-Chief direct. That meant a [1044] relay through Com14, but when we did get the Commander-in-Chief direct, we cut the tape. We transmitted by tape and the message would go through in about a minute. When the Secretary landed at Pearl Harbor on a trip, Admiral Bloch sent a message reporting his arrival, and it was received in the Navy Department a minute and a half after he landed.

110. Q. Wouldn't an hour be ample allowance, under these special circumstances, for getting the dispatch from the inception of sending it to the uncoding stage, transmission and decoding, and receipt by the addressee?

A. In general, yes, if it was not stopped by something else. There were peaks of traffic.

111. Q. Assuming that the Chief of Naval Operations had written out a dispatch of not more than twenty words and sent it to you directly, designating the special urgency of the circumstances, would not an hour have been ample allowance to get it through either Com14 or the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Get it as far as Com14 or the Commander-in-Chief himself.

112. Q. Admiral, do you know of any message, other than that with respect to the destruction of codes, which was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific from November 27 to December 7, giving him the secret information you had received during that period?

A. Oh, yes, a great deal of this went. I could not tell from memory.

113. Q. Do you know whether any of these deciphered messages went to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Certain messages were sent to the Commander-in-Chief with a cipher on the original message, so that we deciphered there, but I could not say which ones were from here.

114. Q. Do you have any knowledge of having sent any of these decrypted messages, the purple code messages, or any information contained therein, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I could give you a negative answer. I could say the note was not sent. I could not say just which ones were sent, because when I had finished my responsibility was the mechanics of the crypto-analysis. The messages were turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Who saw them in the Navy Department or whether they went on was primarily a matter for Naval Intelligence.

115. Q. If any one of these messages, or the contents of any of these so-called decrypted messages, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, such message would have been sent through Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Well, it might have been sent by air mail or pouch.

[1045] 116. Q. I am speaking of Naval Communications as such.

A. I would not necessarily have seen it, no.

117. Q. Was there any system in your office by which, generally speaking, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept informed as to the contents of these decrypted messages? I am speaking now of the purple code.

A. The purple code is just one method of communication. To handle that long message, for instance, the 14-part message, to take an extreme case, was a very difficult matter for us. Wherever it happened to be picked up, and we got hold of it, it required first decrypting, for which we often did not have the key.

The court directed that the reporter read the question.

A. The office of Com14 was primarily set up to read naval matters. This so-called purple code, which was quite new, was, as far as we were concerned used primarily for diplomatic matters.

118. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the Commander-in-Chief was kept informed of the contents of these purple code messages?

A. Of all these purple messages?

119. Q. You have heard the question.

A. Not all of these purple messages. It would have been a physical impossibility to do it.

120. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the most important of these purple messages, and the information contained therein, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief for his information?

A. Whenever the Director of Naval Intelligence or War Plans Division or the Chief of Naval Operations himself—Whenever anyone directed or requested that a message be forwarded, it was done.

121. Q. But there was no system in your office by which the important messages were transmitted?

A. Not the diplomatic messages.

122. Q. Or to get checks on them to see that they had been received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Not the diplomatic messages.

123. Q. When these important decrypted messages were received, did you have anything to do with sending them in to the Chief of Naval Operations, or did you insist on some initialing or something to show that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen these particular messages?

A. It goes back to the question of Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who said that he had a separate book, as I understood [1046] it,

for the Chief of Naval Operations. Originally, there was one book for the people in the Navy Department, which was carried by hand, first of all, by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Then it was directed to Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who carried the book himself to the people concerned, first of all, the Chief of Naval Operations.

124. Q. As Director of Naval Communications did you try to keep informed about the very important traffic flowing through?

A. I did.

125. Q. There has been referred to in this testimony the note of 26 November, which was really the beginning, probably, of the message which you state Mr. Hull gave the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to the breaking off of negotiations. Did you have any idea about November 26 as to this note? It is document 17 of Exhibit 63.

A. No.

126. Q. Did you know that the officers in your department were standing by and were anticipating a reply to this note from 26 November to 7 December, 1941?

A. We had set up a continuous watch, established direct telephone communication between the War Department and ourselves and had taken every step to get immediate action on anything important received.

127. Q. But you had no reference to this special note of November 26?

A. No. It was not done on account of that. It was done on account of the general thing. There was no special step in regard to a particular note.

128. Q. But due to the importance of this message, everybody was on the alert awaiting its answer?

A. I gather from the question that somebody had said that they were giving that particular message—In my own mind, it was all important.

129. Q. When the reply of this note of 26 November came in and was received, in accordance with the testimony heretofore given, on the afternoon of December 6, and those thirteen parts were translated and ready for delivery at 9 p. m. on December 6, did you hear at that time anything at all regarding this reply? I am asking this question in view of the fact that you stated in your testimony that if any important reply came in, night or day, the watch officer would immediately inform you.

A. I was there. I was in my own office at 8:30 Sunday morning.

[1047] 130. Q. I am speaking of Saturday, December 6.

A. Not to the best of my recollection at that time.

131. Q. Did you see the reply consisting of those 13 parts on the morning of December 7?

A. I could not say just when I first saw it.

132. Q. You stated that if any of these decrypted messages were received in Honolulu, they were forwarded to Washington; is that correct?

A. No.

133. Q. I meant that anything decrypted was forwarded to Washington or the information contained therein?

A. You have here a very small part of the mass of material that we had. The general plan was that the Commander-in-Chief primarily tried to build up the naval codes.

134. Q. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. It was really Com14. Com14 was on shore. It was a long process—a group here and a group there. From all that material they endeavored to get these naval codes in Com14's establishment in readable shape. From time to time they sent their values to Washington, which was behind but kept up as material came in. The same way, there was a return exchange from Washington to Honolulu. A good deal of it was done by air mail and special messenger on account of the bulk of the traffic and the danger of what we were doing being discovered.

135. Q. Admiral, we are discussing these important messages which have a bearing on information which was or was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. We well realize that there were thousands of messages coming in, but these messages had a particular bearing on information which could have been used by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and that is what we are discussing.

A. Those messages are picked out of many other messages.

136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds Message": Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with the execute to the "Winds Message" and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be correct.

137. Q. You speak of a naval radio circuit. During your experience in Washington was this Naval radio circuit quicker than the Army's means of communication between Washington and Honolulu?

A. Yes.

[1048] 138. Q. In other words, if you had had a very important message which was to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for his information, even if originating by the Army, you would have sent it immediately by naval radio circuit; is that correct?

A. Yes.

139. Q. Do you think a considerable time would have been saved thereby?

A. By following the procedure I outlined, that is the fastest that could be done.

140. Q. By naval radio rather than Army circuit?

A. Faster than any means there was available, but that required some preparation.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testified that you did receive some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, there was a false alarm about it.

142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that particular subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds Message"; is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.

Reexamined by the court:

144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

[1049] 146. Q. Yes.

A. No.

147. Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna, Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?

A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.

149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?

A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."

150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.

A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."

151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?

A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already been received.

152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from?

A. This was not necessarily—

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following statement: I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.

The witness made the following statement: Somebody in Batavia had gained that information.

153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?

A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against the rechecking that was done in Washington.

154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message" was received; that is, who gave it to you?

A. No.

[1050] 155. Q. But you do not recollect that you did hear about the execution of this before 7 December 1941?

A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollection for three years back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were my subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this false report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?

A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there must have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found to be correct.

157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report which you received and which later you determined to be false?

A. I don't know.

158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?

A. I don't.

159. Q. Adverting again to document 3 of Exhibit 64, in which counsel for an interested party pointed out to you the words, "Japan will inform her consuls of war decision": His question seems to infer that this was a translation of the Japanese weather code. Might not the words, "war decision", have been an evaluation from other information as well as the weather code, as set up?

A. Except that the message states "code intercept." I don't think that this is an exact translation. It is a paraphrase.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would merely like to say that I am sorry not to have been able to answer the questions more specifically. Three years ago I had all the communications business of the Department to handle. This was one part of my duties. I realize that the court considers some of these messages of greater [1051] import than they were considered then. We made every attempt at the time to cull what we could handle. We had thousands of these messages. We had to get the best information we could from them. Messages such as that note we could not have possibly transmitted in a secure means back to the field. It was most important that there should be no inkling of the fact to Japan that we could read any of her codes. There is no better way to have that discovered than to re-cipher a message which has been already sent by somebody. That is exactly what we did do in the ones we considered sufficiently important, but we had

to keep down on the number of messages that were sent for those reasons. Although it was not my decision, I do not think that the details of the purely diplomatic matters were as important as some of the others. There are many more messages which at the time looked very important, but those particular ones were culled. We handled all we could with the personnel and the system we had available. It was very difficult for us to get Japanese translators. There are very few reliable Japanese translators in this country. We worked with the War Department. We split our work with them, and we had a great deal of difficulty in working in a foreign language, plus putting in an enemy secret code. It is not just an open and shut proposition.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (Relative to introduction of exhibit), and Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U. S. Navy. Pages 1091-1108, inclusive.

[1091] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

1. Q. Have you in your possession a document requested by the interested party, Admiral Stark?

A. I have. It is a document containing intercepted dispatches prepared for the interested party, Admiral Stark, at the request of the judge advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications. It contains sixteen documents, duly authenticated under official seal.

The document referred to was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 68" for reference, description appended.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate, none of the parties to the inquiry desiring further to examine him.

A witness called by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications, attached to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of 1941?

A. Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

3. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 68, which contains sixteen separate documents. Do you recognize it?

A. These are extracts from the files of the Communications-Intelligence organization which relate to diplomatic traffic [1092] which had been intercepted and translated by the organization under the Director of Naval Communications.

4. Q. Will you read Document 1?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Seattle (Sato).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

J-19: (Priority.)

#165: (Message to Washington Circular #80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to _____ and Los Angeles.

ARMY 24990 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

5. Q. Will you read Document 2?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

1 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#723. (Re your #318)*

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino _____ (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

[1093] 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between

910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 50 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of *altitude planes* (?) it is said.

Details by mail.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5681: "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

6. Q. Will you read Document 3?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Manila.

5 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#355. For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

[1094] These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

7. Q. Will you read Document 4?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

1 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#722.

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.

2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).

3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military Planes.

Large bombers, 29.

Scout planes, 324.

The same, B type, 62.

Fighters, 317.

The same, B type, 131.

Pursuit planes, 302.

The same, D type, 69.

Training planes, 49.

Total, 1283.

(b) Naval planes.

Large flying boats, 26.

[1095] 4. Ships in port on the 1st; MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI*, PASU*, 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

JD-I: 6335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR)

*Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Office of Naval Intelligence

Washington

In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2.

SECRET

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

U. S. Air Forces in the Philippines

Type	NAVY	Strength
PBY-4 (Patrol).....		14
PBY-4 (Patrol).....		14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation).....		4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation).....		2
J2F-4 (Utility).....		3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation).....		2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation).....		2
O52U-2 (Observation).....		2
Total		43

2 squadrons of OS2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

ARMY

B-18 (Heavy Bomber).....	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber).....	35
P-35A (VF).....	52
P-40B (VF).....	30
P-40E (VF).....	117
[1096] O-46A (VO).....	7
O-49 (VO).....	3
O-52 (VO).....	10
A-27 (Dive bomber).....	9
C-39 (Combat).....	1
C-49 (Combat).....	1
P-26A (VF).....	15
Total	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 1942.

SUMMARY

Bombers	Fighters	Combat	Patrol	Observation	Utility	Total
62	214	2	28	32	3	341

Japanese Estimates of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines

MILITARY PLANES

Type	Strength
Large bombers.....	29
Scout planes.....	324
The same, B type.....	62
Fighters	317
The same, B type.....	131
Pursuit planes	302
The same, D type.....	69
Training planes	49
Total.....	1,283

NAVAL PLANES

Large flying boats-----

26

SECRET

8. Q. Will you read Document 5?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Manila.

5 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#349.

Re your #722*.

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.*

JD-1: 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands.

JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR)

[1097] 9. Will you read Document 6?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 8, 1941.

Purple.

#742.

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohoto*,^a The *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th).

ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

10. Will you read Document 7?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

Purple.

#745.

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.

2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.

3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing, 2,300 soldiers.

ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

11. Q. Will you read Document 8?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 12, 1941.

Purple.

753.

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on ———. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6)

[1098] 12. Q. Will you read Document 9?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Manila.

November 20, 1941.

Purple.

#372. (Strictly Secret.)

Please advise immediately the results of your investigation as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay^a.

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6)

^a Near Manila, P. I.

13. Q. Will you read Document 10?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 22, 1941.

Purple.

#785.

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu^a; Pisu^a; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41. (6)

^a Kana spelling.

14. Q. Will you read Document 11?

A. (Reading:)

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Seattle.

25 November 1941.

(J19.)

#026.

[1099] Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton.

Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.

JD-1: 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

15. Q. Will you read Document 12?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

25 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#790.

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland^a (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

^a Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000 tons).

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16. Q. Will you read Document 13?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#799.

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 7084 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

[1100] 17. Q. Will you read Document 14?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: San Francisco.

29 November 1941.

(J19.)

Circular #2431.

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

18. Q. Will you read Document 15?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Singapore.

5 December 1941.

(PA-K2.)

#377

(Abstract)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)

19. Q. Will you read Document 16?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Seattle.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

PA-K2.

#184. (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[1101] 20. Q. Admiral, from what you remember, as you examined the class of information from which these are extracts during the last few months of the war, were there, in addition to those which you have just read, a considerable number of other reports from Japanese consuls or other agents giving our ship movements and dispositions, which came to your notice?

A. Why, the general tenor of the Japanese traffic was in a searching expedition all over the world as to movements not only in United States ports but also in those of foreign countries.

21. Q. Had that been going on for some time?

A. During the several months preceding December, 1941, it was intensified and had been going on for a considerable period.

22. Q. As you recall, was the physical volume of that traffic which was translated considerable or not?

A. In the early part of 1941 it wasn't so great, but towards December it built up month by month. I refreshed my memory yesterday. There were about 700 of these diplomatic dispatches in our hands during the month of November, 1941.

23. Q. Referring to all the translations made by the Army and the Navy during the last two months of peace in 1941, can you give a fair estimate of the number of those translations which were averaged per day?

A. Well, the diplomatic traffic during that month averaged about 26 messages a day.

24. Q. During the last month?

A. The last month.

25. Q. How was it during the preceding month?

A. September and October were also heavy, but it increased in November. I will say this. It was beyond the capacity of the staff we had to handle all those translations expeditiously.

26. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before the court to the effect that this class of information, which was recovered by the organization under you, was not transmitted to commanders at sea, particularly the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you give the court any reasons why that should not have been transmitted to all commanders in the Pacific, including the coastal frontier commanders on the Pacific Coast?

A. Well, first, I would like to indicate the method in which this [comintellig] information was handled. It was the function of the Director of the Naval Communications organization to procure it. It was then passed to the Office of Naval [1102] Intelligence, whose function it was to evaluate and disseminate. In regard to our part in it, Naval Communications had always objected, for security reasons, to any of this traffic being passed other than in a secure cryptographic system. Only the intercept traffic itself, which was available to any intercepting agent, was allowed to go by air mail. The rest of it would have to be put in the naval cryptographic systems. That volume was such, with the staff available, that it was not all disseminated, and we would have objected seriously if it had been loaded on the naval communications system. We would have objected to its being passed by air mail, because had it been known and compromised, we would have lost our source of information.

27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your answer, the translations, if passed by the quickest means, would have to be uncoded in one of our own systems before transmission; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

28. Q. Do you mean that the personnel available was not sufficient for that work?

A. Yes, we only had four watch officers to handle the naval traffic coding here before the war without taking on a load of this intelligence information.

29. Q. Well, would such uncoding have been a great increase proportionately in the work of those officers?

A. Yes, I would say at least it would have doubled it.

30. Q. Will you further elaborate your reply, giving the reasons which you mentioned, for not transmitting this information, at least, to Pearl Harbor by air mail?

A. Well, in accordance with the regulations, secret matter is not sent out, even today, beyond the continental limits by air mail, and this information was considered, at least, on a level above our own naval administrative secret, and we would not permit any of this to go by air mail. We do not today transmit any of it by air mail.

31. Q. Just why was the level of required secrecy so high?

A. You jeopardize your source of intelligence if the enemy knows your degree of success.

32. Q. Has it developed that the maintenance of that secrecy has been very important in carrying on the war since December 7, 1941?

A. I would say it has been vital to the war effort.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :

[1103] 33. Q. There has been testimony before the court, Admiral, relative to what was known as the "Winds Message". Were you Assistant Director of Naval Communications at the time of the "Winds Message"?

A. If you will give me the date in relation to the "Winds Message", I can answer.

34. Q. November and December, 1941.

A. I was the Assistant Director at that time.

35. Q. Do you recall the receipt of the execute of the "Winds Message"? Would you like to see it?

A. Yes, I would. I never have.

36. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63.

A. Yes, I have seen this message. This is not the one I thought you alluded to that set up the procedure. Yes, I have seen that message.

37. Q. Did you see what has been called the execute?

A. No, that is the one I referred to. I never did see it.

38. Q. Did you hear about it?

A. Yes, I heard about it in discussion.

39. Q. At or about the time it was received?

A. That is right.

40. Q. Do you recall approximately when that was, Admiral?

A. Well, this is just a hazy recollection. It was about the 6th or 7th of December. I would say right in that period. I don't know exactly when the message was sent, but I heard the discussions about it. I never saw it.

41. Q. Can you fix it as being before or after the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. No, I can't. What impresses it upon my mind is that there was some discussion as to the exact meaning of that message, whether it actually applied to this one or not.

42. Q. With whom did you discuss it, Admiral?

A. I really wasn't in the discussion. I heard about it from the Director, who was Admiral Noyes, and the officer who had charge of the folder, who was Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

43. Q. In answer to one of Admiral Hart's questions you said that there were several hundred of these intercepted diplomatic matters during the month of November; is that right?

A. That is right. I obtained that information from the file yesterday.

[1104] 44. Q. That number included all the diplomatic intercepts?

A. All diplomatic that they had.

45. Q. It did not refer only to inquiries concerning ships or ship movements?

A. Oh, no, the diplomatic intercepts for the month.

46. Q. How many of the 700 during the month of November are of the character of those contained in Exhibit 68?

A. I couldn't answer that. I would have to take the file and dig the information out of it.

47. Q. Did you select all of the documents which were included in Exhibit 68?

A. I had nothing to do with it.

48. Q. I note that 11 of the 16 were from here to Manila. Is that a fair portion of the inquiries or answers to inquiries concerning ships which emanated from here and were directed to Japanese representatives in the Philippines?

A. I couldn't answer that either without making a study of the file.

49. Q. Would you look at document 40 of Exhibit 63?

A. I have it here.

50. Q. Insofar as the information in that document purports to place various ships in certain areas, is that an unusual document of the character of which we have been talking?

A. Well, it was more specific than any of the others I saw.

51. Q. It was most specific?

A. Yes.

52. Q. There was nothing specific from any continental ports?

A. No, the continental ones more or less referred to movements in and out of port.

53. Q. It was even more specific than any answer from Manila?

A. Yes, because this apparently referred to some particular chart upon which he was reporting.

54. Q. Now, you told Admiral Hart that it was not feasible to un-code and transmit by our system all the diplomatic intercepts to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor was it secure to do it by any other means.

A. I did not say "any other means." I said by air mail.

55. Q. Were there any other means?

A. You could have put a courier on the job and sent him.

[1105] 56. Q. Was a courier used?

A. No.

57. Q. Was any of the information obtained in this manner transmitted directly or indirectly to those who were vitally interested in acquiring the information?

A. In perusing this file recently, I noticed that there were messages sent from Manila to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, into Washington with information copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. They related to the information which was gained out there in that theatre.

58. Q. Was any of the information which was processed in Washington transmitted in any way to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. You are asking me something which I would have to gain from knowledge of the files, because, as I have previously testified, we did not disseminate the information. It was disseminated by ONI, but when it came to translating these exacts, as we call them, we did not transmit them.

59. Q. So far as you know—and I appreciate that your knowledge was limited—was any of it transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief?

60. Q. The exact messages, I don't believe, were transmitted. There were other messages relating to the situation which were sent. They were not, however, originated by the Director of Naval Communications. The only traffic that the Director of Naval Communications originated had to do with the destruction of codes and ciphers and information relating to the code and cipher system of the enemy.

61. Q. Was the reason why the messages could not be transmitted applicable to a condensed digest of the information?

A. That goes back to the functions of ONI. I would say, yes, we could have handled digests.

62. Q. The information would not be of much use unless either it or some evaluation of it was made available to some of those in the field, would it?

A. That is correct, but, again, that was the function of ONI to evaluate information.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

63. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in his intelligence organization or his intercept command, have the same facilities for receiving and for translating messages of the type contained in Exhibits 63 and 68?

A. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific had any of [1106] the intercepts, he could not have worked on them, because he did not have the machines to do it. The problem was never assigned to Honolulu, and all the translations were accomplished here in Washington.

Examined by the court:

64. Q. Admiral, in order to clear this question of transmitting information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or other commanders in the field, and having in mind these intercepts of a very secret nature, aren't there means other than by air or courier of sending a brief of such information by dispatch in code?

A. Oh, yes, that is a brief of it, but I was referring to the exact translation, that is, the total.

65. Q. But you could have sent a brief, giving full information?

A. We could have handled that, yes.

66. Q. We have had testimony before this court that on or about December 3 there was a dispatch made up and discussed with the Chief of Naval Communications, which was a summary of information received in Washington. There was a suggestion that this dispatch be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Are you aware of any such dispatch, or were you familiar with the conversation among Admiral Wilkinson, Captain McCollum, and Rear Admiral Noyes regarding the sending of such a dispatch?

A. No, sir, I was not.

67. Q. You have no knowledge of such a dispatch?

A. That is correct.

68. Q. Have you any knowledge of any dispatch reporting a summary of information, having in mind these very secret documents, being sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic?

A. I have not. There were one or two dispatches which originated from the Chief of Naval Operations and which indicated what you might call a situation out there, but they didn't allude to what we call ultra information.

69. Q. Did those dispatches give any information included in the intercepted messages?

A. I think the best way is to let the dispatches speak for themselves. They are in the files.

70. Q. Were the dispatches you referred to based on that information?

A. Oh, partially, yes. I don't know what dispatches this court has before it.

[1107] 71. Q. Do we understand that certain dispatches were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which gave information contained in these ultra secret dispatches?

A. No, they were based on that information. They were situation dispatches. It is a long time since I saw those dispatches. One was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, which alerted him as to the passage of a Japanese force into China and alerted him as to a possible attack in Manila, and some of these dispatches did include the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and some did not, and the best way I know of is to get those dispatches from the files.

72. Q. Have you in mind any particular dispatch sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, along these lines?

A. There was one, as I remember it, which told him to execute War Plan 46 or 47.

73. Q. Execute it? When?

A. No, that came after it. It said to take measures in accordance with that War Plan.

74. Q. Do you have reference to Exhibit 13?

A. (Referring to Exhibit 13.) It says,

By Japan for her present desperate situation there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

That is the background of ultra information.

75. Q. What date was that?

A. That is under the 16th of October. It states:

In view of these possibilities, you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

and so forth.

76. Q. The question had particular reference to information being transmitted from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, between the dates of 27 November and 7 December.

A. I could take the whole file and go through it. Here is one of November 27 which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic. It states, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning."

The question was repeated by the reporter.

A. Well, the only information I have is a recollection of these dispatches which were sent and which were in the files of the office.

77. Q. You have no recollection of anything else?

A. No.

[1108] Reexamined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

78. Q. I show you Exhibits 15 and 17 before this court. You have been asked several questions concerning the transmission of summaries, briefs, etc., of the information in the super secret class. Would that serve as a fair example of what you meant in your replies?

A. It would, because it states here, "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." Those statements in there came from ultra sources.

Reexamined by the court:

79. Q. In the Roberts Report it is stated that on December 1 the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated at considerable length the elements of a situation existing at that time. Was that transmitted by radio?

A. That I could not answer. If I saw it, I could tell, I can say off hand it was not transmitted by a dispatch.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Pages 1121-1123, inclusive.

[1121] 34. Q. Admiral, you have stated that had you been aware of this information which was not conveyed to you between 27 November and 7 December 1941, you would have had, in all probability, taken the Fleet to sea. Did any of this information to which you refer, and which you state you did not receive, bear any indication that there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think that the series of messages inquiring as to the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor itself, wanting to know which ones were in areas, the report of the Japanese Consul giving in detail the courses taken by those in the harbor, would have indicated to me that they were not only interested in the ships that were in the Pearl Harbor area but that they were interested in exactly where they were in Pearl Harbor proper. There are only two forms of attack that would be effective against the ships inside Pearl Harbor. One is for submarines to come into the harbor, and at that time I did not know that they had any midget submarines, and I would have discounted largely the submarine attack and would have considered that about the only thing that could get in would be a bombing attack. I would also and did

discount the aircraft torpedo attack for reasons which have been presented to this court, and in view of that I would have said, "Well, they probably are going to make an air bombing raid here." I do not see any other conclusion you can draw from it unless you put it down to Japanese stupidity in wanting all this information, and I do not think they were so stupid.

35. Q. In view of the fact they were also making inquiries about the disposition of ships at Puget Sound and Manila Bay, would that have indicated, reading those dispatches collectively, Pearl Harbor particularly or rather a desire for information as to what to do in case hostilities were opened?

A. Well, the dispatches I have seen in regard to Puget Sound and Manila Bay indicate an interest only in the ships that were there, whether the ships were in port or whether they had left. Where they are is something that is of interest always. Every ship located reduces the number of those unknown, and if a carrier and a battleship are located in the Navy Yard at Puget Sound, that is very definite information that they are not in Hawaii. However, they did not ask in Puget Sound nor in Manila, so far as I am informed, whether the ships were tied up in a certain area, or where they were. They did do that, I believe, in Pearl Harbor.

36. Q. What effect would the knowledge of the existence of the Winds Message and so forth have had upon you?

A. Again I must say that I do not want to be so wise now that everything has happened, but still I have a right to an opinion, and I will give it for what it is worth. The definite fact that Japan, at least, was going to break off diplomatic relations and, at most, was going to war with us [1122] would have had a very great effect on me and all my advisors. That would have been something definite. I think that Commander Layton, who was my Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Japanese language student, has already testified that had that come through, he would have advised an all-out alert, to put it briefly.

37. Q. I am interested to know what good that would have done?

A. I don't know. That, I think, is open to question also.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

38. Q. You have testified that had you had the information contained in the "winds message", that you might have taken certain action with regard to security or disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet. What information was contained in the "winds message" as regards the possible relations of the United States and Japan, as you recall it?

A. In that Exhibit 63, there are several messages leading up to the "winds message."

39. Q. I am asking only about the "winds message" at this time.

A. I am trying to answer about the "winds message." The "winds message" contained a statement that at most they were going to declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies; they were going to have peace with Russia; and that at the least, they stated, that Japan was going to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, and maintain diplomatic relations with Russia—and a

very strong belief by most of Japanese students that the translation in fact meant that they were going to declare war, and a definite statement such as that—would have lead me to know that the war was coming, and coming almost immediately.

40. Q. Did not the dispatch, Exhibit 17, say in effect the same thing, for the reason that it sets out that "negotiations have ceased, and an aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days," and it sets out territory of the United States as an objective?

A. It doesn't convey the same thing to me at all, and I have testified at length as to my reactions when I received the message of November 27, and I can add nothing to that now.

Examined by the court:

41. Q. Referring to these Fleet planes, Admiral, if you [1123] had received the message which you did receive several hours subsequent to the attack on 7 December, relative to the delivery of the answer by the Japanese, what would have been your action regarding these planes based on shore?

A. I hate to make statements as to what I would have done under theoretical circumstances. It is difficult for me to answer that. I think I would have taken action. I would have gotten the planes in the air, at least, and taken all the steps possible, at least until a day or two had elapsed, because that definite time for delivery must have meant something. However, I do believe that the message sent by General Marshall to General Short could have been a much clearer message than the one that was sent.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Page 1154.

[1154] The court questioned the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), as follows: To what document did you refer in your preceding answer?

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, made the following reply: I referred to the "execute" of the Winds Message. I might further identify the first part of the Winds Message as Documents 13 and 15, Exhibit 63, and Documents 2 and 3 in Exhibit 64.

EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME I

No. 1 to 29 (both inclusive)

NOTE.—Exhibits No. 11 and 29 contain privileged matter, which though not “Top-Secret”, do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in “red”, together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 1

GENERAL ORDER
No. 142

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., Jan. 10, 1941.

STATUS OF COMMANDANTS FIFTH, TENTH, THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICTS

1. General Orders Nos. 109, 119, and 128 are hereby cancelled, and this order substituted therefor effective February 1, 1941.

2. The Commandants of the Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Naval Districts, the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Bermuda, and the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far as pertains to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands are hereby assigned a dual status as follows:

(a) As Commandants of their respective Naval Districts, operating under the orders of the Navy Department.

(b) As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of a Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief.

3. As commandants of their respective districts, they will be governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts. The units under their command will be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and will include the Local Naval Defense Forces as well as the usual shore activities.

4. Their exercise of duties as officers of a Fleet will be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet may consider desirable.

5. Upon assuming command of their respective districts, commandants will further report to the officers indicated below in order that they may carry out their Fleet duties as indicated above:

(a) The Commandants of the Fifth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts will report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

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(b) The commandants of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts will report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

FRANK KNOX.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Biesemeier,

H. BIESEMEIER,

Captain, U. S. Navy,

Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 2

GENERAL ORDER
No. 143

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1941.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this order organized into:

The United States Fleet, comprising:

- (a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
- (b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
- (c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;

The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,

Special Task Forces,

Special Duty Ships,

The Naval Transportation Service,

Naval District Craft,

The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the foregoing will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders or in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.

4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.

5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as possible, the type commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

6. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.

7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders. Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and "Naval Local Defense Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval

Coastal Frontiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Commandants of Naval Districts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.

9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are performing.

10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the naval district or station to which assigned. They consist of such naval craft and floating equipment of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense Forces."

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Blesemeier,

H. BIESEMEIER,

Captain, U. S. Navy,

Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 3

GENERAL ORDER
No. 170

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., March 23, 1942.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES FLEET

1. Pursuant to Executive Order of the President the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations have been combined and placed under one officer who has the title "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", with the rank and title of Admiral. This officer is the principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment.

2. As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding the combined offices has supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the Navy and is directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President therefor.

3. The staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, is composed of—

(a) A Chief of Staff, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who, in the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", shall act as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;

(b) Such deputy and assistant chiefs of staff as may be necessary; and

(c) Such other officers as may be appropriate and necessary to enable the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" to perform the duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

4. As Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation, readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the Navy, and with the coordi-

nation and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

5. The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations is composed of—

(a) A Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who has all necessary authority for executing the plans and policies of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" so far as pertains to the duties herein prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations. In the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" he shall act as Chief of Naval Operations;

(b) An Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the title of Sub Chief of Naval Operations and the rank of Rear Admiral, and such additional assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations as may be required; and

(c) Such other officers as may be considered to be appropriate and necessary for the performance of the duties at present prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations.

6. During the temporary absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. In the temporary absence of all of these officers the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, United States Fleet, respectively, shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy.

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Biesemeier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

SECRET

[i]

EXHIBIT No. 4

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC) A16(R-5)
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).

Enclosures:

- (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages.
- (B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL-46.

4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.

5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.

6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning," and in the "Registered Publication Manual".

7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL-8.

[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual".

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDINATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.

H. R. STARK.

[iii] *Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Subject Matter	Page or Sheet No.	Change in Effect
Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC) A16(R-5) of May 26, 1941.	i, ii.....	Original
List of Effective Pages.....	iii.....	Original
Table of Corrections.....	iv.....	Original
Distribution List.....	v, vi.....	Original
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Part III.....	15 to 60 inc.....	Original
Part IV.....	61 to 80 inc.....	Original
Part V.....	81, 82.....	Original
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Table ATF-1.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
Chapter III.....	6.....	Original
Table PAF-1.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
Table PAF-2.....	1.....	Original
Chapter IV:		
Table SEP-1.....	1.....	Original
Chapter V:		
Table ASF-1.....	1, 2.....	Original
Chapter VI.....	7.....	Original
Table NE-1.....	1.....	Original
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Chapter VII:		
Table CNO-1.....	1.....	Original
Chapter VIII:		
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Table SCF.....	1 to 5 inc.....	Original
Table CACF.....	1 to 4 inc.....	Original
Table FACF.....	1.....	Original
Table PSCF.....	1.....	Original
Table PNCF.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
Table HCF.....	1.....	Original
Table PhCF.....	1.....	Original
Chapter IX.....	11.....	Original

[iv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

R. P. M. or Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change.
1.....	26-7-44	Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.

928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 3, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 064112

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46.

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:

(a) *On Page 45*

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(g), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.

(b) *On Page 80*

Paragraph 4601, first line,—after “will be” insert “prepared as”.

(c) *On Page 30 of Appendix I*

Paragraph 51.a.(13), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.

Paragraph 51.a.(14), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.

(d) *On Page 31 of Appendix I*

Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.

2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.

3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting*.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

[V]
Official to whom issued

Registered Nos.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1
Commander, Battle Force	2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force	3
Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld)	4
Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld)	5
Commander, Battleship Division Three	6
Commander, Battleship Division Five	7
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force	8
Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force	9
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force	10
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force	11
Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force	12
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Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force	14
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force	15
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force	16
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	17
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	18
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet	19
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet	20
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet	21
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet	22
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet	23
Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet	24
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet	25
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Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division	27
Commanding General, Second Marine Division	28
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—Director, Naval Communications Division	33
—Director, Fleet Maintenance Division	34
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Chief of Bureau of Navigation	38, 39
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance	40
Chief of Bureau of Ships	41
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks	42
Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics	43
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Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	46
[V] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy	47
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	48
Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy)	49

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Op-12B-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 071912

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 1, 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.

Reference:

- (a) GO No. 142.
- (b) GO No. 143.
- (c) WPL-46.

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established.

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, Appendix I, WPL-46.

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended.

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense Forces.

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:

Commandant, 3rd Naval District—Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 6th Naval District—Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 10th Naval District—Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier;
Commandant, 15th Naval District—Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier;

930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Commandant, 12th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Frontier;
 Commandant, 13th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Frontier;
 Commandant, 14th Naval District—Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier;
 Commandant, 16th Naval District—Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the commanders thereof, is assigned a *RESTRICTED* classification. The limits of the Naval Coastal Frontiers remain in a *SECRET* classification. Correspondence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] W. P. L.—46

NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES

NAVY

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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[5]

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN

0101. This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is included in this plan as Appendix I.

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

[6]

CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5".

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

[7]

Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof.

[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and BAHIA.

a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.

b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited capacities of the ports.

c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port.

d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance are not required.

e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, through the United States Naval Observer.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is prescribed below:

a. *THE OPERATING FORCES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

2. *THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. *THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*, under command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

4. *THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

5. *THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.

6. *THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*, under the command of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:

(a) *THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES*;

(b) *THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES*.

b. *THE SERVICES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE*.

2. *THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE*.

3. *THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE*.

c. *THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*, under the direction of the appropriate Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.

[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Appendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in Appendix I, "Section V."

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the world showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers." This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, **EXHIBIT-ILLUSTRATIONS**, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."

[13] PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."

[14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of Appendix I.

2202. The Navy General Task is as follows:

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, will:

1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;

2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;

3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;

4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and

5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

[15] PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Section 1. *THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET*

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially be organized into task forces as follows:

- a. *OCEAN ESCORT*;
- b. *STRIKING FORCE*;
- c. *SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE*;
- d. *SUBMARINE FORCE ONE*;
- e. *SUBMARINE FORCE TWO*;
- f. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*;
- g. *NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*;
- h. *U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA*;
- i. *ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.*

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET—Continued**a. TASK**

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

b. TASK

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS, TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

[16] c. TASK

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

d. TASK

IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C";

e. TASK

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

f. TASK

PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

3113. **a.** So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direction of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.

3114. **a.** SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. TASK

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA this force will execute the following task:

1. TASK

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.

d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for administrative purposes.

3115. **a.** THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. **TASK**

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supplemented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States sources.

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and temporary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of available British facilities.

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States sources.

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. *U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. *NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b));

3. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA;

4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[21] *Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are:

a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.

3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

CATEGORY D—THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

[22] b. TASK

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. TASK

SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET;

d. TASK

SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIER.

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:

1. TASK

SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this plan;

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans*—RAINBOW No. 5, including an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants, FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

[23] (a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans*—RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) *Joint Embarkation Plans* as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval Districts.

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operation Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[25] *Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply:

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

[26] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is assigned as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and task purposes.

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the

Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.

[27]

CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

- a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
- b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
- c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA:

a. TASK

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;

b. TASK

PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;

c. TASK

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. TASK

SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST;

[28] e. TASK

DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY "D";

f. TASK

DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY "F";

g. TASK

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

h. TASK

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

i. TASK

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

j. TASK

ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;

k. TASK

ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES.

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT in Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, when so directed by that officer.

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired

by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supplemented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may, at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.

[50] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O-1, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M;

3. *NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval Station Samoa Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be prepared.

NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5.

[31] Section 2. *THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

b. TASK

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

c. TASK

SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR;

d. TASK

PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.

[32] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan O-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:

a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.

CATEGORY C—THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT UNALASKA.

CATEGORY D—UNALASKA.—THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

[34] b. TASK

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. TASK

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;

d. TASK

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIERS.

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 5*, including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan O-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

(a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval District Plans O-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

- [35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.
- b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
- (b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.
4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[36] *Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242):

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

[37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if this situation arises.

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in

matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, *temporarily*, to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.

[38]

CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:

"Far East Area"

"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES."

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II).

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

[39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY AXIS FORCES;

b. TASK

SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES.);

c. **TASK**

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. **TASK**

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

[40] e. **TASK**

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER—CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";

f. **TASK**

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from commercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources in the United States.

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that Area.

through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed if available.

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O-2, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix I, Paragraph 48;

3. *SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5*. (Sixteenth Naval District Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

1. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*;

2. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*.

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*

1. *TASK*

ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN APPROACHES;

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*

1. *TASK*

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.

[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service or from vessels assigned to the task forces.

a. Fuel from United States and British sources.

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from United States sources.

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facilities assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations.

[44]

CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix II) is assigned the following task:

a. TASK

PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on 10M.

NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on 10M.

(1) These two forces will move in one convoy.

(c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 15M.

(e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.

(f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.

[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[47] Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVISION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.

3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:

a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;

b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of commanders of forces afloat, including aircraft.

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Communication Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5 which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[48] *Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.*

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:

a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence;

b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and Outlying Naval Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[49]

CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV,

[50]

CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to which assigned.

b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.

3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establishments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."

b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organizations as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.

[51] *Section 2. MOBILIZATION*

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2;

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan.

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task.

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be taken over from private sources or other government departments.

[52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

[53] *Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING*

3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";

a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter

within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."

b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, except protection.

Definitions

3732. a. *ROUTING*. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meeting points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a part of routing.

b. *INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.

c. *INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval Coastal Frontier.

d. *INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers, not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.

e. *FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING*. All shipping of the Associated Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.

f. *OVERSEAS SHIPPING* is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

Instructions for routing shipping

3733. INTRA-DISTRICT, INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by them.

[55] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.

3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING.

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:

1. *CLASS A*. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States;

2. *CLASS B*. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United Kingdom.

b. *WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA.*

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Districts in which are the ports of assembly of the convoys, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC

TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders of vessels.

c. *PACIFIC AREA.*

1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, with the following exceptions:

(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;

(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;

(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.

Instructions for the protection of shipping

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the Operating Forces.

[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combination of these methods.

c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.

d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be viewed as having an especial importance.

[58] *Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE*

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare".

3742. Except under extraordinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly notified.

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy.

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategical Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be detrimental to our own forces.

[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-

mentations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief concerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.

[60] *Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD*

3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating matters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.)

[61]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks:

- a. *TASK*
PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;
- b. *TASK*
PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;
- c. *TASK*
PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.

[62]

CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES

Section 1. PERSONNEL

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:

- a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;
- b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
- c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
- d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.

"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940".

4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel for such period of time as found to be necessary.

[63] *Section 2. MATERIAL*

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:

- a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;
- b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
- c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
- d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material

will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

[64] *Section 3. TRANSPORTATION*

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:

1. THE OPERATING FORCES;

2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.

b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.

b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transportation may be provided.

c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the District Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).

b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regarding the safety of vessels.

c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered vessels); the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army personnel.

(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

[66] *Section 4. LEGAL SERVICES*

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, necessary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.

4242. These services will include:

a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Establishment;

b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;

c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraph 59).

[67] *Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*

4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks.

4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both government and private requirements.

[68] *Section 6. PRIORITIES*

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERVICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the priorities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.

a. *PRIORITY ONE*

1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial movements to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA, TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.

2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.

3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

b. *PRIORITY TWO*

1. Initial movements to ICELAND.

2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE not specified under PRIORITY ONE.

c. *PRIORITY THREE*

1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.

d. *PRIORITY FOUR*

1. New Construction.

[69]

CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR WAR SERVICE

4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing personnel to perform their war tasks.

4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION prescribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4313. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for immediate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4314. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobilization Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for mobilization.

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.

[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far in advance as practicable.

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established and other related instructions.

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.

e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except as follows:

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage;

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled;

4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for the installation of batteries and magazines.

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable number of officers and men as follows:

1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.....	6;
[72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.....	8;
3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.....	8;
4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.....	6

[73] *Section 2. MAINTENANCE*

4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the Services in condition of readiness for war by:

- a. Replacement of personnel and material;
- b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;
- c. Hospitalization of personnel;
- d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and welfare of personnel.

Replacements

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in paragraph 1102 of this plan.

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services, as determined by war experience.

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation to destination.

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until deficiencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replacements of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Establishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transportation Service will submit their requests for replacements.

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows:

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers designated by them;

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Commandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where delivery is desired;

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these units are established.

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replacements obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements made to Shore Establishment activities.

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the Services will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.

Repairs

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment activities.

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work required;

3. The degree of urgency of the work required;

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.

Hospitalization and evacuation

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.

[76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore Establishment activities.

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other available vessels having adequate medical facilities.

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army hospitals or field medical units.

Recreation and welfare

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps personnel.

b. Provisions for these activities will include:

1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Establishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are concentrated, and at Training Stations;

2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.

[77] *Section 3. AUGMENTATION*

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the Services by:

a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;

b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;

c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy from other Government Departments;

d. Acquisition of material.

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.

[78] *CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES*

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with instructions issued in separate directives.

[79] *CHAPTER V. SALVAGE*

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render salvage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas prescribed in paragraph 4101.c.

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.c.

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within the waters of the United States.

4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:

1. *From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY*

PIONEER,
GUIDE,
DISCOVER;

2. *From the COAST GUARD*

REDWING.

b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

[80] *CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in Part V, WPL-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.

[81]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

5101. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60:

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."

5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.

[82]

CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government."

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

- a. Intelligence Service;
- b. Censorship and Publicity;
- c. Mobilization of Resources."

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Intelligence Service.

► b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censorship and Publicity.

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.

[1]

APPENDIX I. TO WPL-46, THE JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5

[2]

SECTION I. DIRECTIVE

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in paragraph 2 of this paper.

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of drafting.

[3]

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as including all such Powers.

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia.

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

[4]

SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

- a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
- b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

[5]

SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941.

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) *United States*

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(b) *British Commonwealth*

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) *Sea Communications*

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

[6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplishment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air operations against the sources of Axis military power.

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."

13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will be governed by the following:

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces.

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort.

[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM
RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to war operations.

In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and ABC-22).

15. *Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United Kingdom.* a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

f. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth in paragraph 16.

[11] 16. *Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces.* a. *United States Areas.* Upon entering the war, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, except:

(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements.

(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[12] b. *The Far East Area.* Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

[13] *c. Joint Land Offensives.* Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.

d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other areas not described in sub-paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* next above. These areas as initially delimited are:

(1) *The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA* comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.

(2) *The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA* comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.

(3) *The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.*

(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,

(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,

[14] (c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,

(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:

To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.

To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.

(f) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

(4) *The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA* comprises:

(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(5) *The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS* comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.

[15] (6) *The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA* comprises:

(a) India,

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.

(c) The islands in the above ocean area.

17. *Collaboration in Planning.* *a.* The High Commands of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will

similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these Missions will be as follows:

(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

f. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

[17]

Communications

18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:

a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

Control and Protection of Shipping

20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment

of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

23. *Special Relationship between Canada and the United States.* Joint Agreements are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will be incorporated in this plan.

[19]

SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS

24. *Joint General Task.* In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:

- a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;
- b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;
- c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;
- d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by
- e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

[20]

SECTION VII. TASKS

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.

The Western Atlantic Area

27. *Definition.* The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

28. *Army Tasks.* a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.

e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.

[21] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany.

h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if such garrisons have been established.

29. *Army Forces.* a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detachments.

b. Local defense forces.

c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and Latin American Republics.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

30. *Navy Tasks.* a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

[22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.

f. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

31. *Navy Forces.* a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Pacific Area.

32. *Definition.* The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:

a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast and Longitude 74° West.

33. *Army Tasks.* a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

[23] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

34. *Army Forces.* a. Local defense forces.

b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the West Coast of South America.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

35. *Navy Tasks.* a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.

36. *Navy Forces.* a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Far East Area

37. *Army Tasks.* In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

38. *Army Forces.* Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.

39. *Navy Tasks.* a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.

b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues.)

[25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

40. *Navy Forces.* a. The Asiatic Fleet.

United Kingdom and British Home Waters

41. *Definition.* a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North.

b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.

42. *Army Tasks.* a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.

[26] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in cooperation with the Navy defend that island—Category of Defense "D".

43. *Army Forces.* Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces: a. *British Isles.*

3 Heavy Bombardment Groups

2 Medium Bombardment Groups

3 Pursuit Groups

Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments

Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)

One reinforced Regiment (Token Force)

b. *Iceland.*

One reinforced Division.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.

44. *Navy Tasks and Forces.* a. *Northwest Escort Force.*

Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.

b. *Submarine Force Three.*

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

North Atlantic Area.

[27] 45. *Definition.* The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:

a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North.

b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North.

c. Western boundary, Longitude 40° West.

d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West.

46. *Navy Tasks and Forces.* a. *Submarine Force Two.*

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.

Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision.

Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
 Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
 Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

47. *Categories of Defense.* The Categories of Defense listed in this paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval Frontiers and isolated positions.

East Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, except United States Bases in Newfoundland.....	Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland.....	Category C
Eastern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier.....	Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers.....	Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except Alaska.....	Category B
Alaska, Less Unalaska.....	Category C
Unalaska.....	Category D
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.....	Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier.....	Category E
Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine Coastal Frontier.	
Bermuda.....	Category C
Iceland.....	Category D
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra.....	Category D
Guam.....	Category F

Joint Plans to be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will be disregarded.

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as directed by ABC-22.

Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports are located.

SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS

Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.

Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Transport Service.

Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless M-day has occurred before such date.

The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop movements specified in this subparagraph a.

(1) *NEW YORK to ICELAND*, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.

First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24-M.

Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57-M.

These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(2) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M.

(3) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M.

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.

(4) *NEW YORK to BERMUDA*, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 8-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[30] (5) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to destination.

(6) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(7) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported. These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.

(8) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(9) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.

(10) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be transported.

(11) *GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA*, 6,000 troops, embark on 15-M.

(12) *GALVESTON to TRINIDAD*, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M.

(13) *GALVESTON to PANAMA*, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(14) *GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO*, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[31] (15) *SEATTLE to ALASKA*, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(16) *SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII*, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day.

(1) *GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA*, 24,000 troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.

(2) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN AMERICA*, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The 56 aircraft may be flown to destination.

(3) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINATIONS*, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum rate of movement 60,000 troops per month.

(4) *EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M.

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES

[32] 52. *Theaters of Operation*. The designation and delimitation of additional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.

53. *Time of Execution*. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

54. *Personnel*. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

55. *Ports of Embarkation*. The Army will establish, when required, additional ports of embarkation at:

New Orleans, La.

Galveston, Texas

Boston, Mass.

Charleston, S. C.

56. *Material*. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject

the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from production sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other the material involved.

Supply Levels. Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this paragraph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved.

Supplies other than ammunition.

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) Iceland..... | 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. |
| (2) British Isles..... | Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. |
| | <i>Pursuit Aircraft</i> |
| | 60 days, build up to 120 days within six months. |
| (3) Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers..... | 30 days, build up to 45 days within six months. |
| (4) Newfoundland and Alaska (Less Unalaska)..... | 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. |
| (5) Unalaska..... | 60 days, build up to 90 days within six months. |
| (6) Bermuda..... | Maintain at 30 days. |
| (7) Hawaii..... | Maintain at 70 days. |
| [34] (8) Philippines..... | As the situation may permit, the desirable standard being the maintenance of stocks at 90 days' supply. |

Ammunition for places listed under 57 a:

- (1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then maintain at that level.
- (2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then maintain five times the mobilization allowance.
- (3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days within six months.
- (4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' operations; build up to 120 days within six months.

Industrial Planning. For industrial planning purposes, and with due regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with following general policy:

The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial production.

When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as necessary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with national policy.

c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army requires, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.

Supporting Legislative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as seemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan.

Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained

through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships and all related means.

61. *Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government.* The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

- a. Intelligence Service.
- b. Censorship and Publicity.
- c. Mobilization of Resources.

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemisphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases.

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the Island of Fernando do Noronha.

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage opposition to the Axis Powers.

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.

57]

ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint organization and command.

"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below.

NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a).

"b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

"c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

[38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b."

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States, but including United States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22.

Southern.—Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River, Virginia—North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an officer, designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[39] "c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Newfoundland sector.

(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22.

The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

(2) New England sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, First Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts.

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

(3) New York sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

Southern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

(4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton exclusive.

[41] Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—There is no naval commander of this sector. The Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval District, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts."

4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"35. Southern coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

[42] Southern.—The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south-eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that boundary.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

"c. Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively."

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded as follows:

[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a line direct to the place of beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"c. Sectors.—The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Guantanamo sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, Hispaniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal frontier boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

[44] Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

(2) Puerto Rico sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

(3) Trinidad sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad."

6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35B. Panama coastal frontier.

[45] "a. Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South, longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"c. Sectors.

The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Atlantic sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continental divide.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

(2) Pacific sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District."

7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama coastal frontier."

8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:

"36. Pacific coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required by ABC-22.

[47] Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.

(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.—The Pacific coastal frontier is divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern boundary of California.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—

(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also designated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.

(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.

(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands the naval local defense force assigned to his district.

(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[48] "c. Sectors.—This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:

(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.

(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of California.

(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of Washington.

(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.

"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.

(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to Moclips, Wash., inclusive.

(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington.

[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West.

(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West.

9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

"36B. Philippine coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.

[50] "b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Philippine Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the United States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex I. Coastal Frontiers". This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 2, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[1] APPENDIX II TO WPL-46, COMPOSITION OF FORCES

[2] CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.

2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number.

b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.

c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning purposes, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.).

2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.

b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature (AP 60, AK 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.

2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and aircraft belong, as follows:

A—Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;

B—Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under construction;

C—Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government to be commissioned in the Navy;

[8] D—Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;

E—Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;

CG—Coast Guard vessels.

[4] CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, submarine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE

TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE BASE, COCO SOLO.

b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.

2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE.
18 VPB and necessary tenders;
2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders;
3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

[5] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, for the transportation of Army troops.

2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and submarines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE ATF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
BATTLESHIPS			
Batdiv 3.....	BB	3	
Batdiv 5.....	BB	3	
CRUISERS			
CA 31.....	CA	1	
Crudiv 7.....	CA	4	
Crudiv 8.....	CL	4	
Crudiv 2.....	CL	4	
DESTROYERS			
AD 2, 12.....	AD	2	
DD 141, 187, 343.....	ODD	3	
Desdiv 54.....	ODD	4	
Desdiv 22.....	DD	4	
Desron 2.....	DD	9	
Desron 8.....	DD	9	
Desron 9.....	DD	8	1,850 tons.
Desron 13.....	DD	8	
AIRCRAFT			
Cardiv 3.....	CV	2	
CV 5.....	CV	1	
Patwing 3			
VP 31.....	VPB	12	
VP 32.....	VPB	12	
AVD 4, 9.....	AVD	2	
AVP 1, 9.....	AVP	2	
Patwing 5			
VP 51.....	VPB	12	
VP 52.....	VPB	12	
AVD 13.....	AVD	1	
AVP 3, 8.....	AVP	2	
SUBMARINES			
PG 53.....	PG	1	
Subron 1			
S/M Base, New London			
ASR 2.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 11.....	OSS	8	
Subdiv 12.....	OSS	7	
Erdie 1			
AG 24.....	AG	1	
SS 20, 48.....	OSS	2	
SS 204.....	SS	1	

TABLE ATF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>SUBMARINE—Continued.</i>			
<i>Subron 3</i>			
S/M Base, Coco Solo			
ASR 4	ASR	1	
Subdiv 31	OSS	6	
Subdiv 32	OSS	6	
<i>Subron 7</i>			
AS 5, 21	AS	2	
Subdiv 71	OSS	3	
Subdiv 72	OSS	7	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2			
S/M Base, St. Thomas			
<i>TRAIN VESSELS</i>			
AF 1, 9	AF	2	AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941.
AG 17	AG	1	
AKS 3	AKS	1	AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941.
AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26	AO	8	
AT 37, 66	AT	2	
AE 2	AE	1	To be assigned in August, 1941.
<i>MINECRAFT</i>			
<i>Minron 7</i>			
Mindiv 13	DMS	4	
Mindiv 14	AM	7	
<i>TRANSPORTS</i>			
Transdiv 1	AP	4	
Transdiv 11	APD	2	
<i>PATROL CRAFT</i>			
Subchaserdiv 31	PC	5	
DUANE (CG)	XPG	1	
INGHAM (CG)	XPG	1	
CAMPBELL (CG)	XPG	1	
SPENCER (CG)	XPG	1	
HAMILTON (CG)	XPG	1	
BIBB (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTH STAR (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTHLAND (CG)	XPG	1	
AG 29	AG	1	
<i>UNCLASSIFIED</i>			
IX 20	IX	1	
<i>NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA</i>			
<i>MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1</i>			
<i>MARINE CORPS FORCES</i>			
First Marine Division			
First Marine Aircraft Group			
Fifth Defense Battalion			

[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

2-302. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE

12 VPB and necessary tenders,

2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR);

2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE

12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE PAF-1

Unit—Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
BATTLESHIPS			
Batdiv 1.....	BB	3	
Batdiv 2.....	BB	3	
Batdiv 4.....	BB	3	
CRUISERS			
Crudiv 4.....	CA	4	
Crudiv 6.....	CA	4	
Crudiv 9.....	CL	5	
DESTROYERS			
<i>Desflot 1</i>			
CL 7.....	CL	1	
AD 3, 4.....	AD	2	
Desron 1 (less one Desdiv).....	DD	5	
Desron 3, 5.....	DD	18	
<i>Desflot 2</i>			
CL 8.....	CL	1	
AD 11, 14.....	AD	2	
Desron 4, 6.....	DD	18	
Desdiv 50.....	ODD	4	
MINECRAFT			
CM 4.....	CM	1	
Mindiv 1, 2.....	DM	8	
AIRCRAFT			
Cardiv 1.....	CV	2	
Cardiv 2 (less CV 5).....	CV	1	
<i>Patwing 1</i>			
VP 11.....	VPB	12	
VP 12.....	VPB	6	
VP 13.....	VPB	5	
VP 14.....	VPB	12	
AV 1.....	AV	1	
AVD 6, 10.....	AVD	2	
AVP 4.....	AVP	1	
<i>Patwing 2</i>			
VP 21.....	VPB	12	
VP 22.....	VPB	12	
VP 23.....	VPB	12	
VP 24.....	VPB	12	
AV 4.....	AV	1	
AVD 11, 14.....	AVD	2	
AVP 7.....	AVP	1	
<i>Patwing 4</i>			
VP 41.....	VPB	6	
VP 42.....	VPB	6	
VP 43.....	VPB	6	
VP 44.....	VPB	6	
AVD 2, 12.....	AVD	2	
AVP 5, 6.....	AVP	2	
SUBMARINES			
CL 9.....	CL	1	
<i>Subron 2</i>			
AS 3.....	AS	1	
ASR 5.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 21.....	SS	6	
Subdiv 22.....	SS	6	
<i>Subron 4</i>			
S/M Base, Pearl Harbor.....	ODD	1	
DD 336.....	AM	1	
AM 30.....	ASR	1	
ASR 1.....	OSS	6	
Subdiv 41.....	SS	4	
Subdiv 42.....	SS	5	
Subdiv 43.....	SS	5	
<i>Subron 6</i>			
Subdiv 61.....	SS	3	
Subdiv 62.....	SS	3	
BASE FORCE			
TRAIN VESSELS			
AE 1.....	AE	1	
AF 7, 8, 11.....	AF	3	
AG 16, 31.....	AG	2	
AH 1.....	AH	1	
AKS 1, 2.....	AKS	2	
AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52.....	AM	10	
AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29.....	AO	14	
AR 1, 4.....	AR	2	
ARb 1.....	ARb	1	
ARD 1.....	ARD	1	
AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65.....	AT	6	
TRANSPORTS			
Transdiv 2.....	AP	2	
Transdiv 4.....	AP	2	
Transdiv 12.....	APD	4	

To be formed about October 1, 1941.

Includes SM 1.

To be assigned in August, 1941.

EXAD 13.

TABLE PAF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
BASE FORCE—Continued			
MINE SQUADRON 3			
DMS 13.....	DMS	1	
Mindiv 4.....	DMS	4	
Mindiv 5.....	DMS	4	
Mindiv 6.....	DMS	4	
NAVAL STATION, GUAM			
NAVAL STATION, SAMOA			
Seventh Defense Battalion.....			
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Second Marine Division.....			
Second Marine Aircraft Group.....			
Second Defense Battalion.....			
Sixth Defense Battalion.....			

TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
Cruidiv 5.....	CA	4	

CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE

2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.

TABLE SEP-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
Cruidiv 3.....	CL	2	
DESTROYERS			
Desdiv 1 or 2.....	DD	4	As assigned by CinCpac.

CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET

2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

TABLE ASF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
CRUISERS			
CA 30.....	CA	1	
CL 12.....	CL	1	
DESTROYERS			
AD 9.....	AD	1	
Desron 29.....	ODD	13	
AIRCRAFT			
Patwing 10			
VP 101.....	VPB	12	
VP 102.....	VPB	12	
AV 3.....	AV	1	
AVD 1, 7.....	AVD	2	
AVP 2.....	AVP	1	
SUBMARINES			
Subron 20			
AS 9, 20.....	AS	2	
ASR 6.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 201.....	OSS	6	
Subdiv 202.....	SS	4	
Subdiv 203.....	SS	7	
PATROL CRAFT			
PG 21, 22.....	PG	2	
PR 3, 4, 6, 7, 8.....	PR	5	
PY 10.....	PY	1	

TABLE ASF—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
TRAIN			
AO 6, 13.....	AO	2	
AT 32.....	AT	1	
Mindiv 3.....	AM	2	
Mindiv 9.....	AM	4	
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Marine Detachments			
Fourth Marines (Shanghai).....			
Marine Detachments			
(North China).....			
Marine Detachments			
(Philippines).....			

[7]

CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, show the initial composition as of July 1, 1941.

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*—TABLE NE-1.

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material preparation.

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*—TABLE NE-2.

TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
DESTROYERS			
AD 15.....	AD	1	
Desron 7.....	DD	9	
Desrons 30, 31.....	ODD	18	
DD 341, Desdiv 53.....	ODD	5	
Desdiv 21.....	DD	4	
Mobile Destroyer Repair Units 1, 2.....			
AIRCRAFT			
<i>Patwing 7</i>			
VP 71.....	VPB	12	
VP 72.....	VPB	12	
VP 73.....	VPB	9	
VP 74.....	VPB	9	
AV 5.....	AV	1	
AVD 3, 8.....	AVD	2	
<i>Patwing 8</i>			
VP 81.....	VPB	12	
VP 82.....	VPB	12	
VP 83.....	VPB	12	
VP 84.....	VPB	12	
AVD 5.....	AVD	1	
<i>Patwing 9</i>			
VP 91.....	VPB	12	This wing will be formed following completion of Patwing 8.
VP 92.....	VPB	12	
VP 93.....	VPB	12	
VP 94.....	VPB	12	
Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, 2.....			
TRAIN VESSELS			
AM 73, 74, 75, 77.....	AM	4	
AMc 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50.....	AMc	6	
MARINE CORPS FORCES			
Eleventh Provisional Marine Company.....			

TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
SUBMARINES			
<i>Subron 5</i>			
AS 13.....	AS	1	
ASR 3.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 51.....	OSS	7	
Subdiv 52.....	OSS	4	
Subdiv 53.....	OSS	6	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3.....			

CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the Chief of Naval Operations.

TABLE CNO-1.

Unit—Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
AG 1.....	AG	1	
AG 23.....	AG	1	SecNav Yacht.
AG 25, 26.....	AG	2	President's Yacht and tender.
AG 30, 32.....	AG	2	Survey vessels.
AM 40.....	AM	1	BuOrd duty.
PG 52.....	PG	1	Tender for PT's and PTC's.
MTB Squadron 1.....	PT	6	
MTB Squadron 2.....	PT	7	
Subchaser Squadron 1.....	PTC	4	
COMANCHE (CG).....	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
ALGONQUIN (CG).....	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
MODOC (CG).....	XPG	1	Greenland Patrol.
RARITAN (CG).....	XYT	1	Greenland Patrol.
IX 50.....	IX	1	Greenland Patrol.
SS 206 to 211 incl.....	SS	6	In commission or to be commissioned and to operate either under the CNO or CinClant for temporary duty. To be assigned to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

[8]

CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following general rules:

a. TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES

1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels").

2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval Local Defense Forces.

3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.

b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT

1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.

c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are operating.

[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy.

2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces in tabular form.

1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1).
2. Sub-group Column (2).
3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations) Column (3).
4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which the vessel is to be mobilized) Column (4).

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.

2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in Column (4), where mobilization will take place.

[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration of the following:

- a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the Mobilization;
- b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;
- c. Equipment available;
- d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;
- e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no conversion.

2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel	Sub-group	From	Mob. Dist.	Notes
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56.....	5 PE	A		
PY 12, 13, 15, 16.....	4 PY	A		
PG 17, 18, 54.....	3 PG	A		
VPB.....	18 VPB	A		
AV or AVD or AVP.... number as required...		USAF	-----	{Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
ZNP.....	6 ZNP	A	IV ND	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, Salem, Mass.....				
Air Station, New York, N. Y.....				
Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C.....				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 1.....	1 XPG	D	CNO	I
XPG 2, 3.....	2 XPG	D	CNO	III
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 1 to 30 incl.....	30 XYP	D	I ND	I
XAGs 1, 2.....	2 XAGs	D	I ND	I
XAM 1 to 4 incl.....	4 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 1 to 9 incl.....	9 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 1, 2.....	2 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in I ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER--Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 31.....	1 XYP	D	III ND	III
XAM 5 to 13 incl.....	9 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 10 to 14 incl.....	5 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 3 to 16 incl.....	14 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in III ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 1.....	1 XCMc	D	I ND	I
XPy 1, 2.....	2 XPy	D	III ND	III
XPy 3, 4.....	2 XPy	D	IV ND	IV
XAGs 3.....	1 XAGs	D	IV ND	IV
XAM 14 to 21 incl.....	8 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 15 to 24 incl.....	10 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 17 to 19 incl.....	3 XAMc	D	IV ND	IV
XAMc 20.....	1 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in IV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 2.....	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V
XYP 32 to 38 incl.....	7 XYP	D	V ND	V
XAGs 4.....	1 XAGs	D	V ND	V
XAM 22, 23.....	2 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMc 21 to 31 incl.....	11 XAMc	D	V ND	V
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in V ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
None				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
MOJAVE, TAMPA..... 240' 2 XPG	CG	VI ND	VI	
TALLAPOOSA..... Misc. 1 XPY	CG	VI ND	VI	
MOHAWK..... 165' 1 XPY	CG	IV ND	VI	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, Charleston, S. C.....				
Air Station, Miami, Fla.....				
Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla.....				
Air Station, Biloxi, Miss.....				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 4..... 1 XPG	D	CNO	VI	
XPY 1 to 4 incl..... 4 XPY	D	III ND	III	
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 3..... 1 XCMc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 5, 6..... 2 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XYP 39 to 44 incl..... 6 XYP	D	VI ND	VI	
XAGs 5, 6..... 2 XAGs	D	VI ND	VI	
XAM 24 to 27 incl..... 4 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 25 to 31 incl..... 7 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 32 to 34 incl..... 3 XAMb	D	VI ND	VI	
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in VI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPYc 7, 8..... 2 XPYc	D	I ND	I	
XPYc 9, 10..... 2 XPYc	D	III ND	III	
XAGs 7, 8..... 2 XAGs	D	VII ND	VII	
XAM 28, 29..... 2 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAMb 35, 36..... 2 XAMb	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 32 to 35 incl..... 4 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in VII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 4..... 1 XCMc	D	III ND	III	
XPYc 11 to 18 incl..... 8 XPYc	D	IX ND	VIII	
XYP 45 to 50 incl..... 6 XYP	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XYP 51 to 55 incl..... 5 XYP	D	V ND	V	
XAGs 9 to 11 incl..... 3 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XAMb 37 to 40 incl..... 4 XAMb	D	VIII ND	VIII	
XAMc 36 to 40 incl..... 5 XAMc	D	I ND	I	
XAMc 41 to 43 incl..... 3 XAMc	D	VI ND	VI	

TABLE SCF. -SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER--Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued <i>Units Ashore</i> As indicated in VIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. <i>Marine Corps Forces</i> Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE CACF.—CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE			
<i>Navy Vessels</i>			
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.			
ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67.....	5 ODD	A	USAF { Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
PY 18.....	1 PY	A	
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	
AV or AVP or AVID.....	number as required	A	
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>			
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.			
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>			
XPG 6, 7.....	2 XPG	D	CNO X
XPC 2, 3, 4.....	3 XPC	D	III ND III
XPY 8.....	1 XPY	D	V ND V
XPY 9, 10.....	2 XPY	D	III ND III
XPYc 24 to 27 incl.....	4 XPYc	D	III ND III
XPYc 28 to 31 incl.....	4 XPYc	D	I ND I
XYP 128 to 131 incl.....	4 XYP	D	IV ND IV
XAM 42 to 47 incl.....	6 XAM	D	I ND I
XAMb 61 to 66 incl.....	6 XAMb	D	V ND V
XAMb 67 to 70 incl.....	4 XAMb	D	I ND I
XAMc 93 to 102 incl.....	10 XAMc	D	I ND I
<i>Units Ashore</i>			
As indicated in X ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.			
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>			
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.			
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.			

TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE				
Navy Vessels				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 67.....	4 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. ATLAN- TIC FLEET.
PG 50.....	1 PG	A		
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USAF	
AV or AVP or AVD number as required.....		A	USAF	
Coast Guard Vessels:				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
Vessels from Other Sources.				
XCMc 6.....	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V
XPC 5, 6.....	2 XPC	D	III ND	III
XPY 11 to 14 incl.....	4 XPY	D	IX ND	VIII
XPYc 32 to 43 incl.....	12 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 44 to 46 incl.....	3 XPYc	D	V ND	V
XPYc 47.....	1 XPYc	D	VI ND	VI
XYP 132 to 141.....	10 XYP	D	IV ND	IV
XAGs 16, 17.....	2 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII
XAM 48 to 50 incl.....	3 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 71, 72.....	2 XAMb	D	V ND	V
XAMc 103 to 116 incl.....	14 XAMc	D	V ND	V
Units Ashore				
As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5,RAINBO W No. 5.				
Marine Corps Forces				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE PSCF.—PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel	Sub-group	From	Mob. Dist.	Notes
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
ODD Desdiv 70, 83.....	8 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
PE 32, 38.....	2 PE	A		
PY 14.....	1 PY	A		
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USPF	
AV or AVD or AVP number as required.....	A	A	USPF	
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
TANEY.....	327' 1 XPG	CG	IXV ND	XI XII
SHAWNEE.....	Misc. 1 XPY	CG	XII ND	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, San Francisco, Calif.....				
Air Station, San Diego, Calif.....				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 5.....	1 XPG	D	CNO	XII XI
XPY 5, 6, 7.....	3 XPY	D	XI ND	
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—ELEV- ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:				
<i>Navy Vessels:</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific South- ern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels:</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources:</i>				
XCMc 5.....	1 XCMc	D	III ND	III XI XI XI XI XI XI XI
XPC 1.....	1 XPC	D	XI ND	
XYP 93 to 97 incl.....	5 XYP	D	XI ND	
XAGs 14.....	1 XAGs	D	XI ND	
XAM 39 to 41 incl.....	3 XAM	D	XI ND	
XAMb 51 to 60 incl.....	10 XAMb	D	XI ND	
XAMc 65 to 86 incl.....	22 XAMc	D	XI ND	
<i>Units Ashore:</i>				
As indicated in XI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces:</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 98 to 127 incl.....	30 XYP	D	XII ND	XII XII XII
XAGs 15.....	1 XAGs	D	XII ND	
XAMc 87 to 92 incl.....	6 XAMc	D	XII ND	
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XII ND Plan O-5, RAIN- BOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE PNCF.—PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIR- TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 82.....	5 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
PG 51.....	1 PG	A		
PE 57.....	1 PE	A		
SS.....	2 SS	A	USPF	
ASR.....	1 ASR	A	USPF	
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USPF	
AV or AVD or AVP number as required.....	A	A	USPF	

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i> Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. AURORA..... 165' B 1 XPC	CG	XI ND	XIII	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i> Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i> XPYc 19 to 23 incl..... 5 XPYc	D	XI ND	XIII	
XYP 56 to 92 incl..... 37 XYP	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAGs 12, 13..... 2 XAGs	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAM 30 to 38 incl..... 9 XAM	D	XI ND	XIII	
XAMb 41 to 50 incl..... 10 XAMb	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAMc 44 to 64 incl..... 21 XAMc	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAOB 1, 2..... 2 XAOB	D	CNO	XIII	
<i>Units Ashore</i> As indicated in XIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i> Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE HCF.—HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE</i> <i>Navy Vessels</i> Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. ODD Desdiv 80..... 4 ODD	A			
PG 19..... 1 PG	A			
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i> Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. DAPHNE..... 165' B 1 XPC	CG	XII ND	XII	
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i> XCMc 7..... 1 XCMc	D	V ND	V	
XYP 142 to 167 incl..... 26 XYP	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAM 51 to 55 incl..... 5 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAM 56..... 1 XAM	D	XII ND	XII	
XAMc 117 to 119 incl..... 3 XAMc	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAOB 3, 4..... 2 XAOB	D	CNO	XIV	
XYF 1 to 5 incl..... 5 XYF	D	XIV ND	XIV	
<i>Units Ashore</i> As indicated in XIV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i> Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. First Defense Battalion..... Third Defense Battalion.....				

TABLE PhCF.—PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</i> Such suitable vessels as are locally available and additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. <i>Units Ashore</i> As indicated in XVI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. <i>Marine Corps Forces</i> Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
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[11]

CHAPTER XI. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.

EXHIBIT No. 5

My

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipCincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063WPEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipCinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 21, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

- (A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.
- (B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSELY,
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[ii] *U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac-46

Subject Matter	Page Number	Change in Effect
Promulgating letter: CinePac file A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W of July 21, 1941.	i.....	Original
List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46.....	ii.....	"
Table of Corrections.....	iii.....	"
Distribution List.....	iv.....	"
Title Page.....	1.....	"
Table of Contents.....	2, 2a, 2b.....	"
Parts I to V (incl.).....	3-52 incl.....	"
	52a-52h incl.....	"
	53-56 incl.....	"
	56a-56d incl.....	"
	57-74 incl.....	"
Annex I.....	I-1 to I-11 incl.....	"
Annex II.....	II-1 to II-9 incl.....	"
Annex III.....	III-1 to III-5 incl.....	"
Annex IV.....	IV-1 to IV-3 incl.....	"

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Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change
.....		
.....		
.....		

[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to Whom Issued	Registered Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations.....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.....	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.....	10, 11
Commander, Task Force One (Comabattor).....	12, 13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbattor).....	14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor).....	16, 17
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Commander, Submarines Scouting Force.....	34
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Commanding General, Second Marine Division.....	37
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa.....	38
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.....	39
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.....	40
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.....	41
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	42
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.....	43

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

SECRET

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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[3]

SECRET

*U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One.....	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two.....	B-1, "
Task Force Three.....	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force.....	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force.....	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force.....	F-1, "
Base Force.....	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force

Batdivs 2, 4.....	6 BB
SARATOGA.....	1 CV
Crudiv 3, 9.....	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9.....	4 OCL#
	2 DL
	16 DD#
	2 AD

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force

Batdiv 1.....	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN.....	1 CV
Crudiv 5.....	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50.....	1 OCL
	8 DD
	2 AD

(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force

Crudiv 4, 6.....	8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA.....	1 CV
Desrons 4, 5.....	2 DL
	16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindiv 5, 6.....	5 DM
Available Transports Base Force.....	— AP
	— APD

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.

[12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)* Commander Aircraft Scouting Force

All units of Aircraft Scouting Force.....	107 VP
	2 AV
	2 AVP
	4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force.....	10 VJR

5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)* Commander Submarines Scouting Force

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School..	30 SS
	2 OSS
	1 SM
	1 ODD
	3 AS
	2 ASR
	1 AM

6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)* Commander Minecraft Battle Force

All units of Minecraft Battle Force.....	1 CM
	8 DM

7. *TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)* Commander Base Force

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less	8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.	4 AF
	6 AT
	1 AH
	13 AO
	2 AR
	1 ARD
	2 AK
	2 AE
	1 AKS
	10 AM
	4 AG
	Utility Wing

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Coastal and local defense forces.

10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reinforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15]

CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con-

tained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1). Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] *Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
 - d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
 - e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
 - f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
 - b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.
 - c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
 - d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
 - e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
 - f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.
 - [23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.
 - h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24] **PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS**

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
- a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
 - b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
 - c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
 - d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;
 - e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
 - f. Defend Guam in category "F";
 - g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
 - h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
 - i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
 - j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
 - k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] **CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION**

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:
- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
 - b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
 - c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
- h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- (26) 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
- k. Continue training operations as practicable.
- 1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
- m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
- b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
- c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
- d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
- e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
- 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
- f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
- g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
- i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
- j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
- k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
- l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy basic plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[29] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5"/51 caliber guns
12 3"/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5"/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
4 3"/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
8 3"/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE);

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task.*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing attack training.

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* and *Two*

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS**Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)*3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

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(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39]

CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reenforce and support operations of *Task Force two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40]

Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41]

Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42]

Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the

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defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. Tasks.

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be V. J. Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. Special Logistics.

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252. a. 1. Special Information.

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:

- a. Continue training for landing attacks.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.
- c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
- d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*

3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and thenational interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54]

CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For.	{ 2 OCL..... 1 Desdiv.....	When directed..	
Taskfor 3.....		1 CL.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Under-sea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS..... 1 ASR.....	W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3.....	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM..... 8 DM.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
All Forces.....	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.....	When directed..	
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	For escort duty. To revert on completion.

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

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[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b]

CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c]

CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d]

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58]

CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59]

CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60]

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] *Section 1. Phase I*

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by Commander *Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to Task Force Three.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

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(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—

(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One.* Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two.* Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three.* Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

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PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three.*

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

*Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.*

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan

No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 - (b) Task Force Two.
 - (c) Task Force Three.
 - (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 - (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 - (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 - (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2.

Phase I

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

[I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reinforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reinforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reinforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

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(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ———

Initial Task Organization.

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*

- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information*.—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reenforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing

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parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;
- guns and observation posts;
- mines;
- channel and beach obstructions;
- other defense installations;
- beaches suitable for landing operations;
- extent of anchorage area;
- hydrographic, topographic, and meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

- combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
- other ships;
- fuel tanks;
- power and radio installations;
- troop concentrations;
- storehouses;
- other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two*, to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from largeships at discretion of force and group commanders.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports. No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders

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of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-3] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

EXHIBIT No. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

Prepared by the Joint Board, 1927; revised by the Joint Board, 1935. [J. B. No. 350 (Serial No. 514)] (Confidential)

[SEAL] Approved by the Acting Secretary of War, September 16, 1935.

[SEAL] Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, September 19, 1935.

[iii] 1. The policies and procedure enunciated herein are published for the information and guidance of the Army and the Navy.

2. It is vital to success in war that the Army and the Navy so coordinate their action as to produce the most effective mutual support. To accomplish this, it is essential that both services have a common, definite understanding of their respective functions in national defense and of the approved methods for attaining coordination in operations.

3. The aim of this publication is to assemble in one volume all joint policies, agreements, or instructions which have been approved by the War and Navy Departments, with a view to securing effective coordination. It is divided into two parts:

PART I.—Policies to govern joint action of the Army and the Navy.

PART II.—Policies, agreements, and joint instructions which, by providing effective organization and agencies for coordination, and by enunciating standard practice, promote harmonious joint action.

4. The loose-leaf form is adopted, in order to facilitate revision and to permit the addition of new subject matter.

5. This publication supersedes "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" published April 23, 1927, which is rescinded. The pamphlets entitled "Joint Overseas Expeditions" and "Regulations, Maneuver Rules and Umpire Instructions for Joint Army and Navy Exercises" are incorporated in this publication as Chapters VI and VII, respectively, and their classification changed to "Confidential."

GEORGE H. DERN,
Secretary of War.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1935.

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PART I

POLICIES TO GOVERN JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

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[1]

CHAPTER I

POLICY GOVERNING THE RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

1. *Purposes of statement of policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to distinguish between the functions of the Army and the Navy in such a manner as to establish an authoritative and adequate basis for developing, planning, procurement, and training of each service; and for their guidance in joint operations.

2. *Constitutional basis.*

a. The Army and Navy are maintained to secure the objectives stated in the Preamble to the Constitution:

"* * in insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare * * *"

They are required by the national need for political and territorial security; for the support of our national policies; and for the assurance of the supply of materials vital to the existence of the Nation.

b. The Army and Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President, either expressed or implied, and are directed to a common end.

3. *Common mission of Army and Navy.*—Conjointly and in cooperation, to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States in peace and in war.

4. *General functions of the Army and the Navy.*

a. To accomplish the above mission, the Army performs functions that normally pertain to land operations, the Navy performs functions that normally pertain to sea operations. The air forces of the Army are an integral part of the land forces. The air forces of the [2] Navy are an integral part of the sea forces. The Marine Corps is likewise an integral part of the sea forces. Land and sea operations each include air operations connected and coordinated therewith. The President has the power to make exceptions to any general allocation of functions; and, in some cases, due to the nature of the forces available, the functions of one service may be performed temporarily by the other service; but sea operations by the Army are proper only when immediately auxiliary to or in support of normal Army functions, and, similarly, land operations by the Navy are proper only when immediately auxiliary to or in support of normal Navy functions.

b. The Army and the Navy have joint responsibilities in joint operations. In such operations, it is the duty of the commander of the service which is not invested with the primary responsibility for the conduct of an operation, to render every possible assistance to the commander of the service which is invested with such primary responsibility, to the end that ultimate success will rest with our arms. The spirit of this paragraph should also govern in the preparation of war plans.

c. In order that the most effective cooperation may be attained, the following general principles will govern:

(1) Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and weapons used by the other service in carrying out its functions.

(2) Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the area of operations of the other service in carrying out its functions.

(3) Each service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other service in carrying out its functions.

5. *General functions of the Army.*

a. *General functions of the Army in peace and war.*

(1) To provide for and to prepare the land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the land forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To defend the continental United States and its overseas possessions, to include the defense of all permanent naval bases.

[3] (3) To support the national policies of the United States and to furnish land forces for the occupation of foreign territory in protection of the interests of the United States.

(4) To protect the United States from internal disorder or insurrection.

b. *Additional general functions of the Army in war.*

(1) To conduct effective military operations.

(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases.

(3) To provide such forces as may be necessary for joint overseas expeditions.

6. General functions of the Navy.

a. General functions of the Navy in peace and war.

(1) To provide for and to prepare the sea forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the sea forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.

(3) To support the national policies and commerce of the United States.

(4) To assist the Army in the suppression of internal disorder or insurrection.

b. Additional general functions of the Navy in war.

(1) To conduct effective naval operations.

(2) to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States.

[5]

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

7. Coordination—General considerations.

a. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires that the efforts of the Army and the Navy be properly coordinated.

b. The method employed for coordinating the operations of forces of the Army and of the Navy depends upon the geographical location of the theaters of operations, the character and relative strength of our own and enemy forces, and the consequent nature of the contemplated operations, whether these be independent or joint operations.

c. Independent operations of forces of the Army and of the Navy are those in which the forces of one service can give no tactical support to the forces of the other service. When independent operations are conducted by both services simultaneously within the same or strategically interdependent theaters of operations, coordination may be required in the assignment of missions or objectives, or in timing the operations.

d. Joint operations are those usually requiring tactical coordination of forces of the Army and of the Navy for the accomplishment of a common mission.

e. Under all conditions, coordination is primarily ensured by assigning missions in the joint basic war plan to the Army and to the Navy.

f. When coordination is required in the conduct of independent operations, it will be effected by the commander of each service working in close cooperation with the commander of the other service.

[6] *g.* Under conditions requiring joint operations, coordination is effected either by the exercise of unity of command, or by the exercise of limited unity of command, as determined by paramount interest.

8. Paramount interest.

a. The service whose operations are of the greater importance for the accomplishment of a joint mission in a joint operation has paramount interest in such an operation.

b. The fact that one service has paramount interest in a joint operation does not automatically confer paramount interest upon that service in all subordinate operations thereunder. The senior officer of the service having paramount interest in the main operation shall designate the service to have paramount interest in subordinate operations as far as the necessity for this designation can be foreseen. In case paramount interest has not been determined and announced for subordinate or local operations, the senior officer present of the service which has paramount interest in the operation to which such subordinate or local operation is immediately subordinate shall determine and announce it.

c. The commander of the force invested with paramount interest in a joint operation is charged with the authority and responsibility for coordinating the operation of the forces employed therein. Coordination under paramount interest will be effected as outlined below.

9. Coordination by the exercise of unity of command.

a. Unity of command in a joint operation vests in one commander the authority and responsibility for designating the missions and for controlling the action of the Army and the Navy forces participating.

b. The President as Commander in Chief may appoint an Army or a naval officer to exercise unity of command over forces of the Army and the Navy engaged in joint operations.

c. Where the magnitude and character of the operations warrant, a commander exercising unity of command shall have a headquarters separate and distinct from those of the commanders of the forces of the two services, and shall deal with these forces as coordinate elements of his command.

[7] d. Unity of command empowers the commander to coordinate the operations of the forces of both services assigned to his command, by the organization of task, forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the provision of logistic support; and to exercise such control during the progress of the operations as will insure the most effective effort toward the accomplishment of the common mission.

e. Unity of command does not contemplate the issue by the commander of instructions as to dispositions for, or methods of, operation in the accomplishment of missions assigned solely to forces of the service to which the commander does not belong, nor control of the administration, discipline, or technique of the operations of such forces.

f. The appointment of a commander authorized to exercise unity of command carries with it the power further to delegate this authority, whenever in the opinion of such commander such action is necessary. When this is the case, such commander will determine which service has paramount interest in subordinate joint operations under his control and will appoint a subordinate commander, either Army or Navy, to exercise unity of command or limited unity of command over task forces organized for the purpose of conducting the subordinate joint operations.

10. *Coordination by the exercise of limited unity of command.*

a. Limited unity of command in a joint operation vests in the commander of the force having paramount interest, the authority and responsibility for designating the missions of the Army and the Navy forces participating. It does not include the authority and responsibility to control the action of the forces of the service not having paramount interest.

b. In the exercise of limited unity of command in a joint operation:

(1) The commander of the force of the service having paramount interest is authorized and required to designate the missions of the Army force and the Navy force participating in the joint operation.

(2) The commander of the force of the service not having paramount interest is required to execute the mission assigned by the commander of the service having paramount [8] interest and to render all possible assistance to that commander. In executing such mission the commander of the service not having paramount interest does not yield the actual command of his force. He shall, however, be held responsible by the next superior in command in his own service for properly and wholeheartedly coordinating his activities with those of the commander having paramount interest.

11. *Joint basic war plans, joint operation plans, and joint operation orders to state method of coordination.*—Each joint basic war plan, joint operation plan or joint operation order shall assign paramount interest and shall prescribe for each phase of a campaign or phase of an operation how the operations of the forces of the Army and the Navy are to be coordinated. Where unity of command is specified, the plan or order will state whether an Army officers or a naval officer is to be designated to exercise such command.

12. *Coordination of air operations.*

a. When a force of one service supports by aircraft only a force of the service having paramount interest in the particular operation, unity of command for the conduct of the participating air forces shall be immediately vested in the commander of the force to be supported.

b. In other cases, when air units of the Army and the Navy are combined into one task force for the accomplishment of a common mission, the commander assigning the mission shall determine paramount interest and shall designate an officer to exercise unity of command over such task force during the conduct of the operation.

13. *Coordination in coastal frontier defense.*

a. In coastal frontier defense the Navy is responsible for the patrol of the coastal zone and for the control and protection of shipping therein; the Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. Subject to the provisions of

subparagraphs *b*, *c*, *d*, and *e* below, the Army's responsibility for the direct defense of the coast includes the operations necessary to repel attacks directed against the land frontiers or coasts of the continental United States or against its overseas possessions; and to repel enemy movements directed against adjacent foreign territory on the continent from which such attacks could be launched.

[9] *b*. In operations against enemy forces approaching the coast, but still outside of defensive coastal areas, paramount interest will be vested initially in the Navy, but will pass to the Army when it is apparent that the enemy forces intend to attack a shore objective.

c. In operations within a defensive coastal area, paramount interest will be vested in the Army, except when it is apparent that the objective of the enemy force is shipping within the coastal zone.

d. When the Fleet, as distinguished from naval local defense forces, is strategically present and free to act, paramount interest in operations at sea rests with the Navy. If any Army air force joins in such operations, it will be in conjunction with and under the temporary command of the naval commander as outlined in paragraph 12.

e. When enemy forces approach close enough to threaten or to launch a direct attack against our territory, and the Fleet, as distinguished from naval local defense forces, is not strategically present, or is not free to act, paramount interest shifts to the Army and the function of the Navy is to support the Army. In this case, except in joint air operations connected therewith, coordination will be under limited unity of command. Coordination of joint air operations will be as outlined in paragraph 12.

14. *Coordination in joint overseas expeditions.*—The method of coordination, whether under unity of command or limited unity of command, for joint overseas expeditions will be prescribed in joint Army and Navy basic war plans or by the authority ordering a joint overseas expedition under the principles outlined above.

15. *Coordination in special situations.*

a. Special situations may arise in which the forces of one service will be acting tactically with forces of the other service in operations, the character of which would normally make them distinctive operations of but one service. These special situations would include such operations as:

(1) The operations of Army forces in a country in which the character and extent of waterways make it practicable and desirable to utilize naval means in support of the Army operations.

(2) Employment of air forces of the Army in support of naval forces engaged in operations such as those connected with the control of coastal zones and sea lanes.

[10] *b*. In such special situations the organization of the forces of the assisting service should be maintained intact and the operations coordinated by the exercise of unity of command. The commander who exercises unity of command should be selected from the service which is conducting the operation.

[11]

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION

16. *Types.*

a. Independent operations.

b. Joint operations which are generally of two classes:

(1) Joint overseas expeditions.

(2) Coastal frontier defense.

17. *Tasks of Army and Navy forces in joint operations.*—The normal Army and Navy tasks enumerated below are to serve as guides in the planning and execution of operations in which Army and Navy forces jointly participate. This statement of tasks also indicates in which service authority for coordination should be vested for various forms of joint operations. When Army forces participating in joint operations move overland, tactical coordination of the Army and Navy forces will be exercised when the forces of the two services approach the objective to within supporting distance of each other.

18. *Joint overseas expeditions.*

a. *Joint overseas expeditions include:*

(1) Joint overseas movements.

(2) Landing attacks against shore objectives.

b. *Joint overseas movements.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To provide and operate all vessels for the Army, except when naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case they are provided and operated by the Navy.

(b) To assemble the Army troops, together with their equipment and supplies, at designated ports of embarkation.

[12] (c) To provide and operate the Army ports of embarkation.

(d) To load transports, whether these are provided by the Army or the Navy, for the transportation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies, subject to Navy approval as to stability of vessels.

(e) To load in readiness for operation such aircraft and armament as can be made available to assist the Navy during the movement at sea or in landing operations.

(f) To organize and operate shore installations used primarily for debarkation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To maintain sea lines of supply.

(b) When naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected—

1. To procure, man, equip, and operate the vessels necessary to transport Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

2. To assemble the necessary transports at designated ports of embarkation at the times specified by the commanders of the ports of embarkation.

3. To provide for security of transports at sea.

4. To provide in outlying ports means for the embarkation, or debarkation, of Army troops, equipment and supplies, when such means cannot be provided or obtained by the Army.

c. *Landing attacks against shore objectives.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in landing attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are:

(a) The deployment into boats used for landing, these boats being operated by the Navy.

(b) The delivery of rifle and machine-gun fire from landing boats, except from such machine guns as are parts of the naval equipment of the boats.

[13] (c) The deployment from the landing boats and the gaining of a foothold on shore.

(d) The organization of a beachhead.

(e) The organization and conduct of operations to extend the beachhead.

(f) The conduct of operations beyond the beachhead for the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are:

(a) Naval forces.

1. To provide adequate reconnaissance.

2. To provide the defense against enemy naval forces during landing operations.

3. To provide, man, equip, and operate the small craft required for landing operations.

4. To cover the landing by mine sweeping, gunfire, aircraft, and screening operations.

5. To provide signal communications between ships and shore.

6. To organize and operate the necessary sea lines of supply for forces on shore.

(b) *Marine forces.*—Marines organized as landing forces perform the same functions as above stated for the Army, whether operating with the Navy alone or in conjunction with the Army and Navy.

19. *Coastal frontier defense.*

a. Attacks against our coastal frontiers may be classified as follows:

(1) Major operations, i. e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and

(2) Minor operations, i. e., raids against shipping or shore objectives.

b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory.

[14] c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are:

(1) To provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct defense of the coast.

(2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor defenses.

d. In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain—

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

(4) Controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(5) A system of underwater listening posts.

(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol.

(7) Fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine barrages.

(8) Additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation.

e. The general function of the Navy in coastal frontier defense is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

f. The specific functions of the Navy in coastal frontier defense are:

(1) To control and protect shipping in the coastal zones.

(2) To conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast.

(3) To support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

[15] g. In carrying out these functions the Navy will:

(1) Provide and operate—

(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instruction with the Army.

(c) Contact mines, nets, and booms, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(d) Inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater obstructions other than beach defenses; for the control and protection of shipping in passage through defensive sea areas; for the control of shipping in defensive coastal areas, and for the prevention of enemy mining and submarine operations.

(e) Underwater listening posts for naval use where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts.

(f) Through the Lighthouse Service, when turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation, and to change them as necessary.

(g) An information system through the Coast Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses and light vessels.

(h) Necessary mine-sweeping vessels.

(2) Provide and maintain such fixed underwater obstructions as are component parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(3) Operate gates through nets.

(4) Conduct shipping through channels in mine fields or obstructions.

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CHAPTER IV

FUNCTIONS OF ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS

20. General functions.

a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy stated in chapter I, Policy Governing the Respective Functions of the Army and of the Navy. Under this policy:

(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

b. Aircraft, by their nature, are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions. Available air strength should therefore be used whenever possible by either service in support of the other.

c. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may temporarily execute Army functions under like conditions.

21. Primary functions.

a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

b. These primary functions are:

(1) The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

[18] (2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

22. Secondary functions.

a. Second functions of the air component of the Army are:

(1) Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

(3) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

(2) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

23. Provisions to minimize duplication.

a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones.

c. Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.

d. When estimated aircraft production and procurement do not meet the requirements of the Army and the Navy under any specific war plan, The Joint Board will make allocation in numbers and priorities of airplanes to the Army and Navy, respectively.

[19] e. Allocations of production and procurement facilities for airplanes to meet the needs of any joint war plan shall be made to the Army and Navy, respectively, by The Joint Board upon the recommendation of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Allocations may be proposed to the Army and Navy Munitions Board by the Aeronautical Board.

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PART II

POLICIES, AGREEMENTS, JOINT INSTRUCTIONS, AND JOINT AGENCIES

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CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER V

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

Section I

Introduction and Definitions

24. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present the principles and measures necessary for the effective joint organization and conduct of operations in coastal frontier defense and the method of planning involved and the responsibilities of the two services in connection therewith, in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. (See pars. 13 and 19, pt. I, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

25. *Purpose of coastal frontier defense.*

a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area established defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
- (2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
- (3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;
- (4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.

[28] 26. *Definitions.*—In order to provide a common basis of understanding between the Army and the Navy in the employment of forces in coastal frontier defense, the following definitions of terms employed are hereby established:

a. A *coastal frontier* is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors.

b. *Coastal frontier defense* is the organization of the forces and matériel of the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

c. *The naval district* is a military and administrative command ashore established for the purpose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities outside the Navy Department proper, and for the further purpose of centralizing under one command within the district and the waters thereof:

(1) For military coordination, all naval activities; and

(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific exceptions.

The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal zones. The limits of the naval districts are laid down in the Navy Regulations. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the direct representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.

[29] d. *Naval local defense forces* consist of naval forces, including Coast Guard and Lighthouse Service, afloat and ashore, attached to a naval district and under the command of the commandant of the district. These forces are not a part of the Fleet.

e. A *naval base* is a center from which men-of-war can operate and be maintained.

f. An *army* is a military organization or unit composed of a headquarters, a body of auxiliary troops and trains called army troops, and two or more corps temporarily assigned, the number of corps depending upon the nature of the service required. To these may be added a special assignment of GHQ aviation, GHQ reserve artillery, cavalry divisions, and other troops varying in number and composition according to the task assigned. As thus constituted, an army has both territorial and tactical functions. It is the largest self-contained military unit and may act independently or may form part of a group of armies or other higher organization.

g. A *corps area* is a territorial and administrative command within the continental area of the United States, established for purposes of administration, training, and tactical control during peace time and for the conduct of mobilization and other functions of the zone of the interior in war.

h. A *coast artillery district* is a military command within a certain corps area which contains harbor defenses. It is established for the purpose of decentralizing the corps area commander's functions of discipline, instruction, and routine training of the coast artillery troops within the corps area. When frontier commands, sectors, and subsectors come into active existence, coast artillery districts as such cease to exist and all coast artillery troops, including the district staff, located within the frontier, sector, or subsector automatically become part of the frontier, sector, or subsector command as the case may be. The coast artillery district commander automatically becomes a coastal frontier or sector commander, as prescribed in section IV of this chapter and/or in specific war plans. As frontier commander, he is responsible to the army commander as long as the latter retains tactical responsibility within the area. Upon departure of the army commander, the frontier commander is responsible directly to the commanding general of the field forces.

[30] A *sector* is one of the subdivisions of a coastal frontier command.

j. A *subsector* is one of the subdivisions of a sector command.

k. *Coastwise sea lanes* are the water areas adjacent to the seacoast that include all the usually traveled routes of coastwise shipping.

l. *The coastal zone* is the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to the seacoast and extends seaward to cover the coastwise sea lanes and focal points of shipping approaching the coast.

m. A defensive sea area is a portion of the coastal zone, usually including the approach to an important port, harbor, bay, or sound, within which, if such area be publicly proclaimed and neutrals notified, international practice tacitly permits the belligerent to extend his jurisdiction with a view to the protection of neutral shipping from minefields, obstructions, or the danger of being considered hostile. A defensive sea area is established by proclamation of the President and by notification to neutrals. The limits of the defensive sea area must be contained in the proclamation, and should be such that control of shipping in the area is within the capacity of the available naval local defense forces.

n. A defensive coastal area is a part of a coastal zone and of the land and water area adjacent to and inshore of the coast line within which defense operations will involve both Army and Navy forces, and in consequence require effective coordination. A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *outer harbor area*, the *harbor channel area*, and the *inner harbor area*; its outer limits, which are specified in each case by joint plans, are the outer limits of the ranges of the shore defense batteries. When a defensive sea area and a defensive coastal area coexist in any one locality, the water area of the defensive coastal area which lies between its outer limits and the inner limits of the harbor channel area, shall be considered superimposed upon a like portion of the defensive sea area, without in any way detracting from the Army's responsibility for the direct defense of the coast. Defense activities in that portion of a defensive sea area not included within a defensive coastal area, are essentially naval in character but are of immediate interest to the Army as by such means are disclosed the presence and indicated objectives of enemy forces.

[31] *o. The outer harbor area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries.

p. The harbor channel area is the water area which lies between the outer harbor area and the inner harbor area, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

q. The inner harbor area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor.

r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a defensive sea area.

s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore patrol.

t. An escort force is a part of the naval local defense forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

u. A coastal force is a naval force which may be organized to operate within the coastal zone to meet a special situation in which naval local defense forces are inadequate to carry out the Navy's functions in coastal frontier defense.

v. A harbor defense is an administrative and tactical Army command, comprising the armament and accessories, including antiaircraft armament, controlled mines and supporting aircraft, with the personnel for manning, provided for the defense of a harbor or other water area. Harbor defenses exist to provide on the outbreak of war an effective seaward defense of important strategic points, such as large centers of population, important commercial centers, navy yards, coaling or fuelling stations, locks and dams; to deny the enemy entrance to or occupation of a harbor or other waters which might serve as a base for land or naval operations, or both; and to keep the enemy at such distance from the entrance to a waterway that our naval forces may debouch therefrom and take up a battle formation with the least hostile interference.

w. A beach defense is that part of the Army ground organization for defense against landing attacks which is located at or near the beach for resistance at the water's edge. It consists of a series [32] of organized tactical localities in rear of those sections of the shore line where landings are likely to be made, and includes barbed-wire entanglements and other obstacles below and above the water line. Beach defenses may be organized both within and outside of defensive coastal areas.

x. Army outpost or covering forces are mobile Army forces allotted to subsectors or frontiers, to provide security against raiding operations, and to cover the points of landing in a direct attack prior to the assembly of Army reserves, or additional forces.

y. Army reserves are mobile Army forces drawn from any available source and held in readiness to be sent to any part of the frontier or frontiers that may be threatened by an enemy attack.

z. An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

Section II

Possible Enemy Operations

27. Major operations.

a. When control of vital sea areas cannot be maintained due to our inferiority in naval power, destruction of our Fleet, or to its absence in distant waters, serious attacks against our coastal frontiers are possible and may be expected against strategically important areas when the enemy possesses the requisite force and marine transportation. These attacks may be of major proportions and may have as their object any one or more of the followings:

- (1) The securing of a beachhead as a point of departure for an invasion;
- (2) The securing of an area for use in conjunction with other military operations or in connection with the destruction [33] of our shipping and/or our military and/or industrial installations and facilities;
- (3) The securing of an area for use as a naval base;
- (4) The securing of an area in order to deny its use to our forces;
- (5) The securing of an area for use as an air base, for air raids or for the establishment of local air superiority;
- (6) The blockading of our seacoast against shipping and/or against our naval forces.

b. Landing attacks in force—namely, those involving large invading forces—presuppose that the attacker has local control of the sea area, and also that he has the power to establish locally and for the necessary period of time a definite air superiority. The aviation with the enemy fleet may be insufficient for this purpose, so that the enemy may have to resort to the establishment of air bases and the concentration thereof of the necessary land-based aircraft. The enemy will, however, endeavor to make the maximum use of tactical surprise; he may further be expected to avoid fortified areas so far as may be consistent with his mission and objective.

c. Where a landing attack in force involves operations against fortified areas, the following steps, either distinct or merged together, may be anticipated, although the desirability for tactical surprise may cause complete omission of any preliminary reconnaissance:

- (1) Reconnaissance in force, in which all types of ships may be employed with carrier-based aviation either to determine what defense elements are manned and what resistance is to be expected, or to clear the way for heavier ships. It will be a period of intensive reconnaissance, possibly accompanied by mine sweeping, minor raids with limited objectives, and feints.
- (2) Bombardments by aircraft and long-range armament of the heavier ships to neutralize such land artillery as may be effective in opposing the landing.
- (3) Support of the landing by the fire of naval ships, assisted by aviation, to cover debarkation from the transports, approach to the beach and landing thereon.
- [34] (4) Employment of the requisite force to secure harbor facilities suitable for the debarkation of the heavy troop equipment and for the establishment of a base.

d. When a landing attack in force does not involve operations against a fortified area, the enemy may be expected to make the maximum use of tactical surprise, in order to allow his troops to reach the beach with a minimum concentration against them. Such reconnaissance as the enemy may decide to make will probably be on a wide front and be followed without loss of time by debarkation and the attack of the beaches under such supporting fire as may be available. The attacker may be expected to land on a broad front in several waves in an endeavor to establish, as quickly as possible, a beachhead to a depth of the effective range of light artillery.

28. Minor operations.—So long as our Fleet retains command of the sea, or so long as such command remains in dispute, our coastal frontiers bordering upon the sea areas in which our Fleet is operating may be regarded as protected against a major attack. However, neither command of the sea nor

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superiority of our air forces, in any given locality, can be counted upon to prevent surprise attacks or raids by minor naval forces for the accomplishment of minor missions. These hostile operations may have as their objectives the following:

- a. Destruction of military and industrial installations and facilities.
- b. Destruction of shipping in the coastal zones.
- c. The gaining of minor advantages incident to controlling the sea, or for reconnaissance, bombardment, mining, countermining, demolition, or in operations preliminary to joint major operations.
- d. The observation or blockade of our naval forces while they are lying under the shelter of fortifications.

29. General.

a. The execution of naval missions or the performance of functions of navies in war may lead to offensive operations from the sea against land areas. Such operations will usually be in the nature of joint expeditions of Army and Navy forces.

b. Operations by naval forces against shipping may involve a blockade of certain localities and attacks on shipping in the coastal zone, in approaches to harbors, and even in harbors.

[35] c. The employment of naval forces alone in minor operations against our coastal frontiers, and not incident to joint operations, will, in general, be limited to bombardment from ships or by aircraft of positions not well covered by defensive means, small landing raids for demolition purposes, and feints.

d. The employment of naval forces alone in operations preliminary to joint operations may include all forms of reconnaissance; the seizure of land bases for aviation fields preparatory to supporting a landing; blockading, mining, and countermining operations; attacks on outer defense elements of a fortified area; and feints.

e. Bombardments of land positions by gunfire of naval forces may be undertaken under special circumstances, but any naval force engaging in such bombardment accepts hazards which are so obvious that they have to be justified by circumstances. The employment of capital ships, for instance, in the bombardment of fortified land positions is not likely to be undertaken if such action jeopardizes in any appreciable degree the ability of the bombarding force later to meet on terms of at least equality the enemy naval forces. Ships and their personnel are much more vulnerable to artillery fire than the corresponding material and personnel of land artillery and other defensive shore installations are to fire from ships. The ammunition normally carried by ships is not well suited to the attack of land targets. In addition to the hazards incident to land artillery fire directed against ships engaged in bombarding shore positions, there is the added hazard of attack by land-based aircraft, of submarines, and of mines. Special opportunity is given for the efficient use of these added weapons against the bombarding ships by the fact that the operation is a localized one. Under modern conditions, in an attack upon a fortified harbor, no naval force of capital ships will attempt to force the passage of, or to run by, the fortifications except under most unusual circumstances, when the end in view is vital to the success of the campaign. This applies whether or not enemy land forces are operating on shore against such a fortified harbor.

f. In a discussion of possible enemy naval operations and of possible defensive and offensive air operations, the circumstances of the season and the weather must not be lost sight of, since varying conditions of these two elements have a marked effect on the powers and limitations of naval attacks. During the period of heavy storms, [36] enemy naval operations will probably come to a standstill. Northern winter weather will, as a rule, considerably restrict naval operations, limiting them in the general case to observation and reconnaissance, and to ineffective offensive action against the obstacles of the defense, and precluding any but very minor landing operations. Thick weather may be advantageous to the enemy in covering minor operations against outlying elements of the defense; but heavy fog will generally suspend enemy offensive operations.

g. During periods of heavy storm, low visibility, or low ceiling, air patrol and air observation will probably be unreliable, offensive air operations may be impossible, and air operations may even have to be suspended entirely.

h. Consideration of the preceding paragraphs indicates that the forms of hostile action which an enemy may employ either singly or in combination, against, or in the vicinity of, our coastal frontiers, may include any one or more of the following operations:

- (1) Attacks on shipping in the coastal zone or in approaches to harbors.

(2) Attacks on naval forces of the defender, either off the coast, entering a harbor, while inside the harbor, or while debouching therefrom.

(3) Air bombardments of the seacoast and contiguous areas from forces well out to sea.

(4) Blockading of the seacoast against shipping and/or against our naval forces.

(5) Mine laying off the seacoast or the entrance of harbors.

(6) Naval raids on undefended or lightly defended coastal areas, primarily for demolition purposes and involving air or gun bombardments, or landings with limited objectives of forces composed of sailors and marines without intent to occupy any part of the frontier for any considerable period of time.

(7) Feints, involving part or all of the operations of (3), (4), (5), and (6) above.

(8) A broad general reconnaissance, especially by aircraft, to determine the nature, extent, and location of defending forces.

[37] (9) Local reconnaissance, either—

(a) To determine the practicability of taking advantage of surprise and an unprepared state of defense, in order to secure an area before the defending forces are ready;

(b) As part of an attempted landing; or

(c) In force against a fortified area to determine its state of preparedness, or to clear the way for a major attack.

(10) Seizure of land bases for air fields preliminary to further operations.

(11) Bombardment by gunfire and by aircraft for the neutralization of land artillery and for the destruction of important shore objectives.

(12) Minor attacks, possibly involving small landings, against outlying elements of the defense.

(13) Mine sweeping, countermining, and attempts to destroy nets or other obstacles.

(14) Torpedo fire into harbors.

(15) Blocking action against harbor entrances.

(16) Penetration by naval vessels into a harbor or water area.

(17) Major landing operations supported by rapid-fire guns on ships and by aviation.

(18) Seizure of harbor facilities for debarkation of heavy equipment and for the establishment of a base.

4. The parts played by the different types of naval craft in the above operations include:

(1) *By surface craft*.—Information and reconnaissance; seizure or destruction of shipping; combat with naval vessels; mining or countermining; mine sweeping; launching air operations; blockade; closing harbors or channels; clearing under-water obstacles; attacking nets; cutting cables; torpedo attacks on ships outside or inside harbors; laying smoke screens; gun bombardment; making feints; forcing a passage; and making and covering landings either for demolition purposes or for minor raids or raids in force.

[38] (2) *By submarines*.—Attacks on combatant vessels; information and reconnaissance; blockade; raids on nets or other obstacles; cutting cables; mining; minor bombardments; making feints; and minor landings.

(3) *By aircraft*.—Information and reconnaissance; attacking ships and shore objectives with machine-gun fire and/or high-explosive bombs; destroying obstacles; landing observers or spies; gaining superiority in the air; spotting gun-fire; and laying smoke screens.

Section III

Categories of Defense and Requirements and Means To Be Provided

30. *Degree of preparation*.—The degree of preparation in coastal frontier defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of the forces to be provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature. These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to

the War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means required for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be proclaimed in time of actual or impending war as necessitated by the nature of the war and the probable enemy.

31. *Categories of defense.*

a. Category A.—Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons. Under this category, only a sufficient part of the gunfire elements of harbor defenses will be manned in the strength required to create a show of preparedness. The strength required will be that [39] considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A nominal offshore patrol will be maintained.

b. Category B. Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. Under this category, the harbor defenses will be provided with one manning relief, and a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive sea areas may be established and a limited offshore patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving harbors.

c. Category C.—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack. Under this category, the coastal defense area should be provided, in general, with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet the following enemy naval operations: those incident to controlling the sea; those against shipping; and minor attacks against land areas. The harbor defenses should be fully manned and air support arranged. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces are available, outposts will be established outside of harbor defenses along the sensitive areas of the shore line. The inner mine barrages will, in general, be established; a full inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a rule, be instituted; and certain outer mine barrages and defensive sea areas may be established, and a limited offshore patrol instituted.

d. Category D.—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

[40] *e. Category E.*—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. Defensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army commander of the theater of operations or frontier.

f. Category F.—Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.

g. General.

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable initially, local defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question, and which can be diverted from the mobilization and concentration of the Army forces, from the United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of operations.

(2) Under all categories of defense, the Army coastal frontier or Army sector commander is responsible for the antiaircraft defense within the corps area and naval district extending inland from the frontier or sector, such antiaircraft defense to include an aircraft warning service. Cases involving the antiaircraft

defense of Army GHQ airdromes and those where one corps area borders on two coastal frontiers, will be specifically covered in appropriate Army strategical plans.

[41] 32. *Requirements and means to be provided.*

a. *General requirements.*

(1) The proximity of important cities and industrial areas to certain of our seacoast and lake frontiers and the consequent vulnerability of these places to attack, as well as the importance to the Nation of our shipping and its related industries, and the fact that our coastal bases are the mainsprings of naval action, make the protection of these frontiers in time of war a highly important part of the national defense.

(2) Positive security, to include harbor defenses, has been provided for certain areas, the fixed armament of which has been or is being installed during peace time. Depending upon the liability of these areas to attack, and upon the character of such attack, defensive coastal areas have been designated and defensive sea areas should be designated in order to ensure the security of these important areas and the security of the shipping within their waters.

(3) In other respects, a minimum land and sea defense should be contemplated for our whole coastal frontier on the outbreak of war, and should involve the employment of only such parts of the means of defense as are required under the situation. In some situations, involving only minor enemy operations, it may be necessary to organize the beach defense for certain localities. Other situations involving more serious enemy attacks will require that the means of defense be successively augmented.

b. *Defensive operations required.*—From a study of possible enemy operations, it appears that the defense of our coastal frontiers should take into consideration the following:

(1) The observation of the coastal frontier and the sea beyond as far as circumstances permit or seem to demand.

(2) The protection of shipping in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

(3) The attack on enemy vessels in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

(4) The resistance to enemy approach to the seacoast.

[42] (5) The protection of the seacoast, and especially strategic harbors, against raids.

(6) The defeat of enemy landing attacks on the seacoast, including the provision of defensive installations on shore and in the waters adjacent thereto.

(7) The initiation of counteroffensive operations to eject a landed enemy.

c. *Means available.*—Under the above conception of defensive operations that may be required for coastal frontier defense, the means that may be made available in time of war include—

(1) *The Fleet*, the employment of which, in accordance with the strategic situation, may keep the enemy away from our coastal frontiers.

(2) *Naval local defense forces*, which control the water areas within a naval district, conduct naval operations against enemy forces in the naval district waters, and cooperate with and support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

(3) *The Army forces.*

(a) *Mobile forces*, including air forces, to provide the covering or outpost forces for the initial coastal frontier defense organization and likewise the additional forces necessary to defeat landing attacks and air attacks and to carry out the Army functions specified in paragraph 13a.

(b) *Harbor defense forces* for maintenance and operation of essential harbor defenses designed to prevent ingress into areas, including the air space thereof covered by these defenses.

d. *Relation of the Fleet to coastal frontier defense.*—The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases. In the case of hostile major overseas movements directed against our coasts, the Fleet, if present and free to act, will be a powerful factor for ensuring the security of its bases and our coasts, and, if it engages the enemy, should be supported by all the land-based aircraft available.

[43] e. *Relation of Army mobile forces to coastal frontier defense.*—The Army, in its responsibility for the direct defense of the coast, must be prepared to meet successfully any attack directed against any part of our coastal frontiers. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand the presence of the Fleet in another theater of operations make it necessary for the Army to provide mobile forces, not only those to be used as covering or outpost

forces in the initial coastal frontier defense organization, but also the additional forces required to defeat enemy landing or air attacks directed against any part of the coast. When any part of a coastal frontier is threatened, these additional mobile forces will be concentrated with a view to defeating the enemy in the affected area.

f. Relation of Army air forces to coastal frontier defense.—In operations against enemy attacks along our coast and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case, no restrictions will be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full power of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile Army forces engaged in the direct defense of the coast. Their functions and operations will be governed by the principles outlined in paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, and 22. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and the following quoted paragraphs from J. B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539) subject, "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force":

"(b) When any sector of a frontier is threatened, units of all arms, including units of the Air Corps, will be concentrated in support of the covering forces and the operations of all components will be in accordance with the general plan and the specific decisions of the frontier and sector commander. The Army Air Corps operates along the coast under the same conditions as in other operations except that occasions may arise when the GHQ air force or units thereof may act in conjunction with naval air forces under temporary direction of naval commanders; or similarly when naval air forces may operate in conjunction with and under temporary direction of Army commanders.

"(c) The Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand [44] the presence of the Fleet in another theater require that joint plans for coastal frontier defense be drawn without counting upon the assistance of the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces. But it should be borne in mind that, when the Fleet is so situated that it can and does operate effectively against enemy forces afloat that are approaching some sector of the coast, the security of such sector against major attack is ensured for the time being.

"(d) In addition to a radio communication system, the Navy maintains shore stations at strategical centers, where scouting and patrolling seaplanes may be concentrated to meet naval situations. These naval forces are important elements in the communications and information service, and would normally be the source of the first notice of the approach of an enemy by the sea. When the Army GHQ air force operates along the coast, it maintains such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency. The coordination and cooperation of these two sources of information are secured by joint plans prepared by frontier, sector, overseas department, and naval district authorities. Such plans should provide for augmentation of one service by the other in gaining and disseminating information of enemy movements offshore.

"(e) When the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces is strategically present and free to act, paramount interest in operations at sea rests with the Navy. If the GHQ air force joins in such operations, it will be in conjunction with and under the temporary command of the naval commander. In the absence of the Fleet, the primary responsibility of securing information of hostile fleet movements rests with naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units. However, in either situation the GHQ air force retains the responsibility for such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency.

"(f) In the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy at sea, a major attack upon the coast may develop so as to require the utilization of the GHQ air force in three phases as follows:

"1st phase—The conduct of reconnaissance over the sea approaches to the coast and (when favorable opportunity presents itself) the attack of enemy elements.

"2d phase—The support of artillery involving both fixed and mobile guns and mines, by aircraft conducting observation, reconnaissance, and offensive operations, from the time the enemy comes within range of ground weapons, until he is driven off or the operation enters the third phase.

"3d phase—Air operations in connection with the use of all arms on our coastal frontier.

Reconnaissance, as outlined for the first phase, will be continued to the extent possible throughout the later phases.

"(g) *War plans.*—In peace-time planning for war-time use under any of our existing war plans, each coastal frontier plan, and where necessary, each sector and subsector plan will include plans for the employment of such air units as may be assigned under the particular war plan involved. In the preparation of these plans, consideration will be given to the category of defense as defined in chapter V, part X (sec. III of 1935 revision), Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and specified in the particular war plan in question. Each specific war plan prepared by the War Department will set forth the initial missions assigned the GHQ air force and, in general terms, the operations to be undertaken. Based upon these missions, the GHQ air force commander will prepare his plan covering the details of concentration, the missions, and the general plan of initial operations to be undertaken by the various elements of the GHQ air force.

"(h) *Defense projects.*—Harbor defense projects will contain a statement of the minimum observation aviation needed for reconnaissance and observation of fire for the harbor defense artillery included in such project.

"(i) *Installations and facilities.*—The most important of these are communications, airdromes, and landing fields. Of the first, the radio systems of the naval districts and of the Coast Guard are available, and joint plans contemplate their utilization in connection with any additional stations found necessary and installed by either service. Harbor defense projects and the plans of coastal frontier commanders will make provision for the airdrome areas and installations and the communications and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the air organizations assigned. In addition, the plans of each coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide, in consultation with the GHQ air force commander, for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of such coastal frontier command, by including in such plans logistical provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate. Civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so as to permit M-day operation.

"(j) In overseas departments, the utilization of the aviation component of the garrison will be as directed by the department commander."

g. Naval local defense forces.

(1) The naval local defense forces are furnished by naval districts from such surface, subsurface, and aircraft as may be made available, including small submarines, old destroyers, mine vessels, and aircraft tenders, with such local vessels as are taken over in time of war for naval district use.

(2) The naval local defense forces of a naval district may comprise any or all of the following task forces:

(a) *The inshore patrol*, which may be composed of section bases, submarine bases, destroyer bases and air stations; coastal lookout system, including lightships, lighthouses, Coast Guard stations, and special lookout stations; motor boats, submarine chasers, yachts, aircraft, mine sweepers, guard ships, aircraft tenders, and additional task forces in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To execute the Navy's part of all joint plans for defensive coastal areas.
2. To search for, locate, report, and attack enemy vessels operating close in to the coast and off harbor entrances.

3. To sweep such channels close in to the coast and off harbor entrances as are necessary for our naval forces and merchant shipping, and to clear mine fields laid by the enemy.

4. To patrol the outer limits of defensive coastal areas in order to convey to the harbor defense commander prompt and full information of the approach of friendly or hostile vessels, including all those of the offshore patrol. This information is to be conveyed directly to the nearest elements of the Army communication system.

5. To patrol the areas of obstacles, especially during thick weather or darkness, to protect the obstacles, and to prevent light craft from going over them.

6. To operate a system of control including piloting in the defensive sea and defensive coastal areas.

7. To maintain a guard ship at or near harbor entrances to see that all vessels leaving or entering port give the proper recognition and clearance signals and to transmit orders to shipping as directed.

8. To furnish with routing instructions all merchant vessels departing without escort.

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[47] 9. To maintain a coastal-lookout system along the district coast line by use of the Coast Guard stations and Lighthouse Service, and special look-out stations to prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy.

10. To maintain, through the Lighthouse Service in the district, the system of buoyage, lights, and other aids to navigation regularly established, with such modifications and changes as military necessity may require.

11. To render prompt assistance to merchant shipping and naval units in case of collision, breakdown, or other accident in port or along the coast.

12. To exercise naval control of harbors through the captain of the port, when the Treasury Department requests the Navy to exercise such control.

(b) *The offshore patrol*, which may be composed of destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, gunboats, eagle boats, yachts, aircraft tenders, aircraft, and additional types in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To patrol systematically the coastal zone outside of those parts assigned to the inshore patrol.

2. To develop information of, report, and attack enemy forces sighted, in accordance with the doctrine of the patrol.

3. To supplement and support the main armament gunfire of the harbor defenses.

4. To lay mine fields and sweep against enemy mines outside the field of operations of the inshore patrol.

(c) *The escort force*, which may be composed of any suitable and available naval forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

[48] (d) *A coastal force* may be organized to operate within the coastal zone. It will be organized from suitable and available naval forces. Such coastal force will be in addition to the forces required for each naval district.

(e) In view of the paramount interest of the Army in defensive coastal areas involving existing harbor defenses, the commander of the inshore patrol, who will be stationed ashore, should have his headquarters located as conveniently as possible to the headquarters of the harbor defense commander and at the same location if practicable. In any event he should be in direct communication with the harbor defense commander, as well as in direct connection with all naval activities in the defensive coastal area.

h. Defensive coastal areas.

(1) *Extent*.—Defensive coastal areas will be delimited by joint agreement between the Army and the Navy. Each defensive coastal area will cover that part of the coastal zone and adjacent seacoast which will require an intensive joint defense by reason of the inclusion therein of valuable harbors, stretches of the coast where hostile landings can be made in connection with attacks on our harbors or on industrial centers on or near the coast which are subject to attack from the sea. Defensive coastal areas will ordinarily include land and water areas in the vicinity of a fortified harbor, in which will be located in time of peace some personnel and usually a considerable amount of matériel pertaining to the harbor defenses.

(2) Harbor defenses.

(a) Harbor defenses are highly organized, permanently defended localities within sectors or subsectors of a coastal frontier whose broad mission is to protect important coastal areas (seaports, naval bases, and anchorages) and utilities primarily against attack from the sea. They are an element of the defensive organization of the subsector or sector in which they are located and they operate under subsector or sector control.

[49] (b) The defensive elements of harbor defenses consist of the fixed and mobile seacoast artillery, the antiaircraft artillery, searchlights, controlled mines, underwater listening posts, subaqueous sound-ranging system, observation and fire-control system, harbor patrol boats and supporting aircraft with personnel for manning the same.

(c) Harbor defenses provide protected anchorages for naval forces and commercial shipping and support their debouchment therefrom.

(d) The Army is responsible for the defense against aerial attack of all military and naval facilities ashore within a harbor area.

(e) War-time personnel of the Army in these areas will consist essentially of harbor defense troops reinforced by Army air elements. In the usual case mobile troops will be limited to those manning reinforcing mobile artillery, railway and tractor, allotted to seacoast defense. The harbor defense troops themselves will thus have the mission of beach defense in the vicinity of the batteries. A limited number of mobile troops may be assigned to the harbor defense for local beach defense; the further reinforcement of the area by mobile troops will, in general,

not take place until the enemy situation indicates an attack in force involving landings and requiring a considerable mobile force for defense against landing attacks.

(f) The peace-time matériel consists of seacoast and antiaircraft guns of various calibers, the fire-control establishments for these guns, together with searchlights and with mine structures when the hydrography and current conditions render a controlled mine project feasible.

(g) In time of war, other obstacles, such as torpedo-defense nets, antisubmarine nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and contact mines may find employment, primarily in the harbor channel areas, to increase the resistance against enemy penetration into the inner har- [50] bor areas. For the purpose of detecting the presence of enemy underwater vessels or of any vessel during the hours of darkness or in fog or thick weather, a system of underwater listening posts, both fixed and on the vessels assigned to harbor defense activities, may be installed.

(h) In the installation and upkeep of obstacles, full use will have to be made of a considerable part of the available local Government-owned and private floating equipment. Where Army and Navy requirements conflict, agreement as to priorities will be reached between the local commanders of the two services and recommendations made to the War and Navy Departments respecting same.

(i) The defense will extend its operations to seaward as far as possible by the use of the local defense forces and aircraft of both the Army and the naval local defense forces

(3) *Communications.*—The system of communication between elements of the Army and the Navy requires most careful consideration because of the intimate relations existing between the elements of both services on land, on the water, and in the air. The system must give consideration to all the forms of communication that may find employment. It is further vitally important that the two services be trained together in time of peace to insure complete understanding of the system. Provision must be made for bringing all incoming information of the enemy by the quickest possible means into the interested headquarters of both the Army and the Navy, and for disseminating such information rapidly and accurately. Reports from elements of the offshore patrol should, as a rule, be sent to the headquarters of both the senior Army and Navy officers in the area. For reports from elements of the inshore patrol, the most direct communication is desirable by all available means from naval elements to batteries, forts, and command posts of the Army. A system of identification signals for all friendly naval craft approaching defensive coastal areas must be established.

[51] (4) *General.*—The Army is responsible for the development, installation, and operation of the equipment of fixed listening posts, of the listening equipment required for defense vessels under its control, and for the immediate transmission of information received by these posts to the Navy units of the defense.

i. Defensive sea areas.

(1) Since the object of establishing defensive sea areas is to control shipping, the proclaiming of such an area obligates the Navy to control shipping therein and puts the burden to enforce this control upon the naval forces. The number and size of defensive sea areas should be reduced to the minimum consistent with security, in order to minimize the burden upon the naval forces, and interference with shipping.

(2) Authority for the establishment of defensive sea areas is vested in the President of the United States by section 44 of the act entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States, approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine", as amended by the act "Making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes", approved March 4, 1917.

(3) When war with a specific power appears probable, the Secretary of the Navy submits recommendations to the President as to the defensive sea areas to be proclaimed and the time when they shall be proclaimed. If and when the development of the war necessitates, he submits recommendations as to additional defensive sea areas to be proclaimed.

(4) The Secretary of the Navy is charged with the preparation, for the signature of the President, of the proclamation designating defensive sea areas, with their outer definite limits, and with the publication thereof. He is further charged with the preparation and publication of regulations pertaining thereto and with the enforcement of such regulations.

(5) Copies of the local regulations for the guidance of the armed forces issued in time of war by the commandants of naval districts for the defensive sea areas within their districts [52] will be furnished to harbor defense commanders and other Army authorities concerned.

j. Defense against landing attacks.

(1) *Measures and operations demanded of the defense.*

(a) Enemy landing operations in force must be opposed to the utmost. To this end the Army forces within the coastal frontier will be augmented by forces from the strategic or general reserve, the Army GHQ air force, and by other available Army forces. The naval local defense forces will be augmented by any other naval forces available. The successful frustration of the hostile landing operation will depend largely upon the timely concentration of the requisite forces at the locality against which the main attack is being directed. It is therefore of vital importance that everything be done to discover the focal point of this main attack at the earliest possible moment. For this reason the defense must initiate the following operations as early as possible:

1. Location of the hostile force at sea, and maintenance of observation of this force.

2. Interference with the hostile force as far off-shore as practicable to prevent or delay its approach.

3. Resistance in coastal zone waters and at the shore, taking advantage of the adverse situation in which the attacker is placed just prior to and during landing.

(b) In general, the enemy may be expected to attempt to make landings at several places. Some of these attempted landings may be mere feints. The coastline should be carefully studied with a view to determine the places which the enemy is most likely to use for landings, principal or secondary.

(2) *Steps in the joint organization and operations against landing attack.* Complete preparation for opposing an enemy landing in force requires the following steps [53] in correctly organizing and employing all possible means of defense:

(a) Organization of a beach defense for important localities.

(b) The selection and organization of the principal defensive positions in rear and on the flanks of the portion of the shore line to be defended.

(c) Preparation of a complete joint system of signal communications to connect with one another all land, air, and water elements, and to insure intelligence of the enemy getting to the shore posts of command. Organization of an aircraft warning service to warn industrial centers and other important areas of the approach of hostile aircraft.

(d) Distant reconnaissance by available air elements and naval vessels of enemy approach in the coastal zone.

(e) An air offensive by all available Army and Navy aircraft in order to secure superiority in the air and to destroy at sea the approaching hostile elements that are vital to the enemy in making a successful landing.

(f) Employment of the available naval forces to seaward to keep contact with and attack the enemy; patrol of the beach defenses and beach obstacles by the Army with outpost detachments, aircraft, and vessels to give warning of actual landing operations; maintenance of these beach obstacles by vessels of the Army.

(g) Bombardment by heavy land-emplaced artillery and by aircraft to hold hostile vessels at a distance, in order to deny the enemy effective artillery preparation of the landing area and to increase the difficulties of his debarkation and approach to the shore.

(h) Determined resistance by the Army to the enemy's movement in small boats in landing waves to the shore, light and medium artillery fire, together with personnel, bombs and machine-gun fire by aircraft, [54] being used in support of the troops occupying the strong points of the beach defenses.

(i) Resolute resistance at the shore line by troops occupying the first defensive position, coupled with the movement of infantry reserves and artillery, in support of these troops, against the hostile main landing effort as soon as it can be determined.

(j) Counterattack by subsector and larger reserves, supported by all available artillery fire, to destroy enemy forces that have landed or, if this be impossible, to confine the enemy's advance to a limited strip along the beach, while continuing the attacks by air and subsurface craft against transports, supply ships, carriers, and small landing boats.

k. Obstacles—types.

(1) *General*.—The term obstacle as herein used includes any object which is placed in the water to interfere with the movement of ships or their torpedoes. Included under this term are nets, booms, piles, sunken ships, and mines. Obstacles are used to close harbor channel areas completely, to bar direct approach to channels, or to force adoption of ship formations and movements unfavorable to the attacker, but favorable to the defense. To be effective, obstacles must be so designed and so well protected that they cannot be removed entirely or destroyed during periods of poor visibility. They are protected by guns capable of delivering rapid fire against the smaller types of craft which the enemy is likely to employ for their removal. Moreover, certain searchlights are located primarily for the illumination of hostile targets in mine fields. Patrol vessels may be needed in the areas containing obstacles during periods of darkness and in thick weather.

(2) *Obstructions*.—Obstructions such as piles, under water barriers, and sunken vessels are fully effective against all classes of vessels and may be used to help close completely channels or other navigable water areas.

(3) *Torpedo-defense nets*.—Torpedo-defense nets may be used to close the inner harbor to torpedoes fired from seaward.

[55] (4) *Antisubmarine nets*.—Antisubmarine nets may be used to close the inner harbor area to submarines.

(5) *Booms*.—Booms are used for blocking water areas against the entrance of surface craft. They find application primarily to arrest the movement of ships running at high speed into areas that cannot otherwise be blocked; they may be used in lieu of antisubmarine nets in shallow entrances which submarines cannot enter submerged.

(6) *Mines*.—Mines are of two types: Controlled and contract. The former are provided and installed by the Army; the latter by the Navy. Mines, both controlled and contact, employed in any one defensive coastal area constitute the mine barrier for that area. The barrier may consist of two barrages—an inner, or essentially controlled mine barrage which is an integral part of the fixed defenses of most of our important harbors, and an outer barrage of contact mines.

Section IV

Organization and command

33. *Joint organization and command*.—Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peace-time planning therefor, are as stated below. (See map attached showing coastal frontiers, sectors, subsectors, and defensive coastal areas.)

34. *North Atlantic coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle [56] Sound, Chowan River, Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.

b. Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans. The Commanding General, First Army, is responsible for security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) *New England sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

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Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—First Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—Commandant, First Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts.

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Blue Lightship, Monomoy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

(2) *New York sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

[57] **Southern.**—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—Second Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

(3) *Delaware-Chesapeake sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton, exclusive.

Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—Third Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—The commandants of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

35. *Southern coastal frontier.*

a. *Boundaries*

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

Southern.—The Rio Grande.

[58] b. *Commanders.*

Army.—Fourth Coast Artillery district commander. The Commanding General, Third Army, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and of supervision of peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. *Sectors.*—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively.

36. *Pacific coastal frontier.*

a. *Boundaries.*

Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier.

Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States.

b. *Commanders.*

Army.—Ninth Coast Artillery district commander. The Commanding General, Fourth Army, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and of supervision of peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts within the limits of the Pacific coastal frontier. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into the southern California, northern California, and northwestern sectors, with boundaries based on those of the present naval districts as follows:

(1) Boundary between the southern California and northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.

(2) Boundary between the northern California and the northwestern sectors, northern boundary of California.

[59] **d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:**

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.

(2) San Pedro subsector. San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to Moclips, Wash., inclusive.

(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington.

37. *The Great Lakes coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries.—The frontier extends from Isle Royal, mouth of Pigeon River, northern shore of Lake Superior, western boundary of Wisconsin, all inclusive, to mouth of Raquette River, N. Y., exclusive.

b. Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans. The Commanding General, Second Army, is responsible for security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—To be designated in specific war plans. The commandant, Ninth Naval District, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

c. Sectors.—The Great Lakes coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) *Michigan sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Isle Royal, mouth of Pigeon River, northern shore of Lake Superior, western boundary of Wisconsin, all inclusive.

Eastern.—Western shore of Lake Erie, southern boundary of Michigan, all inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

[60] (c) The Michigan sector is subdivided into the Sault Ste. Marie and the Detroit subsectors with boundary between subsectors as follows: Drummond Island, Point Detour, northern shore of Lake Huron, northern and western shores of Lake Michigan (all to Sault Ste. Marie subsector).

(2) *Erie sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Western shore of Lake Erie, southern boundary of Michigan, all exclusive.

Eastern.—Niagara River, southern shore of Lake Erie, western boundary of New York.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

(3) *Buffalo sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Niagara River, southern shore of Lake Erie, western boundary of New York.

Eastern.—Mouth of Raquette River, N. Y., exclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

38. *Defensive coastal areas.*—Defensive coastal areas have been delimited at the localities named below. Commanders will fit defensive coastal areas into the sector and subsector organizations in such a manner as to provide for efficient coastal frontier defense. These defensive coastal areas are—

Portland	[61] Pensacola
Portsmouth	Mobile Bay
Boston	Mississippi River
New Bedford	Sabine Pass
Narragansett Bay	Galveston
Long Island Sound	San Diego
New York (eastern entrance)	Los Angeles
New York (southern entrance)	San Francisco
Delaware Bay and River	Columbia River
Chesapeake Bay	Puget Sound
Baltimore	Cristobal
Washington	Balboa
Cape Fear River	Honolulu and Pearl Harbor
Charleston	Manila Bay
Savannah River	Subic Bay
St. Johns River	
Key West	
Tampa	

39. *Defensive sea areas.*

a. From a naval viewpoint, and depending upon the specific emergency, defensive sea areas may be important in the approaches to the following water areas:

Portland	Sabine Pass
Portsmouth	Galveston
Boston	Puget Sound
Narragansett Bay	Columbia River
Long Island Sound	San Francisco
New York Bay	San Pedro
Delaware Bay	San Diego
Chesapeake Bay	Cristobal
Charleston	Balboa
Key West	Manila Bay
Pensacola	Subic Bay
Mobile	Waters surrounding the Hawaiian Islands
Mississippi River	

b. In addition to the above, the local Army and Navy commanders of coastal districts concerned will study the relationship of defensive sea areas to the defensive coastal areas that may be needed and, in the event that additional defensive sea areas will, in their opinion, be required to meet any specific situation, they will include such additional defensive sea areas in their plans.

Section V

Planning

40. *Means to facilitate joint planning.*

a. In order to facilitate joint planning, a planning representative will be designated for the Army commander and for the Navy commander [62] of each coastal division. The planning and development chain of command in both the Army and the Navy will follow the same lines as for combat. In selecting such planning representatives, officers will be selected who are located conveniently to the area to be defended and whose headquarters have the personnel and other facilities necessary for planning.

b. In addition to the above, the local Army and Navy commanders of coastal areas whose headquarters are in the same vicinity will appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters are widely separated, more than one joint planning committee may be organized.

41. Collaboration in joint planning.

a. In the preparation of such joint coastal frontier defense plans as may be required under a joint basic war plan, the following commanders will collaborate:

	Army	Navy
(1) North Atlantic coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, First Army, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Third Naval District.
(2) Southern coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Third Army, or an officer designated by him, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
(3) Pacific coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Fourth Army, or an officer designated by him, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
(4) Great Lakes coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Second Army, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

b. The sector defense plans of the New England sector and of the Delaware-Chesapeake sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the First and Fifth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Third Naval District and will be formulated to support the North Atlantic coastal frontier defense plans.

[63] (c) The subsector or defensive coastal area defense plans of the Delaware subsector or Delaware Bay defensive coastal area will be forwarded by the commandant, Fourth Naval District, to the commandant, Fifth Naval District, and will be formulated to support the Delaware-Chesapeake sector defense plans.

d. The sector defense plans of the Florida sector and of the Gulf sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Sixth Naval District and will be formulated to support the southern coastal frontier defense plans.

e. The sector defense plans of the southern California sector and of the northwestern sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the Eleventh and Thirteenth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Twelfth Naval District and will be formulated to support the Pacific coastal frontier defense plans.

f. The commandant, Ninth Naval District, will confer with the commandants, Third and Fourth Naval Districts, as to the naval means which may be available for defense in the Erie and Buffalo sectors.

42. Details of joint coastal frontier defense plans.

a. Each specific war plan will provide for the organization of the defense of the land and coastal frontiers and will designate theaters of operations and the task forces to be employed therein. Actual limiting points and boundary lines between coastal divisions will be modified to the extent necessary to meet the needs of the situation assumed for the specific plan. The covering forces and the initial concentrations made for frontier defense in each plan will be based on the protection of probable objectives of enemy attack, the projected offensive operations, and the combined use of Army and Navy forces. A flexible organization of frontiers is required for tactical operations and the boundaries of coastal divisions may be changed in specific war plans or during the progress of operations.

b. Under the directive of each joint basic war plan and based on the allocation of forces under Army and Navy supporting defense plans, each frontier, sector, and subsector command of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense will develop and will revise annually joint coastal frontier defense plans applicable—

(1) To the defense to be instituted on M-day.

[64] (2) To later defense steps, should such be indicated as desirable to insure frontier defense as the war progresses.

c. Joint coastal frontier, joint sector, and joint subsector defense plans (or defense coastal area plans when joint subsector plans are not required) will, in general, under the specified category of defense, consider what can be done with the means available; these plans may include or refer to a project for a desired development of means which should also be available on the outbreak of war. In the event that other categories have been indicated as probable later steps in coastal frontier defense, these plans should include what can be done with the means of defense then available; they may also include a project for further desired development.

d. Joint coastal frontier, joint sector, and joint subsector (or defensive coastal area) defense plans will be supported by such Army and Navy operating defense plans as may be necessary. Army and Navy supporting operating defense plans will be prepared to support the joint plan of lowest sequence required to be prepared by a joint basic war plan. The joint coastal frontier defense plans will be submitted to both the War and Navy Departments by the commanders under the joint organization for coast defense immediately subordinate to their respective Departments. All joint coastal frontier defense plans will be authenticated by the signatures of the two commanders who submit them. Supporting Army and Navy operating defense plans will be submitted by the commanders who formulate them to their respective next higher commanders within their respective Departments.

e. (1) Joint coastal frontier defense plans for the North Atlantic coastal frontier will be prepared only for situations included under Categories C, D, and E, as indicated under specific war plans. For situations included under Categories A and B, only joint sector plans for this coastal frontier with their supporting plans will be prepared.

(2) I view of the restricted operations contemplated under a Category A or B defense, subsector plans, in general, will not be required for coastal frontiers to which these categories initially apply.

[65] (3) The sequence to be followed in the preparation of joint defense plans is as follows:

(a) Joint coastal frontier plan.

(b) Joint sector plan.

(c) Joint subsector plan or joint defensive coastal area plan.

Generally, the lowest sequence of plans required for the Navy will be that pertaining to a naval district, whether the naval district is a sector or subsector.

f. The plan of higher sequence will contain the directives for the plan of next lower sequence. The lower sequence plan will be formulated to support the plan of next higher sequence.

g. Army and Navy operating defense plans will obtain their directives from the joint plan they are required to support. They will provide the means and organizations and will insure the Army's and/or Navy's effective operation thereunder.

h. Joint coastal frontier and joint sector defense plans will cover the category of defense, the delimitation of areas (including subsector, defensive sea and coastal areas included therein), assignment of missions, allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops, the air and ground anticraft defense measures to be instituted, the designation of areas of responsibility, paramount interest and method of command, the details of joint communications and intelligence services to include the censorship and supervision of cables and wire lines in accordance with approved policy, and an aircraft warning service. These plans or their supporting projects will also make provision for the Army airdrome areas and installations necessary in connection therewith and the communication and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the Army air organization assigned. In addition, the plans of each Army coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of his command by including in such plans logistic provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate; civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so that M-day operation will be possible.

[66] *i.* Joint plans of the lowest sequence, such as joint subsector or joint defensive coastal area plans, should contain, either in the plans proper, in appendices or annexes thereto, or in supporting plans or projects—so much of the following as is appropriate:

(1) The relationship of the defensive coastal area to the subsector organization and/or of the subsector to the sector organization.

(2) The category of defense and such delimitation of the area as may be necessary for the coordination of the Army and the Navy forces operating in the area, to include areas of responsibility and paramount interest.

(3) The assignment of missions and allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops or additional forces required for later defense steps.

(4) The relationship of the area to such defensive sea areas as have been designated for the vicinity, with special reference to methods of keeping the

Army informed of movements of all vessels in the coastal zone and the composition, mission, and methods of operation of the offshore patrol.

(5) Such general plan of the forts, batteries, searchlights, underwater listening posts, air installations, and areas of gunfire and illumination as may be necessary to define the areas of Army responsibility for defense and naval assistance to the Army in this defense, including areas available to the enemy from which he can deliver bombardment fire without effective interference from the land armament.

(6) Definite assignment to the Navy of responsibility and tasks for offensive action in such areas as are covered by the fire of the land armament.

(7) General plan of the part of the underwater defense to be prepared or installed, including the character of the mine barrages, nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and other obstacles, their location, priority of installation, definite responsibility of the Army and the Navy for their provision, estimate of time of installation, definite indication of free passages through mines and openings in nets, navigation range installations required and responsibility for their establishment. Decisions as to which service and what commander in [67] this service shall determine when these elements shall be placed.

(8) Allocation to the Army and the Navy of locally procurable means, particularly vessels and material required for the installation and maintenance of the underwater defense, together with an estimate of the availability of such means, the nature of the alteration required, and the probable cost and time involved.

(9) Composition, mission, and method of operation of the inshore patrol, with particular reference to method of protection of underwater defense elements and identification of elements of the patrol with land elements of the defense at night and in thick weather, including a definite decision as to the conditions under which doubtful vessels should be fired upon by the armament of fortifications.

(10) The air, the ground antiaircraft, and the close-in defense measures; the measures for defense against landing attacks to be instituted on M-day and for the later defense steps to be instituted as the war progresses.

(11) The details of joint communication and intelligence services and an aircraft warning service. These details for the joint communication and intelligence services to include the location of headquarters of the several commanders, communications nets of both services, with the additional means, both military and commercial, required and the frequencies allotted to Army and Navy radio nets, responsibilities of Army and Navy commanders as to communication, censorship, and supervision of cables and wire lines as prescribed by higher commanders.

(12) General method of operation of the inshore patrol in sweeping and mining operations and in conducting and controlling maritime traffic, including designation and location of entrances and exits to defensive sea areas and of guard ships and methods of control of shipping within the harbor.

(13) Composition, mission, and method of employment of other naval local defense task groups, in sufficient detail to indicate the character and degree of cooperation required of Army and Navy air units.

[68] (14) Definite establishment of factors controlling the passing of paramount interest from the Navy to the Army in the coastal zone adjacent to the area.

(15) Detail of at least one liaison officer by name from each service to represent his commander at the headquarters of the other service and such other liaison officers as may be decided upon jointly.

j. A highly important part in each joint defense plan and project, and in the supporting defense plans and projects developed therefrom, is a definite statement of the time of accomplishment of the individual items under the plans and projects. For plans, these statements of times should be for the means and forces actually available and a consideration of the condition of the means and state of training of the forces. For projects, these statements of times should consider both the time of procurement and the time of installation or training after procurement.

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CHAPTER VI

JOINT OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

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Introduction and Definitions

43. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present a set of general principal for the planning and conduct of joint overseas expeditions in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. This publication will form the basis for any training instructions or regulations issued by the War or the Navy Department for the guidance of the forces which may be engaged in such operations. The subject matter is designed to apply to joint operations of considerable forces of both the Army and the Navy, involving landings against opposition, but also to lesser efforts, which as a rule are simpler of execution.

44. *Purpose of an overseas expedition.*—A joint overseas expedition should be undertaken only as a part of a campaign designed as a phase of operations having in view the accomplishment of the purpose of the war. Hence, its success should weaken the enemy and gain for us an advantage in the next step to be undertaken. The land operations to be undertaken in a joint expedition may involve all or any of the following: (a) The securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations; (b) the seizure and securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; (c) the seizure and securing of an area for use as a naval base from [74] which naval forces will carry out further operations of the campaign; (d) the seizure and securing of an area in order to deny the use of that area to the enemy; (e) a raid to destroy enemy military or industrial installations and facilities or to draw enemy forces away from another area.

45. *Advantages inherent in landing operations.*—A joint overseas expedition has many of the advantages inherent in offensive warfare. In particular, it has the initiative with a wide choice of objectives and lines of approach toward them. Its extreme mobility, combined with the use of feints, frequently will conceal the objectives selected until the coast is approached. Through the mobility of its reserves retained afloat, it has an excellent opportunity to exploit initial successes ashore.

46. *Disadvantages inherent in landing operations.*—On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages. In particular, it requires a longer time to launch an attack by troops from transports than from a position already established on shore. While the troops are being brought ashore in boats they are unable to take any effective part in the combat, but offer a particularly vulnerable target to all enemy weapons. Usually, troops must land on and fight over comparatively unfamiliar ground where information of hostile dispositions will be more difficult to obtain than in other types of operations. Difficulties of supply are greatly increased. The artillery support in the initial stages of the attack must be furnished by naval guns; and, finally, success depends to a great degree upon the proper coordination and intimate cooperation of two distinct services.

47. *Superiority of force essential.*

a. An overseas expedition presupposes marked superiority on the sea and in the air within the area of, and during the time required for, the operations. Such superiority does not necessarily preclude all possible damage to vessels of the expedition by enemy action, but it must be sufficient to ensure a reasonable degree of protection for all transports accompanying the expedition while in passage and during the progress of the landing operations. Large ships stopping in the open ocean and troops disembarking in small boats are extremely vulnerable to attack by submarines and aircraft. Careful consideration therefore must be given to the removal of the sub- [75] marine and air menace prior to the actual landing of the expeditionary forces. The possibility of enemy air and naval reinforcements arriving during the operation and the further possibility of enemy use of chemical agents to oppose a landing should be given due weight in the estimate of relative strength.

b. Unless the landing forces available for the expedition are unquestionably superior to the enemy forces that may be expected to oppose the landings and operations on shore subsequent thereto, the initiation of such operation is not justified. Numbers alone cannot afford this superiority. There must also be that effectiveness which is obtained by proper organization, equipment, and training of the forces for the special type of operations to be undertaken.

48. *Definitions.*

a. *A joint overseas expedition* is a combined Army and Navy force dispatched to a theater of operations by sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations on shore.

b. Phases.—The execution of a joint overseas expedition divides itself naturally into the three following phases, and plans are made accordingly:

(1) *The embarkation phase* consists of all preparatory measures taken to assemble the troops and their equipment, the supplies, and the transportation at or near the port of embarkation; it also includes the actual loading of the troops and supplies on the transports.

(2) *The movement overseas phase* is the period from the time the expedition sorties from the port of embarkation until the joint attack forces rendezvous within their landing areas.

(3) *The landing phase* begins with the movement of the expedition from the rendezvous within the landing area, and continues until the landing forces are securely established on shore.

c. A naval attack force is the naval unit in landing operations, consisting of transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels, operating against a continuous shore line, usually designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the terms "right", "left", "center", etc.

[76] **d. A landing force** consists of the Army organizations which are to carry out landing operations from the transports of a naval attack force.

e. A joint attack force includes a naval attack force and the landing force associated therewith.

f. A landing area is the area within which are included the operations of a joint attack force and comprises the shore and sea area involved in the landing operations. A large joint overseas expedition may require the use of more than one landing area.

g. A transport area is the water area assigned for debarking troops from the transports.

h. A naval support area is the sea area assigned to naval vessels detailed to support a landing.

i. A beach is that portion of the shore line of a landing area normally required for the landing of a force approximating a combat team. A combat team is defined in subparagraph *m* below.

j. A beachhead is a position organized in depth, with a view to offensive or defensive operations, which protects the beach initially from enemy light artillery fire (range about 10,000 yards) and eventually from medium artillery (range about 15,000 yards).

k. A beachmaster is a naval officer detailed to control the beach from the high-water mark seaward.

l. A shore party commander is an Army officer detailed to control Army administrative activities at the beach.

m. A combat team is the basic Army unit in landing operations, consisting normally of an infantry battalion and supporting troops including any or all of the following, depending on the requirements of the situation and the availability of transportation: A platoon of the howitzer company; the battalion medical detachment; a battery of field artillery; a company of engineers; necessary liaison and communication agencies.

n. An artillery concentration is artillery fire placed on an area.

o. Counterbattery is fire delivered by naval vessels or the Army's artillery, on enemy artillery, for the purpose of neutralizing or destroying it.

p. A boat group is a group of boats organized for transporting a combat team or some other similar tactical unit.

[77] **q. A wave** is one boat group, or two or more boat groups landing abreast, when operating in a tactical formation for landing.

r. A subwave is each line of boats in a wave.

s. Commercial loading utilizes to the maximum the ship space and does not contemplate tactical employment of the troops on landing until their equipment, other than personal equipment, has been issued to them. This method of loading is applicable to movements from an established port to an established and well-secured port. Troops moved by this method are not available for tactical employment in landing operations against hostile forces.

t. Unit loading gives primary consideration to the availability of the troops for combat purposes on landing, rather than utilization of ship space.

The degree of readiness for employment depends upon the degree to which organizations are unit loaded as follows:

(1) *Combat unit landing*, in which certain units, selected because of their probable destination and employment in landing on hostile shores, are completely loaded on one ship with at least their essential combat equipment and supplies immediately available for debarkation with the troops, together with

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the animals for the organization when this is practicable. This method of unit loading is particularly applicable to units which probably will be required for an assault on hostile shores by a landing from small boats. Such an operation against any one beach will require an army combat team. This, of course, is subject to modification to meet special requirements. Combat teams will be loaded in such manner as to permit simultaneous debarkation.

(2) *Organizational unit loading*, in which organizations with their equipment and supplies are loaded on the same transport, but not so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. This is somewhat more economical in ship capacity than is combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units available for employment as soon as the troops and their equipment have been assembled on land. Like combat unit loading, this method permits diversion en route by complete ship loads, from the destination originally intended.

[78] (3) *Convoy unit loading*, in which the troops with their equipment and supplies are loaded on transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same transport. This allows a considerable utilization of ship space, particularly by using this method of loading to fill in space on transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary to assemble them on land, with their equipment and supplies.

Section II

Command

49. *Method of coordination*.—The joint Army and Navy basic war plans, or the authority directing the undertaking of a joint overseas expedition, will prescribe whether coordination will be by the exercise of unity of command or by the exercise of limited unity of command. (See ch. II, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

50. *Commanders to embark on same ship*.—The Army and the Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should also the respective Army and Navy commanders of a joint attack force. This method should be applied, where practicable, through all echelons of command.

51. *Liaison agents and staffs*.—The mutual exchange of liaison agents assures a degree of cooperation between the Army and the Navy not otherwise readily obtainable. Wherever joint operations are undertaken the commander of one service should have on his staff members of the other service.

52. *Communication with subordinate units*.—It is highly important that all landing force commanders should land with their units or as soon thereafter as possible, establish communication with subordinates who have already landed, and issue orders for subsequent operations based on personal knowledge of the situation and the terrain. The senior commander ashore must act with vigor and initiative.

[79]

Section III

Plans

53. *The joint basic decision and directive.*

a. *The decision* to undertake a joint overseas expedition will be derived from a joint Army and Navy estimate. Such a decision may be contained in a joint Army and Navy basic war plan, or it may be reached at any time during the progress of the war.

b. *A directive* will be issued by the authority arriving at the decision to undertake a joint overseas expedition, to the commander designated to command the combined forces, or to the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces which constitute the joint overseas expedition. This directive will generally include:

(1) Digest of available information of the enemy.

(2) Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon the proposed operations.

(3) Information of any supporting operations contemplated.

(4) The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the Navy.

(5) The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the mission or missions, with designation of the initial theater of operations.

(6) The forces assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of concentration and availability for embarkation.

(7) The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.

(8) The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement and operation.

(9) The method of coordination. The designation of the commander in chief under the method of unity of command; or the designation of the service in which paramount interest will be vested during each phase, with the designation of the respective commanders of the Army and the Navy forces.

(10) Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in order to give the commander in [80] chief or the respective commanders of the Army forces and the Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the success of the expedition.

54. Expeditionary force joint estimate and joint plan.

a. Upon receipt of the above directive, the commander in chief, or the commander of the service in which paramount interest is initially vested, will prepare such an estimate as may be desirable and, after full discussion with the respective Army and Navy commanders, or the commander of the other services, will issue instructions based on the directive and in amplification thereof; these instructions, particularly when prepared prior to the war, will ordinarily be in the form of a joint plan. Such instructions will generally include:

(1) Decision.

(2) Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.

(3) Operations to be undertaken, including both joint operations and such separate Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to insure the success of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces required and their commanders.

(4) Announcement of selected landing areas.

(5) Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.

(6) Provision for joint training.

(7) Provision for logistic support of the expedition.

(8) Provision for communications (signal) between forces.

(9) Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until shortly before the landing forces are ready to debark.

(10) Alternative plans.

b. It should be emphasized that the plans for embarkation and movement overseas should be based upon the requirements of the plan covering the actual landing operations.

55. Cooperation in planning.—In the preparation of these plans and of the subordinate plans it is essential that there be the closest cooperation between all Army and Navy commanders who are to be associated in the projected operations. Officers of each service [81] should have a clear understanding of the problems confronting the other service and the limitations incident to the employment of the facilities of both services. The staffs of both services should study the problem together. This applies not only to the staffs of the higher commanders, but also to the staffs of the subordinate commanders who are to be associated in each operation. Technical details relating to each service are to be worked out by the service concerned.

56. Development of plans by Army and Navy commanders.—On receipt of the instructions set forth in paragraphs 53 and 54, the respective commanders of the Army forces and of the Navy forces will proceed to develop the detailed plans to carry out the projected operations and will issue the necessary orders to their respective forces.

57. Plans of subordinate units.—Based on the orders of the commanders, Army and Navy, there will be prepared detailed plans covering the employment of subordinate units which, in the case of operations that are unfamiliar to the forces involved, will go into great detail. Orders of subordinate units, like those of higher units, will be prepared in close cooperation between commanders of the two services who are to be associated in the operations.

58. Flexibility of the plans.—In the preparation of all plans and orders, it must be borne in mind that one which fails to provide for flexibility has little chance of success. Therefore, provision will be made for necessary modifications due to weather conditions, enemy action, the strength of enemy resistance encountered at any of the landing beaches, and changes in the situation that may occur between departure and arrival at destination. Alternative landing areas will be selected and alternative plans providing for landing at these areas will be pre-

pared before embarkation. However, as the plan of embarkation cannot be changed in case an alternative plan is used, the plan of embarkation must be the same for, and should support, both the preferred and alternative plans. The alternative plans must be drawn so as to make this possible.

59. *Details to be perfected before sailing.*—It is necessary that all possible details of each plan of landing and orders for subordinate units be determined upon as far as may be practicable before the joint expedition sails, or at the latest before it departs from the [82] last port which it will touch before arrival in the landing area. All commanders should familiarize themselves as far as possession of information will permit with the nature of the beaches and the terrain over which operations are to be projected. A draft of the order initiating the landing contemplated must also be prepared and distributed for study during the voyage.

Section IV

Embarkation and measures preparatory thereto

60. *Plans and orders.*—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. For the Army forces:

- (1) Organization and equipment of the Army forces for the operation.
- (2) Special training of troops for the proposed operations.
- (3) Date on which loading of troops will commence.
- (4) Movement of troops from the concentration centers to ports of embarkation, in accordance with loading priority.
- (5) Directions covering requisition for supplies for delivery at ports as requested by the Navy.

(6) Subdivision of the Army forces for assignment to transports in accordance with the tactical plan.

(7) Embarkation tables for troops, and the necessary loading tables for general cargo to accompany troops.

(8) Loading of troops and equipment on board ship in accordance with the tactical plans and the Navy assignment of ships.

b. For the naval forces:

- (1) Organization of the naval forces for the operation.
- (2) Arrangements for procurement of boats, lighters, and other special equipment required to land the Army forces, their equipment, and supplies.
- (3) Allocation of available transport and ship space and tonnage as required to meet Army grouping of troops and unloading requirements.

(4) Special training of naval personnel for the proposed operations.

[83] 61. *Procurement of sea transportation.*—The joint basic plan or directive (see par. 53 b (8)) will state which service is responsible for procurement and assembly of the sea transportation required for the Army forces. Transportation required by the Navy will be procured by that service. Unless stated in the plan or directive, the commander in chief or the commander of the force having paramount interest will decide when and where the necessary sea transportation is required and will request the War or Navy Department, as the case may be, to have it so assembled.

62. *Ports of embarkation.*—Regardless of whether the transportation employed for the movement of the Army forces overseas is under the control of the Army or Navy, the necessary ports required for embarking the Army forces are selected, organized, and operated by agencies of the War Department not included in the forces to be employed overseas. The Army embarkation service includes the employment of experienced riggers, longshoremen, and stevedores; harbor floating equipment, etc., for loading ships.

63. Special organization.

a. Army forces are restricted by the necessarily limited facilities available for transportation, not only in the transports, but in the boats and small craft available to transfer them to the shore, and the facilities, or lack of them, for debarkation from the boats. For support in the first stage of attack the landing of tanks is difficult and the landing of heavy artillery is impracticable. It is ordinarily impracticable to employ Army air units before and during the early stages of the landing. Special organization is, therefore, required to facilitate debarkation of intact combat units, reduce ship cargo requirements, provide increased small arms and machine-gun fire in lieu of normal artillery support, and insure mobility of the first units ashore.

b. Special naval organization is required to embark, escort, debark, and land the Army forces, including provision for the most effective possible artillery,

communications, and air support until the Army can establish its own artillery and air units on shore. This involves the organization and provision of boat officers and crews for the landing boats and lighters; organization for covering landing operations by gunfire on land targets; organization to provide air-[84] craft support and observation to serve the needs of ground troops, including observation of the fire of the Army's artillery; and organization to provide ship-to-shore communications.

64. Special equipment.

a. In general, in order to meet the requirements and limitations mentioned, the Army must reduce equipment to absolute essentials. Wherever practicable, motor transport will replace animal transport, and the motor transport provided will be of the types (light tractors and light trucks) which can be most easily handled, especially into and out of small boats. However, combat efficiency should not be sacrificed to facilitate sea transportation. The amount and kind of transportation is dependent on the terrain and the distance of the advance.

b. Because of the special nature of the operations required in the transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore against enemy opposition and under supporting fire from friendly ships, special equipment must be provided by the Navy. This includes special boats for landing the assault troops, including installation of machine guns therein, and the provision of protection so far as practicable against small arms fire from shore; special boats, barges, and motor lighters for landing all other troops and their equipment, including artillery, tanks, airplanes, and motor and animal transport, and supplies; provision of special ammunition required for the artillery support; and special communications equipment.

c. The maximum number of landing boats which can be transported efficiently should be provided. The number of boats should be at least sufficient to land simultaneously the number of assault battalions to cover the frontage required in the proposed scheme of maneuver, and local reserves sufficient to hold the ground gained until reinforcements are landed in later waves.

d. All boats possible should be carried on the transports. The standard Navy boats on combat vessels are to be used only as necessary to supplement transport equipment and for towing.

65. Special equipment to be assembled before departure.—Estimates of the special equipment required will be made well in advance of the date of departure of the expedition in order that it may be procured and some training in its use may be carried out before loading.

[85] **66. Joint training.**—The difficulties of landing on a hostile shore from small boats, heavily encumbered troops, most of whom have had little or no experience with the sea, and the unfamiliarity of the Navy with attack of land objectives, and with firing over friendly troops, make it necessary that as much preliminary joint training be carried out as time permits. It is particularly necessary that all operations projected be rehearsed in as realistic a manner as the facilities permit prior to the actual landing.

67. Embarkation plans.

a. The plans required for the subdivision of the Army forces for assignment to transports constitute the embarkation plans. Embarkation is so intimately related to and dependent upon debarkation that the details of embarkation plans cannot be completed until decision has been reached as to the method of debarkation. The debarkation plan itself is dependent upon the tactical plan of employment of the Army forces.

b. The orders directing embarkation will be based upon the debarkation plan for the preferred tactical plan and the details of embarkation will be contained in embarkation tables and special equipment tables prepared by the Army as a part of the embarkation order.

c. The data to be contained in the embarkation and special equipment tables will be as follows:

(1) Whether or not the organization is to be unit loaded and if so the degree of unit loading desired. (See par. 48 t.)

(2) The number of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men; total personnel; total number of animals; the number and kind of each article, and space required in cubic feet to store, and the weight in long tons; the dimensions, length, breadth and height of each separate package of equipment; the total space required to store and the total tonnage in long tons of the supplies and equipment pertaining to the unit.

d. When the sea transportation is under the control of the Navy, this information will be furnished to the Navy as far in advance of the embarkation as possible.

68. *Joint planning.*—Embarkation tables cannot, of course, be finally prepared until the transports which will be available are [86] definitely known. Joint study and planning for embarkation of expeditionary forces are absolutely necessary.

69. *Loading.*

a. For the movement overseas of joint expeditionary forces, two general methods of loading troops and their equipment on transports are applicable. These two methods are termed *commercial loading* and *unit loading*. (See subpars. 48 s and 48 t.)

b. The determination of the method of loading for embarkation is primarily dependent upon an estimate as to the probable employment of the organizations upon debarkation. While economy of ship's space will be a highly important factor in planning for a joint overseas expedition, and combat unit loading is somewhat less economical in this respect, yet the all important factor of combat efficiency can not be sacrificed. Minimum requirements to secure combat efficiency may be stated as:

(1) Each combat team, combat unit loaded, will be complete on one ship.

(2) There will be at least as many such teams, one or more per ship, as there are beaches to be assaulted.

(3) Infantry battalions required as local reserves for assault echelons will be combat unit loaded.

c. To secure the best use of ship's space and at the same time provide the combat unit loading required by the situation, combinations of the different methods of unit loading on the same transport may often be made. Thus, the same transport may contain a combat team, combat unit loaded; the infantry regimental headquarters, and possibly other elements, organizational unit loaded; and freight, equipment, and supplies, together with other units designated to debark early in the operations, convoy unit loaded.

70. *Loading aviation units.*

a. The most desirable unit loading for Army aviation units is to have them loaded on carriers so that the planes can take off therefrom to operate in support of the landing; and to have sufficient airdrome personnel and equipment on the carrier to permit the early establishment of facilities for the operation of the units on shore. This is the ideal condition to be attained, but it is probable that lack of available carriers for this purpose will necessitate the acceptance [87] of a lesser degree of readiness, which will preclude the use of Army aviation units in support of the landing.

b. If Army aviation units cannot be unit-loaded on carriers, transports should be selected which will permit the planes to be stowed between decks, almost completely set up, and the loading on the same ship of the airdrome personnel and equipment necessary to permit prompt establishment on shore of the facilities required for the operation of the units.

c. It may be necessary to employ transports of such restricted space between decks as to require that the planes be shipped knocked-down and crated. This is the least desirable method of loading, due to the docking facilities necessary for unloading and the time element involved in getting the planes ashore and ready for flying.

Section V

The movement overseas

71. *Plans and orders.*—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. *For the Army forces:*

Designation of such landing areas as may have been concurred in by the Navy, and announcement of the plan for establishment of the Army forces on shore.

b. *For the Naval forces:*

(1) Information of time of departure, in accordance with paragraph 72, following.

(2) Concurrence with the Army in selection of the landing areas and plan for the establishment of the Army forces on shore.

(3) Safe escort of the expedition to the landing areas and organization therefor.

72. *Time of departure.*—The time of departure from the ports of embarkation of the expedition and assembly at the designated rendezvous will be decided by

the commander in chief or the commander of the service having paramount interest.

73. Convoy and escort.

a. Prior to departure of the overseas expedition, the naval commander will organize all noncombat vessels, such as troop and [88] animal transports and cargo ships, into such convoy groups as may be advisable, the basis for organization being the retention in one group of the ships carrying the troops and equipment to be landed at any one beach. Each convoy group will be commanded by an officer of the Navy of suitable rank, designated by the naval commander. The naval commander will furthermore organize and station the escort for the convoy groups, whether these convoy groups are proceeding in one, or more than one formation.

b. In the event that the expedition has for its major objective the establishment of the fleet in a base in a theater of operations normally controlled by the enemy, it is probable that all transports and cargo ships will be incorporated in the fleet train which includes the auxiliary vessels necessary for the logistic support of the fleet.

74. Navigation and defense.

a. Whatever the type of landing operations to be undertaken, the navigation and defense of the convoys of troop transports in joint overseas expeditions at sea are entirely under the direction of the Navy, and the Navy is responsible for the safe conduct of all the forces afloat included in the operations.

b. The Army personnel are passengers and do not interfere with the formation, route, or conduct of the expedition. The troops on board may be assigned certain duties such as that of lookouts, as may be directed by the commander of the transport through the commanding officer of troops on board.

75. Protection of the lines of supply. (lines of communication).—The Navy is always responsible for the protection of the overseas lines of supply.

Section VI

The Landing (Including Preparations Therefor)

76. Joint plans.—Based upon the expeditionary force joint plan, all Army and Navy commanders of larger units operating together will prepare joint plans covering their operations in the landing phase.

77. Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders.—The joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders should, in general, include the necessary details concerning:

[89] a. Mission (assigned in the expeditionary force joint plan).

b. Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.

c. Decision as to the joint operation to be undertaken and such separate Army and Navy tasks as are considered to be necessary.

d. Designation of respective task forces required and their commanders.

e. Selection, number, and locations of the beaches within the landing area.

f. The hour of landing.

g. Gunfire and air support, both naval and Army.

h. Maintaining control of the necessary sea area during the operations.

i. Clearing enemy naval forces and obstacles from the landing area.

j. Army debarkation tables for troops, equipment, and supply.

k. Navy transport of troops from ship to shore in accordance with Army debarkation tables.

l. Seizure and organization of designated objectives on shore and exploitation of initial success after landing.

m. Relief of naval forces furnishing gunfire and air support and communication (signal) service.

n. Detail of liaison agents.

o. Communication (signal) service.

p. Establishment of ports of debarkation and supply bases on shore and other logistic details necessary for the landing operations.

q. Protection and maintenance of overseas lines of supply (communication).

78. Orders.—The orders of the Army and the Navy commanders will include such details of the "Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders" as are pertinent to their respective commands.

79. Surprise.

a. The chances of success in an opposed landing are much improved when surprise is effected.

b. Strategic surprise is difficult to accomplish, as air and surface scouting can be carried a long distance to seaward, and may result in the early discovery of the approaching expedition. Tactical surprise, as regards the commencement of operations, against a particular beach at a particular time, is often possible, and every effort should be made to effect it.

c. The effectiveness of tactical surprise is dependent upon the number of landing places available, the size of the landing force, the secrecy and rapidity of approach, the character of the enemy dispositions and ability to throw the Army reserve rapidly into an area where enemy weakness has been determined by the initial attack. Tactical surprise may also be effected by the use of darkness or smoke to conceal movements, and by means of demonstrations and feints.

80. Reconnaissance.

a. In cases where overseas expeditions are under consideration, steps should be taken, before initiating debarkation plans to make such preliminary reconnaissance of the proposed landing areas as may be possible to determine the enemy's preparation for defense, character of the terrain, and hydrographic conditions adjacent to the tentatively selected beaches. After completion of the plan, a further reconnaissance should be made, if practicable, to check the details and soundness of the plans.

b. During the landing phase, continuous reconnaissance should be conducted by all echelons of command. Air forces, submarines, and patrols landed from small boats, as well as the troops when landed, should carry out this reconnaissance.

c. Air reconnaissance of the terrain inland from the beach preliminary to landing is of value in determining the enemy strength in numbers and position, which must be overcome; but to avoid arousing the enemy's suspicions, air reconnaissance should be on a very broad front, or it may be necessary to suspend aerial reconnaissance in such areas for a time preliminary to the attack, unless such reconnaissance can be concealed by including it in other air operations. However, where organized resistance is expected, information obtained by air reconnaissance of enemy positions, with photographs, may prove of far more value to the landing forces than any benefits derived from attempted surprise landings without this information.

[91] 81. Employment of the Army forces.

a. A landing against opposition is in effect the assault of an organized defensive position modified by substituting naval gunfire support for divisional, corps, and Army artillery, and generally Navy aircraft support for Army aircraft support. However, every effort will be made to utilize all possible aircraft support, both Army and Navy.

b. Three successive phases in the operations are to be expected, each being marked by an attack or attacks with limited objectives:

(1) *First phase*.—Seizure of the necessary terrain immediately in rear of the beach, followed when sufficient strength has been landed by an advance to secure the beach from enemy light artillery fire. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line about 10,000 yards inland.

(2) *Second phase*.—Operations to insure further advance inland to a position which denies enemy medium artillery fire on the beach. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line at least 15,000 yards inland.

(3) *Third phase*.—Further land and air operations for securing the objectives for which the landing was undertaken.

c. Simultaneous landings will be made by as many combat teams on as broad a front as the boat facilities will permit, but not to the extent of causing undue dispersion.

d. The formation of the waves approximates as closely that of an assault on land as the facilities permit.

e. It is imperative that the landing be made on the beach by tactical units, even down to the squad, in order that tactical team unity may be preserved and the fighting power of the team be at the maximum at the moment of physical contact with the enemy.

f. In the day attack, assault platoons endeavor to develop all fire power practicable, making free use of machine guns while in the boats. In the night assaults, fire of the assaulting troops before reaching the beach will be used only as a last resort.

82. Employment of the Naval forces.

a. The commander of the naval attack force is responsible for the preparation of plans for and the actual operation of landing on the beach of all personnel and material pertaining to the Army forces with which he is associated

in accordance with Army debarkation tables; the support of the landing by gunfire; the employment of the Navy air forces in support of the Army; the maintenance of signal communications between the Army and Navy forces both afloat and in the air; all this in addition to the normal functions involved in protecting the forces against hostile naval attack.

b. If the distance from the transports to the beach is considerable, consideration should be given to towing the boats by mine sweepers or light surface craft as close to the beach as the depth of the water permits, in order to minimize confusion due to breakdown and failure to keep to the designated courses. However, every care should be exercised in the methods of handling boats and in boat formations to minimize excessive losses from hostile fire.

83. Organization of the Army forces.

a. The Army forces designated to land at each beach or group of beaches and the necessary reserves are organized into subordinate commands adhering to normal formations. In order to effect the closest possible cooperation, Army commanders of the various echelons should be embarked initially on the ships of the commanders of the corresponding naval echelons, as far as practicable.

b. As the beach or group of beaches at which the landing will prove successful cannot be foreseen, the appropriate echelons or command should provide for adequate, highly mobile reserves afloat which may be promptly moved to exploit the situations developing on shore.

84. Naval organization for landing.

a. Preparatory to landing, the transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels engaged in a joint overseas expedition will, if not already so organized, be organized into one or more *naval attack forces* and the forces so formed designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the terms "right", "left", "center", etc. A naval officer will be designated to command each attack force. (See par. 48 c.)

b. Such *naval attack force* is further subdivided into *task groups*, which will generally include the following:

(1) *The fire support group*, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned the following fire missions: [93] Against enemy troops opposing the landing or against their probable positions; against reserves; against hostile machine guns and hostile artillery; and on hostile routes of advance or retreat. Effective results may further be obtained by close-in support of light vessels, such as destroyers, delivering direct fire.

(2) *The air group*, consisting of naval aircraft, for observation of gunfire of the fire support group and the Army's artillery, for protection of the attack force against enemy air operations, for reconnaissance of enemy positions, for bombing enemy objectives, and for liaison with the Army forces. Where practicable, observation units should support each division landing. It should be noted, however, that the fleet air forces, in the theater of operations, other than planes carried on battleships and cruisers, are normally organized into a single task force, with the mission of supporting the landing of the expeditionary force and the operations of the attack forces.

(3) *The mine group*, consisting of the mine-laying vessels and mine sweepers for the purpose of sweeping the landing area clear of enemy mines and of laying defensive mines to protect the vessels of the attack force from enemy submarines and night torpedo attack.

(4) *The antisubmarine group*, consisting of the vessels designated to protect the vessels of the attack force from attack by enemy submarines.

(5) *The transport group*, consisting of the transports and all noncombatant vessels carrying troops, equipment, and supplies.

(6) *The screening group*, consisting of those vessels designated to locate and give warning of the approach of enemy vessels attacking same if possible. This group usually includes the submarines accompanying the expedition.

(7) *Salvage group*, consisting of such light craft as may be available for rescuing personnel of distressed boats, hauling off grounded boats, and the recovery of sunken equipment.

c. The above organization is repeated for each separate landing area at which landing operations are to be carried on.

[94] d. The commander of the naval attack force should, so far as possible, take such station that he may control and coordinate most effectively the naval operations in his area and be kept informed of the progress of the operations on shore.

85. *The landing area.*—The selection of the landing area or areas (defined in 48 d) depends primarily upon tactical considerations as to the objective and the enemy opposition likely to be encountered.

86. Characteristics of a landing area.

a. The area selected, from an Army viewpoint, should offer a maximum of the following advantages:

(1) Permit both approach and landings on a broad front, commensurate with the size of the landing force.

(2) Afford a sufficient number of favorable beaches that are preferably mutually supporting.

(3) Contain no natural obstacles which would prevent or hinder greatly an advance.

(4) Have natural terrain features on which one or both flanks may rest.

(5) Afford sufficient area for the establishment of a beach head.

(6) Afford sufficient area inland for maneuvering the forces employed.

(7) Provide sufficient suitable road running inland to insure movement of troops toward their objectives and the movement of artillery and supplies.

(8) Afford sites permitting the landing of heavy equipment, artillery, and supplies.

(9) Afford suitable ground for the operation of Army aircraft, unless areas outside the landing area are to be used for this purpose.

b. The area selected, from a Navy viewpoint, should offer the maximum of the following advantages:

(1) Afford suitable approach, free from obstruction, to the area in which the transports are to debark troops and equipment.

(2) Afford some shelter for the transports, so that ships may complete debarcation with the least possible interference by weather conditions, and in a depth of approximately 10 [95] fathoms, where practicable, as a protection against submarines.

(3) Afford maneuvering space for the naval supporting forces, including hydrographic conditions favorable for the maneuver of accompanying ships, close in to shore.

(4) Provide a few sheltered landing points where temporary or improvised floats or wharves can be employed for unloading that part of army equipment required ashore in the early phases.

(5) Provide suitable waters for anchorage and protection of the convoy as soon as the coast line has been freed from enemy artillery.

(6) Afford ultimately a harbor suitable for the maintenance of the military forces ashore and of the naval forces.

87. Selection of beaches.

a. Within any given landing area, the number and locations of the beaches are decided by the Army commander after a careful joint estimate of the situation by Army and Navy commanders, and after a reconnaissance, where practicable.

b. From the viewpoint of the Army, the number and location of the beaches to be employed will be based upon—

(1) Freedom from hostile opposition, as that is the most serious obstacle to a successful landing.

(2) Inability of the defenders to concentrate troops opposite each possible beach as compared with the attacker's ability to do so.

(3) Absence of permanent means of defense or obstacles installed by the enemy.

(4) Access to the terrain over which the troops are to operate.

(5) Extent and existence of adjoining beaches permitting landings and approach on a broad front. The shore line need not be suitable throughout its whole extent for landing, provided the various beaches permit the units landing thereon to be mutually supporting.

(6) The character of the terrain inland from the beach. The establishment of a beachhead requires that the landing forces be able to clear rapidly the area inland adjacent to [96] the beach to a depth of at least 10,000 yards, so as to allow the continued landing of troops without interference by light artillery fire. It further requires that, as a next step, the forces ashore be able to establish themselves preparatory to a further advance on a line at least 15,000 yards inland, so as to allow the continued landing of heavy material without interruption by medium-range artillery fire.

c. From the viewpoint of the Navy, the water area adjacent to the beaches selected should:

(1) Be free from serious obstructions to navigation.

(2) Be of a slope permitting beaching of boats close to the shore line.

(3) Be firm, particularly where guns and heavy army equipment are to be landed.

(4) Contain some area sheltered from wind and sea so that the troops and equipment may be landed from boats without undue interruption or interference by surf.

(5) Have satisfactory tidal and current conditions. Local currents, particularly those close inshore, rough water, surf, usual weather conditions, and tidal range, must be considered by the Navy in determining which beaches are practicable for landing.

(6) Have satisfactory approaches from seaward, without narrow passages, thus permitting the movement of boats on a broad front.

d. Unfavorable beaches may have to be selected for various reasons. Use of such beaches may be obligatory even at the risk of losses, because better beaches do not exist, or in order to take the overbalancing advantage of surprise, or to gain a flanking fire which will assist the larger landings on more favorable beaches. Successful landings have been made on shore lines thought to be inaccessible.

88. *Final selection of landing areas and beaches.*

a. Final selection of the landing areas and beaches must be based on a reasonable probability of attaining the major objective. The decision must assure the landing of sufficient troops at a place from which they can reach their objective and accomplish the mission for which the operation was undertaken. Landing areas and beaches [97] should be selected with a view of determining the enemy's weakest point.

b. Since tactical considerations governing the employment of the troops on shore are paramount, *final decision* as to the landing area of Army forces, its breadth, beaches to be used, and order of landing of the troops will be made by the Army commander from among those areas and beaches that the Navy commander states are practicable so far as naval considerations are concerned.

89. *Hour of landing.*

a. Decision as to the hour of landing involves several factors which will be considered jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in charge of the operations.

b. *Advantages of landing during darkness.*—A landing before or just at day-break greatly increases the chance of securing some measure of tactical surprise, materially lessens the efficacy of any fire the defense may employ except prearranged fires or defensive barrages, reduces the losses to be anticipated while the troops are in small boats, and prevents the enemy from gaining the necessary information on which to dispose his forces, particularly the reserves. Advantage may be taken of fog or smoke as a protection against searchlights and flares. However, fog and smoke may increase the difficulty of landing at the desired beaches.

c. *Advantages of landing during daylight.*—In a daylight landing the movements of both ships and small boats are made under favorable circumstances, as positions and courses can be accurately fixed and as troops can be loaded into small boats more easily than during darkness. Likewise, the attack is assured of better gunfire and air support, and better defense against mines, submarines, light naval forces, and hostile aviation. The attackers, by means of naval gunfire and aviation, are better able to pin the enemy to the ground and interdict movements of his reserves, thus preventing his exploitation of the fuller and more accurate information which daylight permits him to obtain.

d. *Smoke.*—In case the landing is not made under cover of darkness, the resulting disadvantage may, to some extent, be overcome by the use of smoke. A smoke screen laid by destroyers or aircraft may be utilized to conceal the movements and dispositions [98] of the transport groups, while an airplane smoke screen laid on hostile positions when known or at the shore line may serve to protect the small boats from hostile fire and at the same time keep the enemy in doubt as to the exact strength and point of attack. In planning for the use of smoke the direction and velocity of the wind must be carefully considered.

e. *Daylight essential for exploitation.*—The landing must be made early enough to allow sufficient daylight for the Army forces to reach their first objectives.

f. *Other considerations.*—In addition to the above considerations, a particular combination of tide, wind, fog, or moon may be desirable in selecting the hour as well as the day for the landing.

g. *Final decision* as to the hour of landing rests with the commander in chief, in the case of unity of command, or the commander of the service having paramount interest.

90. Approach to and occupation of landing area.

a. The approach to the landing area and the occupation of the sea area included therein are conducted under orders of the commander of the naval attack force or forces. Careful calculation must be made as to the time required to embark the first wave in the boats and the length of time it will require to reach the beach. This result is applied to the previously determined hour for the landing and the approach so conducted that the transports will be in position at the time required. In order to minimize risk of detection as well as torpedo attack by enemy submarines, vessels should not be required to arrive within the landing area until they are needed. Where hydrography allows, transports may be anchored in water of such depth as to afford protection against hostile submarines. It is highly desirable that the submarine danger be eliminated prior to making landings. Submarine nets may be used to protect transport groups.

b. When the waters of the proposed landing area are known or suspected of being mined, breaches must be made before the landings begin. The necessary mine sweeping is performed by the Navy.

c. The Navy is responsible for the demolition or removal, when possible, of underwater obstacles near the beach. Consideration will be given to the possibility of destroying such underwater obstacles as barbed-wire entanglements by cutting devices rigged on the small boats of the assault wave.

[99] d. Enemy submarines and mines may influence the conduct of the convoy, the approach to the landing area and the beaches, naval gunfire support, or the method of debarkation, thus requiring changes in the details of the plan.

91. Transport and naval support areas.

a. The transport area is defined in paragraph 48 g. The commander of the Navy forces is responsible for the selection of the transport area.

b. The area assigned to each transport group should be as close to the beach as possible without coming under effective enemy artillery fire. The desirability of utilizing smooth water for the purpose of debarking the troops into the small boats is an important consideration. The transport area should not be crowded.

c. The naval support area, defined in paragraph 48 h, should be sufficient in depth and breadth to permit free maneuvering of the supporting ships, with deep water close enough in to permit them to cover effectively with gunfire the land objectives step by step up to the extreme ranges. If practicable, it will be separate and distinct from the transport area.

92. Employment of air forces.

a. The plan for employment of the air forces, Army and Navy, depends upon the time during the operations at which the Army air forces can be made available for service. Factors which affect early employment of Army air units are:

(1) The selection of landing fields for use by the Army air forces; their location with reference to the landing area.

(2) The time required for preparation of necessary landing fields and the amount of labor available for this purpose.

(3) Whether land bases for Army aviation are to be seized prior to main landing.

(4) Whether land bases for Army aviation are to be seized at the same time of the main landing.

(5) The difficulty of transporting airplanes uncrated, the amount of ship's space available for this purpose, and the difficulty of transporting airplanes from ship to shore and to places where they can take off.

(6) The time to assemble airplanes that are transported in crates.

[100] (7) The practicability of flying a portion of the Army air forces to temporary landing fields within operating distance of the landing area.

b. When the enemy is provided with an air force, the hostile observation is almost certain to learn of the approach of the expedition, and the hostile air force, unless neutralized, may prevent the convoy from approaching the coast or the successful debarkation and landing of the troops without serious losses. The convoy must be assisted by an air force strong enough to protect the convoy and the landing area from effective air attack. This is the function of the naval air forces, with such assistance from the Army air forces as may be practicable.

c. While the Army air units will enter into the action as early as possible, Army air activities will be restricted until suitable land bases are secured. Hence, in addition to reconnaissance and air spotting of naval gunfire during the early phases of the landing operations, the Navy air forces will be prepared to take over, or at least to assist in other missions usually assigned to the Army air units. Naval assistance in such missions, which include infantry liaison, artillery

adjustment, reconnaissance, and attack in support of ground operations, will continue until the various classes of Army air units are available. Army observers will be utilized, if practicable, in naval planes in such operations prior to the arrival of Army planes.

93. Naval gunfire support.

a. As artillery support, at least in the initial stages, must be given by naval gunfire exclusively, the maximum effectiveness of its use must be assured by very careful prearrangement. Liaison and communications between advancing troops and their supporting artillery should be provided.

b. Naval artillery being of the high velocity, flat trajectory type, the objectives selected for it to fire upon must be large, well defined, and farther ahead of our infantry for safety reasons, than is usually the case. Due to the limited supply of ammunition available for all types of naval guns, barrages and firing on minor or suspected targets will not be feasible. Instead of this the best method of support will be by short intense concentrations fired according to a [101] Prearranged schedule on targets visible from the firing ships, from observation points on land, or from spotting aircraft. Concentrations should be placed on other targets as they disclose themselves by groups specially designated beforehand. Although possible, map firing should be employed only as a last resort; observed firing is always to be preferred. However, liberal use should be made of maps in the designation of artillery objectives in the plan of fire support.

c. Reduced charges may be used to advantage in cases where the design of the gun permits this. High angle fire may be obtained by the design, manufacture, and supply of artillery for the particular purpose of supporting a landing force in joint operations. Naval antiaircraft guns will be used throughout against enemy air operations, but if not needed for this purpose they may be used advantageously against shore objectives.

d. The gunfire support furnished by the naval forces should be continuous. It will usually start with a preparation fire and continue throughout the successive stages of the landing until the limit of range of guns is reached or until the Army's own artillery is in a position to furnish adequate support. During the time the first wave is embarking in small boats from the transports and until the first of these boats reach the beach, the fire will be placed on known hostile artillery positions, organized strong points, machine-gun nests, defiles on routes over which supports and reserves must pass and, generally, on such other objectives the neutralization of which will lessen the enemy's defense. Artillery support plans will provide for effective fire on the beach to cover the movement of the first wave ashore. Just before our troops reach the shore the fire will lift to targets farther inland. The terrain beyond the beach will influence the amount of lifting of the fire. In any event it must be kept far enough in advance of our infantry to assure against losses from our own fire.

e. There are two general methods which may be employed by naval forces in affording artillery support in a forced landing where two or more Army divisions land simultaneously. One is to keep all firing units centralized under the highest commander; the other is to decentralize naval support groups to support subordinate Army [102] units. The following are examples of the second method: When two infantry divisions land simultaneously and the naval units have been divided into two naval attack forces, it might be desirable to have the naval vessels of one naval attack force support one division, and the naval vessels of the other naval attack force support the other division, or to divide the naval force into three supporting groups—one being assigned to support each division and one to support the operation as a whole; or a division might be made by calibers, the large caliber main batteries of large ships being assigned to general support while the smaller caliber secondary batteries are assigned to support subordinate units to include divisions, and sometimes brigades.

94. Cooperation in gunfire support.

a. Complete plans for gunfire support should be worked out prior to embarkation between the commanders of the naval groups which are to give the support and of the respective Army units they are to support. Army commanders will indicate the objectives upon which they desire fire, the purpose of the fire, and the times they are to be fired upon. The naval commander concerned will indicate exactly how much of the desired support he can give. In case the Navy has not sufficient guns to cover the desired objectives, every effort will be made to secure additional ships rather than defeat the Army plan by reducing below the minimum the artillery support required by it.

b. Since the effectiveness with which naval gunfire support plans and orders are carried out is largely dependent upon the maintenance of adequate liaison

and communications between shore and ship, such plans and orders should include adequate provisions for the installation and maintenance of all means necessary to assure this. To assist in securing effective support, liaison officers will be interchanged between Army and Navy units. Advantageous use may be made of Army officers of artillery organizations which do not debark initially. All liaison officers should report to the headquarters to which assigned in plenty of time—probably prior to embargation—to become thoroughly familiar with their duties. They should be sufficiently familiar with the other service as to be able to interpret the desires and needs of the commanders of the units whom they represent in the case of Army liaison officers and the capabilities of naval firing groups in the case of naval liaison officers.

c. In addition to normal communication through the beach master as provided in paragraph 101 a, each naval liaison officer should have direct communication with his commander whom he represents. For this purpose each should be accompanied by a signal party with facilities for maintaining radio and visual communications with his commander.

95. Debarkation of troops.

a. A wave is defined in paragraph 48 q. The organization of the troops of each wave, with the time of arrival at the beach, is determined by the debarkation tables which are prepared by the Army officer commanding the unit. Such organization is based on best information on hand and upon information received from the naval attack force commander as to availability and capacity of boats.

b. The tactical requirement of deployment in depth will cause the debarkation to be made in successive waves.

c. The number of waves to be under way at the same time will depend upon the tactical plan and the number and kind of boats available. After the initial tactical force has been carried ashore by successive waves, the remaining Army units will be sent ashore in as orderly and expeditious a manner as is feasible by the use of such boats and lighters as remain available, unless the necessity for tactical formations demands continuation of movement by waves.

d. The Navy is responsible that the waves are so spaced that they will arrive at the beach in the order and at the time intervals requested by the Army.

e. In order to reduce the time that the troops may be under fire in the boats, it is desirable that the first wave, at least, be debarked in fast motorboats, the larger and slower boats being reserved for succeeding waves in which larger groupings are not objectionable. The provision of special boats for the purpose of landing the troops is highly desirable and is a duty of the Navy.

f. All boats of an assault wave should mount machine guns to be manned by either the Army or Navy, and should be provided with as much protection as possible against the effects of small-arms and machine-gun fire directed at them from the beaches and from aircraft.

[104] g. All boats used for landing troops, equipment, or supplies will be manned by Navy crews and commanded by Navy personnel.

96. Debarkation of supplies and light equipment.

a. The plan covering the landing phase will provide for the supply of the troops on shore. Their needs must be foreseen and transports loaded in accordance with the plan of supply. The first administrative orders to be issued after landing will be prepared, at least in tentative draft form, before the expedition sails.

b. Troops usually carry only enough rations and ammunition upon landing to last 1 or 2 days. However, a beach reserve of rations and ammunition for at least 10 days should be built up as soon as possible, preferably from supplies carried in the transports for this purpose. Ordinarily, few stores other than ammunition and water can be unloaded and landed on the first day.

c. The troops of each wave should carry the signal communication equipment appropriate to the units involved.

d. Debarkation of supplies and equipment and the priorities therefor should be provided in the Army debarkation tables.

97. Debarkation of artillery and other heavy equipment.

a. The plan of debarkation should avoid encumbering early waves with non-essential equipment. Field artillery, though difficult to land, is essential. The landing of field artillery heavier in weight than light artillery upon open beaches is difficult, and the terrain may be such as to make the prompt movement or employment of such artillery, after landing, impracticable. In favorable situations, on a good beach, a small amount of light artillery and tanks may be landed early. Such artillery will usually have to be moved into position by

hand. Light tractors suitable for moving field guns into position can be debarked more easily than animals.

b. There are no suitable boats at present carried by vessels of war or merchant ships for transporting a large amount of army supplies or the heavier army equipment, such as medium field artillery pieces, tanks, motor trucks, airplanes. Special barges or lighters, preferably self-propelled, should be provided by the Navy for this purpose prior to embarkation.

c. All equipment and supplies which cannot be handled easily from boats to shore require improvised ramps and piers and some special naval equipment for handling. For landing a limited [105] amount of light equipment and supplies to accompany troops, the Navy will require small sheltered bights or inlets along the coast, and for handling the bulk of supplies and heavier Army equipment, fairly well protected harbors with temporary piers and wharves and appliances for unloading.

98. *Debarkation of animals.*—The number of animals that can be debarked or handled on an open beach is limited, yet provision will have to be made for transportation, debarkation, and landing of some animals, probably early in the operations. The Army will provide for the supply of proper slings, transportation stalls, and such other equipment as will facilitate the handling of the animals to be landed. Tidal currents should be considered in swimming animals ashore. Animals may be debarked as follows: From the transport to small boats by using flying stalls; from the boats into the water by ducking ramps; from the transports into mine sweepers or similar light craft, by flying stalls or slings; from mine sweepers or similar light craft into the water by slings or a ducking ramp; from the transport into the water by slings.

99. *Debarkation of air forces.*

a. The method of debarking Army air units will depend upon the plans for their initial employment and the manner in which transported.

b. When the situation is such that it has been planned to transport Army aircraft crated, and not to use them until a suitable landing field has been secured as a result of the seizure of a beach head, the aircraft will not be debarked until suitable means for transferring them from ship to shore are available. Such a situation would exist when the operation was directed against an enemy known to be unable to offer effective air opposition to the landing operation.

c. However, the normal situation will require a maximum employment of all available air force, Army and Navy. Every effort should be made to transport Army aircraft so that they can participate in the initial operations. Navy aircraft carriers are taxed to capacity to care for their own planes and usually would not be available for handling Army aircraft; but if available should be used.

[106] d. Often it will be possible to debark aircraft at some distance from the landing area of the main operation, but within flight reach. The seizure and protection of a suitable area may constitute a secondary landing operation. Such an operation might be carried out in advance of the main operation, in order to make additional aircraft available to participate in the latter, but at the possible sacrifice of secrecy.

e. A favorable situation is one in which the area selected for the operation is within flight distance of friendly territory, thus permitting Army air units, flying from such territory, to participate in the initial phase of the operation.

100. *Supply of water to the troops.*—If the landing is made during hot weather or in a tropical climate, the amount of water that can be carried may be considerably less than the landing troops require. When there are no facilities for supply of water ashore in the landing area, arrangements must be made by the Navy to furnish water for the troops ashore. The Army's estimate and the Navy's arrangements for the water supply must be liberal. Allowance will be made for loss of water and containers, including damage by hostile fire. Until the tactical situation ashore permits water being delivered by water boats to be provided by the Navy, at least one cask of water will be placed in each boat going ashore. Plans will provide for the continuous supply of water by the Navy until the Army has developed its supply ashore.

101. *Organization of the beach.*

a. *The beachmaster* is a naval officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The beachmaster has complete control of the beach from the high-water mark seaward; of all naval operations thereat, together with all landing facilities. He causes the beach to be promptly marked to facilitate its recognition by approaching waves; organizes, maintains, and controls all communication with

the Navy; transmits all Army messages from shore to ship, and receives and transmits to the shore party commander all messages from ship to shore which apply to the Army except as provided in paragraph 94 c; and cooperates with the shore party commander. The beachmaster and a few of his principal assistants land with the first wave. [107] The beachmaster's headquarters should be provided with such protection from enemy fire as may be practicable. Previously trained Army artillery and Army air corps liaison personnel, in addition to competent naval communication personnel, will be established at the beachmaster's communication center, so that messages may be transmitted in terms and manner to which each service is accustomed.

b. The shore party commander is an Army officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The shore party commander takes charge of all engineer and labor troops, equipment, and supplies on arrival at the beach; organizes the beach facilities, such as the establishment of dumps, collecting stations, and prisoners' inclosures; establishes information and message centers; facilitates the movement of all troops inland; and cooperates with the beachmaster. The shore party commander lands with the first wave.

c. Military police.—Confusion is likely to occur at the beaches, due to the irregular arrival of troops and supplies, hostile fire, movement of wounded and stragglers to the rear, and to the arrival of runners with messages. It is necessary, therefore, to have the beach well policed, and a sufficient number of military police should be detailed to assist the shore party commander.

d. An engineer party will be landed with or soon after the first troops. The shore party commander will detail necessary engineers to assist the beachmaster in establishing at once improved landing places for boats and in removing obstructions. A wharf of some kind is usually the next work, and it must be completed with the least possible delay. Army ponton equipment may be valuable for this purpose, and such equipment should be loaded with a view to its early use. The shore party commander will arrange for the construction of routes of communication to the interior. The location of these routes of communication may be determined by a study of maps beforehand, and this will be done wherever practicable.

e. Boat repair party.—Casualties to the hulls of boats and to the machinery of power boats due to enemy fire, sea conditions, and the hazards of landing on open beaches will likely occur at a high rate. It is desirable, therefore, to land as soon as practicable a repair party, including carpenters' mates, machinists' mates, and electricians' mates, under competent leadership, to assist the beachmaster in salvaging and repairing damaged boats.

f. Medical service.

(1) The Army evacuates to the shore line; the Navy is responsible from the shore line to the shore line at the base port, where the Army again becomes responsible.

(2) Attached medical troops will accompany combat units, taking with them the necessary supplies to meet initial requirements. Such mobile medical installations as are established at the beachhead do not carry out definitive treatment. This will be carried out on shore after fixed hospital units have been landed and established. As soon as sufficient terrain has been secured to afford protection, additional medical facilities, such as collecting stations, ambulances, hospital stations, and evacuation hospitals, in the order named, will be landed. Until a systematic service is provided, such evacuation as is practicable will be handled by the beachmaster from shore to ship in such manner as will not interfere with landing of essential troops and supplies. Systematic evacuation of all cases to hospital ships or transports will be established as early as practicable. A plan of evacuation will be prepared prior to debarkation of the expeditionary forces.

g. Marking routes inland.—It is highly important that all Army units thoroughly understand and have identified routes inland. Each unit will mark promptly and plainly its routes inland, together with location of message and information centers. This marking will be displayed so as to be visible from seaward only.

102. *Subsidiary landings.*

a. In addition to the main landing, certain subsidiary landings may be advantageous, namely, those pertaining to demonstrations or feints, and those which may be termed secondary landings.

b. Demonstrations or feints have as their missions the diversion of enemy reserves from the area of the main effort, or the retarding of the movement of enemy reserves thereto. To be effective they must be directed against objectives of importance to the enemy. They also should be so coordinated as to time and directed

against points at such a distance from the area of the main landing that they will insure, to a reasonable degree, the containing of the forces [109] stationed at or drawn to such points, and prevent them from participating in the opposition to the main landing. Unless they are conducted on the scale of a landing in force, so as to be convincing to the enemy, they probably will fail of their purpose.

c. *Secondary landings* are operations which only indirectly support the main landing; they may be for the purpose of seizing and holding areas, such as sites for air bases, which are desirable for operations in connection with the main landing.

d. It must be borne in mind that in some situations the further developments of the operations may result in that which was initially planned as a subsidiary landing becoming a main landing and, therefore, plans should provide for the necessary flexibility to meet such a contingency. In any event, sufficient force must be employed to accomplish the object sought; failure of such an operation wastes strength and has an adverse effect on morale.

Section VII

Withdrawal and Reembarkation

103. *Plans for withdrawal.*

a. Withdrawal of troops engaged in landing operations, with consequent evacuation of positions on shore which have been occupied, may be required by strategical considerations or may be necessary by reason of unsuccessful tactical operations.

b. The withdrawal and reembarkation of the forces in close contact with an enemy in relatively greater strength is an exceedingly difficult and hazardous operation.

c. Decision to withdraw having been approved by the authority having responsibility for the expedition as a whole, the necessary plans in as great detail as possible are drawn up by the commander of the Army forces in consultation with the commander of the Navy forces.

d. The means available to the Navy for clearing the reembarkation points will determine the stages of the withdrawal. The direction of withdrawal is closely limited by the location of the embarkation points, and such withdrawal involves the passing of troops, material, and supplies through the embarkation points, which are defiles of the most constricted nature.

[110] e. When the situation permits an orderly withdrawal, the plan will usually provide for evacuation in the following sequence: Animals, supplies, artillery matériel, troops. However, when in close contact with a superior enemy, it may be necessary to establish the following priorities for evacuation: Troops, artillery, supplies, animals, in which case provision will be made for the destruction of such artillery, equipment, supplies, and animals as cannot be evacuated.

104. *Secrecy.*—The importance of secrecy in the final stages, at least of the withdrawal, cannot be overemphasized. An attack delivered on the covering force at its last adequate covering position by the enemy during the withdrawal of the main body, would probably produce consequences of the most serious nature. For this reason, this stage of the withdrawal should be conducted under the cover of darkness or a smoke screen, and every possible precaution must be taken to conceal the movements of the forces and other activities indicative of a withdrawal. When the force had been in contact with the enemy for an appreciable time, and conditions are more or less stabilized, evidence of any change in conditions will be avoided with scrupulous care. Ruses to convey to the enemy impressions of such normal conditions are desirable, but such ruses must be carefully planned and executed in order not to arouse the curiosity or suspicions of the hostile force.

105. *Air superiority.*—As long as the enemy is able to maintain air reconnaissance, concealment of the operations involved in withdrawal is difficult, and therefore necessitates a maximum use of darkness, smoke screens, and camouflage. For this reason it is desirable that at least a temporary local air superiority be obtained prior to the last stages of the withdrawal. Plans to obtain such superiority include coordinated effort by both the Army and Navy air forces. Every effort will be made to retain such temporary air control until the forces have been reembarked.

106. *Weather conditions.*—Favorable weather conditions, at least during the last stages of the withdrawal and reembarkation, are requisite to the success

of the operations. The Navy will, through its aerological service, furnish the Army with weather predictions. The utmost effort must be made by the Navy to take advantage of favorable weather conditions during the reembarkation.

[111] 107. *Naval support.*

a. The operations of the Navy forces during a withdrawal of the Army forces from the shore are similar to those during a landing operation, the phases occurring in reverse order.

b. In addition to providing the sea transportation and the small boats to reembark the Army forces, including crews to man the boats, the Navy will be prepared to furnish gunfire and air support during the withdrawal. The Navy will, as in the case of the initial stages of the landing operation, provide for signal communications between ship and shore until the last unit is evacuated.

Section VIII
Communications

108. *Plans.*

a. In accordance with paragraph 54a (8), the commander in chief, or the commander of the service in which paramount interest is initially vested, is required to provide joint plans for communication between forces. While the particular situation and the designated directive will greatly influence the preparation of specific instructions, the following general directive should apply to all such plans, in order that advance preparations, including training, may be accomplished and any obstacles to the successful culmination of the plans may be avoided.

b. The joint communication plan and the communication plans of subordinate commanders of both the Army and the Navy shall cover the following phases:

- (1) Movement overseas.
- (2) Landing.
- (3) Operations subsequent to landing.

c. All communication plans shall include.

- (1) Frequency plans.
- (2) Provisions for communication security.
- (3) Provisions for radio intelligence.
- (4) Designation of procedure to be followed.

(5) Requirement that portable radio sets and other communication material be tested prior to embarkation.

[112] 109. *Communications between ship and shore.*—Efficient signal communications between ship and shore are of primary importance. It is the duty of the Navy to establish and maintain, through the beachmaster, necessary signal communications facilities for both Navy and Army requirements. The Army communication net ashore will be connected up with the Navy's communication center at the beachmaster's headquarters. The Army prolongs its axis of signal communications inland as the attack progresses. In this connection see paragraph 94 c.

110. *General.*—In drawing up communication plans reference should be made to paragraphs 63 b; 77 o; 82 a; 93 a; 94 c; 98 c; 101 a, b, c, d, and g; 104; 107 b; 108; and 109.

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CHAPTER VII

REGULATIONS, MANEUVER RULES, AND UMPIRE INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOINT ARMY AND NAVY EXERCISES

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Section I

Introduction

111. *Object of joint exercises.*—The object of joint exercises is to train Army and Navy forces in joint operations and to test existing joint war plans, Army and Navy war plans predicated thereon, the sufficiency of means provided for the defense of various localities, and the adequacy of plans for their employment, under conditions as closely approximating those of war as possible.

112. *Classes of joint exercises.*

a. Joint Army and Navy exercises are divided into two classes—

(1) Grand joint exercises, and

(2) Minor joint exercises.

b. *Grand joint exercises* are joint exercises that involve the United States Fleet as a whole or one or more of its major subdivisions and equivalent Army forces, and which require Joint Board coordination.

c. *Minor joint exercises* are joint exercises other than grand joint exercises.

Section II

Regulations

113. *Instructions for joint exercises.*

a. *Prior to the commencement of a grand joint exercise.*

(1) The Joint Board shall formulate such general instructions as are necessary to assure adequate and properly co- [116] ordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the grand joint exercise. Any question arising in connection with the foregoing instructions that requires interpretation, amplification, or modification shall be referred to The Joint Board for decision. Copies of these instructions sufficient in number for all Army and Navy forces and agencies concerned shall be furnished by The Joint Board to the War and Navy Departments for distribution. A separate copy for transmittal to the Governor of the Panama Canal shall be furnished by The Joint Board to the Secretary of War in the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone.

(2) The War and Navy Department shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces under their respective jurisdictions, to the end that the grand joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions formulated by The Joint Board. Copies of detailed instructions issued by one Department that are of interest to the other Department shall be furnished to the Department thus affected for its information. In the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Navy Department shall furnish the Secretary of War for transmittal to the Governor of the Panama Canal so much of the instructions issued by the Navy Department as are of interest to the authorities of the Panama Canal.

(3) In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Secretary of War will issue such instructions to the Governor of the Panama Canal as he may deem necessary.

b. *Prior to the commencement of minor joint exercise.*

(1) The Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold a minor joint exercise shall jointly formulate such general instructions as are necessary to

assure adequate and properly coordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the exercise, and shall issue them to those concerned in their respective commands.

(2) The Army and Navy commanders referred to in the preceding paragraph shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces concerned in their respective [117] commands, to the end that the minor joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions jointly formulated by them. Copies of detailed instructions issued by either commander that are of interest to the other commander shall be furnished to the commander thus affected for his information.

c. Subsequent to the commencement of any joint exercise.—Subsequent to the commencement of any joint exercise and until its termination all instructions in connection with the conduct of the exercise, including definite directions as to commencement and termination of a temporary general or local suspension of the exercise, shall be prepared and issued by The Joint Board or by the chief umpires in case of a grand joint exercise, and by the commanders concerned in case of a minor joint exercise.

d. Instructions to include commencement and termination of joint exercise.—The instructions issued in preparation for a joint exercise shall include the following:

(1) The date and hour when the exercise is to commence.

(2) The date and hour when the exercise is to terminate, or merely the approximate date when it is to terminate, when determination of the actual date and hour of its termination is to be left to the discretion of the chief umpires, in which case this fact will be stated.

(3) A description of the signal or an indication of the method by which the chief umpires will terminate the exercise in case its termination is left to their discretion.

114. *Designation of forces engaged.*

a. The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall habitually be divided into—

(1) *Blue forces*, representing those of the United States, and

(2) *Black forces*, representing those of the enemy.

b. The Army and Navy forces that are to participate as Blue and Black forces in a joint exercise shall be indicated either in the problem or in the instructions issued in connection therewith—

(1) In general terms, in case of a grand joint exercise, by The Joint Board.

[118] (2) In case of a minor joint exercise, by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such an exercise.

c. The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall, insofar as practicable, be actual forces. Constructive armament and means shall not be used, except that field works, shelter, obstacles, and other structures that could not be built except at considerable expense and labor may be used constructively but must in every case be outlined clearly and indicated by markers or other contrivances, and material therefor must be actually available.

115. *Problems for joint exercises.*

a. The problem for a joint exercise shall habitually consist of the following:

(1) The *general situation*, which shall embody information assumed to be known to both sides.

(2) The *special situation—Blue*, which shall embody full information in regard to the Blue forces and such information of the Black forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

(3) The *special situation—Black*, which shall embody full information in regard to the Black forces and such information of the Blue forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

b. The problem for a grand joint exercise shall habitually be prepared by The Joint Board, which shall furnish a sufficient number of copies thereof to the War and Navy Departments for issue by them, respectively, to the Army and Navy forces concerned. In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone The Joint Board shall furnish a separate copy of the problem to the Secretary of War for transmission to the Governor of the Panama Canal.

c. In case grand joint exercises are to be held in the Hawaiian Islands or in the Philippine Islands, The Joint Board will prepare a letter for transmittal by the War Department through official channels to the respective governors, containing such information as may be necessary to inform them of the operations contemplated.

[119] *d.* The problem for a minor joint exercise shall be prepared jointly by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such exercise and shall be promulgated by them to those concerned in their respective commands.

116. Conduct of joint exercises.

a. The conduct of a joint exercise shall habitually be supervised by—

- (1) The chief umpires.
- (2) A senior umpire—Blue.
- (3) A senior umpire—Black, and
- (4) Such umpires and assistant umpires as may be necessary.

b. For a grand joint exercise, 1 Army and 1 Navy member of The Joint Board or 1 Army and 1 Navy officer of high rank, recommended by The Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act jointly as the chief umpires, and 1 or more Army or Navy officers, preferably members of the joint planning committee, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to the chief umpires.

c. For a grand joint exercise, 1 Army or Navy Officer, preferably a member of the joint planning committee, recommended by The Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act as senior umpire—Blue, and 1 as senior umpire—Black, and 1 or more Army or Navy Officers, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to each senior umpire. Such number of other Army and Navy officers as The Joint Board may recommend shall be detailed by the War and Navy Departments, or by their authority, to act as umpires for major subdivisions and as assistant umpires for important elements of such subdivisions, it being understood that if this number does not suffice additional umpires and assistant umpires shall be designated by the Army or Navy commander concerned upon call by the senior umpire concerned.

d. For a minor joint exercise the chief umpires, the senior umpire—Blue, the senior umpire—Black, such assistants to the foregoing as may be necessary, and such umpires and assistant umpires as may be required shall be designated by mutual agreement between the Army and Navy commanders who desire to hold such an exercise.

e. The offices of the chief umpires shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the senior umpires, and the office of each [120] of the latter shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the Blue or Black umpires and the Blue or Black forces, as the case may be, and with the chief umpires.

f. Unless specifically directed otherwise in the problem or instructions issued in connection therewith, the commander of the Army forces and the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise shall each furnish the chief umpires, prior to the commencement of the exercise, with a copy, in triplicate, of his estimate of the situation, plans, or synopsis thereof and initial orders. The chief umpires shall retain 1 copy of each document and shall furnish 1 copy to the senior umpire—Blue, and 1 to the senior umpire—Black.

g. After a joint exercise begins any new estimates made and all orders issued shall be immediately communicated by the commanders indicated in subparagraph *f* above to the senior umpire—Blue or Black, as the case may be, through the umpire assigned to their staffs, or directly in case there is no umpire so assigned.

h. Commanders other than those referred to in subparagraphs *f* and *g* above shall similarly communicate their initial estimates and orders and all subsequent estimates and orders to the umpire or assistant umpire assigned to their staffs.

i. All reports and messages that would in an actual case be dispatched by commanders to the Blue War and Navy Departments, the Black War and Navy Departments, or to other forces that are not represented in the exercise, shall be sent to the senior umpire—Blue or Black, as the case may be, for transmission to the chief umpires, who will represent those agencies or forces.

j. All action taken by commanders and all events occurring within the realm of a command shall be promptly communicated by the assistant umpire, or umpire concerned, to his umpire or senior umpire, as the case may be, of the side (Blue or Black) to which he is assigned.

117. Communication between umpires.

a. So far as practicable, separate telegraph, telephone, visual signal, radio, or other communications shall be provided for the use of the umpires.

[121] *b.* All messages passing between umpires shall be preceded by the word "umpire" in plain language. Such messages are to be given to the senior umpire at the station addressed, or to the nearest umpire. The information contained in such messages shall not be given to persons other than umpires.

Neither side shall attempt to decode or decipher messages preceded by this prefix, nor shall radiocompass bearings be taken on any station transmitting an umpire's message. No attempt shall be made to jam the radio-frequency assigned for the transmission of umpires' messages. All stations are prohibited from shifting to the umpire's frequency for the purpose of avoiding radio interference on their own assigned frequencies.

118. *Critique*.—At the conclusion of the exercise the commanders and staffs of all units participating, or at least those of the major units, shall be assembled for a discussion of the exercise as a whole. This discussion shall be held under the direction of the chief umpires and shall consist essentially of a brief résumé of the situation and progress of the exercise and of a critique thereof, and shall conclude with a statement of the lessons to be learned from the exercise.

119. *Reports*.—As soon as practicable after the termination of a joint exercise, the following reports thereon, embodying pertinent conclusions and recommendations, shall be rendered:

a. In case of a grand joint exercise—

(1) By the chief umpires, to the War and Navy Departments.

(2) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. In case of a minor joint exercise—

(1) By the chief umpires, to the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held.

(2) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the Army and Navy commanders, respectively, by whose authority the exercise was held.

(3) By the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

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Section III

Maneuver Rules

120. *Distinguishing marks.*

a. Blue forces shall have no special distinguishing marks other than those authorized to be worn and displayed by United States land and sea forces.

b. Black forces shall be distinguished as follows:

(1) *Ships* shall fly the international K flag (a square flag divided vertically into two equal parts, the half nearest the mast being yellow and the other half blue) at the port yardarm.

(2) *Launches and boats* shall fly the same flag (international K) at the stern.

(3) *Planes* shall have the following white stripes, each 12 inches wide, painted on them with water paint as indicated below:

Two vertical stripes, 12 inches apart, on each side of the fuselage, about 3 feet in rear of the rear edge of the wings, and extending from top to bottom of the fuselage.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the upper surface of the upper wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the under surface of the lower wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

(4) *Personnel*.—Each officer and enlisted man shall wear a white band at least 1½ inches wide around his headdress.

c. Umpires shall wear a red band 4 inches in width on the left arm above the elbow.

d. Such changes as the chief umpires deem desirable may be made in the distinguishing marks of the Blue and Black forces.

121. *Simulation of fire.*

a. The fire of small arms and light field artillery and of boat guns shall be simulated with blank cartridges. Shore batteries, where [123] practicable, will simulate fire by the use of blank ammunition fired from field guns located near batteries.

b. The fire of all ships shall be simulated during daylight by turning a searchlight upon the target or targets, if visible, during such times as the target is being fired upon. Care must be taken that searchlights are not thus used when the force in question is unable to deliver an effective fire against the target so

indicated. In addition to the use of searchlights, ships may use excaliber or subcaliber rifles and one-pounder blanks when simulating fire.

c. Such additional rules as in their judgment are necessary shall be prescribed by the chief umpires.

Section IV

Umpire Instructions

122. General duties of umpires.

a. Senior umpires shall constantly keep the chief umpires informed of all that occurs on their side in order that an accurate picture may be had by the chief umpires of the progress of the exercise, this being essential to the making of intelligent decisions.

b. The chief umpires shall similarly keep each senior umpire informed of the situation on the opposing side, and each senior umpire shall similarly keep his umpires and assistant umpires informed of the progress of the exercise. A senior umpire, umpire, or assistant umpire, as the case may be, shall similarly give a commander or commanders concerned such information of the situation, of the effect produced by any action taken by them, and of the action of the enemy as those commanders would possess or be able to obtain in an actual case. Information that commanders should and would in an actual case obtain only through the medium of an agency represented in the exercise shall in no circumstances be furnished by an umpire to any commander.

c. To illustrate: The commander, Black Fleet, decides to bombard the land defenses in the locality where the exercise is being held and informs the senior umpire, Black, of his decision and of the character of fire to be delivered and the time and period of delivery. The senior umpire, Black, communicates this information promptly to the chief umpires, who in turn inform the senior umpire, Blue, who com- [124] municates it to his umpires, in particular to the umpire assigned to the defenses in question. The reaction of the commander of those defenses is then reported by the umpire of those defenses to the senior umpire—Blue, who communicates it to the chief umpires. The latter then makes a decision in the premises and communicates it to both senior umpires, who in turn communicate it to the umpires concerned and to the interested commanders.

d. The chief umpires shall prepare and promulgate adequate safety precautions for the use of the forces participating in the exercise.

123. Umpires' decisions.

a. All umpires' decisions shall be made by the chief umpires directly, or by the chief umpires' authority, by either senior umpire or by an umpire or assistant umpire, such decisions being promptly communicated to those concerned. Local decisions that may have to be made by a senior umpire must be immediately communicated to the chief umpires; if made by an umpire or assistant umpire, they must be immediately communicated to the senior umpire concerned and by him to the chief umpires. Wherever it is feasible, as, for example, in the case of an attack made by a landing party against land troops or positions, the umpires or assistant umpires on opposite sides on the spot should, if practicable, confer on the situation before making a decision.

b. When it is contemplated holding a grand joint exercise, such additional umpire instructions and maneuver rules as may be necessary and as are not already prescribed herein shall be prepared by The Joint Board. In case such additional rules are prepared, The Joint Board shall furnish a sufficient number of copies thereof to the War and Navy Departments for issue by them, respectively, to the Army and Navy forces concerned.

c. In general, the instructions listed below will be used in joint exercises and by The Joint Board as the basis for the preparation of any additional instructions which may be necessary:

(1) Fleet Umpire Instructions or such other instructions and regulations as may be in use by the United States Fleet to determine damage to ships from naval gunfire, torpedoes, mines, or air attack.

[125] (2) Current rules in use by the Coast Artillery Corps to determine damage to ships from seacoast artillery.

(3) Current rules in use by the Coast Artillery Corps in case airplanes fly over land-based antiaircraft guns and the current rules in use by the United States Fleet in case airplanes fly over ship-based antiaircraft guns to determine damage to airplanes from antiaircraft gunfire.

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(4) Current rules in use by the Army Air Corps, or those in use by the United States Fleet, or special rules, will be used to determine damage to airplanes from attack by other airplanes, but in any case the same set of rules will be applied to the aviation of both services.

(5) War Department Manual for Umpires of Field Maneuvers and other current War Department documents to determine damage to troops from small-arms fire, artillery fire, aviation attack, and naval gunfire and damage to fortifications and Army installations generally.

d. In the revision of current rules in use by both services and in the preparation of any additional rules that may be necessary, consideration will be given to the maneuver rules and umpire instructions used in preceding grand joint exercises and to the pertinent comments received thereon from the senior Army and Navy commanders and umpires, to the end that damage results from attacks of various kinds will simulate actual war conditions as nearly as possible and that the capabilities and limitations of offensive and defensive instrumentalities and measures may be truly represented.

e. The chief umpires shall have full latitude in changing umpire instructions and maneuver rules, or in prescribing additional ones.

124. *Journal of events.*—The chief umpires shall keep a complete journal of events covering all occurrences of the joint exercise. Each senior umpire and each umpire and assistant umpire shall keep a similar journal of all events coming under his cognizance. The journals kept by umpires and assistant umpires shall be turned in to their senior umpire, and by him with his journal of events to the chief umpires, at the conclusion of the exercise.

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CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 24, 1921, as amended by G. O. No. 162, 1927. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. [130] tions. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the joint planning committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 24, 1921. The committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 2, 1927, as amended by G. O. No. 5, 1932, and Navy Department G. O. No. 227, 1932. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the [131] Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Chief of Planning Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the joint planning committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The purpose of the board is to prevent duplication of effort and to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development and employment of the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation. It is also charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when, in its judgment, it is necessary, and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation. The board investigates, studies, and renders reports to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy upon all questions affecting jointly the development and employment of aviation of both services referred to it by the Secretary of War, by the Secretary of the Navy, by The Joint Board, by the Chief of the Army Air Corps, or by the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint policies or joint plans for the tactical or strategical employment of aircraft or for the location of air stations are addressed to The Joint Board for consideration and recommendation to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The board also is required to formulate and submit to

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The Joint Board for approval suitable joint Army and Navy aircraft problems to be carried out each year.

132. In the execution of the foregoing the board is governed by the following: The development of new types of aircraft and accessories is, so far as practicable, assigned to the Army or Navy and is carried on only by the service to which assigned. Either service may employ any types of aircraft or weapons after their development. The board prepares plans to prevent competition in the procurement of material, when the chiefs of the two services have been unable to come to an agreement concerning procurement. Joint plans for the procurement of material in time of war will be submitted to the [132] Army and Navy Munitions Board. The board is specifically charged with the consideration and recommendation of all projects for experimental stations on shore, for coastal air stations, and for stations to be used jointly by the Army and Navy, or for extensive additions thereto, and with consideration of and recommendation in regard to all estimates of appropriations for the aeronautical programs of the Army and Navy before such estimates are submitted to Congress.

Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of The Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national [133] defense are required to be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

Section V

Joint Merchant Vessel Board

136. The Joint Army and Navy Board of Survey of Merchant Vessels was established August 21, 1916, as the result of an agreement entered into by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy approved the final form of the agreement on August 2, 1916, and the Secretary of War on August 19, 1916. In order to simplify the name of the board it was changed to "The Joint Merchant Vessel Board." This change in name was approved by the Secretary of War April 30, 1917, and by the Secretary of the Navy May 5, 1917. The board consists of one Army officer and three Navy officers as members, with one of the latter acting as recorder.

137. The board inspects and classifies merchant vessels with a view to their possible use in war. The board is assisted by local sections consisting of Army and Navy officers who conduct the actual inspection.

Section VI

Local Joint Planning Committees

138. The authority for agencies for cooperation between Army and Navy activities within departments, armies, and corps areas of the Army and naval

districts is War Department G. O. No. 19, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 103, 1923. Commanding generals of departments, armies, and/or corps areas, and commandants of naval districts whose headquarters are in the same vicinity, appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a permanent local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters for a given department, army, corps area, or district are widely separated, more than one planning committee may be organized. In addition, the commanding general and the commandant of the naval district [134] designate one or more officers on their staffs through whom close contact with other services is maintained.

139. The local joint planning committee takes cognizance of questions referred to it by proper authority and originates questions on such local subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. Its reports and recommendations are made jointly to the commanding general and commandant of the naval district concerned.

Section VII

Joint Economy Board

140. The authority for the Joint Economy Board is contained in War Department, G. O. No. 11, 1933, and Navy Department G. O. No. 237, 1933. The board is charged with the continuing responsibility of investigating and reporting to The Joint Board on economies which can be effected, from time to time, without loss of efficiency, by the elimination of overlap or the simplification of functioning in those activities of the War and Navy Departments concerned with joint operations of the two services or which have approximately parallel functions.

141. The membership of the Joint Economy Board will comprise five or more officers from each service and will include the following:

a. For the Army.—The Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch and four other officers of the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department.

b. For the Navy.—The Assistant Budget Officer, Navy Department; the Director, Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Director, Material Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Assistant Director, Navy Yard Division, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and an officer from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (not below the rank of commander).

142. The Secretary of The Joint Board will be the Secretary of the Joint Economy Board.

143. Reports and recommendations of the Joint Economy Board will be presented to The Joint Board for action.

[135] 144. Each chief of arm, service, or bureau will designate a liaison officer whose name shall be furnished to the Joint Economy Board and who will maintain contact between his office and the corresponding activity of the other service and with the board. Liaison officers will bring to the attention of the Joint Economy Board any matter which their respective chiefs shall deem to come within the purview of the Board. Each liaison officer will furnish such aid to the Board in securing information and data from his particular arm, service, or bureau as the board shall request. The Joint Economy Board will have authority over the liaison officers insofar as their duties pertain to the work of the Board.

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CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section A

Policy for Coordination of Radio Activities of the Army and Navy

1. Joint Board reports, J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 183), of January 16, 1923. "Utilization of the radio services of the War and Navy Departments for the transmission of Government dispatches," and J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 253), "Proposed draft of Executive Orders re regulation of radio in the event of war or national

¹ NOTE.—Ch. IX—Communications—is a reprint of ch. VI—Communications, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1927, and is effective until completion of revision now in progress. Paragraph numbering of old ch. VI is retained pending revision.

emergency," are rescinded. The following policy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is published for information and guidance:

I. Purpose of Radio Policy.

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and Navy in the development of radio material, the establishment of radio stations, and in the conduct of radio activities.

II. Basic Policy.

3. The Army and Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations as, augmented by private and [138] other Government-owned radio facilities, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of a militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated radio system adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation on expenditure imposed by economy.

III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time paramount interest in certain areas or theaters of operation will be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service having paramount interest.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

(a) To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

(b) To the Army in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Army wherever operating.

[139] (c) To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea, exclusive of Army vessels, except such of the latter as may have been placed under Navy control in case of war or national emergency.

(4) For the establishment and operation of radio-compass stations along the coasts of the United States, Alaska, overseas possessions, or occupied foreign territory.

(d) To the Navy in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Navy wherever operating.

V. War-time Jurisdiction over Nonmilitary Radio.

6. In time of national emergency, when directed by the President according to law, the Army and the Navy will assume jurisdiction as follows:

(a) The Army and Navy shall each assume complete control over such nonmilitary radio stations as may be allocated to them by the President to augment their peace-time facilities.

(b) For purposes of censorship and supervision over such nonmilitary radio stations as are permitted to operate:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to the Navy in the following paragraph:

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

[140] (c) For the purpose of suppression of unauthorized radio:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama, and in insular possessions or foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions or foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

VI. Principles to be Observed in Radio Coordination.

7. Coordination in radio operation will be effected:

(a) In the development of types of radio equipment suitable for intercommunication.

(b) By the assignment of call letters, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption of a common procedure, and the formulation of codes and ciphers for joint Army and Navy communication.

(c) All air radio stations of the Navy and air radio stations of the Army along the coast and in the insular and outlying possessions shall be equipped to send and receive on a common intermediate frequency and a common high frequency, and all aircraft carrying radio, except fighting and pursuit planes, shall as soon as practicable, consistent with proper economy, be equipped to send and receive on one of these common frequencies.

(d) The radio field sets provided for the use of the Marine Corps on shore shall be capable of intercommunication with the radio provided for the operation of similarly equipped units of the Army.

(e) The radio communication equipment provided for the vessels of the Army Transport Service shall be of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class and shall be capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication.

VII. Coordination with Radio Stations of Other Departments and Civilian Stations During Peace.

8. Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the radio act of 1927 (secs. 6, 8, and 25).

[141] VIII. Coordination of Development Programs.

9. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peace-time radio operation and operational development of the two services. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendation for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy and will coordinate technical radio matters of joint concern to the two services.

Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 24, 1927.

Section B

Joint Army and Navy Radiotelegraph Procedure

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I. General.

1. Details for intercommunication by radio between the Army and the Navy shall be made by the senior officers of the two services in the area concerned.

2. Address and signature.

(a) Address and signature codes will not be used between the Army and the Navy.

(b) Messages intended for an addressee on board ship or in a unit of command will be routed by call letters of the station concerned. Delivery to proper officer or office is a function of the command addressed. When believed necessary to secure proper delivery, more complete address may be included in the body of the message.

(c) All official messages will be authenticated in the name of the commanding officer. This signature is not ordinarily transmitted.

[142] 3. Use of clear and secret language.

(a) In time of peace, messages are transmitted in clear or in secret language as directed by the writer.

(b) (1) In time of emergency, all messages, except as noted below, are transmitted in secret language.

(2) When the tactical situation is such that time cannot be spared for cryptographing, and when the information to be transmitted if intercepted by the enemy could not be acted upon in time to influence the situation in question, a commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language by a radio station serving his headquarters.

II. Call Up.

4. (a) The call up shall consist of the call sign(s) of the receiving station(s) transmitted not more than three times, the letter "V" and the call sign of the calling station transmitted not more than three times. This may be followed by certain signals to indicate the purpose of the call up.

(b) The call up may be:

(1) Single-station, as NA V BA K.

(2) Collective, as DAB DAB DAB V BA BA BA K. DAB in this example might be the "net call," in which case all nonsilent stations in the net would answer; or it might be a "group call," in which case all nonsilent stations in a particular preassigned group would answer.

(3) Multiple, as NA NA NB NB V BA K, in which case NA and NB both answer.

(4) *General.*—The general call for Navy and Marine Corps stations shall be USN, and for Army stations USA. The general call shall be used to establish communication in case the call letters of the station with which communication is desired are not known. Example: USN USN USN V BA K.

5. In order to avoid undue interference with other communications, the following rules will be observed in calling:

(a) The call signs of the receiving and transmitting stations are made once only except when great distance or poor transmitting conditions make repetition desirable.

[143] (b) If the receiving station fails to answer, the first call up may be repeated once.

(c) If the second call up is not answered, the transmitting station will wait at least two minutes before repeating the call.

(d) If the receiving station still fails to answer after this further call up, it may be called at intervals, but not more frequently than once in five minutes, except for the transmission of an urgent or priority message, in which case no restriction is placed upon the repetition of the call up.

(e) When two stations are known to be within easy radio range of one another, it is unnecessary first to call up such station before sending the message.

6. If the calling station has an urgent or a priority message for the called station it shall indicate that fact by adding the signal O or P to the call up. Example: NA V BA O K.

III. Answering the Call Up.

7. (a) The station called shall reply by transmitting not more than three times the call sign of the calling station, the letter V, its own call sign, and, if it is ready to receive traffic, the letter K.

(b) A net, group, or general call up requiring an answer is answered by the called stations in the alphabetical order of their call signs; a multiple call up requiring an answer is answered in the order in which the stations were called. If a called station fails to answer in its turn, the next station in the order of

answering, after waiting 15 seconds, will answer and the delinquent station will not answer until all other stations have finished.

8. If the station is busy or is otherwise unable to take the message, it shall replace the letter K in the reply formula by the signal AS followed if desirable by a number indicating in minutes the probable duration of the wait.

9. (a) If the calling station has indicated that it has an urgent message for the called station, the latter will answer as indicated in (b) below even if by so doing it must interrupt traffic of lower priority.

(b) Example of answering the call up: BA V NA K.

[144] IV. Normal Form of Message.

10. The normal form of message for transmission between Army and Navy stations shall be as follows:

Part	Example	When used	Para. graph
Call.....	NA V BA.....	Always.....	11
Number.....	NR 3.....	Usually.....	12
Operating instructions.....		Special cases only.....	13
Class.....		Urgent or priority messages only.....	14
Check.....	GR 7.....	Usually.....	15
Break.....	BT.....	Always.....	16
Text.....	The message in secret or clear language.....	do.....	17
Time of origin.....	0923.....	Usually.....	18
Ending signal.....	AR (followed by K, B, VA, etc.).....	Always.....	19

11. *Call*.—The call consists of the call sign(s) of the station(s) called (in alphabetical order), followed by "V" and the call sign of the station calling, each call sign being made once.

12. *Number*.—(a) The message number is a serial number of a separate series, beginning at midnight, for transmission to each station worked and another separate series for reception from each station worked. Thus, since midnight on a certain day BA has transmitted three messages to NA and has received five messages from him. His next message to NA is NR 4 and his next message from NA is NR 6.

(b) The message serial number is a material aid in the handling of traffic. Its primary purpose is to prevent the omission of messages; it is also useful in identifying messages for repetitions, omissions, etc.

(c) The message number may be omitted at the discretion of the transmitting office, which, however, assumes responsibility for any error which may occur thereby. The message number is usually unnecessary in fire control and aircraft work, and in messages consisting of procedure signals. It may also be omitted in the case described in paragraph 3 (b) (2) above.

13. *Operating instructions*.—Operating instructions are special instructions for operating and for relaying the message when relay is necessary. (See F, par. 27; G, par. 28; T, par. 38.)

14. *Class*.—(a) Messages are classified to show the relative order in which they shall be transmitted. This order is as follows:

	CLASS	Symbol
Urgent		O
Priority		P
Routine		None

(b) The *urgent* classification is reserved for messages requiring the greatest speed of handling. Urgent messages will be sent immediately upon receipt, except when communication involving another urgent message is being carried on. The urgent classification is used only in combat or when combat is imminent, real or simulated, to indicate that the message following conveys most urgent orders, information or request pertaining to the combat.

(c) The *priority* classification is used for messages of less urgency than those entitled to urgent classification but of such nature as to warrant precedence over routine messages. Priority messages will be transmitted before such routine messages as may be waiting to be sent but communication of a message will usually not be interrupted to send a priority message.

(d) The *routine* classification is used for messages which require no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic in the shortest time. No signal to indicate routine classification is transmitted.

(e) In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, messages of the same class, whether they originate in Army or Navy, will be handled in order of filing or of receipt for retransmission.

15. *Check*.—(a) In plain-language messages, each dictionary word of the text is counted. The writer's message number is counted as one word; the time or origin or any continuous group of letters, numerals, or of letters and numerals is counted as one word.

(b) In code or cipher messages each group of the text, whether numeral, letter, or mixed numerals and letters, is counted, including, [146] when sent, the writer's message number, the code or cipher indicator, and the time of origin.

(c) When a message is to be transferred to or from a communication system which uses a method of word count other than that prescribed in (a) and (b) above, the military or naval office which handles the transfer is responsible that the text of the message is correctly transferred. The check in the other system will be made by the office of that system which first receives the message.

(d) The purpose of transmitting the check of a message is to prevent the omission of any word or part of the message.

(e) The check may be omitted under the same circumstances as the message serial number. (See par. 12 (c).)

16. *Break*.—The break sign BT will be used to separate the heading from the text of the message.

17. *Text*.—(a) The text of the message will be transmitted as written in secret or clear language (without space signs separating the words).

(b) The writer's message number, if given, and the code or cipher indicator, if the message is in secret language, are transmitted in the order named as the first words of the text.

18. *Time of origin*.—(a) The time of origin is the time at which the message is signed by the writer, unless the writer fails to note the time on his message, in which case time of origin is the time at which the message is filed at the first message center or communication office through which it passes.

(b) Time of origin is transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour. Examples 0600 is 6 a. m.; 1943 is 7.43 p. m.

(c) The time of origin usually appears in official messages. It is not used, however, with messages consisting of—

- (1) Procedure signals.
- (2) Corrections to messages.
- (3) The executive signal.
- (4) Messages which are going to be followed by the executive signal.

[147] 19. *Ending signal*.—An ending signal will be used to terminate each transmission and will indicate the transmitting operator's desire with respect to the transmission which is to follow.

V. Procedure Signals.

20. The following procedure signals are prescribed for communication between the Army and Navy:

Sign	Meaning	Paragraph
AAA.....	Blank, representing missing or doubtful portions.....	24
AA.....	All after (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 31
AB.....	All before (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 34
AR.....	End of message.....	22
AS.....	Wait.....	8, 23
B.....	There is more to follow.....	24
BN.....	All between (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 34
BT.....	Break, separating heading and text.....	16
C.....	You are correct.....	25
E.....	Error.....	26
F.....	Do not answer.....	27
G.....	Repeat back.....	28
GR.....	Group(s).....	29
HM.....	Silence.....	30

Sign	Meaning	Para-graph
II	Space	31
IMI	Repeat; I will repeat; interrogatory	32
INT	Is this correct?	33
IX	Message following is a preparatory command; not to be carried out until the signal (command) of execution is received.	47
5-second dash	Signal (command) of execution	48
2-second dash	Salvo mark (battery fired, i. e., on the way)	49
J	Verify and repeat	34
K	Go ahead (i. e., answer—an ending signal)	35
N	Nothing (or not) received	36
NR	Number	12
O	Urgent	14
P	Priority	14
[148]		
R	Received or readability (according to context)	37, 52
S	Signal strength	51
T	Transmit to	38
T of O	Time or origin	39
TOR	Time of receipt	40
U	Radio guard (Navy); net control station (Army)	41
UO	Negative silence	30
V	From	4, 11, 38
VA	End of communication; finished (an ending signal)	42
W	Interference	43
WA	Word after (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification)	32, 34
X	Static interference	44

AAA

21. AAA is used in conjunction with "ZCL," the groups missed being indicated by AAA. Use is made of this signal when the receiving station is unable to get a repetition.

Example: BA has sent a message to NA for relay to NB but NA failed to receive two groups and was unable to obtain a repetition from BA. In order not to delay the message, NA sends it to NB as follows:

NB V NA NR7 NB V BA ZCL GR 11 BT
 NR2 DFC4 JOFX RABU AAA
 RUHG MILZ YSIP AAA XUBO
 1433 AR K.

AB

22. AR is used at the end of every message. It means: "This is the end of this particular message." It is used at the end of all other transmissions in normal radio procedure which do not conclude with one of the procedure signals "B," "C," or "R." The signal AR is followed by another message or by AS, K, or VA, which signals indicate the operator's desire with respect to the transmission which is to follow. AR may be written thus: +

[149]

AS

23. (a) AS is an ending signal meaning "wait." It may be used in answer to a call up (see paragraph 8); to stop transmission because part of the message has been missed or because there is interference or other reason requiring delay, or to notify the receiving station that the transmitting station is unable to continue.

(b) The station receiving this signal does not answer.

(c) Whenever a transmitting station has been asked to wait it resumes transmission at the signal "K."

B

24. (a) B is an ending signal meaning "There is more to follow."

(b) When transmitting a long message, it may be convenient to send it in

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portions. In order to insure that each portion has been received before proceeding with the next, the letter "B" is made at the end of each portion.

Example: NA V BA NR3 GR137 BT

First 50 groups in text II B 50 K

NA answers: BA V NA R 50 K

BA continues: NA V BA II Next portion of text.

(c) When a message is sent in portions, the "B" is followed immediately by figures indicating the number of groups thus far transmitted.

(d) Long radio messages in plain language (i. e. press dispatches, etc.) made by ship and shore stations when not broadcasting on schedule and not employing the break system will be sent in portions, each of which will not exceed six minutes' duration.

O

25. (a) C is an ending signal meaning "You are correct."

(b) It is used in connection with G, INT, and J to signify the correctness of the message or portion of a message which has been repeated back or the coding of which has been checked and correctly repeated.

Example: NA, having repeated back correctly a message from BA, which was prefixed with "G," BA transmits: NA V BA C.

[150]

EEEEEEEEE

26. E (ten times).—This signal is used to erase a word or group which has been incorrectly transmitted. Should a station while transmitting a message make a mistake in a word, group, or letter, it must immediately make the "erase" sign; then make the last word or group which was correctly transmitted, and continue the message. The repeat signal (IMI) is *not* to be made when a mistake is made in transmission. The "erase" signal will be used exclusively to correct these mistakes.

F

27. F.—(a) The letter "F" used in the heading signifies "Message following is *not* to be answered."

(b) When the letter "F" is used in the heading of messages, the groups of the message are invariably to be made through twice.

(c) When the letter "F" is used in the heading, stations are not to ask for repetitions or corrections of the message without the authority of the commanding officer in each case.

(d) The VA sign is *always* used to indicate the end of a message or series of messages sent by the "F" method.

Example: BA has a message for NA, but does not wish NA to answer.

BA makes:

NA NA V BA BA NR1 NR1 F F GR2 GR2 BT BT

VOBU VOBV 1235 VA VA

NA does not answer.

G

28. (a) The signal "G" used in the heading means "Repeat back." When repeating back or correcting repetitions, the text or groups concerned are made only once, notwithstanding that the original message may have been made twice.

Example: BA has a message VUBO ABYZ 1010 for NA and wishes the message to be repeated back.

NA V BA NR1 G GR3 BT VUBO ABYZ 1010 AR K

NA, having received the message correctly, transmits:

BA V NA NR1 G GR3 BT VUBO ABYZ 1010 AR K

BA answers: NA V BA C VA

NA does not answer.

[151] (b) When G occurs in the heading of a long message which is sent in sections, each section is acknowledged by the receiving station by R followed by the number of the last group or word received, as R 50, R 100, etc. When the last portion of the message has been received, the entire message is repeated back.

GR

29. GR.—The group signal followed by a number is used in the heading of a message to signify: "The text contains the number of words or groups indicated." (See par. 15 for check.)

HM and UO

30. When necessary a station may silence a whole net, certain stations in a net, or all stations on a certain frequency, by use of the silence signal HM. The silence signal is a command and must be obeyed. Its use is confined to those stations in authority such as airplanes and net control stations. It will not be used until other less drastic methods of obtaining order have been tried. *It will be annulled as soon as the emergency has ceased to exist.*

Example: (1) PL, an airplane, working in a net whose net call is DAB, wishes to silent the net. PL sends: DAB DAB V PL HM HM HM HM HM HM VA.

All stations in the net stop transmitting and remain silent. They will not transmit again except to send urgent traffic or to answer a call from the silencing station or the U station until the silence signal is annulled. To annul the silence signal PL sends:

DAB DAB V PL UO UO UO UO UO UO VA

NOTE.—A single station may be silenced, and the silence annulled by substituting the station's call sign for the net call of the examples above.

II

31. The space signal (the letters "II" made separately) is used for the separation of procedure signals or other parts of the transmission when it is feared that confusion of the signals might otherwise result. Space signals are not used to separate the words or groups of the text; they are sometimes useful in the heading of a message or in messages [152] consisting of procedure signals. A common use of the space signal is shown by the example under B, paragraph 24.

IMI

32. (a) When the reception of a part of a message is doubtful or completely missed, the receiving station may request repetition of the doubtful portion by the use of IMI followed by AA, AB, BN, WA, GR —, or GR — to GR —, and the doubtful or missing passage.

Example: BA has transmitted a plain-language message to NA containing the following sentence in the text: "Prepare to sail for Constantinople at ten a. m. Monday twentieth August." NA having entirely missed the word "Constantinople" transmits:

BA V NA IMI WA for K.

BA replies:

NA V BA WA for Constantinople K.

(b) Repetition of an entire message may be requested by the use of IMI followed by the number of the message as:

BA V NA IMI NR6 K.

INT

33. When the reception of a part of a message is doubtful, the receiving station may question his reception by the use of INT followed by the questioned word or passage.

Example: Same as that of 32 (a) above except that NA has received but is not quite satisfied with the accuracy of the word "Constantinople." He transmits: BA V NA INT for Constantinople K. BA replies: NA V BA CK.

J

34 When the cryptographing office finds difficulty in decryptographing a received message, verification of the cryptographing may be requested of the originator by the use of J followed by AA, AB, BN, WA, GR —, GR — to GR —, and the passage to be checked. (If the entire message is to be checked, J is simply followed by the number of the message.)

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[153] Example: NA has received the following message from BA:

NA V BA NR7 GR14 BT NR2 DFC4 YSIP NAWU LEGT ERUV LIOP
OHIO RAEQ LATU JOFX GISN TUVI 1150 AR.

The cryptographing office at NA finding it impossible to decode "OHIO," NA transmits:

BA V NA J NR7 GR8 K.

The cryptographing office at BA checks the encoding, finds "OHIO" erroneously written for "OHIG" and BA transmits:

NA V BA C NR7 GR8 OHIG II OHIG K.

K

35. K is an ending signal meaning "Go ahead"; "answer."

N

36. (a) When a station does not immediately answer a message which requires an answer or does not proceed with a message after "K" has been made in answer to a call up, the signal "N" may be used. Example: BA calls up NA:

NA V BA K.

NA replies:

BA V NA K.

But BA fails to proceed. NA transmits:

BA V NA N K.

(b) The signal "N" followed by a serial number means "Message NR—has not been received."

Example: BA V NA N NR16 K.

R

37. (a) The signal "R" used by itself means "last message" or "last transmission" received. Example: NA having received a transmission from BA answers BA V NA R. If NA has a message for BA, he follows the "R" by "B" or "ZAR." BA does not answer (unless he desires NA to wait) and NA proceeds to transmit his message.

(b) The signal "R" followed by NR and a serial number means "Message number — has been received." This form is preferable to [154] that of (a) above to receipt for a numbered message. Example: BA V NA R NR16 VA. (For use of R to indicate readability of signals see par. 52.)

T

38. The signal "T" is used in the heading and means "Transmit the following to -----"

Example: BA has a message for NB, and as he can not communicate directly with NB he sends it to NA for retransmission to NB. BA transmits thus:

NA V BA NR5 T NB V BA GR2 BT PLOP 0845 AR K

NA having receipted for the message calls NB and being given the "go ahead" signal transmits:

NB V NA NR10 NB V BA GR2 BT PLOP 0845 AR K

Note that T is omitted when the message is being transmitted to the station of the addressee. Note also that NR5 is BA's number to NA while NR10 is NA's number to NB, the number being reassigned in its own series by each relaying station.

T of O

39. "Time of Origin" is transmitted as a four-figure group, the last word of the message. (See par. 18.) The abbreviation "T of O" is not used in the original message but is employed in conjunction with the signals IMI and INT in connection with repetitions and corrections.

TOR

40. The "time of receipt" signal, the letters "TOR" made separately (— — — — . — .), is used in conjunction with a four-figure group similar in composition to the time of origin number, to denote the time at which the message is received. It is written TOR.

The time of receipt is entered in the proper space on the message blank, but is *not* transmitted except upon request. The time of receipt is entered when the message is received at a station, whether it is received by radio, land line, visual, messenger, telephone, or any other means.

A message received at station A by messenger at 1040 a. m. would immediately be noted by the proper person as being received at 1040, [155] and he would enter on the blank "1040." This message is transmitted by radio to station B at 1045. The operator at B enters on the blank "1045." If the operator at B then sends the same message to station C by land line at 1050, the land line operator at C enters "1050" in the proper place.

The time of receipt is never used in referring to messages in the same way as is done with serial numbers and the time of origin. The time of receipt is useful in tracing delays.

When transmitted by radio the "time of receipt" signal follows the time of origin. In cases where the radio procedure requires that messages be transmitted twice in succession, the time of receipt signal (when used) follows the last transmission only.

U

41. The signal "U" following a station's call letters indicates that that station is being announced as the net control station (Army) or radio guard (Navy).

VA

42. VA is an ending signal meaning "end of communication"; "finished." When used, it indicates that the transmitting operator expects no answer, that he believes the series of transmissions completed.

W

43. (a) The signal "W" by itself signifies "Am being interfered with by other stations." A call signal following W denotes that the interference is being caused by the station indicated. Examples: NA is prevented from receiving a message from BA owing to interference from other ships or stations. NA transmits:

BA V NA IMI W K

Again NA is being interfered with by transmissions from NB. NA transmits:

BA V NA IMI W NB K

(b) Such steps as are possible are taken by the transmitting station to overcome the interference.

X

[156] 44. (a) The signal X signifies "Am being interfered with by static." It is used in a manner similar to that of W in the first example, paragraph 43.

(b) It rests with the transmitting station to take such steps as are possible to assist the receiving station (i. e., by changing power, note, or frequency; by sending in portions; or by using "G" in the heading).

VI. Control of Artillery Fire by Radio.

45. An abbreviated form of message is authorized for the exchange of communications controlling or directing the fire of artillery. Its use makes possible the control of fire by radio, when the radio station of the observer and the radio station of the battery are in direct touch. It is practically impossible to relay fire-control messages through linking radio stations. The term "radio station of the battery" is used to indicate the battalion radio station which will be in direct communication with the battery firing, either by voice or telephone.

Example: NA V BA BT Text AR K.

46. When the nature of the answer to a fire-control message is such as to clearly indicate that the previous transmission has been received, the "Received" signal "R" need not be transmitted.

IX

47. The signal "IX" which is inserted just before BT means "Message following is a preparatory command, and is not to be carried out until the signal of execution is given."

Example: NA V BA IX BT Text AR K.

FIVE-SECOND DASH

48. (a) The five-second dash is the signal of execution and means, "Execute the last preparatory command."

(b) It should be sent by the observer only.

(c) It is always preceded by a call and followed by $\overline{AR}$. It is never canceled or annulled.

Example: NA V BA five-second dash $\overline{AR}$.

[157] (d) If the observer desires, he may send the call at any time previous to the five-second dash. He can then keep contact with the battery, by using the "wait" signal $\overline{AS}$ until in a position to observe, when the five-second dash will be sent.

Example: NA V BA $\overline{AS}$ $\overline{AS}$ $\overline{AS}$ five-second dash.

TWO-SECOND DASH

49. (a) The two-second dash is the salvo mark, and means "Battery fired" (i. e., "On the way"). This is sent by the operator at the battery radio station just as the battery fires.

(b) It may be followed by a numeral indicating the time of flight of the projectile in seconds.

(c) It is never preceded by a call.

Example: Upon receiving the five-second dash, command of execution signal (see par. 48), the battery fires and the operator at the battery makes the two-second dash.

VII. Strength and Readability of Signal.

50. It may facilitate the transmission of message traffic if a station, which is to work with another, knows the strength and readability of his signal at the other station.

51. Strength of signal is indicated by the procedure signal "S" (signal strength) followed by an appropriate figure from the table below. The table may be used also with the procedure signal "X" (static) to indicate strength of static and "W" (interference) to indicate strength of interference.

1. Very weak, hardly audible.
2. Moderately weak.
3. Medium strength.
4. Moderately strong.
5. Strong.

Example: AB V BC S5 K.

52. Readability of signals is indicated after the procedure signal "R" by means of the table below:

1. Unreadable.
2. Poor but readable; plain language twice; code unreadable.
3. Fair; readable; plain language once, slowly; code twice.
- [158] 4. Good; readable; plain language or code once.
5. Perfectly readable.

Example: AB V BC R4 K.

53. Signals may be strong but readability poor for various reasons; conversely signal strength may be moderately weak but readability good. The tables given above can be used to show such cases.

Example: AB V BC S5 II R2 K.

VIII. Z Signals

54. The following signals in addition to the procedure signals listed in paragraph 20 are prescribed for communication between the Army and Navy:

Signal	Meaning
ZAB	Are you in communication by visual with ———?
ZAD	Am in communication by visual with ——— (through ———).
ZAF	Are you in communication by radio with ———?
ZAG	Am in communication by radio with ——— (through ———).
ZAK	Call me again at ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZAL	Can you hear ———? If so what is his signal strength?
ZAM	Can hear ———; his signal strength is ———.
ZAN	Did ——— send anything for me? If so, please repeat.
ZAO	Following is what ——— sent (at ——— o'clock).

Signal	Meaning
ZAP	Have (or ——— has) been calling you since ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZAR	Have ——— messages for ——— (if blanks not filled, means, "Have a message for you").
ZAU	I (or ———) will call you again as soon as I (he) can (or at ——— o'clock) (on ——— KCS).
ZAV	——— is calling you (on ——— KCS).
ZAW	Inform ——— that I am calling him (on ——— KCS).
ZAX	Nothing received from ——— (at ———).
ZAY	Report when you are in communication by visual with ———.
ZAZ	Report when you are in communication by radio with ———.
ZBA	Wait, I must shift to copy another station (or ———) but will call you as soon as I can (or at ——— o'clock).
ZBK	Reception impossible. Send series of six dashes if transmission received or send series of six dots if transmission not received. Send receipt message when communication next established.
ZBM	Fragments only received (from ———).
ZBN	Send each message twice. I have difficulty receiving
ZBO	Send each message once only. Reception is good.
ZBP	Send faster.
ZBQ	Send slower.
ZBR	You are missing dots.

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ZBU	Your Morse is difficult to read.
ZBV	Reception very bad; send each group ——— times.
ZBW	Reception exceptionally bad; send each character ——— times.
ZBX	Reception impossible.
ZBY	Accuracy of reception of message ——— is doubtful.
ZBZ	Are you certain of accuracy of reception of messages(s) ——— (or of group(s) ——— in message ———)?
ZCA	Cease listening in for messages from ———.
ZCB	Groups ——— in message ——— should apparently read as follows: ———.
ZCC	Has executive sign (signal of execution) for last message (or for message following ———) been made?
ZCD	Have you received the signal to execute last message?
ZCF	Have you received SOS just made (by ———) (at ——— o'clock)?
ZCG	Listen in for messages from ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZCJ	Message (——) does not concern you (or ———).
ZCK	Message which you just forwarded was incorrectly transmitted.
ZCL	Message following was incompletely received; groups missed are indicated by the "blank sign" (AAA).
ZCN	Number of groups (in message ———) was ———.
ZCP	Repeat message(s) from ——— (at ——— o'clock).
ZCQ	Reply to message ——— is to be transmitted now.
ZCT	Following is correct version (of message ———).
ZCU	The following is heading of message (——) as received. Check to origin if necessary and repeat.
ZCV	Transmit your messages in strings of ———.
ZCW	Am going to transmit messages in strings of ———.
ZCX	Have you received my message ———?
ZCZ	Delay was due to fault in my receiving apparatus.
ZDA	Delay was due to fault in my transmitting apparatus.
ZDB	You are causing delay by slowness in answering.
ZDC	You are causing delay by answering out of turn.
ZDD	Request immediate reply to my message.
ZDF	Send receipt for message (——) when communication next established.
ZDG	Transmit all of your messages one after the other.
ZDH	When may I expect answer to my message ———?
ZDM	Continuous frequency.
ZDN	Vacuum tube transmission.
ZDP	Land wire or cable.
ZDR	Radio telephone.
ZDV	Tonic train (chopped CW) transmission.
ZDW	Visual.

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Signal	Meaning
ZDX	Frequency.
ZDY	Type ——— transmitter.
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ZDZ	Type ——— receiver.
ZFA	Model ——— receiver.
ZFJ	——— is radio guard on ——— KCS (net control station for net whose call is ———).
ZFK	Am ready to take over radio guard (to act as net control station).
ZFL	Are you radio guard (net control station) (for ———)?
ZFM	Indicate ships (stations) for which you are radio guard (net control station).
ZFQ	(———) Act as ——— (until ——— o'clock) (on ——— KCS).
ZFW	Am in your zone. Relay communications for me.
ZFX	Expect to be out of communication for radio until ——— o'clock. Handle radio communication for this ship (station).
ZFZ	Am (or ——— is) unable to ———.
ZGA	Are you (or ——— is) unable to ———?
ZGB	Am going to use (or am shifting to) ———.
ZGC	Am (or ——— is) unable to use ———.
ZGD	Am (or ——— is) using ———.
ZGF	Use ———.
ZGG	My antenna (or antenna of ———) has been damaged (or carried away).
ZGJ	My receiving apparatus is temporarily out of commission.
ZGK	Repairs completed. Am in commission.
ZGL	There appears to be something wrong in your (———) receiving equipment.
ZGM	There appears to be something wrong in your (———) transmitter.
ZGN	My ——— (or ——— of ———) is defective.
ZGO	Your ——— appears to be defective.
ZGP	I can not transmit on ——— KCS.
ZGQ	Your antenna appears to be grounding.
ZGR	At the end of this transmission I (or ———) will transmit on CW.
ZGS	I have increased my radiation.
ZGT	My radiation is good.
ZGU	I can not receive (———).
ZGV	How is my note?
ZGW	Lower your note.
ZGX	Raise your note.
ZGY	Your note is bad.
ZGZ	Your note is clear and musical.
ZJA	Your note is rising and falling.
ZJB	Decrease strength of signals.
ZJC	Increase strength of signals.
ZJD	How are my signals?
ZJF	What is my signal strength?
ZJG	Your signals are unreadable owing to your bad note.
ZJJ	Your spark is broken.
ZJK	Your signals fade.

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ZJL	Cease using ———.
ZJM	Act as relay between me and ———.
ZJN	Give me your message for ———; I will forward it.
ZJQ	Inform me when this message (or message ———) has been received by the addressee (or by ———).
ZJR	Message ——— has been received by the addressee (or by ———).
ZJV	Message(s) ——— has (have) been sent by land wire.
ZJY	Take no further action with regard to forwarding message ——— (to ———).
ZJZ	Transmit this message now (or at ———) by "F" method.
ZKA	Transmit this message now (or at ———) without preliminary call up.

Signal	Meaning
ZKC	Transmit this message (or at ———) by "I" method.
ZKG	Pass following message to destination by dispatch mail system.
ZKH	Distribute this message by dispatch where no charges are involved and to all others by mail.
ZKM	Forward this message by commercial niteletter.
ZKN	Send V's on your present frequency (or ——— KCS).
ZKO	Am going to send V's on my present frequency (or ——— KCS).
ZKP	Am going to transmit on ——— KCS.
ZKQ	Am shifting to receive on ——— KCS.
ZKR	Am (or ——— is) unable to transmit on ——— KCS.
ZKU	Am (or ——— is) transmitting on ——— KCS.
ZKX	On receiving "K" on ——— KCS I shall (or ——— will) transmit message to you on ——— KCS. Answer on your present frequency (or ——— KCS).
ZKY	Shift to receive on ——— KCS until further orders.
ZKZ	Shift to ——— KCS.
ZLA	Transmit and receive on ——— KCS.
ZLB	What frequency are you (or is ———) using?
ZLC	How is my frequency?
ZLD	Your frequency appears to be correct.
ZLF	Increase your frequency a trifle (or ——— KCS).
ZLG	Decrease your frequency a trifle (or ——— KCS).
ZLH	Your orientation is wrong; check it immediately.
ZLJ	Transmit on ——— KCS.
ZLK	Shift from telegraph to compensating frequency or vice versa.
ZLL	Check your frequency.
ZLV	General call; all stations copy.
ZMC	Who is interfering with you?
ZMF	I am being interfered with by ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZMG	Listen in before transmitting. You are causing unnecessary interference.
ZMJ	Do not interfere, I am receiving from ———.
ZMK	You are causing interference.
ZML	You are causing interference by inattention to order to wait.
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ZMM	You are causing interference. Send on another frequency.
ZMN	You are sending at the same time as ———.
ZNO	Answer ——— and take his message(s).
ZNP	Answer calls for me (or for ———).
ZNU	Answer in alphabetical order of call signs.
ZNV	Answer on ——— KCS.
ZPA	Negative; no; not. (For use with operating signals only.)
ZPB	Affirmative; yes. (For use with operating signals only.)
ZPF	Send ——— (weather, obstruction, storm warnings, press, etc.) Last received (or received at ———) to me (or to ———).
ZPG	Set clocks to ——— o'clock upon receiving signal of execution.
ZPH	What time is it?
ZQO	Send report of weather conditions your vicinity.
ZXA	What was station serial number of last message received from this station (or from ———)?
ZXB	Station serial number of last message received from you (or from ———) was ———.
ZXC	What was station serial number of last message you transmitted to me (or to ———)?
ZXD	Station serial number of last message transmitted to you (or to ———) was ———.
ZZO	Broadcast your messages without preliminary call up.
ZZP	Do not broadcast. Call your station first.
ZZX	Close your station.

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Approved by the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy, August 16, 1928.

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CHANGE NO. 1, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

J. B. No. 350.

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, July 22, 1936.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy recommended by The Joint Board have been approved by order of the Secretary of War and by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

JARVIS BUTLER, *Secretary.*

Cancel list of effective pages of Navy FTP 155 appearing on page ii, and insert new list of effective pages (Navy copies only).

PARAGRAPH 6. "General Functions of the Navy." Remove and destroy page 3 and substitute new page 3 containing amendment of subparagraph 6. a. (3) and added subparagraph 6. b. (3).

PARAGRAPH 128. Organization of the Joint Planning Committee. Remove and destroy pages 129-130 and substitute new pages 129-130 containing amended paragraph 128.

PARAGRAPHS 131 and 132. "Aeronautical Board." Remove and destroy pages 131-132 and substitute new pages 131-132 containing amendment of paragraphs 131 and 132.

NOTE.—The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publication Section, Navy Department, require no report on receipt of the above changes.

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JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Title page-----	Original
CNO letter of promulgation, dated November 15, 1935 (p. 1)-----	Original
List of effective pages (II)-----	C. J. A. 1
Letter of approval by Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, dated September 11, 1935 (p. III) (p. IV blank)-----	Original
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Chart—Joint organization for coastal frontier defense-----	Original
J. B. letter promulgating changes in Joint Action No. 1, dated July 22, 1936-----	Original

[5] (3) To support the national policies of the United States and to furnish land forces for the occupation of foreign territory in protection of the interests of the United States.

(4) To protect the United States from internal disorder or insurrection.

b. Additional general functions of the Army in war.

(1) To conduct effective military operations.

(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases.

(3) To provide such forces as may be necessary for joint overseas expeditions.

b. General functions of the Navy.

a. General functions of the Navy in peace and war.

(1) To provide for and to prepare the sea forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the sea forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.

(3) To support the national policies and commerce of the United States and to provide forces for emergency service in foreign territory in support thereof.

(4) To assist the Army in the suppression of internal disorder or insurrection.

b. Additional general functions of the Navy in war.

(1) To conduct effective naval operations.

(2) To gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States.

(3) To seize, establish, and defend, until relieved by Army forces, advanced naval bases; and to conduct such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.

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CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office

of Naval Operations. The [130] board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. [131] No. 81, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Head of Plans Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The function of the Aeronautical Board is to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy. It will investigate, study, and report upon all questions affecting jointly the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy which have been referred to it by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, The Joint Board, the Chief of the Air Corps, or the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In addition, it will also be charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when in its judgment necessary and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army and the Navy as to aviation.

132. In the execution of the foregoing, the Aeronautical Board will be governed by the following. It will hold regular monthly meetings and such extraordinary meetings as may be deemed advisable. It will prescribe its own procedure and will be assisted by working committees, the members of which will be appointed by the Aeronautical Board. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint Army and Navy policies or plans relative to the national defense will be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Matters affecting the procurement of matériel in time of war to meet joint requirements will be submitted to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. All other matters will be submitted direct to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

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Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national

[I] [C. J. A. I.]

CONFIDENTIAL

CHANGE No. 1, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

J. B. No. 350.

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, July 22, 1936.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy recommended by The Joint Board have been approved by order of the Secretary of War and by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

JARVIS BUTLER, *Secretary.*

Cancel list of effective pages of Navy FTP 155 appearing on page ii, and insert new list of effective pages (Navy copies only).

PARAGRAPH 6. "General Functions of the Navy." Remove and destroy page 3 and substitute new page 3 containing amendment of subparagraph 6. a. (3) and added subparagraph 6. b. (3).

PARAGRAPH 128. Organization of the Joint Planning Committee. Remove and destroy pages 129-130 and substitute new pages 129-130 containing amended paragraph 128.

PARAGRAPHS 131 AND 132. "Aeronautical Board." Remove and destroy pages 131-132 and substitute new pages 131-132 containing amendment of paragraphs 131 and 132.

NOTE.—The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publication Section, Navy Department, require no report on receipt of the above changes.

[Ib] C. J. A. 2.

CHANGE No. 2, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 350 (Serials 628, 630, 631, and 635).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, November 30, 1938.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War, the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages.

Page nos.	Subject matter
Ib-Ic II-IIa	Promulgation of Change No. 2. List of effective pages.

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Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated.

Old page nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
I-II	Reprint of promulgation of Change No. 1 on pages I-Ia.
V-VI	Title of Chapter II changed.
VII-VIII	Paragraph headings under Chapter II changed.
5-10	Paragraphs 7-15 deleted and new paragraphs 7-10 substituted on pages 5-6.
11-12	Paragraph 17, second sentence deleted.
17-18	Paragraph 23b, new sentence added.
27-28	Paragraph 24, parenthetical reference changed.
41-42	Paragraph 32c (3) (a), fifth and sixth lines changed.
43-44	Paragraph 32f, twelfth line changed; subparagraph (e) changed.
47-48	Paragraph 32g (2) (c), first sentence changed.
65-66	Paragraph 42h, sixth and seventh lines changed; paragraph 42i (2), last line changed.
67-68	Paragraph 42i (14), changed.
69-70	Items "Wave" and "Subwave" under Definitions changed.
77-78	Paragraphs 48g and 48r, changed; paragraph 49 changed.
79-80	Paragraph 53b, changed; paragraph 54a, changed.
[7c] 83-84	Paragraph 61, last sentence changed; paragraph 64c, last line changed.
87-88	Paragraph 72, third and fourth lines changed.
91-92	Paragraph 81d, changed.
97-98	Paragraph 89g, changed; paragraph 90a, second sentence changed.
101-102	Paragraph 93d, third and fourth sentences changed.
103-104	Paragraph 95a, first sentence changed; paragraph 95e, first sentence changed; paragraph 95f, first line changed; paragraph 96c, first line changed; paragraph 97a, first sentence changed.
105-106	Paragraph 101a, last line changed.
107-108	Paragraph 101b, last line changed.
111-112	Paragraph 17a, first sentence changed.
129-130	Paragraph 125, fourth line changed; paragraph 126, last sentence changed.
133-134	Paragraphs 141b and 142, changed.
137-138	Paragraph 4 (b), changed.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

This Change No. 2 includes all changes which have been directed to be made in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, since the promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.

The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this Change No. 2.

ROBERT S. CHEW,
Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy,
Acting Secretary, Joint Board.

[11] C. J. A. 2.

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

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Subject matter	Change in effect	Page nos. ¹
Title page	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only)	"	0-00*
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*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128 and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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PART I

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CHAPTER II

COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

7. *Coordination*—General considerations.

a. Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated.

b. In determining the method to be used in coordinating the operations of the two services, consideration will be given to the respective functions of the Army and of the Navy as defined in this document, the geographical location and nature of the contemplated operations, the character and strength of our own and enemy forces, and the probable intentions of the enemy.

8. *Methods of coordination.*—Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by one of the following methods:

a. Mutual cooperation.

b. The exercise of unity of command.

9. *Determination of the method of coordination.*

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.

b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

(1) When ordered by the President; or

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

[6] 10. *Responsibility and authority conferred by unity of command.*

a. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph *b* below, unity of command in an operation vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both services by the organization of task forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary to insure the success of the operation.

b. Unity of command does not authorize the commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the service to which he does not belong, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination.

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CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION

16. *Types.*

a. Independent operations.

b. Joint operations which are generally of two classes:

- (1) Joint overseas expeditions.
- (2) Coastal frontier defense.

17. *Tasks of Army and Navy forces in joint operations.*—The normal Army and Navy tasks enumerated below are to serve as guides in the planning and execution of operations in which Army and Navy forces jointly participate. When Army forces participating in joint operations move overland, tactical coordination of the Army and Navy forces will be exercised when the forces of the two services approach the objective to within supporting distance of each other.

18. *Joint overseas expeditions.*

a. *Joint overseas expeditions include:*

- (1) Joint overseas movements.
- (2) Landing attacks against shore objectives.

b. *Joint overseas movements.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To provide and operate all vessels for the Army, except when naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case they are provided and operated by the Navy.

(b) To assemble the Army troops, together with their equipment and supplies, at designated ports of embarkation.

[12] (c) To provide and operate the Army ports of embarkation.

(d) To load transports, whether these are provided by the Army or the Navy, for the transportation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies, subject to Navy approval as to stability of vessels.

(e) To load in readiness for operation such aircraft and armament as can be made available to assist the Navy during the movement at sea or in landing operations.

(f) To organize and operate shore installations used primarily for debarkation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To maintain sea lines of supply.

(b) When naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected—

1. To procure, man, equip, and operate the vessels necessary to transport Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

2. To assemble the necessary transports at designated ports of embarkation at the times specified by the commanders of the ports of embarkation.

3. To provide for security of transports at sea.

4. To provide in outlying ports means for the embarkation, or debarkation, of Army troops, equipment and supplies, when such means cannot be provided or obtained by the Army.

c. *Landing attacks against shore objectives.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in landing attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are:

(a) The deployment into boats used for landing, these boats being operated by the Navy.

(b) The delivery of rifle and machine-gun fire from landing boats, except from such machine guns as are parts of the naval equipment of the boats.

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CHAPTER IV

FUNCTIONS OF ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS

20. *General functions.*

a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy stated in chapter I, Policy Governing the Respective Functions of the Army and of the Navy. Under this policy:

(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

b. Aircraft, by their nature, are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions. Available air strength should therefore be used whenever possible by either service in support of the other.

c. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may temporarily execute Army functions under like conditions.

21. *Primary functions.*

a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

b. These primary functions are:

(1) The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

[18] (2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

22. *Secondary functions.*

a. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

(1) Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

(3) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

(2) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

23. *Provisions to minimize duplication.*

a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development.

c. Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.

d. When estimated aircraft production and procurement do not meet the requirements of the Army and the Navy under any specific war plan, The Joint Board will make allocation in numbers and priorities of airplanes to the Army and Navy, respectively.

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CHAPTER V

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

Section I

Introduction and Definitions

24. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present the principles and measures necessary for the effective joint organization and conduct of operations in coastal frontier defense and the method of planning involved and the responsibilities of the two services in connection therewith, in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. (See Ch. II, and par. 19, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

25. Purpose of coastal frontier defense.

a. The purpose of a joint organization and measures for coastal frontier defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
- (2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
- (3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;
- (4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.

[28] **26. Definitions.**—In order to provide a common basis of understanding between the Army and the Navy in the employment of forces in coastal frontier defense, the following definitions of terms employed are hereby established:

a. A *coastal frontier* is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors.

b. *Coastal frontier defense* is the organization of the forces and matériel of the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

c. The *naval district* is a military and administrative command ashore established for the purpose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities outside the Navy Department proper, and for the further purpose of centralizing under one command within the district and the waters thereof:

(1) For military coordination, all naval activities; and

(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific exceptions.

The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal zones. The limits of the naval districts are laid down in the Navy Regulations. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the direct representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.

[41] **32. Requirements and means to be provided.**

a. *General requirements.*

(1) The proximity of important cities and industrial areas to certain of our seacoast and lake frontiers and the consequent vulnerability of these places to attack, as well as the importance to the Nation of our shipping and its related industries, and the fact that our coastal bases are the mainsprings of naval action, make the protection of these frontiers in time of war a highly important part of the national defense.

(2) Positive security, to include harbor defenses, has been provided for certain areas, the fixed armament of which has been or is being installed during peace time. Depending upon the liability of these areas to attack, and upon the character of such attack, defensive coastal areas have been designated and defensive sea areas should be designated in order to ensure the security of these important areas and the security of the shipping within their waters.

(3) In other respects, a minimum land and sea defense should be contemplated for our whole coastal frontier on the outbreak of war, and should involve the employment of only such parts of the means of defense as are required under the situation. In some situations, involving only minor enemy operations, it may be necessary to organize the beach defense for certain localities. Other situations involving more serious enemy attacks will require that the means of defense be successively augmented.

b. *Defensive operations required.*—From a study of possible enemy operations, it appears that the defense of our coastal frontiers should take into consideration the following:

(1) The observation of the coastal frontier and the sea beyond as far as circumstances permit or seem to demand.

- (2) The protection of shipping in waters adjacent to the seacoast.
- (3) The attack on enemy vessels in waters adjacent to the seacoast.
- (4) The resistance to enemy approach to the seacoast.
- [42] (5) The protection of the seacoast, and especially strategic harbors, against raids.

(6) The defeat of enemy landing attacks on the seacoast including the provision of defensive installations on shore and in the waters adjacent thereto.

(7) The initiation of counteroffensive operations to eject a landed enemy.

c. Means available.—Under the above conception of defensive operations that may be required for coastal frontier defense, the means that may be made available in time of war include—

(1) *The Fleet*, the employment of which, in accordance with the strategic situation, may keep the enemy away from our coastal frontiers.

(2) *Naval local defense forces*, which control the water areas within a naval district, conduct naval operations against enemy forces in the naval district waters, and cooperate with and support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

(3) *The Army forces.*

(a) *Mobile forces*, including air forces, to provide the covering or outpost forces for the initial coastal frontier defense organization and likewise the additional forces necessary to defeat landing attacks and air attacks and to carry out the Army functions.

(b) *Harbor defense forces* for maintenance and operation of essential harbor defenses designed to prevent ingress into areas, including the air space thereof covered by these defenses.

d. Relation of the Fleet to coastal frontier defense.—The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases. In the case of hostile major overseas movements directed against our coasts, the Fleet, if present and free to act, will be a powerful factor for ensuring the security of its bases and our coasts, and, if it engages the enemy, should be supported by all the land-based aircraft available.

[43] *e. Relation of Army mobile forces to coastal frontier defense.*—The Army in its responsibility for the direct defense of the coast must be prepared to meet successfully any attack directed against any part of our coastal frontiers. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand the presence of the Fleet in another theater of operations make it necessary for the Army to provide mobile forces, not only those to be used as covering or outpost forces in the initial coastal frontier defense organization, but also the additional forces required to defeat enemy landing or air attacks directed against any part of the coast. When any part of a coastal frontier is threatened, these additional mobile forces will be concentrated with a view to defeating the enemy in the affected area.

f. Relation of Army air forces to coastal frontier defense.—In operations against enemy attacks along our coast and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case, no restrictions will be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full power of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile Army forces engaged in the direct defense of the coast. Their functions and operations will be governed by the principles outlined in Chapter II and in paragraphs 20, 21, and 22, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and the following quoted paragraphs from J. B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539) subject, "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force":

"(b) When any sector of a frontier is threatened, units of all arms, including units of the Air Corps, will be concentrated in support of the covering forces and the operations of all components will be in accordance with the general plan and the specific decisions of the frontier and sector commander. The Army Air Corps operates along the coast under the same conditions as in other operations except that occasions may arise when the GHQ air force or units thereof may act in conjunction with naval air forces under temporary direction of naval commanders; or similarly when naval air forces may operate in conjunction with and under temporary direction of Army commanders.

"(c) The Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand [44] the

presence of the Fleet in another theater require that joint plans for coastal frontier defense be drawn without counting upon the assistance of the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces. But it should be borne in mind that, when the Fleet is so situated that it can and does operate effectively against enemy forces afloat that are approaching some sector of the coast, the security of such sector against major attack is ensured for the time being.

"(d) In addition to a radio communication system, the Navy maintains shore stations at strategical centers, where scouting and patrolling seaplanes may be concentrated to meet naval situations. These naval forces are important elements in the communications and information service, and would normally be the source of the first notice of the approach of an enemy by the sea. When the Army GHQ air force operates along the coast, it maintains such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency. The coordination and cooperation of these two sources of information are secured by joint plans prepared by frontier, sector, overseas department, and naval district authorities. Such plans should provide for augmentation of one service by the other in gaining and disseminating information of enemy movements offshore.

"(e) In the absence of the Fleet, the primary responsibility of securing information of hostile fleet movements rests with naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units. However, regardless of the presence or absence of the Fleet, the GHQ air force retains the responsibility for such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency.

"(f) In the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy at sea, a major attack upon the coast may develop so as to require the utilization of the GHQ air force in three phases as follows:

"1st phase—The conduct of reconnaissance over the sea approaches to the coast and (when favorable opportunity presents itself) the attack of enemy elements.

"2d phase—The support of artillery, involving both fixed and mobile guns and mines, by aircraft conducting observation, reconnaissance, and offensive operations, from the time the enemy comes within range of ground weapons, until he is driven off or the operation enters the third phase.

"3d phase—Air operations in connection with the use of all arms on our coastal frontier.

"Reconnaissance, as outlined for the first phase, will be continued to the extent possible throughout the later phases.

"(g) *War plans.*—In peace-time planning for war-time use under any of our existing war plans, each coastal frontier plan, and where necessary, each sector and subsector plan will include plans for the employment of such air units as may be assigned under the particular war plan involved. In the preparation of these plans, consideration will be given to the category of defense as defined in chapter V, part X (sec. III of 1935 revision), Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and specified in the particular war plan in question. Each specific war plan prepared by the War Department will set forth the initial missions assigned the GHQ air force and, in general terms, the operations to be undertaken. Based upon these missions, the GHQ air force commander will prepare his plan covering the details of concentration the missions, and the general plan of initial operations to be undertaken by the various elements of the GHQ air force.

"(h) *Defense projects.*—Harbor defense projects will contain a statement of the minimum observation aviation needed for reconnaissance and observation of fire for the harbor defense artillery included in such project.

"(i) *Installations and facilities.*—The most important of these are communications, airdromes, and landing fields. Of the first, the radio systems of the naval districts and of the Coast Guard are available, and joint plans contemplate their utilization in connection with any additional stations found necessary and installed by either service. Harbor defense projects and the plans of coastal frontier commanders will make provision for the airdrome areas and installations and the communications and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the air organizations assigned. In addition, the plans of each coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide, in consultation with the GHQ air force commander, for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of such coastal frontier command, by including in such plans logistical provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate. Civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so as to permit M-day operation.

"(j) In overseas departments, the utilization of the aviation component of the garrison will be as directed by the department commander."

g. Naval local defense forces.

(1) The naval local defense forces are furnished by naval districts from such surface, subsurface, and aircraft as may be made available, including small submarines, old destroyers, mine vessels, and aircraft tenders, with such local vessels as are taken over in time of war for naval district use.

(2) The naval local defense forces of a naval district may comprise any or all of the following task forces:

(a) *The inshore patrol*, which may be composed of section bases, submarine bases, destroyer bases and air [46] stations; coastal lookout system, including lightships, lighthouses, Coast Guard stations, and special lookout stations; motor boats, submarine chasers, yachts, aircraft, mine sweepers, guard ships, aircraft tenders, and additional task forces in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To execute the Navy's part of all joint plans for defensive coastal areas.
2. To search for, locate, report, and attack enemy vessels operating close in to the coast and off harbor entrances.
3. To sweep such channels close in to the coast and off harbor entrances as are necessary for our naval forces and merchant shipping, and to clear mine fields laid by the enemy.
4. To patrol the outer limits of defensive coastal areas in order to convey to the harbor defense commander prompt and full information of the approach of friendly or hostile vessels, including all those of the offshore patrol. This information is to be conveyed directly to the nearest elements of the Army communication system.
5. To patrol the areas for obstacles, especially during thick weather or darkness, to protect the obstacles, and to prevent light craft from going over them.
6. To operate a system of control including piloting in the defensive sea and defensive coastal areas.
7. To maintain a guard ship at or near harbor entrances to see that all vessels leaving or entering port give the proper recognition and clearance signals and to transmit orders to shipping as directed.
8. To furnish with routing instructions all merchant vessels departing without escort.

[47] 9. To maintain a coastal-lookout system along the district coast line by use of the Coast Guard stations and Lighthouse Service, and special lookout stations to prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy.

10. To maintain, through the Lighthouse Service in the district, the system of buoyage, lights, and other aids to navigation regularly established, with such modifications and changes as military necessity may require.

11. To render prompt assistance to merchant shipping and naval units in case of collision, breakdown, or other accident in port or along the coast.

12. To exercise naval control of harbors through the captain of the port, when the Treasury Department requests the Navy to exercise such control.

(b) *The offshore patrol*, which may be composed of destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, gunboats, eagle boats, yachts, aircraft tenders, aircraft, and additional types in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To patrol systematically the coastal zone outside of those parts assigned to the inshore patrol.
2. To develop information of, report, and attack enemy forces sighted, in accordance with the doctrine of the patrol.
3. To supplement and support the main armament gunfire of the harbor defenses.
4. To lay mine fields and sweep against enemy mines outside the field of operations of the inshore patrol.

(c) *The escort force*, which may be composed of any suitable and available naval forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

[48] (d) *A coastal force* may be organized to operate within the coastal zone. It will be organized from suitable and available naval forces. Such coastal force will be in addition to the forces required for each naval district.

(e) The commander of the inshore patrol, who will be stationed ashore, should have his headquarters located as conveniently as possible to the headquarters of the harbor defense commander and at the same location if practicable. In any event he should be in direct communication with the harbor defense commander, as well as in direct connection with all naval activities in the defensive coastal area.

h. Defensive coastal areas.

(1) *Extent.*—Defensive coastal areas will be delimited by joint agreement between the Army and the Navy. Each defensive coastal area will cover that part of the coastal zone and adjacent seacoast which will require an intensive joint defense by reason of the inclusion therein of valuable harbors, stretches of the coast where hostile landings can be made in connection with attacks on our harbors or on industrial centers on or near the coast which are subject to attack from the sea. Defensive coastal areas will ordinarily include land and water areas in the vicinity of a fortified harbor, in which will be located in time of peace some personnel and usually a considerable amount of the matériel pertaining to the harbor defenses.

(2) *Harbor defenses.*

(a) Harbor defenses are highly organized, permanently defended localities within sectors or subsectors of a coastal frontier whose broad mission is to protect important coastal areas (seaports, naval bases, and anchorages) and utilities primarily against attack from the area. They are an element of the defensive organization of the subsector or sector in which they are located and they operate under subsector or sector control.

[65] (3) The sequence to be followed in the preparation of joint defense plans is as follows:

(a) Joint coastal frontier plan.

(b) Joint sector plan.

(c) Joint subsector plan or joint defensive coastal area plan.

Generally, the lowest sequence of plans required for the Navy will be that pertaining to a naval district, whether the naval district is a sector or subsector.

f. The plan of higher sequence will contain the directives for the plan of next lower sequence. The lower sequence plan will be formulated to support the plan of next higher sequence.

g. Army and Navy operating defense plans will obtain their directives from the joint plan they are required to support. They will provide the means and organizations and will insure the Army's and/or Navy's effective operation thereunder.

h. Joint coastal frontier and joint sector defense plans will cover the category of defense, the delimitation of areas (including subsector, defensive sea and coastal areas included therein), assignment of missions, allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops, the air and ground antiaircraft defense measures to be instituted, the designation of areas of responsibility, the details of joint communications and intelligence services to include the censorship and supervision of cables and wire lines in accordance with approved policy, and an aircraft warning service. These plans or their supporting projects will also make provision for the Army airdrome areas and installations necessary in connection therewith and the communication and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the Army air organization assigned. In addition, the plans of each Army coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of his command by including in such plans logistic provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate; civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so that M-day operation will be possible.

[66] i. Joint plans of the lowest sequence, such as joint subsector or joint defensive coastal area plans, should contain, either in the plans proper, in appendices or annexes thereto, or in supporting plans or projects—so much of the following as is appropriate:

(1) The relationship of the defensive coastal area to the subsector organization and/or of the subsector to the sector organization.

(2) The category of defense and such delimitation of the area as may be necessary for the coordination of the Army and the Navy forces operating in the area, to include areas of responsibility.

(3) The assignment of missions and allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops or additional forces required for later defense steps.

(4) The relationship of the area to such defensive sea areas as have been designated for the vicinity, with special reference to methods of keeping the Army informed of movements of all vessels in the coastal zone and the composition, mission, and methods of operation of the offshore patrol.

(5) Such general plan of the forts, batteries, searchlights, underwater listening posts, air installations, and areas of gunfire and illumination as may be necessary to define the areas of Army responsibility for defense and naval assistance to the Army in this defense, including areas available to the enemy from which he can deliver bombardment fire without effective interference from the land armament.

(6) Definite assignment to the Navy of responsibility and tasks for offensive action in such areas as are covered by the fire of the land armament.

(7) General plan of the part of the underwater defense to be prepared or installed, including the character of the mine barrages, nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and other obstacles, their location, priority of installation, definite responsibility of the Army and the Navy for their provision, estimate of time of installation, definite indication of free passages through mines and openings in nets, navigation range installations required and responsibility for their establishment. Decisions as to which service and what commander in [67] this service shall determine when these elements shall be placed.

(8) Allocation to the Army and the Navy of locally procurable means, particularly vessels and material required for the installation and maintenance of the underwater defense, together with an estimate of the availability of such means, the nature of the alteration required, and the probable cost and time involved.

(9) Composition, mission, and method of operation of the inshore patrol, with particular reference to method of protection of underwater defense elements and identification of elements of the patrol with land elements of the defense at night and in thick weather, including a definite decision as to the conditions under which doubtful vessels should be fired upon by the armament of fortifications.

(10) The air, the ground antiaircraft, and the close-in defense measures; the measures for defense against landing attacks to be instituted on M-day and for the later defense steps to be instituted as the war progresses.

(11) The details of joint communication and intelligence services and an aircraft warning service. These details for the joint communication and intelligence services to include the location of headquarters of the several commanders, communications nets of both services, with the additional means, both military and commercial, required and the frequencies allotted to Army and Navy radio nets, responsibilities of Army and Navy commanders as to communication, censorship, and supervision of cables and wire lines as prescribed by higher commanders.

(12) General method of operation of the inshore patrol in sweeping and mining operations and in conducting and controlling maritime traffic, including designation and location of entrances and exits to defensive sea areas and of guard ships and methods of control of shipping within the harbor.

(13) Composition, mission, and method of employment of other naval local defense task groups, in sufficient detail to indicate the character and degree of cooperation required of Army and Navy air units.

[68] (14) Definite consideration of factors which may influence coordination.

(15) Detail of at least one liaison officer by name from each service to represent his commander at the headquarters of the other service and such other liaison officers as may be decided upon jointly.

j. A highly important part in each joint defense plan and project, and in the supporting defense plans and projects developed therefrom, is a definite statement of the time of accomplishment of the individual items under the plans and projects. For plans, these statements of times should be for the means and forces actually available and a consideration of the condition of the means and state of training of the forces. For projects, these statements of times should consider both the time of procurement and the time of installation or training after procurement.

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CHAPTER VI

JOINT OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[77] *q.* A *boat division* is a subordinate task organization of a boat group, organized for transporting a subordinate unit of a combat team or other similar tactical unit.

r. *A wave* consists of the boats, within a boat group, which carry the troops that are to land approximately simultaneously. It may consist of a single boat division or two or more boat divisions.

s. *Commercial loading* utilizes to the maximum the ship space and does not contemplate tactical employment of the troops on landing until their equipment, other than personal equipment, has been issued to them. This method of loading is applicable to movements from an established port to an established and well-secured port. Troops moved by this method are not available for tactical employment in landing operations against hostile forces.

t. *Unit loading* gives primary consideration to the availability of the troops for combat purposes on landing, rather than utilization of ship space.

The degree of readiness for employment depends upon the degree to which organizations are unit loaded as follows:

(1) *Combat unit loading*, in which certain units, selected because of their probable destination and employment in landing on hostile shores, are completely loaded on one ship with at least their essential combat equipment and supplies immediately available for debarkation with the troops, together with the animals for the organization when this is practicable. This method of unit loading is particularly applicable to units which probably will be required for an assault on hostile shores by a landing from small boats. Such an operation against any one beach will require an army combat team. This, of course, is subject to modification to meet special requirements. Combat teams will be loaded in such manner as to permit simultaneous debarkation.

(2) *Organizational unit loading*, in which organizations with their equipment and supplies are loaded on the same transport, but not so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. This is somewhat more economical in ship capacity than is combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units available for employment as soon as the troops and their equipment have been [78] assembled on land. Like combat unit loading, this method permits diversion en route by complete ship loads, from the destination originally intended.

(3) *Convoy unit loading*, in which the troops with their equipment and supplies are loaded on transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same transport. This allows a considerable utilization of ship space, particularly by using this method of loading to fill in space on transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary to assemble them on land, with their equipment and supplies.

Section II

Command

49. *Method of coordination*.—The method of coordination will be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

50. *Commanders to embark on same ship*.—The Army and the Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should also the respective Army and Navy commanders of a joint attack force. This method should be applied, were practicable, through all echelons of command.

51. *Liaison agents and staffs*.—The mutual exchange of liaison agents assures a degree of cooperation between the Army and the Navy not otherwise readily obtainable. Wherever joint operations are undertaken the commander of one service should have on his staff members of the other service.

52. *Communication with subordinate units*.—It is highly important that all landing force commanders should land with their units or as soon thereafter as possible, establish communication with subordinates who have already landed, and issue orders for subsequent operations based on personal knowledge of the situation and the terrain. The senior commander ashore must act with vigor and initiative.

[79]

Section III

Plans

53. *The joint basic decision and directive*.

a. *The decision* to undertake a joint overseas expedition will be derived from a joint Army and Navy estimate. Such a decision may be contained in a joint Army and Navy basic war plan, or it may be reached at any time during the progress of the war.

b. A *directive* will be issued by the authority arriving at the decision to undertake a joint overseas expedition, to the commander designated to command the combined forces, or to the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces which constitute the joint overseas expedition. This directive will generally include:

- (1) Digest of available information of the enemy.
- (2) Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon the proposed operations.
- (3) Information of any supporting operations contemplated.
- (4) The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the Navy.
- (5) The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the mission or missions, with designation of the initial theater of operations.
- (6) The forces assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of concentration and availability for embarkation.
- (7) The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.
- (8) The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement and operation.
- (9) The method of coordination.
- (10) Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in order to give the commander in chief or the respective commanders of the Army forces and the Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the sources of the expedition.

[80] 54. *Expeditionary force joint estimate and joint plan.*

a. Upon receipt of the above directive the commander designated to command the combined forces in the case of coordination by unity of command or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation, will prepare such an estimate as may be desirable and, after full discussion with the interested commanders of the participating forces, will issue instructions based on the directive and in amplification thereof; these instructions, particularly when prepared prior to the war, will ordinarily be in the form of a joint plan. Such instructions will generally include:

- (1) Decision.
- (2) Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.
- (3) Operations to be undertaken, including both joint operations and such separate Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to insure the success of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces required and their commanders.
- (4) Announcement of selected landing areas.
- (5) Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.
- (6) Provision for joint training.
- (7) Provision for logistic support of the expedition.
- (8) Provision for communications (signal) between forces.
- (9) Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until shortly before the landing forces are ready to debark.
- (10) Alternative plans.

b. It should be emphasized that the plans for embarkation and movement overseas should be based upon the requirements of the plan covering the actual landing operations.

55. *Cooperation in planning.*—In the preparation of these plans and of the subordinate plans it is essential that there be the closest cooperation between all Army and Navy commanders who are to be associated in the projected operations. Officers of each service

[83] 61. *Procurement of sea transportation.*—The joint basic plan or directive (see par. 53 b (8)) will state which service is responsible for procurement and assembly of the sea transportation required for the Army forces. Transportation required by the Navy will be procured by that service. Unless stated in the plan or directive, the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command, or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation, will decide when and where the necessary sea transportation is required and will request the War or Navy Department, as the case may be, to have it so assembled.

62. *Ports of embarkation.*—Regardless of whether the transportation employed for the movement of the Army forces overseas is under the control of the Army

or Navy, the necessary ports required for embarking the Army forces are selected, organized, and operated by agencies of the War Department not included in the forces to be employed overseas. The Army embarkation service includes the employment of experienced riggers, longshoremen, and stevedores; harbor floating equipment, etc., for loading ships.

63. Special organization.

a. Army forces are restricted by the necessarily limited facilities available for transportation, not only in the transports, but in the boats and small craft available to transfer them to the shore and the facilities, or lack of them, for debarkation from the boats. For support in the first stage of attack the landing of tanks is difficult and the landing of heavy artillery is impracticable. It is ordinarily impracticable to employ Army air units before and during the early stages of the landing. Special organization is, therefore, required to facilitate debarkation of intact combat units, reduce ship cargo requirements, provide increased small arms and machine-gun fire in lieu of normal artillery support, and insure mobility of the first units ashore.

b. Special naval organization is required to embark, escort, debark, and land the Army forces, including provision for the most effective possible artillery, communications, and air support until the Army can establish its own artillery and air units on shore. This involves the organization and provision of boat officers and crews for the landing boats and lighters; organization for covering landing operations by gunfire on land targets; organization to provide air-
[84] craft support and observation to serve the needs of ground troops, including observation of the fire of the Army's artillery; and organization to provide ship-to-shore communications.

64. Special equipment.

a. In general, in order to meet the requirements and limitations mentioned, the Army must reduce equipment to absolute essentials. Wherever practicable, motor transport will replace animal transport, and the motor transport provided will be of the types (light tractors and light trucks) which can be most easily handled, especially into and out of small boats. However, combat efficiency should not be sacrificed to facilitate sea transportation. The amount and kind of transportation is dependent on the terrain and the distance of the advance.

b. Because of the special nature of the operations required in the transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore against enemy opposition and under supporting fire from friendly ships, special equipment must be provided by the Navy. This includes special boats for landing the assault troops, including installations of machine guns therein, and the provision of protection so far as practicable against small arms fire from shore; special boats, barges, and motor lighters for landing all other troops and their equipment, including artillery, tanks, airplanes, and motor and animal transport, and supplies; provision of special ammunition required for the artillery support; and special communications equipment.

c. The maximum number of landing boats which can be transported efficiently should be provided. The number of boats should be at least sufficient to land simultaneously the number of assault battalions to cover the frontage required in the proposed scheme of maneuver, and local reserves sufficient to hold the ground gained until reinforcements are landed later.

d. All boats possible should be carried on the transports. The standard Navy boats on combat vessels are to be used only as necessary to supplement transport equipment and for towing.

65. Special equipment to be assembled before departure.—Estimates of the special equipment required will be made well in advance of the date of departure of the expedition in order that it may be procured and some training in its use may be carried out before loading.

[87] of a lesser degree of readiness, which will preclude the use of Army aviation units in support of the landing.

b. If Army aviation units cannot be unit-loaded on carriers, transports should be selected which will permit the planes to be stowed between decks, almost completely set up, and the loading on the same ship of the airdrome personnel and equipment necessary to permit prompt establishment on shore of the facilities required for the operation of the units.

c. It may be necessary to employ transports of such restricted space between decks as to require that the planes be shipped knocked-down and crated. This is the least desirable method of loading, due to the docking facilities necessary for unloading and the time element involved in getting the planes ashore and ready for flying.

Section V

The Movement Overseas

71. Plans and orders.—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. For the Army forces:

Designation of such landing areas as may have been concurred in by the Navy, and announcement of the plan for establishment of the Army forces on shore.

b. For the Naval forces:

(1) Information of time of departure, in accordance with paragraph 72, following.

(2) Concurrence with the Army in selection of the landing areas and plan for the establishment of the Army forces on shore.

(3) Safe escort of the expedition to the landing areas and organization therefor.

72. Time of departure.—The time of departure from the ports of embarkation of the expedition and assembly at the designated rendezvous will be decided by the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command; or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation.

73. Convoy and escort.

a. Prior to departure of the overseas expedition, the naval commander will organize all noncombatant vessels, such as troop and [88] animal transports and cargo ships, into such convoy groups as may be advisable, the basis for organization being the retention in one group of the ships carrying the troops and equipment to be landed at any one beach. Each convoy group will be commanded by an officer of the Navy of suitable rank, designated by the naval commander. The naval commander will furthermore organize and station the escort for the convoy groups, whether these convoy groups are proceeding in one, or more than one formation.

b. In the event that the expedition has for its major objective the establishment of the fleet in a base in a theater of operations normally controlled by the enemy, it is probable that all transports and cargo ships will be incorporated in the fleet train which includes the auxiliary vessels necessary for the logistic support of the fleet.

74. Navigation and defense.

a. Whatever the type of landing operations to be undertaken, the navigation and defense of the convoys of troop transports in joint overseas expeditions at sea are entirely under the direction of the Navy, and the Navy is responsible for the safe conduct of all the forces afloat included in the operations.

b. The Army personnel are passengers and do not interfere with the formation, route, or conduct of the expedition. The troops on board may be assigned certain duties such as that of lookouts, as may be directed by the commander of the transport through the commanding officer of troops on board.

75. Protection of the lines of supply (lines of communication).—The Navy is always responsible for the protection of the overseas lines of supply.

Section VI

The Landing (Including Preparations Therefor)

76. Joint plans.—Based upon the expeditionary force joint plan, all Army and Navy commanders of larger units operating together will prepare joint plans covering their operations in the landing phase.

77. Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders.—The joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders should, in general, include the necessary details concerning:

[91] **81. Employment of the Army forces.**

a. A landing against opposition is in effect the assault of an organized defensive position modified by substituting naval gunfire support for divisional, corps, and Army artillery, and generally Navy aircraft support for Army aircraft support. However, every effort will be made to utilize all possible aircraft support, both Army and Navy.

b. Three successive phases in the operations are to be expected, each being marked by an attack or attacks with limited objectives:

(1) **First phase.**—Seizure of the necessary terrain immediately in rear of

the beach, followed when sufficient strength has been landed by an advance to secure the beach from enemy light artillery fire. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line about 10,000 yards inland.

(2) *Second phase.*—Operations to insure further advance inland to a position which denies enemy medium artillery fire on the beach. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line at least 15,000 yards inland.

(3) *Third phase.*—Further land and air operations for securing the objectives for which the landing was undertaken.

c. Simultaneous landings will be made by as many combat teams on as broad a front as the boat facilities will permit, but not to the extent of causing undue dispersion.

d. So far as practicable, the disposition of the boats within boat divisions and the disposition of boat divisions within boat groups will be such as to land troops in the formations best suited to effect a landing and to seize a suitable beach head.

e. It is imperative that the landing be made on the beach by tactical units, even down to the squad, in order that tactical team unity may be preserved and the fighting power of the team be at the maximum at the moment of physical contact with the enemy.

f. In the day attack, assault platoons endeavor to develop all fire power practicable, making free use of machine guns while in the boats. In the night assaults, fire of the assaulting troops before reaching the beach will be used only as a last resort.

82. *Employment of the Naval forces.*

a. The commander of the naval attack force is responsible for the preparation of plans for and the actual operation of landing on [92] the beach of all personnel and material pertaining to the Army forces with which he is associated in accordance with Army debarkation tables; the support of the landing by gunfire; the employment of the Navy air forces in support of the Army; the maintenance of signal communications between the Army and Navy forces both afloat and in the air; all this in addition to the normal functions involved in protecting the forces against hostile naval attack.

b. If the distance from the transports to the beach is considerable, consideration should be given to towing the boats by mine sweepers or light surface craft as close to the beach as the depth of the water permits, in order to minimize confusion due to breakdown and failure to keep to the designated courses. However, every care should be exercised in the methods of handling boats and in boat formations to minimize excessive losses from hostile fire.

83. *Organization of the Army forces.*

a. The Army forces designated to land at each beach or group of beaches and the necessary reserves are organized into subordinate commands adhering to normal formations. In order to effect the closest possible cooperation, Army commanders of the various echelons should be embarked initially on the ships of the commanders of the corresponding naval echelons, as far as practicable.

b. As the beach or group of beaches at which the landing will prove successful cannot be foreseen, the appropriate echelons or command should provide for adequate, highly mobile reserves afloat which may be promptly moved to exploit the situations developing on shore.

84. *Naval organization for landing.*

a. Preparatory to landing, the transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels engaged in a joint overseas expedition will, if not already so organized, be organized into one or more *naval attack forces* and the forces so formed designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the term "right", "left", "center", etc. A naval officer will be designated to command each attack force. (See par. 48c.)

b. Such *naval attack force* is further subdivided into *task groups*, which will generally include the following:

(1) *The fire support group*, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned the following fire missions: [97] should be selected with a view of determining the enemy's weakest point.

b. Since tactical considerations governing the employment of the troops on shore are paramount, final decision as to the landing area of Army forces, its breadth, beaches to be used, and order of landing of the troops, will be made by the Army commander from among those areas and beaches that the Navy commander states are practicable so far as naval considerations are concerned.

a. Decision as to the hour of landing involves several factors which will be considered jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in charge of the operations.

b. Advantages of landing during darkness.—A landing before or just at daybreak greatly increases the chance of securing some measure of tactical surprise, materially lessens the efficacy of any fire the defense may employ except prearranged fires or defensive barrages, reduces the losses to be anticipated while the troops are in small boats, and prevents the enemy from gaining the necessary information on which to dispose his forces, particularly the reserves. Advantage may be taken of fog or smoke as a protection against searchlights and flares. However, fog and smoke may increase the difficulty of landing at the desired beaches.

c. Advantages of landing during daylight.—In a daylight landing the movements of both ships and small boats are made under favorable circumstances, as positions and courses can be accurately fixed and as troops can be loaded into small boats more easily than during darkness. Likewise, the attack is assured of better gunfire and air support, and better defense against mines, submarines, light naval forces, and hostile aviation. The attackers, by means of naval gunfire and aviation, are better able to pin the enemy to the ground and interdict movements of his reserves, thus preventing his exploitation of the fuller and more accurate information which daylight permits him to obtain.

d. Smoke.—In case the landing is not made under cover of darkness, the resulting disadvantage may, to some extent, be overcome by the use of smoke. A smoke screen laid by destroyers or aircraft may be utilized to conceal the movements and dispositions [98] of the transport groups, while an airplane smoke screen laid on hostile positions when known or at the shore line may serve to protect the small boats from hostile fire and at the same time keep the enemy in doubt as to the exact strength and point of attack. In planning for the use of smoke the direction and velocity of the wind must be carefully considered.

e. Daylight essential for exploitation.—The landing must be made early enough to allow sufficient daylight for the Army forces to reach their first objectives.

f. Other considerations.—In addition to the above considerations, a particular combination of tide, wind, fog, or moon may be desirable in selecting the hour as well as the day for the landing.

g. Final decision as to the hour of landing will be made by the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command, or jointly by the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation.

90. Approach to and occupation of landing area.

a. The approach to the landing area and the occupation of the sea area included therein are conducted under orders of the commander of the naval attack force or forces. Careful calculation must be made as to the time required to embark the troops into the leading boat groups and the length of time required to reach the beach. This result is applied to the previously determined hour for the landing and the approach so conducted that the transports will be in position at the time required. In order to minimize risk of detection as well as torpedo attack by enemy submarines, vessels should not be required to arrive within the landing area until they are needed. Where hydrography allows, transports may be anchored in water of such depth as to afford protection against hostile submarines. It is highly desirable that the submarine danger be eliminated prior to making landings. Submarine nets may be used to protect transport groups.

b. When the waters of the proposed landing area are known or suspected of being mined, breaches must be made before the landings begin. The necessary mine sweeping is performed by the Navy.

c. The Navy is responsible for the demolition or removal, when possible, of underwater obstacles near the beach. Consideration will be given to the possibility of destroying such underwater obstacles as barbed-wire entanglements by cutting devices rigged on the small boats of the assault wave.

[101] prearranged schedule on targets visible from the firing ships, from observation points on land, or from spotting aircraft. Concentrations should be placed on other targets as they disclose themselves by groups specially designated beforehand. Although possible, map firing should be employed only as a last resort; observed firing is always to be preferred. However, liberal use should be made of maps in the designation of artillery objectives in the plan of fire support.

c. Reduced charges may be used to advantage in cases where the design of the gun permits this. High angle fire may be obtained by the design, manu-

facture, and supply of artillery for the particular purpose of supporting a landing force in joint operations. Naval anti-aircraft guns will be used throughout against enemy air operations, but if not needed for this purpose they may be used advantageously against shore objectives.

d. The gunfire support furnished by the naval forces should be continuous. It will usually start with a preparation fire and continue throughout the successive stages of the landing until the limit of range of guns is reached or until the Army's own artillery is in a position to furnish adequate support. During the time the troops are disembarking from the transports into the leading boat groups and until the leading boats reach the beach, the fire will be placed on known hostile artillery positions, organized strong points, machine-gun nests, defiles on routes over which supports and reserves must pass and, generally, on such other objectives the neutralization of which will lessen the enemy's defense. Artillery support plans will provide for effective fire on the beach to cover the movement of the leading waves ashore. Just before our troops reach the shore the fire will lift to targets farther inland. The terrain beyond the beach will influence the amount of lifting of the fire. In any event it must be kept far enough in advance of our infantry to assure against losses from our own fire.

e. There are two general methods which may be employed by naval forces in affording artillery support in a forced landing where two or more Army divisions land simultaneously. One is to keep all firing units centralized under the highest commander; the other is to decentralize naval support groups to support subordinate Army [102] units. The following are examples of the second method: When two infantry divisions land simultaneously and the naval units have been divided into two naval attack forces, it might be desirable to have the naval vessels of one naval attack force support one division, and the naval vessels of the other naval attack force support the other division, or to divide the naval force into three supporting groups—one being assigned to support each division and one to support the operation as a whole; or a division might be made by calibers, the large caliber main batteries of large ships being assigned to general support while the smaller caliber secondary batteries are assigned to support subordinate units to include divisions, and sometimes brigades.

94. *Cooperation in gunfire support.*

a. Complete plans for gunfire support should be worked out prior to embarkation between the commanders of the naval groups which are to give the support and of the respective Army units they are to support. Army commanders will indicate the objectives upon which they desire fire, the purpose of the fire, and the times they are to be fired upon. The naval commander concerned will indicate exactly how much of the desired support he can give. In case the Navy has not sufficient guns to cover the desired objectives, every effort will be made to secure additional ships rather than defeat the Army plan by reducing below the minimum the artillery support required by it.

b. Since the effectiveness with which naval gunfire support plans and orders are carried out is largely dependent upon the maintenance of adequate liaison and communications between shore and ship, such plans and orders should include adequate provisions for the installation and maintenance of all means necessary to assure this. To assist in securing effective support, liaison officers will be interchanged between Army and Navy units. Advantageous use may be made of Army officers of artillery organizations which do not debark initially. All liaison officers should report to the headquarters to which assigned in plenty of time—probably prior to embarkation—to become thoroughly familiar with their duties. They should be sufficiently familiar with the other service as to be able to interpret the desires and needs of the commanders of the units whom [103] they represent in the case of Army liaison officers and the capabilities of naval firing groups in the case of naval liaison officers.

c. In addition to normal communication through the beach master as provided in paragraph 101 a, each naval liaison officer should have direct communication with his commander whom he represents. For this purpose each should be accompanied by a signal party with facilities for maintaining radio and visual communications with his commander.

95. *Debarkation of troops.*

a. A wave is defined in paragraph 48r. The organization of the troops of each wave, with the time of arrival at the beach, is determined by the debarkation tables which are prepared by the Army officer commanding the unit. Such organization is based on best information on hand and upon information received

from the naval attack force commander as to availability and capacity of boats.

b. The tactical requirement of deployment in depth will cause the debarkation to be made in successive waves.

c. The number of waves to be under way at the same time will depend upon the tactical plan and the number and kind of boats available. After the initial tactical force has been carried ashore by successive waves, the remaining Army units will be sent ashore in as orderly and expeditious a manner as is feasible by the use of such boats and lighters as remain available, unless the necessity for tactical formations demands continuation of movement by waves.

d. The Navy is responsible that the waves are so spaced that they will arrive at the beach in the order and at the time intervals requested by the Army.

e. In order to reduce the time that the troops may be under fire in the boats, it is desirable that small, fast, power boats be used for the leading boat groups, the larger and slower boats being reserved for succeeding boat groups in which larger groupings are not objectionable. The provision of special boats for the purpose of landing the troops is highly desirable and is a duty of the Navy.

f. All boats of the leading boat groups should mount machine guns to be manned by either the Army or Navy, and should be provided with as much protection as possible against the effects of small-arms and machine-gun fire directed at them from the beaches and from aircraft.

[104] g. All boats used for landing troops, equipment, or supplies will be manned by Navy crews and commanded by Navy personnel.

96. Debarkation of supplies and light equipment.

a. The plan covering the landing phase will provide for the supply of the troops on shore. Their needs must be foreseen and transports loaded in accordance with the plan of supply. The first administrative orders to be issued after landing will be prepared, at least in tentative draft form before the expedition sails.

b. Troops usually carry only enough rations and ammunition upon landing to last 1 or 2 days. However, a beach reserve of rations and ammunition for at least 10 days should be built up as soon as possible, preferably from supplies carried in the transports for this purpose. Ordinarily, a few stores other than ammunition and water can be unloaded and landed on the first day.

c. The troops embarked in each boat group should carry the signal communication equipment appropriate to the units involved.

d. Debarkation of supplies and equipment and the priorities therefor should be provided in the Army debarkation tables.

97. Debarkation of artillery and other heavy equipment.

a. The plan of debarkation should avoid encumbering the troops embarked in the leading boat groups with nonessential equipment. Field artillery, though difficult to land, is essential. The landing of field artillery heavier in weight than light artillery upon open beaches is difficult, and the terrain may be such as to make the prompt movement or employment of such artillery, after landing impracticable. In favorable situations, on a good beach, a small amount of light artillery and tanks may be landed early. Such artillery will usually have to be moved into position by hand. Light tractors suitable for moving field guns into position can be debarked more easily than animals.

b. There are no suitable boats at present carried by vessels of war or merchant ships for transporting a large amount of army supplies or the heavier army equipment, such as medium field artillery pieces, tanks, motor trucks, airplanes. Special barges or lighters, preferably self-propelled, should be provided by the Navy for this purpose prior to embarkation.

c. All equipment and supplies which cannot be handled easily from boats to shore require improvised ramps and piers and some special naval equipment for handling. For landing a limited [105] amount of light equipment and supplies to accompany troops, the Navy will require small sheltered bights or inlets along the coast, and for handling the bulk of supplies and heavier Army equipment, fairly well protected harbors with temporary piers and wharves and appliances for unloading.

98. *Debarkation of animals.*—The number of animals that can be debarked or handled on an open beach is limited, yet provision will have to be made for transportation, debarkation, and landing of some animals, probably early in the operations. The Army will provide for the supply of proper slings, transportation stalls, and such other equipment as will facilitate the handling of the animals to be landed. Tidal currents should be considered in swimming animals ashore. Animals may be debarked as follows: From the transport to small boats by using flying stalls; from the boats into the water by ducking ramps; from the transports into mine sweepers or similar light craft, by flying stalls

or slings; from mine sweepers or similar light craft into the water by slings or a ducking ramp; from the transport into the water by slings.

99. Debarkation of air forces.

a. The method of debarking Army air units will depend upon the plans for their initial employment and the manner in which transported.

b. When the situation is such that it has been planned to transport Army aircraft crated, and not to use them until a suitable landing field has been secured as a result of the seizure of a beach head, the aircraft will not be debarked until suitable means for transferring them from ship to shore are available. Such a situation would exist when the operation was directed against an enemy known to be unable to offer effective air opposition to the landing operation.

c. However, the normal situation will require a maximum employment of all available air force, Army and Navy. Every effort should be made to transport Army aircraft so that they can participate in the initial operations. Navy aircraft carriers are taxed to capacity to care for their own planes and usually would not be available for handling Army aircraft; but if available should be used.

[106] d. Often it will be possible to debark aircraft at some distance from the landing area of the main operation, but within flight reach. The seizure and protection of a suitable area may constitute a secondary landing operation. Such an operation might be carried out in advance of the main operation, in order to make additional aircraft available to participate in the latter, but at the possible sacrifice of secrecy.

e. A favorable situation is one in which the area selected for the operation is within flight distance of friendly territory, thus permitting Army air units, flying from such territory, to participate in the initial phase of the operation.

100. Supply of water to the troops.—If the landing is made during hot weather or in a tropical climate, the amount of water that can be carried may be considerably less than the landing troops require. When there are no facilities for supply of water ashore in the landing area, arrangements must be made by the Navy to furnish water for the troops ashore. The Army's estimate and the Navy's arrangements for the water supply must be liberal. Allowance will be made for loss of water and containers, including damage by hostile fire. Until the tactical situation ashore permits water being delivered by water boats to be provided by the Navy, at least one cask of water will be placed in each boat going ashore. Plans will provide for the continuous supply of water by the Navy until the Army has developed its supply ashore.

101. Organization of the beach.

a. *The beachmaster* is a naval officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The beachmaster has complete control of the beach from the high-water mark seaward; of all naval operations thereat, together with all landing facilities. He causes the beach to be promptly marked to facilitate its recognition by approaching waves; organizes, maintains, and controls all communication with the Navy; transmits all Army messages from shore to ship, and receives and transmits to the shore party commander all messages from ship to shore which apply to the Army except as provided in paragraph 94 c; and cooperates with the shore party commander. The beachmaster and a few of his principal assistants land with the leading boat groups. [107]

The beachmasters headquarters should be provided with such protection from enemy fire as may be practicable. Previously trained Army artillery and Army air corps liaison personnel, in addition to competent naval communication personnel, will be established at the beachmaster's communication center, so that messages may be transmitted in terms and manner to which each service is accustomed.

b. The shore party commander is an Army Officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The shore party commander takes charge of all engineer and labor troops, equipment, and supplies on arrival at the beach; organizes the beach facilities, such as the establishment of dumps, collecting stations, and prisoners' inclosures; establishes information and message centers; facilitate the movement of all troop inland; and cooperates with the beachmaster. The shore party commander lands with the leading combat team.

c. *Military police.*—Confusion is likely to occur at the beaches, due to the irregular arrival of troops and supplies, hostile fire, movement of wounded and stragglers to the rear, and to the arrival of runners with messages. It is necessary, therefore, to have the beach well policed, and a sufficient number of military police should be detailed to assist the shore party commander.

d. An engineer party will be landed with or soon after the first troops. The shore party commander will detail necessary engineers to assist the beachmaster in establishing at once improved landing places for boats and in removing obstructions. A wharf of some kind is usually the next work, and it must be completed with the least possible delay. Army ponton equipment may be valuable for this purpose, and such equipment should be loaded with a view to its early use. The shore party commander will arrange for the construction of routes of communication to the interior. The location of these routes of communication may be determined by a study of maps beforehand, and this will be done wherever practicable.

e. *Boat repair party.*—Casualties to the hulls of boats and to the machinery of power boats due to enemy fire, sea conditions, and the hazards of landing on open beaches will likely occur at a high rate. It is desirable, therefore, to land as soon as practicable a repair party, including carpenters' mates, machinists' mates, and electricians' mates, under competent leadership, to assist the beachmaster in salvaging and repairing damaged boats.

f. *Medical service.*

(1) The Army evacuates to the shore line; the Navy is responsible from the shore line to the shore line at the base port, where the Army again becomes responsible.

(2) Attached medical troops will accompany combat units, taking with them the necessary supplies to meet initial requirements. Such mobile medical installations as are established at the beachhead do not carry out definitive treatment. This will be carried out on shore after fixed hospital units have been landed and established. As soon as sufficient terrain has been secured to afford protection, additional medical facilities, such as collecting stations, ambulances, hospital stations, and evacuation hospitals, in the order named, will be landed. Until a systematic service is provided, such evacuation as is practicable will be handled by the beachmaster from shore to ship in such manner as will not interfere with landing of essential troops and supplies. Systematic evacuation of all cases to hospital ships or transports will be established as early as practicable. A plan of evacuation will be prepared prior to debarkation of the expeditionary forces.

g. *Marking routes inland.*—It is highly important that all Army units thoroughly understand and have identified routes inland. Each unit will mark promptly and plainly its routes inland, together with location of message and information centers. This marking will be displayed so as to be visible from seaward only.

102. *Subsidiary landings.*

a. In addition to the main landing, certain subsidiary landings may be advantageous, namely, those pertaining to demonstrations or feints, and those which may be termed secondary landings.

b. *Demonstrations or feints* have as their missions the diversion of enemy reserves from the area of the main effort, or the retarding of the movement of enemy reserves thereto. To be effective they must be directed against objectives of importance to the enemy. They also should be so coordinated as to time and directed against points at such a distance from the area of the main landing that they will insure, to a reasonable degree, the containing of the forces

[111] 107. *Naval support.*

a. The operations of the Navy forces during a withdrawal of the Army forces from the shore are similar to those during a landing operation, the phases occurring in reverse order.

b. In addition to providing the sea transportation and the small boats to reembark the Army forces, including crews to man the boats, the Navy will be prepared to furnish gunfire and air support during the withdrawal. The Navy will, as in the case of the initial stages of the landing operation, provide for signal communications between ship and shore until the last unit is evacuated.

Section VIII

Communications

108. *Plans.*

a. In accordance with paragraph 54a (8), provision must be made for communications between forces. While the particular situation and the designated directive will greatly influence the preparation of specific instructions, the following general directive should apply to all such plans, in order that advance preparations, including training, may be accomplished and any obstacles to the successful culmination of the plans may be avoided.

b. The joint communication plan and the communication plans of subordinate commanders of both the Army and the Navy shall cover the following phases:

- (1) Movement overseas.
- (2) Landing.
- (3) Operations subsequent to landing.

c. All communication plans shall include:

- (1) Frequency plans.
- (2) Provisions for communication security.
- (3) Provisions for radio intelligence.
- (4) Designation of procedure to be followed.

(5) Requirements that portable radio sets and other communication material be tested prior to embarkation.

[112] 109. *Communications between ship and shore.*—Efficient signal communications between ship and shore are of primary importance. It is the duty of the Navy to establish and maintain, through the beachmaster, necessary signal communications facilities for both Navy and Army requirements. The Army communication net ashore will be connected up with the Navy's communication center at the beachmaster's headquarters. The Army prolongs its axis of signal communications inland as the attack progresses. In this connection see paragraph 94c.

110. *General.*—In drawing up communication plans reference should be made to paragraphs 63b; 77b; 82a 93a; 94c; 98c; 101a, b, c, d, and g; 104; 107b; 108; and 109.

[129]

CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in paragraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The [130] board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O.

[133] defense are required to be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

Section V

Joint Merchant Vessel Board

136. The Joint Army and Navy Board of Survey of Merchant Vessels was established August 21, 1916, as the result of an agreement entered into by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy approved the final form of the agreement on August 2, 1916, and the Secretary of War on August 19, 1916. In order to simplify the name of the board it was changed to "The Joint Merchant Vessel Board." This change in name was approved by the Secretary of War April 30, 1917, and by the Secretary of the Navy May 5, 1917. The board consists of one Army officer and three Navy officers as members, with one of the latter acting as recorder.

137. The board inspects and classifies merchant vessels with a view to their possible use in war. The board is assisted by local sections consisting of Army and Navy officers who conduct the actual inspection.

Section VI

Local Joint Planning Committees

138. The authority for agencies for cooperation between Army and Navy activities within departments, armies, and corps areas of the Army and naval districts is War Department G. O. No. 19, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 103, 1923. Commanding generals of departments, armies, and/or corps areas, and commandants of naval districts whose headquarters are in the same vicinity, appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a permanent local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters for a given department, army, corps area, or district are widely separated, more than one planning committee may be organized. In addition, the commanding general and the commandant of the naval district [134] designate one or more officers on their staffs through whom close contact with other services is maintained.

139. The local joint planning committee takes cognizance of questions referred to it by proper authority and originates questions on such local subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. Its reports and recommendations are made jointly to the commanding general and commandant of the naval district concerned.

Section VII

Joint Economy Board

140. The authority for the Joint Economy Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 11, 1933, and Navy Department G. O. No. 237, 1933. The board is charged with the continuing responsibility of investigating and reporting to The Joint Board on economies which can be effected, from time to time, without loss of efficiency, by the elimination of overlap or the simplification of functioning in those activities of the War and Navy Departments concerned with joint operations of the two services or which have approximately parallel functions.

141. The membership of the Joint Economy Board will comprise five or more officers from each service and will include the following:

a. For the Army.—The Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch and four other officers of the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department.

b. For the Navy.—The Assistant Budget Officer, Navy Department; the Director, Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Director, Material Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; an officer from the Shore Establishments Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and an officer from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (not below the rank of commander).

142. The Secretary of the Joint Economy Board will be detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

143. Reports and recommendations of the Joint Economy Board will be presented to The Joint Board for action.

[137]

CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section A

Policy for Coordination of Radio Activities of the Army and Navy

1. Joint Board reports, J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 183), of January 16, 1923, "Utilization of the radio services of the War and Navy Departments for the transmission of Government dispatches," and J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 253), "Proposed draft of Executive Orders re regulation of radio in the event of war or national emergency," are rescinded. The following policy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is published for information and guidance:

I. Purpose of Radio Policy.

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and Navy in the development of radio material, the establishment of radio stations, and in the conduct of radio activities.

II. Basic Policy.

3. The Army and Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations as, augmented by private and [138] other Government-owned radio facilities, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of a militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated radio system adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation on expenditure imposed by economy.

III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

¹ NOTE.—Ch. IX—Communications—is a reprint of ch. VI—Communications, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1927, and is effective until completion of revision now in progress. Paragraph numbering of old ch. VI is retained pending revision.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

- (a) To the Army in radio communication—
 - (1) With and between Army units wherever located.
 - (2) Within the Territory of Alaska.
 - (3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.
- (b) To the Army in radio intelligence—
 - (1) For the Army wherever operating.

[Id] C.J.A.3.

CHANGE NO. 3, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 319-1 (Serial 653).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, June 28, 1940.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages.

Page Nos.	Subject matter
Id-Is.....	Promulgation of Change No. 3.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated.

Old page Nos.	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa 137-164.....	C. J. A. 3—List of effective pages (revised June 28, 1940) Chapter IX, revised, with diagrams Nos. I and II.

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBEX,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
United States Army, Secretary.

1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[II]

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

[Revised June 28, 1940]

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only)	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936	1***	1-1a
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938	2	1b-1c
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940	3	1d-1e
List of effective pages	3	1f-1g
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935	Original	III-IV**
Contents	2	V-VI
Contents, Part I	2	VII
Contents, Part I, continued	Original	VIII
Chapter I	"	1-2
Chapter I, continued	1	3-4**
Chapter II	2	5-6
Chapter III	2	11
Chapter III, continued	Original	12 to 16**
Chapter IV	"	17
Chapter IV, continued	2	18
Chapter IV, continued	Original	19-20**
Contents, Part II	"	21-22**
Contents, Chapter V	"	23-26
Chapter V	2	27
Chapter V, continued	Original	28 to 41
Chapter V, continued	2	42 to 44
Chapter V, continued	Original	45 to 47
Chapter V, continued	2	48
Chapter V, continued	Original	49 to 64
Chapter V, continued	2	65-66
Chapter V, continued	Original	67
Chapter V, continued	2	68
Contents, Chapter VI	2	69
Contents, Chapter VI, continued	Original	70 to 72
Chapter VI	"	73 to 76
Chapter VI, continued	2	77 to 80
Chapter VI, continued	Original	81-82
Chapter VI, continued	2	83-84

*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[IIa]

C.J.A.3

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Chapter VI, continued	Original	85-86
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Chapter VI, continued	Original	88 to 90
Chapter VI, continued	2	91
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Chapter VI, continued	2	98
Chapter VI, continued	Original	99-100
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Chapter VI, continued	Original	108 to 110
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Chapter VI, continued	Original	112
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Chapter VII	"	115 to 126**
Contents, Chapter VIII	"	127-128**
Chapter VIII	2	129-130
Chapter VIII, continued	1	131-132
Chapter VIII, continued	Original	133
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Chapter VIII, continued	Original	135-136**
Chapter IX	3	137-164
Chart of Organization for Coastal Frontier Defense	Original	No number
Diagram No. I, Coastal Frontier. Joint Radio and Wire Communication	3	No number
Diagram No. II, Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase. Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach	3	No number

**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128 and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[157]

CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Policy For Coordination of Radio Activities of the Army and Navy

1. Joint Board reports, J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 183), of January 16, 1923, "Utilization of the radio services of the War and Navy Departments for the transmission of Government dispatches," and J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 253), "Proposed draft of Executive Orders re regulation of radio in the event of war or national emergency," are rescinded. The following policy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is published for information and guidance:

I. Purpose of Radio Policy.

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and Navy in the development of radio material, the establishment of radio stations, and in the conduct of radio activities.

II. Basic Policy.

3. The Army and Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations as, augmented by private and other Government-owned radio facilities, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of a military controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated radio system adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation on expenditure imposed by economy.

[158] *III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.*

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

(a) To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

(b) To the Army in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Army wherever operating.

(c) To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever

¹ Ch. IX—Revised and republished June 28, 1940. Section I of the revised Chapter IX is a republication of old Section A, with a redesignation of the section. Paragraph numbering of old Section A, 1 to 9, is retained pending revision and republication of Section I. Section II is new matter replacing old Section B the contents of which is withdrawn from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and issued as a separate document under a "restricted" classification. Paragraphing in Section II begins with 156.

located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea, exclusive of Army vessels, except such of the latter as may have been placed under Navy control in case of war or national emergency.

[139] (4) For the establishment and operation of radio-compass stations along the coasts of the United States, Alaska, overseas possessions, or occupied foreign territory.

(d) To the Navy in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Navy wherever operating.

V. War-time Jurisdiction over Nonmilitary Radio.

6. In time of national emergency, when directed by the President according to law, the Army and the Navy will assume jurisdiction as follows:

(a) The Army and Navy shall each assume complete control over such nonmilitary radio stations as may be allocated to them by the President to augment their peace-time facilities.

(b) For purposes of censorship and supervision over such nonmilitary radio stations as are permitted to operate:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to the Navy in the following paragraph:

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

(c) For the purpose of suppression of unauthorized radio:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama, and in insular possessions or foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions or foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

VI. Principles to be Observed in Radio Coordination.

7. Coordination in radio operation will be effected:

(a) In the development of types of radio equipment suitable for intercommunication.

(b) By the assignment of call letters, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption of a common procedure, and the formulation of codes and ciphers for joint Army and Navy communication.

(c) All air radio stations of the Navy and air radio stations of the Army along the coast and in the insular and outlying possessions shall be equipped to send and receive on a common intermediate frequency and a common high frequency, and all aircraft carrying radio, except fighting and pursuit planes, shall as soon as practicable, [140] consistent with proper economy, be equipped to send and receive on one of these common frequencies.

(d) The radio field sets provided for the use of the Marine Corps on shore shall be capable of intercommunication with the radio provided for the operation of similarly equipped units of the Army.

(e) The radio communication equipment provided for the vessels of the Army Transport Service shall be of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class and shall be capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication.

VII. Coordination with Radio Stations of Other Departments and Civilian Stations During Peace.

8. Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the radio act of 1927 (secs. 6, 8, and 25).

VIII. Coordination of Development Programs.

9. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peace-time radio operation and operational

development of the two services. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendation for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy and will coordinate technical radio matters of joint concern to the two services.

Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 24, 1927.

[141]

Section II

Doctrines and Guides Governing Communication (Signal) Effectiveness in Joint Operations of the Army and the Navy

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Subsection I—General

156. Effective signal communication in joint operations of the Army and Navy requires—

- a. The interconnection of the appropriate elements of the Army and the Navy by the appropriate means of signal communication.
- b. Joint communication (signal) training.
- c. The preparation and proper distribution of important items of information and instructions governing signal communication.
- d. Appropriate provisions for communication security.
- e. Adequate provision for cryptographing.

157. The information presented hereinafter should serve as a guide, to indicate—

- a. The elements that are to be interconnected during joint operations.
- [142] b. The distribution that should normally be given important items of information and instructions governing signal communication.
- c. The cryptographic systems to be employed in joint operations.
- d. The essentials of a Joint Communication (Signal) Plan.

158. *Miscellaneous considerations.*—Details for communication between the Army and the Navy shall be made by the senior officers of the two services in the area concerned. The following items are here presented for the guidance of all concerned:

a. *Liaison officers.*—The importance of detailing qualified liaison officers for joint operations is indicated in chapter V, section V, paragraph 42i(15) and in chapter VI, section II, paragraph 51.

b. *Means and methods of communication.*—All suitable means of communication are to be considered available for joint use. When a choice is available, the most reliable means should be selected, with due consideration for speed and security. Attention is particularly invited to the advantages of effecting simultaneous delivery of messages to numerous addressees by radio broadcasting (F-method) without obtaining a receipt, or by teletype in case addressees are all on a teletype net. Scheduled F-method radio transmissions should usually be on an especially prescribed frequency and should be regularly copied by most addressees. Such transmissions should be relayed to those addressees who either are not able to copy, or are not required to copy them. However, F-method

transmissions may be made at any time on the same frequency as that usually employed for the 2-way R-method (i. e., in which receipts are obtained for each message transmitted).

c. Precedence.—In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, messages of the same precedence, whether originating in the Army or the Navy, will be handled in the order of filing for transmission, or of receipt for relaying. Messages are divided into precedence groups to show the relative order in which they shall be transmitted and acted upon. This order is as follows:

(1) The URGENT designation is reserved for messages requiring the greatest speed of handling. Any message designated as URGENT will be sent immediately upon receipt, except when communication involving another URGENT message is being carried on. URGENT precedence is reserved for use during combat, or when combat is imminent, real or simulated, to indicate that the message so designated conveys the most important orders, information or request pertaining to the combat, [143] and thus requires immediate attention. A primary example of this type of message is a so-called Army "flash" message which is employed to report air observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of air forces. For joint communication purposes, an Army "flash" message may be considered to be an urgent message of the highest priority. A primary example of a Navy message of the highest priority is a major contact report.

(2) The PRIORITY designation is reserved for messages of less urgency than those entitled to URGENT precedence, but of such nature as to warrant precedence ahead of messages designated as ROUTINE or DEFERRED. Any message designated as PRIORITY will be transmitted before any routine or deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* routine or deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a PRIORITY message.

(3) The ROUTINE designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic most expeditiously. Any message designated as ROUTINE usually will be transmitted before any deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a ROUTINE message.

(4) The DEFERRED designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence, and whose delivery to the addressee may be delayed until the beginning of office hours following the day on which they are filed. This will sometimes necessitate transmission of Deferred messages ahead of Routine messages, in order to effect delivery before the time indicated.

d. Address and signature.—While all official messages will be sent by authority of the commanding officer, no signature will ordinarily be transmitted. Messages intended for an addressee on board a ship or airplane, or within a command on shore, will be routed by use of the appropriate call sign of the ship, airplane, or shore command. Delivery to any specific addressee within the ship, airplane or shore command is a function of the command to which delivered. [144] If call signs are assigned for joint use to particular commanders, as well as to particular ships, airplanes and shore commands, such commander call signs may also be employed to indicate routing, addressees and originators.

e. Use of clear or cryptographic language.—The general rules governing the use of clear and cryptographic language are set forth in subsection IV of this chapter, wherein communication security is discussed.

f. Operating instructions and procedure.—Operating instructions are special instructions for transmitting, receiving, and when required, for relaying messages. These instructions are set forth in a separate restricted pamphlet entitled, "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure."

g. Time.

(1) The time of origin is the time at which the message is released or authenticated by the originator. If this time does not appear on the message, it will be the time when the message is filed for transmission.

(2) The time of origin in joint communications is expressed in the 24-hour clock system and transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour.

Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 0600 and 7:43 P. M. is 1943.

(3) For communication within the Army, the 12-hour clock system is used.

Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 600 A, and 7:43 P. M. is 743 P.

h. Dates.

(1) The date is expressed for joint communication purposes by two figures *preceding* the time of origin, indicating the day of the month. If the date number is less than ten, it is always preceded by zero. For example, the first day of the month is 01, and the tenth day is 10. "071626" means date was 7th day of month, and time of origin was 1626.

(2) The month and year may be added to the date and time of origin group when necessary for reference purposes in the text of messages. For example: "Your 071626 DEC 1938" means "Referring to your message, with time of origin 1626 on the 7th day of December 1938 * * *".

[145] (3) In the text of messages, if times indicated are not given particular descriptions, the time prescribed for use by the originator shall be understood.

i. Addressees.—In drafting messages, the various classes of addressees may be indicated:

- (1) Action addressees.
- (2) Information addressees.
- (3) Both action and information addressees.

Subsection II—Coastal Frontier Defense

159. *Joint channels and means of intercommunication* (See ch. V, Sec. III, Par. 32*h* (3) and Diagram I.).—The radio, visual, and wire communication which *may* be required between the two services in joint coastal frontier defense operations are indicated below. Certain Army-to-Army communication circuits and certain Navy-to-Navy communication circuits are also included where considered desirable to indicate the more important of such circuits. No attempt has been made herein to prescribe the number of separate circuits to be provided between stations. The number and the type of circuits should be determined in each case by the nature and amount of the traffic to be transmitted and by geographical considerations. If practicable, separate wire circuits should be provided for command, intelligence, and administration.

a. Coastal frontier headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Various naval district headquarters within the coastal frontier.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Various naval district headquarters within the coastal frontier.

b. Corps area headquarters.

- (1) Wire to: Nearest naval district headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters.

c. Sector headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Nearest naval district headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters.

d. Subsector headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters from those subsector headquarters that are identical with defensive coastal area headquarters and harbor defense headquarters and forts.

[146] (3) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol. This communication will necessarily be on the frequency assigned for communication between ships and inshore patrol headquarters. Subsector headquarters normally only intercepts radio messages from the inshore patrol to inshore patrol headquarters, but may transmit also, when necessary.

(4) Wire through: Sector headquarters to nearest naval district headquarters—for receiving information from the offshore patrol.

e. Harbor Defense Headquarters.

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol headquarters from harbor defense headquarters that are located at forts.

f. Forts (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters through subsector headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol headquarters.

g. Army aviation headquarters.

- (1) Radio (1)* to: Navy airplanes, when required.
- (2) Wire to: Navy air station (if in coastal frontier).
- (3) Radio (2)* to: Navy air stations.

(1) *See par. 160—Aircraft communication principles.

(2) *Indicates radio two ways—for transmitting and receiving, to be placed in operation if wire is not available, or fails for any reason.

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h. Army reconnaissance airplanes (1) (5)**

(1) Radio to: (a) Navy airplanes (in emergencies and/or when jointly engaged in a mission).

(b) Navy air station (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

(c) Inshore patrol (via inshore patrol headquarters when engaged in joint missions with the inshore patrol).

(d) Offshore patrol ships (in emergencies and when Army airplanes are assigned offshore patrol missions).

[147] (2) Visual to: Inshore and offshore patrols.

i. Army and Navy airplanes (combat) (1) (When present in coastal frontier defense).*

(1) Radio (4)* to: (a) (For air command purposes) between squadron, group, and higher commanders of Army and Navy joint task force elements.

(b) (For air and air-ground liaison purposes) between reconnaissance and scouting airplanes, and the commander of the joint task force. Also, between squadron, group, and higher commanders of Army and Navy joint task force elements. Between reconnaissance aviation or bombardment aviation and the following:

1. To elements of the fleet at sea (if present).

2. To the joint task force headquarters—air (Army or Navy). Also, between pursuit, fighter, and bombardment aviation and Navy air station and/or Army aviation headquarters from which operating as well as with the headquarters of antiaircraft regiments and antiaircraft gun battalions (for recognition purposes).

j. Navy airplanes (1) (5)*.*

(1) Radio to: (a) Army airplanes (in emergencies and/or when jointly engaged in a mission).

(b) Army aviation headquarters (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

[148] (2) Visual to: Land antiaircraft defenses

k. Navy air station (If present in coastal frontier).

(1) Radio (1)* (5)* to: Army airplanes (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

(2) Wire to: Army aviation headquarters.

(3) Radio (2)* to: Army aviation headquarters.

l. Offshore patrol ships (Navy).

(1) Radio (1)* (5)* to: Army airplanes (in emergencies and when Army airplanes are assigned offshore patrol missions).

m. Inshore patrol ships (Navy).

(1) Radio (1)* to: (a) Army airplanes, via inshore patrol headquarters when engaged in joint missions with inshore patrol.

(b) Forts.

(c) Subsector headquarters (when identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters).

(2) Visual to: Batteries, forts.

(3) Visual to: Those subsector headquarters which are identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters.

(4) Visual to: Outpost forces (if present).

n. Inshore patrol headquarters.

(1) Wire to: Subsector headquarters.

(2) Wire to: Harbor defense headquarters.

(3) Radio (2)* to: (a) Subsector headquarters (if identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters).

(b) Harbor defense headquarters when located at forts having radio facilities.

[149] *o. Naval district headquarters (3)*.*

(1) Wire to: Nearest corps area headquarters.

(2) Wire to: Nearest subsector headquarters.

(3) Wire to: Coastal frontier headquarters.

(4) Wire to: Nearest sector headquarters.

(5) Radio (2)* to: Coastal frontier headquarters.

(6) Radio (2)* to: Nearest corps area headquarters.

(1)*See par. 160—Aircraft communication principles.

(2)*Indicates radio two ways—for transmitting and receiving, to be placed in operation if wire is not available, or fails for any reason.

(3)*In certain areas it may be practicable and desirable for communication purposes to have various shore headquarters located in the same building, or sufficiently close to facilitate intercommunication and cooperation.

(4)*Not shown on diagram I, being too variable.

(5)*Circuits for use in emergencies are not shown on diagram I.

(7) Radio (2)* to: Nearest subsector and sector headquarters.

(8) Wire to: Information Center, Aircraft Warning Service.

p. Coastal force.

(1) Radio to: (a) Naval district headquarters.

(b) Commander offshore patrol.

q. Escort force.

(1) Radio to: (a) Naval district headquarters.

(b) Commander offshore patrol.

(2) Visual to: Army and Navy units as necessary.

160. *Aircraft communication principles.*—The following principles governing aircraft communication should usually be observed in joint coastal frontier defense:

a. When Army or Navy airplanes are used jointly as a part of a task force organization, the frequencies for communication would be as prescribed by the Army or Navy commander of the task force.

b. When not otherwise specifically provided, Army airplanes will work with Army ground stations and Navy airplanes will work with Navy stations afloat or ashore.

c. In emergencies, if the Army wishes to communicate directly with a Navy airplane, the Army will utilize a frequency which is known to be guarded by that Navy airplane. Similarly, when the Navy wishes to communicate directly with an Army airplane, the Navy will utilize a frequency which is known to be guarded by that Army airplane.

d. Airplanes will not be required to shift frequency for joint communication purposes while in the air. Any airplane which is able to communicate on more than one frequency at a time may do so when required.

[150] e. It is expected that those various commands of the Army and Navy, which may have need of information to be transmitted by particular aircraft of either service, will, whenever practicable, arrange to receive such information direct, by having receiver (intercept) watches set on the aircraft frequencies involved.

f. Normally, all joint radio communication, except for command purposes between airplanes in flight, should be by radiotelegraph.

161. *Aircraft warning service.*—The various elements of the Army and the Navy involved in joint operations must be interlinked with an Aircraft Warning Service Information Center in a communication net that will insure the prompt receipt and distribution of warnings of the approach of enemy aircraft. While the elements included in this net will vary according to conditions, the information center should usually be connected with the following for the purpose indicated:

The reception of warnings from—

Civilian reporting stations.

Army elements:

Ground reporting stations.

Aviation elements engaged in missions which would enable them to advise of approach of hostile aircraft.*

All Army elements in a position to report the approach of hostile craft.

Naval elements:

Escort Force.*

Coastal Force.*

Offshore patrol:

Airplanes*

Ships*

Inshore patrol:

Airplanes*

Ships*

Naval direction finder stations.*

Coast Guard stations:

Lighthouses.

[151] The distribution of warnings to—

Army aviation headquarters for the warning of:†

Army aviation bases.

†These elements are connected by wire with the Information Center. Aircraft warnings may be distributed by radio broadcast.

*Information Center radio receivers will intercept for this purpose the normal frequencies which these elements are using.

Army aviation elements.

Army aviation fields.

Air defense headquarters.† (When present in coastal frontier.)

Antiaircraft artillery headquarters.† (When an air defense headquarters is not located in the coastal frontier or when so located, it does not control all antiaircraft artillery defense elements in the coastal frontier.)

Coastal frontier and/or Army or corps area headquarters (for the warning of civilian population and Army ground elements and establishments).†

Naval aviation headquarters (for the warning of naval aviation units).†

Naval district headquarters for warning of:†

Navy bases—air, ship, and submarine.

Navy yards and other Navy shore establishments.

Escort force.

Coastal force.

Offshore patrol.

Inshore patrol.

All units of fleet present.

162. *Preparation and distribution of communication (signal) plans and instructions* (See ch. VI, sec VI, par. 77 and sec. VIII, par. 108a).—It will be necessary for each service to have certain items of information and publications pertaining to the other service. The items of information as well as the distribution should be prepared to suit each operation. The importance of early preparation and distribution of these plans and instructions should be impressed upon all concerned. For illustrative "Joint Communication (Signal) Plan," see paragraph 173.

Subsection III—Joint Overseas Expeditions

163. The specific circuits for the movement overseas of a joint overseas expedition are not herein presented diagrammatically, as in the case of joint communication for coastal frontier defense, since each joint overseas expedition presents a varied set of forces and conditions. However, the following discussion is intended to cover all major items concerning communication for any joint overseas ex- [152] pedition, and to serve as a guide therefor. Diagram II should be considered merely as a guide to indicate the joint circuits which *may* be employed during the landing phase of an overseas expedition. The circuits and the number and type thereof should be determined in each case by the nature and amount of traffic to be transmitted and by geographical considerations.

164. *General* (See ch. VI, sec. III, par. 54.).—Many of the measures necessary to insure effective communication (signal) in joint overseas expeditions must usually be completed prior to, and during, the embarkation phase. *Prior* to this phase, the following measures should be undertaken: (1) the design and production of the appropriate equipment and publications which will be required for communication (signal) between the Army and the Navy, and (2) the training of communication officers and enlisted men of both services that will participate in the joint overseas operations in the use of prescribed joint communication procedure and methods. *During* the embarkation phase, the necessary communication (signal) plans and instructions should be prepared, distributed, and studied, and the particular training required for communication and for security should be undertaken.

165. *General principles*.—The following general principles which concern communication have been established:

a. During the movement overseas, the Army and Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should the commanders of a joint attack force, and, where practicable, the method should be extended throughout all echelons of command. Each transport should have a communication center operated by Navy personnel. The complement of this center will be augmented by the addition of Army personnel who will remain on duty therewith until their services are no longer required for the routing of messages pertaining to the Army. The communication (signal) officers should be informed of:—

(1) The particular ships in which the commanders of their next subordinate and next superior units are embarked.

(2) The naval communication arrangements for handling communications

†These elements are connected by wire with the Information Center. Aircraft warnings may be distributed by radio broadcast.

between the ships, mentioned in (1) above, to the end that they may arrange for the transmission of orders and information under the circumstances.

b. (See ch. VI, sec. II, par. 50-52.) The liaison officers exchanged between the commands of the Army and the Navy should have copies of the cryptographic systems of their own service for handling messages applying particularly to that service. These liaison officers may have messages transmitted in these systems, regardless of the service [153] operating the agencies of communication (signal), provided the restrictions on communication (signal) then in effect, are not violated.

c. *Landing phase* (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 82, and sec. VIII, par. 109.)—The Navy, during the landing phase will—

(1) Have responsibility for shore-ship communication, and communication with Navy boats used for landings.

(2) Have the beachmaster establish a communication center at each landing place to handle communication between ship and shore. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 101a.)

(3) Provide a naval liaison detachment to accompany each combat team to provide the radio and visual communication and operation facilities necessary for effective naval gunfire support of the combat team. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 93a, 94b and c.) (See also par. 168b.)

d. As soon as possible, the Army will establish all of its own signal communication for combat, and, in addition, provide wire communication and messenger service from the command post of each Army combat team to the commander of the naval liaison detachment assigned to accompany that particular unit.

e. The Army shore party commander will establish a message center at each landing place and will connect by wire and messenger service with the Navy beachmaster's communication center at that landing place. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 101a, c, and d, and sec. VIII, par. 109.)

166. *Aircraft communication principles and aircraft warning service.*—So far as they are applicable to communication in a joint overseas expedition, the principles set forth in paragraphs 160 and 161, in connection with joint coastal frontier defense, should usually be observed.

167. *Joint communication (signal) training.*—The various elements of the Army and the Navy to be jointly trained are indicated below. In particular, training during the embarkation phase should include communication between the elements which will have to communicate during the landing phase, the familiarization by all concerned with the cryptographic systems prescribed for all phases.

a. *Army and Navy aviation elements.*

(1) *Navy observation airplanes.*—Even though Army observers may be provided in Navy observation airplanes, it is essential that Navy personnel therein be trained as indicated below, since in the early phases of the landing they will usually be required to undertake liaison, reconnaissance, and Army artillery adjustment missions.

[154] (a) In communication with the ground units to be supported during the landing.

(b) In recognition of Army panel and pyrotechnic signals used in lieu of radio.

(c) In picking up messages from and dropping messages to ground troops.

In addition, such Navy personnel should be cognizant of so much of the communication plans and instructions issued to ground troops as may be necessary for effective operations.

(2) *Navy reconnaissance and spotting airplanes.*—The Navy personnel engaged in air reconnaissance and air spotting of Navy gunfire in support of landing operations should be trained in the pyrotechnic and panel signals displayed by ground troops, particularly those used to indicate:

Location of front lines.

Gunfire is falling short.

Lift gunfire to next objective.

Put down gunfire on a particular objective.

(3) *Navy observation airplanes with Army observers.*—Army observers who may be assigned to Navy observation airplanes during the early phases of a landing on missions involving liaison, reconnaissance, and Army artillery adjustment should be trained in the use of the Navy radio equipment and in Navy spotting procedure.

(4) *Combat aircraft task forces.*—It is especially important that the combat elements of the aviation task forces of both services be jointly trained in communication (signal) methods and procedure to the end that the highest degree of effectiveness may be attained in the operations of such joint task forces as will be required to support the landing operations.

b. Other elements of both services.

(1) *Army ground elements.*—All Army ground elements should be trained to distinguish friendly Naval aircraft from hostile aircraft. In addition, the personnel of those Army radio stations that will be required to communicate with Navy air planes engaged in reconnaissance, liaison, and Army artillery adjustment missions should receive training in communicating with the Navy aviation personnel that will be assigned to cooperate with them in the actual landing. Elements of the antiaircraft defense forces should be informed of the recognition signals (visual or radio) that will be employed by Navy aircraft operating in support of the landing.

[155] (2) *Naval liaison and communication detachments.*—Naval liaison officers and Naval communication (signal) detachments assigned to accompany the Army assault elements (in order to handle the observation and communication (signal) required to bring about effective Naval gunfire support of the Army assault units) should be trained in the use of—

(a) The mobile field radio equipment required.

(b) The Army visual (including pyrotechnic) signals, particularly those used to indicate—

Landing successful.

Landing not successful.

Reached objectives.

Location of front lines.

Gunfire is falling short; and lift gunfire to next objective.

Put down gunfire on a particular objective.

This liaison and communication personnel through rehearsals in the embarkation phases should be familiarized with the operations of ground troops and the other means of communication that are available in case it is necessary to use the Army Communication (signal) system to get Naval messages back to the commander of the Naval fire support group via the Naval beachmaster (see par. 168b).

(3) *Liaison officers.*—Liaison officers who are exchanged between the higher elements of command of the two services should be thoroughly familiar with—

(a) Provisions governing responsibility for communications during the various phases of a joint overseas expedition.

(b) Actual command "set-up" of the communication systems.

(c) Rules of both services governing communication security.

(4) *Communication officers.*—All communication officers should be made cognizant of the following, during the embarkation phase:

(a) The three items listed in (3) above under liaison officers.

(b) The communication channel requirements, cryptographic systems and frequency plans for all phases. (See ch. VI, sec. VII, pars. 104 and 107.)

[156] 168. *Special equipment.*—The special communication (signal) equipment that should be provided and with which the personnel concerned should be thoroughly familiarized prior to and during the embarkation phase consists in general of the following items (i. e., when normal equipment of the particular element will not meet the needs of the situation):

a. Radio sets that will permit of intercommunication between the airplanes of such joint task forces as may be established.

b. Radio sets for such Navy liaison detachments as are to accompany the Army combat teams. These sets should be of appropriate size and weight to permit ready transportation to all locations where an infantry battalion command post may be established, and should permit direct communication between the Navy liaison detachment commander and the commander (and ships) of the Navy fire support group which is supporting the operations of the particular Army combat team. As it is probable that radio equipment now available for this purpose may not be effective under all conditions to be encountered, substitute means for this communication should be provided—such as aircraft radio or Army wire back to the beachmaster and thence by radio to ships concerned.

c. Cryptographic systems for joint communications during all phases of the operation, including sufficient Army fire-control and airground liaison codes

to supply copies to all Navy observation airplanes assigned to Army reconnaissance, liaison, and artillery adjustment missions.

d. Radio sets for the beachmaster, for the small boats, used in the landing, and possibly for transports of such characteristics as to permit direct communication between units linked, as shown in Diagram II.

e. Pyrotechnics for use in the landing boats and on the beach.

When Navy airplanes are assigned to Army reconnaissance, liaison, and artillery adjustment missions, arrangements shall be made, if practicable, to permit communication between the Army ground stations and Navy airplanes.

Subsection IV—Communication Security

169. *General*—a. Classified communication between the Army and the Navy will be divided into the following security classes:

(1) *Secret*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked secret when disclosure of the information contained therein might endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation.

[157] (2) *Confidential*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked confidential when disclosure of the information contained therein, although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation.

(3) *Restricted*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked restricted when information contained therein is for official use only, or when its disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy or denied the general public.

Secret, confidential, and restricted messages and written communications, plus the information contained therein, will be handled and safeguarded in a manner appropriate to their classification, as defined above, and in accordance with the instructions of the service(s) concerned.

b. The following doctrines will govern in the classification of messages and the use of the various cryptographic systems:

(1) *Reliability, security, and speed*.—Reliability is paramount and shall never be sacrificed for security or speed.

(2) *Use of clear and cryptographic language*.

(a) In time of war or emergency, all messages to be transmitted by radio, or by other means when danger of hostile or unauthorized interception exists, are cryptographed except in the following cases: when the tactical situation is such that time cannot be spared for cryptographing or the information to be transmitted if intercepted by the enemy could not be acted upon in time to influence the situation in question, a commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language. Such messages will be marked "Send in clear", over the signature of the commander or his authorized representative.

(b) So far as practicable, during joint exercises and joint communication training exercises, each message will be given the same classification and handling as would be given to the same subject matter in war.

(3) *Mutual observance of classifications*.—The classification of a message with respect to security may be changed only by the originator of the message or by superior authority.

[158] (4) *Rules governing communication security*.

(a) The communications of one service must not be permitted to compromise the operations of the other service.

(b) Radiotelegraph is the preferred method of joint Army-Navy radio communication.

(c) The rules governing cryptographic security in the Army and the Navy are based on the same doctrines and are, in general, similar. Compliance with the rules of either service should insure the necessary cryptographic security.

c. Classified communication between Army and Navy commands or units resolves itself into the following categories or echelons as regards distribution of cryptographic systems:

Category A—Cryptographic systems used in communication between special high commands of the Army and Navy.

Category B—Cryptographic systems used in communication between all high commands of the Army and Navy.

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Category C—Cryptographic systems used in communication between intermediate commands of the Army and Navy.

Category D—Cryptographic systems used in communication between smaller units of the Army and Navy.

d. The foregoing categories should, in general, be followed, but may be varied, if necessary, at the discretion of the senior commander of either service in each theatre of operation. The senior commander of the other service shall be immediately notified.

e. The cryptographic systems prescribed for the various categories will be used as circumstances require. For this reason, all commands will be supplied with the cryptographic systems prescribed for lower categories.

f. The cryptographic systems authorized for safeguarding classified communication for each category are prescribed in the documents mentioned in paragraph 171a.

g. Only the prescribed cryptographic system shall be used for classified communication between the Army and the Navy.

h. Classified communication between Army and Navy units of categories A and B will be facilitated by an exchange of liaison and communication (signal) officers between the Army and the Navy elements involved.

[159] 170. *Grouping of Army and Navy units into categories for classified communications.*—The categories authorized for classified communication, and the Army and the Navy units grouped therein, are as stated below:

a. *Category A.*

Army:

War Department.

Commanders, theatres of operations.

Commanders, field armies.

Any other commanders designated by the War Department.*

Navy:

Navy Department.

Commanders-in-Chief, United States Navy.

Any other commanders designated by the Navy Department.*

b. *Category B.*

Army:

All commanders listed under category A above.

Coastal frontier commanders.

Commanders, expeditionary task forces.*

Commanders, Hawaiian, Philippine, Panama Canal, and Puerto Rican Departments.

Commander, troops in Alaska.

Commanders, all corps areas.

Commanders, GHQ Air Force and wings.

Commanders, Air Corps wings in oversea departments.

Commanders of major air fields likely to be engaged in joint operations.*

Navy:

All commanders listed under category A above.

Force commanders, United States Fleet.

Type commanders, United States Fleet.

Commanding general, Fleet Marine Force.

Commanders, major detached task forces, United States Fleet.*

Commander, attack force.

Commander, transport group.

Commanders, detached squadrons.*

Commanders, destroyer flotillas.

Commanders, patrol wings.

Commandants, all naval districts.

Commanders, major naval air stations.*

[160] c. *Category C.*

Army:

All commanders listed under categories A and B above.

Commanders, coast artillery districts.

Commanders, sectors (coastal frontier).

Commanders, subsectors (coastal frontier).

*The other Department will be informed of the commanders designated under this provision in order that all concerned may be notified.

Commanders, harbor defenses.
 Commanders, shore parties.
 Commanders of units down to and including brigades which will communicate with Navy units.
 Commanders, Air Corps coastal stations likely to be engaged in joint operations.*
 Commanders, air force groups and squadrons.
 Commanders, ports of embarkation.

Navy:

All commanders listed under categories A and B above.
 Commanders, fire support group.
 Beachmasters.
 Destroyers, light mine layers, all larger combatant surface ships, and division and squadron commanders thereof.
 Squadron commanders of submarines, mincraft, and train vessels.
 Air squadron commanders.
 Commander, inshore patrol.
 Commander, inshore air patrol.
 Commander, offshore patrol.
 Commander, offshore air patrol.
 Commander, escort force.
 Commander, coastal force.
 Commanders, fleet Marine force brigades.
 Naval operating bases.
 Naval advanced bases.
 Naval air stations, air bases, and seaplane tenders.
 Destroyer, submarine, and section bases.

d. Category D.

Army:

All commands listed under categories A, B, and C above.
 Commanders of all mobile ground units down to and including infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons.
 Commanders, landing force combat teams.
 Commanders, individual forts or groups (harbor defenses).
 Army transports and mine planters.
 Aircraft in joint operations.

[161]

Navy:

All commands listed under categories A, B, and C above.
 Vessels of inshore patrol and offshore patrol.
 Aircraft of inshore air patrol and offshore air patrol.
 Coastal force vessels and aircraft.
 Escort vessels and aircraft.
 All vessels and aircraft (not a part of or attached to the local defense forces) engaged in joint operations.
 Commander, Marine Corps units down to and including battalions.

171. General instructions.

a. The authorized cryptographic systems for the categories of classified communication, the distribution of the various systems and the effective publications governing their use are prescribed in the current editions of the following documents:

Army: SIGNAN.

Navy: CSP 817, 818, 819, 820.

b. The communication (signal) plans should normally prescribe the cryptographic systems to be used.

c. Whenever practicable, in joint tactical exercises or communication training exercises simulating coastal frontier defense, oversea expeditions and landing force operations, exercise or training editions of the prescribed cryptographic systems shall be used.

d. For emergency use in peacetime by all categories of command, the cylindrical cipher device (Army: M-94; Navy: CSP 488) shall be used. A universal emergency key for use with this device shall be determined jointly by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communications and shall be communicated to both services from time to time. Cipher keys for use in local emergencies shall

*The other Department will be informed of the commanders designated under this provision in order that all concerned may be notified.

be determined locally and jointly by the senior commanders of the Army and Navy units involved. The United States Coast Guard holds this device and is furnished the universal emergency key by the Director of Naval Communications.

Subsection V—Joint Communication (Signal) Plan

(See ch. VI, sec. VIII, par. 108-110).

172. *General.*—The joint communication (signal) plans (or orders) for joint operations of the Army and the Navy (whether for coastal frontier defense or joint overseas expeditions) will in general include the following items, in the sequence indicated below:

a. Information.

(1) Such information of enemy communication (signal) as may be essential from the point of view of joint operations of the Army and the Navy.

[162] (2) Such information of friendly commercial communication facilities as are to be used (or are available for use) as may be necessary for the coordinated action of the two services in joint operations.

(3) Such information of the communication (signal) systems of the two services as may be necessary for understanding by one service of the capabilities and limitations of the communication (signal) systems of the other service.

(4) Such information of the aircraft warning service communication system as is necessary to insure the prompt reception and distribution of the information of approach of hostile aircraft.

(5) Such information pertaining to the command "set-up" (i. e., location of the headquarters or command posts) of the two services as may be necessary for the effective installation and operation of communication (signal) system.

(6) Designation of the time systems to be used for communication purposes and in the texts of messages.

b. Radio.

(1) General radio instructions, as necessary, including radio silence restrictions, etc.

(2) Call signs and frequencies, to include such instructions covering the assignment and distribution of radio call signs and frequencies as may be necessary—

(a) To insure coordinated action and avoid mutual interference between the two services.

(b) To provide a guide for the two services in distributing the particular items or publications to the interested elements of the two services.

(c) *Time* when call signs and frequencies become effective (see par. 172a (6)).

(3) Instructions for the establishment and operation of such special channels of radio communication as may be required for joint operations include—

(a) The assignment of personnel and special equipment when necessary

(b) Operating schedules, etc.

(4) Authentication instructions.

[163] *c. Radio intelligence* (radio direction finding and radio intercept)—include such information and instructions as to radio intercept and direction finding as may be necessary for—

(1) The coordinated action of the radio intelligence service of the Army and Navy.

(2) The distribution (or exchange) of radio intelligence.

d. Visual.

(1) General instructions, as necessary, including—

(a) Restrictions as to use of visual signal equipment, daylight and darkness.

(b) Priority of various means (flags, searchlights, etc.).

(c) Meanings of special pyrotechnic signals.

(2) Visual call signs.

(a) Call signs needed for communication between the Army and Navy.

(b) Guide for the distribution of call signs to interested elements of the two services.

(c) Designation of such visual codes as may be required for joint operations.

(d) Time when call signs are effective. (See par. 172a(6).)

(3) Instructions for the establishment and operation of such special visual channels as may be required between elements of the two services.

e. Wire.—Instructions necessary for the installation, operation, and maintenance of such wire communications as may be needed between the two services should include provisions for a wire teletype (telegraph printer) or telegraph antiaircraft intelligence net and an aircraft warning service net. (See Diagram I.) If required, authentication instructions should be issued.

f. Messenger (or courier) service.—Instructions necessary for the operation of a messenger service between Army and Navy elements when practicable and necessary, should state schedules, means of transportation, and whether officer or enlisted man.

g. Recognition signals.

(1) Recognition doctrine.
(2) List of the types to be used—day and night—with statements of time when each becomes effective.

(3) Guide for distribution.

(4) Identifying silhouettes of—

Ships: Friendly and enemy.

Aircraft: Friendly and enemy.

[164] (5) Recognition signals (surface craft, submarines, and aircraft)—
Type or types to be used.

Prescribed signals or maneuvers.

Identifying marks on ships, special flags, lights, etc.

h. Communication security and cryptanalytic activities.—Such instructions should be promulgated as may be necessary to insure the coordination of the communication security activities of the two services and the prompt exchange of technical information between the cryptanalytic elements of the two services.

i. Codes and ciphers.

(1) Such instructions as are not included in existing regulations and publications concerning the codes, ciphers and cipher keys to be used in joint operations.

(2) Guide for the distribution of codes and ciphers.

j. Commercial communication facilities.

(1) Such allocations to the Army and the Navy as may be required.

(2) Special instructions covering traffic to be handled by commercial stations.

(3) Special instructions covering supervision of commercial communication facilities.

(4) Call signs and frequencies.

Subsection VI—Miscellaneous

173. *Other joint communication requirements.*—In addition to the intercommunication necessitated by simulated or real joint coastal frontier defense and joint overseas expeditions, intercommunication may be necessary daily in peacetime for liaison purposes between various units of the Army and the Navy (and the Coast Guard), and when specially required in cases of earthquake, flood, riot, and other emergencies, both natural and man-made. During neutrality, intercommunication may be necessary in the joint maintenance of a patrol in United States coastal waters. For the purposes indicated above, the doctrines set forth herein will, insofar as applicable, govern.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 6 there appear Diagrams I and II bearing captions "Coastal Frontier, Joint Radio and Wire Communication" and "Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase, Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach", respectively. These diagrams will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 3 and 4, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[17] C. J. A. 4.

CHANGE No. 4, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 301 (Serial 671).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 664).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, January 25, 1941.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

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Add the following new pages:

Page Nos. ¹	Subject matter
If-Ig.....	Promulgation of Change No. 4.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated:

Old page Nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa.....	C. J. A. 4—List of effective pages (revised January 25, 1941).
129-130.....	Paragraph 128, sentences added.
137-140.....	Chapter IX, Section I revised.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBEE,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
United States Army, Secretary

[II] JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

(Revised January 25, 1941)

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page.....	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only).....	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.....	1***	I-Ia
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938.....	2	Ib-Ic
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940.....	3	Id-Ie
Promulgation of Chicago No. 4, January 25, 1941.....	4	If-Ig
List of effective pages.....	4	II-IIa
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935.....	Original	III-IV**
Contents.....	2	V-VI
Contents, Part I.....	2	VII
Contents, Part I, continued.....	Original	VIII
Chapter I.....	"	1-2
Chapter I, continued.....	1	3-4**
Chapter II.....	2	5-6
Chapter III.....	2	11
Chapter III, continued.....	Original	12-16**
Chapter IV.....	"	17
Chapter IV, continued.....	2	18
Chapter IV, continued.....	Original	19-20**
Contents, Part II.....	"	21-22**
Contents, Chapter V.....	"	23-26
Chapter V.....	2	27
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	18-41
Chapter V, continued.....	2	42-44
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	45-47
Chapter V, continued.....	2	48
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	49-64
Chapter V, continued.....	2	65-66
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	67
Chapter V, continued.....	2	68
Contents, Chapter VI.....	2	69
Contents, Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	70-72
Chapter VI.....	"	73-76
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	77-80
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	81-82

*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[17a]

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	83-84
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	85-86
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	87
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	88-90
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	91
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	92-97
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Chapter VI, continued.....	2	106-107
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	108-110
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	111
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	112
Contents, Chapter VII.....	"	113-114**
Chapter VII.....	"	115-126**
Contents, Chapter VIII.....	"	127-128**
Chapter VIII.....	4	129-130
Chapter VIII, continued.....	1	131-132
Chapter VIII, continued.....	Original	133
Chapter VIII, continued.....	2	134
Chapter VIII, continued.....	Original	135-136**
Chapter IX.....	4	137-140d
Chapter IX, continued.....	3	141-164
Chart of Organization for Coastal Frontier Defense.....	Original	No number
Diagram No. I, Coastal Frontier. Joint Radio and Wire Communication.....	3	No number
Diagram No. II, Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase. Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach.....	3	No number

**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128, and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[129]

CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in paragraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

[130] 127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations. In the case of technical matters involving cooperation between the two services, the Joint Planning Committee may, upon approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, set up committees of experts to advise upon appropriate action. Each committee of experts shall be composed of such officers of the Army and Navy as may be designated by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, respectively.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O.

[137]

CHAPTER IX

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Policy for the Coordination of Communication Activities of the Army and the Navy

145. *General.*

a. The policy and the proposed actions set forth in this chapter are based on the fact that the Army and the Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President either expressed or implied.

b. The policy for the coordination of communication activities of the Army and the Navy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is set forth herein for information and guidance.

c. Censorship is not considered to be a communication activity.

146. *Purpose of communication policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and the Navy in the development of communication matériel, the establishment of communication stations, and in the conduct of communication activities, in order to insure adequate and efficient intercommunication between the Army and the Navy especially in joint operations, to prevent interference and conflict between the communication services of the Army and the Navy, to provide for the effective physical control of their communications in time of war or other national emergency, or when the United States is likely to become a belligerent, and to indicate the views of the War and Navy Departments as to the extent communications control is to be exercised by other Government agencies under the situations mentioned.

147. *Basic policy.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations, together with the necessary [138] interconnecting equipment as, augmented by nonmilitary communication facilities and services, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other

national emergency of militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated communication systems adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation of expenditure imposed by economy.

b. While the communication requirements of the Army and the Navy for purposes of national defense must be considered paramount, adequate provision also must be made for the needs of other governmental agencies, of industry, and of other civilian activities.

148. *Military and naval communications.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall have full authority respectively over all military and naval communications, and over all other communication facilities allocated in whole or in part to the Army and the Navy.

b. For operation in time of war as may be necessary, it is contemplated that the allocation of additional nonmilitary communication facilities to the Army and the Navy will be recommended by the Defense Communications Board created by Executive Order on September 24, 1940, or by a similar board subsequently created, and that changes in the initial allocation will be similarly recommended. It is further contemplated that all allocations will be made by Executive Order.

c. In order that the Army and the Navy may plan for essential acquisitions of nonmilitary communication facilities and services for wartime or other emergency use, it is assumed that allocations will be based generally upon the following:

(1) The Army assumes prior right to utilize, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army, except the stations over which the Navy is assigned prior right to utilize in the following subparagraph.

(2) The Navy assumes prior right to utilize, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea, and non-military communication stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

149. *Wartime jurisdiction over nonmilitary communications.*

a. The civil authorities, including the established courts, will continue their control of the civil communication agencies in the [139] continental United States in nonmilitary matters, as far as practicable, except in theaters of military or naval operations.

b. If, at some time subsequent to the declaration of war, the President should declare martial law, the control of all communication facilities within the affected area shall devolve upon the Army or the Navy in accordance with the principle of unity of command as set forth in paragraph 151b below.

c. As general policy, whatever essential wartime functions nonmilitary Government communication systems are responsible for performing in peacetime and can continue to perform in wartime, they shall be permitted to continue to perform, provided that such arrangements are compatible with the requirements of the military services for national defense, and provided that all nonmilitary Government communication agencies so conduct the operation of their communication facilities as to render the greatest possible assistance to the Army and the Navy. Accordingly it is contemplated that among others—

(1) The Federal Communications Commission will continue to perform its peacetime functions, including especially the detection, location, and suppression of unauthorized radio stations so far as its jurisdiction, facilities, and personnel permit. Beyond its jurisdiction and the capabilities of its facilities and personnel, such functions may become the responsibilities of the Army and the Navy. When functions normally performed by the Federal Communications Commission devolve upon the Army and the Navy—

(a) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, and in insular possessions and foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(b) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions and foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

(2) The Department of Commerce (Civil Aeronautics) will continue to perform its peacetime functions, and to operate its regular communication facilities, except in areas such as in actual theaters of operation, where national defense may require such facilities to be put under control of the Army or the Navy by Executive Order.

d Although nonmilitary communication agencies will normally operate as

indicated in the preceding subparagraphs, it may be necessary in the interest of national defense for the Army and the Navy [140] temporarily to take over and operate some nonmilitary communication facilities not allocated to the respective services. For example, in case of threatened attack by hostile aircraft, it might be essential summarily to close certain nonmilitary radio stations by order of the military or naval commander having responsibility for the safety or defense of the threatened area. Or, instead of closing certain radio stations, it might be essential for the responsible commander summarily to utilize some or all communication facilities temporarily—for example, to promulgate an air-raid warning and to give notice when the danger has passed. Provision for such actions shall be made by Executive Order, by a Federal Communications Commission Rule or Regulation, or otherwise as appropriate.

e. Whenever necessary in the interests of national defense, and in accordance with existing law, all amateur radio stations not specifically designated by the Army or the Navy for military operation will be closed by Executive Order upon the recommendation of the Defense Communications Board mentioned in paragraph 148 above, or in the absence of such a board, upon the recommendation of the Secretaries of War and Navy. The operation of amateurs on Army and Navy frequencies, under Army and Navy control, shall not be affected by such closing.

f. Nonmilitary radio stations fall into four categories as follows:

(1) Those stations which the Army or the Navy will require in time of war or other national emergency to supplement their peacetime circuits.

(a) These stations would be taken over and operated by the respective services.

(b) It is contemplated that the number of such stations will be kept to a minimum.

(2) Those stations from which the Army or the Navy will require some circuits, or those stations all of whose facilities are required part time.

(a) The Army or the Navy would supervise the operation of such stations with direct control over the circuits serving military needs.

(b) Such circuits as are not utilized by the Army or the Navy would usually remain available to serve nonmilitary purposes.

(3) Those stations which must remain in operation as nonmilitary stations to serve Government procurement, commercial, or civilian needs. These stations would be permitted to continue in operation under jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (or other Government agency normally having jurisdiction), assisted as may be necessary by the Army and the Navy.

[140a] (4) Those stations which are not required by the Army or the Navy, or for other national defense purposes.

(a) These stations may be allowed to continue in operation as in peacetime, or they may be closed.

(b) These stations whether allowed to operate or not would be under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (or other Government agency normally having jurisdiction), assisted as may be necessary by the Army and the Navy.

150. *Authorized nonmilitary communications.*—In the case of nonmilitary communication stations not allocated for utilization in whole or in part to the Army or the Navy, but which are allowed to continue in normal operation, supervision and control may sometimes devolve upon the Army or the Navy. For purposes of such supervision and control—

a. The Army will assume jurisdiction over all such stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to Navy jurisdiction in subparagraph b below.

b. The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

151. *Primary responsibility of the Army and the Navy in communication activities.*

a. The assignment of primary responsibility to the Army or to the Navy for communication activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficient operation of the communications serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use communication facilities to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious interference is caused thereby.

b. In wartime, unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy. Communication activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

a. In order to avoid uneconomical duplication—

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts or more in the antenna).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communication commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska (unless the Navy is unable to handle the communication), nor [140b] operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits

152. *Assignment of primary responsibility.*—Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs a and b of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

a. To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.*

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

b. To the Army in radio intelligence, including radio intercept and direction finding for the Army wherever operating.

c. To the Army in landline communication—

(1) Connecting headquarters, units, and establishments of the Army wherever located.

(2) Crossing the international boundaries between the United States and Canada, and between the United States and Mexico.

(3) Within the continental United States when charged therewith in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 149 above.

(4) In Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, and in insular possessions and foreign territory occupied by the Army.

d. To the Army in cable communication—

(1) Connecting headquarters, units, and establishments of the Army within the continental limits of the United States.

(2) Within the continental United States when charged therewith in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 149 above.

(3) Between the continental United States and Alaska.

(4) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(5) At points outside the continental United States occupied exclusively by the Army.

e. To the Army in aircraft warning service (see par. 161)—

For the continental United States, Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, all insular possessions of the United States garrisoned by Army troops, and all foreign territory occupied by the Army

[140c] f. To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea and with and between aircraft which fly over the sea, exclusive of Army vessels and aircraft, except such Army vessels and aircraft as may have been placed under Navy control.

g. To the Navy in radio intelligence, including radio intercept and direction finding for the Navy wherever operating.

h. To the Navy in landline communication—

(1) Connection headquarters, units, and activities of the Navy wherever located.

(2) In insular possessions and foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

i. To the Navy in cable communication—

*NOTE.—Attention is invited to paragraph 151c (2). While the Navy is charged with primary responsibility for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service, it is agreed that the Army shall not be prevented from handling radio communication, commercially or for other Government departments, between the continental United States and Alaska.

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(1) For communication from the United States to all points outside the United States except to Alaska.

(2) At points outside the continental United States occupied by the Navy.

(3) Connecting headquarters, units, and activities of the Navy wherever located.

j. To the Navy in aircraft warning service (see par. 161)—

(1) For all vessels and aircraft of the Navy, including Army vessels and aircraft operating under Navy control.

(2) For all insular possessions garrisoned exclusively by the Navy.

(3) For foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

153. *Principles to be observed in communication coordination.*—Coordination in communication operation will be effected by—

a. The development of types of communication equipment suitable for intercommunication between the Army and the Navy.

b. The assignment of call signs, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption for joint Army and Navy communication of a common procedure, and the formulation of cryptographic systems.

c. The provision of field radio sets for the use of the Marine Corps on shore which shall be capable of communication with the radio sets used by similarly equipped units of the Army.

[140*d*] *d.* The provision, on vessels of the Army Transport Service, of radio communication equipment of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class, and by provision of such equipment capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication. (If practicable, vessels of the Army Transport Service should be provided with radio equipment identical with that provided for vessels of the Navy similarly employed.)

e. The preparation of suitable joint communication plans for all joint operations.

f. The conduct of joint communication training exercises.

g. For a more detailed discussion of coordination requirements, see Section II of this Chapter.

154. *Coordination with radio stations of other departments and civilian radio stations during peacetime.*—Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

155. *Coordination of development programs.*—The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peacetime operation of communications and the operational development of the two services to insure adequate and effective joint intercommunication. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendations for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy, and will coordinate technical communication matters of joint concern to the two services.

[/h] C. J. A. 5.

CHANGES NO. 5, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 301 (Serial 702).

A. G. 062.1 (5-26-41).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 684).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 685).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 14, 1941.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages:

Page Nos.	Subject matter
Ih-II.....	Promulgation of Change No. 5.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated:

Old page Nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa.....	C. J. A. 5.—List of effective pages (revised July 14, 1941).
129-130.....	Paragraph 126, second sentence changed.
131-132.....	Paragraph 133, fourth and fifth lines changed.
137-138.....	Paragraph 148, subparagraphs c (1) and (2) changed and (3) added.
143-144.....	Paragraph 158, subparagraphs g (4) and (5) added.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBEEY,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
United States Army, Secretary.

[II]

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

(Revised July 14, 1941)

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page.....	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only).....	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.....	1***	I-Ia
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938.....	2	Ib-Ic
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940.....	3	Id-Ie
Promulgation of Change No. 4, January 25, 1941.....	4	If-Ig
Promulgation of Change No. 5, July 14, 1941.....	5	Ih-Ii
List of effective pages.....	5	II-IIa
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935.....	Original	III-IV**
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**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128, and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in paragraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

[130] 127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also

originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations. In the case of technical matters involving cooperation between the two services, the Joint Planning Committee may, upon approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, set up committees of experts to advise upon appropriate action. Each committee of experts shall be composed of such officers of the Army and Navy as may be designated by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, respectively.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. [131] No. 81, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Head of Plans Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The function of the Aeronautical Board is to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy. It will investigate, study, and report upon all questions affecting jointly the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy which have been referred to it by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, The Joint Board, the Chief of the Air Corps, or the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In addition, it will also be charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when in its judgment necessary and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army and the Navy as to aviation.

132. In the execution of the foregoing, the Aeronautical Board will be governed by the following. It will hold regular monthly meetings and such extraordinary meetings as may be deemed advisable. It will prescribe its own procedure and will be assisted by working committees, the members of which will be appointed by the Aeronautical Board. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint Army and Navy policies or plans relative to the national defense will be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Matters affecting the procurement of matériel in time of war to meet joint requirements will be submitted to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. All other matters will be submitted direct to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

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Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national

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CHAPTER IX

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Policy for the Coordination of Communication Activities of the Army and the Navy

145. *General.*

a. The policy and the proposed actions set forth in this chapter are based on the fact that the Army and the Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President either expressed or implied.

b. The policy for the coordination of communication activities of the Army and the Navy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is set forth herein for information and guidance.

c. Censorship is not considered to be a communication activity.

146. *Purpose of communication policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and the Navy in the development of communication matériel, the establishment of communication stations, and in the conduct of communication activities, in order to insure adequate and efficient intercommunication between the Army and the Navy especially in joint operations, to prevent interference and conflict between the communication services of the Army and the Navy, to provide for the effective physical control of their communications in time of war or other national emergency, or when the United States is likely to become a belligerent, and to indicate the views of the War and Navy Departments as to the extent communications control is to be exercised by other Government agencies under the situations mentioned.

147. *Basic policy.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations, together with the necessary interconnecting equipment as, augmented by nonmilitary communication facilities and services, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated communication systems adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation of expenditure imposed by economy.

[138] b. While the communication requirements of the Army and the Navy

for purposes of national defense must be considered paramount, adequate provision also must be made for the needs of other governmental agencies, of industry, and of other civilian activities.

148. Military and naval communications.

a. The Army and Navy shall have full authority respectively over all military and naval communications, and over all other communication facilities allocated in whole or in part to the Army and the Navy.

b. For operation in time of war as may be necessary, it is contemplated that the allocation of additional nonmilitary communication facilities to the Army and the Navy will be recommended by the Defense Communications Board created by Executive Order on September 24, 1940, or by a similar board subsequently created, and that changes in the initial allocation will be similarly recommended. It is further contemplated that all allocations will be made by Executive Order.

c. In order that the Army and the Navy may plan for essential acquisitions of nonmilitary communication facilities and services for wartime or other emergency use, it is assumed that allocations will be based generally upon the following:

(1) The Army shall have prior right to use, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army, and the stations of the inter-American commercial air routes except the stations which the Navy is assigned prior right to use in the following subparagraph.

(2) The Navy shall have prior right to use, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships or with aircraft flying over the sea, exclusive of Army vessels and aircraft, except such Army vessels and aircraft as may have been placed under Navy control, but inclusive of nonmilitary communication stations in Panama and the Canal Zone, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy, except stations of the inter-American commercial air routes.

(3) Stations of the inter-American commercial air routes shall, for the purposes of the two preceding subparagraphs, be deemed to include those land airports in Central and South America, excluding Panama and the Canal Zone, at which nonmilitary facilities have been established at the primary instance of the War Department.

149. Wartime jurisdiction over nonmilitary communications.

a. The civil authorities, including the established courts, will continue their control of the civil communication agencies in the

[143] and thus requires immediate attention. A primary example of this type of message is a so-called Army "flash" message which is employed to report air observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of air forces. For joint communication purposes, an Army "flash" message may be considered to be urgent message of the highest priority. A primary example of a Navy message of the highest priority is a major contact report.

(2) The PRIORITY designation is reserved for messages of less urgency than those entitled to URGENT precedence, but of such nature as to warrant precedence ahead of messages designated as ROUTINE or DEFERRED. Any message designated as PRIORITY will be transmitted before any routine or deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a short routine or deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a PRIORITY message.

(3) The ROUTINE designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic most expeditiously. Any message designated as ROUTINE usually will be transmitted before any deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a short deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a ROUTINE message.

(4) The DEFERRED designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence, and whose delivery to the addressee may be delayed until the beginning of office hours following the day on which they are filed. This will sometimes necessitate transmission of Deferred messages ahead of Routine messages, in order to effect delivery before the time indicated.

d. *Address and signature.*—While all official messages will be sent by authority of the commanding officer, no signature will ordinarily be transmitted. Messages intended for an addressee on board a ship or airplane, or within a command on shore, will be routed by use of the appropriate call sign of the ship, airplane, or shore command. Delivery to any specific addressee within the ship, airplane

or shore command is a function of the command to which delivered. If call signs are assigned for joint use to particular commanders, as well as to particular ships, airplanes and shore commands, such [144] commander call signs may also be employed to indicate routing, addresses and originators.

e. Use of clear or cryptographic language.—The general rules governing the use of clear and cryptographic language are set forth in subsection IV of this chapter, wherein communication security is discussed.

f. Operating instructions and procedure.—Operating instructions are special instructions for transmitting, receiving, and when required, for relaying messages. These instructions are set forth in a separate restricted pamphlet entitled, "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure."

g. Time.

(1) The time of origin is the time at which the message is released or authenticated by the originator. If this time does not appear on the message it will be the time when the message is filed for transmission.

(2) The time of origin in joint communications is expressed in the 24-hour clock system and transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour. Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 0600 and 7:43 P. M. is 1943.

(3) For communication within the Army, the 12-hour clock system is used. Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 600 A, and 7:43 P. M. is 743 P.

(4) For communication within the Navy, Greenwich civil time (G. C. T.) is used in headings of messages.

(5) Unless otherwise prescribed, the time of origin in the headings of messages in joint communication will be Greenwich civil time (G. C. T.).

h. Dates.

(1) The date is expressed for joint communication purposes by two figures preceding the time of origin, indicating the day of the month. If the date number is less than ten, it is always preceded by zero. For example, the first day of the month is 01, and the tenth day is 10. "071626" means date was 7th day of month, and time of origin was 1626.

(2) The month and year may be added to the date and time of origin group when necessary for reference purposes in the text of messages. For example: "Your 071626 DEC 1938" means "Referring to your message, with time of origin 1626 on the 7th day of December 1938 * * *".

EXHIBIT No. 7

[4]

SECRET

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 April 1941.

S-A16-1/A7-3(8)/ND14

(0898)

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42.

Subject: Original 14ND-JCD-42.

References:

(a) WPL-42.

(b) FTP 155, Introduction, Chapter II.

Enclosures:

(A) Original 14ND-JCD-42, Reg. No. 19 including List of Effective Pages.

(B) Receipt and Destruction Form, in duplicate.

1. The Original 14ND-JCD-42 (Army Short Title HCF-41) is hereby promulgated to the officers on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-42, including those on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-13. It was signed and placed in effect by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District on 11 April 1941, to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved, in part or in whole, by either the War or Navy Departments.

2. This Original Plan, prepared in accordance with references (a) and (b), supercedes 14ND-JCD-13 (Army Short Title HCF-39) and will be handled as follows:

a. All holders of 14ND-JCD-13 remove and destroy by burning all pages now contained in 14ND-JCD-13.

b. Insert this letter and the pages of Enclosure (A) in their proper places in the old binder, if used, in accordance with the List of Effective Pages contained in Enclosure (A); new holders on the Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42 provide own binders.

c. Report receipt, destruction of superceded pages of 14ND-JCD-13 and check of contents on the form herewith, Enclosure (B). New holders report receipt and check of contents only.

[44] 3. a. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations and in the Registered Publication Manual.

b. This volume *shall not be carried in aircraft*, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage, as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

4. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM, OR COPY, PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

C. C. BLOCH.

[iii]¹ *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier—List of Effective Pages, 14ND-JCD-42*

Subject Matter	Page Nos.	Change in Effect
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Distribution List.....	3	"
Table of Contents.....	4	"
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¹ Original, April 1941, 14ND-JCD-42
HCF-41

[1]

Register No. 19

[Full Title]

JOINT

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

AND

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

[Short Title]

HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

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[2]

Table of Corrections

Change No.	Date of Entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

[3]

Navy distribution list

Official to whom issued	Registered Numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations	18 and 19
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District	20
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	21
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	22
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	23
Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	24
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	25
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	26
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†Commander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR	35
†Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE	36
†District Intelligence Officer	37
†District Communication Officer	38
†Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR	39
†Inspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU	40

*Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.

†These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.,
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN
HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER—
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
and
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a. page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

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SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREA:

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUHI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII, KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU, LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILI POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. **HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.** WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for PEARL HARBOR and KANEOHE.

(1) **DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:—

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI, KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI, LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—HAWAIIAN D. S. A.

(2) **PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.** The PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area comprises—

The area of water in PEARL HARBOR lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the PUULO A Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE. This area is given the short title—PEARL D. S. A.

(3) **KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.** The KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE Sea Area comprises:—

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows:— line bearing northeast true extending three miles from KAOIO POINT, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from KAPOHO POINT, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—KANEOHE D. S. A.

(4) **PALMYRA, KINGMAN REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY and WAKE—DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.** These defensive sea areas comprise:—

Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. **OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.** The Defensive Coastal Area for OAHU comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:—

KEAHI POINT—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
 PUU KAPOLEI—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
 PUUIKI STATION } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards).
 KAHUKU POINT }

This area is given the short title—OAHU D. C. A.

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Tasks and Forces

12. **CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.** Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. TASKS.

a. **JOINT TASK.** To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. **ARMY TASK.** To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. **NAVY TASK.** To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[8] 15. FORCES.

a. ARMY FORCES.

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. NAVAL FORCES.

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. CIVIL ORGANIZATION. A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. GENERAL.

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] **c.** The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

[10] **j.** An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will

gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the manpower and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. ARMY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.
 (5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 *d.* above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(1) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

c. NAVY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

Section VI—Joint Agreements

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieut. General, U. S. Army.

Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

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[1]

EXHIBIT No. 8

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FF12/

A4-3/QL/(13)

Serial 01646

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised).

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Continuous patrols*.—(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *Intermittent patrols*.—(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) *Air Patrols*:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will

search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(O) *Sortie and entry.*—(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[3] (D) *Operating areas.*—(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need to be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services of other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall

follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) *Ships at sea.*—(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each Task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

- (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.
- (b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

- Priority 1—BBs
- Priority 2—CVs
- Priority 3—CAs
- Priority 4—CLs

- (c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

- (d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

- (e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

- (f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

- (g) Maintenance of condition of readiness **THREE** on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

- (4) (h) Maintenance of material condition **XRAY**, or equivalent in all ships.

- (i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

- (j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

- (k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

- (1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) *Ships in port.*—(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) *Defense against air attack.*—(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com-

mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plant for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.*—(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task force commander operating at sea.*—(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval base defense officer.*—(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

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(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area.*—(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ships attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[6] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based fleet aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval district.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task force commander at sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[7] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. Crosley,

Flag Secretary.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 8 there appears a chart showing the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, being Enclosure "A" to Cincpac 2CL-41-Revised. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 5, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B)

Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT No. 9

SECRET

Op-12B-9-McO
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 09112

JAN 24 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful

bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 100 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages,

the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy Forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

Copies to:

CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com14

Op-22

Op-30

EXHIBIT No. 10

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK

4 JUNE 1941.

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands.

(Signed) H. E. KIMMEL.

Copies to

Gen. Marshall

Adm. King

Adm. Towers

1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 11

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 August 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.

As of today we have about 262,000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of July. Our advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get at least 10,000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or whatnot.

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. Our *small* ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was perfectly delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example:—I ordered an electric heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the effort required.

I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpenter, who came down to see me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have heard from Bunav direct.

I am delighted also over your comment about the recreation facilities and hope the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is satisfactory.

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation so will not repeat here.

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling

the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to AMs and ATs.

Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, I am told those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think history has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where you are.

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department.

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great difficulties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were).

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are nearing solution.

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here. Incidentally the Russian Ambassador with his gang is coming down to see me tomorrow. I will not put down on paper my feelings about the visit—I will just leave it to your good imagination.

[Handwritten notation:] This is privileged matter which must not be disclosed without "EXPRESS AUTHORITY SECNAV"

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and best of luck.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

ADMIRAL H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. NAVY,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[NOTE.—The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 11 which is a personal letter dated 28 August 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The last two sentences in the sixth paragraph on page 3.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 11, which the Judge Advocate proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.]

30 AUGUST 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Will send a memo from Holcomb by separate letter re defense battallions. He is away for a couple of days and I want him to O. K. anything I send.

Keep cheerful.

H. R. S.

EXHIBIT No. 12

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 23 September 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.

Act. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."

Regarding questions (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or

our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers *about one month after Japan and the United States are at war*. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVEREIGN, RAMILLES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it we can get nowhere

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towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—*is*—or—*is not*—a good thing—I hesitate say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL.

P. S. #2. Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

BETTY.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark:

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila. A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.

A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched.

A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

[Handwritten notation:] You may have had word of this already!

G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

EXHIBIT No. 13

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12 Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message precedence
From CNO Released by Ingersoll Date, October 16, 1941	For action CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (ACKNOWLEDGE)	Priority X Routine Deferred
For coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
162203 CP0534

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly Nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third aedes inform appropriate Army and naval district authorities. Acknowledge.

EXHIBIT No. 14

Cincpac File No.
HRS-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA unit about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want to repeat some of them once more. The

urgency for additional [copy not legible] craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continually. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Cabu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhauled at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the long range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send one of these to the Pacific? If so—when? We still find it necessary to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel are so used they can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 15

SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE—NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992		Addressees		Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations. Released by Ingersoll..... Date November 24, 1941.	ACTION	To.	CinCaf CinCpac Com11 Com12 Com13 Com15	Priority Routine Deferred
	INFO.	Spenavo London CinClant		Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....				

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
242005 CR#443

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL DELIVERY.

Date Time GCT

1174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TEXT Cincaf, Cinepac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action. Spenavo London and Cinclant for info.

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X this situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ADEES to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

Copy to (WPD, War Dept) and to Op-12 *but no other distribution*. Plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, 25 November 1941.

In reply refer to
Initials and No.

HRS/Hu

Sec. #6

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to

authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaign extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some of the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. B. KNOX, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
California.

P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

HRS.

1176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Nov. 25, 1941.

Summary

Type	Complement fiscal yr 1939	Complement recommended by fleet BD	Present complement	Number on bd	% on bd as of Oct. 31 where available otherwise September 30	
					To 1939 complement	To present complement
BBs.....	19,351	26,583	22,244	19,870	102.68	89.32
CVs.....	6,990	7,602	7,258	6,902	98.74	91.68
CAs.....	12,164	18,508	15,878	14,067	115.64	88.59
CLs.....	11,490	15,860	14,156	12,896	112.23	91.09
DDs:						
(1850 Ton).....	3,119	3,900	3,119	2,826	90.60	90.60
(1500 Ton)						
(8 at 192).....	1,536	1,920	1,536	1,346	87.63	87.63
(18 at 191).....	3,438	4,392	3,438	3,138	91.27	91.27
(4 at 196).....	784	1,000	784	728	92.85	92.85
(8 at 178).....	1,424	1,952	1,424	1,312	92.13	92.13
(10 at 187).....	1,870	2,480	1,870	1,717	91.82	91.82
(12 at 200).....	2,400	3,000	2,364	2,171	90.46	91.83
(1200 Ton).....	1,644	1,898	1,716	1,673	101.76	97.49
(Asiatic)						
(4 at 132).....	528	584	536	446	84.46	83.20
(33 at 126).....	3,906	4,626	4,209	3,704	94.82	88.00
SSs:						
(4 at 29).....	174	192	180	230	132.18	127.78
(22 at 39).....	858	946	858	891	103.84	103.84
(22).....	1,203		1,203	1,390	115.54	115.54
(6 at 54).....	324	348	324	375	115.74	115.74
Patrol vessels.....	1,062		1,078	1,109	104.42	102.87
OGLALA.....	282		320	290	102.83	90.62
ISABEL.....	84		84	82	97.61	97.61
TOTALS.....	76,631		84,849	77,163	103.39	90.94

EXHIBIT No. 17

SEALED SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number OP 12—Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations..... Released by Ingersoll..... Date November 27, 1941.	For action: CINCAF CINCPAC	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information CINCLANT SPENAVO	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

GKVL BVKLW 272337 0921

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition ~~probably~~ against either the Philippines or KRA Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD War Dept.

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 18

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number Op-12, Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations Released by H. R. Stark Date November 26, 1941	For Action CINCPAC	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory

270838 CR8758

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See art 76 (4) Nav Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 19

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12, Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations..... Released by H. R. Stark. Date November 28, 1941	For action COM PNCF COM PSNCF	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information CINCPAC COM PNCF	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

290110 R866

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander Western Defense Command (quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X

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This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G Two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X unquote) XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Orig: Op 12

Copy to: Op 30, 38, WPD ARMY

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 20

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number 3598	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV Released by T. S. Wilkinson Date December 3, 1941.	For action CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by Paraphrased by	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

031850 CR0553

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X ~~from foregoing infer that orange plans early action in southeast Asia.~~

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 21

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV..... Released by Ingersoll..... Date DECEMBER 4, 1941.	For action NAVSTA GUAM	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by Paraphrased by	Information CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory

042017 CR0701

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery

Text.—Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report Crypto channels retained

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs;

EXHIBIT No. 22

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Op-20

'Phone Ext. No. 3313	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV Released by _____ Date 6 December 1941	Action To CINCPAO	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Info. CINCAF	Priority Routine Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory
061743

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery.

Text.—In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person.
(See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

EXHIBIT No. 23

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters
14th Naval District
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII—SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS.

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.

I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39 (14ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that

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the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft release to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS.

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
14th Pursuit Wing	Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Waialufe Radio Station

b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.	Waialufe Radio Station
*Headquarters, HSCA Brigade	Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
18th Bombardment Wing	Marine Air Group, Ewa
14th Pursuit Wing	

[3] c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:

ARMY	NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office)	14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B.	14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft Kam)	14th Naval District

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.

* Not control Station.

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:

- a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.
- b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY

CP, PH Gpmt, Ft Kamehameha
CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger
Additional stations that may be determined to be necessary

NAVY

Waialupe
Destroyer Patrol
Mine Sweepers

- c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4] available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES.

8. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commandant General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. Balloon barrages.

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. Aircraft Warning Service.

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to [5] the completion of the

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AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF.

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

VI. SMOKE SCREENS.

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor—Hickam Field area from air attacks.

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST.

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(C348)

Confidential

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing Two,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

March 31, 1941.

Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADDENDUM I TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

JOINT ESTIMATE COVERING JOINT ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST OAHU OR FLEET UNITS IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7,000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and

characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accomodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would not be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we would have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions [4] this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

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IV. Action open to us.

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying army effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft).

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying

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from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

- (a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.
- (b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.
- (g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 24

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm. AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm. AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

[2] 5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

/S/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Blesemeier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

[24]

Op-30B3-AJ

(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI

MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

D-27446

Navy Department

February 13, 1941.

From: Director, Naval Districts Division

To: Director, War Plans Division

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr. of Feb. 7, 1941 to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

/s/ Alex Sharp
ALEX SHARP

(Pencil Notation: Done O15712 of 11 Feb. M.)

A true copy. Attest:

H. Blesemeier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate

EXHIBIT No. 25

(Exhibit No. 25 is a fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941. This report is reproduced in four parts and will be found as Items Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 26

SECRET

27 MAY 1940

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow—well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut out short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? **Answer:** obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel:—Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently. I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as—

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.

[3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.

(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.

(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.

(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet:

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies,—I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and home-made recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1,—modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that now appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division, possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [4] from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made,—for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic—should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in those areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands:—We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

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I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter—as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever.

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. RACHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 27

SECRET

eft/10

CinC File No. A16/01705

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

U. S. NAVY YARD, BREMERTON, WASH.

October 22, 1940

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: War Plans—Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan;

[2] *Third.* That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

(a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient "to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior [3] to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area."

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, denude that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE *at the beginning* of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

(b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.

(c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the [4] necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this BASE forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

[5] Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

(d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPL 14 and throughout the O-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period or some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

[6] (a) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear [7] picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;

(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);

(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

[8] (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:

(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;

(3) Threats and raids against the enemy;

(4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.

12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. O. RICHARDSON

EXHIBIT No. 28

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/

U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., January 7, 1941.

*Confidential**First Endorsement to*

Com 14 Conf. Ltr.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14

(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.**To:** The Chief of Naval Operations.**Subject:** Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

1. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

[2] 3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measure that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detaching important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U. S. Fleet. It is fur-

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ther considered that the provision of adequate [3] Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to: Com FOURTEEN

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cincpac.

ENSIGN H. E. RORMAN, USN,
Secret Mail Officer.

[1] OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD,
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629)

30 DEC. 1940.

Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References:

- (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
- (b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
- (d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
- (e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. Aircraft Raids.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to [2] the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no

plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. Defense Against Submarines.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other [3] islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. Defense Against Mines.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. Defense Against Bombardment.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. Sabotage.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. Water and Electric Supply.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement [4] has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard

but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the [5] numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH.

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cincpac.

H. E. Norman

ENSIGN H. E. NORMAN, USN.,

Secret Mail Officer.

This is copy of original run of letter.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 29

[SECRET]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long since have learned my habits.

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will continue in future communications of ours similar searching analyses. Just for a moment refresh on your paragraph 3; and permit me to say "check and double check".

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. *(Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time.)*¹ Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way.

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter of the 25th (0129) are just signed.

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good

¹ This matter is Privileged and must not be released for any purpose without "EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF SECNAV."

ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope, too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

[2] Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder; we have distributed them to the outlying stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should be put aboard ship.

Every good wish in the world.

As ever sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
*Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

[3] P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the 27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with one or two other things.

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but still objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared to make a quick decision if it is ordered.

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Nimitz and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple of weeks ago, even before I got your letter, the President told me I was overcrowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary with increased complements so we may have to ask for the doctors' opinion regarding the new complements.

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satisfactory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a misnomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back on the West Coast.

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral Bloch.

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new

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sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them.

[4] I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday".

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.

All good wishes.

Keep cheerful.

BETTY.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 29 which is a personal letter dated 10 February 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The fourth sentence in the third paragraph on page 1.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 29, which the Judge Advocate purposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME II

No. 30 to 44 (both inclusive)

NOTE—Exhibits Nos. 31 and 39 contain privileged matter, which, though not classified as "Top Secret", do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in "red" together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. N.,
Judge Advocate.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 30

UNITED STATES FLEET

CinC File No.

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
18 February 1941.

DEAR BETTY: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interferences with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for \$39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for \$9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor

[2] I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARES to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palmyra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palmyra. I think our recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

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Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate correspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regulation proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwarded me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.

I come to another question of the highest importance, the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact

in all the aeronautical organizations afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrains" vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Draemel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. We received through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese *trade routes*. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

EXHIBIT No. 31

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-10 Hu

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, 25 February 1941.

Dear Kimmel: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of especial importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog", we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to "Dog" (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your

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Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could wish for more.

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids, I hope that you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint—but, again, you may consider that they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly *SECRET*) *you and I may be ordered* to make them, so it is just as well for you to have considered plans for it.

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on the Hill (*and I might add, all of which is irresponsible*)¹ constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff conversations (and thank the Good Lord there has been *little* no public leak that they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions reached just as soon as we can.

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the office for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I always have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the covering sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, were sound.

Keep cheerful.

All good wishes and Good Luck.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.

¹ The underlined matter is privileged—It must NOT be released without specific authority SECNAV.

[1] [Pencil Notation:] Sent to W. H. by Capt Callaghan

DRAFT

11 FEBRUARY 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) of destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its un wisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southward or into the Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.

[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his submarines which are in urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:—

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

[4] The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plant our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view.

Op-12-CTB Secret

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.

1. The despatches from the Naval Attaché in London concerning prospects of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI to Tokyo indicates to me two things,

(1) The demands by Japan will be far-reaching, and

(2) The February 10th date is too soon for an attack, as the negotiations are likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan:

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent of the two governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.

(b) The size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan is insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. So far as I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move. [2] Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations she will assuredly occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and air bases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land forces in Indo-China in readiness for action against Malaya and British North Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Hainan. I question her readiness to attack the British before June, but this belief is subject to revision.

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can con-

tinue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration.

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's success in the Balkans. If the Germans succeed in conquering the British Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-China.

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reinforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.

H. R. STARK.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to *Exhibit 31* which is a personal letter dated 25 February 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined to answer as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets:

The words in parenthesis in the second sentence in the first paragraph on page 2.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 31, which the Judge Advocate Proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 32

SECRET

In reply refer to initials and No. Op-10/Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 22, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letter of February 18th was handed to me upon my return from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Island; literally, a flying trip.

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to the questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, here goes:

The checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must have had acknowledgments by this time.

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3—a copy of which I have—seems to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not comment

any further on that subject; except that, with regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully understand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.

With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now, have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands. Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra Islands should not exceed the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water, and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new PTC's at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 28 immediately.

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed by the Congress and signed by the President.

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accomplished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.

With respect to paragraph 10 Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you of March 5th, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's letter that all requirements will be completed either in the May, 1941, voyage of the U. S. S. Lassen, or the ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that island and asking you to assist in transporting them from the mainland to Oahu. Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the availability of magazines.

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation; 5,000 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly.

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substitute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the Fleet.

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels: Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may be ready for service.

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with additional destroyers for some months, if then; in fact we may have to take some away soon.

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraphs 14 and 15 relative to complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted:

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all types of ships since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by improved A. A. defence, D. C. equipment, splinter protection and increased ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accordance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way are obtained.

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear, sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approximately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel

Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions as shown by table.

	Over Increase Men	Resulting Weight Added
BBs-----	286	143 tons
CAs-----	228	114 tons
CLs-----	136	78 tons
DDs-----	57	28.5 tons

(c) While the decision against recommended increases was based on weight and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions on berthing space introduced by sealing of airports on the lower decks has made the space component of more importance than formerly.

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed increased complements for the additional AA batteries installed.

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.

[4] (f) On a comparative basis the complements now allowed are 10-15% greater than those assigned by the British on similar types of ships.

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bureau of Ships requesting comment on the maximum number of men which can be accommodated on the various types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considerations. The reopening of the case depends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.

P. S. The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It is anticipated that it will be recommended for approval to maximum extent permissible within space, weight and stability recommendations of BuShips."

Paragraph 18 of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every possible effort to provide the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate only limited by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by *specific directives* to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out that the Navy Department in the fact of long and determined opposition has been successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models of naval airplanes now on order for the Fleet. This priority (A-1-b) is higher than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the P4OB's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.

VP-----	PBY5-----	197
VSB-----	SBD-2&3-----	262
VF-----	F4F-----	324
VSO-----	SO3c-----	260
VSB-----	SB2c-----	70
VTB-----	TBF-----	108

1, 221

Your paragraph 18 recommends the acquisition of two more "seatrains" vessels. Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's, 2 New Jerseys, 2 Manhattans, was recommended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jerseys as you probably know was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 15, 1941, but *funds have not been made available*. The New Jersey type is now used for ferrying loaded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled airplanes of the scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. I might add that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and stack arrangement are being prosecuted. No provisions will be made for airplane landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying capacity for the Manhattans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded; under these conditions the planes could not, of course, be flown off.

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In answer to your comment in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional stores ships and transports, the following obtains:

On 15 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for three additional store ships (AF). The President cut it to two. The status of legislation authorizing and appropriating *money* for these two vessels is indeterminate at the present moment. It is hoped these vessels will be acquired sometime during the current fiscal year.

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels will report for duty by June or July, 1941. In addition to their intended employment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be necessary for forces afloat to use one or more of those transports to meet transportation requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships, negotiations are being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed and ready for service.

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The date appearing on the chart is the date 1939, which was the last complete year for which export and import data on commodities was available at the time the chart was revised.

Every good wish as always.

Keep Cheerful.

Unload all you can on us.

Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong cross currents and tide rips—just as we do you—and,

Best of luck,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania.
Pearl Harbor, T.

EXHIBIT No. 33

[1] A16/0828 of 26 May 1941.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

26 MAY 1941.

From CinC.

To: Opanav

Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pac. fl.

I. PERSONNEL.

(a) *Stability*.—A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel*.—Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There

appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the [2] various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible for correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.*—The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new [3] construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approached 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined. [4] and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.*—The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.*—It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral

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Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye, is able, vigorous, and loyal: and is an officer whom I would select above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

(f) *Uniform.*—There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity [5] and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. AVIATION.

(a) *Aviation Training.*—The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.*—The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes [7] and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor.

(c) *Separate Air Force.*—This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition

of the intimate relationship between air and surface [8] sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps [9] would make the situation much worse—for the navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. MATERIAL, GENERAL.

(a) *Priorities*.—The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army, and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the [10] situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's, and those *sine qua non* needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR Equipment*.—Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

[11] IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. OPERATIONS.

(a) *Fleet Operations*.—With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed *vital* interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to “cover” the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid [12] strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having “broken our backs”, so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must [13] be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

(b) *Fourteenth Naval District*.—The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take [14] over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine*.—The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force

in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

[15] (d) *Logistic Support*.—Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. NATIONAL POLICY.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense [16] commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. INFORMATION.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence [17] in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and

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time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all [18] important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 34

Our 7971
Via Clipper Mon 28 July
Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 26, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY:—When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been thinking:—

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of co-operation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:—

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) ne-

cessity for providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—

(a) *Transports and Light Destroyer Transports*.—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. It at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

(b) *Marine Equipment*.—The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) *Ammunition Facilities*.—The condition of ammunition handling and storage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Storage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen

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off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

(1) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

(3) *Communications*.—The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

(4) *Aviation Requirements*.—These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:—

(a) *Pre-Fleet Training*. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

(b) *New Torpedo Planes*.—Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

(c) *Conversions for Carrier Landing Training*.—Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots *must* be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

(d) *A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment*.—This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

(e) *I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment*.—This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

(f) *Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's)*. Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

(g) *Landplane Field at Johnston Island*. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to

local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

(h) *Keehi Lagoon Development*. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

(i) *Development of the N.A.S. Barber's Point*. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No 35

SECRET

WRS/mjf

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, August 22, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in this next clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic and in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. [Handwritten comment: It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite may-be.]

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District Mate, (Admiral Bloch) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck—wish you were close by

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, *U. S. N.*
USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[1]

DRAFT

AUGUST 19, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was insufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and

2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers upon my return to the Navy Department.

I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers and 200 P-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown to Russia via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the fighters and naval escorts for same. On 11 August 1941, the Russian Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant General of their Army and a Captain of their Navy, was received by Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated that his country had pressing need for all manner of military supplies, planes—and anti-aircraft guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and that there [2] were no reserve stocks in the country from which to draw. The Secretary summarized his remarks by saying that, since the President had made the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counted upon to cooperate to the utmost.

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored." This will be done. The conversations which took place at sea between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystallize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was ~~reached~~ *announced* as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as a result of the latter's attack on the provinces in question. [Handwritten comment: I have done my utmost to get a decision—it can't be had now either here or in London. I make no forecast.]

Of course, Japanese action against the Maritime provinces remains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. However, it is my own thought that if Japan gets embroiled with Russia over the Maritime provinces, such action could hardly react other than to somewhat relieve the pressure now being exerted by Japan to the southward. ~~In such an event, I think there would be many signs of relief.~~

If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific. [Handwritten comment: I could not get no plan from the British—They did not have one—ABC and Rainbow V still prevail.]

We are in complete agreement about developing Guam and bolstering the defenses of the Philippines. The Army is sending everything it can out there. As you know, we are sending Tommy some PTs. More aid would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that it is pretty late to start on Guam anything more than we already have in hand. We will make all the progress we can, remembering that "Dollars Cannot Buy Yesterday."

[3] In discussing the priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific War, for your convenience, I shall quote the paragraphs from your letter *in order* and follow each with ~~shall then~~ comment ~~on it~~.

Paragraph 2 (a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destroyer Transports. During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it

cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

Comment. We all recognize that the APD's were developed with a Pacific campaign in mind. We withdrew them to the Atlantic with great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Likewise, work is being pushed on the HARRIS and ZEILIN. I must confess that progress on those ships has not been wholly satisfactory.

[Handwritten note at bottom of page:] I more than confess—I admit it. The whole thing has been a headache. It was these old crocks or nothing. Slow as they have been, I am glad I took 'em over. At least we will have 2 we could not get now. Every AP has been a struggle. I am keeping the APD's open—don't give up hope—yet.)

[1]

ROUGH DRAFT FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER

AUGUST 16, 1941

Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter—Marine Equipment.—The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come, they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

Comment.—In reference to the 3" AA guns, and the .30 caliber machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Headquarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its initial allowances in those weapons since 7 July 1941; that is, 12—3" AA guns, and 30—.30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .50 caliber AA machine guns should be remedied by September, 1941.

An outline of the present situation in reference to Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet about 25 July 1941. It is believed that this presents as complete a picture as is possible at this time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the Army. Existing stocks in the United States are at present much too low to meet the requirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Marine Corps may expect their proportion to be delivered from the manufacturers more steadily and consistently in the future than heretofore.

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are likely to exist for some time, however, mainly due to the fact that quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient ammunition to fill immediate requirements of the Second Division [2] as it exists today may be specially obtained from the Army. We have milked the Army pretty dry now.

The present outlook indicates that sufficient personnel will be available by 1 October 1941, to form for expeditionary duty a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave within the Division a nucleus for training of its remaining units. It is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by January, 1942.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter—Ammunition Facilities. The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barracaded stowage for live

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mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

Comment. The Bureau of Ordnance has had all ammunition storage items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch. Funds have been obtained to extend the ammunition pier from 600 feet to 1500 feet. Since no authorization will be required to extend the pier from 1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to avoid delay. The funds required are \$250,000, which will eventually be obtained from Congress to repay the project robbed.

(b) No funds are available for the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch. No authorization has been obtained for the construction of these magazines. The Bureau of Ordnance will have these magazines included in the next authorization [hand written comment: supplementary] bill to be presented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at \$210,000.

[3] The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional land."

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

Comment.—Building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.—The Bureau of Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 1942) to take care of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necessary to repair and maintain the 1946 feet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in the amount of \$20,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of an additional major battleship dock. This dock together with the other facilities which will be accomplished with the money, will bring the yard up to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as follows:

12 months for 50% of the facilities.

18 months for the remainder of the facilities.

22 to 24 months for the dry dock.

Note:—The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Fleet Maintenance—Operations control making ships available for overhauls and set the priority for work at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this Yard of spare propellers and shafting—it has under procurement, additional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.

[4] The Shore Establishments Division intends to augment the working force as the capacity and work load are increased.

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the Bureau of Yards and Docks has issued instructions to expedite all of this work to the greatest practicable extent.

The recommendation to confine the activities of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to emergency and low priority overhauls can be accomplished by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers to West Coast yards but this recommendation is not concurred in for the following reasons:

(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Secretary of the Navy on

May 14, 1941, recommended that the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of handling "full overhauls and damage" with simultaneous drydocking facilities for 2 Battleships, 1 CB, 1 CV, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine railway. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments Division) dated June 26, 1941 in regard to building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 1943. The third paragraph of this letter is quoted herewith:

"It is believed it is necessary that capital ships be overhauled at Pearl Harbor if that Yard is expected to perform the war task that has been assigned. It is, therefore, recommended that in the next revision of the availability schedule, a start be made toward an equitable diversion of the overhaul of Battleships and Carriers from Puget Sound to Pearl Harbor."

~~The Director, Fleet Maintenance Division,~~ It is believed that only by actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can the Pearl Harbor organization be trained and made capable of repairing [5] these ships in an emergency, together with development of necessary facilities.

(2) Repairs to British Naval vessels, particularly the larger types of ships, is absorbing a large percentage of the repair facilities of continental U. S. yards and it is expected that the demands will increase. East Coast yards are being used primarily for this work but it has been found necessary—due to full schedules of these yards—to send some British ships to Puget Sound and Mare Island.

If these latter yards are fully scheduled with our own ships (as can be expected if all Battleship, Carrier, Cruiser, and Destroyer overhauls are transferred to them from Pearl Harbor) it is problematical whether British ships can be repaired and overhauled at the rate that this is now being undertaken.

The foregoing comment ~~by Fleet Maintenance~~ is substantially in accord with your letter L9-5 (50) over L9-3 Serial 01176 of 1 August 1941.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter.—Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

[Handwritten comment:] I know it—God knows, I wish I could send 'em.

Comment. The present rate of recruiting is about 9,300 men a month. According to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits are required in order to meet the requirements of the service on June 30, 1942 based on present allowances. (This estimate is subject to variables such as changes in dates of commissioning ships and stations.) Therefore the Navy will lack approximately 32,000 men necessary for Navy requirements on June 30, 1942. It is estimated that this will be enough men to [6] fill complements and allowances on that date to an average of about 92%. The Fleets are now filled to about 94% of complements. This percentage will drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron allowances. It is estimated that Navigation can replace losses in the Fleets with recruits to maintain them at about the same percentage of men aboard to complements as at present. Should be 100+.

The recent large withdrawals from the Fleets have been due to the necessity of supplying the crews for the large number of auxiliary vessels recently acquired and for the assembly of men for Advanced Destroyer, Submarine and Aviation Bases. These demands were superimposed upon the demands for the regular building and usual purchasing program.

The above estimates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting of 9,300. Recruiting is now on the increase and additional men over the 9,300 monthly will be furnished to the Fleets.

[Handwritten comment:] We are spending \$1,000,000 in advertising—hope to speed it up.

Paragraph 2 (f) of your letter.—Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

Comment. It is contemplated assigning the SOLACE (AH5), Ex-IRIQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be in the latter part of August, 1941. Further, it is contemplated transporting Mobile Base Hospital No. 2 from New York to Oahu in the U. S. S. PROCYON (AK19) departing New

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York early in October; she is a 15-knot ship and will call at San Diego to debark some personnel and stores there en route.

So far as the new hospital is concerned, the contract for this has been let and presumably the work is underway.

Paragraph 2 (g) of your letter. Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

Comment. The project is now underway to send twelve PT's to the 14th Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and transportation provided. This shipment will follow the six MTB's going to the 16th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.

[Handwritten note at bottom of page:] Wish I had more. They will be coming. I know Xmas is too, but we are doing the best we can—and I am kicking all the time.

[6a] *Paragraph 2 (h) of your letter.* The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

Comment. The project of assembling advance Base Material has been raised to an A-1-a [handwritten note: our highest priority] priority, and the assembling of this material is going ahead satisfactorily.

[7] *Paragraph 2 (i) of your letter.* Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

Comment. In this connection, I quote verbatim the remarks of the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you may have the entire picture:

The status of placing depth charges and under-water sound equipment on light craft is as follows (taken up by classes):

DMs and DMSs—These vessels have depth charges and echo-ranging equipment authorized; some have the equipment installed and those ships that have not yet received their echo-ranging equipment will get Model QC Series commencing in September 1941. [Handwritten note: Too slow I know—but I have been doing my d'st.]

AVDs—Stability conditions on these ships are not good and the addition of depth charges, racks, or Y-guns, and echo-ranging equipment will necessitate compensating weight removal. It is understood that the desired equipment can be installed providing the towing reel on the fan tail is permanently removed. A lightweight echo-ranging and listening gear equipment, Model WEA, has been developed which weighs about 1300 pounds, with deliveries commencing in October 1941.

The following are the requirements for the WEA equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D. C.
- (b) Head room required for hoist-train equipment about 70 inches.
- (c) At least 24 inches between frames of ships to accommodate pedestal.
- (d) Remote control of train by means of cables and sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.

The above equipment is suitable for any installation in AMs (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts. Additionally, this equipment can be installed in any other types of ships having adequate space and power supply.

A lightweight listening equipment (Model JK-9), about 1300 pounds, has been developed and contract awarded for 230 sets; delivery [8] commences in August 1941 at a rate of 10 each week. The following are the requirements for installation of the JK-9 equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D. C. or 24 volts D. C. (Two types of motor generators available, producing 115 volts, A. C.). Overall dimensions of motor generator set $29\frac{1}{2} \times 13\frac{1}{2} \times 11\frac{3}{4}$ inches.
- (b) Maximum head room required for hoist-train mechanism about 96 inches.
- (c) Only limitation or frame spacing is that it pass the 4-inch projector shaft.
- (d) No remote control—hand hoist and train directly connected to projector shaft.

This equipment is for listening only (no echo-ranging feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship having adequate space and power supply. Space

allotted to the equipment must provide for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7'-9" x 26½" x 20"), receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x 15½") and sufficient space for the operator.

APDs—The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and now carry 24—300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these ships is so unsatisfactory that they will require 50 tons of fixed ballast. The installation of the WEA echo-ranging equipment, described under AVDs, above, can be accommodated in these ships.

AMs and AVPs—The question of installing depth charge and echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has been referred to the Bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practicability of accomplishment.

It should be pointed out that draft and stability conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions are about to be issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau of Ships indicates that compensatory weight reduction must be made on practically a pound-for-pound basis in order to install the desired equipment. The installation of echo-ranging, or listening equipment is dependent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs.

[9] It is to be noted that the lightest depth charge rack now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500 pounds. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs 420 pounds, the total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be about 4000 pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater sound equipment is about 1300 pounds as explained above under AVDs.

PEs, PCs, PYs, PYCs, and YPs. All these vessels have depth charges, the number depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns.

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been authorized and will be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided."

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications. The supply of communications, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

Comment. Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

"During the fiscal year 1941 the Bureau of Ships placed contracts for radio and sound material amounting to approximately \$110,000,000. The material contracted for included all of the material listed in the 1941 and 1942 Communication Improvement Plans issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular 1941 budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law on June 11, 1940, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation act in mid September 1940. Considering the time when the necessary funds became available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid, as could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. However, it is recognized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay at [10] all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is objectionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and components have in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care of within the next few months.

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular 1941 appropriation act, which became law on June 11, 1940. Initiation of procurement of radio material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately after the funds became available. Funds for items later added to the allowance became available in September, 1940.

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The tabulation below indicates the present situation as regards radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station :

Allowed equipment	Installed	To be shipped	Expected date	Remarks
2 TBM.....	1	1	Jan. 1942.....	
2 TBP.....	2			
1 TBU.....		1	Mar. 1942.....	
6 TBW.....		2	Sept. 1941.....	
		4	Jan. 1942.....	
2 TCA.....		2	Sept. 1941.....	1 TBO-1 in use
2 TCB.....		2	Nov. 1941.....	
1 TCC.....		1	Aug. 1941.....	1 TBR-1 installed
4 RBA/RBB/RBC.....		4	Indefinite.....	New type—other receivers available if urgently required
6 RAS.....	6			
1 DY.....		1	11 Aug. 1941.....	from NY Wash
1 DP.....		1	11 Aug. 1941.....	1 DN from NYMI
1 Inst. LDG Equip.....		1	Sept. 1942.....	#40 on priority list; deliveries start Sept. 1941
1 RAU.....		1	Oct. 1941.....	
1 YA.....		1	Jan. 1942.....	

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs at Kaneohe if required. These TBR-1 equipments are not necessarily reserved or intended for advanced base service, but are available for any use at the discretion of the Commandant or the Commander in Chief.

[11] *Paragraph 3(b) of your letter.* It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

Comment. Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and the Director, Naval Communications Division in order named:

"The Model XAF RADAR equipment developed by Naval Research Laboratory was installed in USS NEW YORK 12-18 December, 1938, and was tested at the same time as the Model XXZ Radar equipment developed by RCA Mfg. Co., and installed in USS TEXAS. These tests continued through March 1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 8 April, 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment was returned to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of the Department as a result of which it was decided to proceed with the procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract was awarded 16 October 1939 to RCA Mfg. Co. The time between the date of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment was shipped by factory May 21, 1940. It will be noted that the time for delivery of the first equipment by contractor was approximately 13 months from the date of completion of tests in USS NEW YORK and 7 months after date of contract. The last equipment was shipped by contractor on June 20, 1940. The dates of installation of this equipment were dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned. A matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment was completed August 24, 1940, and the last on October 14, 1940, and the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the report on NEW YORK tests."

[Handwritten comment:] Read to here in evidence.

[12] "The Model XAF RADAR, built by Naval Research Laboratory, was tested afloat during the late winter and early spring of 1939. This test indicated that additional equipment should be purchased for trial. A study was made to determine the practicability of installing the equipment afloat; this study disclosed that only ten (10) ships could accommodate the large antenna array without first making extensive alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to the radio beam from the ships' structures. Chief of Naval Operations requested procurement of ten (10) production models of the XAF. The earliest that funds could be obtained to manufacture the Model CXAM (copy of NRL Model XAF) was during fiscal 1940. Due to the higher unit cost of the

equipment and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in connection with "neutrality enforcement", the Bureau of Ships could manufacture but six (6) complete units. When additional funds were made available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (14) Model CXAM-1's were ordered as "stop-gap" equipment pending completion of development of an improved detector—the Model SC."

[Handwritten comment:] Long winded—what he wants is radars and more radars.

Paragraph 3 (c) of your letter. For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

Comment. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships states:

"The need for a satisfactory recognition device in the fleet has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest one since the time of the last war and every idea advanced by the fleet, the Naval Research Laboratory or other laboratories that appeared to offer promise has been thoroughly investigated. This research has fully covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound spectrums. Many systems which were developed to a point which warranted service tests have been tested in the fleet and all have been reported unsatisfactory by the fleet even after modification by NRL and other [13] laboratories in accordance with the wishes of the fleet. There has been no lack of funds in this connection. The NRL has been engaged continuously since its establishment in efforts to develop a recognition system. That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by NRL in any form of radio recognition is not one of fact."

[Handwritten comment:] The files of NRL contain a letter so stating!

It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet Radar installations will be made before the end of the calendar year.

[Handwritten comment:] High time.

Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

Comment. In regard to the foregoing, the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks as follows:

[Handwritten comment:] Development—Development—Development—The other fellow has it—

"Currently, the Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the earliest practicable development and procurement of suitable RADAR equipment for aircraft. Recognition equipment will be installed in all service aircraft at the earliest opportunity. One hundred (100) ABA (American recognition) sets are now due for delivery, and they will be distributed to the Fleet in the most effective manner possible. Material is being assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which will be put in production by General Electric as soon as a satisfactory service test is completed. [Handwritten comment: Rush.] 356 British I. F. F. sets have been requested; 56 of these sets are being delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed."

[Handwritten comment:] Here's hopin'!

The tentative plan for initial RADAR installations in aircraft is as follows:

A brief summary of nomenclature is:

a. ASV MK II—British search equipments suitable for VPBs.
b. ASA—American search equipment including high altitude altimeter, suitable for VPB's.

c. ASB—American search equipment, expected to be suitable for 2 and 3 place planes.

[14] d. ASV—MK II (Fleet Air Arm modified), British search equipment for use in large single engine planes.

e. ABA—American recognition equipment.

f. IFF—British recognition equipment.

g. AYA—American high range altimeter.

h. AYB—American low range altimeter.

i. AI—MK IV—British Interception equipment—multi-place airplanes.

Search equipment (long range British ASV or American ASA) will be installed in all PBY-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installations are being made.

It is expected to install ASB (small search equipment) with a low range altimeter in one plane of each section of VTB's. All TBF airplanes will have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve space in all new VSB and VSO airplanes for the American ASB, and where practicable install this equipment in current types.

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Initial installation is now being made of the experimental model of the ASB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available as soon as the equipment is provided.

[Handwritten comment:] Still experiment.

Steps have been taken to obtain models of the British MK II ASV equipment (modified for Fleet Air Arm) for reproduction purposes. It is expected to supplement manufacture of American ASB equipment with an American version of the modified MK II.

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part of the American search equipment in all VPB airplanes. It is planned to equip one airplane of each section of VTB's with high altitude altimeters and another airplane of each section of VTB's with a low range altimeter for use with the ASB equipment (as indicated in paragraphs above research equipment).

Recognition equipment will be installed in all service airplanes at the earliest opportunity. The first 100 American ABA equipments are now due for delivery.

[15] *Interception equipments.* Provision for these equipments will be made in a certain number of F4U airplanes as soon as the development in the United States and abroad of models suitable for use in single engine, single place airplanes permits. Pending this development, a test installation is being made of a British MK IV equipment in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available for use as interceptors as soon as this equipment can be obtained from either British or American source.

Projects have been initiated to design search and interception antenna structures which are most readily demountable and which are streamlined as much as practicable. Development of American search and interception equipment will stress ready removal provisions in order to result in maximum of operational flexibility.

[Handwritten comment:] Ought to reap some benefit after this intolerable delay.

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser airplanes are dependent on installation difficulties and initial performance. A more comprehensive plan may be expected to be published about January, 1942.

The Bureau of Ships remarks:

"Deliveries have begun on 104 Model ABA IFF equipments for aircraft together with 32 model BE/BF equipments for shipboard use. These will be given service tests in the fleet together with 3 Model BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at NRL September 22, 1941. The contractor is assembling material for 1500 additional ABA equipments and further production will be authorized just as soon as tests justify the step. All of the above is of American design but because of design and operational features it will not operate with corresponding British ship, shore or aircraft types. To provide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore and aircraft equipments are being flown to the United States and will be modified for production in the United States and supplied to all forces likely to operate with British forces. These sample equipments are due within a few days according to advices from the Naval Attache, London. The 56 equipments mentioned in the paragraph to which this comment is directed are for Support Force Aircraft and eight are now in the process of being installed."

[16] *Paragraph 3 (e) of your letter.* Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

[Handwritten comment:] Agree.

Comment. An omni-directional aircraft detection equipment was tested in GRAYLING on 2 August 1941. Although the results of the test were somewhat discouraging, the equipment showed sufficient promise to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a directional antenna system will greatly improve [Handwritten comment: Yea—but when—] the performance of the submarine equipment; this project will be prosecuted.

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm surface-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for delivery about January 1942. The equipment which is being designed for making night attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be capable of taking accurate ranges and bearings on capital ships at distances in the order of 10,000 yards.

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equipment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. [Hand written comment: Thank God—] The delay in procurement of radio and sound equipment is not entirely due to the "elaborate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy Department is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment.

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submarines are equipped with Radar. It is, however, highly probable that they are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much facility at night.

Paragraph 4 (a) of your letter. Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

[17] *Comments.* In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks:

"On 28 July, I signed a letter that embodied measures for the improvement of aviation training of pilots and other members of flight crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary schools and fleet squadrons. I hope the effect will be salutary and beneficial in the immediate future. VP-13 will be held at San Diego to launch an intensive transitional training program in combination with the Training Test and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of pilots for the organization of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every experienced aviation officer in the training establishment ashore will be released for duty in fleet squadrons as soon as he can be replaced. The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons.

Aside from transitional training in the larger patrol planes, pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol squadrons whose primary task is their preparation for duty in active combatant squadrons. Although every squadron on the West Coast may be assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings ONE and TWO in the Hawaiian Area to absorb any excess in personnel that cannot be trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and qualified personnel.

There will be an advanced carrier training organization at San Diego in accordance with my letter of 28 July. Additional new VO/VS pilots will commence reporting to the Fleet during August. Any of these pilots who cannot be trained expeditiously on board ship should be retained in the advanced carrier training squadron at San Diego for more flying, particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet.

[18] The priority accorded to the Army and British heavy bomber programs has been the cause of our most urgent attention. The final action on priorities was decided at a conference between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representatives of the Army Air Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office of Production Management. The net result was an A-1-b award to approximately 2,000 (plus or minus 500) additional naval aircraft, and brings a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest priority classification given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare aircraft are now planned for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare aircraft have been requested for patrol squadrons.

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation remarks:

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter, Op-22-B5, (SC) P11-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to establish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the following units:

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic—for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego and for the Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia—Purpose of these groups is to give advanced carrier training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from training centers, prior to assignment to carrier units in the two fleets.

(b) Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic and Transition Training Squadron, Pacific—Purpose of these squadrons is to give advanced patrol plane train-

ing to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from the training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two fleets. These squadrons also train experienced aviators in the operation of the model PB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the model PBM airplanes in the Atlantic Fleet.

[19] Experienced Naval Aviators have already been ordered to report to these training groups and squadrons when they are formed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these units.

By the letter referred to above, Chief of Naval Operations has indicated that during the months of August to December, 1941, inclusive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will be ordered to both fleets. Also, for the same period, 334 carrier pilots and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above mentioned training units for assignment to each fleet.

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning pilots out at such a rate that at all times thereafter, we will always have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the operating aviation units to meet all the fleet requirements, including double complements of patrol squadrons.

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV Schools training aviation ratings and radiomen (qualair) will be approximately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942.

Sixty-five (65) percent of the graduates of these Class "A" Schools have been marked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville and Miami, until about 8,170 graduates have been fed into the flight training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by about January 20, 1942.

This will leave an estimated balance of 18,926 Class "A" School graduates for the Forces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 30, 1942.

The allowances of patrol plane squadrons have been increased 220% over the 1941 allowances."

Paragraph 4 (b) of your letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

[20] *Comment.* The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of VTB for the Fleet.

Paragraph 4 (c) of your letter. Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

Comment. The conversion of the U. S. S. WAKEFIELD and U. S. S. MT. VERNON to auxiliary aircraft carriers with landing features incorporated is contemplated. Steps are now being taken to procure material and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable also that the U. S. S. WEST POINT will be included in the above category.

[Handwritten comment:] and now, if we can get the President to give in—To date the answer is No—

Paragraph 4 (d) of your letter. A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

There is an aircraft RADAR project set up in the Bureau of Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necessary equipment that can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due consideration for other essential equipment. The training of RADAR operators is underway so that by the time the equipment arrives there will be trained personnel who are essential for its successful operation. ASV sets will be provided as alternate installations in all carrier planes that can accommodate them and all patrol planes will be ASV-equipped. Every possible source of supply, including British and Canadian, is being investigated to accelerate the program. Three hundred Canadian ASV

equipment sets are expected at the monthly rate of one hundred sets commencing 1 October, 1941.

[21] *Paragraph 4 (c) of your letter. J. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment.* This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

Comment. This subject has been discussed elsewhere in this letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board is setting up essential requirements for RADAR equipment on board ship. The Board has been advised to incorporate the identification feature in ship control and fire control sets since identification is a very necessary part of the RADAR installation.

Paragraph 4 (f) of your letter. Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBV-5's). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

Comment. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer have been advised of the nose section failures in the engines of VP-14. The loose-coupled shaft in these engines will eliminate the restrictions on operating the engine within the present critical speed range. However, this does not apply to VP-14 but this squadron is being supplied new heavier nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies if engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only three planes outside VP-14 have encountered failures in the light nose sections. The heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.

Paragraph 4 (g) of your letter. Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

Comment. Funds in the amount of \$750,000 for this project are available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.

Paragraph 4 (h) of your letter. Kechi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

[22] *Comment.* The Navy Department has included Kechi Lagoon as one of the Navy-sponsored developments for commercial seaplanes in the Hawaiian area in its recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The War Department has an appropriation of approximately \$3,330,000 for this project and arrangements are being made for additional funds for the dredging which is expected to commence very soon. Navy patrol plane facilities are not included in the prospective plans for this location. Any special facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must be of a temporary nature.

Paragraph 4 (i) of your letter. Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point. This important development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

Comment. Your comment on the need for this development is supported wholeheartedly in the Department and will receive the most careful attention until it meets the Fleet's needs. Funds for Barber's Point in the amount of \$18,605,000 will be available in August and work begun immediately if the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House and has been approved by the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I want you to be fully advised. Don't hesitate to tell us how you think we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, and helpful criticism is always in order.

You no doubt have seen in the press about our conference at sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was most helpful. It is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being present.

With all good wishes, I am

[Hand written:] Too long—Oh Lord—Too Long.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

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EXHIBIT No. 36

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 12, 1941.

DEAR "BETTY": We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for *surface* raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much concern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We cannot carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "status quo" and, if necessary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON. I feel that their movement to the Pacific, now, would have a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that *all* our thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be prepared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased demand for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distances involved and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job properly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that

should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity, *if we have the strength here to meet it*. Do not misunderstand me—I don't discount the Atlantic problem—but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.

Sincerely,

Reg. #293 guard mail. U. S. #282 via 14 Sept. Clipper.

EXHIBIT No. 37

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, 23 September 1941.

Op-10 Hu

DEAR KIMMEL.—This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of

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self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVEREIGN, RAMILLES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Rynjo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[4] P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL:

P. S. #2. Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convey to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

BETTY.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 12 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila. A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes. A group of pursuit, some

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130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G. C. M.,
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

[Hand written:] (You may have had word of this already!)

EXHIBIT No. 38

[1]

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 17 October 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can

maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Will add a P. S. in the a. m. Want this to make the clipper.—H. R. S.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.
%Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and by advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain face is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

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At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

EXHIBIT No. 39

[1]

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much *definite* information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations has given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a *good* reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney".¹

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.¹

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for the ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by *getting* or, rather, *not getting* into production. At last, we are "over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 22 sets. Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having flight deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty:—I agree with you 100%. The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is *far* from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She *can* be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

¹These paragraphs are privileged and "must not be disclosed without the "EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF SECNAV."

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which *could* be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an *important mission* (transporting British troops to the Middle East—*obviously most secret*) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot if we had those ships *now* converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat purposes.

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty (20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-McCormicks now engaged in the South American run. We have had our eye on the NORMANDIE. Thus far, State Department and President are adamant. I suppose they *think* that to take her over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. Of course, if Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice—What do you think of going ahead *now* with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which *might* be of service to us. To be sure, we *might* lose it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With all good wishes! Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,

U. S. S. Pennsylvania,

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court of Inquiry to Exhibit 39 which is a personal letter dated 14 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, and among the principal cases of privilege are:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The second, third and fifth paragraphs on page 1.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 39, which the Judge Advocate purposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of his letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

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[1]

EXHIBIT No. 39A

SECRET

Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China Incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistances by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

[2] Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operation, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Naval Operations.

Chief of Staff.

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EXHIBIT No. 40

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12 Ext. 2992	Addresses	Message precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations Released by Released by Ingersoll Date November 26, 1941	For action: CINCPAC	Priority Routine X Deferred
TOR coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

270040 CR #756

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4), Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 41

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 7 May 1941.

Via Clipper Mail—Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small, fast sea-going vessels equipped with listening gear, depth charges and guns.

(b) Aircraft.

(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the island bases and the other ports of the islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to their anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the coastal frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the island bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this letter will be required at these places.

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship

at Wake is 10 days. Imagine a vessel moored 10 days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1(a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this district at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to: Cincpac

(At this point in Exhibit No. 41 there appears a routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 04122 and date of 7 May 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 10, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 42

CinC File No. A16/(038W)

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 20 May 1941.

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—Local defense forces.

References:

- (a) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1(WP)(4)/ND14(0430) of May 7, 1941.
- (b) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-3/A4-3(1)/ND14(177) of May 13, 1940.
- (c) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-1/A7-3(3)/ND14(510) of Oct. 31, 1940.
- (d) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1/A7-2/ND14(629) of December 30, 1940.
- (e) CinCus conf. 1st end. A16 (022) of January 7, 1941.
- (f) CinCus secret ltr. A16 (0129) of January 25, 1941.
- (g) CinCus rest. ltr. A4-3/OP (499) of February 17, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Table of assignment of forces to the Fourteenth Naval District.

1. In reference (a), the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has again invited attention to the serious weakness of the local defense forces of his district, particularly in antisubmarine types. This continues to be a matter of grave concern to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. In case of war it seems certain that the Commander-in-Chief must divert important units of the Fleet from their proper function with the Fleet to supplement the inadequate local defense forces now available, or must accept the risk of serious losses to combatant ships, naval auxiliaries, and merchant ships. If the Fleet should be shifted from the Pearl Harbor area, or be temporarily absent, the local defense forces would be lamentably weak for carrying out their assigned tasks.

2. This situation has been the subject of considerable correspondence during the past year. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in order to lend further emphasis to its critical nature, and to clarify [2] the picture, will briefly review that correspondence:

(a) In reference (b), the Commandant recommended the assignment of 36 vessels, including DD's, PG's, XPG's, PC's, and XPC's, for escort and antisubmarine duty; as well as other vessels for harbor patrol, inshore patrol, mine-sweeping, etc. The Commander-in-Chief concurred in those recommendations.

(b) In reference (c), the Commandant, in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' request of September 23 for his estimate of requirements of certain patrol types, replied with a list by classes, numbers, and contemplated general employment.

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(c) W. P. L. 42, when issued, assigned to this district, including the outlying advanced bases, only seven vessels that were at all suitable for escort or anti-submarine work, viz: four destroyers and three Coast Guard vessels—a most inadequate number.

(d) W. P. L. 44 made no change in the assignment.

(e) In reference (d), the Commandant invited the attention of the Department to the weakness of the local defense. The Commander-in-Chief, in reference (e), strongly concurred and pointed out the importance of providing adequate forces that would be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.

[3] (f) In paragraph 7 (c) of reference (f), the Commander-in-Chief again expressed his concern over the situation, particularly as to its effect on the security and operations of the Fleet.

(g) In reference (g), the Commander-in-Chief recommended the assignment of six PT's and eight PTC's to the Hawaiian area.

3. The net accretion to Fourteenth Naval District forces to date, except for the arrival of Destroyer Division 80, is almost negligible, and in so far as the Commander-in-Chief is aware, suitable arrangements have not been made to build those forces up to an adequate state.

4. The tabulation of enclosure (A) shows:

Column 1.—allocation of vessels by W. P. L. 42 (W. P. L. 44 gives the same allocation) plus the number allocated otherwise;

Column 2.—the total requirements considered necessary by the Commandant and the Commander-in-Chief;

Column 3.—the vessels present in the Hawaiian area, whether or not now under naval control;

Column 4.—the additional number of vessels needed;

Column 5.—remarks.

5. The requirements are indicated for specific types of vessels. Where the particular type can not be made available, some other type of more or less similar characteristics should be substituted.

6. Column 3 of the aforementioned tabulation shows the extreme paucity of antisubmarine, escort, and patrol types. The Commander-in-Chief strongly reiterates his previous representations as to correction of this situation and requests that he receive early information in the premises.

7. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Comdt. 14 ND.

Enclosure (A).

	Allocated	Total required	Present	Additional required	Remarks
DD	4	8	4	4	
PG & XPG	1	8		8	Notes (1) (2).
PC & XPC (165')		8		8	
PC & XPC (110' or 125')		12		12	
PTC		8		8	
PYc & XPYc	2	2	2		Coast Guard.
YP & XYP	27	28	27	1	2 CGC, local sampans & Yachts.
PT		8		8	
AM & XAM	8	8		8	
AMc & XAMc	6	8		8	4 expected end of May.
AMb & XAMb	3	3		3	
CMe & XCMc	1	1		1	
YMS	2	2		2	2 being built.
YN	8	8	2	6	2 being built 1 fitting out.
YNg	1	1		1	Being built.
VP	84	84		84	15,000-plane program.
VSO	48	48		48	15,000-plane program.

NOTE: (1) Assigned XPG is U. S. C. G. TANEY, now on West Coast and C. G. District Commander Honolulu believes she will not return to Honolulu.

(2) PG-19 (SACRAMENTO) designated for special duty, Maui Range, is also assigned.

EXHIBIT No. 43

Op-12B-7-djm. (SC) A16-1/ND14
Serial 070312

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 23, 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—local defense forces.
References: (a) CinCpac secret serial 038W of May 20, 1941.
(b) WPL-46.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations is aware of the situation in regard to the naval local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District discussed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in reference (a), and realizes the necessity of increasing the strength of these forces.

2. Until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander in Chief can be remedied, the light forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken cognizance of this necessity by providing in reference (b) that the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier act as an officer of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, operating under orders of the Commander in Chief thereof, in command of task groups of that fleet under all circumstances, when so directed.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken action to increase the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District by the immediate acquisition of four purse seiners for conversion to YP. It is also anticipated that at least five (5) sampans, recently condemned, will be available in the District. The SACRAMENTO is under orders to depart from Norfolk for the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941.

4. The construction program of PC's and YMS's will not permit the delivery of vessels of this type to the Fourteenth Naval District before the late fall.

5. The Chief of Naval Operations is considering the acquisition and conversion of a number of the vessels assigned to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in appendix II, of reference (b). The questions of funds and personnel, and the suitability of these vessels will affect the decision reached.

6. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will be kept informed of assignments made.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Com14.

EXHIBIT No. 44

CONFIDENTIAL

(Rough) 05/paw

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinc File No.
A9/PF12/(05)
Serial 01275A

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 15 August 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the period 1 July 1940, to 30 June 1941.

Reference:

(a) Article 699(4), U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

(b) Opnav ltr. Op-13A/CT, A9-1(330527) dated 27 May 1933.

Enclosure: (A) Thirty-five copies of subject report.

1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in references (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. Included therein is data obtained from the annual reports of the Commandants Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts, and the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, (Second Marine Division).

2. By separate correspondence, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets were directed to submit annual reports direct to the Navy Department for their respective Fleets, with a copy to this Command. Unless the Department so desires, it is not intended to issue a combined annual report for the entire United States Fleet.

3. As noted in the distribution list below, copies of this report have not been distributed to Bureaus or offices of the Navy Department.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Cincpac File No.
A9/FF12/(05)
Serial 01275A

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES
PACIFIC FLEET FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1940 TO 30 JUNE 1941

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P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary

[1]

PART 1—ORGANIZATION

(A) *EXISTING ORGANIZATION.*

(a) Comment on existing organization including suitability and adequacy of the Fleet for accomplishment of its primary war mission:

(1) On 1 February 1941, in accordance with General Order No. 143, the United States Fleet was organized into administrative and task organizations as follows:

- (a) The United States Atlantic Fleet.
- (b) The United States Pacific Fleet.
- (c) The United States Asiatic Fleet.

(2) On 1 June 1941, there was made effective, in the United States Pacific Fleet, a task organization designed to facilitate inter-type training and at the same time provide for a ready transition from a peacetime organization to one more suitable for the most probable operations of war. Three new task forces were created as follows:

Task Force ONE, under Commander Battle Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics of a Covering Force.

Task Force TWO, under Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics of a Reconnaissance and Raiding Force.

Task Force THREE, under Commander Scouting Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics for Expeditionary and Amphibian Operations.

The above Task Forces absorb all the battleships, carriers, cruisers and destroyers of the Pacific Fleet. Submarines, patrol planes and mincraft, while operated primarily as separate types, are assigned from time to time to one of the above Task Forces as required for special training or operations. This organization has largely relieved the Commander Battle Force and Commander Scouting Force, as such, of their operational functions, but they retain their responsibility for general supervision of administration, training and material of their respective Forces. As Commanders of Task Force One and Three, respectively, they are given operational functions and responsibilities more adaptable to the probable operations of war.

(3) There is, in process of accomplishment, a general reorganization of the Base Force. This, when completed, will provide a squadron and divisional organization more adaptable to the accomplishment of both peace and war missions of that command. The organization will provide the following:

Squadron Two—Harbor services.

Squadron Four—Transportation of personnel, landing force equipment, etc.

Squadron Six—Offensive and defensive mining and general services.

Squadron Eight—Transportation of bulk cargo.

The final establishment of this organization is awaiting the reporting of squadron commanders and staffs and availability of suitable flagships.

On 12 June 1941, there was established, in the office of the Commander Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier, nucleus personnel of the Base Force Subordinate Command. This step will also place the logistic supply of the Fleet more nearly on a war basis.

(4) The above organization is believed suitable and adequate, at the present time, for the accomplishment of the war mission of the Fleet. The strength of the Pacific Fleet in numbers of ships is adequate for only limited offensive operations in the Pacific because of [2] the distances involved and the known enemy strength and strategic dispositions in that area. There is a serious deficiency in numbers in practically all Types, but particularly in aircraft carriers, improved aircraft of all types, destroyers and light cruisers and also in auxiliary tankers, supply ships, and transports including the destroyer transport.

(5) In addition there are material deficiencies, including radar, close anti-aircraft defense weapons, sonic gear, aircraft radio identification, advance Base equipment and landing equipment.

(6) To all this must be added the total inadequacy of personnel. Deficiencies in the numbers required to man the ships at present in the Fleet are serious enough. When, however, it is realized that the Fleet is now short of personnel, that it will be called upon to further deplete its numbers to furnish its trained personnel to new construction, that even now the losses exceed the replacements, then this personnel deficiency added to the deficiencies in numbers of ships and essential material in ships, leads to the conclusion that the adequacy of the Pacific Fleet for the accomplishment of its war mission leaves much to be desired.

(B) CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION.**(a) Executed.**

Subsequent to organization of the U. S. Pacific Fleet on 1 February, 1941, the following changes have been executed:

(1) Battleship division THREE, YORKTOWN, Destroyer Squadrons EIGHT and NINE, Cruiser Division EIGHT, CINCINNATI, Patrol Squadron SIXTY-ONE, CIMARRON, SANGAMON, SANTEE, RELIEF, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, FULLER, HEYWOOD, LITTLE, MANLEY, STRINGHAM, McKEAN, BRANT, PARTRIDGE, ALGORMA, and KALMIA, were transferred to the Atlantic Fleet.

(2) Mine Division NINE was transferred to the Asiatic Fleet.

(3) New, converted, or recommissioned units were added to the Fleet: SAILFISH, TAMBOR, TAUTOG, THRESHER, TUNA, CURTISS, BOREAS, CASTOR, KASKASKIA, PLATTE, RAMAPO, SABINE, SEPULGA, NAVAJO, SEMINOLE, Patrol Squadron FORTY-FOUR.

(4) Submarine divisions and squadrons changed to new numbers on 1 June, 1941. Patrol plane squadrons and mine divisions were renumbered 30 June, 1941 and 1 July, 1941, respectively.

(b) Expected.

No changes in the basic organization of the Pacific Fleet are anticipated. New, converted, and recommissioned units are expected to join as they became available. These additional units are indicated in Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 6CN-1 (Cincpac Serial 01011).

[3]

PART II—OPERATIONS AND TRAINING**(A) EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES.****(a) Policy regarding Fleet Employment.**

Caused by developments in the international situation, drastic changes have been made in Fleet employment during the fiscal year, 1941. Schedules were initially based on administrative organization and type controlled training, with certain periods set aside for the development of inter-type coordination and Fleet exercises. Under this system, ships averaged four operating weeks (of four or five days underway with week-ends in port for inspections and recreation) to two weeks in upkeep. With increasing necessity for basic war training and security measures in Fleet operating areas, transition to a Task Force operational program was effected. Two Task Forces were employed at first, each at sea and in port alternate weeks. This arrangement proved impracticable because of large fuel expenditures and loss of extended upkeep periods essential to material maintenance. With the organization of the Pacific Fleet, a three Task Force assignment was adopted to insure necessary coordinated Task Force training for war, to provide for instant transition to full war operational status, to conserve fuel, and permit most efficient use of repair ship upkeep facilities. Under this re-assignment, Task Forces averaged eight days at sea to thirteen in port. Of each underway period about five days are devoted to gunnery exercises and type training, three days to Task Force exercises. The time allocation to various activities under the current three Task Force system is satisfactory.

(b) Major changes in approved schedules.

(1) No major Fleet tactical period for an extended Fleet Problem was scheduled during the fiscal year 1941. In lieu thereof, shorter periods during which two or more Task Forces conducted joint exercises were scheduled as follows:

9-16 September 1940

3-5 March 1941

18-20 March 1941

14-26 May 1941

28 June-3 July 1941

(2) During a part of the 14-26 May 1941 period, joint Army-Navy exercises were conducted.

(3) Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1 was conducted by Commander Scout- ing Force in the San Clemente Area in late May and early June, 1941. This exercise was curtailed by withdrawal of the transports.

(4) The addition of leave, liberty, and recreation cruises from the Hawaiian Area to West Coast ports caused some disruption of schedules, which was more than compensated for by improved morale and reduction in logistic requirements.

(5) Numerous changes in schedules resulted from the degaussing program and restricted availabilities for increased anti-aircraft defense, splinter protection,

and radar installations. Time assignment to these items is decreasing as the program progresses.

(6) CHICAGO, PORTLAND, BROOKLYN, SAVANNAH and Destroyer Squadron THREE made a good will cruise to Australian and New Zealand ports from 3 March to 10 April, 1941. SANGAMON accompanied this force as far as Samoa.

(7) Escort trips to Manila were made by CONCORD and TRENTON, to Samoa by CONCORD, and to Midway by Cruiser Division EIGHT.

(B) **FLEET TRAINING.**

(a) *Phases of strategical and tactical training with review of results.*

Strategical training, other than that undertaken by the Fleet War Plans Section, has been limited to studies by individual commands of probable strategic areas and special situations existing therein. In setting up Fleet minor problems emphasis has been placed on rapid estimates of changing situations.

Tactical training has been based on probable war requirements and instant transition from exercise to full war operational status. To these ends the Fleet has been organized in three primary Task Forces:

[4] *Task Force ONE—Covering Force.*

6 BB, 5 CL, 1 CV, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.

Task Force TWO—Reconnoitering and Raiding Force.

3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CA, 3 CL, 1 OCL, 1 DL, 8 DD.

Task Force THREE—Amphibious Force.

8 CA, 1 CV, 2 DL, 16 DD, 5 SS, 5 DMS, 6 AP, 4 APD, 24 VP, Second

Marine Division less defense battalions and advanced base detachments.

Specific tactical situations have been presented to each of these Task Forces, for study in port, for game board exercises, and for test in the form of inter-type exercises or minor problems during operating periods at sea. Great benefit has accrued in the increased understanding of Task Force and Task Group commanders of the limitations and capabilities of the individual types and development of coordinating doctrines.

Operations have also included the conduct of Advanced Light Force and Submarine Practices; bombardment and landing exercises; photographic reconnaissance; attacks on the Fleet or smaller dispositions by air, submarines, and destroyers, both day and night; fueling at sea exercises in which all types fueled from tankers, and destroyers fueled from battleships, cruisers, and carriers; towing; mining; minesweeping.

Satisfactory doctrines have been developed for concerted action by patrol planes and submarines, patrol planes and destroyers, cruisers and destroyers.

New and more flexible cruising dispositions have been devised. Means of changing the front of a Fleet disposition and deploying during darkness have been developed and tested with all ships darkened.

The use of Radar is causing many changes in tactical ideas. Progressive training is underway in the use of this instrument and its tactical application to defense against day and night air, submarine, and destroyer attack. Training in Radar adaptation to gunnery is also proceeding. To develop the maximum usefulness of this equipment its installation in all ships and planes must be expedited, and the automatic feature for identifying friendly forces must be incorporated.

The change from peacetime to wartime training has been accompanied by unrelenting efforts toward realism. Appropriate material conditions and conditions of readiness are maintained underway, all ships except submarines are habitually darkened, actual anti-aircraft fire is opened on targets towed over Fleet dispositions, starshell have been used to develop night contacts, live depth charges have been used to condition submarine crews against this form of attack, and through cooperation with the Army, battle lookouts have been trained to recognize all types of aircraft now in use in the Hawaiian Area.

The rapid and continuous flow of personnel through the Fleet, transfer of trained men to new assignments, recruit replacements, substitution of reserve for regular officers, all tend to retard the training of the Fleet as a whole. Adjusting operating plans and schedules to accomplish basic training of new personnel, while bringing about a realistic preparation of a Fleet for war has required intense and strenuous efforts of officers and men.

Careful studies have been made of all available intelligence reports of foreign operations. Lessons learned therefrom are being steadily incorporated into the doctrines and training of all Fleet components.

(b) **GUNNERY TRAINING.**

(1) **BASIC AND GENERAL.**

With few exceptions the mandatory practices were completed by all ships of all types. Training was necessarily interrupted for installation of degaussing equipment, but the interruption served ships as a basic training period for new personnel which were received, in most, cases, during installation periods.

All types have tested and effected essential changes in ships' organizations to bring conditions of readiness into proper symmetry. These reorganizations of battle con- [5] ditions of readiness have effected an increase in offensive power for each condition, and, by more efficient use of man power, a decrease in work load per man.

All types have conducted extensive studies of the ammunition service of all batteries, with service ammunition. These studies have isolated faults and determined means for improving the drill requirements for ammunition service.

The necessity for the development and training of all forms of battle lookouts has been emphasized. Exercises both day and night, with increased realism, have been developed and every opportunity is used to conduct them.

The free inter-change of services between types, inter-type exercises, and intelligence bulletins, have brought out weaknesses of gunnery doctrines, with resultant correction and almost constant refinement.

The availability of Army coast defense triangulation stations during the past two quarters, for under-way rangefinder calibration, has been especially valuable.

All types conducted successful gunnery schools. The schools emphasized fundamental training. In view of the large number of inexperienced officers in all types, and the increasing responsibility being forced upon all junior officers, these schools were invaluable.

Antiaircraft gunnery has improved in all types during the year. The degree of improvement is not measurable because of the great number of new personnel, both officers, and men, that have been trained, and because of the increased realism and difficulties that have been introduced in antiaircraft practices. It is manifest, however, that the satisfactory development of the antiaircraft batteries may be obtained only by continued emphasis and constant improvement in the methods of training.

Surface firings are in general satisfactory. It is evident in these batteries that performances were affected by the large percentages of inexperienced personnel.

All types have conducted simulated Fire Support and Shore Bombardment exercises. In addition, type doctrines for Fire Support and Shore Bombardment have been developed and promulgated. Heavy Cruisers and Destroyers have actually conducted one bombardment practice during which valuable lessons were learned.

The increasing degree of the emergency and the resultant operational restrictions, differences in the state of training of units of a type, and experiences from abroad, have gradually forced wider divergences from the conventional gunnery cycle. This has been evidenced by the development of new practices to fit conditions experienced abroad, and local restrictions, as well as the requests and recommendations by type commanders for greater latitude of discretion. The need for such latitude is apparent if progressive training is to keep pace with the ever changing and necessary demands of the international situation. Full latitude in the conduct of gunnery training has recently been granted by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(2) IMPORTANT DETAILS.

SUBMARINES.

During the past year authority was obtained from the Bureau of Ordnance to fire torpedoes six times between overhauls provided not more than thirty days elapsed between the first and last firings. This has resulted in a great increase in the number of torpedoes fired, especially on practice approaches, with consequent improvements in the condition of all submarines. This force has concentrated on the training of junior officers for command and especially in the art of torpedo firings which has permitted the junior officers to obtain a great deal of experience in actually firing torpedoes. Information from intelligence reports has indicated that a great deal of torpedo and gun firings from submarines by all belligerents has been conducted at night. Therefore the training in night approaches and torpedo firings has been greatly intensified. This training has also included the exercising of night lookouts in picking out and identifying targets. No night gun firings have been conducted this year, but it is planned to conduct them in the near future using remnant ammunition.

All submarines of Submarine Squadron TWO and some submarines of Submarine Squadron FOUR, have made mine plants of 32 mines which appears to be the limiting number than can be made in one continuous plant.

[6] Results obtained from the .50 caliber machine gun firings while better than the previous year are not considered satisfactory. Advantage has been taken of all quotas to the machine gun school assigned this force.

DESTROYERS.

Two Advanced Day Battle practices were conducted. One Squadron of destroyers and two light cruisers participated in each of these practices, which involved both gun and torpedo fire.

Two Advanced Light Force practices were participated in by destroyers. A high standard of torpedo performance was obtained.

Antiaircraft practices against radio controlled targets were fired at every opportunity and with considerable success. A type of surprise antiaircraft practice, which is the most realistic seen to date, was developed in destroyers and has since been adopted by all types.

The reduction of fire because of casualties associated with the loading of the gun continues to be a serious problem. The isolation of material failures from personnel mistakes is difficult in most cases, due primarily to inexperienced and constantly changing personnel. The suggested removal of loading machines from destroyers is considered to be courting disaster.

The lack of a supply of trained enlisted rangefinder operator-spotters, and the lack of time and facilities for selection and fundamental training in destroyers, is probably the largest single factor against attaining desired performance. The establishment of shore based rangefinder operator-spotter training centers, distinct from optical schools, would greatly improve this situation.

The performance of torpedoes over the year has been most satisfactory. The need for depth charge racks, extensions, and throwers, has become increasingly apparent. Particular consideration should be given in new construction to increasing the number of depth charges carried and to improved handling facilities.

The Sound School has produced a large number of competent sound operators during the year. Increased opportunities for sound training have been provided the destroyers in the Hawaiian Area. The results of practices and training runs have been satisfactory.

LIGHT CRUISERS.

10,000-ton Class.—These ships have demonstrated their ability to shoot fast and hit consistently at short and intermediate ranges. Their performances at night have been particularly impressive. There has been an appreciable improvement in spotting and control of gunfire over last year.

7,500-ton Class.—These ships have shown some improvement in hitting with their main batteries during this year. Increasing number of 3" 50 caliber guns from six to nine has improved antiaircraft defense, but lack of suitable control seriously reduces the potential effectiveness of this battery.

HEAVY CRUISERS.

Accuracy of range finders has been considerably improved as the result of frequent rangefinder calibration made possible by the services and cooperation of Harbor Defenses, Pearl Harbor. The value of these calibrations to effective gunners cannot be over emphasized.

Prompt opening salvos and continuous volume of fire have been continually stressed with improved results.

The lack of an adequate allowance of small arms ammunition has been a serious handicap in small arms training and firing, especially with the continual influx of new personnel. Consequently, little improvement has been made in the performance of these weapons.

[7] Heavy Cruisers have been reorganized so that all the anti-aircraft batteries are manned in Condition of Readiness II, and all of the 5" battery and part of the 3" and machine gun batteries in Condition of Readiness III.

CARRIERS.

Carrier gunnery has been affected by a congested schedule of operations. It has not been possible to conduct all mandatory practices, except in ENTERPRISE. Basic training has been stressed and successfully continued. Comprehensive training plans for lookouts have been instituted and progress is being made.

The effectiveness of RADAR equipment was successfully demonstrated in the YORKTOWN firing at a radio controlled target plane.

BATTLESHIPS.

The performance of battleships in gunnery for the past year is summarized:

- (1) Main batteries in general—good.
- (2) Antiaircraft batteries—fair.
- (3) Secondary batteries—poor to fair.

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In spite of the considerable reduction in experienced personnel, their replacement by inexperienced personnel, and the increased complements, there has been and is now a progressive improvement apparent in gunnery activities in battle-ships.

Battleship training exercises have been revised and improved and additional exercises, covering aircraft surprise attack and lookout training, have been added.

An exercise to provide data for analysis and study, as to the cause of "lag on turns", is in effect.

The MISSISSIPPI established means for precise calibration of rangefinders in Pearl Harbor. This development was promulgated to the Pacific Fleet.

GUNNERY OBSERVATIONS.

Both day and night fall of shot observation has been made by available pilots of VO and VCS Wings whenever opportunity offered. Low altitude spotting stations at about 1500 feet were taken by several units for information and training. Carrier scouting squadrons also observed fall of shot as circumstances and heavy schedules permitted. Color identification of 6-inch splashes at long ranges was found difficult. In view of the high rate of fire of the main battery of light cruisers, spotting the individual salvos of the opening ladder proved impracticable after the battery had gone to continuous fire. By spotting the individual salvos of the opening ladder and then spotting only specifically designated salvos aircraft can effectively assist in spotting the main battery six inch fire.

AIRCRAFT.

Type gunnery schools for VF, VSB, and VT were again organized. They were originally scheduled for the San Diego area but it was necessary to establish them at Pearl Harbor as the majority of the Fleet remained in Hawaiian waters. The schools operated under difficulties due to dearth of firing areas, equipment, office, shops, and school room space, and transfer of experienced personnel. However, the value of the schools became more apparent as time progressed and as each squadron and aviation unit became depleted of its experienced personnel.

All mandatory and monthly training practices have been fired. Almost continuous training in IBP (Fixed Guns), IBP (Free Guns), IBP (Dive Bombing), and IBP (Depth Bombing) has been carried on to qualify all possible new personnel. Practically all required personnel have qualified in the above mentioned practices. The Monthly Aircraft Training Practices have been of great benefit in maintaining proficiency of personnel, insuring proper maintenance of material and providing an interesting periodic check-up in all phases of training. Due to the numerous unexpected changes in schedule and the influx of new personnel, less opportunity than formerly for investigation of experimental practices has been afforded, but very favorable progress was made in night bombing, together with night illumination, of UTAH.

[8] In the patrol wings, points of particular interest were the substitution of monthly training exercises for the old methods of concentrated training for various practices in succession, the introduction of low altitude glide bombing against submarines, the use of new delayed action high intensity flares for night bombing and torpedo attacks and the emphasis given torpedoes as a major offensive weapon for patrol planes. Concentrated gunnery training has been greatly curtailed, as it has in other aircraft units, by the exigencies of the expansion program and other operations in connection with security and transfer of units. The effect of this curtailment has been minimized as much as possible by using all available time and facilities for ground training.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT.

This form of gunnery and its associated problems have been stressed over the year. Exercises have been placed in effect that provide training in tracking on combatant planes, plane identification, and surprise attacks by combatant aircraft simulating horizontal, dive and glide bombing, and torpedo plane attacks. In addition, units with ship based observation planes have developed exercises simulating the various forms of attack with own planes.

The need for competent antiaircraft control parties and gun crews in each condition watch has been emphasized, and all ships now have in training three or four crews, depending on the type. Exercises promulgated are designed to provide training for all crews.

Two types of practices have been developed which are deemed effective and realistic training. The first, a surprise attack, is by a radio controlled target against a single ship. The attack can take place at any time over an extended period, and serves to stimulate lookout training as well as control and battery

training. It is proposed to extend this practice to small formations of ships to develop the technique of formation aircraft defense.

The second practice developed is an attack by horizontal bombers against a Fleet disposition. The targets are sleeves, or flares, towed by utility wing planes. The ammunition allowance is limited to between ten and four rounds per ship. The exercise has been conducted in conjunction with other Fleet exercises, and in cruising, approach, and battle dispositions. It has served to add interest to the exercises, stimulate antiaircraft batteries and lookouts, and to assist in determining the adequacy, and weaknesses, of dispositions against various forms of attack or combinations of attacks.

UTAH conducted extensive firing in connection with the Fleet elementary and advanced anti-aircraft schools. It is believed that these schools, in 5" 25 caliber, 1" .175 caliber and .50 caliber anti-aircraft fire, provided exceedingly valuable training to the personnel of the Fleet and has led to improved anti-aircraft gunnery. However, with the percentage of hits obtained, ability to knock down drone aircraft is still most disappointing. Small fragmentation of the bursts seem to be a contributing factor. UTAH developed an open sight for the 5" 25 caliber gun which appears to give promise of considerable utility in local control, especially against dive bombing.

The Fleet Machine Gun School has served a most useful purpose, and its continuance is considered vital. In the face of a possible shortage in training and target practice ammunition for fifty-caliber guns, the need for such training, if acceptable efficiency with this gun is to be maintained, cannot be too forcefully stressed. Prior to the opening of the Fleet Machine Gun School at Puuloa, two classes were held aboard UTAH. The Puuloa school was ready for operation in January. Since that time 1003 students have completed the course. Of these 25 qualified as experts, 777 as gunners and 201 failed to qualify. When this school was forced to close because of lack of ammunition, a class in maintenance of machine guns was started. This activity has been most favorably received by the Fleet and much good is being accomplished.

MINING.

(a) *Gunnery*.—Two fifty-caliber machine guns have been installed on each AM and DM. The prescribed practices have been fired by all DM's. Two additional fifty-caliber machine guns are recommended for DM's.

Mine Divisions ONE and TWO have been provided with two portable depth charge racks. Each rack carries four depth charges and four spares are allowed. Each division has con- [9] ducted a depth charge practice and has dropped two live depth charges. Normally, when these divisions are operating as tactical units of the Fleet, the depth charge racks are carried mounted ready for use.

Mine Division NINE has had a depth charge rack installed holding six charges: two spare depth charges are allowed. The rack does not interfere with mining.

(b) *Mining*.—Several slight departures have been made necessary from prescribed practices by restricted use of areas.

A thorough investigation has been made into the causes of premature firings, and recommendations have been made to the Bureau of Ordnance to reduce the percentage of premature firings.

Shortages in material have been remedied, or additional items contracted for. Recommendations have been made for:

(1) The modification of deficient items, such as extender mechanisms, K2 Mod. 2 diaphragm assembly and pellet holder, method of float securing and releasing, and antennae winding.

(2) The distribution of available mines.

(3) Facilities necessary for the preparation of mines.

The Minecraft Mine School has qualified seventy-six men in Mk. VI and Mk. VII mines. The method of mine assembly has been changed to a production assembly line, with a view to preparing a nucleus for wartime assembly. This method of assembly was employed for Battle Mining Practice "Easy", and 285 Mk. VI mines were assembled in 2½ days (159 in the last day).

Minecraft completed the regularly scheduled plants and, in addition, ten experimental plants

MINESWEEPING.

The preliminary tests of the "O" Type and magnetic minesweeping equipment installed in Mine Division NINE appeared satisfactory. The magnetic sweeping equipment limits the time a ship can sweep because of the very rapid rise in battery temperature during the operation.

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A semi-permanent mine field has been established off Oahu for training in the detection of mines by underwater sound equipment. The ability of trained operators to detect mines was established and some drill has been accomplished. Tests to determine the practicability of locating mines by aerial photography, or visual aircraft observation, have not given favorable results.

Base Force minesweepers have had more than the normal amount of training in minesweeping. The bird class sweepers conducted regular dawn sweeps of the area off Pearl Harbor. The high speed sweepers have done so less often. However, the high speed sweepers have drilled extensively in the various phases of minesweeping with the Fleet and independently. Their proficiency in the use of the gear provided may be considered as satisfactory. During the past year little improvement in sweeping gear and the technique of using it has been shown.

GENERAL.

Services for gunnery exercises to the Fleet have been provided with great difficulty during the past year. The increased demand for services has taxed facilities to the limit. The necessity for concentrating services in the Hawaiian Area has reduced the availability of these services on the West Coast to almost zero. The shortage of high speed towing ships and series 60 sled targets has been most keenly felt. One result of this has been that the ships of Mine Division SIX (formerly Mobile Target Division ONE) have had very little minesweeping exercise and two ships—BOGGS and LAMBERTON—have been unable to complete any of the prescribed gunnery during the year. Upkeep periods for this division have been shortened and occasionally interrupted. The officers and crews of these ships have done a splendid job.

The Fleet Camera Party has had an increased load incident to the greater number of ships served and the difficulties of services occasioned by operations at sea under conditions approximating those of war. A large number of young officers have received very valuable training while on temporary duty with the Camera Party.

[10] (c) *ENGINEERING PERFORMANCES.*

Engineering performances were generally satisfactory. A marked increase in hours underway and miles steamed was noted. As might be expected, under the operating conditions imposed, general increases in the fuel per mile were noted. Electric drive battleships were unable to maintain full power under tropical conditions due to limiting temperatures in the motor winding. Increased displacement, excessive fouling, and high injection temperatures combined to prevent a few ships from making the required full power R. P. M. Reliability has been excellent. The Engineering Competition was suspended as of midnight 30 April.

(d) *COMMUNICATIONS.*

(1) *Training Program.*

Throughout the year a continuous training program in rapid communications has been prosecuted with accent placed on securing efficient Task Organization command communications within the Fleet in the event of war.

Training in the use of cryptographic aids, military uses of the direction finder, underwater sound signaling, creating and avoiding interference and in radio deception have been actively prosecuted by Type Commanders by frequent standardized and impromptu drills with generally excellent results.

A heavy training load was placed on experienced communication personnel by the rapid influx of new men. Many Naval Reserve Communication ratings joined the Fleet, many, who were not properly qualified to perform the duties of their rate. These men had to be extensively trained before they were able to function in the communication organizations. The Transfer of numerous experienced men outside the Fleet resulted in placing comparatively new and inexperienced men in responsible positions where they were required by necessity to carry their share of the load. Although this resulted in some inefficiency at times, it was found that new men attained a state of efficiency after further training.

Individual training in proficiency in communication ratings has been prosecuted by ships utilizing the striker method, which, though inefficient as compared with shore based schools, has been employed of necessity. Where possible the shipboard striker method of training radio and visual has been augmented by schools at the Destroyer Base, San Diego, SubBase P. H., various air stations, and on tenders. The results of such school training has been excellent and the schools will be continued.

The increased use of voice circuits in the Pacific Fleet indicated the necessity for training of both officers and men in voice procedure. Such training has been

carried out, but further training remains necessary in this field. Particularly successful training and resultant improvement in voice radio circuits has been noted in Aircraft, Battle Force.

(2) Control and Supervision.

In order to train commanders afloat in their responsibilities in regard to communications the major responsibility of training program has been entrusted to Task Force and Type Commanders rather than using the standardized communication competition as was used in past years. For the same reasons Task Force Commanders have been required to prepare own communication plans based on standard communication doctrines. It has been emphasized throughout the year that communications are an integral function and responsibility of command.

A system of numerical designations of Task Organizations has become adopted which has simplified command communications and made possible the promulgation of radio frequency plans and call signs for any and all phases of a naval campaign. Particularly gratifying was the acquirement of the ability to organize and operate large or small Task Organizations composed of various type ships from unrelated administrative organizations without confusion or hiatus due to communications.

New administrative organization frequency plans have been issued which in general provide for all ships in any port being on one frequency, and eliminating the previously used system of assignment of frequencies to divisions and squadrons. Type frequencies have been allocated but are seldom used except for drills and exercises.

[11] (3) Personnel.

The communication personnel situation has continued to be acute due to transfers to new construction, to converted merchant ships, and to the expanding shore station facilities. The introduction of RADAR has also increased the duties of these men in the fleet units so equipped. The induction of a large number of reserve radiomen and the increased size of service schools has somewhat alleviated this situation so far as numbers are concerned; however, the personnel received from these sources are generally not qualified for the rates held and require from 6 months to a year's training within the Fleet before they are capable of taking the place of experienced personnel being lost to the Fleet. The service school graduate received as Radiomen third class could not in any respect fulfill that rate.

The sound enlisted personnel have suffered in a similar manner. This situation is being alleviated by the increase in the Sound School for Preliminary Training and an increase in the advanced training within the Fleet.

Reserve officers to a large extent have replaced regular officers in communication duties within the Fleet. These officers came to the Fleet untrained, and required extensive instruction before they could take over their duties.

(4) Material, Visual.

An urgent need for an improved type of visual blinker signal gun has become apparent since ships of the Fleet have been operating in a darkened condition at night. Bureau of Ships has cooperated with the Greenway Reflector Company in the development of a blinker signal gun which will have a limited arc of visibility and control of range visibility. It is expected that 25 of these signal guns will be received on or about 25 July 1941 for service test in the Pacific Fleet.

Experiments have been conducted in the various types of ships within the Fleet with a low power flashing light mounted on 7 x 50 binoculars. Reports received from forces afloat indicate that this experimental light is practicable and provides greater security than the present blinker gun when ships are operating in a darkened condition, at night. Recommendations will be submitted regarding the manufacture of this light.

New signal halyards have been installed in the ARIZONA, PENNSYLVANIA, NEVADA and OKLAHOMA. These yardarms slope aft at an angle from the athwartship line and give a desirable offset to adjacent flag hoists and tend to keep the signal halyards from fouling the anti-aircraft directors. This arrangement is a decided improvement. In Battleship Division THREE the signal bridge was located on the mainmast and the arrangements for visual signalling in these ships is unsatisfactory. Lack of quick control, the use of exposed and fragile loud speakers, absence of secondary hoists, and obstructions account for the unsatisfactory arrangement. It is considered that the primary signal station should be in the vicinity of the foremast in this division.

There is an urgent need for improved recognition devices at night between surface ships and aircraft and between submarines and aircraft. Much use has been

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made of the recognition device in current use on surface ships. In order to use any recognition device quickly and accurately, personnel must be trained constantly in its use. There has been considerable training in the use of the current device during the past year.

(5) *Material—Radio.*

(a) *Underwater Sound.*

Super-sonic depth finders continue to function satisfactorily in all types. During the year the existing modernization program in destroyers for super-sonic echo-ranging equipment was completed. The modification of single-frequency (24 Kcs.) installation in DD's 347-393 by two-frequency installations (20 Kcs. and 24 Kcs.) is now in progress although considerable delay is being experienced in obtaining delivery of material. The installation of echo-ranging equipment in the remaining light minelayers, and high speed minesweepers is sorely needed and when received will increase materially the utility of these types to the Fleet. The delivery of sound equipment is slow and recommendations have been made to speed up this procurement program.

[12] Aircraft. Battle Force, experimented during the year with the development of a combined oxygen-microphone mask for high altitude flights; encouraging results have been attained.

Frequency or amplitude modulated super-frequency equipment, Model CXAB CXAC has been installed in the CALIFORNIA, TENNESSEE, and OKLAHOMA. Tests of this equipment are now in progress. Ultra-high frequency amplitude modulated TCD RAR equipment is being installed in Crudiv SIX.

(b) *Research and Experimental.*

Battleships have continued to experiment with the reception of weak radio signals to determine what improvements are necessary.

Considerable work has been done in submarines to receive low frequency shore station radio signals under water. The results of these experiments have been most gratifying and should prove invaluable for war operations.

Considerable experimenting has been done with RADAR equipment, now installed, to improve its performance and reliability.

The U. S. Naval Radio Laboratory, San Diego, Calif., has cooperated with the Fleet units present in San Diego in essential work, tests and repair beyond the capacities of these units.

During the past year considerable wave propagation data was accumulated covering the frequencies used by patrol planes. A number of clear channel harmonically related series were found to give excellent signals, day and night, during trans-Pacific ferry flights.

Project Baker in Patrol Wing ONE continued experiments and tests with Blind Landing Equipment, together with numerous other tests of ultra-high frequency receivers, antennae, aircraft direction finders, and miscellaneous radio equipment.

(c) *General.*

The frequency coverage of radio equipment within the Fleet, particularly in the smaller units, has proved to be a serious handicap in the working up of frequency plans for the various Task Forces. If all ships were able to use any frequency from 195 to 18,100 Kcs. for transmitting and receiving, considerable simplification would result in the structure of frequency plans for command communications.

As a whole radio equipment is reliable, effective and easy to operate. In some instances crystal control equipment cuts down the necessary flexibility.

During the year the procurement program of new equipment went forward but still the lack of modern equipment was seriously felt in some units.

Installation of ultra-high frequency equipment in destroyers, light minelayers, and high speed minesweepers was completed during the year.

New aircraft homing equipment has been installed in LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. The associated plane equipment, has been received in limited quantities in LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE air groups. Preliminary tests indicate that this equipment is of great value to ship-based aviation, both for military and safety purpose.

The LEXINGTON is in need of modernization of its radio transmitters.

Satisfactory ship board radio direction finding ability above 1000 Kcs. continues to be an unsolved problem.

All radio direction finders on the BROOKLYN class cruisers have been moved from a position immediately abaft the foremast to a position on the searchlight platform. The resultant improvement in operation has been gratifying.

Receiving antennae and correctors for direction finders have been moved to cut down or eliminate interference with anti-aircraft gunfire.

In a large number of ships the old type TAV is still the only portable radio equipment aboard and is inadequate for the use for which it was designed.

[13] Modernization of the radio installation on the NARWHAL, NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT were authorized. The LITCHFIELD will be equipped as a radio relay vessel with a complete new set of radio and sound equipment during its coming overhaul.

There is an urgent need for a voice transmitter, with a frequency range of 2000-18000 Kcs. in a large number of ships, particularly in flagships. This deficiency is being remedied by the Bureau of Ships procurement program.

One of the bottlenecks in outfitting new patrol plane squadrons has been the supply of radio equipment. The practice of making the radio installation after delivery of the plane by the contractor is being discontinued. The contractor will deliver the aircraft complete, and better radio installation may be expected.

Air station efficiency and usefulness to the Fleet have suffered due to poor delivery of essential communication apparatus.

(6) Security.

General:

A marked improvement in Fleet attitude toward security of communication occurred during the year. Senior officers, force, and type commanders evidenced more interest in, and a greater appreciation of the general principles and technical aspects of the subject. This was brought about less by purely communication considerations than by the general atmosphere of the times, by the continuation of the communication mobilization, and by the increasing emphasis which has been placed upon security of ship movements and naval information.

Considerable progress was made toward further reduction of administrative despatch traffic. However, there still exist many administrative procedures for which despatches are used to an excessive degree. These concern principally personnel matters and administration of material between shore activities and the forces afloat.

It has been noted that shore activities frequently send messages to ships with either a specific request, or an inference given by too high a precedence designation, that a radio reply be made immediately. In the case of an individual ship receiving such a message from a senior officer ashore, the radio reply is usually made, even though the importance of the matter involved may not actually warrant such reply. This situation is believed due to a combination of lack of concern by commands ashore with communication security afloat, and to the lack of regular line officer supervision of communications in the shore establishments.

In conformity with the requirement of the communication mobilization that radio traffic shall be reduced to a minimum, ships of the Pacific Fleet were directed to drastically reduce the number of administrative radio messages sent, and to give consideration to the use of mail in replying to despatches received from shore activities.

The presence of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, with attendant lack of rapid and frequent mail service, has caused the origination of many despatches which would otherwise have been unnecessary.

It is emphasized that the question of communication security is a basic one, involving the entire naval establishment. Adequate security requires extensive education and whole hearted cooperation of all hands, plus the setting of a proper example by high commands ashore and afloat.

The change from a "peacetime communication mobilization for training" to an "actual communication mobilization for threatened hostilities" effected on 12 May by Alnav 45, did not produce the desired result. Due principally to the fact that Alnav 45 authorized use of plain language for a number of categories of despatches, some of which have no place in any bona-fide mobilization set up, and at the same time directed reduction of radio traffic to a minimum, confusion inevitably resulted, and an increase of radio traffic (mostly plain language) occurred. Immediate steps were taken to reduce this traffic in the Pacific Fleet.

Cryptographic Security:

The abolition of NRC-3 on 1 April was a notable advance toward achievement of a satisfactory state of cryptographic security. However, this advance was in some measure nullified by certain of the plain language authorizations of Alnav 45.

[14] Cryptographic systems furnished the Fleet were inadequate, especially regarding: (1) Unsatisfactory call sign cipher, (2) Obsolescent contact and air-

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craft codes, (3) No joint Army-Navy aircraft and lower command systems, (4) No detailed instructions for cryptographic security, (5) No rapid system for small units (ECM Mk. II is now in production), (6) Obsolete crypto-channel charts, (7) Lack of proper ROB and war reserve editions of all systems, (8) Unconcealed external indicators, (9) Unsatisfactory authenticator and radio Operator's Signal cipher, (10) No fire control code for landing operations.

Due to the large number of untrained communication personnel and the failure to provide the Fleet with proper instructions in cryptographic security, errors and delays increased. Stress was placed on the thorough training of coding boards to counteract these mistakes. No systems were considered compromised through misuse by the Fleet except in the case of the lowest restricted system which is inherently short-lived due to the large volume of traffic and nature of its text. No ROB edition for this cipher has yet been designated. In general, few ROB editions were available for replacement of compromised or out-lived codes and ciphers.

Radio Security:

The number of radio messages sent was materially reduced by increased use of mailgrams. The use of unnecessary information addresses in despatches was discouraged. However, the practice of sending despatches for information to all commands who could conceivably have an interest in the subject matter is a deep-rooted habit of long standing throughout the entire Naval Service. This practice greatly facilitates the process of traffic analysis and is highly detrimental to security. The Pacific Fleet has been directed to inform necessary information addressees by mailgram where practicable, omitting their call signs from radio headings.

Many plain language messages in the categories listed in Alnav 45 have, by their number, headings, and contents, disclosed classified information when taken in the aggregate, although individual messages did not appear to do so. This applies particularly to Class E. personnel, Navy Relief, and certain matériel messages, which have been a fruitful source of information on ship movements. The classification of movement reports as confidential is futile if the information contained therein is to be divulged through plain language messages on other subjects.

The desire of commanders afloat to insure that radio communication with their units unquestionably exists at all times during tactical exercises, has resulted in considerable "testing" and "lining up" of circuits at times when the condition of radio silence in effect actually prohibited such procedure. Consequently, radio security during tactical exercises cannot be said to have been satisfactory. It is obvious that security, and real wartime training in this regard, will not be obtained unless those in command are willing to sacrifice habitual clockwork precision in conducting peacetime training operations, with a view toward studying and analyzing failures in instant radio communication, which are certain to occur during prolonged periods of radio silence.

In Fleet tactical periods, stress was placed upon the use of authenticators and changing call signs.

Radio call signs:

The lack of a rapid, secure, compact and universal method of enciphering radio call signs is the most serious security deficiency in the Fleet today. The adoption of a numerical system of task organization designation, and the corresponding use of visual call signs (which were the only suitable ones available) rendered obsolete the radio call sign device then in effect. The cipher (in reserve status) subsequently issued for encrypting visual call signs is slow and cumbersome. A more rapid-call sign cipher has been developed and submitted to the Navy Department for consideration.

Coding Boards:

At the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, the use of reliable petty officers for coding board duties was authorized for all restricted despatches, as well as for confidential exercise traffic. This has been of inestimable value to the smaller ships. The number of enlisted men assigned to coding duties was limited within the Pacific Fleet to a maximum of four per ship.

It has been obvious from encrypted traffic examined that enlisted personnel and reserve officers assigned to coding duties have been insufficiently trained. Multitudes of inexcusable cryptographic errors, clearly covered by existing instructions, have been noted. The responsibility for this condition is directly that of regular line officer supervisor personnel. Steps have been taken to correct this situation although satisfactory results cannot be expected until the Fleet is furnished adequate instructions for cryptographic security.

[15] Physical Security:

The state of physical security of registered publications in the Pacific Fleet has been unsatisfactory. Many cases have occurred of registered publications being blown overboard, lost from aircraft, removed from staterooms, or otherwise found to be missing. Cases of probable compromise were few. However, nearly all the cases of loss indicated carelessness.

At the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, all registered publications except cryptographic aids and a few tactical publications necessary for training and operations were removed from submarines for the duration of the emergency.

(e) DAMAGE CONTROL.

The merits attained in Damage Control Practices held during the year were not high. This is believed due to a recognition of the necessity for realism, and the general tautening which resulted. Casualties listed in intelligence reports have been studied and solutions worked out. Exercises in shoring have been stressed; also in effecting repairs to carrier flight decks. Security measures dictated the curtailing of the underway portions of the practices toward the latter part of the year. In the older ships, inadequate ventilation when operating for extended periods under required conditions, adversely affects the efficiency of the personnel. Action has been initiated to correct this.

(f) Aviation.**(1) Carriers and Carrier Aircraft.**

New and advanced types of planes, together with the large influx of inexperienced personnel, have resulted in necessity for careful scanning and standardization of carrier operating technique.

The newer types of planes are in general larger than their type predecessors. Difficulty of operating full carrier groups has increased due to this feature. Receipt of folding wing aircraft of all carrier types is expected to ease this difficulty in the future. While the number of accidents in carrier aviation has increased, this is largely due to the large increase in both number of pilots and total flying hours and it is considered that the ratio of accidents to number of pilots or to total flying hours is about the same as for the previous year.

The continuing and increasing flow of new personnel as the aviation expansion program develops has made it mandatory to provide some form of pre-fleet training to bridge the gap between primary qualification and responsible duty in active combat squadrons in the Fleet. Initial steps to fill this need, extending to development of carrier replacement groups, have been taken.

Two very important needs have clearly developed. Both must be met if our limited number of aircraft carriers is to remain sufficiently available for their primary mission of active duty with the Fleet. The first of these is converted merchant vessels for carrier flight deck training in connection with the pre-fleet indoctrination of new personnel. The second is the conversion as necessary of merchant or sea-train vessels for transportation of aircraft, for which duty regular aircraft carriers have, lacking other suitable means, been employed extensively during the past year.

(2) Battleship and Cruiser Aircraft.

The majority of the training effort in battleship and cruiser aircraft during the past year has been devoted to the training and indoctrination of green personnel. The aviation units have been largely drained of experienced pilots, radiomen, and maintenance personnel, and their places have been taken, in the main, by recent graduates from Pensacola and by inexperienced enlisted men. This has resulted in a tendency toward decrease in efficiency. Coincident with efforts to train flight personnel in strictly flying duties, much successful work has been accomplished toward the improvement of their water work and seamanship.

The training of green personnel can best be continued in the ships in which they are required to operate. It has recently become apparent, however, that the only satisfactory way in which to do this is to hold on board the personnel which they replace until the new personnel are suitably qualified for Fleet responsibilities. This must be done if adequate combat readiness is to be maintained.

[16] Increased attention has been directed toward instrument training and night flying. Flight time per pilot and per plane have been increased, and Fleet operating schedules have resulted in increasing the proportion of embarked operations, with consequent marked improvement in shipboard handling of aircraft incident to launching and recovery.

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Although two or more squadrons were simultaneously shore-based temporarily at the Naval Air Stations, San Pedro and Pearl Harbor, for short periods, no squadron or wing concentration has been held and it has, therefore, been somewhat more difficult to coordinate the air training of the units. Night recoveries of aircraft have been conducted on one or more occasions by Cruisers, Scouting Force, and by each unit of Cruisers, Battle Force, except the ST. LOUIS, which joined late in the year and shortly thereafter went to the Navy Yard. Night recoveries are feasible, but only under medium sea and wind conditions. Training in navigational flights up to 200 miles has been conducted. Training of new personnel in navigational flights is continually underway. Communications have been generally satisfactory although continuous training must be stressed in view of the fact that new personnel are being received constantly.

The Battle Force and Scouting Force Aviation Repair Units attached to the U. S. S. MEDUSA and KINGFISHER, respectively, operating as one unit at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, were invaluable in services rendered to the VO-VS units in the Hawaiian Area. Without their repair facilities it is doubtful whether the units would have been able to function properly due to the number of planes awaiting repairs, or engine and structural changes impossible of accomplishment aboard ship, or to the overloaded facilities of the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

The use of VO-VS aircraft for anti-submarine patrols has increased during the year and the cooperation of the submarine force has enabled them to receive exceedingly valuable training in actual bombing, with miniature bombs, of submarines at fully extended periscope depth.

Also, the use of VO-VS aircraft for training of A. A. batteries in all types of attacks—horizontal, dive bombing, and even torpedo plane attacks—has increased as has the service of towing of sleeves for machine gun practices.

(3) *Patrol Aircraft.*

There has been an unavoidable trend toward lowering of the state of training of patrol squadrons during the year as a result of reduction of the average experience level with transfers of experienced personnel to meet the demands of the expansion and training programs. The rapid shift of squadrons to other commands, the formation of new squadrons, the high turn-over of personnel and the necessary concentration of effort on the basic training of fresh personnel have all contributed to this.

Patrol squadrons are still functioning on the basis of single crews for flight and maintenance. Recently approved increased complements will eventually correct this deficiency and make it possible to obtain results more nearly approaching the potentialities of the planes.

Action has been initiated to provide for the training of pilot and flight crew personnel in sufficient numbers to meet demands resulting both from increased complements and increased numbers of patrol plane squadrons. Pre-fleet, or transition, training for all concerned is mandatory and requires considerable time for each individual if the patrol squadrons are to be able to perform required Fleet missions. More important than any other feature of the program is the provision of the necessary enlisted personnel in time for adequate training prior to deliveries of the planes they must man.

During the year, training and qualification of patrol plane commanders has been the major mission in Wings ONE, FOUR and SIX. Wing TWO has suffered less turn-over of personnel and consequently has been able to conduct its training more thoroughly, although a heavy patrol schedule in connection with the Fleet's presence in Hawaiian waters has caused some interference with the training program. Patrol ONE has conducted advance base operations from San Pedro. Advanced base operations have been conducted from Hilo, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, French Frigate Shoals, Canton and Funafuti.

Patrol Wing FOUR resumed operations in Alaskan waters commencing March 31, with Patrol Squadron Forty-one basing at Sitka. Advanced base operations were conducted at San Diego, Tongue Point, San Francisco and Kodiak. Patrol Squadron Forty-Three transferred [17] P2Y airplanes to Pensacola, with stops at Magdalena Bay, Acapulco, Carmen and Corpus Christi.

With the delivery of P2Y models to training activities at Pensacola via Mexico (Acapulco to Carmen), deliveries of new models and transfer of PBY models are currently being made in flights overland across the southwestern states.

(4) *Utility Wing.*

Utility Squadrons ONE and TWO provided considerably more services to the Fleet than in the past because of increased Fleet activity. Their services consisted of Towing antiaircraft targets, photographic flights for gunnery, torpedo

and experimental practices, aerial mapping, mail and rescue flights, recovery of torpedoes and transportation of passengers.

Utility Squadron THREE continued to provide most satisfactorily and increased volume of services assigned by special directives, the results of which have been covered in confidential reports. While operating from Maui airport this squadron has, in addition to providing services, supervised and administered the airport for the greater part of the year.

A detachment of two JRS-1 airplanes, plus two J2F airplanes with personnel from Utility Squadron TWO, continued basing at Norfolk, Virginia, for the purpose of rendering necessary services to Fleet Units based on the East Coast. This unit was designed as Utility Squadron FOUR in November, 1940, and jurisdiction was transferred to Commander Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet. A detachment of six to eight J2F airplanes with personnel from Utility Squadron TWO was based in the Hawaiian area to augment the services available in Utility Squadron ONE.

Utility Squadron TWO at San Diego was occupied in receiving PBV airplanes and training pilots and mechanics in this type. In addition, this squadron rendered services to Fleet Units in the San Diego Area. On June 20, 1941, four PBV type airplanes manned by Utility Squadron TWO personnel, were ferried from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. These planes will provide additional services to the Fleet. Besides the services rendered, every opportunity was taken to train pilots in instrument flying, night flying, and familiarization in the various types of planes.

(5) *Tenders.*

One modern AV (the CURTISS) was assigned in June to Aircraft, Scouting Force. As a newly commissioned vessel, her state of training is therefore not up to that of the rest of the Fleet.

The state of training of the WRIGHT, the AVD's and the AVP's, (all old ships) is very good considering the serious limitations of their age and general unsuitability of design. The well-known features of these types should need no elaboration. They are stop-gaps only, and need replacement.

In addition to providing services at normal and advanced bases, the AVP and AVD tenders have participated as plane guards on the overseas flights to and from Hawaii, and in the southbound flights to Pensacola across Mexico. In the Hawaiian area the tenders have been employed on a considerable scale in the advance base operations at outlying islands and in the transfers of VPB aircraft via air to Manila.

(6) *Aerology:*

Aerological services to the Fleet have been reorganized during the year by the establishment of a Fleet Weather Central located at Ford Island under Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

All Fleet weather and ballistic information emanates from this central. This information is augmented by the aerological units afloat through visual communications.

Aerological officers and enlisted aerographers assist in the operation and development of the Fleet Weather Central when the ships to which their units are attached are anchored in Pearl Harbor. This practice serves to educate personnel and develop the organization.

[18] All aerological reports from vessels of the Pacific Fleet have been limited to Naval addresses and encoded in Navy cipher for reasons of security of ships movements.

Every effort has been made to develop the aerological organization along the lines of complete mobilization of communications.

An exchange of coded analyzed weather maps has been established between the Fleet Weather Central and the weather central attached to the Twelfth Naval District. This exchange has been on a semi-weekly basis. Arrangements have been made to commence a daily exchange of such maps between the weather centrals at San Francisco, Pearl Harbor, and Cavite, P. I. These coded maps will be available to vessels of the Pacific Fleet by interception and will cover the entire North Pacific.

Preliminary arrangements have been made to obtain coded weather reports from South Pacific Islands, New Zealand and Australia. Weather codes have been exchanged between interested agencies, eventually a complete North and South Pacific map will be prepared daily by this Weather Central.

The installation of raysonde equipment on various islands of the north and south Pacific is contemplated in the near future, radio personnel qualified to operate such equipment have been trained and stationed.

The need for additional weather information from the Alaskan Area is marked. With the development of additional air stations in Alaska it is felt that the establishment of a weather central at Kodiak which will eventually exchange coded maps with the three centrals before mentioned, will furnish a detailed composite North Pacific map and thereby completely cover all possible areas of operation in the North Pacific.

(g) *Landing Force Operations.*

(1) *Army-Navy Joint Exercises.*

Units of the Pacific Fleet, Fourteenth Naval District, and all echelons of the Hawaiian Department participated in joint exercises during the period May 14-26, 1941. The exercises involved offense by fleet forces plans for Hawaii. Specific operations carried out by fleet units were air attacks; submarine attacks, including entrance to harbors; mining; bombardment; offensive blocking of channels; and landings, including simulated demolition of installations and capture of outlying airfields. The fleet forces employed in these exercises were Aircraft Carriers, 9 Cruisers, 13 Destroyers, 4 Minelayers, 5 Submarines, 4 Auxiliaries (simulating transports), and a Marine Air Group.

(2) *Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise Number One.*

Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise Number One was conducted in the San Clemente area during the period May 14-June 18, 1941. The exercise consisted of the approach of a Naval Attack Force to San Clemente which was defended by air, surface vessels, submarines, and land forces. Later, bombardment by heavy cruisers and destroyers, using service ammunition, was executed against shore targets. A landing from transports was to have been executed by the Second Marine Division but this had to be abandoned because of the departure of all transports and the Sixth Marines from the San Diego area. A token landing of one motor launch from each heavy cruiser was executed without incident. Despite the curtailment of the exercise, valuable training was obtained from joint staff work, planning, and the phases it was possible to execute.

(3) *Miscellaneous Landing Force Activities.*

(a) On November 7, 1940, Cruiser Division Four, Five and Six participated in an exercise which consisted of furnishing a marine landing force, boats and boats' crews, communication personnel, and simulated naval gunfire support for the landing.

(b) Patrol Wing One conducted elementary air infantry training with the First Battalion, Sixth Marines. Practicability of transporting air infantry by patrol aircraft was demonstrated.

(c) On May 29, 1941, aerial reconnaissance of an atoll, simulated bombardment, and landing for demolition at Johnston Island were conducted.

(d) As part of the Heavy Cruiser Main Battery Gunnery School, U. S. S. PORTLAND bombarded a shore objective at Pakini Military Reservation. This practice was marked by the great accuracy of fire.

[19] (e) Action has been taken to establish in Hawaii a reinforced regiment of the Second Marine Division, in order to advance all phases of landing force training and to have an amphibious force available in an emergency.

(f) The Second Marine Division has conducted field and landing training. Curtailment of efficiency and training activities has resulted from transfer of Sixth Regiment and all transports to the Atlantic area, from limitations on ammunition allowances, from lack of personnel and essential equipment, and from the necessity of maintaining one regiment at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, for guard and police duties.

(h) *BASES.*

(1) *West Coast.*

During the year, the facilities of West Coast bases have been employed only for regularly scheduled Navy Yard overhauls, interim dockings, replenishment of ships present on recreation cruises and for special work such as degaussing, installation of King Board alterations, etc.

The San Pedro-San Diego area continues to offer the best facilities for peacetime training of the Fleet. Except for adequate shore-based A. A. defense (an Army responsibility), and with the completion of the underwater defenses now in process of installation, this area will be a satisfactory base for wartime use should a situation arise that would make its use desirable. It is hoped that continued emphasis on the relative susceptibility in the Army's material and training situation will result in marked improvement in the A. A. defenses.

San Diego.—The recently completed projects of providing four additional carrier berths, the expansion of the Destroyer Base, the air field on San Clemente and

additional outlying fields for the Naval Air Station have greatly added to the potential value of this base. Work on the new patrol plane base is in progress.

San Pedro.—Work on the breakwater extension the new drydock and the underwater defenses of this base is concurrently in progress. The installation of underwater defenses will result in some curtailment of berthing space, but, as the breakwater extension progresses, this situation will correct itself. Private ship-building and repair facilities have been more extensively utilized during the past year.

San Francisco.—The Naval Station at Alameda was commissioned November 1, 1940. The Oakland Supply Depot is still in progress of construction. Underwater defenses of the harbor are in process of installation. The acquisition, by the Navy, of Treasure Island, as a base for Local Defense Craft, and of the drydocks at Hunter's Point has added greatly to the value of San Francisco as a Fleet Base. Additions to the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, and the enlargement of the mine assembly plant and loading dock at that place, when completed, will materially improve the stowage and facilities for handling ammunition for the Fleet. Regardless of where the Fleet may be based in the Pacific, San Francisco is and will continue to be of major importance as a source and point of embarkation of supplies, men and material, and Mare Island will continue as an important overhaul yard for cruisers, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries and smaller craft.

Puget Sound.—The Naval Air Station at Tongue Point, Oregon was commissioned December 10, 1940. It is uncompleted, but facilities for VPB operations are being provided. The facilities at the Naval Air Station, Seattle, are complete for normal operations, but there is need for more accessible ammunition stowage and re-arming arrangements. These are being provided under present projects. When underwater defenses at Port Townsend and Rich Passage are laid, a considerable portion of the Fleet could be based on this area if the necessity should arise.

Barracks and messing accommodations, at the navy yard, for crews of vessels undergoing overhaul are a present important deficiency. It is understood that this is being corrected by new construction.

(2) *Alaska.*

Sitka.—This air station is still in progress of construction. Due for completion about September 1941, it has been used for patrol plane operations and may be considered satisfactory for operations of one squadron at the present time.

[20] *Kodiak.*—This station is due for completion in September 1942. It includes a landplane field for emergency use and will, when completed, provide facilities for operation of 4 squadrons of patrol planes, as well as services to planes operating farther westward in the Aleutian chain. Last estimates received indicated that Kodiak would be useable to a certain degree as a base for one squadron as of May 1, 1941.

Uualaska.—Work on the Naval Air Station at Dutch Harbor is well underway and is being accelerated. It will eventually provide facilities for operation of one squadron of patrol planes. Last estimates received gave June 1, 1941, as the probable date of its being useable to some degree by a limited number of planes.

(3) *Hawaiian Area.*

Pearl Harbor.—Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report either have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facilities for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists. It is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of the work at Barber's Point—sometime in the future.

Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity of the yard will be materially increased.

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other require-

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ments of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard to such forces is as follows:

- (1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.
- (2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.
- (3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.
- (c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.

Kaneohe Bay.—The Naval Air Station Kaneohe was commissioned February 15, 1941. It is still uncompleted, but is in operating condition and three squadrons are now based thereon. Communications, ammunition stowage and handling, and provision for night flying are the principal present deficiencies.

Outlying Fields.—Outlying or auxiliary fields are in operating condition at Maui, Molokai, and Ewa.

Maui provides facilities for Utility Squadron Three and for semi-permanent operation of one carrier group. Widening and lengthening of runways is being accomplished by C. A. A. Molokai has limited facilities for day to day operation of one carrier group. Runways are being improved by C. A. A. Ewa has a partial cross runway 300' x 1800' and is in use, in an expeditionary status, by the Second Marine Air Group. Permanent runway and other minor improvements are being provided.

Development of Keehi lagoon as a civil air base has been started, with C. A. A. funds. When completed, this will provide an alternate operating base for VP planes and will be an important contribution to the defense of this area.

Outlying Fields.

Midway.—This station, as originally planned, is now nearing completion. Latest estimates give a date of November 1, 1941, with an additional 18-19 months for completion of the projected Submarine Base. It is useable for two patrol plane squadrons in emer- [21] gencies. A landing strip, now useable in emergency by carrier planes is nearing completion on Eastern Island. No other facilities for land planes are being provided. Shore defenses have been installed at Midway and a Defense Battalion established there. The Naval Air Station, Midway, is scheduled for commissioning on August 1, 1941.

Johnston.—This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is at present useable by one squadron, with tender. Shore defenses have been installed and nucleus Marine personnel established there. Magazines, fresh water distilling apparatus, housing and cold storage facilities for the defense garrison are being provided. A landing strip on Johnston Island has recently been removed from the augmented project for this station. It should be restored. The Naval Air Station, Johnston Island, is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

Palmyra.—This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is useable at present by 6 VPB, with tender. Landplane runway is being provided. Shore defenses and nucleus of defense personnel have been established. The Naval Air Station Palmyra is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

Wake.—Construction at Wake is now well underway and, although work is in initial stages, substantial progress is being made. Presently planned projects are due for completion about December 1942. Landplane runways are a part of the project. In emergency, one squadron, utilizing contractor's and P. A. A. facilities, can conduct limited operations from Wake at the present time. There is no useable channel for tenders into the lagoon at this time. It is contemplated that some shore defenses will soon be established there.

(5) *Samoa.*

Considerable expansion of the establishment at this station is now underway. Fuel oil, diesel and gasoline storage, net depot, seaplane facilities, landing field and barracks and mess hall for defense personnel are being provided. This work is currently estimated for completion January-March 1943. Samoa is not suitable for heavy load operations of VPB's, but is satisfactory for emergency landings and light load take-offs. Marine defenses and a Marine Defense Battalion are established there.

(6) *Guam.*

Some bomb-proofing, construction of fuel oil storage and harbor improvements are underway at Guam. Present projects are scheduled for completion in January 1943.

(C) *TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS.*

(a) The following publications were newly issued or revised and reissued within the Fleet during the year:

- (1) By Commander Battleships, Battle Force:
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 1-40 (Analysis of Tactical Advantage in Battle Line Engagements).
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 2-40 (Instructions Regarding Methods of Changing Battle Line Formation Axis).
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 1-41 (Measures to Decrease the Effectiveness of Enemy Air Attacks).
- (2) By Commander Aircraft, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 74 }
 U. S. F. 75 } Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U. S. Fleet Aircraft and
 U. S. F. 77 } Aircraft Carriers.
 U. S. F. 78 }
- (3) By Commander Destroyers, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 32 (Revised)—Destroyer Tactical Instructions.
 U. S. F. 33 (Revised)—Destroyer Doctrine.
 [22] D. T. B. 2-40—Night Search and Attack (revised).
 D. T. B. 1-41—Joint Operations of Patrol Planes and Destroyers (new).
- (4) By Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, and Commander Cruisers, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 20—Cruisers Tactical Orders.
 U. S. F. 21—Cruisers Doctrine.
- (5) By all types:
 Revised Training Exercises.
- (b) The following publications were in course of preparation at the end of the year:
 (1) By Commander Destroyers, Battle Force:
 D. T. B. 2-41—Gunnery Doctrine and Fire Control Procedures (5" 38 Gun Destroyers) (Revised).
 D. T. B. 3-41—Destroyer Smoke Screen Tactics (New).
- (c) Fleet Tactical Boards are currently studying the following problems with a view to establishing doctrines and standard procedures:
 (1) Fleet Air Defense.
 (2) Coordinated Cruiser—Destroyer Action in Night Search and Attack.
- (d) Tentative Revised General Tactical Instructions (F. T. P. 183 and 188) have been in effect since 15 September, 1940. These publications are a great improvement over those they replaced, but numerous modifications and corrections are required before final printing. Recommendations in the premises are in preparation.
- (e) Revision of War Instructions, 1934, should be printed and distributed at the earliest practicable date. Comments and recommendations covering the proposed revision were forwarded on 25 January, 1941.

[23]

PART III—MATERIAL

(A) CHARACTERISTICS AND MATERIAL CONDITION OF SHIPS.

GENERAL—The material condition of the ships of the Fleet is very good. The principal deficiencies are the lack of RADAR equipment, the increased displacement, the inadequate ventilation, and the unsatisfactory facilities for fighting fires under conditions of battle damage. The first two items apply to all ships. The latter two to the older ships.

Degaussing gear either temporary or permanent, has been installed on all ships. Replacement of temporary with permanent gear is proceeding. Work to reduce missile hazards is proceeding. A discussion of important items by forces follows:

- (a) *BATTLE FORCE.*
Battleships:
 (a) Sky lookout stations installed.
 (b) Accommodations for additional crew provided.
 (c) Airports at ends of ships welded closed.
 (d) Regunned main batteries NEW MEXICO, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND;
 Secondary batteries MARYLAND and NEVADA.
 (e) Blisters completed on MARYLAND.
 (f) Radar (search) installed on CALIFORNIA.

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(g) All ships except ARIZONA and NEVADA had four 3" 50 A.A. guns installed pending the availability of 1.1" machine guns. Two 5" 51 broadside guns were removed to permit this.

(h) Splinter protection was installed around all A.A. gun mounts.

(i) The inability of the electric drive battleships to maintain full power under tropical conditions is a serious matter. It has been taken up in previous correspondence.

Cruisers:

(a) Splinter protection provided around A.A. guns.

(b) Certain airports have been welded closed.

(c) Difficulty experienced with turbo generators BROOKLYN, PHILADELPHIA and HONOLULU. Corrective action is underway.

Carriers:

(a) Radar installed in the YORKTOWN.

(b) Bow arresting gear installed in SARATOGA and flight area increased at bow and stern.

DESTROYERS:

(a) There have been about thirty cases of cracked shell plating in the 1500-ton destroyers during the year, indicating structural weaknesses. Action by the Bureau of Ships to correct this has been initiated.

(b) *SCOUTING FORCE.*

Cruisers:

(a) Splinter protection for A.A. guns has been or will soon be completed on all ships.

(b) Sky lookout stations installed on all but three ships.

(c) Certain airports welded closed.

(d) Cafeteria system and accommodations for additional crew completed on nine ships. Will soon be completed on other three.

[24] (e) Ballistic protection of armored spaces improved.

(f) Renewing of reduction gears NEW ORLEANS Class, completed except for NEW ORLEANS which will get new gears during forthcoming overhaul.

(g) Radars (search) installed on four ships.

(h) Four 3" 50 A.A. guns temporarily installed in CHICAGO, PORTLAND, LOUISVILLE, and SAN FRANCISCO. 1.1" mount foundations were installed in SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON.

(i) Mark XIX Directors modified.

Submarines:

(a) Air conditioning equipment which must be installed before the S Class submarines can be considered ready for war patrol in tropical waters has been authorized and will be completed about December 1941.

(b) Correction of the defective air conditioning system in the ARGONAUT and NARWHAL has been completed. Some work has been accomplished on the DOLPHIN'S system. This should be completed early in October 1941.

(c) ARGONAUT sustained surface speed of 8.9 knots is not satisfactory. This condition will obtain until the ship is reengineered.

(d) Plane fueling facilities have been completed in NARWHAL. These facilities will shortly be completed in ARGONAUT.

(e) The use of contract lubricating oils in submarine main engines has not been satisfactory. Special oils have been resorted to in all H.O.R. engines, and are being experimented with on one set of Winton engines.

(C) *BASE FORCE.*

Oilers:

(a) All oilers have been equipped for fueling heavy ships at sea.

(b) The newly acquired Fleet oilers have certain defects for Naval purposes, most of which will be corrected when conversion is undertaken. The most serious of these is the lack of sufficient evaporator capacity to be self sustaining in fresh water. The matter of exposed ship and cargo control wiring and piping not at present included in conversion items has been taken up in separate correspondence.

(c) The slow speed and antiquated machinery installation of the older ships of the Base Force will seriously handicap the supply of services to Fleet under war conditions.

Mine Vessels:

(a) All ships of the Mine Squadron TWO (formerly Mine Squadron THREE) have been equipped or are now equipped with magnetic sweeping gear.

(b) The lack of depth charge equipment and listening gear in the AMs, DMs and DMSs is a serious defect. Corrective measures have been recommended.

(B) OVERHAULS.

Regular overhauls were carried out as scheduled by the Department. A new and more satisfactory basis for future overhauls was worked out between the Commander-in-Chief and the Department. This reduced the length of overhauls, and limited the numbers of combatant ships of each type permitted to be under overhaul at any one time.

Regular overhauls have been handicapped due to lack of opportunity for advance planning and the difficulty of obtaining deliveries of material for alterations. Improvement in this situation is expected as a result of recent correspondence.

In addition to regular overhauls, wide use of restricted availabilities at Pearl Harbor has been resorted to in order to accomplish in a minimum of time, many alterations of great military importance. It is expected that this procedure will find wide use in the future.

[25] (C) ADVANCE BASE AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE EQUIPMENT.

The present war has demonstrated the urgent need for advance base and expeditionary force equipment in modern warfare. The situation in the Pacific demands not only a large volume of such equipment but also that it be the most modern and the latest kind procurable.

The general situation as to advance base and expeditionary equipment in the Pacific area is most unsatisfactory. Specific deficiencies contributing to this situation are:

(a) Material for advance bases is being assembled in the Twelfth Naval District and an Advance Base Depot with warehouse is in process of development. An exercise for the testing of advance base material has been directed but the amount of material on hand has so far been too small to warrant conducting the exercise. However, improvement in the unsatisfactory delivery situation is expected in the near future.

(b) Aeronautical advance base and expeditionary force equipment was requisitioned about one year ago but has not been received to date. The Bureau of Aeronautics has advised that this equipment is on schedule.

(c) There are no transports now in the Pacific capable of being combat unit loaded. This situation will be relieved, in part, by November 1941, but sufficient transports and cargo vessels should be made available to move the Second Marine Division and at least one Defense Battalion.

(d) All destroyer transports have been transferred from the Pacific area.

(e) No hospital ship is now available to this Fleet. A mobile hospital unit will arrive in the near future, but further steps to relieve the hospitalization situation must be taken.

(f) Landing boats, artillery lighters, tank lighters, amphibian tractors, and rubber boats are not yet available, or are of such insufficient numbers as not to meet even training requirements.

(g) There are serious deficiencies in the equipment and armament of the Second Marine Division, particularly in vehicles and weapons.

(h) Bombardment projectiles are not on hand at mobilization bases in sufficient quantities to meet war plan requirements.

(i) Antisubmarine nets and netlaying vessels for providing adequate defense for advance bases are not yet available in sufficient quantity.

(j) Floating drydocks for light force vessels are a particular necessity.

(k) Portable A. A. guns and fire control equipment must be provided in greater numbers.

(l) Equipment for rapid construction of landing fields should be developed and procured.

(m) Base oilers, provision and ammunition lighters, etc., should be made available.

(n) Distilling ships and distilling units for fresh water for troops are required to maintain troops and air operating personnel in localities where the potable water supply is undeveloped or entirely lacking.

(D) AVIATION.**(a) Tactical Developments.**

Excellent progress has been made in aircraft tactical development as a result of almost continuous tactical exercises with the Fleet or Task Forces thereof. Reports of current war operations have formed a fertile basis for testing and developing new ideas and procedures and there has been general improvement in terms of reduced artificiality and increased realism. In addition, good advance has been made in inter-type tactics between aircraft and surface types, including

submarines, and valuable training has been had in the various forms of coordination along this line that will be essential in action.

The use of aircraft in combination with the Radar for Fleet defense has become a subject of major importance and its further development will be intensively carried on.

War reports have indicated the increasing importance of adequate aerial photographic reconnaissance and its development has been stressed throughout the year. Progress is hampered by the time factor with respect to both material and personnel. Satisfactory results are contingent on the assistance that the Department is able to render.

[26] Aircraft tactics of all kinds must continue to be influenced by the current status of armament and protection of Fleet aircraft. As these characteristics improve with the delivery of newer aircraft, the tactics of aircraft employment can be made more effective.

The Fleet Aircraft Tactical Unit has continued its valuable work, both directly in connection with aircraft tactics and indirectly by its compilations from war reports of aircraft tactical information.

(b) New Airplanes.

Although considerable improvement is more immediately in sight, the situation still remains similar to that reported last year in that too few modern or modernized Fleet aircraft have been delivered and the numbers of spare parts and spare planes for those on hand, in all categories, are too few. It is realized that diversions of deliveries to other destinations have necessarily interfered with the program for Fleet aircraft and that various phases of manufacturing priorities have been beyond the Department's control. It cannot be repeated too often, however, that the readiness of Fleet squadrons should not be jeopardized.

It is realized that many replacement planes now being delivered are not intended to be the final word in improvement and that more satisfactory planes are scheduled to replace them shortly. This plan must not be lost sight of, for many of the new airplanes with armament and protection built into designs already existing, have lost thereby altogether too much in the way of performance.

(c) Material Conditions.

The material condition of Fleet aircraft is, on the whole, far from satisfactory. The faults are due either to obsolescence and accumulative wear of types not yet replaced or to serious defects that have too frequently become apparent in new types after their exposure to actual service conditions.

The most important examples of the foregoing are:

(1) Failure of the R-1280-32 and 40 engine main bearing and seals which required a major disassembly of the engines to correct.

(2) Failure of rivets in the SBD wings in way of the wheel wells and wing fairing at the fuselage. This necessitated the return to the contractor of those airplanes which were already delivered to west coast units.

(3) Failure of the F2A landing gear struts. This required reworking and strengthening of all F2A main landing gear struts. These failures persist and are currently being experienced regardless of the reinforcements.

(4) Displacement of the wing bulkhead in the F2A airplanes to which landing gear main strut hinges are attached. This failure is progressive and prevents the landing gear from housing and causes failures in the wings. It was found necessary to suspend these airplanes from carrier operations pending correction of this trouble inasmuch as carrier landings aggravated the situation.

(5) Failure of some of the F2A aileron control rods incident to the contractor having installed non-heat treated rods.

(6) Discovery of numerous instances wherein foreign objects such as riveter's bars were left in sealed compartments. This resulted in a few near crashes due to jammed controls and necessitated much labor in opening sealed compartments for inspection.

(7) Elongated wing attachment bolts in numerous SBD airplanes. This trouble required the inspection and replacement of approximately 20,000 bolts.

(8) Nose section failure of the engines of new PBY-5 airplanes. This, unless and until corrected, is extremely serious.

(9) Weakness of main floats and wingtip float struts of OS2U (battleship) aircraft caused numerous failures in operations at sea. New and strengthened floats and struts will, it is hoped, correct this defect.

(10) The extreme obsolescence of SOC, SON (cruiser aircraft), both in terms of material condition and battle suitability. Deliveries of replacement planes have been greatly delayed. The highest priority for these deliveries is none too

good, for the characteristics of aircraft now carried in cruisers will be a serious liability in action.

[27] Perhaps the most serious matter of all has been the concentration on manufacture and delivery of new aircraft, for the sake of total numbers produced, at the expense of concurrent provision of spare parts and spare accessories that are manifestly essential for continued effective operation. Until the Department is able to alter this policy, the readiness of Fleet aviation will be far more apparent than real.

(r) *Overhaul.*

There has been a gratifying increase in total overhaul facilities available. The overhaul situation in the Hawaiian area, however, remains far from satisfactory. As has frequently been stated, it is an unsound and potentially dangerous situation for Pacific Fleet aircraft, other than patrol planes, to have to be overhauled almost entirely on the mainland as a result of current overhaul facilities at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor being limited to the amount necessary for patrol plane overhaul. Transportation for overhaul now necessary between Pearl Harbor and the mainland, in addition to the mis-use of aircraft carriers that is periodically necessitated for this purpose, results in dead-time that, in effect, reduces an already meager supply of spare aircraft. Under war conditions it is altogether too apparent that this transportation for overhaul might be impracticable.

(e) *Miscellaneous Equipment.*

No comment.

(f) *Experimental Development and Tests.*

There have continued to be numerous tests in the various Fleet aircraft units of new equipment, as well as tests for determination of causes and remedies of material troubles. An excellent step toward relief of operating units from a major portion of this load has been the recent establishment of the Acceptance, Test and Training Unit under Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.

The following items, both test and experimental, are of interest:

- (1) Exhaust de-icers.
- (2) Extension of oil draining interval.
- (3) True airspeed meters.
- (4) Solar heating units.
- (5) Camouflage.
- (6) Propeller and engine vibration tests.
- (7) Fuel tank and armor protection.
- (8) Oxygen equipment.
- (9) Blind landing equipment.
- (10) Tractors.
- (11) Parachutes.
- (12) Fuel jettisoning.
- (13) Night photography using flare bombs.
- (14) Numerous other photographic tests and developments, including the development of films while in flight.
- (15) Improved flight clothing.
- (16) Further progress in night recovery of cruiser airplanes.
- (17) Various improvements in hoisting arrangements for ship-based aircraft.

(g) *Aerology.*

Additional raysonde equipment is needed for installation on outlying Pacific Islands as well as regular aerological equipment for four such stations. Preliminary steps have been taken to procure this material and it is expected to be delivered shortly after the commissioning of the air stations at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

Raysonde equipment was temporarily removed from the U. S. S. INDIAN-APOLIS for installation at Kaneohe, where a complete aerological unit has been set up during the year. Necessary radio equipment and instruments needed for the expanding operation of the Fleet Weather Central have been requested but not yet received.

[28] The complete equipment of the aerological unit assigned to Cruisers, Battle Force was removed from the Pacific Fleet due to the transfer of the U. S. S. BROOKLYN to the Atlantic Fleet. Replacement equipment has been requested.

(E) *SUPPLY ACTIVITIES.*

The past year has presented exceptional opportunities for improvement in the logistic support of the Fleet. Conditions closely akin to war time supplanted

those of years gone by. The inadequacy of auxillary vessels of all classifications became quickly apparent.

(a) *Provisions.* The problem of subsisting the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area was attended by greater difficulties than ever before encountered due to:

- (1) Inadequacy of provision stores ships.
- (2) Lack of cold storage facilities at Pearl Harbor.
- (3) Inadequacy of commercial cold storage facilities at Honolulu.
- (4) Inadequacy of refrigerated cargo space in commercial ships serving the Hawaiian Area.

(5) Inadequacy of locally produced meats, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products for the needs of the civilian population, and Army and Navy personnel. Solution was found in the completion of the cold storage plant at Merry Point, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, on 1 June 1940, in furnishing to prospective contractors of guaranteed estimates of purchases to be made, and in the stocking of the cold storage plant at Merry Point means of commercial shipments, and by two shipments in the ALDEBARAN.

Formerly provision stores ships were loaded by totaling individual ship requisitions submitted months in advance. There are now standard loadings controlled by the Fleet Supply Officer. Requisitions are required from the individual ships ten days in advance of the arrival of the provision stores ship in order to prorate the cargo.

The standard loadings of provision ships has worked out advantageously from every angle. The Navy Purchasing Office is given more time in which to contract for requirements. Lengthy radio dispatches are eliminated, and flexibility to meet changes necessitated by turning over stocks at Pearl Harbor and by unscheduled movements of ships is provided for. Even under the difficulties raised by unexpected ship movements it has been possible to operate with less than 4% of error.

To accomplish these results continuous collaboration and cooperation between the Supply Officer, Pearl Harbor and the Fleet Supply Officer were essential. The excellent results obtained are evidence of the collaboration and cooperation which existed.

For many years it had been the rule to require ships to receive from provision ships any excesses remaining after provisioning the Fleet. In theory this was to prevent loss, but in practice it amounted in most cases to a dispersion of surveys of provisions unfit for use among the ships of the Fleet rather than have a large survey which might look bad for the provision ship. This subterfuge fooled no one, and required additional and unnecessary labor and correspondence. Since the rule served no good purpose it was abolished. No forced issues were necessary, nor were any large surveys required. In a few cases transfer of excesses to the cold storage plant at Merry Point prevented loss which might otherwise have occurred.

The need for more provision ships is worthy of serious consideration. There were many times when the disablement of one of the two provision ships assigned to the Base Force would have required the withdrawal of a portion of the Fleet to the Mainland. Had the Fleet operated beyond Pearl Harbor, many of the ships would have had to subsist on dry stores solely, after the first three weeks.

At the close of the period covered by this report the tentative future assignment of provision ships for the Base Force was ARCTIC, BOREAS, ALDEBARAN and POLARIS, the BRIDGE being transferred to the Atlantic Fleet. Based on a Fleet complement of 60,000 officers and men, each of the four ships could carry supplies sufficient to last the Fleet for twenty-three days. It is believed, however, that the ALDEBARAN and POLARIS will be found by experience to have at least 15% greater capacity. The planned operation of these ships presupposed one under overhaul during the next nine months. It was planned to keep one ship at Pearl Harbor at all times, each ship remaining three weeks. This plan would have made a provision ship at once available for an extended cruise if required, would have permitted combatant ships to keep loaded with provisions to 75% of capacity, and would have allowed each ship six weeks for going to and coming from San Francisco, loading and upkeep.

[29] Mention should be made of the approaching need for supplying provisions to Midway, Wake, Guam, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa. Such a task could not be accomplished by the Base Force with only three provisions ships in operation, and with the Fleet complement of 60,000 officers and men.

The Hawaiian Islands could be self-sustaining as to many items and provide for Army and Navy needs. This condition will not, however, be met unless sub-

stantial encouragement is received from the military forces. An excellent grade of potato of fine flavor is being raised by the Oahu Sugar Plantation. It will mature about March. At that time the potatoes available on the Coast are in poor condition, and a considerable portion is lost due to shrivelling, sprouting, dry rot and susceptibility to decay in open storage after being kept in chilled storage. The Oahu potatoes are firm, free from imperfections, thin skinned, and of good keeping quality in open storage. Under these conditions the disparity in price, approximately .015 against .025, is not as great as the figures indicate. Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of the Oahu Sugar Co., intends to experiment with a potato of greater yield with a view to reducing the price.

Many sugar plantations due to sugar quotas now have land not required for cane planting, but they are loathe to go into the potato business unless assured of a local market. If the Navy agreed to buy a given tonnage of island grown potatoes at a price not to exceed a specified figure during the months of March, April, and May, there would be a response from the sugar plantations. The subject merits investigation.

(b) *Fuel.*

The fiscal year of 1941 has seen many changes in the fueling tasks, fueling facilities, and fueling points of the Base Force. The year commenced with inadequate equipment, stocks at low points, and reliance on commercial oilers to meet all the fuel needs of the Fleet. The fuel situation is now satisfactory and well in hand. A few minor desirable improvements remain to be made as time permits.

Early in fiscal year 1941 four hundred thousand barrels of fuel oil per month were required for Fleet use at Pearl Harbor. During the period the major portion of the Fleet concentrated in Pearl Harbor the seven Base Force oilers were not adequate to meet this demand and also replenish the depleted fuel stocks at Pearl Harbor. Commercial deliveries of fuel oil were contracted for with difficulty and during the period July to December 841,800 barrels of fuel were delivered in commercial bottoms to Pearl Harbor storage. The price of fuel oil delivered into Pearl Harbor dropped from \$1.44 per barrel in July to \$0.96 per barrel in December. The contract price for Navy fuel oil in Los Angeles Harbor averaged \$0.65 per barrel and \$0.30 per barrel is considered a fair price for transporting fuel oil from Los Angeles to Pearl Harbor. The excess price paid by the Navy for the transportation of oil was due to a world wide demand to increase fuel stocks in storage coincident with German Victories in Europe.

In addition to the reserve stock of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor, (3,495,478 barrels which cannot be used without Presidential authority), there is space available for approximately 500,000 barrels of fuel oil. It was not necessary to use any of the reserve stocks of fuel oil, although at the end of July 1940 there was only 2,165 barrels of fuel oil available for immediate issue to the Fleet. The reserve stock of fuel oil consists of 2,804,540 barrels of Navy fuel oil, and 690,928 barrels of topped crude, a long time storage oil. Arrangements have been completed to deliver an additional 300,000 barrels of topped crude into storage during the months of May and June 1941. It is understood that when the first units of the new underground storage at Pearl Harbor are completed they will be filled with topped crude from present stocks.

During the second quarter, the major part of the Fleet returned to West Coast bases for a two weeks leave and liberty period, and prolonged its stay for well over a month for installation of degaussing equipment and drydocking. While the Fleet was away from Pearl Harbor, issues decreased, and fuel stocks were increased to maximum capacity. At this time word was received that four high speed national defense oilers of the CIMARRON Class would be on the West Coast and available to Base Force by December 1940. Additional Commercial deliveries of fuel oil to Pearl Harbor were not needed as these four new tankers gave Base Force sufficient capacity to provide all fuels required.

By the end of January the major portion of the Fleet was again concentrated in Pearl Harbor. A new Fleet operating policy was instituted whereby half of the Fleet was underway all the time and fuel issues jumped to over 600,000 barrels per month. 703,036 barrels were issued during the month of March. Base Force had no difficulty in keeping pace with the increased fuel demands, although the oilers of the CIMARRON class were required to make the trips from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor in six days instead of the usual seven days, and upkeep periods were [30] omitted. The assignment of the RAMAPO and SEPULGA will not permit Base Force to meet the increased demands for fuel and also assign proper upkeep periods to the high speed oilers.

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There are seven oilers of the CIMARRON class assigned to Base Force. Each of these has been assigned a period of final conversion. The CIMARRON returned to Philadelphia in September 1940, and was expected to return to the West Coast prior to the NEOSHO entering the Navy Yard Puget Sound on 1 April. The return of the CIMARRON has been delayed because of delays in receipt of materials, will enter Navy Yard Puget Sound on 15 July. The NEOSHO has encountered difficulties and her return to the Fleet is not expected until after 1 August.

Oilers of the BRAZOS class plus the TIPPECANOE have been used to deliver fuel oil to Pearl Harbor, as well as maintain the full stocks at San Diego and Puget Sound. In addition, the CUYAMA delivered 21,000 barrels of fuel oil to Palmyra both in December and in March for use of the contractor's dredge. The NECHES delivered 20,000 barrels of fuel oil to Dutch Harbor, Alaska for the Coast Guard, and the KANAWHA delivered 20,000 barrels to Navy storage at Wake in May. The fuel oil requirements of the outlying islands, the Alaskan stations and the Canal Zone will probably develop into a full time job for the oilers of the BRAZOS class. The SANGAMON accompanied to Samoa the four cruisers and nine destroyers visiting Australian and New Zealand ports.

The fuel oil requirements at the Canal Zone have been met by oilers transitting the canal. The CIMARRON replenished stocks at Balboa and Cristobal on her trip to Philadelphia, and will again replenish these stocks on her return to the West Coast. The KASKASKIA, SABINE, SANTEE, and SANGAMON filled the Navy storage in Canal Zone to capacity when they transitted in December 1940.

Large combatant ships going to Navy Yard Puget Sound for overhaul from Long Beach have filled to capacity with fuel oil prior to departure and delivered fuel oil into storage at the yard. Fuel oil issues at Puget Sound have increased over 30%, and more frequent trips of oilers to Puget Sound have been required. It is planned to keep fuel stocks at Puget Sound at not less than 80% of capacity by oilers making Alaskan trips discharging available fuel oil to Puget Sound on return, as well as by the large oilers going to the Navy Yard for overhaul.

Base Force oilers have executed many assigned tasks not involving fuel during the course of the year. The PLATTE escorted the floating drydock YFD-2, towed by CAPELLA and NAVAJO, from Balboa to Pearl Harbor. Large quantities of freight have been transported in oilers from Mainland to Pearl Harbor as well as to outlying islands and Alaskan ports. The oilers have towed lighters and oil barges from California to Hawaiian Area and likewise have escorted small craft able to make the trip under their own power. The PLATTE made a special trip from San Diego to Puget Sound in May to transport two artillery lighters. The increase in Navy personnel has resulted in the oilers being filled to capacity with both officers and enlisted men as passengers on every trip.

The distribution of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor was accomplished with difficulty early in the year. One oil barge, the YO-21, was used to capacity but it could not meet the needs of the Fleet. Oilers were used to fuel large combatant ships and destroyers were fueled at Merry Point dock. Ships at Navy Yard piers were fueled by yard lines at every opportunity. This arrangement required a great deal of supervision and caused many inconveniences to the ships being fueled. As time went along and it became apparent that the Fleet would remain in the Hawaiian Area, the three oil barges from San Pedro and one from San Diego were transferred to Pearl Harbor. The five fuel oil barges meet the requirements of the Fleet at the present time, but often have to work twelve to sixteen hours a day. A rapid fueling of the Fleet would necessitate many cruisers, and all destroyers fueling from Navy Yard piers. Each barge has a capacity of 3,500 barrels and 28,000 barrels of fuel oil can be delivered during an eight hour day. Four barges are kept working each day, and one barge is assigned an upkeep period. There is a real need for barges of 10,000 barrel capacity, as the small barges use 62½% of their time on a fueling job going and coming from fuel docks and re-loading. When practicable, barges fuel from oilers at anchor in Pearl Harbor. This procedure shortens the fueling time as oilers can fill the barges in a shorter time than the shore activity, and the barges have a shorter distance to travel.

Commander Base Force is responsible for the scheduling and delivery of fuels to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. An arrangement whereby the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor assumed the responsibility for these functions was tried for a week, and then rejected.

Base Force is responsible for the delivery of aviation gasoline to Canal Zone, Pearl Harbor, and Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H. It is expected that Base Force will be assigned the responsibility of maintenance of aviation gasoline stocks in

Alaska. Aviation gasoline storage is being constructed on the outlying islands and these points will be filled and replenished by Base Force [31] oilers. Sufficient gasoline space has been available in oilers to meet the operating needs of the Fleet, the short activities as well as the new storage at Naval Air Stations, Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Bay. During the months of January, February, and March 1941, Base Force oilers transported 5,050,469 gallons of aviation gasoline from San Pedro to Pearl Harbor. There was space available for transportation of three times this amount.

The distribution of aviation gasoline at Pearl Harbor was quite unsatisfactory at the beginning of this fiscal year. Commander Base Force had available for duty two old gasoline delivery boats with gasoline bowsters. These boats would often incur material failures at times when delivery schedules were heavy. Gasoline was delivered by gasoline truck to ships at piers. Large oilers would gas ships when alongside for delivery of fuel oil.

The YO-43, a self-propelled barge with a capacity of 150,000 gallons of gasoline and 30,000 gallons of diesel oil, was completed by Navy Yard and made available to Base Force on 1 March 1941. At the same time, the YO-44 (same as YO-43) was transferred to the Hawaiian Area from San Diego. These two gasoline diesel barges have simplified the gasoline distribution problem. In addition they are being used to fill the new gasoline storage at Kaneohe Bay. At the present time they are the only means of delivering bulk gasoline to Kaneohe other than by truck. Early in April the YO-44 was sent to Johnston Island to deliver 200,000 gallons of diesel oil in order that the contractor could continue dredging work. The gasoline tanks of the YO-44 were filled with diesel oil in order that the desired quantity would be delivered. Some difficulty was experienced in cleaning the gasoline tank of all traces of diesel oil. Another barge similar to the YO-43 will be needed in the Hawaiian Area within the next twelve months to permit proper upkeep of the YO-43 and YO-44, deliver gasoline and diesel oil to the Fleet, and also make deliveries of gasoline and diesel oil to the outlying islands.

No difficulty has been encountered in the transportation of diesel oil to the Canal Zone and Pearl Harbor, but the distribution of diesel oil in Pearl Harbor was unsatisfactory until the YO-43 and YO-44 reported for duty. Diesel oil issues at Pearl Harbor have increased over 50% because of the increase in number of diesel burning ships, the diesel oil burning equipment of contractors and the near completion of dieselization of small boats program. No requests for the delivery of motor gasoline to large ships have been received since January 1941.

To meet fully and expeditiously the needs of the Fleet, as constituted during the past year, and island bases the following ships are required: (1) one base oiler of about 300,000 gallons minimum capacity of aviation gasoline, similar to SAN DIEGO, the acquisition of which has been previously requested; (2) five 10,000 barrel Fleet oil barges, self-propelled at a speed of ten knots; and (3) two additional oilers of the CIMARRON type as a reserve for casualties, and to provide for a widely scattered disposition of Fleet units.

(c) *GENERAL STORES.*

The value of stores issue ships to the Fleet was made plain during the past year. This was however little more than a token; indication of what could be done with an adequate number of stores ships of adequate size.

The size and construction of the ANTARES, the sole stores issue ship assigned to the Base Force, her retention in the Hawaiian Area for use as relief flagship for the Base Force, and her diversion to island bases, interfere with the usefulness of the ANTARES to the Fleet. Until the ships of the Fleet can be assured of regular dependable service from stores issue ships, they will continue to rely on Mainland sources of supply.

The planned operation of stores issue ships in time of peace is: (1) to stock bulky items which combatant ships cannot carry in quantity and (2) to stock small items for retail issue to top off the ships of the Fleet to prevent depletion of their stocks below a six month's supply. The first mission has not yet been fulfilled. Ships continue to submit requisitions to Mainland supply points, and to draw from the ANTARES as well. Under these conditions ANTARES has been unable to determine a normal cargo of bulky items or to increase the bin space in order to better provide for retail issues. Even under the above handicaps the ANTARES did increase its efficiency. The number of items carried for general issue was increased from five hundred to seven hundred.

The preparation of stores issue ships to meet their wartime mission will play an important part in enabling the Fleet to perform its task. Without supplies for operation, maintenance and repair, the Fleet would be quickly hamstrung. The

supply, shipment, and delivery of individual ship's requisitions in wartime is not possible. On the other hand, the supply of bulk cargoes to stores issue ships is definitely possible. The supply of all ship's needs of general stores. [32] from stores issue ships, and the replenishment of stores issue ship's stock by bulk shipments in cargo carriers, is the solution.

The Base Force is in immediate need of two modern cargo ships to replenish the stock of stores issue ships, to transport the varied cargoes which the Base Force is called upon to handle in constantly increasing quantity, to do the various odd jobs which have been assigned to the ANTARES in the past, and to transport advance base material.

[33]

PART IV—PERSONNEL

(A) COMMISSIONED.

(a) Allowances.

In general surface ships have been provided with officers sufficient in numbers but insufficient in training and experience. Regular officers have been and continue to be replaced by reserves of relative inexperience. The rapid turnover of experienced personnel coupled with inexperienced reserve replacement officers has served to lower combat efficiency. Such replacement reserve officers are being trained insofar as possible in one specialty billet in which the individual shows aptitude, thus the beneficial effects of training will be realized much earlier. In time, as such training progresses, it is expected that the above condition will gradually improve and as reserve officers gain in experience, allowances will be adequate in terms of efficiency.

The harmful effect of the withdrawal of a good portion of the experienced gunnery officers from the Fleet for duties ashore to meet the production demands is gradually being overcome by intensive training through the medium of gunnery schools.

Insufficient officers are assigned to submarines from the viewpoint of training to meet the needs of the expanding submarine force. At least six officers should be attached to each fleet type submarine to provide necessary trained submarine officers for war patrols and reserve crews. Reserve officers are being ordered direct from engineering schools to submarines without the benefit of instruction in the Submarine School. This provides numerical relief but delays the state of training of qualified submarine personnel. Additional junior line officers should be ordered to the submarine service after prescribed school instruction in order to provide an adequate supply of young officers qualified for command.

Insufficient Naval Aviators are assigned all types of squadrons from both the point of view of continuous war operations and to meet the requirements of the expansion program. An eight to one expansion in patrol plane personnel is planned within the next several years, which is indicative of the acute need for training of additional officers. Existing deficiencies will not be made good for many months. This situation has been the subject of separate correspondence.

(b) Training.

The Naval building and expansion program will require that additional experienced officer personnel continue to be removed from operating units. Inexperienced reserves must serve as replacements, consequently strong emphasis has been placed upon the training of reserve officers with the end in view of having each experienced officer instruct an understudy along the line of his particular duties, looking to his eventual replacement when he is needed elsewhere in the expansion program. Type gunnery schools were conducted stressing fundamental training and including extensive instructional firings.

Type gunnery schools for the forthcoming year have started and will continue over a longer period than in past years. Officers attending these type gunnery schools are not allowed to be absent from their ships while the ships are underway. This system tends to prolong the school session but it satisfies all conditions of the emergency and, in the long run, it is believed greater benefit will result therefrom.

With an influx of a large number of inexperienced reserve officers, the necessity of more intensive training of junior officers has developed. Some types have prepared syllabi of training for the various duties within departments, and junior officers are required to pursue these courses. Reserve ensigns are trained for duty in one department only.

Although training strives to keep apace with expansion and modern trends, it has been seriously handicapped in some instances because of the rather steady reduction in the number of officers qualified to supervise the inexperienced off-

cers. Tactical training is emphasized during exercises at sea and tactical schools are held in part.

A school for Prospective Commanding Officers is conducted in each submarine squadron to train the second officer of each submarine for command duties and to serve as a refresher course for officers already qualified for command who have been separated from the submarine service. Junior officers have been required, under the immediate supervision of commanding officers, to handle submarines under all conditions of submerged and surface operations.

In the Patrol Wings, in order to maintain the barest minimum of patrol plane commanders essential for operation of the planes assigned, as well as to train additional pilots it has been [34] necessary to assign first priority to pilot training in Patrol Wings One, Four, and Six. Such action was necessitated by the diversion of a considerable number of qualified patrol plane commanders to duty away from the above named wings.

(c) Assignments.

Permanency of personnel has not been in evidence during the past year. There has been considerable shifting of personnel which, in turn, has a tendency to lower efficiency.

The recent establishment by the Bureau of Navigation of a policy whereby each ship maintains an up-to-date list in the Bureau showing the order in which Commanding Officers desire that officers should be detached when and if it becomes necessary, will assist in the future, to retain key personnel on board. It is expected that such a move toward permanency will markedly benefit the Fleet.

In destroyers, a comparatively large number of commanding and executive officers were detached and replaced with more junior officers, which meant the loss of experienced destroyer officers to other types. In addition, a large number of experienced gunnery and engineer officers have been ordered out of destroyers to other duties afloat and ashore.

Insofar as practicable officers are assigned to duties wherein full utilization of their special training is obtained. An abnormal number of changes in assignments of officers have been required in Patrol Wings One, Four, and Six in order to maintain an equitable distribution of officers in those wings, incident to the depletion of officer personnel as mentioned before.

(B) ENLISTED

(a) Allowances.

Special personnel studies during the past year indicate that allowances are inadequate. The Fleet Personnel Board report as approved by the Commander-in-Chief, indicated need for increased allowances to meet war-time demands in all Types. Such an increase in allowance as recommended would accelerate training and would serve to alleviate the situation of impermanency of assignments. In addition to increasing the allowances, requests have been made to the Bureau of Navigation to provide additional personnel for training to meet the demands of new construction over and above that required to properly man the ships. Actual conditions at the end of the fiscal year find all types seriously undermanned. From this inadequate source huge demands have been and are being made upon the Pacific Fleet. A most critical condition of affairs will soon result unless positive action is quickly taken to furnish the Fleet with men in sufficient numbers who can be started on a training program at a time early enough to anticipate the expansion program demands for trained personnel. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Navy Department the urgent need for men in order to get them at least partially trained for needs elsewhere in the expansion program.

The current lack of raw personnel material to train, for both the ship building program and the expanding aeronautical facilities is considered to be the most obvious and dangerous deficiency in the Navy expansion program. The Naval establishment will find itself confronted with a condition of having ships and planes without sufficient trained personnel to operate the equipment unless early and adequate recruits are provided. The result of such a condition will be that not only new construction will be inadequately manned but trained personnel will have been withdrawn from operating vessels to such an extent that their effectiveness will be unacceptably reduced.

The situation in regard to training the aviation and submarine personnel is especially marked and has been the subject of separate correspondence.

During the past year, in order to more expeditiously handle personnel coming into the Naval Organization and to make a more rapid distribution of this per-

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sonnel, the Fleet Personnel Officer moved to the Headquarters, Eleventh Naval District in November, 1940. In order to coordinate with the activities of the Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, the Fleet Personnel Officer moved, in June, 1941, to Headquarters, Twelfth Naval District. These moves accomplished the desired results in reducing the loss of time involved in the handling of incoming and outgoing drafts and reducing radio traffic.

Beginning with January, 1941, the demands for personnel to fill new construction, acquired and converted vessels, newly established shore and outlying stations, were considerably increased over the first six months of the fiscal year. Since January 1, 1941, the Pacific Fleet Personnel Officer was called upon to supply 7,233 men for these activities. Most of these men were rated men. The following table gives some idea of how these men were spread among the various demands:

[35]	To Combatant vessels (new BBs, DDs)-----	1172
	To Auxiliaries (New, converted, and acquired)-----	2710
	To shore stations-----	1679
	To outlying stations-----	1672

The following table shows the number of recruits received in the Pacific Fleet by quarters for the fiscal year:

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total
School Grad.....	332	1,077	846	1,246	3,501
Gen. Service.....	3,750	10,527	6,190	3,401	23,868

It will be noted that in the 4th quarter the number of recruits fell off very badly.

In October, 1940, complements were made effective in lieu of allowances for all vessels of the U. S. Fleet. On March 31, 1941, new complements were put into effect which were greater than previously. The following table is furnished for information:

	June 1940		December 1940		April 1941 (latest available figures)	
	Allow- ance	On Board	Comple- ment	On Board	Comple- ment	On Board
BATSHIPS.....	13,931	13,180	17,664	17,515	18,566	17,589
AIRBATFOR.....	7,113	6,645	8,309	8,141	8,525	8,256
MINBATFOR.....	962	974	1,673	1,573	1,676	1,675
CRUBATFOR.....	5,698	5,702	10,640	10,752	10,489	9,469
CRUSCOFOR.....	8,105	7,972	8,234	7,927	11,066	10,016
DESBATFOR.....	14,813	13,686	17,718	16,672	17,472	16,519
SUBSCOFOR.....	4,749	4,498	7,455	6,667	3,414	3,596
AIRSCOFOR ¹	2,110	3,015	1,522	1,673	1,378	1,490
PATWING 2.....	1,210	1,218	1,033	1,078	1,527	1,649
BASEFOR.....	6,183	6,237	7,679	7,379	9,908	9,328
Totals.....	68,874	63,167	81,927	79,377	84,021	79,587

¹ Does not include Patrol Wing TWO.

Whenever possible, men on general detail and otherwise becoming available to the Fleet Personnel Officer have been utilized to fill demands for new construction, acquired and converted vessels, etc., but when the limiting date which would permit arrival at their respective destinations approached, it was of course, necessary for the Fleet Personnel Officer to go to the Fleet and make demands upon Type Commanders.

(b) *Training.*

(1) *General.*

The expansion of the Fleet and the increase in personnel has opened up large numbers of ratings. The heavy drain on the Fleet for new construction, recommissioning and conversions, has resulted in a strenuous training program to provide the needed rates without loss of efficiency.

Eligibility for advancement in certain ratings (CRM, CTM, CEM, CFM, CCStd, and (Aerog) includes the requirement that the candidates be graduates of certain service schools. Since quotas for these schools are limited, advancement in these

ratings does not keep pace with other unrestricted ratings, and results in considerable hardship to personnel in these ratings.

A serious shortage exists in the fire controlman ratings. Recommendation is being made that class "A" schools lay the ground work for this rating for certain selected recruits before their transfer to the Fleet.

Even though insufficient recruits have been furnished, school training facilities are being utilized fully in order to keep the school organizations intact. Decided handicap has been in evidence due to the Bureau of Navigation ordering away to new construction partially trained seamen when nearly ready for petty officer ratings. The result has been that these men must in effect commence training again on a new ship and thereby lose the benefit of that which has been obtained previously. It has been recommended that new recruits be utilized insofar as possible for such transfer.

[36] (2) *Service Schools.*

The following Fleet schools are being conducted at the Destroyer Base, San Diego, under the administration of Commander Base Force.

Elementary firecontrol school.

Torpedo school (elementary and advanced).

Diesel school.

Visual signalling.

Welding school (elementary and advanced).

Radio striker school.

Requests in excess of the quota are received for all schools except the advanced courses in torpedoes and welding.

Additional torpedo schools (elementary) are at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.; Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, R. I.; and at the Naval Torpedo Station, Keyport, Washington. The latter is being organized and is not yet in operation.

(3) *Special Schools.*

Special schools, such as Minecraft Mine School, have been conducted within types. Special Patrol Wing radio schools have proved to be valuable source of training both elementary and as additional instruction for slower members of the Class "A" radio schools.

(4) *Ships' Schools.*

Systematic schooling to train men in specialist duties and for advancement in rating has been conducted in all ships of the various types. Excessive transfers do not permit the requisite training of sufficient personnel to fill key ratings, in spite of the accelerated program.

(5) *Bureau of Navigation Training Courses.*

Bureau of Navigation Training Courses are satisfactory but courses are lacking for some ratings. To be of value they must be kept revised to date, particularly now when conditions are changing rapidly and large numbers of new men must be trained. Recommendations have been submitted in separate correspondence to bring these courses up to date. The demand for these courses has been heavy. They continue to be most satisfactory for use in training men for advancement in rating. In spite of increased demands, the Bureau of Navigation and its issuing agencies have managed to keep abreast of the number of request.

(C) *ATHLETICS.*

(a) The athletic facilities in the Pearl Harbor—Aiea area (Hawaii) have been greatly increased during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1941. The following facilities are available to the enlisted personnel of the Fleet:

5 Baseball diamonds

17 Softball fields

5 Basketball courts

10 Tennis courts

6 Handball courts

2 Volleyball courts

4 Swimming pools

Golf course at Navy Yard

In addition to the above, a large number of men in swimming parties and overnight camping parties has been accommodated in Camp Andrews, Nanakuli, T. H.

The following facilities are available to officers:

7 Tennis courts

1 Badminton court

1 Paddle Tennis court

2 Handball courts

2 Swimming pools

[37] (b) On 30 June 1941 the enlisted men's pool and clubhouse at Alea was ready for opening. The new athletic development at Alea has done much to increase the athletic facilities available, and has proved to be very popular with the men in the Fleet. It is anticipated that the Fleet Recreation Center will be completed about the middle of August 1941. The Fleet Recreation Center consists of an arena and an enlisted men's clubhouse. The arena will seat approximately 6,000 people. It is planned to use the arena for motion pictures, boxing matches and theatricals. The enlisted men's clubhouse, adjoining the arena, contains reading rooms, writing rooms, canteen, pool tables, and ten bowling alleys.

(c) A project is underway to develop a swimming beach with bathhouse, at Barber's Point Territory of Hawaii for officers and enlisted men. The capacity of Camp Andrews, T. H., is being increased and more modern facilities are being installed.

(d) The Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer reported for duty on 21 May 1941. He is charged with the allocation, maintenance and upkeep of the athletic fields. He is also responsible for arranging swimming meets, boxing matches, and theatricals with the Fleet.

(e) The Fleet athletic policy has been to continue the competitions in various sports within each type in-so-far as operating schedules permit. Every effort is made to get the maximum number of men on the athletic fields.

(f) In the Fall of 1940, three separate Task Forces were sent to the Coast for recreation and liberty. This resulted in athletic schedules being slightly modified. Athletic competitions were handicapped somewhat when the Pacific Fleet was operating as two Task Forces, one Task Force being at sea all the time. This condition is improved now that the Fleet is operating as three separate Task Forces.

(g) During the past year, three athletic groups were established for the purpose of allocating available athletic facilities. This plan has been successful and has tended to provide a more equitable allocation and permit greater use of facilities available.

(D) CHAPLAINS' ACTIVITIES AND WELFARE.

The duties of the Fleet Chaplains have been considerably augmented by the Fleet basing in Hawaiian waters.

Demands have increased for rendering personal services in addition to the religious ones. These have been handled most successfully, and have been a considerable factor in maintaining a high morale.

The usual collateral duties of the Chaplains, such as welfare, recreation, Navy Relief, and Red Cross liaison, have been successfully performed in all worthy cases.

(E) HEALTH & HYGIENE.

With the exception of sharp outbreaks in Measles and Mumps incidental to increased numbers of recruits lacking in "Mass Immunization", an epidemic of Catarrhal Fever and sporadic mild occurrences of gastrointestinal upsets in the Fleet, it is considered the general health has been at normal levels.

The injury rates, and venereal incidence have both decreased perceptibly.

The exanthemata have been reduced to a slightly above normal admission rate which should be stabilized at this level depending always on influx of new personnel. At no time was the situation such as to cause alarm nor require measures prejudicial to the training schedules. However, there was a marked outbreak of Catarrhal Fever in the Fleet which reached its peaks in September and January. This was concomitant with a national situation which unquestionably was the source of our infection. No serious complications appeared except in a few isolated cases. The mortality in these was practically nil. In one instance a battleship was forced to remain at anchor in Lahaina Roads for a few days incidental to the large sick list. Efficient drastic steps were taken in the instance and the schedule was readily resumed.

Various gastrointestinal upsets, mostly of unknown origin, were noted. These were traced in a few instances to food handlers, shore-side foods of questionable quality, et cetera, but as a [38] rule, no definite cause could be detected. The water supply has been suspected wrongly—in all but one case. The repeated weekly and tri-weekly analysis of barge water failed to substantiate any such accusation. Water distilled aboard has been carefully checked especially while in Pearl Harbor. Further precautions were taken in some ships by not distilling drinking water in port, and by chlorination. Several cases were periodically transferred to the Naval Hospital for

thorough study especially whenever the diagnosis of DYSENTERY, BACILLARY, was considered advisable, or indicated by the finding of *Paratyphenteriae* *Shigilla* in the stools.

One theory advanced was the droplet contamination of vegetables transported in spray splashed boats from source of supply to ships. Another was the existence of a "droplet" contamination causing a condition which appeared in Los Angeles epidemically during May and June, also in Honolulu during June and July. The latter has been reported in Los Angeles—1939. Other instances appeared in Denmark—1935, England—1936. Milwaukee reported 120,000 cases in 1936. The symptomatology is practically identical.

However, in the Fleet no deaths occurred, very few cases were severe and though disabling for 2 to 5 days, recovery took place with usual routine treatments. Dehydration and high fevers were the important features in the more severe cases. No one group of ships was affected nor were the instances of localities under suspicion. Breaks in the technique at the dishwashing area, principally low temperature of water and the presence of "carriers" have accounted for many difficulties of this type. Sporadic increases in "sore throats" were traced to defective sterilization or care of scuttlebutts, also to the ubiquitous common drinking cups in some parts of ships.

The injury rates have decreased noticeably and this can only be attributed to the added interest and publicity in prevention by thorough study of each accident followed by remedial steps where possible.

An outstanding improvement has been the lowered venereal disease incidence. This has been truly remarkable. In June, 1939, the rate per 1,000 was 82; in 1940 it was 72. These figures apply to the U. S. Fleet (less Fleet Marine Force and Asiatic Fleet). For the first 5 months of this year the Pacific Fleet showed an admission rate of 41 per 1000 for venereal admissions.

The location of ships has materially affected these statistics, especially when there were sojourns in some of our less supervised Coast ports. Many features concur in the lowering and raising of venereal rates, such as lectures aboard ships, but the excellent measures, supervision and cooperation of the authorities in Honolulu must be given just dues and be pointed out as worthy of attempted emulation by some of our coastal confreres.

There have been very few cases of "food poisoning" per se in the Fleet this year. Only one of mement where over 600 appeared on the "COLORADO" during a gunnery practice. This was traced to a "carrier" of entero-toxic staphylococci in a food handler. No complicated case appeared and the situation fortunately responded to routine medical aid. The necessity for readily available hand washing facilities for food handlers cannot be stressed too much. This is applicable in controlling the fresh water curtailments or "water hours" which manifestly preclude availability to more than a favored portion of the personnel. Efficiency competitions are commendable only until they jeopardize health and comfort.

The increased personnel aboard ships of all types brings problems of sanitation which require constant surveillance, energetic remedial or preventive measures and justifiable concern for the presence of any possible epidemic. This is applicable to the air borne and contaminated food diseases.

Ventilation must be and is being constantly considered, especially in the avoidance of protracted periods of gas attack and other drills. These problems have been given due consideration during the past year with commendatory results. Expediency and necessity in an emergency necessarily control factors in a manner dissimilar to those of placid times. Hygiene and sanitation standards have been modified but have been more carefully watched by that token.

The procurement of drinking fountains at "strategic" areas continues and is relieving a situation which made for problems of sanitation. The sooner our common drinking cups—coffee and otherwise—disappear from their many storerooms, firerooms and the like, the greater will be the decrease of upper respiratory diseases. Most ships have taken substantial steps in this direction.

A dishwashing machine of small restaurant type such as seen in the many "hamburger stands" is urgently needed in officers' pantries. The dishwashing method in these instances has not changed in over thirty years.

[39] Garbage disposal in port remains a problem. Large accumulations over 24 hour periods are detrimental to proper sanitation and fly control. The "lighter" service should be carefully controlled to permit of no breaks, perhaps doubled in frequency.

All personnel have been blood typed excepting an occasional new arrival. The issuance of identification tags in the next few weeks will afford a ready means of information at all times.

Landing Force exercises provided much needed training for the Medical Department personnel and have pointed to some outstanding necessities in equipment and supplies. These latter are applicable to preparation and provisions for casualties more especially in the service of supply and transporting of injured from field of action to evacuating area or ship.

Hospital facilities have been adequate to date. The absence of a hospital ship has thrown a patient increase on the hospital at Pearl Harbor where it has been absorbed efficiently and expeditiously. It now has a bed capacity of 1,000. A mobile hospital of 500 bed capacity is on its way for installation. This is in the area chosen for the erection of a new Naval Hospital at a strategic distance from the industrial and military activities of the Yard. Provided no obstacles arise, this unit should be functioning shortly and furnish components available for installations, if needed, at distant points. The hospital has a daily average patient complement of about 600, leaving a good margin of safety, when the mobile unit and its 500 beds are added. This should be further increased by the expeditious construction of the new permanent hospital. This already has been planned and appropriated for but not started. Possible major catastrophes or large scale casualties make this adjunct urgently needed. With the above situation in mind, a determined successful effort has been made to decrease transfers to hospitals and hospital ship for minor injuries, minor surgery and mild conditions. This accomplishes much towards indoctrination of Medical Department personnel, stimulates resourcefulness and maintains a crew intact while undergoing its scheduled training aboard combatant ships.

(F) *DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.*

The excellent character of Naval personnel continues to be self-evident.

The discipline and morale of the Fleet is considered excellent. This is particularly impressive in view of the existing rapid turn-over in personnel, distance of the Fleet Units from their home bases, and rigorous conditions under which the Fleet operates at sea.

In spite of the rapid personnel expansion program taking place during the year, there appears to have been no corresponding increase in breaches of discipline.

With increased recreational and housing facilities rapidly becoming available, it is anticipated that the present high morale will continue. The only primary unsatisfactory obstacles to morale are the increased cost of living for both officers and enlisted personnel with families, the more lucrative salaries offered civilian workers on "defense" projects, and the uncertainty as to the length of time personnel will be separated from dependents on the Mainland of the United States. This latter feature is compensated for partially by scheduled recreational visits to the West Coast of the United States.

[40]

PART V—INSPECTIONS

The prescribed inspections, military, material, medical supply, and surprise have been conducted in accordance with current instructions. They indicate that the Fleet has generally maintained satisfactory conditions as to material, discipline, efficiency, health, and morale. Wherever conditions requiring remedy were discovered, action was initiated leading to their correction.

The Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, accompanied by Captain M. L. Deyo, U. S. Navy, was present with the U. S. Fleet during the September, 1940, tactical period, and informally inspected various Fleet units, including a battleship, aircraft carrier, light and heavy cruisers, destroyers, and 14th Naval District.

EXHIBITS—NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME III

No. 45 to 62 (both inclusive)

and

No. 69 to 77 (both inclusive)

NOTE.—Exhibits No. 63 to 68, both inclusive are filed with the testimony which by direction of the court was extracted from the record in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

NOTE.—Exhibit 72 contains privileged matter, which though not classified as "Top-Secret", does contain mater which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in "red" together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. N.,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 45

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, Aug. 13, 1941.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30B3-BP

(SC) A16-1/ND14 D-33960

Serial 079630

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—Local Defense Forces.

Reference: (a) CinCPac conf. ltr A16/(16) Serial 01231 of August 9, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District as again put forth by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in reference (a). However, at this time it is impossible to *obtain either authority or funds* to acquire or build any craft other than that now under construction.

2. At the present time, mainly due to lack of engines, it does not appear that any patrol craft now under construction will be completed before the middle of October.

3. It is expected that Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 will leave for Hawaii in about two weeks. This squadron will be attached to the Pacific Fleet rather than to the District and consists of twelve motor torpedo boats.

4. The situation as to the sampans which have been seized in Hawaii has not yet been determined although the Department is doing its utmost to obtain at least some of these boats expeditiously.

5. Vessels now available for the Naval Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District include:

4 Old destroyers

Coast Guard Cutter Taney, Tiger, Reliance

2 Coast Guard YPs

4 AMc's

There are also twelve tugs of various types assigned to and in the Fourteenth Naval District which, should the fleet leave, might be used for patrol purposes. In addition to the vessels now actually in the Fourteenth Naval District PG-19 SACRAMENTO should arrive there within two or three days and YT-HOGA and YN-56 WAPELO are expected to sail from San Pedro for Hawaii on August 17, 1941.

6. When patrol boats now under construction are completed as many as practical will be assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District but as previously stated construction is progressing very slowly.

R. E. Ingersol,
R. E. INGERSOL,
Acting.

1280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 46

UNITED STATES FLEET

(At this point in Exhibit No. 46, there appears a routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 07526 and date of 13 August 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

My
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,

ND14/(18)
Serial 096W
Secret

First Endorsement to Com-14 Secret ltr. S-A16-1/ND14(01084) of 17 October 1941
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces,
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

1. Forwarded.

2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A Fleet, tied to its bases by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for its security at sea, is, in a real sense, no Fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United States by registered air mail is authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14

S-A16-1/
ND14(01084)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 October 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

References:

- (a) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 30 Dec. 1940, Serial 629.
- (b) CINCUS Conf. 1st end to Com 14 serial 629, CINC file A16 (022) of 7 January 1941.
- (c) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 7 May 1941, Serial 0430.
- (d) CINCPAC Secret ltr. Serial 038 W of 20 May 1941 to Opnav.
- (e) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 31 October 1940, Serial 510

1. All of the above references bear on the local defense forces and security measures of this area.

2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no battery, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the department has been fully informed about the deficiencies in this district, he feels it necessary to again bring this subject to attention.

4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success, from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available

for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate for the purpose.

5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the district are the four destroyers of Destroyer Division EIGHTY, one still being unequipped with listening gear, and three Coast Guard cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and security patrols in a very extensive frontier.

6. It is urged that the department send a number of small, fast craft to this district equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose. It is further urged that the department send to this district at least two squadrons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may be expressed in the cliché "too little and too late." It is hoped that we may profit from their errors.

C. C. BLOCH.

79716-14333-34

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 47

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 25, 1941.

In reply to Initials and No. Op-12B-7-dlm (SC)A16-1/ND14
Serial 0135412 D-37057

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

References:

- (a) CinCpac secret let. A16/(038W) of May 26, 1941, to CNC.
- (b) WPL-46.
- (c) WP Pac-46.
- (d) CNO secret let. Op-12B-7-djm (SC)A16-1/1D14 serial 070312 of June 23, 1941, to CinCpac, copy to Com-14.
- (e) Com-14 secret let. C-A16-1/1D14 (01084) of October 17, 1941.
- (f) CinCpac endorsement ND14/18 serial 006W of no date, to reference (e).
- (g) CNO conf. let. Op-22-A2(SC)A16-3(9) serial 0115422 of October 23, 1941.

1. The request of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSC planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. A previous letter of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his war plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

[2] 4. Neither the Local Defense Force Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan O-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army air forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of joint defense plans.

5. The augmentation of the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

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(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of underwater detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned these vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is progressing slowly, and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May, 1942. Eight of these, due for completion in May, 1942, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is indefinite due to the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command the Coast Guard of the Fourteenth Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the following are equipped with depth charges and underwater detection gear: TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when available, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. Two of these are due for completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

[3] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessary and is authorized: within the continental limits of the United States by registered air mail; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A. locked box.

H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT No. 48

[Stamped:] SECRET By Authority of A. C. of S., WPD 12/7/41 CK 7

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, December 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)
Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following *first priority secret radiogram* be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

"MARSHALL."

L. T. Gerow,
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Noted O. C. S. 12/7/41. JW.

Radios as follows dispatched¹ 11:52 AM, 12-7-41, by Code Room, WDMC:

12.05 #733 to CG, USAFFE, Manila, P. I.;
12.17 #529 to CG, Haw. Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH.
12.00 #519 to CG, Crbn. Def. Cmd., Quarry Heights, CZ.
12.11 # 16 to CG, Fourth Army, Pres. of San Fco., Cal. ehb-1705.

I certify that this message was dispatched via facilities of the Western Union Telegraph Company and Radio Corporation of America to RCA Honolulu substantially at the time indicated on the face of the document.

Edward F. French,
EDWARD F. FRENCH,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Chief, Traffic Operations Branch,
Army Communications Service, CCSig.

¹ Code messages sent out D. E. V.

EXHIBIT No. 49

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30C1-AJ
(3c) N20-12
Serial 00330

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height plane at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

[2] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles

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practically surrounding a limited [3] number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet
CinC Asiatic Fleet

EXHIBIT No. 50

(At this point in Exhibit No. 50 there appears a routing slip bearing Cincus Routing No. 01885 and date of 15 February 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[1]

SECRET

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 2, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we could send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facil-

ities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient Marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should ease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"—50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"—51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organizations of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, [3] provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that:— (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both surface and anti-aircraft; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes, (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 12-plane pursuant squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's is an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fijil and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may

become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 51

[1]

SECRET

EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 2 Dec, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.

References:

- (a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
- (b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
- (c) Cincpac despatch 280627 of November 1941.
- (d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
- (e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
- (f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941.
- (g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to reinforce defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, *might occupy* but that they could provide no anti-aircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to co-operate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which referred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

[2] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, *trained* assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-

aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and 5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155mm guns from Hawaii the Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155mm guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37mm guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37mm.

[3] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reinforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency, Army personnel might replace casualties or reinforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

[4] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a squadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases make feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[5] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions);

[6] (b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination.

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defenses [7] Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and

the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five-inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

[8] 16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

[9] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reinforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g));

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battallions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battallions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (See paragraph C);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battallions or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

C. G. Haw. Dept.
Com-14

EXHIBIT No. 52

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 31, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions.

Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41

(b) Cinpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (Furnished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second Marine Div.).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 November 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

TASK FORCE ONE, (COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR	6 BB
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON	1 CV
Crudiv NINE	5 CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE	1 CM, 4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

TASK FORCE TWO, (COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE)

Batdiv ONE	3 BB
Cardiv TWO	1 CV
Crudiv FIVE	4 CA
Desflot TWO	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
Mindiv TWO	4 DM

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Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

[2] TASK FORCE THREE, (COMMANDER SCOUTING FORCE)

Cruidivs FOUR, SIX.....	8 CA
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group 21.....	1 CV
Desron FIVE.....	1 DL, 8 DD
Minron TWO.....	13 DMS
Trainron FOUR.....	6 AP
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment	

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

TASK FORCE FOUR, (COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

That part of Fourteenth
Naval District Activities
which involve the Island
Bases.

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases *in order to* insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

TASK FORCE SEVEN, (COMMANDER SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE.....	1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD
Subron SIX.....	12 SS, 1 AS
Subron EIGHT ¹	6 SS, 1 AS
Subron TEN ¹	4 SS, 1AS

¹ Upon reporting.

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

TASK FORCE NINE, (COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO)

Patwing ONE.....	36 VPB(A), 1 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Patwing TWO.....	42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP

[3] Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient long range *Air Scouting and Air Striking Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

TASK FORCE FIFTEEN. (COMMANDER BASE FORCE)

Units assigned 4 CA or CL

Primary Mission:

To escort trans-pacific shipping *in order* to protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and operations of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the allocation of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise periods of the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of the Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to the above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, and developments of the Island Bases.

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operation of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. For the present, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation and, in the proportion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, insofar as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Trans-pacific westbound convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila Area by the Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Commandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

[4] 10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway.
2. Wake.
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra

In order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group

4.1—District Activities at Midway.

7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.

9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating periods of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL.

DISTRIBUTION: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC,
ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10, (A1—Asiatic,
A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSBY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 53

[1] HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 27 February 1941.
File. C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)
Confidential—Operation Plan No. 1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)
 - Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)
 - Outer—1 DD
 - Inner—1 DD
 - Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)
 - Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)
 - A/B Boom
 - Mine Sweepers—
 - Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86)
 - Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)
 - (b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commanding Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction with Army.
 - (c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer) In conjunction with Army.
 - (d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with Army.
1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.—(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

[2] (3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet.

(3). (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; keep the Pearl Harbor channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "3".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense.* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

[3] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E". (2) Use zone plus ten and one half time. (3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH,
Naval Base Defense Officer,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

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Annexes:

- A. Inshore Patrol Plan.
- B. Base Defense Air Force Plan.
- C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan.

- D. Harbor Control Post Plan.
- E. Communication Plan.

Distribution—complete with Annexes.

CinCPAC (10)
CG HD (20)
Dist. Marine Officer 14ND
Operations Officer 14ND
Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND
Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL
District Intelligence Officer 14ND
NTS 14ND (10)
CO NAS PHTH (5)
CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)
COMAIRSCOFOR (8)
CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)
COMBATFOR (15)

COMSCOFOR (15)
Combatships (17)
COMCRUBATFOR (25)
COMAIRBATFOR (50)
COMDESBATFOR (165)
COMINBATFOR (20)
COMCRUSCOFOR (25)
COMSUESCOFOR (40)
COMPATWINGTWO (20)
COMBASEFOR (75)
COMDR. 2ND. AIRFORCMP (10)
COMDESDIVTWO (05)

[1]

Annex "A"—Revised

File—A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0563)

Confidential—Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A-1-41

To Naval Base Defense Force Operating Plan No. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol*: Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEX, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line*: Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol*: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEX.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer*: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combase.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(2) *East Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(4) *West Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(d) *A/B Boom*: Lieut. Spear. Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft*:

(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Comdr. C. D. Line, D-C, USNR REEDBIRD, CONDOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBILL.

(2) YS-86: C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANQUA, and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1-41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)", are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*".

"The *OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (OAHU D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:

KEAHI POINT	Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI	Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION	} Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards."
KAHUKU POINT	

"The *Outer Harbor Area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries". (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"The *Harbor Channel Area* is the water area which lies between the *Outer Harbor Area* and the *Inner Harbor Area*, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor".

"The *Inner Harbor Area* is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor".

[3] 2. This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2670 kcs. Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered. (Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness: Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) *A/B Boom* to be maintained and operated as present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, pearl harbor.

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(e) *Minecraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operations, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant, Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District "Clear" to mean "The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed".

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of available vessels:

(a) (1) *Pickel Line.*

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol.*

(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6-40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol.*

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base Defense Communication Plan, Annex E. Use zone time plus ten and one half. Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

G. B. Wooley,

G. B. WOOLEY,

Commander, U. S. N. (Ret)..

Commander Inshore Patrol,

Fourteenth Naval District.

J. W. Bays,

J. W. BAYS,

Aide to Commandant.

Distribution: Same as Basic Plan.

[1] Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 Dated February 27, 1941

C-A16-3/A4-3 (5)/ND14 (0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H. April 9, 1941.

Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information.*—This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secretary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group, who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,

(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commander Naval Base Defense Force,

Authenticated:-

J. W. BAYS,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(C348)

Confidential

MARCH 31, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL.

HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE.

Fort Shafter, T. H.

COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,

COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO,

Naval Air Station,

Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

1. *Summary of the Situation.*—(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of Opposing Strengths.*—(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*—(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us:* (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. *Decisions:* 1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to

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our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile, surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material readiness

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan.

Degree of readiness

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes.

Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is in an all hands condition. CONDITION B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

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BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND READINESS REPORTS

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.
2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.
3. *Readiness Reports:*
 - (a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:
 - (1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
 - (2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
 - (b) These reports shall state:
 - (1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.
 - (2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.
 - (c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

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OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41, ANNEX "C"

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

Task organizations

- (a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.
- (b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.
- (c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.
- (d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.
- (e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.
- 1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1-41 and OCABF-38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".
- 2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defense of OAHU:
 - (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive:* Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) *Group Five:* Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five:* Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition, except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five: Command Post:* To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,
Commandant, 14th Naval District).

[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)
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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41, ANNEX "D"

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
5 March 1941.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Harbor Control Post. District Operations Officer.

1. *Information.* As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Army observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operates in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Harbor Control Post.* (1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

Harbor Control Post to

- Hqtrs. Haw'n Dept., FT. SHAFTER
- Hqtrs. HSCAB, FT. DERUSSY
- Command Post, FT. KAMEHAMEHA
- Command Post, HICKAM FIELD
- Commander Patrol Wing TWO
- SOPE (if at dock)
- Navy Yard Signal Tower
- Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft, or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

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(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E", and be prepared to direct Power House as to signal to be used (See paragraph 6000, *Special Signals*.)

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.

Condition II Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

NOTE: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508; after working hours on Honolulu 75148.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

H. B. Knowles
H. B. KNOWLES,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
District Operations Officer.

Approved:

C. C. Block,
C. C. BLOCH,

Naval Base Defense Officer,

(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)

Distribution:

In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1-41

[1] ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41 (MODIFICATION NO. 1)

Communication Plan—July 19, 1941

This plan supersedes Annex Easy to Operation Plan No. 1-41.

1100 *General.*

In order that Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, may coordinate the defense, it is necessary that he have a means for instantly communicating with every vessel and shore activity of the district and with responsible senior officers present in Pearl Harbor.

1111 The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade maintains an Army Anti-aircraft information Service centered at A. A. A. Brigade Headquarters, Fort Shafter, which broadcasts information of enemy aircraft by voice on 900 kc. This information is also vital to all activities including Fleet units present in Pearl Harbor. In order to simplify communications and avoid multiplicity of circuits, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), will establish a Fox

series on 900 kc. using radio telegraph with a modulated CW Transmitter. These transmissions can be copied on an ordinary broadcast receiver which even small vessels should be able to provide. For the present only the SOPE and Sector commanders are required to guard this frequency. All other vessels should guard this frequency is practicable, especially those having anti-aircraft batteries.

1112 The destroyer patrol will use the Joint Army and Navy Inshore Patrol frequency of 2550 kc. The commander of the Pearl Harbor Groupment probably will have a radio station on this circuit which will normally receive only.

1113 Information of hostile or potentially hostile forces acquired by Fleet forces in operating areas must be reported to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), promptly. This can most easily be done on the Ship-Shore frequency (355 kc).

1120 This modification effective upon receipt.

1130 USE ZONE PLUS 10 and ½ TIMES.

[2] 1150 *RADIO SILENCE*.

There will be no restriction upon the use of circuits set up herein, prior to an ALERT, except in care of an emergency. During an ALERT or an emergency, radio silence will be maintained except for contact reports, amplifying reports and tactical orders, instructions or reports.

1170 *CONTACT REPORTS* made by units under this command will be addressed to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), call sign W2X. Fleet units operating outside Pearl Harbor will include Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), as an information addressee. Evaluated information will be placed on Army and Navy Joint teletype or wire loops, and if desirable on Local Fox method circuit. All contact reports concerning hostile aircraft or carriers within 250 miles of Oahu will be made in plain language. Contact reports of enemy surface or submarine forces within 50 miles of Oahu will be made in abbreviated plain language. (See USF 70, Article 1178).

1180 Visual signalling by day will be by searchlight, Flag Hoist or Semaphore. At night use blinker tube if practicable. Ships should refrain from using searchlights at night except in emergencies. Visual signalling prohibited during blackout.

2430 *AUTHENTICATORS* will be used when challenge is made by receiving station. All contact reports will be challenged. Units directly under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), including Destroyer Patrol will use SOI No. 27-7 (Joint) of December 16, 1940. Fleet units should use these grids when communicating with shore radio stations of Army and Navy. Copies of SOI 27-7 (Joint) herewith.

2500 *RADIO CALL SIGNS*.

Units operating directly under command of Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), will use call signs provided in Signal Operating Instruction (SOI No. 43-8 (Joint)) effective April 1, 1940. Same call will be used for Visual and Radio. Copies of SOI No. 43-8 (Joint) herewith.

DESTROYER-PATROL

Inner DD Patrol.....	N5F
(Inshore Patrol Station #1)	
Outer DD Patrol.....	J5Y
(Inshore Patrol Station #2)	

The following calls from SOI No. 43-8 are assigned. All stations enter under NAVY on Page 5.

[3] ALL SWEEPERS.....	V5Z
Sweeper No. 1 (magnetic).....	V1Y
Sweeper No. 2 (Anchored).....	V7P
Sweeper No. 3 (Anchored).....	K2Q

5000 *DESTROYER PATROL*

(a) When patrol is on station, patrol commander report assumption of patrol to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), information to patrol being relieved. Relieved unit will then secure on patrol frequency.

(b) Guard effective Fox schedules when so ordered. Normally, Vallupeguards Fox schedules for destroyer patrol.

(c) Destroyer patrol will use CSP-1023 and CSP-1024.

6600 *CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS*

1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The following cryptographic aids are authorized for Joint Army and Navy use:

For Use Among—	Contact Code	Aircraft Code	General Cipher	D/F Code
All stations less aircraft.....	CSP 680 CSP 696 CSP 697	----- ----- -----	CSP 642 CSP 645 *CSP 732 *CSP 733	USF 64
Aircraft (plus air-ground communications).....	CSP 680 CSP 696 CSP 697	USF 66 -----	-----	USF 66

*Army Short Title—"SIG NOG".

NOTE: By special arrangement, Busdefairfor and Hawaiian Air Force are authorized to use CSP-740 when operating jointly.

7000 HARBOR PATROL.

Very pistol signals will be employed by Harbor Patrol (Motor Boats) as follows:

- (1) General Alarm----- One White Star (may be repeated at intervals)
- [4] (2) Require Assistance-----Two White Stars (repeated at intervals until certain it has been observed)
- (3) All Clear----- One White Star Followed by Two White Stars Simultaneously.

8000 SPECIAL SIGNALS.

(1) AIR RAID ALARMS

SIGNAL	MEANING
(a) <i>Yard Whistle</i> 1 long blast 30 sec Interval 25 sec 1 Short Blast 5 sec	PREPARE for Air Raid—If at night— BLACK OUT (See Blackout procedure 14th ND Order No. 20-40)

This signal to be repeated by one ship in each sector (PACFLT Conf. letter 20L-41) as designated by Sector Commander.

(b) STREET LIGHTS (at night)

- (1) Flashed 3 times PREPARE for Air Raid
(Simultaneous with start of whistle signal)
- (2) Remain dark 5 sec BLACKOUT
- (3) Lighted for 10 sec
- (4) Extinguished

(c) SIGNAL TOWER

Appropriate Emergency hoist (day only) Be prepared for attack by enemy aircraft

RADIO CIRCUITS

Transmit on 900 and 355 kc in plain English Urgent Precedence "AIR RAID" (number and type of planes will be given if possible)

[5] (d) TELEPHONE

Yard duty officer:

- Notify FAD Lualualoi—phone 954
- Notify Radio Lualualoi—phone 976
- Notify Old Naval Station—phone 449

(2) **ALL CLEAR SIGNALS**

SIGNAL	MEANING
(a) <i>Yard Whistle</i> 3 long blasts	All clear
(b) <i>Street Lights</i> Turned on as first long whistle blast is sounded	All clear
(c) <i>Signal Tower</i> Same signal as (1) (c) under negative	All clear
(d) <i>Radio Circuits</i> The all clear signals will be followed by a despatch on all circuits "All Clear". CAUTION: Radio despatch must not be relied upon unless confirmed by other methods.	
8000 DRILLS	
(a) When drills are held they will be preceded by a despatch "Prepare for air raid drill".	
(b) All despatches and orders in conduct of drills will be preceded by word "drill".	
(c) The all clear signal terminating the drill will be followed by despatch "Air Raid Drill Completed".	
This messages will be transmitted on all air raid circuits.	
(d) CAUTION .—Radio despatch terminating drill or actual raid must not be relied upon unless confirmed by other methods.	

(At this point in Exhibit No. 53 there appears a Radio Frequency Plan for the Fourteenth Naval District, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 13, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS
VERIFICATION GRIDS
No. 27-7 (JOINT)

14th Naval District,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
9 December 1940.

Hawaiian Department,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
9 December 1940.

Effective 0001, 16 December 1940.

Destroy previous issue No. 27-6 and supplement

1. VERIFICATION CODE.

a. All radio stations receiving messages from another radio station must be prepared to challenge or obtain verification as to the authenticity of the transmitting station.

b. Inasmuch as the present verification system becomes unsafe after a few challenges and replies have been intercepted it is necessary to restrict the use of this grid system to challenges when in an emergency situation the station receiving a message, for some reason actually suspects the authenticity of the transmitting station. The verification system should be used in training exercises but not more than once in 24 hours by each station.

c. The transmission of ZWA in joint Army Navy Radio Operations during an actual emergency will be challenged.

1310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

d. The method of verification is as follows: Two letters, not on the same line or column, will be selected at random from the daily grid by the receiving station and sent as a challenge. The original transmitting station will take the other two letters which complete the rectangle, the first letter being on the same line as the first letter of the challenge, and reply to the challenge. *EXAMPLE*:—AB receives a message from EF on the first day of the month. If the message has been received without error but AB for some reasons suspects the authenticity of the station AB will select a group at random from the first day grid such as DY. AB will then transmit "R II DY II K". If EF is the authentic station the available grid will disclose that or complete the diagonal, EF will therefore reply "OV VA". If AB transmits: "R II YD II K" the reply on the date in question would be: "VO VA".

2. VERIFICATION GRIDS:

a. The following grids are effective each month of the year at 0001 for the date specified;

1ST	2ND	3RD	4TH	5TH
S W L R K	K H O S L	N M U X K	L F Z W G	B P Y A Q
N V B F Y	W H Q D B	P B A L I	A X P M B	F U W C S
T E P C U	U Z A V C	O Y T Q S	N I L K U	X C G L N
X D I G O	P E Y X G	C V D H R	Y T O Q S	D Z H K I
Q Z A H M	J T M R F	E Z F W G	V H D R C	H R T D V

[2]

6TH	7TH	8TH	9TH	10TH
E Q F B N	P B Q N U	W Q A Y I	C Z A L S	L O X H A
V P K A Y	X A F G S	O L R V F	D V W E G	I Q Y C R
X Z U C D	B V E E W	P B T S M	D X I C M	W K Z N S
L S I H O	Z Y I C L	U Z K E K	P F Q U H	V D B F G
R W M T G	N T Q K R	C H N G D	N X Y R T	E F T O U

11TH	12TH	13TH	14TH	15TH
O G R N Q	D K H X B	E M G K A	A U Y Q M	A O H X Z
K F B X Y	P C E U F	D N Y C F	O R C S X	N R V K C
H A D T W	A T Q S Y	P I B X T	Z P F D W	Y E J L T
I L C H S	M R C Z I	V Q S R U	V I K M L	F D Q U M
P L V U Z	V W N G L	O Z L H W	N T B G E	G D W S F

16TH	17TH	18TH	19TH	20TH
T C E F P	Z S V T X	P N Y V U	X R P F V	D M V L U
O U Z R N	M F O G Q	T K O C Z	Q Y Z I O	S N I Q T
L Q W M V	B D W C Y	I L S B E	E C W D B	O R F A E
H Y D A X	H P E I U	X P Q H D	T N E H U	Y W B X Z
B S K I G	N A K L R	A F W H M	L G A S K	H K C G P

21ST	22ND	23RD	24TH	25TH
L Z U K V	I X F U W	B D C T W	O B P N U	P O B W L
R H A O G	M Y L N T	G L R Z U	W H E R C	M E Z Y G
Q D M T P	D G Z O H	K N X I M	T G K Z F	X C K V U
X C S E W	S K P R V	Q Y V H F	S D V X Q	D A F H N
B I F N Y	Q A C E B	P S C E A	Y M I L A	T Q R I S

26TH	27TH	28TH	29TH	30TH
N E A Z W	O I D F V	A H Q I Y	S F A T R	U A G K X
R V X Y Q	P Y T U E	U Z V R N	O Y D M K	P Z T M I
C H L G B	N C G A S	F C D E B	G X E M W	R Y L B E
T M D I F	X R H W K	W S G M P	U N I V P	V S W D C
X U S O P	Z L Q M B	T X L M O	C Q Z B L	O F E Q N

31ST
S M Q Y P
E U L A K
V T K F R
W M D Z O
D C I N C

b. Only such grids will be furnished as are necessary for a single flight or mission.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General HERRON:

J. W. LEWIS,
Captain, U. S. N.
Chief of Staff.

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Checked by:

W. E. Gultar,
W. E. GUITAR,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N.

OFFICIAL:

R. C. THROCKMORTON,
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

[1]

RESTRICTED

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

RADIO CALL SIGNS

(No. 43-8 Joint)

14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Effective April 1, 1941
(Destroy all previous copies)

Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following call signs for tactical Radio Stations and Nets and no others will be used in the Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District unless changed by this or higher Headquarters.

Station or Net	Call	Station or Net	Call
Hawaiian Department	DH9	35th Inf. Hdqts.	PW7
Hawaiian Department Net	5CP	35th Inf. Net	7VW
Hawaiian Division Hdqts.	3DV	1st Bn. 35th Inf.	YX5
Hawaiian Division Net	7LW	2nd Bn. 35th Inf.	1XQ
21st Brigade Hdqts.	2FC	3rd Bn. 35th Inf.	IQ1
21st Brigade Net	EU7	35th Inf. Motor	
19th Inf. Hdqtrs.	5DK	Patrol & O. P. Net	C24
19th Inf. Net	B88	Patrol or O. P. #1	FK5
1st Bn. 19th Inf.	7FU	Patrol or O. P. #2	JB8
2nd Bn. 19th Inf.	XC2	Patrol or O. P. #3	5LK
3rd Bn. 19th Inf.	HQ1	298th Inf. Hdqtrs.	1MG
19th Inf. Motor		298th Inf. Net	6UN
Patrol & O. P. Net	1TQ	1st Bn. 298th Inf.	G15
Patrol or O. P. #1	MK5	2nd Bn. 298th Inf.	1QG
Patrol or O. P. #2	W76	3rd Bn. 298th Inf.	5ZR
Patrol or O. P. #3	7QW	11th Field Art. Brigade Hdqts.	7YW
21st Inf. Hdqts.	TQ1	11th Field Art. Brigade Net	DW7
21st Inf. Net	2UC	8th Field Art. Hdqts.	7WU
1st Bn. 21st Inf.	SW7	8th Field Art. Net	C29
2nd Bn. 21st Inf.	RB8	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Hdq.	8RB
3rd Bn. 21st Inf.	8QB	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	U75
21st Inf. Motor		1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7EU
Patrol and O. P. Net	U78	1st Bn. 9th F. A. Liaison	QU7
Patrol or O. P. #1	7NU	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	8VB
Patrol or O. P. #2	1HQ	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Hdq.	RC1
Patrol or O. P. #3	M56	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	5BK
Scout Car	5CK	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7CW
299th Inf. Hdqts.	WN6	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	2EC
299th Inf. Net Call	1RG	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7WV
1st Bn. 299th Inf.	AK9	11th Field Art. Hdqts.	BC2
2nd Bn. 299th Inf.	K98	11th Field Art. Net	CC2
3rd Bn. 299th Inf.	5FP	11th F. A. Liaison	7PU
22nd Brigade Hdqts.	CU7	11th F. A. Liaison	2AC
22nd Brigade Net	SK5	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	HB8
27th Inf. Hdqts.	OQ1	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	RS3
27th Inf. Net	Z7C	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	R1E
1st Bn. 27th Inf.	W73	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	MU7
2nd Bn. 27th Inf.	CC2	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	JQ1
3rd Bn. 27th Inf.	7IW	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	W72
Scout Car	8XB	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	KU7
		2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	2ZC

1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Station or Net	Call
13th Field Art. Hqs.	2NC
13th Field Art. Net.	LC2
1st Bn. 13th F. A., Hdq.	B87
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	7GU
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	8YB
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	QB8
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	VQ1
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Hdq.	DK5
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	5JK
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	Q19
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	AB8
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison.	2WC
11th Tank Co. Comd. Car Hq.	TK5
Net.	C25
1st Plat. Comm Car.	7RU
2nd Plat. Comm Car.	U77
3rd Plat. Comm Car.	1BQ
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Hq.	DR5
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Net.	9XK
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Hdq 15 CA.	KP5
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Net.	9GK
Aaua Grp Hdq inactive.	YM4
Ewa Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 55 CA.	4LM
Kamahameha Grp inactive.	9SK
Puu O Huhu Gr Hq 1st Bn. 41 CA.	VK9
Puu O Huhu Gt. Net.	JK9
A Btry. 41 CA.	5PP
Btry. Closson B Bty. 15 CA.	FM4
Barrette Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 15 CA.	2XZ
Barrette Grp Net.	LZ2
Btry. Williston A. bty 15 CA.	2JZ
Btry Hatch C Bty 15th CA.	G14
Honolulu Grpmt Hq. 16 CA.	6VN
Honolulu Grpmt. Net.	PN6
Diamond Hd. Hdq. 16 CA.	X41
Leaal Grp Hq. inactive.	BZ2
Punchbowl Grp. Hq. inactive.	9PK
Ulupau Grp. Hd. D bty 16 CA.	6IN
North Shore Grpmt Hq. 2nd Bn. 55 CA.	RZ2
North Shore Grpmt Net.	M41
Haleiwa Grp. inactive.	1M4
Kaluku inactive.	Z21
41 CA.	GP5
Provisional AA Brig Hq 64 CA.	BQ1
Provisional AA Brig Net.	6SN
AA Gun Grpmt Hq. 64 CA.	QP5
AA Gun Grpmt. Net.	DN6
North Grp 1st Bn. 64 CA.	6YN
South Grp 2nd Bn. 64 CA.	G19
East Grp Dia Hd Grp 16 CA.	X41
West Grp C bty. 15 CA.	G14
Schofield AA Comd Hdq. 251 CA.	CM4
Schofield AA Comd Net.	I55
Schof. Gun Grp 1st Bn. 251 CA.	5EP
Searchlight Grp.	5KP
A. W. Grp 2nd Bn. 251 CA.	1MG
Dept. Radio School Net.	HZ2
Dept. Radio School.	2TZ
Dept. Radio School.	4DM
Division Radio School.	MM4
Division Radio School.	TZ2
Division Radio School.	Y53
USAT Cochrane.	XG1
USAT Tug 91.	6LN
USAT Krautoff.	1FG
USAT Frank.	SM4
Aircraft Warning Co.	RQ1
Aircraft Warning Co.	VF7
Aircraft Warning Co.	ZU7
Aircraft Warning Co.	DS8
Aircraft Warning Co.	2IC
Aircraft Warning Co.	7CU
Aircraft Warning Co.	6QN
Aircraft Warning Co.	6LI
Aircraft Warning Co.	8GB
Aircraft Warning Co.	7MU
Aircraft Warning Co.	3XV
Aircraft Warning Co.	1EG
Aircraft Warning Co.	UQ1
Aircraft Warning Co.	JF7
Hq. Haw. Air Force Com'd.	XL3
Grnd Station.	AF7
Net.	3FL
Hd. Sqdrn. H. A. F. plane.	R52
18th Bomb Wing Com'd.	VH1
Grnd Station.	WG1
18th Wing Bomb WG. Net.	3RX
Hdq. & Hdq. Sq. 18th B. W. plane.	AV3A

Station or Net	Call
Hdq. & Hdq. Sq. 18th B. W. plane.	AV3B
5th Bom. Grp. Com'd.	UZ2
Bom. Grp. Ground.	5WR
Bom. Grp. Net.	KH9
Hdq. Sqdr. 5th Grp Com'd.	3NX
[3]	
Sqd. Flight Comdr. A.	ZP5
Sqd. plane No. 1.	LV3A
To plane No. 5 incl.	LV3F
LV3A, LV3B, LV3D, LV3F, Omit additional letter E on all Army plane calls as above.	
4th Rec. Sqdr. Com'd.	9JH
Ground.	LJ9
Net.	EH1
Flight Comdr A.	M46
Flight Comdr B.	50R
Flight Comdr C.	OJ9
Plane No. 1.	YV3A
To plane 8 incl.	YV3I
23 Bomb. Sqdr. Comd.	3BV
Ground.	ZX3
Net.	UJ9
Flight Comdr. A.	CP5
Flight Comdr. B.	H13
Flight Comdr. C.	5RP
Plane No. 1.	VZ2A
To plane No. 8 incl.	VZ2I
31 Bom. Sqdrn. Com'd.	V39
Bom. Sqdrn. Ground.	MX3
Bom. Sqdrn. Net.	IV3
Flight Comdr A.	9QK
Flight Comdr B.	QH1
Flight Comdr C.	3JV
Plane No. 1.	3NXA
To plane No. 8 incl.	3NXI
72 Bom. Sqdr. Com'd.	1KH
Sqdr. Ground.	TH9
31 Bom. Sqdr. Net.	3EX
Bom. Flight Comdr. A.	1TG
Flight Comdr. B.	3TV
Flight Comdr. C.	5LR
Plane No. 1.	KX3
To plane No. 8 incl.	KX3I
11 Bomb. Group Com'd.	9QJ
Bomb. Group Ground.	XJ9
Bomb. Group Net.	1YH
Hd. Sqdr. 11 B. Grp. Com'd.	DM4
Plane No. 1.	OV3A
To plane No. 5 incl.	OV3F
50th Rec. Sqdr. Comd.	3GX
Rec. Ground.	RK9
Rec. Net.	9DH
Rec. Flight Comdr. A.	YZ2
Rec. Flight Comdr. B.	WJ9
Rec. Flight Comdr. C.	5IR
Plane No. 1.	V31A
To plane No. 8 incl.	V31I
14th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.	1VH
Ground.	WR5
Net.	MH9
Flight Comdr. A.	ZM4
Flight Comdr. B.	GX3
Flight Comdr. C.	9IJ
Plane No. 1.	3KXA
To Plane No. 8 incl.	3KXI
26th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.	QK9
Bomb. Ground.	AH1
Bomb. Net.	TV3
Bomb. Flight Comdr. A.	PK9
Bomb. Flight Comdr. B.	3FX
Bomb. Flight Comdr. C.	J95
Bomb. Plane No. 1.	RV3A
To plane No. 8 incl.	RV3I
42 Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.	H17
Ground.	CX3
Net.	HV3
Flight Comdr. A.	6AN
Flight Comdr. B.	1PH
Flight Comdr. C.	H96
42 Bomb. Sqdr. plane No. 1.	3CXA
To plane No. 8 incl.	3CXI
Hdq. 14th Pursuit Wg. Comd.	3ZN
14th Pursuit Wg. Ground.	2H2
Pursuit Wg. Net.	9AJ
Hdq. Sqdrn. 14 P. Wg. plane No. 1.	9CH
Plane No. 2.	9TJ
15th Pur. Grp. Com'd.	X37

Station or Net	Call
15th Pur. Grp. Ground.....	1QH
Pur. Grp. Net.....	9ZJ
Hdq. Sq. 15th Pur. Grp. Com'd.....	H18
Sq. Plane No. 1.....	HH1A
To plane No. 5 incl.....	HH1F
45th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	H91
Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	JH1
Pur. Sqdr. Net.....	9NJ
Pur. Sqdr. Flight Comdr. A.....	R56
Flight Comdr. B.....	1XH
Flight Comdr. C.....	9UJ
Plane No. 1.....	3MLA
To plane No. 13.....	3MLN
46th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	EX3
46th Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	J94
46th Pur. Sqdr. Net.....	9WJ
Flight Comdr. A.....	X38
Flight Comdr. B.....	5VR
Flight Comdr. C.....	9RJ
Plane No. 1.....	WL3A
To plane No. 13 incl.....	WL3N
[4]	
47th Pur. Sqdr. Command.....	DI6
47th Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	3WL
Net.....	UT9
Flight Comdr. A.....	UL3
Flight Comdr. B.....	3ZL
Flight Comdr. C.....	LL3
Plane No. 1.....	3NLA
To plane No. 13 incl.....	3NLN
19th Pur. Group Com'd.....	4JM
Ground.....	3PX
Net.....	3HV
Hdq. Sqdr. 18 P. Grp Comm'd.....	F77
Plane No. 1.....	BV3A
To plane No. 5.....	BV3F
6th Pur Sqdr. Com'd.....	LG1
6th Pur Sqdr. Ground.....	RH1
6th Pur Sqdr. Net.....	FH9
Flight Comm'dr. A.....	4BM
Flight Comm'dr. B.....	M42
Flight Comm'dr. C.....	FZ2
Plane No. 1.....	OL3A
To plane No. 13.....	OL3N
19th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	K97
19th Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	SR5
19th Pur. Sqdr. Net.....	1GH
Flight Comdr. A.....	5GP
Flight Comdr. B.....	1AG
Flight Comdr. C.....	5MP
Plane No. 1.....	F16A
To plane No. 13.....	F16N
78th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	HK9
78th Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	GJ9
Pur. Sqdr. Net.....	YH9
Flight Comdr. A.....	KM4
Flight Comdr. B.....	6WM
Flight Comdr. C.....	SN6
Plane No. 1.....	I62A
To plane No. 13.....	I62N
44th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	9MJ
Pur. Sqdr. Ground.....	T99
Pur. Sqdr. Net.....	9GZ
Flight Comdr. A.....	ZZ9
Flight Comdr. B.....	S82
Flight Comdr. C.....	EF7
Plane No. 1.....	6JLA
To plane No. 13.....	6JIN
86 Obsv. Sqdr. Com'd.....	5YR
Obsv. Ground.....	PR5
Obsv. Net.....	J99
Flight Comdr. A.....	T94
Plane No. 1.....	KI6A
To plane No. 13.....	KI6N
58 Bomb. Sqdr. (L) Com'd.....	BL3
Bomb. Sqdr. Ground.....	7HF
Bomb. Sqdr. Net.....	9FJ
58 Bomb. Sqdr. Flight Comd A.....	JT9
Flight Comd B.....	F73
Flight Comd C.....	9MZ
Plane No. 1.....	8WSA
To plane No. 13.....	8WSN

Station or Net	Call
19 Trans. Sqdr. Command.....	X35
Sqdr. Ground.....	9AJ
Sqdr. Net.....	5SR
Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	9RZ
Plane No. 1.....	80SA
To plane No. 13.....	80SN
Target Sqdr. Com'd.....	PJ9
Target Sqdr. Ground.....	AT9
Target Sqdr. Net.....	QF7
Flight Comdr. A.....	VT9
Plane No. 1.....	XR5A
To plane No. 6.....	XR5G
17th A. B. Group Command.....	CH9
Ground.....	PH1
Net.....	QX3
18 A. B. Sqdr. Flt. Comdr.....	9DT
18 A. B. Sqdr. plane No. 1.....	JV3A
To plane No. 4.....	JV3D
22 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	MZ9
Plane No. 1.....	3ALA
Plane No. 2.....	3ALB
Plane No. 3.....	3ALC
23 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	PF7
Plane No. 1.....	X88A
Plane No. 2.....	X88B
Plane No. 3.....	X88C
18 Air Base Group Com'd.....	FV3
Group Ground.....	9BH
Group Net.....	H92
17 A. B. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	8SS
Plane No. 1.....	8ASA
Plane No. 2.....	8ASB
Plane No. 3.....	8ASC
Plane No. 4.....	8ASD
24 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	FT9
Plane No. 1.....	6BIA
Plane No. 2.....	6BIB
Plane No. 3.....	6BIC
25 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	3EL
Plane No. 1.....	C16A
Plane No. 2.....	C16B
Plane No. 3.....	C16C
[5]	
Haw. Air Depot.....	BT9
Plane No. 1.....	YI6A
Plane No. 2.....	YI6B
Plane No. 3.....	YI6C
Crash Boat Gen. Westover.....	UG1
Bellows Field Ground.....	7GF
14th Naval District Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com. 14.....	W2X
Com. Haw.-Naval Def. Force.....	B2A
Naval Def. Force coll.....	E1N
Wallupe Radio Station.....	E3L
All Stations this Circuit.....	E2A
U. S. S. Keosangua.....	H1L
U. S. S. Sunnadin.....	J4M
U. S. S. Ward.....	N3L
U. S. S. Schley.....	N8F
U. S. S. Chew.....	R6K
U. S. S. Allen.....	R9Q
Comdesdiv 80.....	U1P
Desdiv 80.....	U9J
Com. Mine Craft.....	N3D
Mine Craft.....	R1Q
Oglala (F).....	S8B
Com. Mine Div. 1.....	V6L
Mine Div. 1 (coll).....	W5C
Pruitt (F).....	X7J
Preble.....	Z9Q
Sicard.....	B6M
Tracy.....	E7T
Com. Mine Div. 2.....	H7O
Mine Div 2 (coll).....	J9P
Tanager (F).....	N7B
Quail.....	R9L
Lark.....	S5V
Whipoorwill.....	U4M
All Mine Sweepers.....	V5Z
Mine Sweeper No. 1 (Mag).....	W1Y
Mine Sweeper No. 2 (Anch).....	W7P
Mine Sweeper No. 3 (Anch).....	X2Q

1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Station or Net	Call	Station or Net	Call
Comdr. Sub. Force	V2J	Com. Patron 21	W1B
Sub. Force (coll)	W7D	Patron 21 (coll)	X20
Litchfield (F)	X2G	Com. Div. 1 Patron 21	Z1A
Com. Subron No. 4	Z2F	Com. Div. 2 Patron 21	B9D
Subron 4 (coll)	B5C	Base Station Patron 21	E10
Sub. Base Radio Station	E8J	Any Plane Patron 21	H1B
Seagull	H4K	21-P-1	J4P
Widgeon	J7O	21-P-2	N3M
Com. Sub. Div. 7	N4P	21-P-3	R1Z
Sub. Div. 7 (coll)	R6O	21-P-4	S7R
S-18	S3T	21-P-5	U5F
S-23 (F)	U1D	21-P-6	V9C
S-34	V4N	21-P-7	W9L
S-35	W7W	21-P-8	Z8F
Com. Sub. Div. 12	X3L	21-P-9	E4L
Sub. Div. 12 (coll)	Z5N	21-P-10	J3U
Argonaut	B9K	21-P-11	R3D
Dolphin	E59	21-P-12	U7R
Narwhal	H3J	21-P-13	W2G
Nautilus (F)	J1B	21-P-14	Z4H
Com. Sub. Div. 13	N1J	21-P-15	B8Z
Sub. Div. 13 (coll)	R3W	Com. Patron 22	J5Q
Shark (F)	S1C	Patron 22 (coll)	R5L
Cachalot	U3K	Com. Div. 1 Patron 22	U7B
Cuttlefish	V8F	Com. Div. 2 Patron 22	W2M
Plunger	W9M	Base Station Patron 22	Z9S
Pollack	X5T	Any Plane Patron 22	E7Y
Pompano	Z6R	22-P-1	J1X
Comdr. offshore Patrol	X8Q	22-P-2	R2G
Offshore Patrol (coll)	Z7W	22-P-3	U3Y
Comdr. Inshore Patrol	B3Q	22-P-4	W1L
Inshore Patrol (coll)	W8O	22-P-5	Z1C
Station No.:		22-P-6	E9Q
1	H5F	22-P-7	J9T
2	J5Y	22-P-8	R9B
3	N8A	22-P-9	U8V
4	R78	22-P-10	W7N
5	S4N	22-P-11	Z8O
6	U3G	22-P-12	E6X
7	V1C	22-P-13	J2G
8	W6R	22-P-14	R5O
9	X4D	22-P-15	S5K
10	Z3X	Com. Patron 23	W3A
11	B1C	Patron 23 (coll)	Z7C
12	E2P	Com. Div. 1 Patron 23	E5K
13	H2X	Com. Div. 2 Patron 23	J3L
14	J2Y	Base Station Patron 23	R4C
15	N2L	Any Plane Patron 23	U5W
16	R4V	23-P-1	W6J
17	S6Q	23-P-2	Z6G
18	U6A	23-P-3	E8O
19	V5G	23-P-4	J7D
20	W3P	23-P-5	R6T
21	X7V	23-P-6	U9O
22	Z8J	23-P-7	W4Y
23	B4G	23-P-8	Z2M
24	E6R	23-P-9	E4B
25	H4D	23-P-10	J8S
Com. Naval Air Station	J6M	23-P-11	R3N
Naval Air Radio Station	N5Y	23-P-12	U5Z
Crash Boat No. 1	R8Z	23-P-13	W8B
[6]		23-P-14	Z4L
		23-P-15	B3R
All Naval Air Station Planes	S4X	Com. Patron 24	E9C
Air Station:		Patron 24	H8B
Plane No. 1	U2N	Com. Div. 1 Patron 24	N7X
Plane No. 2	V3Q	Com. Div. 2 Patron 24	S3P
Plane No. 3	W4F	Base Station Patron 24	V9M
Plane No. 7	X1P	Any Plane Patron 24	X9B
Plane No. 8	Z5Y	24-P-1	Z5P
Plane No. 9	B1L	24-P-2	B2Z
Plane No. 10	E1G	24-P-3	H8M
Com. Pat Wing 2	H3A	24-P-4	J8H
Com. Pat Wing (Admin)	J7Z	24-P-5	N9J
Senior Patron Comdr. Pat Wg. 2	R7M	24-P-6	R8N
All Squadron Comdrs. Pat Wg. 2	U4X	24-P-7	S8U
Pat Wing 2 (coll)	J6K	24-P-8	U8T
Wright	N9C	24-P-9	X6U
Wm. B. Preston	R2U	24-P-10	B7M
Childs	S9G	24-P-11	H3S
Swan	U1L	24-P-12	N1Y
Plane XPBS-1	V1P	24-P-13	S6O
		24-P-14	V4Y
		24-P-15	X8L

Station or Net	Call	Station or Net	Call
[7]		Com. 2nd Marine Air Grp.	X5M
Com. Patron 25	E4Z	VMF2 (Marairgrp)	X9N
Patron 25 (coll)	H2G	Com. VMF-2	X9NØ
Com. Div. 1 Patron 25	N8T	Com. Plane No.:	
Com. Div. 2 Patron 25	S7F	1	X9N1
Base Station Patron 25	V7W	2	X9N2
Any Plane Patron 25	X4K	3	X9N3
25-P-1	B4L	4	X9N4
25-P-2	H5T	5	X9N5
25-P-3	N2G	6	X9N6
25-P-4	S2W	7	X9N7
25-P-5	V2A	8	X9N8
25-P-6	X1Z	9	X9N9
25-P-7	B8Y	10	X9N10
25-P-8	H9Z	11	X9N11
25-P-9	N9V	12	X9N12
25-P-10	S9Y	VMB-2 (2nd Marairgrp)	Z3D
25-P-11	V8A	Com. VMB-2	Z3DØ
25-P-12	X7K	Com. Plane No.:	
25-P-13	B5N	1	Z3D1
25-P-14	H6C	2	Z3D2
25-P-15	N4K	3	Z3D3
Com. Patron 26	U6D	4	Z3D4
Patron 26 (coll)	V4K	5	Z3D5
Com. Div. 1 Patron 26	X6B	6	Z3D6
Com. Div. 2 Patron 26	B6X	7	Z3D7
Base Station Patron 26	H6L	8	Z3D8
Any Plane Patron 26	N5T	9	Z3D9
26-P-1	S6G	10	Z3D10
26-P-2	V8X	11	Z3D11
26-P-3	X3Y	12	Z3D12
26-P-4	B6F		
26-P-5	H9N	Fleet Air Detachment Shore	
26-P-6	N2X	Based at NAS Pearl Harbor	
26-P-7	S4D	Will use only Navy Calls.	
26-P-8	V3F	Coast Guard:	
26-P-9	X3A	CGC Kukui	E5Z
26-P-10	B2N	Coast Guard Hdqts.	B79
26-P-11	H7Y	C. Guard Radio Station	J8A
26-P-12	N6R	Reliance	N6C
26-P-13	S2Z	Taney	E3M
26-P-14	V6R	Tiger	H5F
26-P-15	X5F	U. S. C. G. 400	R7Y
		U. S. C. G. 403	S1L
		U. S. C. G. 838	U2B
		U. S. C. G. AB27	V7T
		All C. G. Vessels	X5Q
		PAA Radio Station Oahu	H1X
		PAA Radio Station Canton Is.	H8U
		PAA Radio Station Midway	J4A
		PAA Radio Station Wake	J7K

[8]

ADDITIONS

USS McFarland	R2U	27-P-3	J5P3
USS Thornton	S9G	27-P-4	J5P4
USS Curtiss	B3K	27-P-5	J5P5
USS Hulbert	B8P	27-P-6	J5P6
USS Avocot	E5N	27-P-7	J5P7
USS Tangier	H8R	27-P-8	J5P8
Comdr Div 1, VP 27	W3G	27-P-9	J5P9
Comdr Div 2, VP 27	V2G	27-P-10	J5P10
Base Station, VP 27	U4B	27-P-11	J5P11
Any plane, VP 27	J5O	27-P-12	J5P12
Patrol Sqdrn 27 (collective)	J5P	27-P-13	J5P13
Comdr Patron 27	J5PØ	27-P-14	J5P14
27-P-1	J5P1	27-P-15	J5P15
27-P-2	J5P2		

Signal Operations Instructions (Joint) No. 43-8.

1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. The Following calls are allocated to units indicated. They may be assigned by the unit Command. but when assigned, report will be made at once to the Department Signal Officer.

Department	MP5	Hawaiian Air Force	EY3
	9HK		HF7
	K93		L35
	2DZ		I22
	Z24		M16
Navy			OG1
	Z3K		RF7
	Z6C		UV3
			VV3
Division			WS8
	ZK5		Z16
	2RC		1HH
	8KB		1IG
	7ZU		1SH
	YQ1		1UG
	P57		1ZG
	9KK		3IL
	2BZ		3MX
	TM4		4CM
	9YK		5AR
H. S. C. A. B.			5NP
	AQ1		5QR
	EK9		6DI
	XN6		6CI
	JZ2		6ON
	AZ2		7KF
	7SW		7QF
	CK5		7YF
			8LS
			8QS

3. Call signs for Radio Sets, types SCR-194 and SCR-195, will be designated by the Commanding Officer of the units using such sets.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General SHORT.

J. W. LEWIS,
Captain, U. S. N.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps.
Chief of Staff.

R. C. Throckmorton
R. C. THROCKMORTON,
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

EXHIBIT No. 54

Op-30Cl-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 010230

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
February 17, 1941.

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
The Commandant, Third Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

1. In previous correspondence the Commandants and local Joint Planning Committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making studies of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the Districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and Local Joint Planning Committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the major fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind :

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to :

Cinc, Pacific

Cinc, Atlantic

Cinc, Asiatic

C. ONav. Net Depot, Tiburon

C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Newport

Buord

Op-12

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in CincPac.

Ensign H. E. RORMAN, U. S. N.
Secret Mail Officer.

1318* CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 55

[1] Op-30C1-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 055730

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cincpac.

H. E. Rorman,
Ensign H. E. RORMAN, USN.
Secret Mail Officer.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to:

CinCpac

CinClant

CinCaf

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport

Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo

Comdt. NavSta, Samoa

Buord

Op-12

EXHIBIT No. 56

CONFIDENTIAL

OP30C-MD-2/7/41

(SC)N20-12

Serial 07830

FEB. 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance

Subj: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms

Ref: ALUSNA London Dispatch 041625 of February 5, 1941

1. Ref. (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this Office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT No. 57

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, December 1, 1941.

Confidential

Copy No. 83
Serial No. 25

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T. S. Wilkinson,
T. S. WILKINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

[1] *Confidential*Serial No. 25.
December 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

A. *The Diplomatic Situation*1. *Japan.*

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

2. *Germany.*

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force. Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which eventually can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequences." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

[2] 3. *Italy.*

The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet with particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome on October apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating this winter.

4. *France.*

France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Europe on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin, until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichsmarshal Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.

[3] The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from \$8,000,000 to \$6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as Interim Secretary of Colonies and Air. Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National Defense Ministry all services under the Franco-German armistice formerly administered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new developments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon and the termination of the mandate in the name of France. The new government will be headed by President Alfred Macache.

France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains unchanged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.

[4] 5. *Latin America.*

Mexico.

President Roosevelt has nominated the present Ambassador to Cuba, George S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman, is expected to arrive in mid-December, which is about the same time that Messersmith probably will take up his new duties.

The State Department announced an agreement has been reached with Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a final fair price for American properties taken over in 1933, through experts or through further diplomatic negotiations. Mexico tendered \$9,000,000 in advance as a token payment. (2) General and agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay \$40,000,000 in full settlement. Mexico has already paid \$3,000,000 on these claims and will pay \$3,000,000 upon exchange of ratifications of the conventions covering them. The remaining \$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of \$2,500,000 annually. (3) A reciprocal trade agreement to be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will provide a \$40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintain the peso at its present rate. (5) The United States will purchase up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established a \$30,000,000 credit for the development of roads and highways. The credit will be available in yearly increments up to \$10,000,000 over a three year period. The Mexican Government guarantees payment unconditionally; and additional security is provided, in the form of highway bonds, payable from the Federal gasoline tax.

Costa Rica.

President Calderon has repeated his offer of landing fields, air and naval bases to the United States, as free measures of hemispheric defense.

El Salvador.

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Merino has been replaced by pro-Ally Colonel Monterrosa.

Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards consolidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named Minister to Washington; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Ariaristas, although there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme nationalistic laws passed by Arias are not repealed, but already their application is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

Argentina.

There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile. The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U. S. lend-lease aid promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argentine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.

A new political party, of Fascist character, called *Patria* has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Fresco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Taborda Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in [6] politics, seems firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Democratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist—or totalitarian—factions, under a strong leader, probably would mean the overthrow of the present government.

Brazil.

During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere defense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to *Surinam* by sending a military mission to *Paramaribo*, and strengthening her border forces in that area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialistic in South America, and his good faith in staff discussions should be accepted with grave reservations.

Chile.

The sudden death of President Aguirre Corda, from a bronchial affection, has caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that country's neighbors. Don Tinto as he was affectionately called, because of the red wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front government, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has preserved for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagonistic and immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day period before the election of a new President.

Colombia.

The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.

The Colombia press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized [7] in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

Bolivia.

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in *La Paz*.

Ecuador.

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

Peru.

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announces the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation.

General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U. S. and anti-Axis.

General.

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised; almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

[8] *Trends.*

Military and Naval.

Mexico.—The naval budget for 1942 has been set at \$5,000,000 pesos, or about \$8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.

South America.—Nothing to add to summary of November 15.

Economic.

The period under review has been characterized by numerous complaints in the press of the American Republics, and in reports from various local sources, over the growing dearth of materials essential to the support of industries. Deprived of European export markets, the American Republics look to the United States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are: The matter of priorities, and the availability of shipping. Here, as in the lend-lease military and naval material, the patience of the Latin-Americans is about exhausted, and their confidence in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. Few Latin Americans appreciate the magnitude now of the demands upon U. S. industry. Aids to Britain, to Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. production, are widely advertised. Opponents to U. S. and to Pan American policies are alert to take advantage of current circumstances. As a measure for the future, no less than for immediate benefit, the allotment to Latin American trade of certain priorities, however limited, and of shipping, appears urgently desirable.

[9] *B. The Japanese Military Situation*

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army strength now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.

[10] *E. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations*1. *Military.**Strength.*

It has been estimated that Germany now may have 300 divisions. Of these, 28 divisions are unidentified. Of the identified divisions 72 are probably unfitted and not yet ready for field duty. This would leave 200 divisions ready for active service at the present time.

Distribution.

The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows:

<i>Location.</i>	<i>Number of Divisions</i>	
Russian Front.....	Total 168	(including 20 motorized, 19 armored, 2 cavalry, and 2 mountain divs.)
Northern Group.....	31	
Central Group.....	86	
Southern Group.....	51	
Italy and Libya.....	3	(including 2 armored)
Balkans and Hungary.....	14	(including 1 mountain)
Poland and East Prussia.....	10	
Finland	7	(including 1 motorized and 3 mountain)
Germany and Austria.....	33	
Holland, Belgium and France.....	27	
Norway	8	
Denmark	2	

Operations.

(Note: Eastern Front only; see ITALY for Libyan Campaign.)

[11] Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

Finnish Sector.—There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector.—The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

Central Sector.—German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Mozhaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

South-Central Sector.—Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

[12] *Donetz Basin Sector.*—The Russians claim deep advances in a counter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any important industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along a broad front, but have been vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of retreating Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.

Crimean Sector.—According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of

Kerch and the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.

Personalities.

General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

2. Naval.

Distribution.

Ship		Date	Location
Name	Type		
Tirpitz.....	BB	November 9.....	Kiel.
Scharnhorst.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest.
Gneisenau.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest.
Schleswig-Holstein.....	OB	November 9.....	Hamburg.
Schlesien.....	OB	October 7.....	Central Baltic.
[13] Graf Zeppelin.....	CV	Prior Nov. 16.....	Departed Stettin.
Admiral Scheer.....	CA	November 19.....	Swinemuende.
Luetzow.....	CA	November 9.....	Kiel.
Seydlitz.....	CA	October 12.....	Bremen.
Prinz Eugen.....	CA	November 21.....	Brest.
Admiral Hipper.....	CA	November 5.....	Off Sassnitz.
Nuernberg.....	CL	November 5.....	{ One of these two ships off Sassnitz.
Leipzig.....	CL		
Koeln.....	CL	September 29.....	Gdynia.
Emden.....	CL	November 9.....	Kiel.
4 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	Northern Norway.
5-7 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	In the Baltic.
1 Unit.....	DD	September 24.....	Bergen.
3 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	North Sea ports.
2 Units.....	DD	October 24.....	Cherbourg.
Remaining Units.....	DD		Unknown.
150 Units (estimated).....	SS		Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports.

Operations.

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

[14] HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases, or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reenforced by five small submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

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Personalities.

Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the *ARK ROYAL*. Reschke entered the Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously mentioned in connection with submarine operations.

[15] Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by *H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE*. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915 and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

3. Air.

Strength and Disposition.

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

	Leningrad	Moscow	South of Kharkov- Kiev	Finland & North Norway
Long range bombers.....	90	200	240	40
Bomber reconnaissance.....	30	30	45	10
Dive bombers.....	0	90	60-75	30
Single-engine fighters.....	30	180	130	30
Two-engine fighters.....	30	35	0	10
Totals.....	180	535	475-490	120

Grand total: 1310-1325.

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

[16]	Bombers	Dive bombers	Fighters	Recon- nais- sance	Coastal
Cyrenaica.....	30	70	75	5	-----
Sicily.....	10	-----	-----	-----	-----
Crete.....	-----	20	10	-----	-----
South Greece.....	60	-----	-----	20	25

Total: 325.

This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean from the last previously reported figures.

Operations

West. Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.

Russian Front.—According to German claims, the German Air Force has been very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid particular attention to railroad communications; namely, the yards near Moscow and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim that 83,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

[17] *Mediterranean.*—German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reinforcements of troop-carrying planes.

Personalities

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret weapon. Lt. Col. Moelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Moelders was returning to the front after attending Udet's funeral.

[18] *F. The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations*

1. *Military.*

Libya.

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British launched their long-awaited offensive against the Italian and German forces in the Libyan Desert. The British have been preparing for this drive for many months, and a steady stream of matériel has been flowing to the Middle East. For the first time British forces are meeting the Germans with ample equipment and air superiority.

The main spearhead of the attack began south of Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast at Sollum, and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi el Rezegh. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division apparently was badly mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, including planes and personnel. Further south an Imperial Motorized Force, starting from Giarabub, raced across the desert to Gialo Oasis and captured the Italian outpost of El Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between German and British armored forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides lost heavily in mechanized equipment. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no decision has been reached. However, the British are now in possession of Rezegh; Gambut and Sidi Omar Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German armored forces) have been captured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a juncture with the main Imperial forces at Ed Duda.

East Africa.

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within the next few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been cut off from supplies for the past seven months. British forces are closing in now and are only seven miles from Gondar.

(NOTE: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been announced.)

[19] *Russian Front.*

Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difficulties are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources are available.

2. *Naval.*

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.

German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.

3. *Air.*

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougler succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougler, who is

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a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of [20] the sinking of the big convoy on November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fougler is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

EXHIBIT No. 58

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Cincpac File No. A2-11/FF12
A16(1)/P16-3/(90) Serial 01353

Confidential

MAY 6, 1942.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 23CL-42

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Battle Organization and Condition of Readiness Watches at Sea.
References: (a) Cincpac Conf. Ser. 0300 of 21 Feb. 1941.
(b) War Instructions—Chapter 8, Section 2.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A), which discusses in detail and sets forth the basic principles upon which conditions of readiness are established, is herewith issued to the Fleet.

2. With the personnel now on board ships of the Pacific Fleet, the proportion of the armament to be manned in the various types of vessels under the three conditions of readiness for action and based on the principles of enclosure (A) should be as follows:

CONDITION ONE

Type	Main battery	A. A. battery	Automatic weapons
BB.....	All	All	All
CV.....	All	All	All
CA.....	All	All	All
CL.....	All	All	All
DL.....	All		All
DD.....		All	All
DM & DMS.....	All		All
AUX.....	All	All	All

CONDITION TWO

BB.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CV.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CA.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
DL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		All
DD.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
DM & DMS.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$
AUX.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

CONDITION THREE

BB.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CV.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
CA.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CL.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$

*Three section organization. Conditions two and three identical.

3. Although the three conditions of readiness for action provide varying degrees of security, they were devised *primarily to preserve the fighting efficiency of the personnel* over extended periods of time.

4. Responsible Commanders are enjoined to keep the balance between security and rest and to choose that Condition of Readiness, even if it is in effect for only a short period, which will conserve to the maximum the energy and readiness of personnel for battle.

5. The War Instructions set forth the circumstances under which Condition Two is the appropriate Condition of Readiness to be maintained.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet believes that with efficient Radar equipment and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition Three will normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Distribution: (21CM-42)

List II, Case 2, P, NTS, X, Z.

EN3, EN6, NB49,

ND11-15, NY8-10.

P. C. CROSBY,

Flag Secretary.

[1] Cincpac File No.

A16 P16-3 (0300)

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 21 February 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To:

Commander Battle Force.

Commander Scouting Force.

Commander Base Force.

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

Commander Battleships, Battle Force.

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.

Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.

Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.

Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.

1. The problem of battle organization and Conditions of Readiness for Action for all types in the Fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution. The Fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requiring a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.

2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personnel assigned to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed by the Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditions of Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be examined in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, susceptible of great improvement.

3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battle and condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basic and fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may know what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest for the crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Action.

4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined; since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and since, however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attack, the three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental consideration is stressed—these conditions were devised as much to give men adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement is to keep every station manned—to provide maximum security—there can be only one condition, Condition One. The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand or caught unaware on the other.

5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to their various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know where he goes and when, in shifting from one of the conditions to another; to permit these shifts to be made without confusion; and to insure that the maximum number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desired is a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Watches as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by their efficient use.

[2] 6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board reveals that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a Condition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting latest maximum requirements; also that even with complements less than those recommended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. The Commander-in-Chief has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all, instead of half, the A. A. battery being manned in Condition Two.

7. It follows that, if in Condition Two all of the A. A. battery can be manned, in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned. This should be the minimum requirement for Condition Three. However, the number of men available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of a watch in four. When this can be done a measure of security is obtained approaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, without the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.

8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery personnel is obvious. To man all A. A. guns in Condition Three without calling on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on A. A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation at sea permits the setting of Condition Three or the situation in port requires the manning of A. A. guns only over long periods of time, to require the A. A. battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making efficient use of the men and material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized. But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion than to make full use of our men.

9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict adherence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadrilateral organization of two watches and four sections. This is essential, and in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished without confusion and without the imposition of successive double watches on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms

"Watch One" and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing, since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it disguises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated in all ships using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established in port.

10. To permit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the turrets fully manned, in Condition Two; or it may be accomplished by having half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned. Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch. Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return considering the material installations in the individual ships and the difficulty of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby falling far short of the requirement of having one half the battery manned, is not approved.

11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been in effect in some heavy cruisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved feasible. Indications are, since many of the installations in a triple turret are in duplicate rather than triplicate, that fire can be opened with all and continued with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off [3] watch responds to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruisers, should settle this question conclusively for that type.

12. Certain types, such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activities in heavy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend themselves to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three section basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualified personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When the latter is truly the case this situation should be recognized and accepted. When the A. A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequently impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in two. If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient service. However, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis of a watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions Two and Three identical—a straight watch in three.

13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types:

(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches and four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries as cannot meet this requirement).

(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of the ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, mess attendants, etc., for essential services, be placed on watch.

(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and efficient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report made to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirements for Condition Three can be changed in basic directives.

14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Commanders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth principles which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. The end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

CinClant

CinCaf

Compatwing TWO

P. C. CROSBY,

Flag Secretary.

1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 59

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A2-11/FF12
A4-1/VZ
A37VZ(95)
Serial 059

C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 7, 1942.

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Airplane situation, Hawaiian Area.

References:

(a) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed to Opnav.

(b) ComAirScoFor Conf. L Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941 addressed to Buero.

(c) CinCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.

(d) CinCPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.

Enclosure. (A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 1941.

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.

2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft requirements here:

(a) *The attack of 7 December will be followed by others.* The enemy has exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not maintained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commercial docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objective the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured with the forces now available to us.

(b) *Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the advantage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of development.* This applies with full force not only to material and to the training, skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, planned and handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) *Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long range search, for striking and for local interception.* All of these are vital for effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate. It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligence reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which provided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning of any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second. As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)), the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) *Carrier aircraft may be launched 300 miles from Oahu.* There is definite evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) *Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.* This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.

(c) *It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) *Air Search visibility is 25 miles.* That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, *which include perfect visibility*, is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when *reliable* radar equipment for airplanes is *available*, for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) here is 42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures). This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contracts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B-17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol planes and 12 Army B-17's are being used daily for search (18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force). The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only *four-fifths* of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces

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on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.

10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immediately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion now at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBV-3 planes now here, is earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an important immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander-in-Chief concurred in reference (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack, which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided. The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose, and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be decisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, *Hawaiian air defense* alone has been considered. Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.

13. Returning to the immediate situation; with present limited numbers of searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is no answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to play the inevitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that *any* immediate increase for either will vitally improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Copy to:

ComAirScoFor
ComPatWing TWO
BuAero
Opnav
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.

[1] PW2/A1b-3/
(0083)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Secret

From: The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; Recommendation for Assignment of.

Reference: (a) Comairscfor Confidential letter A4-1(0755) dated December 18, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.

(B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.

1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth the need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protective searches from Oahu, and stated briefly the advantages and further uses of such aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of this subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wings is vital, not only to defense, but also to future offensive air operations.

2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search operations require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B-17 aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles; or by B-17 aircraft and VO-VS or VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200-300 miles, when the B-17s available for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only partially effective. The lack of experience and training of Army Air Corps flight crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a condition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force, are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the material required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon utilizing PBY aircraft, and [2] upon alternate long range equipment having cruising speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below:

	PBY	150 knot airplane (4 engines)	200 knot Airplane (4 engines)
Radius of daily search	800	840	880
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility)	50	54	54
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	24,750	19,415	14,580
Total number of planes required	150	162	162
Number of flight crews required	225	243	243
Engine changes per month	82.5	129.6	97.2
Spare engines required	182	286	214
Fuel consumption per month—gal	1,080,000	2,912,250	2,916,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	50%	60%	60-70%

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With A. S. V. (40 mile visibility assumed)

	PBY	150 knot airplane (4 engines)	200 knot Airplane (4 engines)
Radius of daily search.....	800	840	880
Number searching planes daily.....	32	34	34
Flight time per search plane-hrs.....	16.5	11.7	9.6
Total plane hours per month.....	16,840	11,934	9,180
Total number of planes required.....	96	102	102
Number of flight crews required.....	134	153	153
Engine changes per month.....	52.8	79.8	61.2
Spare engines required.....	117	178	137
Fuel consumption per month—gal.....	1,267,000	1,700,100	1,836,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated).....	75%	95%	100%

3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabulations and from the study, enclosure (A), are as follows:

(a) PBY aircraft are *too slow* for the mission required of them. Their lack of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover the required area during daylight hours, but also because the excessive duration of flight increases [3] pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.

(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be increased to near 100%, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined with shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear that A. S. V. equipment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a not-to-delay basis.

(c) The PB2Y-3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adequate range. But the operation of 102 PB2Y-3 airplanes presents more difficulties than the operation of a similar number of landplane bombers. PB2Y-3s are not fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of these planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement for search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.

(d) Surveying the landplane field two types are available; the B-17 and the B-24. Experience with the B-17 on search has been disappointing. Their cruising speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In order to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, precluding the carrying of bombs.

(e) The B-24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective search in this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure (B). Provision of 102 B-24 airplanes would provide not [4] only for effective search but also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed that a number of B-24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion from Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to the defense of Oahu.

(f) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B-17-E aircraft, I am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short order take over the operation of four-engined landplane bombers.

(g) Some fields are available and others can shortly be made available in the Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as necessary to accommodate 102 B-24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fields include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maui, Barking Sands on Kaula, and Hilo Airport at Hawaii.

4. Recommendations:

(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B-24 bombers be allocated to Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.

(b) Immediately equipping with B-24s of the three patrol squadrons now on the West Coast equipping with PBY-5As is recommended as the first increment.

(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBY-3s now in this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B-24s, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the

PBY-3s in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning with B-24s.

(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a *not to delay* basis:

- (1) A. S. V. equipment.
- (2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
- (3) I. F. F. equipment.

/s/ P. N. L. BELLINGER.

[1]

Enclosure A

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DETERMINATION OF SEARCH GROUP REQUIREMENTS

A. PBY AIRCRAFT

Assumptions

1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier—27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBY ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark:

(At Pearl)	Dec. 22	June 22
Daylight.....	11.0 hrs.	13.6 hours.
Dark.....	13.0 hrs.	10.4 hrs.

5. Daily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300 mile launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 300 mile circle.

6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27 x 13).....	(27 x 10.4) 351	281
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle		
300 x 27.....	81	81
100.....		
Radius to cover effective at dark.....	732	662

[2] Let a=hours of daylight remaining when plane starts return leg.

Radius of search required is (r) $732+27(a)$ $662+27(a)$

Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus a, times plane speed.

$$732+27a+50=(11-a) 100$$

$$a=2.5 \text{ hrs.}$$

$$662+50=(13.6-a) 100$$

$$a=5.1$$

$$\text{Radius of search (r)} \quad 732+27(2.5) \quad 662+27(5.1)$$

$$\text{Radius of search r} \quad 799.5 \quad 799.7$$

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5 hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is about 60%. On 22 December plane flies last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces to

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290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.

4. Plane hrs/mo—24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)—1,980,000 gal.
6. Engine changes per month (at 600 hrs)—82.5
- Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes)—182

[3] B. PBY AIRCRAFT WITH A. S. V. (RADAR)

Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6-41A) stated that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following performance:

“Forward antenna system

Range—30 miles.

Cone of search—60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the beam); directly ahead and almost vertically downward.

Lateral antennae system

Range—80 miles on both sides.

Cone of search—18° in azimuth (9° on either side of the beam); 30° in elevation; 30° in depression.”

(Weight 290 lbs)

From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our PBY airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected from PBY airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First shipment sunk) Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an effective range of at least 40 miles, the following benefits would result from installation of A. S. V. in PBY aircraft:

For 40 mile A. S. V. “visibility”

1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to 32.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 50% to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce fuel consumption for search from 1,980,000 to 1,287,000 gallons per month; reduce engine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.

[4] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engines required from 182 to 117.

5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plan crews required.

Conclusions

1. *The immediate installation of A. S. V. in search aircraft is vital to successful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and personnel required for any search.*

O. 150 KNOT 4 ENGINED AIRCRAFT

Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search aircraft.

Work	22 Dec	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	(27×10.4) 351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle $\frac{300}{150} \times 27$	54	54
Radius to cover effective at dark.....	705	635

705 80 27a=150 (11-a) 635 80 27a=150 (13.6-a)
a=4.87 a=7.5
Radius of search r=840 r=835

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.

[5] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes daily (40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 12 planes; without A. S. V. 54 planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.

3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without.
4. Plane hrs/mo:
 With A. S. V.----- 11,934
 Without A. S. V.----- 19,415
5. Fuel consumption/mo: (at 150 gal/hr)
 With A. S. V.----- 1,790,100
 Without A. S. V.----- 2,912,250
6. Engine changes/mo: (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/pland)
 With A. S. V.----- 79.5
 Without A. S. V.----- 129.6
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 With A. S. V.----- 175
 Without A. S. V.----- 286

D. 200 KNOT 4 ENGINED AIRCRAFT

Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircraft.

	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run.....	351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300-mile circle		
300		
200 x 27.....	41	41
Radius to cover <i>effective at dark</i>	692	622

$$692+80+27a = 200 (11-a)$$

$$\begin{array}{l} a \quad 6.3 \\ r \quad 860 \end{array}$$

$$622+80+27a = 200 (13.6-a)$$

$$\begin{array}{l} a \quad 8.9 \\ r \quad 862 \end{array}$$

[6] Conclusions

1. Radius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.
- Total force required:
 With A. S. V.----- 102 planes
 Without A. S. V.----- 162 planes
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without. All search made during daylight.
4. Plane hours/month.
 With A. S. V.----- 9,180
 Without A. S. V.----- 14,580
5. Fuel consumption/month (at 200 gallons/hour).
 With A. S. V.----- 1,836,000
 Without A. S. V.----- 2,916,000
6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours).
 With A. S. V.----- 61.2
 Without A. S. V.----- 97.2
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 With A. S. V.----- 137
 Without A. S. V.----- 214

[7] E. DETERMINATION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF PLANES AND FLIGHT CREWS REQUIRED

1. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day in three: i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.
2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sunrise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes are on one hour's notice otherwise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice otherwise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available airplane on the ground.
3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.
4. Initially a minimum of 150% plane crews will be required. The excess over one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.

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PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander COE, U. S. N.

From: Major W. J. Holzapfel, U. S. A.

The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:

B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830 with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during take-off.

The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550 gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Corporation however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.

On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The airplanes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at altitudes of 7-10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumption at these altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, was 150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180-200 statute miles per hour.

This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity of the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of 9 .50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.

The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gross weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,000 pounds. However, conversations with a mechanic who made a trip to England brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pounds and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,000 pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplane.

/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL

EXHIBIT No. 60

(Exhibit No. 60 is, in the main, a work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 14. EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

SUMMARY OF SHIPS (BY TYPES) AS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 60.

BB-----	8	(Battleships)
CA-----	2	(Cruisers, heavy)
CL-----	6	(Cruisers, light)
DD-----	29	(Destroyers)
DM-----	8	(Destroyer Minelayers, conv.)
DMS-----	4	(Destroyer Minesweepers, conv.)
SS-----	5	(Submarines)
YFD-----	1	(Floating Drydock)
AH-----	1	(Hospital Ship)
A-----	21	(Auxiliaries) — (2 AO, 2 AVD, 1 AK, 1 AS, 1 PG, 1 Aux. Flag-ship, 3 AR, 2 AG, 2 AD, 2 AVP, 2 AV, 1 CM, 1 AM)

EXHIBIT No. 61

SECRET

Copy

Enclosure C

From: Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Serial 0479

FEBRUARY 15, 1942

REPORT OF JAPANESE RAID ON PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941

DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY SHIPS AS A RESULT OF THE JAPANESE RAID DECEMBER 7, 1941

(a) **BATTLESHIPS**

ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.

CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.

NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

Certified a true copy. H. Blesemeier, Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

[2] **PENNSYLVANIA** one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb, (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The **TENNESSEE** suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the **ARIZONA**. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side on the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

(b) **CRUISERS**

HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo [31] causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through deck and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

(c) **DESTROYERS**

SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The **SHAW** was re-docked on the same drydock on January 28, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

CASSIN and DOWNES: **CASSIN** was struck by one bomb and **DOWNES** by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the **PENNSYLVANIA**. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the **CASSIN** partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the **DOWNES** when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural [4] failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the **DOWNES** were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the **CASSIN** and probably well over 400 in the hull of the **DOWNES**.

Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the **CASSIN** is 98% good and the **DOWNES** about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the **CASSIN** to permit her re-floating about February 5, and similar work is proceeding on the **DOWNES**.

At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first-line destroyers from this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

(d) **AUXILIARY VESSELS**

OGALALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the **HELENA**. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

[5] **VESTAL** struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the **ARIZONA** when the raid commenced and was beached at Aiea to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down.

Certified to be a true and exact copy:

ROBERT D. POWERS, Jr.,
Lt Cdr. USNR,
Counsel to Judge Advocate.

EXTRACT FROM ENCLOSURE "D"

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 0479

Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

FEBRUARY 15, 1942

Extracts from Columns:	2	5	6
Type	Number present Dec. 7	Number on hand after raid	Number usable after raid
Patrol Planes.....	69	45	11
Inshore Patrol Planes.....	0	0	0
Fighters.....	24	15	0
Scout Bombers.....	60	29	14
Torpedo Bombers.....	2	2	0
Battleship and Cruiser Planes.....	92	82	11
Utility and Transport Planes (non-combatant).....	54	48	16
TOTAL.....	301	221	52

Certified to be a true extract:
ROBERT D. POWERS, JR.,
Lt. Cdr. USNR
Counsel to Judge Advocate

EXHIBIT No. 62

I. General.—The meeting was called at the Information Center on Monday, 24 November, for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment might be needed to do so.

Those present were:

Colonel Murphy	Acting Signal Officer, HHD
Lt. Comdr. Coe	Patrol Wing Two
Major Tindal	18th Bombardment Wing
Lt. Comdr. Taylor	U. S. Navy
Capt. Bergquist	14th Pursuit Wing
Lt. White	Signal Corps, Hawaiian Dept.
Lt. Harville	53rd Coast Artillery
Lt. Thomas	86th Obs. Sq. (Support Command)

The following points were discussed and generally agreed upon:

a. Function of the Information Center: It was agreed that Information Center, properly organized and run, would continually have complete information of all activities in the Hawaiian area, and that this information, properly disseminated, would be of great value to all military, naval and civilian activities, at the present time, during actual state of war, and during attacks on the island. It was further agreed that in order to obtain and disseminate all information, a very close liaison between all activities must be maintained, and that liaison watch officers from each activity would have to be trained and present at the Information Center.

In this connection it was pointed out that it would not be the function of the Information Center to order various activities (other than Pursuit Aviation) to carry out particular operations, but rather to give information and warning of imminent hostile raids to these activities so that they might take immediate action according to prearranged plan. As all information is immediately and visually available to all liaison officers, it would be their duty to pass the pertinent information on to their respective units. The duty Controller will be the representative of the Commanding General, Interceptor Command. His primary duty will be the direction of Pursuit activities, and he will act as coordinator of information when this is necessary.

b. Facilities: Although considerable equipment is on order and planned for the operation of the Information Center, this equipment will not be available for some time to come; it is obvious, therefore, that every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by proper coordination of all various military, naval and civilian activities. It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks.

Information would have to be drawn from the following sources:

Detector Stations.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (a) GLRDF; (b) Observation Posts (Artillery).

[2] (5) Naval Aircraft, ships and stations.

(6) Lighthouses.

(7) Coast Guard.

(8) Army and Naval Intelligence.

(9) Bomber Command.

(10) Support Command.

(11) Civilian Agencies (PAA, Inter-Island, CAA, Police and civilians through Police).

(12) Civilian Air Raid Warning Service.

c. Operations.—(1) At the present time, the Information Center is operating from 0700 to 1130. It is desired to operate the Information Center on a full-time daily basis (0600 to 1800) as early as possible, and eventually, when personnel can be made available, on a 24-hour basis. An estimate of the number of personnel required to man the positions will be studied. It was decided that the following watch officers should man the Information Center at all times, in the numbers required to keep a continuous watch:

(a) Controller

(b) Pursuit Officer

(c) Gun Control Officer

(d) Naval Air Liaison Officer (including Coast Guard)

(e) Naval Surface Liaison (including Coast Guard)

(f) Bomber Command

- (g) Support Command
- (h) Department G-2 Liaison
- (i) CAA Liaison
- (j) CARW Officer
- (k) RDF Officer
- (l) Communications Officer

(2) It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the above watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. It is felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.

(3) It is realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It is therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands will be trained.

(4) It was brought out that the Naval Liaison Officer now assigned to the Information Center is attached to Patrol Wing Two. This is not a permanently shore-based unit, and therefore liaison personnel from Patrol Wing Two might be withdrawn at any time, leaving the Information Center without trained Naval Liaison. It is therefore suggested that the Commandant, 14th Naval District be approached with a view to obtaining naval liaison officers and coordinating the information for all naval activities, shore and afloat.

[3] (5) As the present mobile RDF equipment is not all that might be hoped for, it was agreed that the AA RDF might be tied in. This would permit information on heights of incoming raids sufficiently far from the coast to make interceptions. The AAA RDF equipment is already being tied in with the Information Center for this purpose.

(6) It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises has been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the islands at all times; however, after discussion it was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:

(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their operations rooms.

(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.

(c) By requiring all planes approaching the island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before coming in.

In this connection it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.

(7) The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the island were friend or foe. It would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all RDF frequencies; it was therefore decided that this is not a reliable solution for some time to come.

(8) It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible. Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear; however, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy; this was held to be no obstacle, as the Information Center should be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.

(9) The question of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

(10) It was decided that in order to avoid dangerous time discrepancies, the Information Center should synchronize its clocks with the U. S. Navy time, and that all other clocks should be synchronized with the Information Center.

[4] Clocks will be synchronized to the second, and all times will be reported to the minute within the nearest 30 seconds.

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(11) It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other army, navy, coast guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.

(12) In view of the permanence of its location and operation on the island, and its bombproof position, the question was raised as to whether or not it might be important to use the Information Center as a joint Communications Center, or to have a joint Communications Center adjacent to the Information Center.

(13) The question of teletypes was brought up, and it was considered that in some cases it might be used to advantage but in most cases it was too slow. Direct lines should therefore be used between all manned positions in the Information Center and the various outlying units.

(14) As there has been some difficulty in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits to the Information Center, i. e., requests had to be made by each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits—this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center. Circuits to Kaneohe and Bellows Field are required, and Colonel Murphy agreed that these could be furnished.

(15) It was agreed that all air to ground and air to ship radio procedure, of Fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics Navy Department letter to this effect, it is believed that all naval Fighter squadrons are now using the British system. It was decided, therefore, that all Pursuit squadrons will also use this procedure. It was felt by all that further liaison should be done to insure that the procedure being used is the same.

(16) It was decided that Intercept Tables for use in interceptions are cumbersome and unnecessary, and that therefore interceptions would be accomplished by eye, direct from RDF plots, by the Controller or Pursuit Officer.

(17) It was considered desirable to point out to all aircraft activities that homing and rescue facilities are being made available to all aircraft within the next fourteen days. It was decided that the question of developing this to the highest degree would be worked out with the activities concerned. It was felt that if all information comes in to the Information Center, the Information Center could, with the minimum amount of delay, locate aircraft in distress and send out rescue aircraft or surface craft to the proper position.

(18) It was pointed out also that the Information Center can be used for dissemination of orders, change of policy, or recalling aircraft, immediately, through Information Center direct lines, when this is desired by the Officers commanding the particular activities.

(19) It was decided that communications liaison is vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.

(d) It was decided to investigate the probability and possibility of using naval ship-board RDF (RADAR) to supplement the land-based RDF under various conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.

(e) The facilities of the Information Center can be made available to Army, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons for interception, exercises, by arrangement either by telephone or letter to the Controller, Information Center.

Certified a true copy:

R. D. Powers

R. D. Powers,

Lt-Comdr., USNR.,

Counsel for Judge Advocate.

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 63

Exhibit 63 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. B. BIERMEYER,

Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 63.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 64

Exhibit 64 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. B. BIESEMEIER,
Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 64.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 65

Exhibit 65 is a file of copies of messages, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Secretary of the Federal Communications Commission at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 65.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 66

Exhibit 66 is a copy of a dispatch, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 66.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 67

Exhibit 67 is a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 1 February 1941, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Intelligence at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 67.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 68

Exhibit 68 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

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This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 68.)

EXHIBIT No. 69A

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Steps to Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within the Next Twenty-Four Hours.

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective.
 - (b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
 - (c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating area) return to PEARL HARBOR.
 - (d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart ----- and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at -----; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost despatch, report expected time of their arrival.
 - (e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
- [2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT, now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
- (b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbatfor (ComTask Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
- (c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
- (d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
- (e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

EXHIBIT No. 69B

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Recommended Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours.

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbafor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to joint Task Force Three.

(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to Join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl.

[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(S) C. H. McMorris.

EXHIBIT No. 70

[1]

SECRET

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

CinC File No. A16/0129

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *January 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

References:

(a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-CTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

[2] (b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

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- (d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
 - (e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
 - (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.
 - (g) Local sabotage is possible.
5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

[3] In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

- (a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reenforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
- (b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.
- (c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
- (d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- (3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

- [4] (4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:
 - (a) Provide escort for important ships.
 - (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.
 - (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.
 - (d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
 - (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.
 - (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).
- (5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:
 - (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.
 - (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.
 - (c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.
 - (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

Additional Measures if Japan enters War

- [5] (7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.
 - (8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.
 - (9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.
 - (10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.
6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be

selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes; Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

[6] (a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain.

[7] 9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be dispatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

EXHIBIT No. 71

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials
and No.
Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 July 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Haven't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else. We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had with his mines firing after having been down several hours.

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having delightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as it is only July.

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Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". Be sure and unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 88. Mrs. Hull said I should make sure you did not overlook it.

All good wishes

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, "USS Pennsylvania,"
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.*

[SECRET]

24 JULY 1941.

DEAR TOMMIE: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

Your people who have been laying mines must have had an interesting time, but just about the trouble the cause is in a conundrum still. B—— went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch case you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very appreciative until we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electrolytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not probably had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray Spear on the job. We got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Eastern Lines as agents for the Navy Department), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels enroute, by rail, due to arrive in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite on August 10.

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Produce is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given way in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't drop you a line.

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. HART, USN,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS "HOUSTON",
% Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

EXHIBIT No. 72

[SECRET]

In reply refer to Initials and No.
OP-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 2 August 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc., etc.

We have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore,

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you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt that the Germans are behind schedule and there is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly, having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while.

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

[SECRET]

Op-10 Hu

31 JULY 1941.

DEAR SAVVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc, etc, etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one and hence our consideration.

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 26 PBYS and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc. etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and whatnot, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows whatnot. Marshall's troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc. etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.

I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBY repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the

training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that." Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutulla been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. I hope she and Germany may break upon each other. Europe dominated by the Communists is no more an attractive picture, and in fact less so, than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. Here's hoping we have neither, but rather that they both exhaust themselves. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda whenever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity, etc. etc.

With all good wishes— and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain CHARLES M. COOKE, Jr., USN,

USS "PENNSYLVANIA," c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.

One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. When I got to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to whom I am also sending a copy.

H. R. S.

[NOTE.—The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 72, which is a personal letter dated 2 August 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, enclosing a copy of a letter to Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The second, third and fourth sentences in the fifth paragraph on page 4 of the enclosure to Captain Cooke.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 11, which the Judge Advocate proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.]

EXHIBIT No. 73

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 3, 1941.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Serial 038612.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reenforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval development gives adequate security in case the British Isles

should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.

5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.

8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy in about two months, but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility.

11. Your Operating Plans for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders.

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

cc: Rear Admiral Ghormley.

EXHIBIT No. 74

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 7, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in fine fettle.

Ok on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any *permanent* assignment of either, or both of these ships can be made at this time. *We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training—servicing, etc.*

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high-speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inasmuch as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production.

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delivered to the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.

I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only ten production models were manufactured; these were manufactured for the purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models and to act as "stop-gap" equipment until an improved model could be developed and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU Class CLs, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the ranges of the antiaircraft guns.

Relative to the two Seatrain vessels which we recently acquired and which are now undergoing conversion for use in transporting aircraft, they now have readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships for this purpose. *We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of*

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planes to Europe—Russia—China—? May have to charter them rather than take them over—in order conserve Navy personnel.

Your study of the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it looked like a very good paper. It will be of such help to us.

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I wrote to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclosing, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worse and worse"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,

USS PENNSYLVANIA

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

British movement of BB to far east area—I hope—will be completed in December.

[NOTE.—Handwritten matter in italics.]

EXHIBIT No. 75

From: CNO

To: CINCPAC

Released by: H. R. Stark

Date: November 28, 1941

282054

The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept. will instruct COMGEN HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept. will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 mm AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.

Copy: Op 30

MGC

WPD, U. S. Army

BuAero

EXHIBIT No. 76

From: CINCPAC

To: OPNAV

Date: November 28, 1941

280627

Your 270038 and 270040 Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron Marine planes X Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar crews X Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about one December essential ground material for temporary operation

twelve Baker seventeen Army bombers but at present only six such planes of the twelve on Oahu in operating condition X Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy bombs now available there usable by Army with minor alteration X Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over twenty miles offshore radically limits their usefulness for insular defense X Their use possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed X Flexibility dispositions thereby curtailed X Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions X Proper for Army troop reinforcements outlying bases being made however consider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available X All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command X Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake X Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later X On December 1 sending twelve patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl X Will investigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits.

From: OPNAV
To: CINCAF (action)
CINCPAC (info)
Released by: H. R. Stark
Date: 30 November 1941
300419

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch X Instruct planes to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur X British mission here informed X

(Following the above dispatch, there appears in the exhibit a photostatic copy of a handwritten note identical with the above dispatch. It bears the notation that the dispatch is to be sent as "Secret. Priority." It also bears the note "Read to President and be approved," and a further notation "OK H. R. Stark." The handwritten message is not being reproduced as the context is identical with dispatch 300419.)

From: CNO
To: CINCUS
CINCAF
Released by: H. R. Stark
Date: January 21, 1941
212155

The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my memorandum to the Secretary X If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan Rainbow Three with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment X Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan X Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
070645

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities X Have received no corresponding instructions from you X

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EXHIBIT No. 77

From: CINCPAC
To: OPNAV
Date: Nov. 30, 1941
292350

Desire 37 millimeter anti aircraft guns and ammunition mentioned in your 282054 X Urgently recommend shipment minimum 3000 rounds ammunition with guns for familiarization and training X

From: CNO
To: CINCAF (action)
CINCPAC (info)
Date: 30 November 1941
301709

Priority

Ref my 300 19 priority dispatch requested of any contacts. In case there are no contacts make report once a day even if information is all negative.

TOP SECRET

EXHIBITS NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME IV

No. 63 to 68 (both inclusive)

Note: These exhibits are "Top-Secret" and by direction of the Court have been filed apart from the other exhibits and with extracted matter from the Record of Proceedings. This action was taken in the interest of National Security and the successful prosecution of the war.

/s/ H. BUESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

SECRET

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
25 July 1941.
(Purple).
#571.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy.

JD-1: 4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)**To: Tokyo.****October 14, 1941.****Purple.****#948 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code).**

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

* For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyode).**To: Washington.****October 16, 1941.****Purple (CA).****#671.**

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

From: Berlin.**To: Tokyo.****1 October 1941.****(Purple).****#1198.**

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

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1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instruction, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 23859 6017 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

23 October 1941.

(Purple-CA).

Unnumbered.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As

such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

JD-1:6316 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#736.

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 10, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent).
#1066.

(Part 1 of 2)

1. I sent MOORE* to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

* Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

SECRET

(Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

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3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

ARMY 6440 24655-24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 18, 1941.
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).
#—.

For you Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,^a and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See JD-1: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. # 24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. # 24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
Purple CA (Urgent).
#812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.^a You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be charged. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. # 24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 26, 1941.
Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum, and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Mussabetsu Taigun Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Ito Kun (Mr. Ito)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyunten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO:	Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE:	Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence	Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence	Ginza 1022

ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

JD-1:6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (8)

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From: Tokyo.
To: Nanking.
15 November 1941.
(Purple).
#490.

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while.

JD-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE KUMORI.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.

**North wind cloudy.

***West wind clear.

SECRET

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

SECRET

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25435-25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
#1189. (Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

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(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

ARMY 25441-25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 28, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#844.

Re your #1189.*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (8)

* S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.
^b S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#857.

Re my #844*.

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).

Telephone Code.

TransPacific

Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)

KURUSU. "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

YAMAMOTO. "Yes. I see."

KURUSU. "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—"

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "Yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

K. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

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From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.

**JD-1: 6710.

***Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first come to loggerheads with the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 25554-25555 6944 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#1214. To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #1190*.

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

* S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu (Rijoji).

15 November 1941.

(J19).

#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (8)

SECRET

(Completed Translation)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231.*

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned

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over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.^a Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. ^b We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

ARMY 7021 SECRET Trans. 12/3/41 (7)

^a Not available.

^b Original translation incomplete from this point on.

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231^a.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233^a. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too, ——— the four year incident ———

ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

^a Not available.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand.

Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233*.

ARMY 25660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

* Not available.

From: Toyko.
To: Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#893.

—In the event that Manchuria participates in the war—in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to

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expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Advisor to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussion the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed, Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are faced, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinion on this matter.

JD-1: 7055 SECRET(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#891.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256.*

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (8)

* Not available.

* S. I. S. # 25725.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#875.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #1232*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

JD-1: 7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#1234.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862.^a

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

ARMY 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

^a Not available.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

JD-1: 7098 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

1378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225. (Part 1 of 3.)

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6921

**Available, Purple dated 30 November.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China ----- the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

(Part 3 of 3)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 30, 1941.

Purple.

#1224.

Re your #857^a.

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

Army 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19).

#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

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SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay*, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (8)

* Probably means Mamala Bay.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#901.

Re my #644*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (8)

* See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902.

(Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crises in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China

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or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(December 4, 1941—Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

(December 6, 1941—Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions,

it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country— (45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the—es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n— (50 letters missed) —sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the

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principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand the American government failing, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD::1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, the mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and damages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as".

**Probably "China, can but".

(7 December 1941—Part 14 of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace in the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you my #219^a on that date.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the *Saratoga* was not in the harbor. The carrier, *Enterprise*, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D⁴.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

Purple (Urgent—Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902^a.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3)

^a S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

IA.

#104.

Re my #103.^a

On the 6th the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

Army 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

Purple (Urgent).

#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

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(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us ----- (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) -----

ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 3, 1941.
Purple (Urgent).
#1256.

Re your #875*.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States' Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

ARMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

* See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 6, 1941.
PA-K2.
#128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.
J-19.
#123.

(Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

EXHIBIT No. 64

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Asterisk (*) Mailgram Addressee	Precedence
From: COM SIXTEEN. Released by: Date: 19 July 1941. For Coderoom: 200140.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority PP Routine Deferred
Decoded by A. W. PERING. Paraphrased by: Routed by:	Information: CINCPAC. CINCAF.	Priority PP Routine Deferred

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

191514
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT.

If operational
check below

☐

SECRET

JONAB

Tokyo to net number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep affirm code states that although Cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that Tripartite Pact forms keystone of Japan's national policy and new Cabinet will also pursue policy of former Cabinet in all other matters.

Handwritten:

BOONE 2975.
KIRK ASHTON 5572.
TURNER.
MCC.

Certified to be a true copy.

F. C. Alexander,
F. C. ALEXANDER, Lt. Comdr. USNR,
Communications Officer.

OP-20-G.

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2827	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: CINCAF. Released by: Date: 28 November 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
For Coderoom Decoded by P. R. WHITE. Paraphrased by:	Information: COMSIXTEEN. CINCPAC. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

281430

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery Date Time GCT

TOP SECRET

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words *repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts** Will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita

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Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and nei X X On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and comsixin monitoring above broadcasts.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person.

[Hand written:] Copy delivered to Capt. Safford OP-20-N 31 March 1944 DW.

* This is Morse code.

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number.....	Addresses	Message precedence
From: ALUSNA BATAVIA. Released by..... Date: 5 Dec. 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority RRRRR Routine Deferred
For Coderoom..... Decoded by KALAIDJIAN. Paraphrased by PURDY.	Information: [Handwritten:] File.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory

031000 CR0222

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TOP SECRET

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

[Initialed] GFS

Distribution:

War Dept.-----Action. Files: CNO-----20OP-----20A-----

Record Copy: -----20G-----A Show OPDO-----

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 65

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941,

which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Rómaji version of these messages.

On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

T. J. Slowie,
T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN.
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND.
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP.
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST.

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4

English

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Rómaji

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

1390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 66

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension No.....	Addressees	Prec. of Message
From: OPNAV. Released by Joseph R. Redman. Date: 3 December 1941.	Action: To: CINCAF. COM SIXTEEN.	XPriority XXX. Routine Def'd
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraph's'd by.....	Info: CINCPAC. COM FOURTEEN.	Priority XXX Routine Def'd

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

O31885

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time GCT

SECRET

COPEK

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo One December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.
[Initialed:]

LFS

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (see Art 76(4) NavRegs.)

EXHIBIT No. 67

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

Feb. 1, 1941

Op16-F-2

(SC) A16-3/EF37

Serial No. 09716

Confidential

10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations

To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligences places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

JULES JAMES,
By direction.

Dictated Jan. 31, 1941

" by Lieut. Comdr. A. H. McCollum

Typed by M. E. Morse

CC-Com 14 10466

HAS BEEN SENT.

EXHIBIT No. 68

SECRET

From: Seattle.
To: Tokyo.
Decemehr 6, 1941.
PA-K2.

#184. (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.
2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Singapore.
5 December 1941.
(PA-K2.)

#377. (Abstract.)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: San Francisco.
29 November 1941.
(J19.)
Circular #2431.

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#799.

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 7084 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
25 November 1941.
(Purple.)
#790.

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.
2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.
3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

*Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons).

1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Seattle.
25 November 1941.
(J19).
#026.

Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton.
Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.
JD-1 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 22, 1941.
Purple.
#785.

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu^a; Pisu^a; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines. Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Manila.
November 20, 1941.
Purple.
#372. (Strictly Secret.)

Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft ----- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay^a.

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6)

^a Near Manila, P. I.

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 12, 1941.
Purple.
#753.

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on ——. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 10, 1941.
 Purple.
 #745.

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers.

ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 8, 1941.
 Purple.
 #742.

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohoto*,* the *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th.)

ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

* Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Manila.
 5 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #349.

Re your #722*

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.*

JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR)

*JD-1: 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands.

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 November 1941.
 (Purple).
 #722.

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON*, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.
2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).
3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military planes.

Large bombers, 29.
 Scout planes, 324.
 The same, B type, 62.
 Fighters, 317.
 The same, B type, 131.
 Pursuit planes, 302.
 The same, D type, 60.
 Training planes, 49.
 Total, 1283.

(b) Naval planes.

Large flying boats, 26.

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4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI*, PASU*, 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

JD-1: 6335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR)

* Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, November 27, 1941.

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

U. S. Air Forces in the Philippines

Type	NAVY	Strength
PBY-4 (Patrol)	-----	14
PBY-4 (Patrol)	-----	14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation)	-----	4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)	-----	2
J2F-4 (Utility)	-----	3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)	-----	2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation)	-----	2
052U-2 (Observation)	-----	2
Total	-----	43

2 squadrons of 062U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

	ARMY	
B-18 (Heavy Bomber)	-----	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)	-----	35
P-35A (VF)	-----	52
P-40B (VF)	-----	30
P-40E (VF)	-----	117
O-48A (VO)	-----	7
O-49 (VO)	-----	3
O-52 (VO)	-----	10
A-27 (Dive Bomber)	-----	9
C-39 (Combat)	-----	1
C-49 (")	-----	1
P-26A (VF)	-----	15
Total	-----	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 1942.

	SUMMARY	
Bombers	-----	62
Fighters	-----	214
Combat	-----	2
Patrol	-----	28
Observation	-----	32
Utility	-----	3
Total	-----	341

Japanese Estimate of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines

MILITARY PLANES

<i>Type</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Large bombers.....	29
Scout planes.....	324
The same, B type.....	62
Fighters.....	317
The same, B type.....	131
Pursuit planes.....	302
The same, D type.....	69
Training planes.....	49
Total.....	1283

NAVAL PLANES

Large flying boats.....	26
-------------------------	----

From: Tokyo.
 To: Manila.
 5 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #355.

For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #723.

-(Re your #318)*

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino
 (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above

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place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of *altitude planes* (?) it is said.

Details by mail.

JD-1: 6270 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

SECRET

From: Seattle (Sato).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

J-19. (Priority.)

#165.

(Message to Washington Circular #80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to — and Los Angeles.

ARMY 6612 24990 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parenthesis following the description)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Map of the world showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers". (Exhibit No. 4)
2.	Map of the United States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex I. Coastal Frontiers". (Exhibit No. 1)
3-4.	These items are Diagrams I and II bearing captions "Coastal Frontier, Joint Radio and Wire Communication" and "Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase, Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach", respectively. (Exhibit No. 6)
5.	Chart showing the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. (Exhibit No. 8)
6-9.	Fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 25)
10.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 04122 and date of 7 May 1941. (Exhibit No. 41)
11.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 07526 and date of 13 August 1941. (Exhibit No. 46)
12.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 01885 and date of 15 February 1941. (Exhibit No. 50)
13.	Radio Frequency Plan for the Fourteenth Naval District. (Exhibit No. 53)
14.	Work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 60)

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Y 4. P 31: P 31 pt. 34



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 34

PROCEEDINGS OF CLARKE INVESTIGATION

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE , Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY , Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS , Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART , Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER , Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE , Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON , Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK , Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

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JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

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SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
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39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Nov. 23, 1944, to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 16, 1946, to May 31, 1946
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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 147

**PART I OF PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY
COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE, PURSUANT TO ORAL IN-
STRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
TESTIMONY AND FINDINGS CONCERNING HANDLING OF
CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS**

Top Secret

MIS/DC/CWC/EWG/dc 74195

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

20 SEPTEMBER 1944

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

The report of the investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled is attached hereto as Tab. A. Briefly summarized, the findings disclose the following:

a. That between 1 October 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor the Secretary of State, Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G-2 each received identical copies of the daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy of all of the Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation.

b. During the same period the Navy Department was furnishing similar material to the President through the President's naval aide.

c. On 28 November 1941 the so-called "Winds Code" was decoded. This code provided for the warning of Japanese embassies and consulates throughout the world in a voice broadcast that relations between Japan and the United States, Japan and Russia or Japan and Great Britain, as the case might be, were to be severed and that when this word was received all code papers were to be destroyed. Arrangements were immediately made both by the Army Signal Corps and, through the Army Signal Corps, with Federal Communications Commission for listening for a message that would implement this code. However, prior to Pearl Harbor neither the F. C. C. nor the Army Signal Corps intercepted an implementing message.

d. Thirteen of the fourteen parts of Tokyo's reply to the American counter proposals were received by the War Department in the evening of 6 December and were delivered to the Department of State late that evening. The fourteenth section, which was the concluding section of the Japanese reply, and a message from Tokyo to the Japanese

ambassadors in Washington instructing that this reply be presented to the Secretary of State at one p. m., Washington time, were received in the War Department before 0900 E. S. T., 7 December 1941. As soon as possible thereafter Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War Department and at that time Gen. Marshall decided to send a further warning message to the commanders in the Pacific area. This information was conveyed by Gen. Marshall to Adm. Stark, who concurred therein and asked that the Navy commanders be informed of the Army message. This message was filed in the War Department Message Center at 1200 noon E. S. T., received R. C. A. Honolulu 33 minutes later but not delivered to the Hawaiian Department until 7 hours and 25 minutes after its receipt by R. C. A. Honolulu.

CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Enclosures:

Tab. A.

MIS/DC/EWG/dc 74195
20 September 1944

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to conduct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled. Under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 (AGPO-M-B 333.5 (7 Sep 44)) from The Adjutant General, which read as follows:

It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to administer oaths for this purpose.

the investigation was conducted on 14, 15 and 16 September, in Room 2C637 of the Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Major General Sherman Miles, Acting A. C. of S., G-2 during the year 1941; Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the last half of 1941; Colonel Rufus Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter half of 1941; Colonel John T. Bissell, head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter part of 1941; Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service during the latter part of 1941; and Mr. William F. Friedman, principal cryptanalyst of the Signal Intelligence Service during the latter part of 1941. Documentary evidence in the nature of copies of 38 Top Secret decoded Japanese messages passing between the Toyko Government and various Japanese embassies in many parts of the world in October, November and early December, 1941 were also introduced into evidence.

[2] 2. There were also introduced into evidence memoranda for the Chief of Staff in the nature of Estimates of the Situation which were made by the then Acting A. C. of S., G-2 the latter part of November and early December, 1941, all of them immediately prior to Pearl Harbor day; the findings of fact of the Roberts Report of January 1942; a telegram to the G-2, Hawaiian Department of 5 December 1941, signed Miles; a telegram signed Brink received in the War Department 6 December 1941 at 1629 E. S. T.; a memorandum of 6 December 1941 signed Perry regarding Jap Washington Embassy burning code books the night of 5 December; telegram from Melbourne, Australia from Merlesmith received in the War Department 7 December at 1950 E. S. T.; M. I. D. form containing information received from the Orient dated 3 November 1941 containing information purporting to have come from a Mr. Hirota; report of Headquarters, Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941 entitled, "Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii"; secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 to the Commanding Generals, the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, Hawaiian Department and Fourth Army; radio message dated 27 October 1941 from Manila, signed Brink; radiogram dated 29 October 1941 from Manila signed Evans; copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to MILID between 12 July and 27 July 1941; and the following messages flowing between Commanding General, Hawaii and the War Department: 27 November 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaii; 27 November 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaii; 27 November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii to Chief of Staff; 28 November 1941 The Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaii; 29 November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii to The Adjutant General; 7 December, Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaii et al.

3. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed.

4. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and as a result of this consideration I find the following facts:

a. That between 1 October and the afternoon of 7 December 1941 there were at least 37 coded messages that were flowing between the Tokyo Government and their embassies in various parts of the world which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service and were decoded. In addition there was at least one copy of a telephone conversation between the Tokyo Government and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These intercepted and decoded messages were Top Secret material that was designated as "Magic" in the latter part of 1941. (Ex. #1, Bratton, p. 10. Sadtler, p. 1.)

b. At all times between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Top Secret material that is involved in this investigation was handled as follows (Bratton p. 24; Miles p. —):

It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of an officer to the office of Colonel Rufus Bratton who was then Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of M. I. D. Col. Bratton then read all of the material, screening out that which had intelligence value. The other material he then burned. The screened material was then arranged by Col. Bratton in separate piles, one for

the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of S., G-2, one for the Chief, War Plans Division and one for the Secretary of State. Col. Bratton then bound each pile in a cardboard folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were brought by Col. Bratton back to his office, opened and the material therein checked prior to destruction by burning.

c. Between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G-2 each received identical copies of the daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy of each of the 38 Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation. In addition, for a short time immediately prior to Pearl Harbor and for a short time thereafter, Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, also received daily copies of this Top Secret material. (Bratton p. 7, 24, 25; Miles p. —)

d. During this identical period the Navy Department was furnishing similar material to various officers in the Navy Department and to the President through the President's naval aide. (Bratton, p. 4—Miles p. —)

e. From time to time during this period the Chief of Staff questioned Col. Bratton as to his evaluation of certain of the Top Secret reports that are exhibits in this investigation. (Bratton p. 5 and 12)

f. That on 28 November 1941 Top Secret Army message No. 25432 was decoded. The decoding of this message read as follows (Ex. #2):

From Tokyo
To Washington
19 November 1941

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:

NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

On 28 November 1941 Col. Bratton made arrangements for listening for Japanese broadcasts that might include this code. These arrangements were made through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put Col. Bratton in touch with a Mr. G. E. Sterling, then Chief of the National Defense Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission. The F. C. C. did thereafter monitor Japanese broadcasts for the purpose of determining if

the Japanese sent a message using the "Winds" code. I am unable to find that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the F. C. C. or the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Bratton p. 10, 11; Miles p. —; Sadtler, p. 2; Friedman, p. 7; Ex. #3)

I find that on 5 December 1941, Col. Sadtler was informed by Adm. Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code had been intercepted the previous night, and that the message, decoded, meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken; that on 5 December 1941 Col. Sadtler so informed Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and Gen. Bedell Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler information. I do find, however, that Col. Bratton prior to this time had been informed by the Navy that Commander Rochefort of the 14th Naval [5] District knew all that our own Navy Department knew about the "Winds Code" message and that on 5 December he caused the following message to be sent the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Sadtler p. 2, 3; Bratton p. 17, 18; Miles p. —: Ex. #4):

CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THRU COMMANDANT FOURTEEN NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKIO REFERENCE WEATHER.

I further find that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton were on 5 December 1941, and had been for some time prior thereto, expecting a break in Jap-Great Britain relations. I further find that no officer of the Navy ever advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the Winds Code had been received by the Navy. I find that if in fact such a message was intercepted, it was not intercepted by the Army Signal Corps or F. C. C. (Bratton p. 11, 12, 13, Roundtable; Miles p. —).

g. I find that 13 of the 14 sections of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843 were received by the evening of 6 December and one copy of that part of the Japanese reply was delivered by Col. Bratton to the watch officer on duty at the Department of State late in the evening of 6 December, with instructions to see that the document was delivered to the Secretary of State immediately. (Bratton p. 17; Miles p. —, Ex. #5)

h. I find that between 0830 and 0900 E. S. T. 7 December 1941 Col. Bratton was at his office in the War Department and at that time received copies of section 14 of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, and also received copies of Tokyo's instructions to deliver the reply at 1:00 p. m. 7 December 1941. Top Secret Army No. 25850; that Col. Bratton then immediately attempted to contact the Chief of Staff and the Chief, War Plans Division at their offices in the War Department but these officers were not in their offices at that time; that Col. Bratton then telephoned Gen. Marshall's quarters and was informed that Gen. Marshall had gone horseback riding; that Col. Bratton requested Gen. Marshall's orderly to go out and find him at once and to ask Gen. Marshall to call Col. Bratton on the telephone as soon as practicable as Col. Bratton had an important message to

deliver to him; that Col. Bratton then called Gen. Miles, reporting what steps he, Col. Bratton, had taken and recommending that Gen. Miles come to the office at once; that either Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton thereafter called Gen. Gerow, then Chief of War Plans Division; that sometime between 1000 and 1100 E. S. T. Col. Bratton received a telephone call from Gen. Marshall and then informed Gen. Marshall that [6] he, Col. Bratton, had a message of extreme importance which Gen. Marshall should see at once and advised Gen. Marshall that Col. Bratton would bring the message to Gen. Marshall's quarters if Gen. Marshall so desired; that Gen. Marshall instructed Col. Bratton to report to Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department as the General was on his way there; that Col. Bratton reported to Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department at about 1125 E. S. T., which was shortly after Gen. Marshall's arrival; that shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived; that the message, Top Secret Army No. 25850, instructing the Japanese ambassadors to present Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, to the Department of State at 1300 E. S. T. that afternoon was laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed; that the Chief of Staff then had on his desk the lengthy Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, which he read aloud to those officers present; that the Chief of Staff asked all officers present for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message, Top Secret Army No. 25850; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton both stated that they believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, namely 1:00 p. m., that this was an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time, that they thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas; that Gen. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that the commanders in the areas, indicated should be on the alert; that Gen. Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the telephone and told Adm. Stark over the telephone that he thought the Army should send out a warning substantially as Gen. Miles urged; that after Adm. Stark replied Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that Adm. Stark did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had been several times alerted; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton nevertheless continued to urge Gen. Marshall to send the warning; that Gen. Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message and there was some discussion at this particular time as to whether or not the Philippines should be included; that Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to Adm. Stark the message he, Gen. Marshall, had just written; that Adm. Stark apparently concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed and Gen. Marshall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled [7] warning; that about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived and Gen. Marshall again asked each officer present, in succession beginning with Gen. Miles, their opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message, Army Top Secret No. 25850; that Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance and that warning messages to our people should be sent; that

Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and Col. Bratton concurred; that Gen. Marshall then gave Col. Bratton the message in Gen. Marshall's handwriting and instructed Col. Bratton to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal; that as Col. Bratton was about to leave there was some discussion as to whether the penciled message should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first but it was decided that as time was an important factor Col. Bratton should take it in its draft form to the Message Center; that as Col. Bratton left the room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines; that Col. Bratton took the message to Col. French, a Signal Corps officer then in charge of the Message Center, explained to Col. French that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority; that Col. French then said he would give it his personal attention and that processing of the message would commence immediately; that Col. Bratton then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff and Gen. Marshall then directed Col. Bratton to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees; that Col. Bratton returned to the Message Center, talked the matter over with Col. French, who informed Col. Bratton that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes; that it was then 1150 E. S. T.; that Col. Bratton returned to the Chief of Staff's office and so reported to him. Bratton p. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 23; Miles p. —, Ex. #6, Ex. #7).

i. I find that the log of the warning message sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as follows (Ex. #8):

	E. S. T.	Honolulu time
Filed War Department Message Center-----	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent Western Union-----	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu-----		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu-----		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department-----		2:58 PM

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN T. BISSELL

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 14 September 1944.

Time: 1310-1330.

Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Colonel John T. Bissell.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel John T. Bissell, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. State your name, rank, organization and station please.

Col. BISSELL. John T. Bissell, Colonel, Field Artillery, Headquarters 89th Division Artillery, Camp Butner, North Carolina.

Col. CLARKE. On what date did you become a member of G-2 Division, War Department General Staff?

Col. BISSELL. I believe it was on the 25th day of May 1940.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time?

Col. BISSELL. I was assigned to the Counter Intelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Division.

Col. CLARKE. In what position?

Col. BISSELL. I was Executive Officer of that Group.

Col. CLARKE. How long did you remain on those duties?

Col. BISSELL. I remained as Executive Officer until, I think July 1, 1941, when I became the senior member of that Group.

Col. CLARKE. As Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group of M. I. D., what were your principal duties?

Col. BISSELL. The principal duties that I had were the collection, evaluation and dissemination of counter intelligence information.

Col. CLARKE. Would it be correct to state that your principal duties then dealt with what we might call domestic intelligence rather than any foreign intelligence?

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

[2] Col. CLARKE. Did you focus your attention on any particular enemy or potential enemy?

Col. BISSELL. Yes, on the Germans and Japanese.

Col. CLARKE. By that I mean their agents in this country.

Col. BISSELL. Yes, and in our possessions.

Col. CLARKE. Were Honolulu and the Philippines included?

Col. BISSELL. They were.

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. At that time it was from reports we got from the Philippines and the F. B. I., principally.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of or access to any material which was known as Magic or Ultra during that period prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Prior to Pearl Harbor I did not.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of its existence?

Col. BISSELL. I did.

Col. CLARKE. But you had no knowledge of the contents of any of the material produced?

Col. BISSELL. I never read any of it in the raw. I did receive summaries pertaining to Japanese agents in this country.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the contents of it with either the A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BISSELL. I don't recall that I ever did.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the Japanese situation with the Chief of the Far Eastern Branch of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BISSELL. Only on one or two occasions prior to Pearl Harbor.

[3] Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any information from F. B. I. at any time which would indicate that they had knowledge of any of this material or access to it?

Col. BISSELL. No. Of course I did receive reports on the activities of Japanese agents and attaches in the United States, but that was

obtained by following those individuals, not from any translated codes.

Col. CLARKE. Did any of this information come from wire tapping sources, to your knowledge?

Col. BISSELL. I don't believe so.

Col. CLARKE. In what form did you make available to the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff such information that you did receive?

Col. BISSELL. As I recall it, we prepared in the Group daily a short memorandum if there was anything of any value.

Col. CLARKE. Was that sent to the Chief of Staff or just to the A. C. of S., G-2?

Col. BISSELL. It went to G-2. I am not absolutely certain in my own mind at that time whether I had that system in operation or not, but when I left here I had it going.

Col. CLARKE. Then you had no channels of contact with either the Chief of Staff or the Chief of the War Plans Division except through the person of the A. C. of S., G-2?

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive from F. B. I. any information which would lead you to believe that there was a possibility of any attack by the Japanese on the U. S. or any of its possessions prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did it ever come to your knowledge that certain Japanese consulates were destroying codes and burning secret documents early in December 1941?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know it at the time?

[4] Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew it at the time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That was before Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. It was, I believe, the day of Pearl Harbor that the codes were destroyed. They were burned in the Japanese Embassy here in Washington.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any other places they were burning codes?

Col. BISSELL. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear or know, prior to Pearl Harbor, that the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on December 3, 1941 stating that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents?

Col. BISSELL. I did not know that.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever initiate any warning message to the corps areas or department commanders with respect to sabotage prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I did.

Col. CLARKE. What did you base that on?

Col. BISSELL. I based that upon a directive that I got from the A. C. of S., G-2.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you wrote the message at his direction.

Col. BISSELL. I did, and took it to him for correction and editing.

Col. CLARKE. Then you did not initiate it?

Col. BISSELL. I executed it and carried it out. It was initiated by the A. C. of S., G-2.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of any message which was initiated by the Chief of the Army Air Forces to the same effect?

Col. BISSELL. No I did not.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state briefly what your actions and activities were on December 7.

Col. BISSELL. On that particular date I was at my house in Washington [5] and happened to be listening to the radio in the afternoon. I heard the commentator discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor. I went to the office immediately and was there until sometime that evening.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of any warning message which was sent to the commanders on the morning of December 7?

Col. BISSELL. At that time, no.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever alerted to be watching for a Jap message in code that might be given during a news broadcast?

Col. BISSELL. No. I knew about it after December 7th but not at the time.

TESTIMONY OF RUFUS S. BRATTON

PART I

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 14 September 1944.

Time: 1045-1200.

Present:

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station please.

Col. BRATTON. Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726. Headquarters, Commandant, Headquarters 3rd U. S. Army ETO.

Col. CLARKE. When were you first assigned to duty in the G-2 section of the War Department General Staff?

Col. BRATTON. In the fall of 1936.

Col. CLARKE. And you continued in that duty until when?

Col. BRATTON. I continued on duty in one capacity or another in G-2 until the fall of 1943.

Col. CLARKE. From the time you arrived here until Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 what were your duties?

Col. BRATTON. I was at first assistant to the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and later succeeded him to that office.

Col. CLARKE. Who was that? Mason?

Col. BRATTON. Col. Homer Slaughter. I later succeeded him to that office as Chief of the Far Eastern Section. At that time my immediate superior was Col. Faye Brabson. He was later succeeded by Col. Charles Mason; he in turn by Col. Hayes Kroner. Upon

the latter's designation as Chief of M. I. S. I became Chief of the Intelligence Branch. I think that is accurate.

Col. CLARKE. Was one of your duties both as the Assistant and as Chief of the Far Eastern Section, the handling of this so-called Magic or Ultra material?

[2] Col. BRATTON. That is correct. When I first arrived in G-2 a copy of the day's output was placed on my desk for such information and action as was necessary or advisable. At that time the production of Magic was on a very limited scale and it was a combined product of naval communications, I believe, and the Army SIS. As we progressed in solving various codes and ciphers the quantity and quality of this material naturally improved and it became quite voluminous, and its study and evaluation occupied a large part of my time as Chief of the Far Eastern Section.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state how this material was handled from the time it was received from the Signal Corps, who saw it besides yourself, and what selections were made to go to your immediate chief, also to the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff.

Col. BRATTON. Initially this material reached me through the Chief of the Operations & Training Branch of G-2. Later on this office was eliminated as a transmitter of this material and I dealt directly with the SIS and their counterpart in Navy communications. The material in later years was broken down as to source or type of code by the Army and Navy so that the Army worked on one type and the Navy on another. Normally the material was collected and coordinated by the Army SIS before it was presented to me. Occasionally, in matters of great interest or importance, an officer of the Navy would bring me a message direct, to save time.

Col. CLARKE. How many copies of this did you receive of each message?

Col. BRATTON. Initially I received no copy of any message. I simply received a statement showing that a message had been sent from one diplomatic post to another diplomatic post on such and such a date, followed by a brief summary of its contents. Later on, to further develop this very valuable source of intelligence, arrangements were made whereby I received exact copies of the decoded or deciphered message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember about what date that was, sir?

Col. BRATTON. We started this latter practice, to the best of my knowledge and belief, early in 1941 or late in 1940. It then became my duty to see that the proper officials of the War Department had access to the intelligence contained in these decoded and deciphered messages. This entailed so much traveling around on my part from one office to another that it was a waste of time. So at the direction of the Chief [3] of Staff, transmitted to me through the A. C. of S., G-2. I started the system of having copies made—my office having a very limited number of officers—and instituted a check system whereby all copies were returned to me for destruction. This subsequently proved impracticable because of lack of clerical help and other assistance in the Far Eastern Section, and arrangements were made with the SIS and their counterpart in naval communications to have some six copies of each decoded or deciphered message delivered to me daily for study and evaluation. By this time the volume of

this work had increased tremendously. Many of the messages were purely administrative in character and were of no interest from an intelligence point of view. They were all gone over carefully, however, to make sure that I missed no item which would be of intelligence value. Those that had no intelligence value I destroyed by burning. The others were variously processed.

Col. CLARKE. Were you assigned the duty of selecting the material that went to the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War?

Col. BRATTON. I was.

Col. CLARKE. By whom?

Col. BRATTON. By the A. C. of S., G-2.

Col. CLARKE. Then you personally made the selection of what part of this material he saw and the Chief of Staff saw?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, they both saw the same material.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, if you decided that a message was of sufficient importance to be seen by the A. C. of S., G-2, it was also of sufficient importance to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. Not always, but the reverse was always true. If the message was important enough to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, I of course saw to it that the A. C. of S., G-2 saw the same message so that he could talk to the Chief of Staff intelligently about it.

Col. CLARKE. Did anyone else in G-2 see this material besides you and the A. C. of S., G-2?

[4] Col. BRATTON. Initially no, but as the volume increased it became necessary for me to have assistance in handling it, and with the knowledge and consent of the A. C. of S., G-2, certain trusted clerical help and certain of my officer assistants helped me in handling it.

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of the material that went to the State Department?

Col. BRATTON. Initially there was no agreement on this. Frequently the Navy Department would take the same message to the State Department that we thought would be of value to them. As it was a duplication of effort we finally came to an agreement that the Army would furnish the Secretary of State with material thought to be of interest to the State Department and that the Navy would serve the President likewise.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall about what date that arrangement became effective?

Col. BRATTON. Not exactly, but it was sometime early in 1941 when a written agreement was drawn up between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of Naval Intelligence, a copy of which was placed in the G-2 files.

[5] Col. CLARKE. Initially you made a selection of what was to go to the State Department or the President and the Navy made a similar selection. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Col. CLARKE. When did you start giving all the material produced to the State Department and to the President?

Col. BRATTON. I am quite positive that at no time was all of the material given to the President for the simple reason that the bulk

of it would have been of no interest or value to him. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the State Department was never given all of the material when I was responsible for its transmission. In other words, I made the selection of what was to go to the Secretary of State and it was left to my discretion to determine the material that would be of interest to him.

Col. CLARKE. In the period from July 1, 1941 up to and including Pearl Harbor, did you ever discuss any individual message or group of messages with either the A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of Staff?

Col. BRATTON. Oh yes, on innumerable occasions, with both.

Col. CLARKE. Was the Chief of Staff inclined to take your evaluation on this material or did he want to act on it and place his own interpretation on it?

Col. BRATTON. He almost invariably asked me for my interpretation and evaluation.

Col. CLARKE. What were your relationships with what was then known as War Plans Division? Did you ever discuss this material with the Chief of that Division?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, by direction of the Chief of Staff. They had access in the latter stages of this production and dissemination to exactly the same material that went to the A. C. of S., G-2, to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of War.

Col. CLARKE. Who in that Division had that besides the Chief, do you recall?

Col. BRATTON. Initially, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, I took the message that I wanted the Chief of the War Plans Division to read, directly to him, and when he had read it and after discussing it with him—if there was any discussion—removed the message from his desk, took it back to my office and destroyed it. Later on the Chief of the War Plans Division insisted that certain of his section chiefs should have access to the material also. This was approved by the Chief of Staff, and I then made it a practice to deliver this material in a padlocked leather case to the Executive Officer of WPD, obtaining a receipt from him for certain numbered messages. After they had been read by the proper officers in WPD they were returned to me either the same day, in the locked bag, or on the following day when I delivered that day's messages.

Col. CLARKE. Was there ever prepared in the Far Eastern Section of G-2 any summary or evaluation which was based exclusively on the contents of this material?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular one?

Col. BRATTON. I don't recall any particular one but in the early stages of this work I very frequently submitted to the Chief of Staff, through the A. C. of S., G-2, a staff memorandum [6] based upon one or more messages that I had received, concealing the source by some agreed upon code word, so that the reader would know where I had secured the information which I was evaluating. Later on, as this material became of increasing value, the recipients, that is the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of the War Plans Division, deemed it advisable to have access to the raw material themselves so that they could arrive at their own independent conclusions as to its meaning. This was how the practice developed of delivering the raw material to certain officers desig-

nated by the Chief of Staff. Frequently, even after this practice was instituted, I submitted memoranda to various officers in connection with such and such a message, calling their attention to certain implications or trends indicated therein.

Col. CLARKE. From the period November 1, 1941, when the tension increased between the United States and Japan, was there any special handling of this material?

Col. BRATTON. As the tension between Japan and the United States grew we all took much greater precautions in processing and in otherwise handling the material.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have conferences with your opposite numbers in the Navy and in the War Plans Division regarding the interpretation and evaluation of this material?

Col. BRATTON. Yes. I had almost daily conferences with my opposite number in ONI and with the Chief of the War Plans Division as to the true significance of the material under study. I may say at this point that there was complete cooperation and collaboration between my opposite number in ONI, Commander McCullem, and myself.

Col. CLARKE. Did you agree on the interpretation of this material? In other words, was your evaluation agreed upon?

Col. BRATTON. We were for the most part in complete agreement in our evaluations of the material. Where there were differences of opinion we always consulted and came to an understanding as to how we would present these opinions to our respective chiefs. In the event of any major difference of opinion as to interpretation I always gave the A. C. of S., G-2 a summary of the Navy's viewpoint along with my own, and I believe that my opposite number in ONI did likewise.

Col. CLARKE. In the handling of this material, both in evaluation and [7] safeguarding and what not, did you deal directly with the A. C. of S., G-2 or did you go through the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BRATTON. Initially I went through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, but as tension grew and time became the important factor, at his direction I went straight to the A. C. of S., G-2 first and informed the Chief of Intelligence Branch afterward of my action and the nature of the information that I had transmitted.

Col. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief, the Chief of Staff was kept completely informed of all information and intelligence which was available to G-2 from this source. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. Completely.

Col. CLARK. I wish also to clear this one point up. I understood you to say that it was at the direction of the Chief of Staff that this raw material we served to him and to the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, you used the term "early stages" of this thing—I wish we could put an approximate date to "early stages" as you referred to early stages.

Col. BRATTON. Well, by early stages I mean during the years 1936 and 1937 before the quantity and quality of the material materially increased.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. May I interrupt? Wouldn't you say that your early stages was from the time you came in, in 1936, up to the bombing of the Panay?

Col. BRATTON. Well I wouldn't extend the early stages to as late a date as the bombing of the Panay—earlier than that.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you would say from the summer of 1936 to the summer of 1937 would be the early stages?

Col. BRATTON. Let me put it this way. By early stages I mean the period before our relations with Japan became strained.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Approximately when was it that the War Plans Division started getting this Top Secret material?

Col. BRATTON. You mean copies of the raw material?

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes.

Col. BRATTON. I am sorry, sir, I can't answer that definitely. My memory won't permit a definite answer. I would say not earlier than the summer of 1941. I would like to amplify that, however, with the statement that prior to the summer of 1941 various memoranda, written by me or by the A. C. of S., G-2, based upon this material were submitted to WPD.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When these copies went to the State Department or War Plans they were not allowed to keep them on file? You went around and got them?

Col. BRATTON. They were returned to me as soon as the proper officials of the State Department and WPD had seen and initialed them. They did not remain in the files of either office.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were they allowed to make copies of this?

Col. BRATTON. Not by me or any other officer of the War Department that I know of.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You as Chief of the Intelligence Branch or your Chief of the Far Eastern Unit knew generally, did you not, that the United States policy in the Pacific in 1941 was in conflict with policies of the Japanese Government?

Col. BRATTON. Of course.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever have any knowledge of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy addressed to the Secretary of War on or about 24 January 1941 wherein the Secretary of War was warned that hostilities might be initiated at any time by the Japanese by an attack on Pearl Harbor, or that in substance? Did you ever hear of any such letter at that time?

Col. BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief I have never seen or heard of any such letter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Chief of Staff never advised you of the existence of any such letter?

Col. BRATTON. I have no recollection of any such advice.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any of the what were then termed War Council meetings?

Col. BRATTON. No, I did not.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. In any of your conversations with the Chief of Staff did he ever discuss anything that went on at any conferences he had with his counterpart of the Navy or regarding the Japanese situation?

Col. BRATTON. Not that I recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever told, or did you know, in the latter part of November, of a message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which was concurred in by General Marshall, to the effect that we might anticipate a surprise and an aggressive Japa-

nese attack, or to be prepared for such a thing, or anything of that substance?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I saw such a message. It was dispatched, to the best of my recollection, on or about the 24th of November.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel?

Col. BRATTON. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message brought to the attention of General Miles at that time or General Kroner?

Col. BRATTON. I think so. I have no way of—

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall how you acquired your knowledge of the existence of such a message?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that I first learned of the message through my opposite number in ONI, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division. I later saw and read a copy of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of General Marshall's message of the 27th of November to General Short and other commanders in that general area? A warning message so-called?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you receive at any time during the first week of December 1941 any information either from the Navy or from our own military attaches to the effect that Jap consulates were burning documents and codes on or about the third of December?

Col. BRATTON. I can't recall receiving this information from any local source. I do remember, however, that in various Japanese messages detailed instructions were issued from Tokyo to their consulate and diplomatic officials as to the methods to be used by the latter in destroying their [10] codes and ciphers when directed to do so.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Roberts report states that on December 3, 1941 the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. Did you at that time ever know of such a message being sent by the Navy?

Col. BRATTON. No, to the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first time I have heard of it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the bulletin of December 1, 1941 dealing with the Japanese naval situation, issued by the Director of Naval Intelligence?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, this looks very familiar. I believe that I had access to this or a similar document and used it as the basis of a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of WPD to keep them informed as to where the Navy thought the bulk of the Japanese naval forces were located.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, I have here a whole series of these Top Secret messages, or copies of them rather, and I just want to get in the record whether you knew of these at the time. They are Army Nos. 23570, 23631, 23673, 23859, 24373, 24655, 24656, 24878, 25138, 25344, 25390, 25392, 25432, 25435, 25441, 25445, 25446, 25496, 25497, 25548, 25554, 25605, 25644, 25659, 25715, 25725, 25727, 25730, 25731, 25762, 25773, 25783, 25785, 25807, 25817, 25823, 25843, 25850. Have you seen these communications?

Col. BRATTON. Yes I have seen all of these communications before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to this No. 25432, after you received that did you make some arrangements for listening for broadcasts?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I did, through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put me in touch with an official of the FCC, a Mr. Sterling, I believe.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever receive, prior to Pearl Harbor, word from the FCC that such a code message had been put out by the Japanese?

Col. BRATTON. I did not, though I was in daily telephone communication with Mr. Sterling or his assistant in connection with this matter. Their understanding was that immediately upon [11] receipt of any such message I was to be informed by telephone, day or night. They had my office phone number and my house phone number. I did get from them on one or two occasions messages resembling the Wind Code, but which upon examination proved to be not in that code.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Navy ever give you any information of any such code message being put out?

Col. BRATTON. No, although I did discuss with them certain code messages that had been received which resembled the expected Wind Code messages.

Col. CLARKE. Did Col. Sadtler ever tell you that it was in?

Col. BRATTON. I cannot remember that he did. I have a vague recollection of a conversation with him about a code message indicating a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain. This, however, was beside the point. Such a break had been expected by all of us for some time. The code message we were waiting for was one indicating a break between Japan and the U. S. It never came through that I know of.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any message being sent by G-2 to the 14th Naval District to check up on some such alleged message prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No, I do know, however, that Gen. Miles sent a message to Gen. Short, or to Gen. Short's G-2 directing him to get in touch with Commander Rochefort of the Navy with respect to this type of message as the Navy was completely aware of all the facts in the case.

Col. CLARKE. Well that message actually went to G-2 in Hawaii.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 25138 and ask what your evaluation of that message was, if you remember.

Col. BRATTON. My evaluation of this message at the time I read it was that Japan intended taking military and/or naval action in the Pacific on or after the dates indicated.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And was that evaluation given by you to Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I believe so. I remember that during this period Gen. Miles and I discussed at some length the meaning or implication of each and all of these messages.

[12] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that true also of you and the Chief of Staff?

Col. BRATTON. Not in every case.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect whether it was true or not in this particular case, referring to No. 25138?

Col. BRATTON. I don't remember definitely. I am under the impression that I discussed this particular message both with Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall, and Gen. Gerow.

It. Col. GIBSON. Would you say the same is true of message No. 25644?

Col. BRATTON. No, but I can state that all three of the officers just mentioned were given copies of this in the present form.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Also on No. 25390. What interpretation or evaluation did you place on that particular message?

Col. BRATTON. I at this time do not recall the evaluation I gave that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention also to No. 25554 and 25555. What was your interpretation of this message? Particularly I call your attention to the last sentence thereof.

Col. BRATTON. This message, as is indicated in the text thereof, is an effort on the part of the Japanese Government to inform their diplomatic representative in Germany as to Japanese inability to successfully negotiate a pact with the United States and is an expression of the opinion of the Japanese Government that the United States was and would be allied with England, Australia, the Netherlands and China against Japan.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you at this time, Colonel, consider it a capability of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasibility of such an attack—an attack on our West Coast, an attack on Alaska, an attack on the Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other Pacific installations of ours, the Dutch or the British governments.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From a reading of these messages at that time did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake an attack on some of the United States installations?

Col. BRATTON. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate major objective would be the British and Dutch [13] possessions in the west Pacific. I believed at that time that any attack on any American installation would be in the nature of a diversion or have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the assistance of the Dutch or British.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General Kroner?

Col. BRATTON. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I discussed this feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. Gerow and with the Chief of Staff when asked my opinion in the matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a capability of the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed as one of the Japanese capabilities against us.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 1941 that the capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. I wonder how that happened, if you have any recollection of it?

Col. BRATTON. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the Army who were studying this situation always listed, mentally at least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of the situation with our counterparts in the Navy it was always emphasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, and we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possibility.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time did you feel that there was a fairly reasonable probability that Japan was going to attack the United States in the reasonably near future, I mean at the last of November or the first of December 1941?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, and I had felt for some time—that is over a period of several years—that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you so informed Gen. Miles and the Chief of Staff [14] that you, in the last of November or first of December 1941, felt it was probable that the Japs were going to attack the United States in the near future?

Col. BRATTON. Not in that form, but I repeatedly expressed the opinion to my superiors that Japan intended to take some form of aggressive action which would involve her in a war with us.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here before we get these people back. On the morning of December 7 when you got the famous message that they were going to deliver their note at one o'clock, will you recount briefly the actions which you took with reference to that message and also the actions of Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall?

Col. BRATTON. Will you permit me to refer to a memorandum which I made at the time for the record?

Col. CLARKE. Sure.

Col. BRATTON. The message in question, that is the deciphered message in question, was delivered to me from the Navy sometime between 0830 and 9000 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it had to be communicated to the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief, WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time. I called Gen. Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called Gen. Miles and reported the step that I had taken to him and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called Gen. Gerow or whether Gen. Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it and I don't remember now which of us did, but in any event Gen. Gerow was summoned to the office. I waited for the telephone call from Gen. Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven. I informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at once and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He said to report to him in his office as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 1125 immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived. The message was laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed. We were all asked by the

Chief of Staff for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message, in connection with [15] the lengthy Japanese ultimatum which the Chief of Staff had on his desk and read aloud to us at this time. Gen. Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, one p. m., an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. Gen. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.

PART II

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 15 September 1944.

Time: 1130-1200 and 1340-1455.

Present:

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

[16] Col. BRATTON. General Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the telephone and told him over the phone that he thought we should send out a warning as indicated above. After Adm. Stark replied, Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that the Admiral did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Gen. Miles and I nevertheless urged Gen. Marshall to send the warnings. Gen. Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message. There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included. Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to him the message he had just written out. Adm. Stark apparently concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed. Gen. Marshall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled warning. At about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. Gen. Marshall again asked us, in succession beginning with Gen. Miles, our opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message. Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance and that warning messages to our people should be sent. Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and I concurred. Gen. Marshall then gave me the message in his handwriting and instructed me to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal. As I was about to go out of the door there was some discussion as to whether it should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first, but it was decided that as time was an important factor, I was to take it in its draft form to the Message Center. As I left the room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question of priority involved, to give first priority to the Philippines. I took the message to Col. French, the Signal Corps officer in charge of the Message Center, explained to him that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Col. French said that

he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately. I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the [17] message to the addressees. I returned to the Message Center and talked the matter over with Col. French who informed me that the messages would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 1150 a. m. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me by Col. French.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this reply from Japan (No. 25843) start coming in on the 6th of December, do you have any recollection as to that?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that the message started coming in to the Navy on the 6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State that night.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you conferred with Gen. Miles or the Chief of Staff previously as to when the Japanese reply might be expected?

Col. BRATTON. We knew that some such message was coming. We of course had no way of telling when it would be forthcoming; it might have been a question of hours, it might be a question of days.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to message No. 25445, which apparently was received by you the 28th or 29th of November, you then had some knowledge that a reply might be expected within two or three days from that time. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Anyway, the first thing you did when you got the message on December 7 was to phone Gen. Marshall?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I called Gen. Marshall at his quarters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to the message sent to the G-2, Hawaiian Department on 5 December, signed Miles, requesting that Commander Rochefort, 14th Naval District, be contacted regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. How was it that this telegram happened to be sent?

Col. BRATTON. When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in the Navy, Commander McCullom, and his assistant, Lt. Kramer. They informed me that Commander Rochefort was their man in Hawaii, that he had [18] all the information that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could explain in detail to the commanding general or his G-2 the significance of the code and suggested that I have our G-2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could get the desired information to the commanding general in Hawaii or his G-2 much faster and in much greater detail and with far greater security than by means of a long and involved explanatory message which we would have been forced to send through the Army communication system.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to refer to this so-called Winds message. Did Col. Otis K. Sadtler of the Signal Corps ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, notify you that the Japanese had implemented the Wind Code by broadcasting a message in accordance with that code?

Col. BRATTON. As I have stated before, I cannot remember that he did, although I believe he did speak about one indicating a break between Japan and Great Britain.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know a naval officer by the name of Kramer who at the time of Early December 1941 was an assistant to Commander McCullom of ONI particularly being interested in communications work?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I knew him well and was in constant communication with him at this time both orally, in person and by telephone.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Lt. Kramer at this time ever notify you that the Navy had been advised by the FCC that a so-called Winds message had been intercepted by the FCC monitoring station?

Col. BRATTON. No. We discussed on one or two occasions messages resembling those in the Wind Code but as far as I know no actual Wind Code message ever came through prior to Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a cable sent 27 November to Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept., containing instructions of how to act in case hostilities between Japan and the United States occur and notifying him that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. Did you know of such a cable being sent?

Col. BRATTON. Not prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, I have seen a copy of the message since that date.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now paraphrase of a cable dated November 27, [19] 1941 sent to the G-2's of corps areas, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, signed Miles. Did you know of that being sent?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I did know of this message and was shown a copy of it on or about the date of dispatch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you ever see any reply from Gen. Short to that message?

Col. BRATTON. No, prior to Pearl Harbor I have never seen any reply from Gen. Short to any of these messages.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the sending of this message to the Adjutant General of November 28 warning your corps area and overseas department commanders?

Col. BRATTON. Yes I knew of this message. I am under the impression that I was shown a copy of it on or about the date of its dispatch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You had nothing to do with the sending of either that message or the other message G-2 sent out of November 27?

Col. BRATTON. I did not. My recollection is that they were both drafted in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2 or that of his executive.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I now show you a copy of a telegram from Melbourne, Australia via Honolulu to the War Department and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, date of sending of the message the 6th, date received December 7, 7:50 p.m. Do you recall seeing such a message?

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question. The message, however, looks vaguely familiar.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any of the information contained in this particular message prior to one o'clock the afternoon of 7 December 1941?

Col. BRATTON. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you an MID form, subject: Information received from the Orient, dated 3 November 1941, which is information purporting to come from a Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at a directors meeting of the Black Dragon Society. I ask if you remember receiving this information approximately at that time or shortly before.

[20] Col. BRATTON. I do not recall ever having seen this document, nor can I recall being advised as to its subject matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Information such as that, in the ordinary course of routine back in the summer and fall of 1941, would be routed through you as an ordinary matter, would it Col. Bratton?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, if this is a report from the Counter Intelligence Branch, which I believe it to be, I received information of this nature from the Chief of that Branch as a matter of routine.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to a report of the headquarters, Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941, subject: Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii. This report is signed by Philip L. Thurber, Colonel, GSC. First I ask if you have any recollection of this particular report.

Col. BRATTON. I have never seen this document before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The document last referred to of Headquarters, Third Corps Area, of December 18, 1941, on Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii, states in substance that Senator Gillette at Washington warned officials what was going to happen, stating to officials that Japan would declare war on the United States December 19 and would attack Hawaii. This information was alleged to have been conveyed about 3 weeks prior to December 18. Did you ever receive such information from Senator Gillette or from any other source?

Col. BRATTON. I did not.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you copy of a secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 sent to Commanding Generals of the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, Hawaiian Department, Fourth Army, which in substance was an estimate of the Jap probable course in the near future, and ask if you are familiar with that radiogram.

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall having seen this message prior to or on the date of its dispatch. However from its context I assume that it was based upon an estimate prepared either in my office or at my direction by one of my assistants as it expresses the views we entertained at that time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radio message dated Oct. 27, 1941 from Manila, P. I. to MILID, signed Brink, relative to movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific and ask if you saw that message at or about that time.

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question, [21] but the message looks familiar to me. I have seen this or one like it containing similar information.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radiogram dated October 29, 1941 from Manila to MILID, signed Evans, relative to the movement of Jap aircraft carriers and other seacraft. I ask if you had knowledge of that message at or about that time.

Col. BRATTON. This message also looks familiar. I would like to say at this time that during this period messages of this type came over my desk in considerable volume as all of our military attaches, ob-

servers and agents were under instructions to assist us in following the movements of Japanese naval craft and land forces.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a paraphrase of secret message dated November 29, 1941, No. 986, from Ft. Shafter to TAG, signed Short, which answers secret radiogram No. 4820 of November 28, 1941, and gives other data relative to the sabotage situation in Hawaii. I ask if you had ever seen that message prior to December 7, 1941.

Col. BRATTON. No. I have not seen this message before. As the subject matter deals largely with counter espionage and counter sabotage measures the message would not, in the ordinary course of events, have come over my desk but rather over the desk of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to MILID, those of July 12, July 14, July 23, 11:32 p. m. and July 27 being signed Creswell, and the one of July 23, 3:21 p. m. being signed Orear. I ask if you have recollection of seeing those cablegrams at about that time.

Col. BRATTON. Yes, all of these messages passed over my desk on or about the date of their arrival in MID.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Earlier I asked you about a brief periodic estimate of the situation December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, dated 29 November 1941, for the Chief of Staff. I now call your attention to a memorandum for the Chief of Staff entitled: Supplementary Brief Period Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942, dated December 5, 1941. What occasioned issuing a supplementary report as soon after the November 29th report, if you recall.

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall what the occasion was which demanded [22] the issuance of this supplementary estimate, but I believe that, as is stated in paragraph 1, the supplemental estimate is arranged in a form more suitable for the Operations Division for use in planning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this supplemental report of December 5 correctly represent your evaluation of the Japanese situation at that time?

Col. BRATTON. It did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of memorandums for the Chief of Staff of November 25, 26 and 27 dealing with the Far Eastern situation, Japanese Naval Task Force and Recent Developments in the Far East, respectively. Those reports correctly represent your evaluation of the various situations as outlined therein, did they?

Col. BRATTON. They did. I wrote them.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also call your attention to an undated memorandum of November 1941 for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, on the subject of G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation (for situation and communication maps) with tabs b, c, and d. Did this at that time correctly represent your evaluation of the facts?

Col. BRATTON. It did. I wrote it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you actually have any knowledge yourself as of early December 1941 of exactly what of our naval forces were at Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. Only in a general way.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at that time that the Navy, or a substantial part of it was tying up for weekends at Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. I did not and had I been in possession of that knowledge I would have urged, through the A. C. of S., G-2, that immediate action be taken to prevent such an assemblage in the Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At about this time, the first week of December 1941, had you heard from any source that the Fleet was ordered to stay in Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No. I was under the impression, gained from conversations [23] with my opposite number in ONI that the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had been alerted and all components were at their battle stations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I wish to say in asking this question that I don't have any knowledge that it had been ordered to stay in harbor; I had heard rumors of that, and that is the reason I asked the question.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, the first week of December 1941, were you under the impression that extensive air reconnaissance was being maintained from Hawaii?

Col. BRATTON. I was under that impression.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation or summaries of the situation that I have referred to, do you know what their actual dissemination was?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that in each case you will find at the bottom or lower left hand corner of the last page a distribution list which indicates to whom the carbon copies were routed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection on the morning of December 7 at what time it was that you received the intercept message which in effect instructed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver Tokyo's reply to the Secretary of State if possible at one o'clock in the afternoon?

Col. BRATTON. I received a copy of this intercept from the Navy at about 9 a. m.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Could you say you received it at about the same time as you received the reply itself?

Col. BRATTON. No. The reply itself was received the day before. It was a very long one and took considerable time to decipher and typewrite. It came to me as fast as the various sections could be typed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Col. Bratton, if on or about December 5, or at any time prior to an attack on Pearl Harbor you had been informed that the Japanese had broadcast a code message which implemented message No. 25432, which was the Winds Code message, and had been advised that such message, decoded, in substance meant U. S.-Japanese relations are in danger of being ruptured and their consulates were to burn their codes, what would have been your evaluation and action?

[24] Col. BRATTON. My evaluation would have been that Japan would immediately sever diplomatic relations with the United States and that hostilities against our country would ensue forthwith. Had I received such a report I would have taken immediate and vigorous action, through the A. C. of S., G-2, to see that the proper officials were alerted and warned to be on guard against any and all eventualities.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you once more describe in detail how this Top Secret material was handled between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of an officer to my office. I read all of the material, screening out that which had intelligence value. The other material I then burned. Indeed much that was daily brought in to me did not have intelligence value but was merely routine and administrative in nature. The screened material was then arranged by me in separate piles, one for the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of S., G-2, one for the Secretary of State, and one for the Chief of War Plans Division. I then bound each pile in a cardboard folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were brought back by me to my office, opened and the material therein checked prior to destruction by burning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It is also your recollection that it was shortly before Pearl Harbor that copies of this Top Secret material were to go also to Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, and it was so delivered to him by officer messenger daily for a short time prior to Pearl Harbor and a short time after Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a memorandum dated 6 December signed by James F. Perry and ask if you ever had that called to your attention at that time.

Col. BRATTON. No I have never seen this paper before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was any of the information contained in that paper ever relayed to you as you recollect at that time?

[25] Col. BRATTON. Not that I recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever notified by anybody from the Navy that the Navy had intercepted a message which was an implementation of the Winds Code prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No, and by Winds Code I mean that phrase which would indicate a rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. My recollection is that Lt. Kramer and Commander McCullom had received what appeared to be garbles of variations of this Winds Codes message on one or two occasions, but to the best of my knowledge and belief no clear cut Winds Code message was received prior to Pearl Harbor indicating that relations between Japan and the United States or Japan and Great Britain or Japan and Russia had been or were about to be severed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Commander McCullom ever tell you of drafting a warning message of several hundred words long warning the commanders in the Pacific area that war was imminent and that such message was not sent out because his superiors deemed it unnecessary?

Col. BRATTON. No, this is the first I have heard of this matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, to make sure to tie in all loose ends, let me ask you this. All of the Top Secret material that you have here identified the carrying dates of translation between October 1 and instant of Pearl Harbor and which are in this case Exhibit 1, were delivered by you or an officer working for you to the Chief of Staff, Secretary of War, Chief of War Plans Division, A. C. of S., G-2 and

the Department of State, were they not? And delivered at times relatively close to the date of the translation thereof as shown on the bottom of each Top Secret document?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

[26]

PART III

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 20 September 1944

Time: 1500-1600

Present:

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton

Colonel Carter W. Clarke

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson

Col. BRATTON. I have a statement to make and I request that it be made a part of the record of this investigation. The allegation has been made, in the press and elsewhere in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor, that if G-2 had been "on the job" we would not have been caught so unprepared for our war with Japan. In point of fact, G-2 in general and the Far Eastern Section in particular were very much "on the job," as evidenced by the written record of Estimates, Staff Studies, Memoranda, etc. with which G-2 served the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, ONI, the State Department and other interested planning and policy making agencies of the Government, to warn them of the increasing menace of Japanese war potential and intentions. G-2 can stand on this record and needs no defense from me. I feel, however, that a part of this record, as presented in the documents I now lay before you, should be taken cognizance of by this investigating committee and made a part of its proceedings if for no other reason than that the documents include some Top Secret papers heretofore known as Magic and many references to others.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do I understand, Col. Bratton, that many of the documents contained in the summaries now being introduced into this investigation, most of which were in the nature of Estimates of the Situation, contain conclusions based upon your knowledge of the material contained in the so-called Magic material?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. The principal document I show you I secured from the G-2 files. It is labeled, "Summary of Far Eastern Documents." It came into being as a result of a letter from the President to the Chief of Staff, dated July 14, 1943, in which the former requested copies of the dispatches of our military attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimates of potential military strength of any of the countries involved. The countries which [27] concerned the President were Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England and Russia. He indicated his interest in dispatches from January 1, 1937 until such time as our military attaches left the first seven named countries; his interest in similar dispatches from England dated from January 1, 1937 to the outbreak of the war in September 1939; and his interest in dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time (that is, the time of his letter of July 14, 1943). This letter of the President was transmitted to me by the

then A. C. of S., G-2, General Strong, who instructed me to start work on a compilation of the desired documents. I was at that time the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, MIS, G-2. I detailed Col. Maguire to exercise general supervision over the assembly of European documents and Col. Pettigrew over the Far Eastern documents. As stated in the explanatory note which you will find on page 1 of the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, the yearly summaries which follow on successive pages are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, etc. The summary itself was written in a chronologically arranged narrative form supported by photostats of the original documents in the files of G-2. It was arranged in this way to facilitate the use of the document by historical researchers. The European summaries were similarly compiled and supported by photostats of the original documents. All summaries were transmitted to the Chief of Staff by a covering memorandum signed by the A. C. of S., G-2, General Strong, 20 August 1943. With the covering memorandum was transmitted a memorandum for the President, subject: Axis War Potential, for the signature of the Chief of Staff, which read as follows:

There are forwarded herewith, in accordance with the request of the President dated July 14, 1943, copies of numerous Military Attache dispatches, memoranda, estimates and handbooks dealing with the preparations for war by Germany, Italy and Japan, and their aggressive intentions on the continents of Europe and Asia from January 1, 1937. Similar documents bearing on Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England, and Russia are also included.

These photostatic, carbon, or "true" copies [28] of G-2 dispatches, memoranda, etc., have been arranged in chronological order for each of the above-named countries. To assist the White House Secretariat in studying this material, a brief summary of the contents of each file has been prepared by G-2 and these summaries have also been arranged in chronological order in two volumes. Far Eastern and European, enclosed herewith as Tabs A and B respectively.

It has not been thought advisable to submit all documents on the subject of Axis war preparations to the White House. There are thousands of miscellaneous dispatches and other documents which touch incidentally on German, Italian and Japanese war preparations, but which are only slightly germane to an historical analysis of the information possessed by G-2 on Axis preparations and aggressive intentions.

Furthermore, as the President is aware, during the summer and fall of 1941. G-2 secured from highly secret sources considerable information indicating Japan's determination to resort to armed force in the event that the negotiations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, then being conducted, did not result in an agreement satisfactory to Japan. It is presumed that the President does not desire to have documents from this source included in this compilation because of the danger to security involved.

Great care has been taken by G-2 to include in this compilation copies of mis-estimates by Military Attaches or other persons as regards strength and intentions. A few such mis-estimates actually occurred, but on the whole, false conclusions were rare and pertained not so much to the strength and ultimate aggressive intentions of the Axis as they did to the timing of the aggression.

In the case of the document collection pertaining to Germany, a few very important dispatches have been included dealing with the period 1935-1936, inasmuch as these were the years of the largest and most rapid military expansion.

It is thought probable that, after the White House Secretariat commences to study these documents, it will feel the need for examining still further [29] dispatches on matters correlated to the Axis rearmament program. They can be promptly furnished by G-2 in case they are desired.

Col. BRATTON. On August 26, 1943, the A. C. of S., G-2 received a memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, which read as follows:

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain *only* MA reports.

This memorandum and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to me by Gen. Strong at approximately 2:00 p. m. 26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G-2, Staff Studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence, was not returned to Gen. Strong. I inferred that it would be forwarded to the President as compiled and that Tab A was to contain only raw, unevaluated military attache reports. I instructed the Chief, Far Eastern Unit, to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum. At about 2:45 p. m. 26 August 1943, Gen. Strong directed me to include military observer reports with military attache reports in Tab A. The revised Tab A, revised as directed in memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, dated 26 August 1943, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 1 September 1943. The Summary as then written and its supporting file of 15 volumes were based only upon reports received from military attaches and military observers. The Summary of Far Eastern Documents which went forward to the President did not contain any references to Magic or any summaries, estimates or Staff Studies based thereon wholly or in part. It is to the first edition or unrevised Summary of Far Eastern Documents that I wish to call the attention of this committee.

It will be noted that many of the documents have a "distribution list" written or printed on the document itself indicating the offices or officers to whom copies were given. Where no "distribution list" appears it may be assumed that the War Plans Division was given a copy, as was the Office of Naval Intelligence, as that was our standard operating procedure. The State Department was given copies when the subject matter would be of interest to that department. Occasionally, when considered of sufficient importance, copies went to the President.

[30]

TOP SECRET

PART IV

Place: Room 20637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 23 September 1944.

Time: 0950-1005.

Present:

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, while you were testifying about this meeting in the office of General Marshall on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, you were using a memorandum to refresh your recollection. When was that memorandum prepared and by whom?

Col. BRATTON. On or about the 8th of December 1941, by General Miles with my help.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Is the above paper a true copy of that memorandum?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to get a few more details about this Sunday morning meeting. After your telephone conversation with General

Marshall in which he told you to meet him at his (General Marshall's) office and that he was on his way there, what did you do?

Col. BRATTON. I called General Miles on the telephone and reported to him the gist of my conversation with General Marshall and recommended to General Miles that he come to the office too as General Marshall would no doubt want to see him also. Either General Miles or I, I have forgotten which, then called General Gerow and asked him to come to the office also as we felt General Marshall would wish to see him also. I then proceeded to General Marshall's office and waited for him either in the anteroom, that is, the office of the Secretary of the General Staff, or in the hallway where I could see the Chief of Staff immediately upon his arrival on that floor. My recollection is that General Marshall and General Miles arrived at about the same time and that I followed the two of them into the latter's office, carrying a copy of the message I wished him to see.

[31] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message the message of instructions to the Japanese Ambassadors to deliver the Japanese reply to the Department of State at one p. m. Washington time?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to ask another question to clear up another point. When, to the best of your recollection, was the Japanese reply, Top. Secret Army No. 25843, delivered to General Marshall's office?

Col. BRATTON. Either on the night of 6 December or early in the morning of the 7th, prior to his arrival at his office.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you walked into General Marshall's office, following General Marshall and General Miles, on the morning of 7 December, what did you do?

Col. BRATTON. I handed him the message referring to the time of delivery to the Secretary of State of the Japanese long reply.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did he read it that time or did he read the long Japanese reply first, as far as you recollect?

Col. BRATTON. As far as I recollect, he read the message that I handed to him first, then read the long reply.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, is it possible that the second telephone conversation on that Sunday morning between General Marshall and Admiral Stark was as a result of Admiral Stark's calling General Marshall, rather than General Marshall calling Admiral Stark?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, it is quite possible.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make two or three trips to the message center with the message penciled by General Marshall on that forenoon of 7 December?

Col. BRATTON. I made only two trips to the message center, carrying General Marshall's penciled memorandum with me for delivery to the officer in charge of the message center on the first trip.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy go with you on either trip to the message center on that Sunday morning?

Col. BRATTON. He did not.

[32] Lt. Col. GIBSON. This 11:25 a. m. when you first saw General Marshall on that Sunday morning, that time is the time as you and General Miles recalled it when you drew up this Memorandum for the Record, is it not?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF COL. EDWARD F. FRENCH

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 28 September 1944.

Time: 1015-1045.

Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Colonel Edward F. French.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Edward F. French, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you state your name, rank and serial number and present position, please.

Col. FRENCH. Colonel Edward F. French, O8935, officer in charge of Traffic Operation Branch, Army Communications Service, Office Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you on duty in the War Department in Washington in that position the first week of December 1941?

Col. FRENCH. I was.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. As such, did you have immediate supervision over the War Department message center?

Col. FRENCH. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now telegram dated 5 December 1941 signed Miles, addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and ask if this telegram passed through your message center for delivery to the addressee on that particular day.

Col. FRENCH. This message was received in the code section of the War Department message center at 11:47 a. m. on the 5th of December 1941, as indicated by the stamp on the reverse side. This message was given a code serial number of 519 and its transmission evidenced by the "Sent No. 519 12-5," as typed on the face of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that typed by the message center, that particular typing?

[2] Col. FRENCH. No. This clear text message never left the code room but that number and date was typed on there after the return of the coded copy of the coded text itself from the Signal Center.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who actually did the typing of the words "Sent No. 519 12-5"?

Col. FRENCH. That was typed on there by a clerk in the code room after the return of the message from the Signal Center.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. After the message had actually been sent?

Col. FRENCH. After the message had actually been received by the Signal Center for transmission. Then this copy, as provided for under the routine, was returned to G-2. We do not keep any copies of the original texts in our office; they were returned to the writer within 24 hours.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you explain the routine that then existed between Hawaii and the War Department which was set up to insure that all messages sent were received?

Col. FRENCH. To assure that all messages were received, we had a separate set of serial numbers that was utilized to identify the classified message. These numbers were assigned in sequence and were frequently checked to assure that the message assigned that number reached its destination. In some instances messages have been delayed in transmission or in office routine so that a message would be received in a code room out of sequence. In such instances a service message would be instituted to check for the message not in sequence that was evidently delayed or possibly lost.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, Colonel, if message No. 519, being the telegram in question in this investigation, had not been received by Hawaii, what would have happened?

Col. FRENCH. In checking their numbers off in Hawaii, when Hawaii would receive No. 520 and No. 419 did not appear in a reasonable time, they would query the War Department message center relative to No. 519, and the War Department message center would check the files, verify its transmission and repeat the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you believe this message No. 519 on 5 December 1941 went by cable or by radio?

[3] Col. FRENCH. I believe that that message went via radio as it was a "routine" message and our normal transmitting would be via radio. In the event that our radio was out of service, due to atmospheric conditions, the message would have been transmitted via cable.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your records of messages sent in December 1941 were kept for how long?

Col. FRENCH. As I recall it, at the time it was 6 months. However, the regulations have since been changed and the messages are now retained for a period of 3 months. The War Department code room is not an office of records, under the provisions of Army regulations. All records pertaining to classified messages rest with the office of origin.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Then as far as you know the Signal Corps have no existing records in Washington that would show any more about the fate of message No. 519 of 5 December 1941?

Col. FRENCH. The only actual record of this message is as indicated on the message itself. The files of the coded text have all been destroyed by burning, as provided for in Army regulations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go to the morning of 7 December 1941. Were you on duty in the message center on that morning?

Col. FRENCH. I placed myself on duty on Sunday morning, 7 December.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you there when Colonel Rufus Bratton brought a penciled message to the message center?

Col. FRENCH. I was in my office across the hall from the code room when Colonel Bratton came to the code room with a message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you tell us now what took place at that time.

Col. FRENCH. I heard some commotion over in the code room and I immediately left my desk and on arrival there I found Col. Bratton with a message that he was anxious to have processed for immediate transmission. I asked Colonel Bratton if I could be of any assistance to him and he said he was anxious to get this message processed [4] immediately. The message, as I recall, was written in pencil on a slip of paper. It was rather difficult to read so I told Colonel

Bratton it would be necessary to type the message and have him verify. The message was typed and Colonel Bratton verified and authenticated the message. We immediately processed this message into a code system and after the work was under way I went into the Signal Center to check and determine the method of transmission. I found that our channel at Honolulu was out, due to atmospheric conditions, from about 10:30 that morning. I had the operator check the channel to Honolulu and at that time Honolulu could not be heard. It was determined that Honolulu was working San Francisco but the atmospheric condition was so bad that to transmit the message to San Francisco in a relay to Honolulu would mean that it would have to be sent at slow speed and then copied and retransmitted at San Francisco to Honolulu. I made up my mind that the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service and avoid the risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army facilities through San Francisco.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. What did you know about the means of communication between RCA and Honolulu and Ft. Shafter?

Col. FRENCH. Our normal method of transmitting a message, when atmospheric conditions prevent handling via radio, is to utilize commercial facilities that are available in the Signal Center. As this message could be handled directly to San Francisco via the Western Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA office in San Francisco, with that excellent dispatch, this method had been chosen. I had learned on Saturday, the day previous, that the RCA was installing a teletype circuit to the Department headquarters at Ft. Shafter, so I assumed that this would be the most expeditious means of getting that message with the least practicable delay to the Department headquarters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You have no personal knowledge, I assume, of actually what happened to the message when it got to Hawaii?

Col. FRENCH. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bratton return to the message center a second time after he had been there the first time as you have described?

[5] Col. FRENCH. Yes, I believe Colonel Bratton was in my office several times during that Sunday morning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was he there a second time with reference to this particular message?

Col. FRENCH. As I recall, on my return to the code room from the Signal Center, I met Colonel Bratton at the code room door and he asked me how long it would take to get that message transmitted to Hawaii. I informed him that I thought it would be there within a half hour to 45 minutes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy ever at any time come that morning to your office with Colonel Bratton?

Col. FRENCH. I don't recall that Colonel Bundy came to my office with Colonel Bratton but I very definitely recall Colonel Bundy coming to my office that morning and spending some time with me there.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that before or after this episode?

Col. FRENCH. After this episode. In fact, Colonel Bundy and I reviewed the action taken on certain messages.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Which messages were they that you reviewed the action taken on?

Col. FRENCH. Whatever messages were at that time being transmitted through the office.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1]

PART I

Place: Room 20637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 16 September 1944.

Time: 1045-1115.

Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Mr. William F. Friedman.

Mr. William F. Friedman, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name and official position in the U. S. Government.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, Office Chief Signal Officer.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties in this position during the six months period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service. I had just been retired from active duty as lieutenant colonel, Signal Reserve, in about April, I think it was the early part of April 1941, and was given an honorable discharge for permanent disability. I had been in Walter Reed hospital for some three or four months and was recovering from a nervous breakdown.

Col. CLARKE. In your position you were familiar with and had access to and had read all of the production of the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had access to it. I didn't read it all because at that time, in my condition I was not able to carry on a full day's duty and had been assigned to other work by Col. Minkler who was then the Chief of SIS.

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with a message which was received on or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. I gave you this document and ask you to identify it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that I was familiar with it at the time.

[2] Col. CLARKE. Will you state what, to the best of your recollection, is the history of this message, with any implementing message which may have been received in connection with it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My recollection is so hazy at the moment and I really was not in on the details of cryptanalytic operations at the time, so I would hesitate to make any statement about that.

Col. CLARKE. Could you refresh your memory by getting a log of SIS?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that would be possible.

Col. CLARKE. Do you know whether any implementing message on that was ever received?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not to my direct knowledge at the time. I only learned of it comparatively recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and Capt. Safford of the Navy. If I did know it at the time I have forgotten it.

Col. CLARKE. Would you care to make any statement with reference to the arrangement which was then in existence where the Navy processed messages one day and the Army the next. Would that have contributed to the disaster where you had no continuity of study?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe that arrangement had any particular affect on the situation. It was an arrangement that was worked out between Adm. Noyes and Gen. Mauborgne, to have as fair a distribution of work and credit in the results achieved as possible.

Col. CLARKE. The point I am making there though is, would the translators who worked on the same thing day in and out not have had this continuity of thought in mind if the same people had been working on it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Of course the translators in both the Army and the Navy cryptanalytic sections were constantly engaged on the same sort of material. There was a full exchange of material and results. A message might be done one day by the Navy people and another message the next day by the Army people, so that they kept their hands in it together and they were keeping abreast of each other in the work. That of course was one of the aims of that arrangement. I, as a technician, think that it was a poor arrangement from a cryptanalytic standpoint but from a practical standpoint, in trying to share the work on an equal basis and share credit perhaps, that is as good an arrangement as could be worked out, with two separate but cooperating organizations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Just one question. You received from the FCC a document with three attachments, a letter dated August 18, 1944 having to do with the so-called Winds Message and possible implementation thereof. Is that correct? I show you this telegram.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The documents were not received directly by me from the FCC. I was given a copy by Capt. Safford of the Navy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And this is the document that I now have in my possession?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right.

PART II

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 19 September 1944.

Time: 1030-1200.

Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Mr. William F. Friedman.

[4] **Lt. Col. GIBSON.** Do you now have access to the Signal Intelligence Service records of the United States Army for the dates October through Pearl Harbor 1941?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And have you searched those records to see what, if anything, was done about having Army signal stations monitor for the Japanese Winds Code message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have examined the files which are extant and find that certain messages were sent and I can present copies of those which were found.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Army ask its stations to monitor for implementations of the so-called Winds messages?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not specific Winds messages so far as I know, but a general directive was sent to all its monitoring stations on December 2 directing that monitoring stations were to copy all Japanese plain text in addition to code text and that traffic be forwarded with the regular traffic.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was any other message sent in this regard after that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On December 7 a message was sent to Signal officers at Manila, Ft. Shafter and Presidio of San Francisco directing that they were to send to the War Department by priority enciphered radio Japanese clear language messages all ending with the English word "stop," copied since November 27 and thereafter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Is there any record showing that the Army Signal Service received prior to Pearl Harbor any message that implemented either of these Winds Codes?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not that I have been able to find so far.

[5] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Have you made a diligent search from all possible sources available to you to see if the Army Signal Service, through its monitoring stations, ever received any executing message to these Winds messages?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have made a diligent search but I will not say that it is a completely exhaustive search because of the lack of time. Thus far I have not found a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army station actually intercepted a Winds execute message.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. L. T. GEROW

[1] Place: Room 3E794 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 25 September 1944.

Time: 1420-1530.

Present:

Major General L. T. Gerow.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Major General L. T. Gerow, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station please.

Gen. GEROW. L. T. Gerow, Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding V Corps, Luxembourg.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties, sir, from the period October 1, 1941 through December 7?

Gen. GEROW. Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division.

Col. CLARKE. In this position, will you state whether or not you received from G-2 any material which was then known to you as Magic.

Gen. GEROW. I did.

Col. CLARKE. Are you familiar with that material? Do you identify any of it as material which you have previously seen?

Gen. GEROW. I saw material of a similar nature three years ago. I cannot definitely state at this time whether or not I saw these particular documents. I imagine I did.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall having discussed with Colonel Bratton or General Miles a message which later became known as the "Winds" message? In that message there was a statement that if certain words occurred in the weather broadcast that would indicate the severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan or Great Britain and Japan or Russia and Japan. The message is Top Secret Army No. 29432.

Gen. GEROW. I believe I saw the message and discussed it with [2] Colonel BRATTON. I cannot be sure, at this late date.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall whether on the morning of approximately December 5 or at any other time that you discussed with General Miles or Colonel Bratton any message which implemented that which would indicate the severance of relations between the United States and Japan?

Gen. GEROW. I do not remember any such message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall, as Chief of War Plans Division, any warning message being sent out on or about November 27, 28 or 29 to the overseas commanders?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I remember the message sent out on 27 November.

Col. CLARKE. Do you have any recollection of any of this stuff that Sadtler says here in his testimony?

Gen. GEROW. I have recollection of talking to Sadtler only once. I don't recall ever being informed by Colonel Sadtler of the fact that Japan had decided to declare war on Great Britain.

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever informed by Colonel Bratton or General Miles of that?

Gen. GEROW. Not to the best of my recollection.

Col. CLARKE. When Colonel Bratton would bring this material to you, would you just read it or did you discuss it with him?

Gen. GEROW. Ordinarily he would leave it for me to read. On some occasions he would remark that he had something very hot or refer to a particular paragraph which we would discuss.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever discussing the contents of any of this, prior to Pearl Harbor, with General Marshall?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I do recall discussing Magic information with General Marshall on numerous occasions.

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember whether or not any of the warning messages which you sent out, as Chief of War Plans Division, were based on this material?

[3] Gen. GEROW. The warning messages were based on the general situation as we knew it and a part of that information came from these messages.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever having gotten a warning from the Secretary of State to the effect that negotiations would very likely break down and that war would ensue?

Gen. GEROW. Of course I didn't get any information as a rule direct from the Secretary of State. On one occasion I recall there was a general discussion in the Secretary of War's office relative to the phrasing of a warning message to go to the overseas commanders. Prior to sending this message out the Secretary of War conferred over the

telephone with the Secretary of State. The result was that a message, dated November 27th, was sent out containing such a statement.

Col. CLARKE. General, will you state what you recollect about the instance of the morning of December 7, with particular reference to any message which may have been brought to your attention by Colonel Bratton or General Miles.

Gen. GEROW. I have here a memorandum for record on that subject which I prepared on December 15, 1941. I would like to insert that memorandum in the record as my answer to your question.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you Top Secret Army No. 25850. Is that the message you refer to?

Gen. GEROW. I cannot definitely identify this message, but I think it is the same one that was under discussion.

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. Do you recall who, if anyone, there wrote a message to be sent to Honolulu?

Gen. GEROW. General Marshall personally wrote the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Referring to your memorandum dated 15 December 1941, do you remember whether General Marshall sent Colonel Bratton back to the message center a second time to check?

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall whether there was any discussion or debate regarding the interpretation on either of [4] these messages in General Marshall's office prior to the writing of this message? Was it discussed freely?

Gen. GEROW. The message was discussed freely. The main point involved was the significance of the time—1:00 p. m.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And who was there exactly besides you, Bratton and General Marshall?

Gen. GEROW. General Miles and Colonel Bundy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The discussion, as you remember it, was about this one o'clock proposition?

Gen. GEROW. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember whether or not General Marshall asked your opinion, what it meant, or anything of this nature?

Gen. GEROW. He asked all of us for an opinion as to the meaning of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Magic, was that delivered in a dispatch case at that time to your office everyday—a locked dispatch case?

Gen. GEROW. As I recall, Bratton used to bring it down himself personally in a locked dispatch case.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. During the day you would go over it and the next day he would come and get that and leave you some more?

Gen. GEROW. I don't think we kept it. I think I went over it as soon as I could and occasionally I would call Bundy, my war planning man, in and let him see parts of it, and then it would be returned immediately to Bratton.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you pretty close to G-2 at the time; did they give you estimates of the situation occasionally?

Gen. GEROW. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And you conferred with them about the enemy situation generally?

Gen. GEROW. That is correct.

[5] Lt. Col. GIBSON. It was your duty, as head of the War Plans Division, to direct the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-

ment as to dispositions, what state of alert to take, or anything of that nature?

Gen. GEROW. Not necessarily that way. If something important would come up it would be discussed with the Chief of Staff and might be discussed by the Joint Board. Messages would result from those discussions.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally such instructions sent out would be sent through your office?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, on matters involving WPD responsibilities. If it were purely a G-2 matter, the instructions would go out through the G-2 office. War Plans Division occupied a little different status at that time from what it occupies now.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Navy ever inform you exactly of what their naval schedule was, that is, when their ships would be in harbor and when they would be out to sea, or anything of this nature, particularly referring to the Hawaiian Islands?

Gen. GEROW. No. I don't believe they did specifically inform me. I could have gotten that information, however, from the Navy had I asked for it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware that the Navy were coming in and tying up on definite weekends in Hawaii?

Gen. GEROW. No. I was not.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a message dated 27 November 1941 and ask if that is the message that you have referred to in your testimony where the telephone conversation was had with the Secretary of State prior to the sending of that particular message?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, this is the message I referred to. I presume that it is a true copy of the original message.

Col. CLARKE. Yes it is.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also show you a copy of a secret radiogram dated July 7, 1941 which is in the nature of a warning to the Hawaiian commander and others and ask if you recollect that.

[6] Gen. GEROW. Yes. It carries my signature.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I just wondered if you had any recollection of it now.

Gen. GEROW. Yes. I remember such a message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, even on July 7, 1941, you were giving some sort of warning to these various commanders?

Gen. GEROW. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you sent this warning of November 27, did you consider that as a definite war warning, General?

Gen. GEROW. I considered it very definitely a message to put our forces on the alert in these various overseas garrisons against a possible attack by Japan.

I was called to the Deputy Chief of Staff's office (General Bryden) and there General Miles, Colonel Bundy, General Bryden and I discussed the advisability of including in this message any reference to sabotage or subversive activities. I objected to the inclusion of any reference to sabotage in this message that was being prepared by War Plans Division. As I recall, the decision was finally made by General Bryden that G-2 would send a message to the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department telling them to be on the alert against sabotage. The original copy of the message that we had at that meeting shows that the

reference to subversive activities and sabotage was stricken out and initialed by me, with the approval of General Bryden.

Col. CLARKE. In view, sir, of what you have just stated, in your opinion this message of November 27 constituted a definite war warning to the overseas commanders and you did not want to confuse sabotage or subversion with an alert?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I did conceive it to be that, very definitely.

Lt. Col. GIBSON: General, this message of November 27, 1941 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, was considered by you to be a definite warning to be on the alert against a possible enemy offensive against those garrisons.

[7] Gen. GEROW. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now, General, a paraphrase of a radiogram from General Short received in the War Department 29 November 1941 and ask if you recollect that message.

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall having seen that message. If I did see it my initials probably appear on it in the permanent records.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection of having an answer from General Short to your warning radiogram of 27 November 1941?

Gen. GEROW. The War Department records show that such a message was received in the War Department.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You mean an answer from General Short?

Gen. GEROW. Correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you recollect what his answer was?

Gen. GEROW. I have refreshed my memory from War Department records. There was a reply received from General Short which in substance stated that he had taken all the necessary precautions against sabotage and that he had liaison with the Navy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the message of November 24, 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion, and that the message stated that the Chief of Staff of the Army requested the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the dispatch? Did you know of the sending of that dispatch on or about 24 November 1941?

Gen. GEROW. I knew that the Navy sent such a message and believe that I read it. As to the exact date and wording, I cannot recall at the moment.

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. But it was at about that time?

Gen. GEROW. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you also know that on the 27th of November, the date on which this warning message was sent through your office to the Commanding General of Hawaii, that the Chief of Naval Operations was sending a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Pen-

insula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. The message further stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. At about that time did you know such a message was being sent by the Navy Department?

Gen. GEROW. To the best of my recollection, at that meeting in the Secretary's office on the morning of November 27, it was agreed at that time that the Navy would send a similar warning message to the one that the War Department was sending out.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at the time that on December 3, 1941 the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet stating it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; and that on December 4 and again on December 6 they sent instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet with regard to destroying certain confidential documents and means of confidential communication under conditions of emergency. Did you know of such messages being sent?

Gen. GEROW. I have no recollection of having seen such a message although I may have seen it before dispatch. The War Plans Divisions of both the Army and Navy were in constant contact and kept each other advised of action taken.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, was it your opinion that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the other Commanding Generals of the Departments in the Pacific or of the Caribbean had had sufficient warning against any aggressive action by an enemy, particularly the Japanese?

Gen. GEROW. I felt that they had been sufficiently warned as to the possibility of aggressive action on the part of Japan.

DECEMBER 15, 1941

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army were read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

/s/ L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW

Brigadier General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. HAYES A. KRONER

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 13 September 1944.

Time: 1430-1510.

Present:

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station.

Gen. KRONER. Hayes A. Kroner, Brigadier General. Station: Rio de Janeiro, Military Attache.

Col. CLARKE. When did you first come on duty in G-2, War Department General Staff?

Gen. KRONER. About the first of March 1941.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time?

Gen. KRONER. I was assigned to the British Empire Section of the Intelligence Branch, G-2 but before taking up those duties I was sent to England for a period of observation of the war. I returned from England early in June, about the middle of June 1941, and took up my duties of Chief of the British Empire Section, G-2 at that time.

Col. CLARKE. How long did you continue on that duty?

Gen. KRONER. Approximately one month.

Col. CLARKE. And then what did you do?

Gen. KRONER. About the middle of July I was informed by the retiring Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Col. C. H. Mason, that he was leaving G-2 and that he had been instructed to turn the Branch over to me as the next senior officer. I immediately took over charge of the Branch and for the next several months was acting in charge and later on I was appointed Chief of the Branch. To the best of my memory it was about September 17 that an order was issued by the Executive Officer, G-2 appointing me as the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, which position I [2] held until sometime in the month of December, when General Lee became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and I was then verbally relieved from Chief of Intelligence Branch and made Deputy to General Lee.

Col. CLARK. What did the Intelligence Branch consist of principally?

Gen. KRONER. I found the Intelligence Branch, in July '41, to consist of a very small Administrative Section and of several geographic sections and an Air Section. The Administrative Section was in process of transition. Because of the impact of the war and more information coming into G-2, there was a greater need for proper handling and dissemination of that information. The only geographic section of G-2 which appeared to be expanding at that time was the Latin American Section. By the 10th of October—referring here to the official chart on record—the Intelligence Branch consisted of a headquarters or the Administrative Section, Contact Section, Situation Section, Dissemination Section, and the Air and geographic sections composed of the following: Air Section, British Empire Section, Western European Section, Central European Section, Eastern European Section, South-

ern European Section, Far East Section, and the Latin American Section. The several European sections had been set up to deal with the increased information coming in from the European war and, together with the British Empire Section, it was considered adequate to handle the war in Europe. The Latin American Section was expanding for obvious reasons of hemisphere defense. The Far Eastern Section at this time had not undergone any material change, so far as I remember, for several months. This organization, with a few changes, continued during my tenure of office as Chief of the Branch. The second exhibit of the organization chart of December 5, 1941 indicates that.

Col. CLARKE. I understand you to say then that you were Chief of the Intelligence Group from about July through Pearl Harbor, December 7?

Gen. KRONER. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made—first let me ask you this—who was the Chief of the Far Eastern Section?

Gen. KRONER. Col. R. S. Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made to you as Chief of the Group for any increase in personnel [3] or expansion of its intelligence gathering activities?

Gen. KRONER. Not any to give me any trouble—there was some minor increase of a clerk or two and perhaps one officer, I don't remember, but nothing in the line of expansion as I have referred to in the European Section. I would say this further, that one of their Far East experts, Col. Pettigrew, was taken from the Far Eastern Section at that time to assist in the reorganization of the Headquarters dissemination, so that I had very close to me at that time an experienced Far East officer on my staff.

Col. CLARKE. Who was that?

Gen. KRONER. Pettigrew. It was, I think, worthy of note just here that Col. Betts, who was the Chief of the Situation subsection, whom I called my G-2-G-3 officer on my own staff, Col. Pettigrew being so-called G-1-G-4 officer, together with my own experience in the Far East, that with Col. Bratton it was a fairly good team of Far East trained officers at the head of the Intelligence Group.

Col. CLARKE. Was there any action taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Group that would lead you to think that any difficulties or hostilities were expected in the Orient that would affect the United States?

Gen. KRONER. None specifically as to direct threat in regard to time or date or place. Japanese possible lines of action were often discussed, as you might expect among officers as closely allied as the ones I mentioned above with Far East training and influence. I left the evaluation of information pertaining to the Far East and its interpretation initially to Col. Bratton, and in that over-all sense to Col. Betts.

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the Far East?

Gen. KRONER. Military Attache reports and translations of books and journals which were received from various sources, so far as I was aware.

Col. CLARKE. You had no secret intelligence service?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Col. CLARKE. Was any attempt made to create any during the time that you were in charge?

[4] Gen. KRONER. Yes. I remember the time—I don't remember exactly—but I remember an instance which was partially fulfilled, I believe, that a former Far East trained officer, who I think was retired and living in California, Captain or Major W. C. Clear, was brought into G-2 and given secret briefing by Gen. Miles, to the best of my knowledge, and sent out to the Far East, I think to Singapore, in order to initiate some secret intelligence, of which I have no detailed knowledge.

Col. CLARKE. Did we have any liaison with the Chinese secret intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. Not that I know of. The Military Attache in China may have had such but it did not come to my attention.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have direct communication and contact or a direct reporting system with the G-2 of the Philippine Department?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, we exchanged reports and some telegrams. That I left largely in the hands of Col. Bratton who, as Chief of the Far Eastern Section, encompassed Japan, China and the Philippines and in general the whole Pacific area. In the Intelligence Section, as far as I know, prior to Pearl Harbor the exchange of information was routine; it was automatic. I recall toward the end of the summer of '41 that Col. Bratton got somewhat disturbed because our Military Attache in Tokyo was getting practically no information. The Japanese had practically closed up on him, and we took that as an indication of their general hardening of their relationship towards us.

Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any reports from the State Department agencies such as the Commercial Attache or the consular service?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, all sections in the Intelligence Branch had at that time direct liaison with their appropriate opposite number in the State Department. This was an established standard procedure, and only when something out of the ordinary came to the front was the State Department paper given any special attention. In addition to that I, Chief of the Branch, and Col. Betts talked and discussed things concerning the Far East with various officers in the State Department and also in the Navy Department.

Col. CLARKE. I was going to ask, did you have the same relation with the Navy?

[5] Gen. KRONER. And the same relation with the Navy.

Col. CLARKE. Did that give you, so far as you know, full and complete exchange of information and intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. So far as I know.

Col. CLARKE. What were your relations with the F. B. I.? Did you have any contact with them?

Gen. KRONER. I had none whatever. I got no information—

Col. CLARKE. Did you from any other federal government agency?

Gen. KRONER. The Commerce Department is the only one at that time, I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as Top Secret or the British known as Most Secret?

Gen. KRONER. Meaning communications information?

Col. CLARKE. Signal intelligence.

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Col. CLARKE. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it?

Gen. KRONER. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who sometimes handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. Miles.

Col. CLARKE. Then you don't know what Col. Bratton did with this stuff other than to give it to Gen. Miles?

Gen. KRONER. No official information. I frequently remember seeing him leave his office with several parcels under his arm and be gone for some hours, but I felt it was my duty to follow the established procedure which was apparently pleasing to my own chief, and I didn't question the procedure.

[6] Col. CLARKE. During the time that you were Chief of the Intelligence Group you never had access or never saw any of this material yourself? When did you first see it?

Gen. KRONER. I only saw the material, which later I learned was called material, when I used to receive it from Minkler's hands when Bratton was absent, and lock it up in my safe and give it to Bratton without sorting it out. In other words, I understood, without any specific orders from Gen. Miles, *that he wished it handled that way and therefore I did not violate that procedure.*

Col. CLARKE. Do you know if any estimates were written in the Far Eastern Section based on this material or any prognostications, forecasts, or predictions?

Gen. KRONER. I do not.

Col. CLARKE. If any had been made you would have seen them, wouldn't you, as the Chief?

Gen. KRONER. I think so because estimates were accustomed to being made, not only at regular intervals, but also special estimates from time to time would be made, the Far Eastern part of which was always prepared initially in the Far East, held by Col. Bratton or under his direction brought in to Col. Betts, who revised it and fitted it in with information from other geographic sections. I assumed that the Chief of the Far Eastern Section used all the information at his disposal to make a complete estimate and as accurate an estimate as possible.

Col. CLARKE. Did there exist anything like a central evaluating section where all information came in and was there melted into one estimate or report or summary?

Gen. KRONER. No. There was a trend toward that at the end of the year but we didn't get anywhere with it. It was just in the planning stage.

Col. CLARKE. Well then, you have no personal or official knowledge of who other than Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles saw this Top Secret material?

Gen. KRONER. That is correct. I have not.

Col. CLARKE. Are you familiar with any warning messages that may have been sent to the Hawaiian or other departments?

[7] Gen. KRONER. Only now—not at the time of the sending.

Col. CLARKE. At the time they were prepared and sent you had no knowledge?

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Colonel CLARKE. When did you first become aware of the existence of these warning messages which were sent out of the War Department?

Gen. KRONER. I remember a few days after Pearl Harbor, when there was naturally a certain amount of excitement in the War Department, hearing it said by someone—I don't remember—either in Col. Ralph Smith or Gen. Miles' office, words to the effect, "I wonder if that message got through in time," and it was several days later that I learned that an official message from the War Department had gone out to the Commanding General at Honolulu either the night before or the day after Pearl Harbor, I am not certain.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know anything about any warning messages that were sent out late in November?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Col. CLARKE. Or early in December before the morning of December 7?

Gen. KRONER. I never heard about those until today.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I would like to ask, General, if you ever asked Gen. Miles yourself whether or not you were to see this Top Secret information or whether it was his desire that you not see it.

Gen. KRONER. No, I am very certain I did not ask him and I have a very good reason and that is because Col. Bratton impressed me so much with the secrecy and the importance of his relation with Gen. Miles, that it was Gen. Miles' wish.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you received the information from Col. Bratton that that was Gen. Miles' wish.

Gen. KRONER. Not so much the specific information as it was that I received the impression from Col. Bratton that Gen. Miles wished Bratton to handle this information with him.

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go back to the State Department liaison. Were you, as head of the Intelligence Division, kept informed of the conversations between the Secretary of State and Admiral Nomura and Kurusu prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. No, except that Gen. Miles once in a while would make some remark on the subject.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You personally never went over to the State Department or talked with anyone there about the situation?

Gen. KRONER. In regard to communications?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You never received any warning of any kind from anybody in the State Department?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your Intelligence Section, in receiving reports from the Navy receive any submarine reconnaissance reports or reports of that nature from the Navy?

Gen. KRONER. Not to the best of my knowledge. I don't remember any submarine reconnaissance reports until 1942.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain any gathering of information, any contacts with religious societies or anything to gather information about the Far East from missionaries or anything of that nature?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. There were some missionaries who, by habit and custom, maintained certain contact direct with the Far Eastern Section.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I see. How about these big private corporations, banks and companies that deal with local ones throughout the Far East—were they contacted by your intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. I think they were rather few and far between.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there any contact with the British Secret Service at that time?

Gen. KRONER. Not to my knowledge.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were inquiries made of the Maritime Commission on whether or not shipping was being obstructed out in that area?

Gen. KRONER. There may have been, but I don't remember that. We [9] were building up, you will notice from the chart, the Contact Section and they were beginning to explore the field you were referring to. How far they got I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain close liaison with the War Plans Division—I believe that is what it was called at that time?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. Every section in G-2 knew personally and talked to the Section in War Plans Division.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you personally, for instance, know of what the Fleet consisted of out in Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, in a general way.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know the extent of our own anti-aircraft defenses and of our radar installations?

Gen. KRONER. A very incomplete idea of that.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period from December 1 to sometime in 1942.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers?

Gen. KRONER. No. The matter was discussed—

Col. CLARKE. Did you identify this document?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. I identified it—this is the document to which I referred—IB 159, November 29, 1941. This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wished to focus War Department thought on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the [10] preparation of the estimate each geographic section in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel—now Brigadier General—Thomas J. Betts put the several estimates together and did what we called “polish them up.” He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved.

This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan, an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because when the word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this most secret material or to whom he showed it.

Gen. KRONER. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles.

Col. CLARKE. And you don't know what Miles did with it.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 14 September 1944.

Time: 0930-1030.

Present:

Major General Sherman Miles. Colonel Carter, W. Clarke.

Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Major General Sherman Miles, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station please.

Gen. MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, First Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

Col. CLARKE. During what period were you A. C. of S., G-2?

Gen. MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 from the first of May 1940 until late in December 1941, when I was made Assistant Chief of Staff—that was a technicality—and relieved from the duty the end of January 1942.

Col. CLARKE. In the six months period preceding Pearl Harbor did you have presented to you all information and intelligence which was received in the War Department General Staff with reference to the war making potentialities of Japan?

Gen. MILES. I can't say that all came to me personally. A synopsis of all came to me through my organization. Certain dispatches and reports I never saw in toto. They were handled by the particular Section of the Military Intelligence Division, which I headed, and came to me in the original form if they were of very great importance, but otherwise in the form of summaries, estimates, etc.

Col. CLARKE. Who was the head of the Intelligence Group during the time that you were A. C. of S., G-2?

Gen. MILES. General John Magruder was the Chief. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Mason, as I remember it, who was relieved in the summer of 1941 and succeeded by General Hayes Kroner.

[2] Col. CLARKE. During this entire period who was your Chief of the Far Eastern Section?

Gen. MILES. Colonel Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. The entire period?

Gen. MILES. I think so although I wouldn't be positive.

Col. CLARKE. I am sure that is correct.

During this period, information which was received with reference to Japan or the Far East, was that presented to you, when it was important, direct by Col. Bratton or did you have that transmitted through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, Colonel Kroner or Colonel Mason?

Gen. MILES. Such information as came in Top Secret was habitually handed direct by Colonel Bratton to me. This was particularly so in the six months preceding Pearl Harbor. We were tightening up on secrecy to a great extent. Other information normally came to me through the Chief of the Intelligence Branch.

Col. CLARKE. How was this Ultra information presented to the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. It was presented in a loose-leaf folder in a locked dispatch case for which the Chief of Staff had the key. He took the folder out, read the Top Secret dispatches and returned it to its bag.

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of what was presented to the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section—Colonel Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. Did he present all of that or just what he, Colonel Bratton, considered were the important items?

Gen. MILES. Only what were considered the important items. There was, as I remember, an immense amount of what we called chitter-chatter which came in Top Secret, routine stuff and stuff of no particular significance except to the people to whom it was addressed. This was not put in.

Col. CLARKE. Did Colonel Bratton present this direct to the Chief of Staff or did you present it?

[3] Gen. MILES. It was presented by Colonel Bratton direct to the Chief of Staff. We had a regular system by which it was taken around by an officer courier.

Col. CLARKE. Then Bratton himself didn't always take it to the Chief of Staff and discuss it with him, to the best of your knowledge?

Gen. MILES. No.

Col. CLARKE. Did the Chief of Staff ever discuss with you or Colonel Bratton the contents of any of these messages and their significance?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, he discussed it with me several times.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular messages of the Top Secret which he discussed with you?

Gen. MILES. No I don't. Strangely, I recall the lack of messages which he discussed with me. The one thing we couldn't understand was why they weren't talking more about our air reinforcements of the Philippines. I remember he discussed that point with me at length although we reached no conclusion.

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with what has later been referred to as the "Winds Message" at the time of its receipt?

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember the receipt of the "Winds Message."

Col. CLARKE. Was that discussed with you by the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information that the Winds Message had been implemented?

Gen. MILES. I have been trying to remember and my memory is very hazy about it. I do not remember seeing any document on it, any written statement on it. I'm sorry but my memory is—

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any oral discussion you may have had with any individual with reference to that message, with the implementation of it?

Gen. MILES. No I do not, and yet I do know of course that we sent a dispatch to Hawaii early in December, to the G-2 in [4] Hawaii, directing him to contact a certain officer about the Winds Message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall what the occasion of the sending of that message was?

Gen. MILES. Sending which message?

Col. CLARKE. The one to contact the officer in Hawaii who was familiar with the "Winds Message."

Gen. MILES. It must have been information that the naval command had in regard to the "Winds Message" but I don't remember the background.

Col. CLARKE. Were any of the warning messages that were sent from November 25 through to include Pearl Harbor the result of this most secret source?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, very definitely. The first warning message, the main warning message, written by the War Plans Division, of 27 November was the result not only of what we knew about our own note to the Japanese of the 26th of November, but of the general build-up of Top Secret information, and that also applied to my message to the G-2's of the 27th of November.

Col. CLARKE. At that time did you have direct contact or authority to communicate directly with all of the corps area and department G-2's or did your traffic have to go through command channels?

Gen. MILES. That is somewhat a difficult question to answer because it depended on the message. I realized that I should never put myself, the G-2, in a position of influencing the commanding generals, particularly of overseas departments, on action which had not previously been approved by command channels. I kept in very close contact with War Plans Division, General Gerow, and I remember particularly in my message to the G-2 of November 27 discussing that with Gerow, and I am pretty sure it was his suggestion that I put in the sentence to communicate this only to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. The general proposition held that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the War Department had authority to communicate freely with his G-2's but always under the principal that he did not influence the commanding generals in lines of action not previously approved.

[5] Col. CLARKE. During this period from July 1 through to Pearl Harbor, did the officers of G-2 in the various geographic branches have daily contact with their opposite numbers in the War Plans Division?

Gen. MILES. I can't say that they had daily; they had very close contact I know but how frequent that contact was I think undoubtedly depended on the situation. It might have been two or three times a day in some cases.

Col. CLARKE. In your opinion every piece of vital information that was available in G-2 was made known to the proper people in War Plans?

Gen. MILES. That was my policy and Gen. Gerow's policy—what we were trying to work to at all times. The same applied to ONI.

Col. CLARKE. Then it was the responsibility of War Plans Division and not of yourself to inform these overseas department commanders?

Gen. MILES. To promulgate command decisions, yes.

Col. CLARKE. That is what I am trying to bring out. Do you know whether or not there were discussions between the Chief of the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff regarding this Top Secret material that you weren't a party to?

Gen. MILES. I don't know whether there were such conversations or not.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of this material with the Chief of the War Plans Division and its significance?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, frequently.

Col. CLARKE. These warning messages that you spoke about, they were sent to all overseas departments, Panama, Philippines and Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that the first one drafted by War Plans was sent to all overseas departments. Mine, the one of the 27th to the G-2's, was not sent to the Philippines.

Col. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not messages were received from the overseas commanders of the three overseas departments at that time indicating that they had been warned and had taken appropriate action? [6]

Gen. MILES. I did not at that time know because I never saw the answers of the overseas departments to the first or War Plans warning of the 27th. I did, however, see General Short's reply to a subsequent telegram of November 28 about sabotage which of course clearly indicated to me at that time that he had at least received that warning.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever have any discussions with the Chief of the ONI with reference to the contents of the Top Secret material?

Gen. MILES. Frequent discussions with him.

Col. CLARKE. Did you and he take parallel action with reference to this material?

Gen. MILES. In the sense of informing our Chiefs, yes. I don't remember any difference of opinion on this evaluation between Admiral Wilkinson and myself or Admiral Kirk and myself on Top Secret.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information in G-2 from FBI with reference to this material?

Gen. MILES. Top Secret?

Col. CLARKE. Yes.

Gen. MILES. No, not that I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Can you say whether or not this material or copies of the same material that was made available to the Chief of Staff was also made available to the President and the Secretary of State?

Gen. MILES. Yes, definitely.

Col. CLARKE. Would the President and Secretary of State have received any material which the Chief of Staff didn't receive?

Gen. MILES. Of Top Secret?

Col. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Gen. MILES. No.

[7] Col. CLARKE. Can you state definitely that the same material which was made available to the Chief of Staff here was made available to the President and the Secretary of State?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that on Navy day the Navy put these things in the file and that the same file copies went to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, the two Secretaries, the President and Secretary of State. But I see your point—I don't know.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, I may ask some rather unintelligent questions because I am somewhat foggy about this whole thing. Did you know of the letter that the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War on or about the 24th of January 1941, wherein the Secretary of the Navy warned the Secretary of War that hostilities might be initiated any time by an attack on Pearl Harbor, and did you have at that time any knowledge of such a letter being written?

Gen. MILES. I had at that time no knowledge of a letter containing a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor other than this, that I remember in the late winter of 1940-41 that the Navy was worried about our anti-aircraft defense and air defense of Pearl Harbor. I didn't know that it resulted, although I assume it resulted, from some communication from the Navy Department. I never saw the letter, to my knowledge. However I remember that it was a matter under discussion at about that time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever tell you of any such letter being received from the Navy?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any War Council meetings during that period of 1941?

Gen. MILES. Those were the ones with Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally, I believe, provided for a meeting of the Secretaries of War, Navy and State.

Gen. MILES. No I did not attend any of them.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever talk with you of any matters that were discussed as these War Council meetings during the year 1941?

[8] Gen. MILES. I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you yourself ever have any conferences with the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State or any responsible official in the Department of State relative to their interpretation or understanding of these so-called Top Secret reports during the year 1941?

Gen. MILES. No I did not. I remember, however, once—perhaps twice—going to the office of the Secretary of State, Secretary Hull, rather formally, together with the head of ONI and certain other State Department officials, for a general discussion of the military and naval situations throughout the world. I don't remember in any of these discussions that Top Secret was mentioned.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever informed by the Chief of Staff of any warning from the State Department that war might be expected any minute because of a breakdown of negotiations between the two countries that were then going on in November 1941?

Gen. MILES. No, I don't remember ever having been told by the Chief of Staff that the State Department considered war might result. I did know at the time the general trend, and I think very accurately, the actual substance of our note of November 26 which gave me certainly the impression that war might result.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was your knowledge of that note obtained from the newspapers or from State Department copies of the note?

Gen. MILES. From our liaison with the State Department. We sent an officer to the State Department every day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall who the officer was at that time?

Gen. MILES. Colonel Betts, generally. I don't know whether he actually did it that particular day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever advised or told by the Chief of Staff of the message of 24 November 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message said it was concurred in by Marshall, warning of a possible surprise aggressive Japanese attack?

Gen. MILES. I was never told by the Chief of Staff of any such message.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. You of course knew from previous history that the Japs were apt to make a surprise attack in starting any war?

Gen. MILES. I knew that they had done that in the Russian war.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any knowledge from our military attaches or any other information, possibly from the Navy Department, that certain Japanese consulates were burning their documents and codes on or about 3 December 1941?

Gen. MILES. I have no recollection of any such knowledge as of that date.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the bulletin issued by the Director of ONI on the Japanese situation, on the Japanese naval situation, on December 1 of 1941? I show you a copy of it.

Gen. MILES. I undoubtedly saw this document. I certainly remember that ONI and the Navy Department were persuaded that there was a considerable movement of Japanese naval forces to the south and that there were rumors of forces in the mandates, which were, of course, Japanese waters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember seeing document 23673, message from Berlin to Tokyo?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect seeing Army 23570?

Gen. MILES. Yes I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. With reference to this 23570, did you ever talk with the ONI about this conversation between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that I did. Admiral Turner was rather a law unto himself and my recollection is that I discussed it in a friendly way with my colleague. We didn't reach any definite conclusion.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever visit with Admiral Turner about this?

Gen. MILES. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever get any information on how this meeting came about?

Gen. MILES. No.

[10] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from the Navy Department of any other meeting between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura about one week prior to Pearl Harbor as a result of which Admiral Turner called a meeting of high naval officials as to what Nomura was alleged to have told Turner at this meeting?

Gen. MILES. No I don't remember having any knowledge of that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Army No. 23631. Had you seen that?

Gen. MILES. Yes I remember seeing this one, which was to indicate that Germany and Italy might act of themselves against the United States.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I ask you now if you remember seeing 23859 at that time.

Gen. MILES. Yes I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Would you say that, generally speaking, you saw these shortly after the date shown on the bottom, apparently translated 10-23-41?

Gen. MILES. In all probability the same day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That is undoubtedly true of all of these?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 23860 and ask if you recollect seeing that.

Gen. MILES. Yes I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24373 and ask if you saw that.

Gen. MILES. I am pretty sure that I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24655 and 24656, which go together, and ask if you saw those.

Gen. MILES. I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 25644 and ask if you saw that.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that.

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. No. 25390. Did you see that?

Gen. MILES. I don't remember. I would like to say here that those I have said I have seen recall to my mind in each case [11] certain things that make me say I have seen them. I don't recall that or the one preceding it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 24878.

Gen. MILES. I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25773.

Gen. MILES. I recall that because it was about Mamala.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25817.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25432, which is the Winds Code.

Gen. MILES. I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And did you have that in mind when this so-called Winds Message was reported to you?

Gen. MILES. You mean the implementation of that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall a message being intercepted on the evening of December 3 or 4 which apparently used this code as shown in Army 25432?

Gen. MILES. Well that question I have already answered. My memory is very hazy about it. I don't remember seeing any document on the subject.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you yourself never got the intercepted message of December 3 or 4?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25392.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall this message, which is supplementary to the Winds Code.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25138.

Gen. MILES. No. 25138 I do recall. You want this 25441 too?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes.

Gen. MILES. 25441, yes I do recall that.

[12] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25435 and 25436.

Gen. MILES. Yes I remember 25435 and 436.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25442.

Gen. MILES. That is a continuation of the summary of our note of November 26. I remember it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25446.

Gen. MILES. I do not recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25548.

Gen. MILES. I do recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25823.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25496.

Gen. MILES. Yes I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25497.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that radio telephone message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25554.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25344.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25762.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25605.

Gen. MILES. I think I recall that, yes that was when they told us they were going to handle the note here, not in Tokyo.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25727.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

[13] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25783.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25715.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25659 and 25660.

Gen. MILES. Yes. This is the interview with Sumner Welles. I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25730.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25725, and 25721 goes with it.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I think I remember both of those.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25731.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25785.

Gen. MILES. I think I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25807.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25838 and 25843.

Gen. MILES. 25838, yes. 25843, this is an answer. Yes I certainly remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25445.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that. Before we go any further I think I ought to make a statement. You have shown me a series of important dispatches. I believe, from my knowledge of the system then in effect, that I saw them all. I have identified certain ones as being those that I remembered because as I read them I find statements of fact or assumption that ring a bell in my mind. Others I have identified as not having seen, so far as I now remember, because [14] I find no such statements or assumptions in them that ring a bell in mind. I am conscious of my oath and I want to make it plain that my memory, after two and a half years, is not of the best and I cannot even be sure of identifying those messages which I think I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to come back for just a moment to that so-called Winds Cods. I believe you said you did not remember seeing that.

Gen. MILES. I remember seeing the Winds Code. Then there was another code that I don't remember seeing that was in the intelligence summary.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make any arrangements with the Army or Federal Communications Commission or Navy or any listening agencies to listen—to pick up anything that might be broadcast?

Gen. MILES. We did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And what were those arrangements?

Gen. MILES. These arrangements were that if certain words that we had from the Top Secret were intercepted in any of our monitoring stations we were to be immediately notified by telephone. As I remember, the telephone number that we gave was that of Colonel Bratton—it was to come through that source. We did not, of course, tell FCC what the meaning of this intercepted message would be. They were simply to notify us if they heard it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have knowledge, General, along about the first of December 1941, that there was a Japanese fleet operating in the Marshalls area?

Gen. MILES. I had knowledge that the Navy had received reports that there was a Japanese naval force in the mandated islands.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of your own knowledge or did the Navy tell you as to our own fleet out there around Pearl Harbor, what we had out there, etc.?

Gen. MILES. I knew in general what part of our fleet was in Pearl Harbor. I don't remember that I particularly tried to find out exactly what ships were there but the [15] greater part of the battle fleet was there, I knew from general knowledge. Whether it was in Pearl Harbor or in that area I did not know on any particular day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any general knowledge from anybody on the state of our anti-aircraft defenses of Hawaii at this time?

Gen. MILES. Yes, I know from my previous knowledge of the defenses of Hawaii pretty generally the number and strength of our anti-aircraft batteries on the island.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know about the practice of the fleet coming in and tying up in the Harbor for the weekends?

Gen. MILES. No, I did not know that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, you, I believe, got out an estimate of the situation generally for the Chief of Staff as of 29 November 1941. I will show you a copy for your recollection.

Gen. MILES. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That did not disclose in it that you considered the Japs had a capability of attacking Pearl Harbor by air. I wonder, was that considered before you submitted the report, was that capability considered by you?

Gen. MILES. I presume so. Please note that this estimate starts out with this sentence: "This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat." It was deliberately written that way. I was a little tired of certain defeatist attitudes among certain of my own people and I wanted to get out an estimate of the situation addressed to the objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I knew very well, a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in defense of Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I re-read that estimate yesterday. I regret that in stating the possibilities we stated an attack on the Philippines and did not state an attack on Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, etc. It was an omission, but I think a rather obvious omission.

[16] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever talk with the Chief of the War Plans Division as to the possibility of a Jap attack on Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. I don't remember specifically talking with him on that subject, no. We both were thoroughly familiar with the defense plans and I don't remember that the subject came up.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These reports, these Top Secret reports, when you got them did you evaluate them yourself or did you have somebody else give you their evaluation of them?

Gen. MILES. I evaluated them myself in my own mind. Colonel Bratton was evaluating them and putting his evaluation into the big estimate.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The only dissemination that you made of the evaluation of these reports would be to Colonel Bratton or WPD or the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. As I say, I do not remember that the Chief of Staff ever discussed the effect of the Top Secret dispatches except their absence in not talking about our reinforcement of the Philippines. I don't remember any particular discussion that I had with General Gerow on evaluating them. These were highly important dispatches which all three of us saw and after all I assumed that the command channels could evaluate about as well as I could, in plain English, what the Japanese were saying and thinking.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever take it upon yourself to go up to see the Chief of Staff and say you thought a very serious situation was being revealed by these things and jog him on it?

Gen. MILES. Not until the morning of December 7th. The seriousness of the situation was, obviously, known to him.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. On what occasion on that particular morning did you go up and personally see him?

Gen. MILES. Well, upon the receipt of the long Japanese telegram reply. That, I notice, is dated December 6. I first knew that it was in that evening and of course we were watching for it very eagerly. We knew that that meant some very definite decision regarding the conference. It was being translated all night. [17] I knew that the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th but that did not give away the whole business. I went to the office the morning of the 7th and got the whole thing, also was informed that it was to be delivered that afternoon, and arrangements were made to see Secretary Hull. That of course alone was enough to go to the Chief of Staff.

Col. CLARKE. These messages which you have identified here and which you say according to the system you are sure you had seen all of them, you are positive these were seen by the Chief of Staff, to the best of your knowledge?

Gen. MILES. They were all seen by the Chief of Staff and all seen by me to the best of my knowledge. Certain ones, as I say, ring a bell in my mind. I feel morally certain that I saw them all and the Chief of Staff saw them all.

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever told by the Assistant Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State in July of 1941 that in their opinion war was inevitable and that the War Department should get a secret intelligence service started and get their agents planted around through the world while there was yet time?

Gen. MILES. No, I have no recollection whatever of being told by the Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State.

Col. CLARKE. What was the occasion when you started censorship in the War Department?

Gen. MILES. It is rather a long story. A censorship plan had been drafted in the War Department, largely in MID, before I came in May 1940. My recollection is that that plan was approved by the Joint Board. It must have been because I distinctly remember it went to the President and was disapproved. From then on there were many attempts to revise some form of censorship plan. It was obviously a war necessity if war did occur between us and the Germans or Japanese or anyone and a necessity which could be filled only by pre-preparation and training, in other words, you had to train censors. During 1941, or perhaps as early as late 1940, the Navy, without approval of the President, quietly began to train censors and my naval colleague at that time, Admiral Anderson, Chief of ONI, used to spur me on—"why don't you do this too?" I remember several conversations about that. We were trying, as usual, to play the game and do only what was approved, but as the thing warmed up all over the world, our lendlease and other [18] approaches to war, it became obvious that the War Department had to do something about it and I started the censorship school, as you remember, over here in Clarendon.

Col. CLARKE. That had nothing to do with any of this material, it was the general knowledge inherent within you that—

Gen. MILES. It was just the general trend. We knew we had to prepare for censorship immediately.

Col. CLARKE. You had close contact with ONI but not with the Naval Operations—is that true, at that time?

Gen. MILES. That was very true. Admiral Turner was practically Naval Operations through a large part of that time. Neither Gerow nor McNarney nor McCloy nor myself could get very far with him.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. So the only real liaison you had was with ONI, which really had the strategic intelligence data and not the actual up-to-the-minute operations of the Navy?

Gen. MILES. Yes. The liaison which I should have maintained with the Navy was with ONI. I had nothing officially to do with the Naval Operations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did ONI ever give you any information of Naval Operations or what Naval Operations were doing or what messages they sent to their fleet in Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. Yes. I knew, for instance, through ONI of the naval telegram that went out paralleling ours of November 27. I am pretty sure that I knew other definite moves that were made.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your liaison was an officer that went from here to the Navy, ONI?

Gen. MILES. Several officers, but more directly my own relationship with Admirals Anderson, Kirk and Wilkinson, the latter two of which happened to be very old friends of mine.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your liaison with the State Department merely consist of getting cables that were coming in to the State Department?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It didn't consist of contacting the Under Secretaries [19] or Secretary of State or the experts on the various country desks to ask for their judgment on what was picked up?

Gen. MILES. In a sense it did. Our liaison officer, particularly Colonel Betts, who was extremely successful as a liaison officer, established very personal relations in order to carry out his job with various people of the State Department, from whom he could get this information, not only the factual information but what they thought of it. I had that close relationship also with Assistant Secretary Berle. I saw Under Secretary Sumner Welles at times. I saw Mr. Hull at least once and perhaps more, I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At this time while these critical negotiations were going on in November 1941, did you yourself or Colonel Betts go over particularly to ask the State Department what the result of this thing was going to be?

Gen. MILES. I did not. I don't know if Colonel Betts did or not.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT O'DELL

[1] Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel E. W. Gibson, and Lt. O'Dell. 6 October 1944, 9 A. M.

CWC: All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so you can start telling us what you know.

O'D: Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attache through the Australian

Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

CWC: You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

O'D: That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement of a Jap Task Force in the South China Sea. However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other than the movement of this convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducun plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action. In other words, A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant, because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.

[2] CWC: Let me ask you—now that was on December 5?

O'D: Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it.

CWC: In other words that's the 3rd our time.

O'D: That's right, sir.

CWC: And you didn't send it actually until the 5th?

O'D: Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out, could get to somewhere, either the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was, 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In other words, we sent none direct to MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in writing—

CWC: In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, you gave it to Hawaii and told them—

O'D: And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the Indies at that precise moment would be the first to get it. Now, we sent that cable, that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know—we never had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been overlooked. The file copy was destroyed—ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves in Mindanao—(interrupted)

CWC: General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell.

RAO: O'Dell.

[3] O'D: How do you do, sir.

RAO: Mighty glad to know you.

O'D: Pleased to meet you, sir.

CWC: He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl Harbor business.

RAO: I've heard about it.

CWC: You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

RAO: Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you.

O'D: Thank you, sir.

O'D: What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this information about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they hadn't gotten the works, sir, but they had an inkling. That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one.

CWC: Notice the footnote down there.

O'D: "And relayed to War Department message center" (reading from message).

(Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with General Strong)

O'D: We expected action to take place on Sunday our time, and we all went down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing happened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings of impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had sent. One other positive action was that Kopang—two days before this happened—received fifty (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship.

I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving radio set, and we had had information about that. Also, [4] of course, all the Japanese shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty days before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in the morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was seen to burn all of his codes in the backyard. Nobody, of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that.

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from?

O'D. From Melbourne, sir.

CWC. Melbourne on the fifth.

O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir.

EWG. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department, arriving here at the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and repeat back to them.

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note.

EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe they thought they could, I don't know.

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had.

CWC. What did you use?

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the secret book with the cipher table.

CWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember?

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I remember it, it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had because the Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had to—well, you can imagine, that is a rather laborious job, a message like that.

CWC. The message we got in said it was held 17 hours.

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian government. We put that in the message.

[5] EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor?

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or anything in that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and whether it was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any part of the Indies, the reconnaissance information that was available to us did not specify.

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls?

O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. You did know about that.

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was feeding us what information of value——

CWC. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall?

O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. That was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of that week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to confirm what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposition of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, sir.

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who is this Sir Charles Burnett again?

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of whatever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Colonel Merle Smith was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb perfectly.

CWC. Yes, I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well.

[6] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that would tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to something precise.

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A-2 was?

O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the Naval, because of Pearl Harbor being the Naval Headquarters and the Plan A-2 being for U. S. participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly assumed that if anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the Army would show that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But this Naval Plan, you see there was a Naval Attache in Melbourne, Captain Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about it. What I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed such a positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to the assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or fourth time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code burn-

ing and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was going to be the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't be——

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands Command at 8 A. M. on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before?

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. In other words we had to re-write it because the situation was changing momentarily.

EWG. Then you don't think that this was——

O'D. No, sir, that went out on Friday.

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the suggestion that the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our obligation——".

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all.

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present Military Attache with all old papers, about two years ago.

[7] CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any opinion?

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You see, of course, the capitol, sir, is in Canberra, and we were stationed in Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would have instructed them to let Washington know——. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here.

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then.

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey.

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here.

O'D. Yes, sir, that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a cable to—I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. I mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our government informed, but——.

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it to you with the understanding that you not transmit it.

O'D. No, sir, when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. It was only after we had the cable—you see, we were there over an hour, over two hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which was around seven o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before six thirty, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called this emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable and were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested very specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had

informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own government yet.

CWC: In other words he wanted to spring it on his people first.

O'D: Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir.

CWC: That's logical.

O'D: I might say, sir, that because there were only two of us and because everything was happening day and night then, that was one of the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian cipher section back and forth.

[8] CWC: Why?

O'D: Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by the cipher device.

CWC: You mean the cylindrical?

O'D: That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir.

CWC: But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

O'D: Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the use of the Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether General MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages coming and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. You see Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what delays would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, which was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters which would come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and which Washington would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at least three hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office right into the RAAF Headquarters.

CWC: They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D: No, sir, they did not. They had—I can assure you that Colonel Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security.

CWC: Oh, no, I wasn't thinking about that. Mine was just a question of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit?

O'D: Yes, sir.

CWC: Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole damned South Pacific?

O'D: Then, sir, we started getting messages from General Marshall in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously went through that and got that, it was a

[9] double transposition, which, of course, didn't use the book. We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we called that the Pensacola, sir, that was under escort by one cruiser, which was the Pensacola. We would do about ten of those in one message, sir. One little error in the first, and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you can't tell until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables about the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, including what was on it. As I remember, there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think, 26 P-40's and 18 A-24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to know what was the A-24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A-24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little annoying.

CWC: That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

O'D: That's right, sir, single engine and, of course, the A-20 was a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes and they had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired to Washington to ask them (we didn't, of course, because, with everything happening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23rd of December, sir. They arrived in Brisbane and we went up to Brisbane to meet the convoy.

CWC: Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That interceptor outfit that came out with them.

O'D: Yes, sir, they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General MacArthur had sent General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin and Colonel Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with them, and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin and then up through the Indies to the Philippines. They were trying to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Company and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60 day start, not quite that, about a 45 day start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, of course, this Pensacola convoy came in.

CWC: Yes, I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D: No, sir, I just wanted you to have——

CWC: All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D: Thank you very much, sir.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 16 September 1944.

Time: 0945-1030.

Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.

Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station.

Col. SADTLER. Otis K. Sadtler, 03577, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, War College, Washington, D. C.

Col. CLARKE. When did you become Chief of Army Communications Service, approximately what date?

Col. SADTLER. About the 7th of August 1941.

Col. CLARKE. You held that position at the time of Pearl Harbor?

Col. SADTLER. I did.

Col. CLARKE. As such were you responsible for the production of what is known as Magic or Ultra intelligence?

Col. SADTLER. I was.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to this?

Col. SADTLER. I did.

Col. CLARKE. Did you read the messages before they were sent to G-2?

Col. SADTLER. In general yes, not always.

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with a message which was received in the SIS on or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Col. SADTLER. I am familiar with that message.

Col. CLARKE. I hand you that and ask if you can identify it—#25432.

Col. SADTLER. That is the message, yes.

[2] Col. CLARKE. Will you state what, to the best of your knowledge, belief and recollection, you know of the history of this message and any implementing message which may have been received regarding it?

Col. SADTLER. It is my recollection that that message was intercepted by the Navy and we asked the Federal Communications Commission to monitor all press broadcasts from Japan as a result of that message.

Col. CLARKE. By "we" you mean Signal Corps?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Col. Guest, as I recall, was the man who made the arrangements. The FCC put their Wharton station on these broadcasts from Japan and made arrangements with the telephone company to contact Col. Bratton, the G-2 liaison officer at that time, directly if they heard anything regarding the implementing of that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Meaning message #25432.

Col. SADTLER. That Winds message. We contacted the FCC from time to time and asked them whether anything had been heard that would give us any clue as to when that was going to happen, etc. The

first information that I had regarding any new developments on that message was on the morning of December 5, when Adm. Noyes called me and said, "Sadtler, the message is in," or words to that effect. Adm. Noyes was the head of Navy communications service which included this code and cipher work. I went immediately to General Sherman Miles' office, who was G-2 of the Army at the time, and told him that the message was in and that it was to the effect that war would be declared between Japan and Great Britain. He said, "Wait a minute, I will get Col. Bratton." Bratton came in almost immediately. I told him what Adm. Noyes had told me and he said, "What was the word?" I told him I didn't know what the word was. He took out a little slip of paper he had in his pocket which had the Japanese words shown in this message and asked me if it was one of those. I said, "I don't know but it is the one that means war with Japan and Great Britain." He said, "Do you think you can verify this?" and I said, "I will go back and call Adm. Noyes." The reason I had to go back to call Adm. Noyes was that the secret phone was in my office. I called Adm. Noyes and he said something to the effect that, "I don't know any more Japanese than you do; it's the one of Japan and Great Britain." I said, "Do you think you can verify it?" He said, "I can't do it [3] now because I must report to the Chief of Naval Operations but I will do it later." I said it would be too late then.

I then returned to Gen. Miles' office and told him that Adm. Noyes did not know the word but that it was the one that war was going to be declared between Japan and Great Britain. They said, "Well unless there is something definite as to the meaning of this word this may be a false alarm." There was some other conversation on the subject, and as I recall I was instructed by Gen. Miles to make sure that FCC and other agencies listened on that Japanese press broadcast and to let him know of any future developments. I then returned to my office.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss this with anybody else? Did you make any report of this to the Chief Signal Officer, for example, or to the Chief of Staff or Secretary of General Staff?

Col. SADTLER. No, it wasn't told to anyone else in the Signal Corps because the Chief Signal Officer was in Panama at the time. That was discussed in War Plans Division and it was to some extent discussed with the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Smith.

Col. CLARKE. Did they evidence any interest in this case?

Col. SADTLER. Not a great deal. As I remember, Gen. Gerow made a statement that they had been adequately warned.

Col. CLARKE. By they you mean the department commanders?

Col. SADTLER. Hawaii, Panama and Philippines. Col. Smith decided that nothing further should be done because it had been discussed with G-2 and War Plans.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state what you know about any action that may have been taken on the morning of December 7.

Col. SADTLER. I did not go to the office on the morning of December 7. Anything that I can say about December 7 is as a result of going down to the office afterwards.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Col. Smith is Col. Bedell Smith, now General?

Col. SADTLER. That's the one.

[4] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you talk to Col. Smith personally about the 5th of December?

Col. SADTLER. It was the morning of the 5th, Friday morning, after I talked to G-2.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And he asked you if you had talked with G-2?

Col. SADTLER. He asked me what I had done as a result of this and I told him I had been to G-2 and that I had visited WPD and had seen Col. Gaily and Gen. Gerow. Gaily had nothing to say but Gen. Gerow said they had had plenty of warning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, tell this to Gen. Marshall?

Col. SADTLER. Personally, no.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you know of anybody who did?

Col. SADTLER. I don't know if Gen. Marshall ever knew it.

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

[1]

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 14 September 1944.

Time: 1330-1430.

Present:

Major General Sherman Miles.

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.

Colonel John T. Bissell.

Colonel Rufus Bratton.

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.

Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Gen. MILES (to Col. BISSELL). Definitely you confirmed yesterday my impression that the information we got from F. B. I. through the translations or intercepts of their messages at Hawaii was not given to us and was not available in fact to F. B. I. until after Pearl Harbor.

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

Gen. MILES. I think you also said that we got nothing from the F. B. I. before Pearl Harbor indicating the possibilities of an open break of war with the United States.

Col. BISSELL. That is correct, too.

Col. CLARKE. Where did this message come from here on December 3 that they were burning the codes? Where did that information come from—it is in the Roberts Report. It apparently was the Navy and it must have had something which McCullom didn't make available to you. Bissell says he knew about burning the codes on the morning of December 7. That was in the papers of course.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there much interchange between the F. B. I. and G-2 prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Oh yes, there was a great deal but not of this nature.

Col. CLARKE. It was all on domestic intelligence.

Gen. MILES. Oh, no, there was a lot on South American stuff and a lot on Japanese stuff. I had a personal meeting with Hoover and ONI once a week.

[2] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you ever asked them if they had anything on Hawaii, any information of Japanese activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Yes, to a great extent. The F. B. I. kept us informed as to the locations of these Japanese military attaches and then when they passed into Panama I in turn notified the G-2, with Gen. Miles'

consent, where they were going, and they in turn shadowed them in Panama, and if they turned up in Hawaii we got information both from the F. B. I. and our own people.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Why was it that the F. B. I. suddenly started to turn over to you after Pearl Harbor information that might have been helpful before Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. They didn't have it before.

Gen. MILES. They were held down.

Col. BRATTON. I would like to clear this up. I understand that you (Col. Bissell) and Gen. Kroner have stated that this material (referring to Top Secret) was not made available to you prior to Pearl Harbor. I am of the distinct impression that, under orders from Gen. Miles, I did make it available to you before Pearl Harbor in the form of memorandums that had to do with certain subversive activities. I told you sometime before Pearl Harbor that I had a source of information which—

Col. BISSELL. I don't remember the date. That may have been before Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. I am of the distinct impression that that was initiated sometime before Pearl Harbor, and I am also of the distinct impression that these things were made available to you, at Gen. Miles' order, prior to Pearl Harbor and that you (Gen. Kroner) and Betts used to read them in the evening in the office.

Gen. KRONER. That is not my impression. I am aware of such (Top Secret) existing but I remember very clearly—

Col. BRATTON. Pursuant to instructions to you and an understanding with the General here, when anything was hot I used to run to General Miles first and I always acquainted you with what I had done afterwards at your convenience.

[3] Gen. KRONER. I do not remember that procedure with regard to signal intelligence or what was known as Magic. I do not remember any specific instance.

Col. BRATTON. I cannot recall any specific instance, but I am under the impression you knew what had gone between General Miles and myself.

Gen. KRONER. Well I have just the opposite impression, and that is that it was General Miles' wish, not expressed specifically but as I got it in working with you and his not talking about it to me specifically, that he wished it to continue to be handled between you two and that would form the basis of information, with your general information, and you advised me about the Philippines or about the Far Eastern situation according to the information you had available to you.

Gen. MILES. Your section, Bratton, was part of Kroner's Branch. Now it is true, I remember, that we were always closing in on Magic, making it more secure all the time—trying to—and that we had several people outside of the Munitions Building to serve. It was my definite desire and direction, I think, that you would handle the mechanics of Magic direct with me and the Chief of Staff, and later WPD, ONI, etc., but that you were to inform your Chief of anything important and certainly use Magic in your estimate of the Far East that you were giving to your Chief, Gen. Kroner. I am pretty sure that was the definite arrangement.

Col. BRATTON. That is my understanding too.

Gen. KRONER. My only comment on that is that I was never told or never received the impression that you wanted me to be specifically informed, but I assumed from our association that you expected Bratton to use the information in an all around appreciation of what was available to him when he gave me an opinion about the Far East.

Gen. MILES. I would like to ask Gen. Kroner if you can remember what your general impression of the Far Eastern situation was, of the probabilities of Japanese action whether against us or foreign powers, late in November or early in December.

Gen. KRONER. That there were a number of lines of action open to Japan, mostly connected with the Asiatic Continent, [4] which she would be more likely to take in case she decided to go to war against England or America, and that my attention was focused, after frequent discussions with Col. Bratton and Col. Betts, on the Asiatic Continent rather than toward the South Pacific.

Gen. MILES. Then I would like to ask both of you this. I have just read today that excellent summary that you prepared last year on the information received in MID. From that I get the very distinct impression, and I can remember this was my impression at the time, that the bulk of our information, all of it including Magic, indicated the major probability of a Japanese move to the south, Indo China, Siam, Thailand, perhaps the Dutch West Indies, perhaps Malaya, that our general impression at that time was that that was the most probable Japanese move. We did not exclude war with the United States since we specifically mentioned the Philippines as being part of the Japanese southern push and in a war with the United States of course there was a possibility, particularly with the Japanese, that a surprise attack might be made anywhere, certainly including Hawaii which had been armed and prepared for such an attack for twenty years.

Col. BRATTON. But that initially, as I have testified this morning, any attack against an American installation in the middle or eastern Pacific would be in the nature of a diversion and having as its objective the immobilizing of any force that we might call in to help the Dutch and British in west and southwest Pacific, but as you say their primary initial objective was the destruction of Great Britain's power in southeast Asia and the seizure of—

Gen. MILES. We don't very greatly differ there. I don't know that I would have said at the time that an attack on Hawaii or the Panama Canal, if made, would be a diversion. It would be a pretty serious attack to attain the objective, but not likely in view of the mass of information that we had as to the southern push. Is that more what you remember, Kroner?

Gen. KRONER. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. In view of what you have just stated here with reference to this great mass of information, didn't you consider it was equally the responsibility of the Chief of the War Plans Division to advise the Chief of Staff, as much [5] his responsibility as it was yours with reference to any potential attack which we might expect from Japan or any line of action that Japan might take?

Gen. MILES. It was the primary responsibility of Military Intelligence, always is and always will be, to advise the Command what the enemy may do and possibly do or more probably do. It is certainly the responsibility of Operations to advise the Chief of Staff

what we should do as the result of information received in Military Intelligence from their sources. I certainly considered it then a part of my business to know, in general terms, the disposition of American forces and rather specifically our defense plans of vital installations such as the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines. I certainly knew the location of the major parts of the U. S. fleet.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, General, once you informed the Chief of Staff and the War Plans Division the possibility of an attack, it was then up to the WPD, through the Chief of Staff, to inform our forces what plan to put into effect?

Gen. MILES. Yes, a command responsibility. Now Bratton, in reading your testimony, it gave me the impression that the Magic that you selected for the Secretary of State might not be and was not in some cases perhaps quite the same as that presented to the Chief of Staff and to me.

Col. BRATTON. No, if you got that impression from anything I said I wish to correct it at this time. The Secretary of State never saw any document that was not presented to you, the Chief of Staff and WPD, as far as I am concerned.

Gen. MILES. Vice versa, was any document presented to the Chief of Staff that was not also presented to the Secretary of State?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, very often.

Gen. MILES. Really?

Col. BRATTON. Initially, but in our final breakdown of the thing it was the understanding that Mr. Hull was to see all [6] the communications that you and General Marshall saw.

Gen. MILES. And that had been in effect for sometime previous to Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. Yes. When I first started handling this stuff the State Department didn't see any of it. It was not until our relations with Japan became rather strained that I was instructed to serve it to the State Department at all.

Gen. MILES. I remember that, but for months preceding Pearl Harbor exactly the same selections from Magic which you made went to the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, and the Secretary of War.

Col. BRATTON. Identical.

Col. CLARKE. This meeting is primarily for the purpose of getting the four of you together here to iron out any little differences.

Col. BISSELL. After Bratton talked, I do recall now—I was thinking primarily of Japanese information at the time—Bratton did give me in the summer time various things which applied to domestic things as Communism and things of that nature. It was not primarily Japanese.

Col. CLARKE. One thing I want to bring out, you did not receive any raw material?

Col. BISSELL. I never got any raw material until after Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Going back to this so-called Winds matter again. Gen. Kroner, do you have any recollection of how this telegram was sent to G-2, Hawaii—how it happened to be sent on December 5, 1941, asking them to contact Commander Rochefort immediately regarding a Tokyo weather reference?

Gen. KRONER. No, I have no knowledge of it.

Col. BRATTON. I wrote that, had General Miles' O.K. and had it dispatched.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who initiated it?

Col. BRATTON. I did. The basis is in one of those messages there.

Col. CLARKE. That message is November 19 and this is December 5. [7] Col. BRATTON. There were a number of these messages about this boogey-woogey they were going to send out on weather broadcast. They changed them a number of times and finally it became apparent this was what they were going to do.

Col. CLARKE. It has never been clear in my mind what brought this on. Sadtler said the message came in on the night of December 4 and on the morning of December 5 is when he went to General Miles with reference to this. This message is dated December 5. I wondered if by any chance you could recall whether or not Gen. Miles talked to you about it and told you to have the message sent, or whether McCullom, or maybe Sadtler.

Col. BRATTON. I had discussed this weather announcement system with Commander McCullom of the Navy and was informed by him that the officer in Hawaii who had complete knowledge of all of these Magic messages and who could explain most readily to the Army officials the significance of the radio broadcast, was Commander Rochefort.

Gen. MILES. So then this was a means of getting the information to Hawaii that the Winds message was out. Is that what you mean?

Col. BRATTON. No, that this would be the most expeditious way of telling our people in Hawaii that relations between Japan and one or more countries would be broken off.

Gen. MILES. If a certain message came through?

Col. BRATTON. They were monitoring them in Hawaii; they got them there before we got them. They were listening to the same stuff we were, so my idea here was that if our G-2 got in touch with Rochefort, he having already received this code by broadcast, could tell our G-2 at once what it meant. It was a means of saving time.

Col. CLARKE. Why did you wait two weeks? You got it on November 19 and told Hawaii on December 5. I am not clear on that. Circumstantial evidence points to the fact that Sadtler is partly accurate in what he says.

Gen. MILES. The message of November 19 gave us the word which they would use in three cases. Now what Bratton is saying, if I understand correctly, is that this message of December 5 was a means of letting our G-2 know thoroughly not only that this code had been arranged [8] but the implementing message was in, which would account for the date of December 5. My recollection about that is very vague.

Col. BRATTON. This accounts for some of the discrepancy in the timing. It wasn't translated until the 28th.

Gen. MILES. The Winds Code message was not translated until November 28.

Col. BRATTON. And may not have been given to me until the 29th.

Col. CLARKE. What I am trying to prove is, was there any knowledge in G-2 of the implementing message?

Gen. MILES. I think that that is the correct explanation but, as I say, on that particular thing my memory is hazy, of the implementation of the Winds Code. I can conceive, however, of no reason for

sending that message about Commander Rochefort except that Rochefort was in position not only to know the code but to know the implementation of the code.

Col. BRATTON. There were several nights when I sat up all night waiting for this thing to come through.

Gen. MILES. I am not trying to excuse my poor memory, but I can say that certainly from the 5th to the 7th of December there was little doubt in my mind that war was going to ensue. I wouldn't have said it was inevitable, but on the 6th the President appealed direct to the Emperor of Japan and there wasn't much doubt in our minds here that we were in a very difficult crisis.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It seems to me that if you had notice that the Japanese were ordered to burn their codes on the 5th of December you wouldn't have forgotten that anyway.

Gen. MILES. This (Winds message) says that these words mean "east wind rain" which means, according to this code, that the Japanese-U. S. relations are in danger and also means that these code papers will be burned, but we knew damned well that the Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger. I cannot say that I did know of the implementing message. I can't explain why I knew and why Bratton didn't know if I knew. That is a blank in my memory.

[9] Col. BRATTON. It isn't conceivable that you would have known of this without saying something to me about it because we were both waiting for the thing.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

17 AUGUST 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor

1. The report of the investigation regarding statements of fact made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy sometime prior to 5 July 1945 is attached hereto as TAB A.

2. In view of the fact that the investigation being conducted by Admiral Hewitt is on the same level as that being conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, it would seem that the release of information to the Navy, as requested by Admiral Hewitt in his letter of 5 July 1945, is a matter for determination by the Secretary of War. It is recommended, therefore, that the request of Admiral Hewitt and the results of this investigation be referred to Lt. Col. Clausen for preparation of such portion of the testimony in this case as the Secretary's office deems desirable to furnish Admiral Hewitt.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

1 Incl.
Tab A

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

13 AUGUST 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to conduct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled, under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 which read as follows:

It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to administer oaths for this purpose.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ullo
J. A. ULLO
Major General,
The Adjutant General

2. The investigation was completed in September 1944.

3. On about 8 July 1945 the undersigned was instructed to re-open the investigation to investigate certain statements made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy earlier in July 1945.

4. The investigation was re-opened on 13 July 1945 in Room 2E780, Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Mr. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, [2] Signal Security Agency, War Department; Col. Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces; Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding, presently stationed at Ft. McPherson, Georgia; Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, presently Military Attache to France and, during the days of Pearl Harbor, Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division; and Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell, Headquarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Gen. Bissell was Chief of the Counter-intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. There was also introduced into evidence the testimony of Mr. William F. Friedman as given before Admiral H. K. Hewitt.

5. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed.

6. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and, as a result of this consideration, I find the following facts:

a. That shortly before 5 July 1945 William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, testified before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy in an investigation pertaining to the Pearl Harbor disaster. In his testimony Mr. Friedman testified, along with other things, as follows:

Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel Sadtler, who came to duty in Washington about then, and we talked about

Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our communications service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the—some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes that the message was in—"It's in," as I recall it, was the expression used—or it may be that the Navy source called Army G-2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadtler was then called to G-2 to corroborate the interception of the message.

At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, that was used and when Colonel Sadtler couldn't indicate the word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried—I think he said [3] that they tried to get a verification from whoever it was—Admiral Noyes—but they weren't successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and nothing more than that: highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it.

b. I find that Mr. Friedman was not told by Col. Sadtler the facts as outlined in the last paragraph of Finding a, but was told by Col. Sadtler at some time in 1943 that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

c. I find that Col. Sadtler was told by Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding sometime in August 1943 that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that certain messages, pertaining to Pearl Harbor, had been received and were in the files of G-2 on 7 December 1941 and that Bissell had deemed it most necessary to destroy them.

d. I find that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding was not told by Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and that he (Bissell) deemed it most necessary to destroy them.

e. I find that Col. Sadtler did not tell Mr. Friedman that Gen. Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that certain messages implementing the Winds Code message were destroyed as a result of an order or direction of Gen. Marshall.

f. I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2, and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2.

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

PART II

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

(On the oral directive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke is now re-opening the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor)

13 JULY 1945

FINDINGS

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Date: 13 July 1945, 1:00 p. m.

Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.

Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Mr. William F. Friedman.

Gen. CLARKE. I have been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this investigation on the basis of the old order that we had here last September 9 when we started this investigation. I would like to remind you that you are still under oath with reference to that and I would like to re-swear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. State your name, rank, position and organization.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department.

Gen. CLARKE. I would like you to refresh your memory on this matter by looking that letter and statement over before we ask you some questions about it. It is a statement sent by the Navy bearing date of 5 July 1945 enclosing your testimony before Adm. Hewitt, together with letter from Hewitt to Marshall.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state, to the best of your knowledge and belief and recollection, just what conversations you have had with Capt. Safford on this whole subject of the Winds message from the very beginning.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well that would go back to a period of about 18 months ago when Capt. Safford apparently began to collect material, either on his own behalf or at the direction of some higher authorities, having a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack. In the course of his studies he prepared a list of the pertinent message or messages which he thought pertinent that came out of the Navy cryptanalytic bureau. Of course at that time we were working very closely with the Navy on the diplomatic side and we exchanged fully translations and technical data. There were some cases in which he wanted to piece out some things which might have been missing from his list of messages. He asked the Signal Security Agency—well he asked me first—to

supply [2] certain of this material, which was supplied only after approval had been obtained to supply whatever was necessary. In the course of getting together these materials we compared notes of our recollections and of the dates because at that time he was the head of the Navy cryptanalytic unit and I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service, and naturally I had a deep interest in the whole affair. At about the same time as Capt. Safford began his studies, I thought it would be interesting to collect material of that nature too. And I had a good deal of such material collected in the form of messages and in the form of reports, for example, the Roberts published report, periodical literature that was pertinent, and of course the technical files at the Agency were available for gathering together such material as I was directed to gather together upon three or four instances—I don't remember now just how many times. Well Capt. Safford came over to see me at my office.

Col. GIBSON. When, about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wish I had brought my notes. I can't place the date accurately enough for this purpose, I am afraid.

Col. GIBSON. Do you have notes that could place it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have some notes of dates of conversations, etc. I could place it fairly accurately that way. It is 18 months ago anyhow and possibly more.

Gen. CLARKE. Suppose you refresh your memory on that from your notes and—

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I will do that. Then I was a member of a special committee in connection with cryptographic security, and ad hoc committee, and we had occasion to go over to the building where Capt. Safford had his office from time to time, and every time I passed by he would ask me in or I would stop in to exchange a pleasant word or two with him, because he is a long-standing friend of mine. We had not only official relations of a cordial nature but also in a personal way we were fairly well acquainted. It was in that sort of way that we exchanged ideas about Pearl Harbor, and it was from him that I first learned of the Winds execute message. I had a very good recollection of the Winds code setup—well I had a knowledge of the Winds code setup from the old days of pre-Pearl Harbor, but I hadn't had any recollection whatsoever, if I even had knowledge at the time, of the existence of a so-called [3] Winds execute message. It was in these conversations that Capt. Safford stated on several occasions that there had been such a Winds execute message, that he believed that a copy of it was still in somebody's safe in the Navy Department, but that all of his attempts to local a copy of the Winds execute message in the official files of OP-20-G had been fruitless. And he naturally wanted to know if we had anything of that nature, and I told him I didn't know and I didn't look for anything like that. But some time thereafter—months thereafter—an official request came through from somebody higher up in the War Department—I think it might have been Gen. Bissell—who directed that a search be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless.

Capt. Safford was very firm in his conviction that there had been a Winds execute message and moreover that he himself had had it in his hands and that there was no question in his mind of the actual transmission of the Winds execute message, of its actual interception,

of its translation in accordance with the terms of the Winds code setup, of its having been handed over in the proper translated form to the Navy people in Naval Intelligence who had jurisdiction of dissemination. Also, he was apparently quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the Army, if not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to somebody in G-2. And he felt that there was some very excellent reason why no copies of this message could be found, and of course it left a number of questions and inferences in his mind which he naturally transferred to my mind. Well he also had apparently definite knowledge that certain testimony before one of the several Boards investigating Pearl Harbor showed clearly that there had been a Winds execute transmission and he believed that the Roberts Board had some definite knowledge about its having been transmitted, etc.

Well this mysterious disappearance, according to him, of all copies of the Winds execute message naturally was of extreme interest to me, and some time after my first, or possibly second, conversation with Capt. Safford, I learned of the return to Washington for duty of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends. I have known him for certainly 20 years. And when he came to Washington—I don't know whether he called me or I called him—I can't recall that—but being old friends, naturally we wanted to get together. Shortly after he came back he came over to my office one day—and I don't know whether he had specifically in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor [4] he may have, but at any rate in the course of our reminiscences about those days, he told me some very startling things. I might say he was quite positive about what he said and left me more or less breathless at one part of his news. I don't know whether I should call it information or what, but at any rate, when I asked him about the Winds execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he certainly was positive about his recollection of the fact that such a Winds execute message had been intercepted by a Navy source, because he told me that he was called over to either Gen. Miles' office or Col. Bratton's office—I don't recall which one—but at any rate he was called over to—well we may have to go back—I recall now that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning and my recollection is that it was on December 4—might have been the 5th—1941, saying—and this stands very bright in my memory—he actually quoted what Adm. Noyes said to him on the telephone: "It's in," meaning that the Winds execute message had been transmitted and had been intercepted and that it meant a break in relations between Japan, and he said, if I recall correctly, a break in relations between Japan and England, and that he had then gone over to either Gen. Miles' office or to Col. Bratton's office—or Adm. Noyes had telephoned the same message or the purport of the Winds execute message to Gen. Miles or to Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned or presented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute message had come in and that something should be done right away. Well Col. Bratton, who was the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sadtler to tell him what the Japanese word was that had been included in the Winds execute message. I don't think it is necessary for me to indicate the nature of the Winds code setup, but at any rate, Col. Bratton wanted to know what the Japanese word was. Well Sadtler said

that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information from the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn't give the Japanese word. He was directed to go get the Japanese word. And here my recollection isn't very clear as to whether he actually went over personally to Adm. Noyes' office or whether he tried it on the telephone, but he apparently wasn't able to get the Japanese word, whatever it was. He went back to Col. Bratton or Gen Miles when he was unsuccessful in getting the Japanese word, or perhaps even a copy of the message—which is something I don't understand—at any rate when he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was nothing they could do, that perhaps there was disbelief on their part in the allegation that [5] the message had been transmitted and intercepted. That of course was very interesting to me. And then I asked him whether he had a copy of the Winds execute message, and I am pretty sure in my recollection that he said that he never had had one and of course didn't have any now. He did have certain things put away in a safe deposit box, and I don't know what sort of documents he might have put away. But he did mention one document which was of very great interest to me. I have naturally not seen it—I didn't ask him to show me a copy of it, but this, to the best of my recollection is what he told me about that. He said that on Friday, possibly earlier than Friday, December 5th, he, being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might break out at almost any hour without any declaration on the part of the Japanese. And he felt that somebody high up in the War Department ought to send a message out to Gen. Short warning him that—well I remember the words in general of what he said was the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand: "Break in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within the next 24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there will be no repetition of Port Arthur." Now by that of course he meant that in the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese attacked at Port Arthur without warning, and the implication was quite clear what he had in his own mind. Well he tried to interest some of the people in the higher echelons in sending such a message, and I don't recall the various steps he took. He tried somebody in G-2; he tried somebody in Operations Division; the Secretary of the General Staff—I can't enumerate them all now—but at any rate he said that he got turned down all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. He claims to have a copy of such a proposed message, or rather a draft of a message, still in his possession.

Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, "What do you suppose happened to the Winds execute message which we believe so firmly was intercepted?" Well he said he was told that they were ordered destroyed. And that sort of took me aback, and I said, "By whom?" And he said, "By Gen. Marshall." It was something that I just couldn't believe, swallow, or give credence to, and I expressed my disbelief, but he was pretty firm in his statement and there was no checking him in that. Now where he got it from I don't remember. I do know that on a subsequent occasion or two—because we met each other once or twice thereafter—my disbelief of the story was discredited by [6] him apparently, because he still remained

very firm in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, both in the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to be destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Did he say who told him this story that these messages had been burned—at Gen. Marshall's order?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did.

Col. GIBSON. Who did he say told him that story?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The name is Ike Spalding, but I don't recall his grade or rank. It is possibly Col. Spalding—I don't recall whether or not he told me of the official position which Spalding occupied. Now, while I am at it, I recall that Col. Sadtler stated that there were two messages ordered destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Did he say that as of his own knowledge or that somebody had told him there were two?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowledge. He was passing on second-hand information. Now what credence he gave to the story that was told to him I don't know—I don't recall—but the other message which was allegedly also one that was destroyed was a message which was supposed to have—well as I recall it—a message was sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor, maybe Monday, to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the islands was in operative order at the time of the attack. And the answer came back in the affirmative. Now whether the question and answer were destroyed, or rather alleged to have been destroyed, or just the answer, I don't recall, but at least there were two different things involved.

Gen. CLARKE. In order words, they were on two different subjects?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. This talk took place in your office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In my office.

Col. GIBSON. You don't know the exact day?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I could place that because I made very, very rough notes of the substance of the conversation after—

[7] Col. GIBSON. Will you supply us the approximate date? Was anybody else in your office when that took place?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. There were just the two of us.

Col. GIBSON. Was that the first talk you had with Col. Sadtler after he came back in the War Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The very first.

Col. GIBSON. And after that you had two or three other talks with him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. Those took place where?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think there was one more occasion when he came over to the office and the other time or two was when we were socially having dinner together or something like that. At my home I know there was one evening that we talked about it privately, just the two of us, in my own study.

Col. GIBSON. He never claimed to you to have seen the Winds execute message himself?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He never did.

Col. GIBSON. What did he say he had in his safe deposit box other than a copy of the draft of the message he tried to get sent out?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that he said anything. I may have asked him, "What else do you have there," and he either passed it off with a remark, "Well never mind, I am not telling anybody." But I rather got the impression that he felt that as head of the Army communications at the time and the superior of the officer in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service, he might be called upon some day in connection with an investigation and that he had put certain things away. I might say that, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, Col. Sadtler didn't impose any secrecy upon what he was telling me. Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion, but I don't know whether he had in mind that I might or might not communicate the information to others entitled to know about such things or not. I certainly wouldn't have said anything to Capt. Safford about it if he had imposed some sort of secrecy upon what he was telling me, and of course you understand that, not giving any credence to it myself, I didn't feel that Safford would believe any of it. But to my astonishment. [8] Safford seemed to think there might be something to it, at least he thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can't be found.

Col. GIBSON. Did Safford come to your office for some of these conferences?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he was over to my office two or three times in an official way—I mean getting together the data that he wanted. He supplied us with digests of his series of messages and I think he turned over a copy of everything he gave me to Gen.——. I do have rough notes made of some of these conversations. If they are necessary I will put them at your disposal.

Gen. CLARKE. I think that would be highly advisable, because I hope this is the last round-up and I think that you ought to come back in the morning——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. General, I am going to take for the air tomorrow. I had better do it this afternoon.

Col. GIBSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor and before or somewhat prior, you were not working with Jap cryptography, were you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I was not directly engaged in it because, as you know, I had been ill, had had a nervous breakdown.

Col. GIBSON. You were putting in part time at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, when I came back to duty after I was discharged from Walter Reed, Gen. Mauborgne and Col. Minckler told me I was to take it easy and come and go as I pleased. I used to come in about a half hour or an hour late in the morning and leave a half hour before the end of the day so as to avoid heavy traffic. I was not in direct touch with the cryptanalytic work, although I did see, whenever I wanted to, the messages that came out.

Gen. CLARKE. Who was in direct charge of the Japanese at that time, while you were ill?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well of course at the time of Pearl Harbor it was Col. Minckler, who was in charge of Signal Intelligence Service, and then I think he was ranked as Captain—Capt. Doud, Capt. Svensson and then Rowlett was in technical charge of the Jap diplomatic operation.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not Col. Sadtler saw the output of the institution?

[9] Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am certain that he saw the very important messages but I don't know that he saw everything that came out.

Gen. CLARKE. Did Gen. Mauborgne?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The same situation. He saw the important messages.

Gen. CLARKE. Of course Olmstead was in there—not Mauborgne.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well Gen. Olmstead didn't take as much interest in that sort of thing as Gen. Mauborgne did. He may have seen occasional messages. As a matter of fact, I recall Sadtler said that four or five days before Pearl Harbor, Gen. Olmstead was planning on going to Panama on an inspection tour and that Col. Sadtler tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from taking this trip, saying that "conditions are extremely critical and I believe war is going to break out within the next 72 hours; maybe you had better stay around." Well Gen. Olmstead didn't agree with him and decided to go ahead with the trip, and he did. I think he came back within a day or two after Pearl Harbor.

Col. GIBSON. How many were engaged in the cryptanalytic work on this Japanese traffic at the time of Pearl Harbor by the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mean right in the Munitions Building—exclusively the intercept personnel?

Col. GIBSON. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I prefer to wait until I get my notes to answer.

Col. GIBSON. Was our section as big as the Navy section?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were comparable in size. I think there were just as many on the diplomatic side as on our side.

Col. GIBSON. Did the Army process its material as speedily after receiving it as the Navy did?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes. I believe that there is little to be said about comparative speeds. We were both most anxious to get these things out as expeditiously as possible, in fact there was a good deal of competition in getting out the translations and if, of course on isolated occasions, we found that they were a bit slow or we were a bit slow, we would inquire to see what had happened. Well it might have been a key had to be reconstructed or—I couldn't [10] say that we processed a certain message faster than they because there was no way of telling.

Col. GIBSON. Who set the priorities as to which code should be read first?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Those were set by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communications in conference with the technical people, etc. As a general rule we processed the messages in the Purple system under a first priority because our experience had been that that was the system that carried the most important traffic. What came after that I don't recall exactly. It might have been the combined PA-K2, as I remember one designation. That was an enciphered code system. Then there was a J-19, also an enciphered code system, and the least of the codes in priority was what we called LA, and of course below that would come plain language.

Col. GIBSON. The Army and Navy agreed on this priority?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes, the priorities were set by mutual agreement.

Gen. CLARKE. That was done in conference from the Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer. Do you mean by that those two individuals or their representatives?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that time, Gen. Mauborgne, who was in office as Chief Signal Officer when the odd and even date was set up as the basis for operation, took a great interest in this work, much more so than the Chief Signal Officer. I can't say absolutely at the moment that he himself sat down with his opposite number—at that time Adm. Noyes—and decided the priority scale, but I think those two officers would certainly approve a schedule recommended by the technical people. Naturally the technical people would have to have a hand in determining those priorities because of technical considerations, the difficulty of each system, etc. I should have said also that the A. C. of S., G-2 would have a very vital word to say in the processing of priorities.

Gen. CLARKE. You never got any guidance from the Chief Signal Officer or the A. C. of S., G-2 in your case, or the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy, on interception or anything of that kind? As you got this stuff you worked on it according to the classification of the code and its degree of security? Is that what I understand?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't understand your question. Are you asking did the technical people process these messages in accordance with their own ideas?

[11] Gen. CLARKE. Their own ideas, or did they get guidance from on high?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Guidance from on high. The decision to process Purple messages, for example, would be one for the people of a higher echelon to say, "Yes, process those first." In fact, even in connection with the intercept operation and the forwarding operation, those things were all set up by priorities. The material that came from Honolulu, for example, had to be sent according to some priority system.

Gen. CLARKE. Is it correct in your opinion—something that I have heard—that the most important traffic came in a lower grade system and not in the high grade Purple?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I wouldn't subscribe to that. We occasionally did encounter a case in which a message of considerable importance would be in a low or medium grade code, but largely because it came from a place which didn't have the higher level material, or there have been cases in which some sort of a condition of a breakdown of a machine at a station which was provided with a machine would cause a message to go in a code of a lower category.

Gen. CLARKE. In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and so have you, to the so-called Japanese Purple system. Will you state approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To the best of my recollection, the first complete translation was handed in some time in August, it might have been the early of August or the middle part of August. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system. This system had superseded a system known as the Red, which was also a machine cipher. But when the Purple system was first introduced it presented an extremely difficult problem on which the Chief Signal Officer asked us to direct our best efforts. After work by my associates when we

were making very slow progress, the Chief Signal Officer asked me personally to take hand. I had been engaged largely in administrative duties up to that time, so at his request I dropped everything else that I could and began to work with the group. Naturally this was a collaborative, cooperative effort on the part of all the people concerned. No one person is responsible for the solution, nor is there any single person to whom the major share of credit should go. As I say, it was a team, and it was only by very closely coordinated teamwork that we were able to solve it, which we did. It represents [12] an achievement of the Army cryptanalytic bureau that, so far as I know, has not been duplicated elsewhere, because we definitely know that the British cryptanalytic service and the German cryptanalytic service was baffled in its attempts and they never did solve it. After we solved the Purple system, the technical data necessary to operate the system and a machine constructed by ourselves were turned over to the British so that they were in position to process Purple messages also. We did the same so far as concerns the Navy. We provided them with a Purple machine or two.

Gen. CLARKE. On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the British?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I recall that very clearly. A joint U. S. Navy-U. S. Army cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went to London for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time the Army furnished a Purple machine and the technical data to the British.

Gen. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief then, was all of the traffic which has since become known as the Pearl Harbor traffic in these Pearl Harbor investigations available to the British at the same time as it was available to the American Army and Navy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that to be a correct statement. The only thing that they might lack would be certain intercepts which they were not in a position to—

Gen. CLARKE. You mean by that individual messages?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss or hear them discuss the Pearl Harbor traffic?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Gen. CLARKE. Or any of the traffic leading up to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. The only thing that I do know is that there exists in the files one or two messages which came from British sources out in the Far East. If you remember, the British had some relations with the Dutch in the East Indies.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Date: 14 July 1945.

Time: 10:00 a. m.

Present:

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.

Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath and you are fully aware of what your rights are?

Col. SADTLER. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called Winds execute message?

Col. SADTLER. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?

Col. SADTLER. It was not.

Col. GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you had with it is in your former testimony?

Col. SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came from Adm. Noyes.

Col. GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall." Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall?

Col. SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed.

[2] Col. GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time?

Col. SADTLER. About March 28, 1944.

Col. GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman?

Col. SADTLER. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things?

Col. SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had happened at that time.

Col. GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's office?

Col. SADTLER. Well I assume they did because I have been in his office several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in his office but at his house.

Col. GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. Yes. Some time during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that to Mr. Friedman in one of your conversations?

Col. SADTLER. It is possible.

Col. GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?

Col. SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years.

Col. GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier General J. T. B. Bissell, that you speak of, do you know him personally?

Col. SADTLER. I do not.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize him today if I saw him.

[3] Col. GIBSON. During the period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor did you have any official business of any nature with the then Col. Bissell?

Col. SADTLER. No.

Col. GIBSON. And your only business of an official nature that you did with G-2 at that particular time was done with Col. Rufus Bratton and Gen. Miles?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Hayes Kroner. Mostly with Bratton and Miles. They were my normal contacts.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman also has testified that on or about the time Adm. Noyes advised you that the Winds execute message was in that you prepared a draft of a message that you wanted to suggest be sent to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. Is that so?

Col. SADTLER. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. Will you relate now what happened about that?

Col. SADTLER. In substance the message was about as follows: "Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify the Navy. Signed Marshall."

Col. GIBSON. Did you type that message out yourself or who did the typing?

Col. SADTLER. I am positive that I did it because Miss Robinson says she never saw it.

Col. GIBSON. Did you have that message with you when you went to discuss Adm. Noyes' message to you that the "Winds Execute" message was in, with Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles?

Col. SADTLER. I did not. After leaving Gen. Miles' office where Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information about the execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and thought that something ought to be done. That message was typed up and I went to see Gen. Gerow and talked this over for a few moments with him and suggested that he notify them. Gerow's reply to the effect was that they had been adequately notified, as I recall it. I then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col. Bedel Smith, and told him what had been done and [4] suggested he send a message. His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further.

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Gailey or Gen. Gerow see the message you had prepared—or Gen. Bedel Smith?

Col. SADTLER. No, I don't think so.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, I also want to ask you if it is true that early in December you tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from making a trip to Panama because you felt sure that war was going to break out.

Col. SADTLER. That is correct—on December 1.

Col. GIBSON. Tell us about that.

Col. SADTLER. On December 1, when Gen. Olmstead was making preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington.

Col. GIBSON. What did he say?

Col. SADTLER. He said, "I am going anyhow and that's all there is to it."

Col. GIBSON. When did Olmstead return, do you know?

Col. SADTLER. About the 20th of December.

Col. GIBSON. Did he have any conversation with Marshall when he got back, do you know?

Col. SADTLER. He said that he had gone to Gen. Marshall or had visited Gen. Marshall and Gen. Marshall had told him that his men that he had left in charge while he was gone had not performed 100 percent, or words to that effect. Olmstead said, "Why didn't you act on the information you already had?"

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, have you ever talked anything pertaining to Pearl Harbor over with Capt. Safford of the Navy?

Col. SADTLER. No.

Col. GIBSON. Have you discussed it with any naval officer who had any direct contact with naval communications at the time of Pearl Harbor?

[5] Col. SADTLER. Only with Adm. Noyes.

Continued—17 July 1945, 9:30 a. m.

Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Present:

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.

Col. E. W. Gibson.

Col. O. K. Sadtler

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall. This second message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar installation in the Islands or the answer thereto had been destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. I did not. The circumstances attending that message are about as follows: I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Col. Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into Gen. Marshall's office. I gave a copy to Geo. Gerow. Col. Colton, upon his return from Gen. Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor secret at that time, the information was not to be disclosed. Gen. Gerow kept his message and I think that Col. Handy had it and he held it.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, did Gen. Marshall ever order this radar message, either the original inquiry or the answer thereto, destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. No. To my knowledge, he did not.
 Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from any source that he had ordered either of those destroyed?
 Col. SADTLER. No.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ISAAC SPALDING

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 17 July 1945.

Time: 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.

Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding.

Col. E. W. Gibson.

Col. O. K. Sadtler.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give in this case will be the truth, so help you God?

Gen. SPALDING. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and present station?

Gen. SPALDING. Isaac Spalding, serial number O3383. Brigadier General, USA, Station Ft. McPherson, Georgia.

Gen. CLARKE. What were your station and duties in the three months preceding Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SPALDING. I was on duty as Chief of the Officers Branch of the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department up to the night of December 3, 1941, and on the morning of December 4, 1941 I became Chief of the Army Exchange Service, which lasted for some time after the Pearl Harbor incident.

Gen. CLARKE. Had you previously been on duty in the old War Plans Division?

Gen. SPALDING. I had. I was on duty in the War Plans Division from the summer of 1932 to the summer of 1936.

Gen. CLARKE. But you were not in the War Plans Division on your return from that tour of duty you were then on just preceding Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SPALDING. No. I was placed on duty in G-1, War Department, on January 11, 1941 on my return from overseas service in Hawaii.

Gen. CLARKE. Were you on occasion called into conference by the War Plans Division with reference to Hawaiian war plans?

Gen. SPALDING. During my four year tour you mean?

[2] Gen. CLARKE. While you were with G-1.

Gen. SPALDING. I don't remember ever talking with anyone in WPD about any war plans. I had many friends there and would occasionally go over and see them on matters connected with personnel. I remember someone in the summer of '41—I think it was Gen. Gerow—stating that a message had been sent to the Philippines making Gen. MacArthur the head of all our Army forces over there, but I think that is the nearest that I ever came to anything connected with the war plans in any way. I don't remember talking about Hawaii with anyone in '41, nor do I remember who was in charge of the Hawaiian Defense Project.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you have knowledge of the intercepted traffic which was being produced by the Signal Corps at that time?

Gen. SPALDING. No. My friend Spencer Akin was in charge of some kind of a secret room which was right over G-1 in the same wing of the Munitions Building, and I had planned to go up and visit Akin and see what was going on but I never did go and Akin was transferred away. I knew they had some kind of a secret room up there and I thought it was something with breaking down codes but I don't know what they did.

Col. GIBSON. General, Mr. William F. Friedman, who is at present Director of Communications Research of Signal Security Agency of the War Department, has testified that sometime in 1944, in a conversation with Col. O. K. Sadtler, that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told that a certain message pertaining to a warning on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which we called the Winds execute message, had been ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall and that another message dealing with the question of whether or not the radar installation on the Hawaiian Islands was in operation on the date of Pearl Harbor, and the answer thereto, had been destroyed by Gen. Marshall's order. Mr. Friedman further testified that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told this story by you. Thereafter Col. Sadtler testified that he had never told Mr. Friedman that he had heard that Gen. Marshall had ordered this so-called Winds execute message destroyed or the radar message destroyed, but that he had been told by you at Ft. Bragg sometime in 1943 that the then Col. J. T. B. Bissell, now Brigadier General Bissell, had been ordered to destroy all matters pertaining to Pearl Harbor, or that in substance. I want to ask you, having given you this background, first, did you tell Col. Sadtler that in substance?

[3] Gen. SPALDING. I did not tell him that in substance, answering specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But at no time was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation or discussion.

Col. GIBSON. What was it you did tell Col. Sadtler?

Gen. SPALDING. I would like to make a rather full statement. By so doing maybe I can answer questions which you might specifically ask me later. I wish it to appear in my testimony that it is my full belief that the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, are not involved in any way whatsoever with the testimony which I am about to give, and it is my belief that neither one knew anything of it.

I was around in the War Department for a year preceding Pearl Harbor and for six months thereafter, and of course there were various conversations about Pearl Harbor after that "blitz." It was all very vague to me as to why the A. C. of S., G-2, Gen. Sherman Miles, had not diagnosed this coming war, and it was rather queer to me that soon after the blitz he was transferred to other duty and Gen. Raymond Lee was brought back from England to be the War Department G-2. This transfer aroused my curiosity but I never did know why it was done.

In the summer of 1943 I was stationed at Ft. Bragg, and certain troops at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, came under my command. It was my custom to visit the troops at Ft. Jackson about once a week for from one to three or four days at a time. In July of 1943 I moved

my whole headquarters and headquarters battery from Ft. Bragg down on to the reservation at Ft. Jackson for two weeks field training. Previous to that time and during July and for several weeks after, Col. John T. Bissell, Field Artillery, commanded one of my artillery groups at Ft. Jackson, and so I requested him to make the necessary reservations for camping space and maneuver ground on the Ft. Jackson Reservation. Upon my arrival at this camp site I found that Col. Bissell and his staff had made arrangements preliminary to our entering the camp and Col. Bissell himself had established his command post under canvas within a few hundred yards of my camp site. We were thus camped close together for several days and during that time we often sat under the trees and talked in the late afternoons and early evenings. Bissell had been on duty in the War Department and I believe part of his [4] duties were connected with secret service operators. Naturally we talked about matters which were of interest to each other and I had some curiosity on our secret service, but I learned nothing from him except such generalities as that we had considerable such effort now that the war was under way. I remember telling him that G-2 denied during peacetimes that they ever had any operators, but I didn't believe those statements. He made no remark as to whether they did or didn't. I remember telling him that I had always wanted to be a sleuth or a detective of some kind but I didn't think I would be a success at it. But I was always curious concerning detective stories, etc. It is my opinion and recollection that Bissell in no way whatsoever revealed any secrets connected with his duties concerning our secret operators. I remember that I would have liked to have him talk more but he didn't.

We talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing to him my failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy could fail to discover that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. I was under the impression from my experience in both the Army and Navy War Colleges and in the War Department General Staff and in my dealings with the Navy while on duty in the General Staff, from all these experiences I had thought or believed that our Navy kept track of every vessel carrying the Japanese flag, both commercial and war vessels, and I didn't see how those vessels in peacetime could get away from Japan and come down near Hawaii without our Navy knowing it. I was astounded at their ignorance or inability to detect that! I remember shooting off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for whom I didn't have a very high regard professionally, and I think I remember telling him what I told Walter Krueger when he asked me what I thought about Sherman Miles, I told him that I thought Miles was a "stuffed shirt," and Krueger was astonished that I should think that about him. And so by our talking we got into the subject of Pearl Harbor and the information which we must have had and which the Navy must have had and our failure to give some kind of a better warning to Gen. Short. I remember expressing my disgust at those airplanes up at Wheeler Field all lined up for Saturday morning inspection and were still there on Sunday morning, and I told him of my disgust that those radars weren't working, that I knew when I left Hawaii in 1940 they were being installed. And Bissell said that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary [5] to destroy them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to

the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most desirable that the President, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about. I had the feeling that Bissell destroyed them without even Gen. Raymond Lee, the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence.

Now the question may come up as to sobriety on this occasion. We were out there under the trees and upon my arrival a bottle of Scotch and two or three bottles of soda water had been presented to me and when I broke camp 14 days later I returned the unopened bottle of Scotch and possibly the soda water to the officer who had given them to me upon my arrival at Ft. Jackson. I may have had some liquor of my own with me and Bissell and I may have had a drink or two of Bourbon which I provided—I don't remember—but it is customary for me to drink one or two highballs after the day's work is over. Sometimes the day's work is not over until late at night, midnight or later, and then of course I don't drink, but I am sure I was sober all the time I was down there in camp with my headquarters battery and headquarters staff.

Gen. CLARKE. Was Bissell sober?

Gen. SPALDING. Yes. Bissell and I, in the course of three or four months that he was in my command, we would have a bottle of beer together or over at his quarters before supper have a bottle of beer or a highball. I loafed with him considerable, was with him a lot during duty hours, and never knew him to take a drink during duty and after retreat we would have a drink or two, but I never remember taking more than two. Bissell carries liquor very well and did not drink to excess.

Now about this occasion of my talking to Sadtler. It is natural that we talk about those things which worry us a little and Sadtler dropped into my house one evening at Ft. Bragg about August of 1943 and we talked for an hour or two there in my home. Col. Sadtler does not drink alcoholics, to my knowledge, and didn't there at my house. I knew that he was interested in Pearl Harbor and I told him of this incident of my talking with Bissell out there under the trees and [6] Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would call vital records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the War Department. I don't remember that Bissell used those expressions but that is the impression which I got.

Gen. CLARKE. I got the impression from your statement that these messages were from secret operatives. Was that your impression?

Gen. SPALDING. No, they might have been either, but they were so hot that if Gen. Marshall had known about them it would have been very disagreeable for Gen. Marshall, but what the source of them was I don't remember that Bissell indicated it in any way whatever.

Col. GIBSON. You definitely understood, then, from him that this destruction was done on his own initiative and not at the suggestion of anyone else?

Gen. SPALDING. That is absolutely the impression I have.

Col. GIBSON. Have you ever heard from any other source of any of these Pearl Harbor records, the claim that they were destroyed?

Gen. SPALDING. No. Bissell was the only man who ever told me anything, that I remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn't want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or

George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line I know.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Date: 18 July 1945.

Time: 10:05 a. m.

Present:

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith.

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.

Col. E. W. Gibson.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the statements you make in this case will be the truth, so help you God?

Gen. SMITH. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. Are you familiar with your rights as a witness, self-incrimination?

Gen. SMITH. I am.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station.

Gen. SMITH. Major General Ralph C. Smith. Presently Military Attache, Paris, France.

Gen. CLARKE. What were your duties in the three months preceding and approximately 3 months following the so-called Pearl Harbor incident?

Gen. SMITH. During the period specified and for something more than a year previous, I was Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division.

Gen. CLARKE. Under General Miles?

Gen. SMITH. Under General Sherman Miles, until his relief in December 1941. Thereafter I occupied the same position with respect to Brig. Gen. Raymond Lee.

Gen. CLARKE. You never were Executive Office under Gen. Strong?

Gen. SMITH. My recollection is that Gen. Strong was actually designated as G-2 after I left the G-2 Division. He was acting as G-2 for a week or so prior to my departure.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state in a general way what your duties as Executive Officer were?

Gen. SMITH. As Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division I was charged primarily with responsibility for all administrative functions of the Division. As Executive Officer I was also head of the Administrative Branch. I conceived my mission to be to relieve the [21] G-2 from as much concern about the routine operation of his Division as possible. The Administrative Branch included matters such as finance, personnel, both military and civilian, allotment of office space (Which I may say parenthetically was a terrible headache at that time because we were being moved from one part of the Munitions Building to another). I also had charge of the filing system, the records room and the general procedure of handling records. The Translation Section was also included. Being charged primarily with administrative responsibilities, I did not have any direct responsibility in the intelligence chain. Because of my close relationship with the G-2, I was aware of a great deal that was going on in the intelligence and counter intelligence part of the

Division's work, but I did not have any direct responsibility for operating that. The chain of responsibility passed directly from G-2 to the heads of the Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch and Plans and Training Branch.

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the existence at that time in 1941 of the so-called Magic material?

Gen. SMITH. I was. Of course, as you know, every effort was made to limit to the very minimum, persons who had contact with or even knowledge of the existence of Magic material. However, because of my position, I knew of course, of our work in the Signal Intelligence Service of intercept and I was aware of our success in breaking the Japanese codes. I knew that this material was being handled in the raw in the Far Eastern Section by Japanese experts and that the product of the code-breaking work was being distributed in locked leather pouches to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, G-2 and later to the State Department and the White House.

Col. GIBSON. Will you state your recollection as to how this Magic material was handled between the period of 1 July 1941 and Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. The head of the Far Eastern Section, Col. Bratton, and his principal assistant, Col. Pettigrew, were the principal ones involved in handling this material. I knew that they had a great deal of contact with Gen. Miles, the head of G-2, on this material and I was generally cognizant of its nature and sometimes of its context, but I made no effort to pry into the exact nature of it because it did not concern my direct functions.

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time did you read this material?

Gen. SMITH. Along in the late summer, as I recall it, Gen. Miles gave me a key to the Magic pouches. If I remember correctly, it was when he was absent on leave for a few days. For a period of several weeks or a month, approximately, I saw the pouches and read the contents of most of them. Later in the fall, it was about September, Gen. Miles told me that the Chief of Staff had expressed the desire to restrict to the absolute minimum persons having access to and knowledge of the Magic material. Therefore I returned to Gen. Miles the key to the pouches that I had and after that date I did not see any of the material, so far as I remember.

Col. GIBSON. Who delivered those pouches to Gen. Miles?

Gen. SMITH. As a matter of routine, Col. Bratton. Sometimes Col. Pettigrew. I do not recall their being handled by any other person.

Col. GIBSON. Was that delivery made daily?

Gen. SMITH. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. On occasions did you see Col. Bratton with several pouches in his possession?

Gen. SMITH. Yes. Col. Bratton would have several pouches because similar ones were being given to the Chief of Staff, to the best of my recollection. I believe that the same copy went from the Secretary of War's office to the Chief of Staff, and I know that there was a separate copy for G-2. Whether there was a third copy I am not certain.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that WPD had a pouch?

Gen. SMITH. Yes. I am certain that Gen. Gerow had access to the material because I remember some incidents through the fall when I made contact with Gen. Gerow and arranged a meeting with him for Gen. Miles and vice versa. I also know that the Navy was handling

the material because I remember there were conferences of Adm. Wilkinson with Gen. Miles and Gen. Gerow in the G-2 office.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that the State Department received a pouch?

[4] Gen. SMITH. Yes. A pouch went to the State Department, delivered there in person I believe by Col. Betts, who was the liaison officer with the State Department at that time. That I am a little hazy on, whether it was Col. Betts or Col. Bratton that took it over. And I know a pouch was taken to the White House on many days.

Col. GIBSON. Will you describe how the contents of the pouch looked when you saw them and about how many sheets might be in the pouch?

Gen. SMITH. The Magic pouches were leather brief cases, I believe, with a zipper opening and susceptible of being locked with a padlock. On removing the padlock and opening the zipper the material inside was contained in a loose-leaf red board cover. In the ones that I recollect seeing there were always from three to a dozen or 15 pages. They were always carbon copies of other messages.

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Miles destroy the contents or what happened to them?

Gen. SMITH. Gen. Miles would read the material, place it in the locked pouch and leave it on his desk and I would return it to Col. Bratton or Col. Pettigrew the next time they came up.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of a so-called Winds code message prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I can recall.

Col. GIBSON. Were you in any conferences of G-2 immediately prior to Pearl Harbor or the month prior to Pearl Harbor where the question of Japan and its capabilities and intentions were discussed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not attend such conferences. I think I recall a meeting in Gen. Miles' office attended by Col. Kroner, Col. Bratton, Col. Pettigrew, Col. Betts and some of the other members of the Intelligence brain-trust. I did not participate in the conference but I knew it was being held.

Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation that were being prepared by the various intelligence branches during that period of time, did they come through your office?

Gen. SMITH. They came through my desk. The volume of business in my office was increasing in geometric proportions at [5] about that time. I tried to read those estimates insofar as I could because I wished to keep abreast of the general situation. However, many of them I was unable to touch; they would go over my desk to G-2 and out again.

Col. GIBSON. The Military Attache reports and observer reports that came in from the field did not cross your desk?

Gen. SMITH. They did not. They went directly from the mail room where they had a processing system that would get them with the minimum delay to the interested section in the Intelligence Branch. About the only thing that came to the front office would be the evaluations and estimates based on the Military Attaches' raw material. Sometimes I know, when a report would be of particular interest, it would be brought up and shown to Gen. Miles. I remember some particularly good reports by Gen. Lee's office in London and from the office in Germany.

Col. GIBSON. Were you informed prior to Pearl Harbor of the contents of the message that our Government had sent to the Imperial Government of Japan along in the latter part of November 1941?

Gen. SMITH. I recall vaguely that such a message was in existence, but I do not remember that I saw it in the course of my official duties.

Col. GIBSON. In early December 1941 were you preparing to leave the War Department?

Gen. SMITH. A list of senior colonels had been prepared by the G-1 Division with an indication of possible dates when they might be called for active combat duty with the new divisions that were being contemplated. I remember that my name was on that list, as well as the names of Col. Bratton, Col. Compton, Col. Pettigrew and several other officers. From other divisions of the General Staff I knew Col. Huebner, Col. Ridgeway and others were likewise on this list. The Chief of Infantry had arranged a special two-weeks' refresher course at Ft. Benning for the benefit of colonels who might be relieved from staff duty and assigned to active command in the next few months. My name and that of Col. Bratton were submitted for this course. Bratton's name was later removed because of conversations going on at the White House with the Japanese special envoy and the general tense nature of the Japanese situation. The course was actually planned to begin on the 8th of December. I remember distinctly that I left Washington on the train from the Union [6] Station for Atlanta about 6:00 p. m. December 6th. Ralph Huebner, Mat Ridgeway and several others were on the same train with me. I remember distinctly that we reached Ft. Benning soon after noon of December 7th. We were at the Officers' Club having luncheon when the announcement by radio of the attack on Pearl Harbor was received. A few hours after this, perhaps about 5:00 p. m., I received a telephone message from Gen. Omar Bradley, Commandant of the school, that Gen. Miles had called by phone and asked to have me return to Washington by the quickest available means. Gen. Bradley loaned me a car to drive to Atlanta, where I got a plan and reached Washington Monday morning. I must admit that because of this course and my preparations to leave, that happenings in the office on the morning of December 6 are quite hazy in my mind. My place during my absence was taken by the late Col. Roderick, my Assistant Executive Officer.

Col. GIBSON. In the immediate few days prior to Pearl Harbor, any messages that were sent out from G-2 to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii or Panama, would clear through your office?

Gen. SMITH. They would clear through my office. The volume of messages had reached a formidable proportion at this time and in order to clear them out in the evening, I had had an autograph rubber stamp prepared that was kept locked in my desk or in the desk of one of my assistants. Whenever a message came up properly authenticated with the initials of one of the Chiefs of Branches or Sections, this message would be cleared by one of my assistants without ever coming to my attention.

Col. GIBSON. As a matter of routine then, any message that came to your office at that time to be cabled to the field or sent to the field would be stamped by someone in your office and sent forward for dispatch provided that the Chief of a Branch had initiated the same?

Gen. SMITH. That is right. The functions of my office were to verify that the message had been properly coordinated within the G-2 Division prior to being sent. I assumed no responsibility for the actual context of the message except that it made sense. I had instructed my assistants to read through and see that the message was understandable to them and there were no obvious errors.

[7] Col. GIBSON. The wisdom or the propriety of sending such a message was not a duty of yours?

Gen. SMITH. No. I had no function on that score. I accepted any message that had the approval, as indicated by initials, of any Branch or Section Chief, and I had delegated that responsibility for approval to my assistants.

Col. GIBSON. In fact in your administrative duties, you were kept so busy that you didn't know enough of the intelligence situation to really pass sound judgment on these messages. Is that correct?

Gen. SMITH. I am sorry to say that that is an understatement, if anything. The office was a beehive of activity about this time.

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of certain warning messages that were being sent out by G-2 to the field during the first week in December?

Gen. SMITH. As I have reflected on the events of that week in retrospect, I have a vague awareness that such messages were going out and there was a tense atmosphere in the office. I of course knew about the presence of the Japanese Ambassador and knew that the conferences were not going satisfactorily, but that is about the limit of my detailed knowledge.

Col. GIBSON. Any answers to these messages that were sent out in either the latter part of November or the first week of December, the answers being from Department Commanders, did you see?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I recollect. Our system of office procedure was such that the handling of such messages would be expedited to get them to the interested agency as quickly as possible. Outgoing messages did pass through my office. Incoming messages were handled directly from the Record Section to the interested agency.

Col. GIBSON. Do you ever recall seeing or knowing about a message from Gen. Short, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to G-2 in answer to a warning message that G-2 had sent out either the latter part of November or the first week of December?

Gen. SMITH. I have seen references to the message which I know you mean since, but I am certain that I had no knowledge of it prior to December 7.

[8] Col. GIBSON. After you returned from Ft. Benning on the morning of 8 December, then what were your duties?

Gen. SMITH. My duties continued unchanged as Executive Officer of the Division until approximately the end of March.

Col. GIBSON. Then from the 8th of December until the end of March you were in charge of the records of G-2?

Gen. SMITH. In a broad supervisory sense, yes.

Col. GIBSON. If any records were to be copied or destroyed or transferred to any other source, would you in the ordinary course of your duties have had to pass on it?

Gen. SMITH. I am certain that my subordinates would not have accepted any orders to tamper with the records, either in changing

them, removing them or destroying them without having reported the fact to me.

Col. GIBSON. At any time during your service in the War Department in 1941 and until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were any of the records of G-2 destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. Categorically, no. The only recollection of any destruction of records that I have occurring during my administration was in the early part of my function as Executive Officer in 1941 when we were making an effort to collect out of the files and eliminate a lot of obsolete material dating back to World War I in order to conserve filing space. A considerable cleaning up of the Record Section was done in 1940 and 1941, as I recall it, in order to place with the National Archives material that should be kept of permanent record, and material of no permanent value was destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. After that time to your knowledge was any material of any type destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I am very certain that no permanent records after January 1941, perhaps, were removed or destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. At any time did you ever receive any order from anyone after Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to destroy or have any records destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

[9] . Col. GIBSON. Or held?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Or tampered with?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Or touched in any way, shape or manner?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. As far as you know, are the records of G-2 that pertain to Pearl Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete?

Gen. SMITH. To the best of my knowledge they are.

Col. GIBSON. Until you arrived at the War Department yesterday, did you ever hear of any story to the effect that some of the Pearl Harbor records or reports bearing on Pearl Harbor had been destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comments made that if certain records in G-2 became known or were made public that it would be very damning to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff?

Gen. SMITH. No I had never heard any such comment.

Col. GIBSON. Did you know Col. J. T. B. Bissell?

Gen. SMITH. I did.

Col. GIBSON. And was he on duty in the War Department in G-2 at the same time you were?

Gen. SMITH. Col. Bissell was, first, assistant to Col. Lester and later became Chief of Counter Intelligence Branch. He occupied that position, as I recall it, in December 1941.

Col. GIBSON. Now let me ask you this question. Did Col. Bissell, to your knowledge, ever destroy any records in G-2 in the War Department?

Gen. SMITH. He did not during my tenure of office; and I believe that if he had I would have known about it from my subordinates.

[10] Col. GIBSON. Let me ask you this. Did Col. Bissell ever tell you that he had destroyed some records dealing with Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. He did not.

Col. GIBSON. Had you ever heard, until yesterday, any story alleging that Col. Bissell had said he did destroy certain records?

Gen. SMITH. I had not.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of the incidents leading up to Pearl Harbor with Col. Bissell?

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection. It is true that we were both members of the G-2 Division for the 3 months following Pearl Harbor. It is possible that we may have discussed it in general terms but I have no specific recollection.

Gen. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here. Do you know whether or not the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. Bissell, had at his disposal all of the information and intelligence which was available to the Intelligence Group?

Gen. SMITH. I have a vague recollection that some point was brought up either shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward that some sources of Counter Intelligence data were in existence but not being exploited to the maximum. I think I can state as a certainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not receive the pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have a vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contacts with the Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents in this country.

Gen. CLARKE. What about Japanese agents in Hawaii?

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection on that specific score.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN T. BISSELL

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Date: 4 August 1945, 3:10 p. m.

Present: Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell.

Col. E. W. Gibson.

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, Gen. Clarke has been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this Pearl Harbor investigation on the basis of the old order that he had here last September 9 when this investigation was commenced. I would like to remind you that you are still under oath. With reference to that I would like to reswear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Gen. BISSELL. I do.

Col. GIBSON. You of course are aware of your rights?

Gen. BISSELL. I am.

Col. GIBSON. Will you please state your name, rank, position and organization.

Gen. BISSELL. John T. B. Bissell, Brigadier General, O8624. Headquarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York.

Col. GIBSON. You are here as a result of receiving cable orders to return here for purposes of this interrogation?

Gen. BISSELL. I am.

Col. GIBSON. Since your arrival here have you read the sworn testimony of Mr. Wm. F. Friedman of 13 July 45 before General Clarke

and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. Isaac Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter?

Gen. BISSELL. I have.

Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board?

Gen. BISSELL. I did

[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in September 1944?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that testimony?

Gen. BISSELL. I have.

Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spaulding?

Gen. BISSELL. I do.

Col. GIBSON. How long have you known him?

Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that Brigade.

Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that?

Gen. BISSELL. I had not.

Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spaulding at Ft. Bragg?

Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C.

Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to converse with Gen. Spaulding?

Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg about once a week.

Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg?

Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles.

Col. GIBSON. So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were down at Jackson all of this time?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down to Jackson for some training?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember.

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spaulding during those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G-2 knew about the Pearl Harbor attack?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it.

Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have.

Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he did talk with you at some length about it?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were as strained as they were.

Col. GIBSON. Where was that?

Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at Bragg, as I was up there several times.

Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there or somewhere else. I don't remember the details.

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?

Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.

Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and 5 of his testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk you had with Gen. Spalding.

Gen. BISSELL. As I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought should not be revealed. Following that, he discussed at some length the Pearl Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G-2 had been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian Department alerting them to be on their guard against possible sabotage. He endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed, he asked me what I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, Hawaiian Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained relations with which everyone in G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read the message and change it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more than I had. That message, as far as I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. Miles destroyed as it was marked Secret.

Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General, dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen. Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared.

Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one which I drafted.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy

had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl Harbor attack had left their home ports?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall it.

[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed that Mies was a stuffed shirt?

Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt?

Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being installed?

Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.

Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okeyed and sent it was kept?

Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately.

Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess material that had no value.

Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 and 1942 was always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G-2?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence?

Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor.

Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later found to be information based on signal intelligence?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska.

Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined?

Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the signal intelligence material.

Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department?

Gen. BISSELL. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?

Gen. BISSELL. No.

EXHIBITS OF THE CLARKE INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS 1 TO 8

HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 1

TOP SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

Purple

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Washington

October 16, 1941

Purple (CA)

#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had

* For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516

concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From; Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
1 October 1941
(Purple)
#1198

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

23673 JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my conferees here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#738

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo

1. I sent MOORE* to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

[2] He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

24655 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

* Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

(Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

24656 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)

#———

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,^a and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24,878 JD-1:6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)

#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.^a You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or

^a See JD- : 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24830 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. # 24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

^a See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

[1] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai	Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question)	(New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai	Shikago
(The question of nondiscriminatory treatment)	(Chicago)
Shina Mondai	Sanfuranshisuko
(The China question)	(San Francisco)
Soori	Ito Kun
(Premier)	(Mr. Ito)
Gaimudaijin	Date Kun
(Foreign Minister)	(Mr. Date)
Rikugun	Tokugawa Kun
(The Army)	(Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun	Maeda Kun
(The Navy)	(Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bel kooshoo	Endan
(Japan-American negotiations)	(Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo	Kimiko San
(President)	(Miss Kimiko)
Haru	Fumeko San
(Hull)	(Miss Fumeko)

[2] <i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Kokuaijoosei	Shoobai
(Internal situation)	(Trade)
Jooho Suru	Yama Wo Uru
(To yield)	(To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu	Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to yield)	(Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru	Kodomo Gaumareru
(Situation taking critical turn)	(The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence Ginza 1022

ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

To: Nanking.
15 November 1941

From: Tokyo
(Purple)
#400

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.

25390 JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are *becoming dangerous* we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations

"HIGASHI"

(2) Japan Russian relations

"KITA"

(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)

"NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at the beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

See Supplementary Information File.

(Voice broadcasts)

SIS-25432 JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From Nomura and Kurusu.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

(Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[1] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary Hull and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

[2] (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

25441 ARMY Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[1]

(Part 2 of 2)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objective of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumb-founded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete [2] control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)

#844.

Re your #1189^a.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25441, #25442.

^b S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6 p. m.	To Pacific Coast	JVJ	12275	
6:30 p. m.	To Western Hemisphere	JUO	9430	and
		JVJ	12275	
7:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JVJ	12275	
8:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
9:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
10:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
10:30 p. m.	To Europe	JHP	11980	

(Note: All times Tokyo time)

SIS 25446 JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25496 JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code

TransPacific
Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There

is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so?"

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We are being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y: "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—"

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! ! ! Do you understand? Please, all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#1214. To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #1190*.

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 25548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

* S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

[1] From: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
To: Berlin
Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[2]

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 28th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)

#865

Re my #857.*

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

SIS-25605 JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
***Not available.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are not doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS-25644 JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

[Completed Translation]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple

#1232

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.* Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made that statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between

* Not available.

submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25650-B Trans. 12/3/41

*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

(Part 2 of 2)

[1] Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here."

25660 ARMY

[2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.*

ARMY 25660 Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

* Not available.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China ----- the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

25715 JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
8 December 1941
(Purple)

#875

Chief of Office routing.
Re your #1232*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seems to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

25725 JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021. (SIS #25659-60)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure

does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) Copy

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941.

Purple. (Urgent)

#1234.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862.^a

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspaper of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

25730 JD-7059 Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

ARMY

^a Not available.

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 4, 1941.

Purple (Urgent)

#891.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256.^a

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.^b I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

25731 JD-7105 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

ARMY

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25725.

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 30, 1941

Purple

#1224

Re your #857.^a

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's ex-

^a See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

pected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

25762

ARMY JD 7089 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19

#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

* Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#893

* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident to Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

[Handwritten:] Codes Manchukuo, etc.

JD-1:7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) SIS 25783

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(Purple)

#1223

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7184 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19

#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.^d

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to ———.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)

#122

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

SIS 25823

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram
Memorandum

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best effort to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on

fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country--- (45 letters garbled or missing)---been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the ---es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate

the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

(Part 14 of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

*Probably "and as"

**Probably "China, can but"

124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET, (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941. (S-TT)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.*

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

* JD-1: 7148—text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 2

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)

Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

- (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
- (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
- (3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.
(Voice broadcasts)

S/S 25432
JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 3

SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather message which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such messages was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p.m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

/s/ T. J. Slowie
T. J. SLOWIE
Secretary

(SEAL of the F. C. C.)

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 4

SECRET

DOCUMENT No. 1

Group One is EAST WIND RAIN

Group Two is NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND

Group Three is WEST WIND CLEAR STOP

Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 2

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm.

Weather message from Tokyo Station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 3

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south (repeated 3 times).

Weather message from Tokyo Station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 4

*English**Romaji*

This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:

WEST WIND, CLEAR

WEST WIND, CLEAR

This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:

WEST WIND, CLEAR

WEST WIND, CLEAR

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga hon-jitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo moshlage masu

NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo moshlage masu

NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

Sent No. 519, 12/5

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,

G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandment Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

/s/ RALPH C. SMITH,
*Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.*

Secret Cablegram
las

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 5

TOP SECRET

From Tokyo
To Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMI'YQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941

Purple
#902

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those previously prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941

#902

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

JD: 1 7143

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to agree in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143

Navy Trans 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country— (45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the—es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n— (50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of

the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in all its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking. ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

*Probably "and as"

**Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple—Eng)

#902

(Part 14 of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this report, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

D:1 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)
5843

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CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 6

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902*.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

* JD-1: 7143—text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 7

SECRET

WPD 4544-30

WPD
CKG

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL
L. T. GEBOW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

OCSigO 311.23 (Gen)
(12-8-41)

1st Memo Ind.

O Br.

War Department, OCSigO, Washington, December 10, 1941. To: A. C. of S. G-2

1. Following is the log of the message requested in basic memorandum:

	Honolulu Time	E. S. T.
Filed War Department Message Center	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent Western Union	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department		2:58 PM

2. Attached hereto is paraphrase copy of secret message received from Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

For the Acting Chief Signal Officer:

1 Incl—Paraphrase of radiogram

O. K. SADLER,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 8

SECRET

Paraphrase

1087 DECEMBER NINTH

Re your five four nine radio five two nine RCA received this message at their Honolulu station at seven thirty three morning December seventh and this message was delivered Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh the Adjutant General received the deciphered copy at two fifty eight pm

SHORT

Incl #1

DECEMBER 8, 1941

Memorandum for: The Chief Signal Officer.

Subject: Warning order to Overseas Departments

1. At about 11:30 a. m. Sunday, December 7, a secret radiogram, written by the Chief of Staff, was handed in to the Message Center by Colonel Bratton of this division. Colonel Bratton reported verbally to the Chief of Staff that the message would be in the air in about eight minutes as he was assured by the Message Center. This radio was a highly important warning to all overseas departments including Hawaii regarding the timing of the Japanese ultimatum on that afternoon.

2. It is recommended that steps be taken to determine the exact time of arrival of this message at Honolulu, the time when the deciphered message was transmitted by the Signal Corps to the Staff, and by what office it was received in the Staff. Prompt action on this message might have averted disaster.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

G2/WAH

MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 4, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1 Enclosures:

336. (1103-41)—MID Sum. of Info. re Information received from the Orient; dtd. FMH

Mailed G/2 ———— Nov 5, 1941 Reg. #910405.

MID 336. 11-3-41

G2/C1
FMH

WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.
November 3, 1941.
(Date)

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

Summary of Information:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.

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All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:

All Corps Areas
All Departments
Alaska
FBI
ONI
STATE
File
J. B. Cognizant

Evaluation

—of source	—of information
X	Reliable
	Credible X
	Questionable
	Undetermined

Source: Dr. Cho. Date of original paper 10/28/41 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H.

6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

350.05 (G-2)

Subject: Summaries of Information.

To: War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.

REC'D-B-2 SEP 17, 1941

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB

NO. 519 sent out December 5, 1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G-2 Hawaiian Department
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES

[Handwritten:] From Boogy Woogie.

Date dispatched SIS No.	Date translated	From	To	Extract
11/19/41 25040	11/20/41	Tokyo	Washington	"— please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concession can be made. If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to be broken off."
11/22/41 11/22/41	11/22/41	Tokyo	Washington	There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, if the signing can be completed by the 29th . . . we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

Warning Mess. No. 1. OPNAV. 24 Nov.

"These are very doubtful chances—"

11/14/41 25322	11/27/41	Tokyo	Hongkong	"Should the negotiations collapse . . . we will completely destroy British and American power in China."
11/27/41 25344	11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief Yamamoto of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code . . ."
11/19/41 25432	11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"In case of an emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the [2] daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. (1) In case Japan-U. S. relations in danger: Higashi no Kazeame (east wind rain). This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers etc."
11/19/41 25392	11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations "Higashi". . . The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end."
11/26/41 25349	11/26/41	Washington	Tokyo	Kurusu to Yamamoto: "I have made all efforts but they will not yield."

Trans Pacific telephone conversation

Warning Messages Nos. 2 & 3

OPD "Negotiations with Japan appear G-2." Advise only the Commanding Officer. 27 Nov.

11/28/41 25445	11/28/41	Tokyo	Washington	"Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. . . . However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off, merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions."
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Warning Message No. 4 28 Nov.

[Lines immediately above and below the cross rule are handwritten]

Date dispatched SIS No. Date translated	From	To	Extract
G-2 "Critical situation demands that all			
11/26/41 25460 11/29/41	Washington	Tokyo	"Should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us."
11/29/41 25496 11/30/41	Tokyo	Washington	"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines: . . . [3] (in carrying out this instruction please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations). Kurusu: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" Yamamoto: "Yes."
11/30/41 25497 11/30/41 Telephone conversation 12/1/41 25545 12/1/41	Washington	Tokyo	
12/1/41 25545 12/1/41	Tokyo	Washington	"When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose."
11/30/41 25552 12/1/41	Tokyo	Berlin	"The conversations . . . between Tokyo and Washington . . . now stand ruptured, broken. . . . lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude . . . They are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia . . . we will have to counter by also moving troops . . . war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan."
11/30/41 25553 12/1/41	Tokyo	Berlin	"Say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet . . . however, right now it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north."
12/2/41 25640 12/3/41	Tokyo	Washington	"Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped, burn those now being used in connection with the machine. Burn every "O" code . . . stop at once using the machine and destroy it completely . . . Burn all the codes Kosaka brought you."

Warning message No. 5 Dec.

[4] G-2 "Contact Commander Rochefort			
12/1/41 25787 12/5/41	Tokyo	London	"Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately."
12/5/41 25836 12/6/41	Washington	Tokyo	We have completed destruction of codes but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine."
12/6/41 25838 12/6/41	Tokyo	Washington	"The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States . . . when you receive it I want you to keep it secret for the time being. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States I will wire you in a separate message."
12/6/41 25843 12/6/41	Tokyo	Washington	The memorandum referred to in 25838 above. A 14 part telegram in reply to the American proposal and concluding with the sentence—"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

Date dispatched SIS No.	From	To	Extract
Date translated 12 7/41 25850 12/7/41	Tokyo.....	Washington.....	Re my #902 (see 25843 above) will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

Final message 7 Dec.

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m."

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB


No. 519 sent out December 5, 1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS

*G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.*

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES



INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS
RE
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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2. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Oct. 10, 1941.
3. Newspaper article re Pearl Harbor.
4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before Grunert Board.
5. Copies of Messages.
6. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941.
7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1940.
8. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
9. Message, to Hawaii.
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11. Memo for Col. Holbrook from Lt. Perry, Evaluation Section, Dec. 6, 1941, re Japanese Embassy burning code book.
12. Messages re weather broadcast.
13. Estimate of the Situation Dec. 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.
14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941.
15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Gerow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations terminated with Japan.
16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles, Nov. 27, 1941.
17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16.).
18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops evacuating.
19. Message to G-2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12, 1941, re custodial detention list.
20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft.
21. Information received from the Orient, Oct. 28, 1941.
22. Copies of Messages.
23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor.
24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and Intentions.

EXHIBIT No. 1

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting)

Executive Officer:

Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick

Administrative Branch: Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

Intelligence Branch: Col. C. H. Mason

Balkans and Near East Section: Lt. Col. W. W. Cox

British Empire Section: Lt. Col. Homer Case

Central European Section: Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire

Eastern European Section: Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther

Far Eastern Section: Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton

Latin American Section: Lt. Col. R. T. Heard

Western European Section: Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham

Aviation Section

Editorial Section

Collection Section

Liaison Branch : Lt. Col. A. R. Harris
 Counterintelligence Branch : Lt. Col. J. A. Lester
 Safeguarding Military Information : Maj. W. P. Corderman
 Domestic Intelligence : Maj. W. A. Holbrook
 Plant and Utilities Section : Maj. W. E. Crist
 General
 Plans and Training Branch : Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper
 Plans and Training : Maj. H. V. Canan
 Geographic : Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill
 Approved March 10, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 2—See facing folder

EXHIBIT No. 3

[From the Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 28, 1944]

THE TRUTH OF PEARL HARBOR

(AN EDITORIAL)

By Basil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times

Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America.

Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to restrain Japan from war—chief weapon with which to win, if war came.

Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy. Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for them by the criminal negligence of others.

Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy—Bataan and Corregidor.

Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan.

It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the Japanese war.

Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of devotion," were not to blame for the disaster.

Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor?

Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty.

Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted and punished?

WHY?

The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor :

"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. *They, not we*, will choose the *time*, the *method* and the *place* of their attack."

Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor?

Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations map-marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes, made especially for this attack?

Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the kill?

Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7?

And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders?

INVESTIGATIONS

Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted—all secret. Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission, released a few weeks after Pearl Harbor.

Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony of none has been made public.

Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts investigation, none has been made public.

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Lt. Col. B. W. McIntosh

Why have not these documents been made public?

The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general of the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, for the disaster.

As a result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have been ordered tried by court-martial.

Kimmel and Short, members of Congress and many others repeatedly have demanded the trials be held.

Today, more than 2½ years after the report of the Roberts Commission, neither Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial.

It was urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would interfere with the war.

Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such claim validly can be made.

More than a year ago the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote a letter saying public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect the progress of the war.

Very recently a sub-committee of the House Military Affairs Committee stated public trials would not interfere with the war.

Why, in justice, have not these trials been publicly held, that those charged may be punished, if guilty, and, if innocent, freed?

Why have not the American people been told the truth about Pearl Harbor?

Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their military and political leaders—and their policies.

Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the guilt.

Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens—in the interest of the country in war.

The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor.

Why are they being treated as children, who must not be told?

Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as well as of the soldier dead.

Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take to cleanse the soul—perhaps to bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation?

* * *

Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, until long afterwards.

The facts as to the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld for a year—and then released with news of successful salvage operations.

WAR

For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to official Washington only a miracle or American surrender could keep the United States out of the European war and war with Japan.

Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to war with the U. S., if war with Hitler came.

Japan had notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the pact meant what it said.

Grew had advised Washington.

Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Philippines.

That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, was dubious indeed.

Lend-lease, convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not suffice if Japan attacked Britain.

Therefore, the President faced, early in '41, the two horns of dilemma.

He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan—which meant war.

Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that without the U. S. actively fighting, the Tripartite powers would defeat Britain, force Russia to peace—and attack the U. S.

That the President had determined on war seems indisputable.

On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the maintenance of British supply lines from the Far East was vital.

On Feb. 14, 1941, Dooman, Counsel of the American Embassy in Tokyo, told the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi that, if the Japanese attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the question" that this would mean war also with the U. S.

On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's conference to Washington, saying:

"I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), with whom I have an appointment this morning that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Okashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval."

Washington did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and Grew's statements.

In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the commanders of the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of U. S. entry into the war seemed a matter of—"not whether—but when."

By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with tremendous and ominous speed.

Churchill, the Australians and the Dutch urged an immediate ultimatum—war—if Japan pursued her expected course.

Responding to the argument for an immediate ultimatum, the President only asked if "we would not be better off in three months?"

And then said, "Leave it to me. I think I can baby them (the Japs) along for three months."

There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill as to Japanese plans—nor that Japan must be stopped.

Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant war.

It now is clear the President only was playing for time—time to be better prepared—

And—time for the American people to "catch up," mentally and morally, with commitments, made and to be made.

The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt settled the policy of a united front between the U. S. and England toward Japan.

That this was true seems implicit in the following from Churchill's address to Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks after Pearl Harbor:

"It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. * * *

"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not been falsified by the events."

July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds.

Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embargoes, against oil, steel and gasoline were ordered which only could result in war.

This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the correct decision—in the country's interests—that history shall so record.

With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, out of his political genius, made one, perhaps two fatal errors, which may have brought on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of the attack.

POLITICS

The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the danger to the country being apprehended—the President failed to take the people into confidence.

This was the President's political bent.

A statesman long ago would have told the people the facts—and risen or fallen with the consequences.

Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this thesis is understood and followed.

But the President was not of that talent nor taste.

Far more than he trusted the people, he trusted his own facility of expression, his ability, not necessarily by the use of facts, to get the people to think as he wanted them to think.

Concurrently, this formula had seemed to the President not to have worked badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elections for President.

It was true, also, this was the only method the President knew.

Secretary Hull had said, when questioned about apparent inaction in Washington, "governments which get too far ahead of the people are apt to fall."

The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far ahead of the people—far too far for the people ever to catch up by anything which he, by that time, could say.

Fortunately we can now depend on two of the President's friends and biographers for the facts at this stage of the crisis.

Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, friends of the President, had access, through the President, to confidential information, from which they produced early in 1942, "How War Came."

This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out—Pearl Harbor":

"Few, if any, high officials believed, however, that the United States would, or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck at the East Indies or Malaya, or even thrust into Siam. For at stake were not only immediate interests vital to us, but resources and strategical positions affecting our long-term security as a nation.

"The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the absence of a direct Japanese attack on the American flag, to summon the nation, divided as it then was on questions of foreign policy, to the strong action which they believed essential.

"There had been considerable discussion of possible methods . . . It was commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart to solve this problem for the President by a direct assault on the American flag—especially at Hawaii, which even the extreme isolationists recognize as a bastion of our security."

Surely this is plain enough.

"As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved the problem for the President by a direct assault on the American flag."

The President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required an "incident" that would enable the people to catch up with him.

Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than he needed, expected—or wanted.

Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be a glancing blow—but the blow came full and head-on at the whole body of the country.

Moreover, it was not *the kind* of an incident he had in mind, as shall be disclosed.

THE FLEET

Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor.

Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel.

Admiral Richardson, immediate predecessor of Kimmel, was removed from command by the President because, among other things, he opposed basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The fleet was at Pearl Harbor by orders of the President, though of course he ordered no such concentration as existed there on Dec. 7.

Reasons of diplomacy, and war strategy, as judged by the President, required a powerful fleet based at Hawaii, a threat and a warning to Japan, the only kind the Japanese could understand.

In no other way, the President judged, could the U. S. hope to keep open the British, and our own, supply lines from the Far East.

These supply lines, the President had told Grew, were vital.

These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had agreed to defend together at the Atlantic Conference.

The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, because they believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed to possible attack.

Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high officers of the Navy had for years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese successfully in Far Eastern waters.

Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult.

Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases in the Japanese Navy and by the fact the U. S. fleet in '41 was divided between the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as a threat to Japan.

Such an approach, they considered, was apt to result in "backing into the war," instead of the more forthright and direct method, which they favored.

What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical purposes, already in the war.

We were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would make the war, already a foregone conclusion, "politically possible."

A plan of co-operation with the British Far Eastern fleet had been arranged, which required the U. S. fleet to be as near as practical to the Philippines.

The Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Every war plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki Matsuo, "The Three Power Alliance," published in 1940, plainly stated in war with U. S. Japan would be defeated—if the U. S. Pacific fleet were permitted to get to the Philippines.

We were, at the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" which would start war.

The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the battle fleet of the U. S. must not get to Manila—for a long time had been *preparing the "incident."*

SABOTAGE

Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, it would be expected that the President, of all persons, would make most certain no disaster came from the fleet's being there.

Doubtless the President thought he had so arranged.

It is a fact, however, the President, by his own acts, unwittingly of course, contrived to bring about the success of the Japanese attack.

This was not in the manner that he has been commonly accused, running all the way from plotting the attack, to ordering the fleet unprotected to appease the Japanese—all of which are false.

The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite.

Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent a warning to both Army and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the danger of a surprise bombing attack by air against the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

It had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it would begin by surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President himself had said Jan. 6, 1941.

But, as the months went by between the first of the year and Dec. 7, 1941, as the plans of the Japanese to attack became matured, for some strange reason there was less and less emphasis on surprise attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor by air, more and more on sabotage.

Of seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kimmel, recorded in the Roberts report, in addition to the one in January from Secretary Knox, four referred to sabotage.

None, after the Knox warning, referred to the possibility of surprise attack by air on the fleet.

Twice, in acknowledging warnings and instructions from Washington, General Short reported to Washington he had taken all precautions *against sabotage*.

On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised Washington he had ordered Hawaii "alert No. 1" against sabotage, and gave details of what measures he had taken.

Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense steps," solely against sabotage.

Sabotage, third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in January, had become No. 1 of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. 7 approached.

It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Washington or Pearl Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached.

As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war with Japan, was daily, almost hourly, expected in Washington.

Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 1898—an act of sabotage, had brought war with Spain.

By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the military leaders in Washington, were in a "Battleship Maine" state of mind, when the attack occurred, or at least were up to the last hours before the attack.

This explains why the battle fleet was docked, each ship at its station, awnings up—why the planes were grounded wing to wing, unarmed, ammunition for guns and planes locked in magazines, when Japan struck Dec. 7.

The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, interpreting its instructions from Washington, was "alerted" for sabotage only.

Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the Japs might never have struck, certainly the damage would have been far less.

In far-away Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor, where military orders only had to be followed, U. S. bombers were cruising with live bombs in racks, U. S. fighters, with live ammunition in guns, when the attack came to Pearl Harbor Dec. 7.

DISASTER

But it is not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for which the President must accept his share of responsibility.

There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must shoulder.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger.

But with every warning, save one, came a "precaution," which tied their hands psychologically, if not actually.

As the danger became greater and Pearl Harbor closer, the "precautions" became more definite, more insistent, more urgent.

These precautions came direct from the White House.

The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, which did not contain definite precautionary orders, was the one from Secretary of the Navy Knox in January '41.

This was 11 months before Pearl Harbor and long before the expected "incident," which would kick off hostilities, was expected.

Here are the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," as told in the Roberts report.

Oct. 16, as Kimmel and Short were warned of danger by Washington, they were ordered to do nothing which would "*constitute provocation as against Japan.*"

Nov. 24, 13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy, in any defense moves he made "*to prevent complication of tense existing situation.*"

Nov. 27, came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of Staff to Short, but with it an order that under no circumstances was he to take any steps or make any moves that *would make it appear* the U. S. had committed "*the first overt act.*"

In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "*in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.*"

Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility such an order might tie the hands of the commander, for there was inserted:

"He (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, which would jeopardize his defense."

Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Harbor, Short was cautioned again that any protective measures he took, "*must be confined to those essential to security*" and he must avoid "*unnecessary publicity and alarm.*"

It was the next day, Nov. 29, Secretary Hull stated, "The diplomatic part of our relations with Japan is virtually over and the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."

Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to "*take no offensive action until Japan had committed the first overt act.*"

Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received the last warning message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack.

It was a copy of a dispatch sent to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering certain scouting, but again with the admonition, to "*avoid the appearance of attacking.*"

None of these precautionary orders came from military authorities in Washington, though all came through military channels.

None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was withdrawn.

One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor was changed by the President, personally, to insert the usual precaution.

The official explanation, of course, is that, if war came, the President wanted the record to show he had done all he could to prevent it.

But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Secretary of State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."

The Roberts report, in No. 15 of its conclusions, quotes one of the many precautionary orders from Washington as a cause of the success of the Pearl Harbor attack though the report does not fix the responsibility.

The last full fatal week before Dec. 7, 1941, the Roberts report does not show a single message from Washington to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.

It now is known Washington had, during this week, information of greatest importance, which Short and Kimmel didn't receive until *after* the attack.

This is the real story of Pearl Harbor, seven warnings of danger to the commanders there, *six confusing and contradictory* "precautions," which tied their hands.

Word available the last fatal week—word most needed at Pearl Harbor—never was sent.

Obviously the President, "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely expecting a Japanese attack.

But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto himself.

The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the "isolationists" could not tie onto the President.

But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander-in-Chief as commander and personally.

The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the commanders at Pearl Harbor into expecting only—sabotage.

The President then had given them such restraining precautions and orders they did not know what they could or dare do—in measures of protection and defense.

The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the problem of how to summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor.

But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle fleet, had helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened immeasurably the Japanese war.

WHY?

This of course explains many things.

It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials.

It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public.

It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper a year ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress.

It explains why no information has been given out as to the investigation by Admiral Hart, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox.

It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors.

White House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for a proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This editorial is republished and paid for by The New Bedford, Mass., Standard-Times, as a patriotic public service. No outside parties have contributed in any way toward the cost of publication. Republication permitted.]

EXHIBIT No. 4

10 AUGUST 1944.

Confidential

Colonel CHARLES W. WEST, JAGD,
Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL: General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy of the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this copy of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence showing an inaccurate statement of fact.

General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he communicated with me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will examine and return the same immediately.

I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your assignment.

Sincerely,

DANIEL L. O'DONNELL,
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Service Command Judge Advocate.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Munitions Building, 12 August 1944.

Lt. Col. DANIEL L. O'DONNELL, J. A. G. D.

Hqs. First Service Command,
Boston 15, Massachusetts.

DEAR COLONEL O'DONNELL: Pursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony. Certain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein which we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the earliest opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly "inaccurate statement of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General Grunert.

Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest regards, I am.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. West,
CHARLES W. WEST,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Recorder.

1 Incl: Transcript.

[91] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE
COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?

General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you entered upon that assignment?

General MILES. May 1, 1940.

General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?

[92] General MILES. The end of January 1942.

General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the name of it?

General MILES. That was the official name—Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.

General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?

General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many years. It was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our system was a running digest.

General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and sent out to the various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been going on, to my knowledge, for ~~thirty~~ twenty years. In addition to that, of course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it.

General RUSSELL. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited selection, of officers; particularly of officers. That was a time when the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of course wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them. and We did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development of 400?

General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did, I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.

General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941?

[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.

General RUSSELL. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?

General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the Military Intelligence Division.

General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General MILES. Not that I know of.

General RUSSELL. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, these documents.

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

General MILES. Within the United States?

General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in Hawaii.

General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The information which we could get on the military side from our military attache and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the State Department—Mr. Grew, particularly—on the state of mind of the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.

General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 1941?

General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.

General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation?

General MILES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness).

General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?

General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?

General MILES. I don't remember, General; I can't answer that question.

General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?

General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is

probably the same impression it gave me then: "Yes, of course I know we can't count on it, the Embassy. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not.

General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and indefinite in its nature?

General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 1941 was very indefinite and general?

General MILES. Necessarily so.

General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941." (Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, is as follows:)

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

"(Telegram: Paraphrase)

"Tokyo, November 17, 1941—1 p. m.

"Received November 17—2:00 p. m.)

"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

"GREW"

General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message: "and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions."

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians.

General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called it?

General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."

General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or not?

General MILES. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.

General RUSSELL. Why?

[102] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many years.

General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?

General MILES. Absolutely, sir.

General RUSSELL. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went in there.

General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese nationals?

General MILES. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?

General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in there.

General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[103] General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?

General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.

General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2?

General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with it.

General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?

General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.

General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other war in 1918?

General MILES. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was

there any information in G-2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little, and very general information. We knew that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information in military and from Naval Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any detailed or complete information of possible bases in the mandated islands.

General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?

General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included aircraft carriers?

General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability; that they had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did have those means.

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files?

General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.

General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the islands were?

General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.

General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there?

General MILES. That is what kept us away, General.

General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in?

[106] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated islands in 1941?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.

General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.

General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather material?

General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for one reason or another—this one to be repaired, and so forth—and suddenly launch this an attack from the "Vacant Sea," and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's.

General RUSSELL. In those studies which were made by you, and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?

General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." It was much more as we attacked the problem from the other side.

General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance [handwritten: by our own people in Hawaii] to detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall particularly during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930's that he was very much interested and in it. He was constantly sending in papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving the possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter contained the in these five big Hawaiian islands. That was a current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 1930's.

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms dreams of efficiency.

[108] General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands?

General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. You had less chance there?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?

General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

General RUSSELL. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming and have known before it sailed where it was going.

General RUSSELL. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contiguous thereto?

[109] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?

General FRANK. Prior to December 7?

General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7, 1941.

General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be very careful. That the information you give your Chief is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.

[110] General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information?

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.

General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that information?

General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce action. The latter, in other words, is a command proposition.

General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not analyze it; or do you?

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them.

General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command channels?

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command channels.

General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels rather than from G-2?

[111] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, yes, most definitely.

General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.

General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be through:

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?

General MILES. How is the name spelled?

General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.

General GRUNERT. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes; that was the man, I think.

General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.

General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent recollection on that subject?

General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any particular source.

General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time?

General MILES. It was about that time.

General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.

General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time in obtaining information from them?

General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you remember?

General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and Thailand.

General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl

Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in their Navy?

General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete.

General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not ultimately inevitable.

General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?

General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.

General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that—although there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remember that?

General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MILES. I do not remember that; no.

General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the inevitability of war?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, were they not?

General MILES. The Japanese reply was not back, sir.

General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.

[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but ~~that~~ it all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Government as a result of ~~our~~ the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it was, ~~it~~; which was considered practically an ultimatum.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. I have a few questions.

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer ~~there~~. I ~~did~~ regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately inevitable. I thought that, very definitely, ~~an~~ some action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; but that ~~we~~ need not necessarily ~~would~~ be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan was ~~practically~~ immediately inevitable any time. ~~But~~ There were a good many things Japan could have done, if she ~~did break those~~ broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those ~~matters~~ possibilities.

General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?

General MILES. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?

General MILES. Yes; certainly.

[115] General FRANK. You said you were not prevented specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of "hands off"?

General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him while there.

General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the Japanese?

General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the game.

General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying:

"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin."

Do you remember that message?

General MILES. Very well.

[116] General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?

General MILES. Yes; in a general way.

General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?

General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage.

General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?

General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my answer must be somewhat long.

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Government to keep out of antisabotage and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. delimiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system for the Army, and later a counter-intelligence fifth-column plan, the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the [117] responsibility for measures against an effort overt to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, not only of the overseas departments and later but particularly those in this country. It was but sent it to all of the corps area G-2s, because we knew the build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried about what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. General Arnold was very much worried and that He broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dispatch of November 28.

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I was most directly responsible as G-2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities.

General FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?

General MILES. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most vulnerable.

General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack?

General MILES. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.

General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the probability of an air attack?

General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances—I remember the use of that word—to protect the Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way—that, and of course radar—that such an attack could have been countered. My message also warned of possible hostilities.

General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage?

General MILES. Yes, indeed.

General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing something else?

General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.

General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following message have sufficed:

"War imminent. Act accordingly."?

General MILES. For me to send?

General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?

General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in his message of November 27.

General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?

General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the negotiations?

General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any provocation on their part?

General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.

General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words?

General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 1941 was the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.

General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that correct?

General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, sir.

General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.

General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that attitude?

General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[121] General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To whom?

General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.

General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?

General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. ~~and~~ Our objections were on this line: (1) ~~this~~ an antisabotage message had gone out; (2) ~~that~~ a the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) ~~that~~ the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particularly, to ~~earge~~ protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted in somebody's being shot.

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western fields—I think at Salt Lake—all with the same trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form; that is, not directing such drastic action ~~to be taken~~ against anybody who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned: ~~and~~ that was the final decision.

General FRANK. Now, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?

General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few months ~~past~~ since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.

General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?

General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like that.

General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.

General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.

General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the possibility of war?

General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, ~~that November, preceding November,~~ early preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days, as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their troops ready before the break.

General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?

General MILES. The Army?

General FRANK. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. All right.

General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.

General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December?

General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and about that time.

General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.

General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that?

General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly will disclose it.

[124] General FRANK. If it were given?

General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.

General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?

General MILES. That is correct—and radar.

General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?

General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had the means of carrying it out.

General FRANK. That is all I have.

General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii?

General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that information—the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. That It would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter-intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 men and himself. That was the method.

General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such Commander, and in what form?

General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. I mean That would be the routine. Then any Any particular information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of information; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our military attache at in China and to the G-2 of the foreign departments, or the corps areas.

[126] General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation, that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?

General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.

General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of November 27 O. K'd by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K'd? Did you send it out directly to the G-2?

General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous

messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message that the G-2s were ~~was~~ to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs of Staff only.

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?

General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to the G-2.

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?

General MILES. The answer to that is Yes.

General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.

General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got certain complaints—complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.

General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it "the G-2 message," of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There were no report required.

General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.

General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?

General MILES. I did not see that message—that answer—until after Pearl Harbor.

General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of anything else?

General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed "Marshall."

General FRANK. That is right.

General MILES. That would be my answer.

General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department,

from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?

General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy, were working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere—in Hawaii and the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.

General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G-2.

General MILES. How?

General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G-2.

General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department—

General MILES. Yes, G-2.

General FRANK. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General MILES. He should have, of course.

General FRANK. That is all.

General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?

General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message."

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General Miles?

General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it before me.

General GRUNERT. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] according to the record.

General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell?

General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.

General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute, General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?

General MILES. Some natives there, I believe—a few, there.

General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?

General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particularly now—

General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking forces?

General MILES. Prior to the attack?

General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching this attack?

General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval Intelligence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the KONGO class—their four old battle cruisers; but I have no definite information.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

EXHIBIT No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

[Exact Copy Action Copy Radiogram]

EHB/bjs-1712

SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.

AG 383.4 (9-29-41) MC

From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General.

No. 420. September 29th.

For G-2. Reurad 114 tenth September Nineteen Forty One Re Nazi agents aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject Wilhelm Brandeis was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan aboard USAT President Cleveland.

SHORT.

[Radiogram]

SEPT. 23, 1941.

704 a. m.

105 WTJ

DJ

FLD 1205P 22nd

From: Ft. Shafter T. H.

To: G Two

No. 379 September 22nd.

Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two officers in this department confidential document subject protection electric utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January twentieth nineteen forty one received as inclosure to your letter G two dash ten three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder

SHORT.

CI/G2

CWC

MID 350.05 Safeguarding

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and aircraft.

The Secretary of War Directs:

1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the Commanding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands:

Effective immediately all radio or cable traffic pertaining to movement of vessels and aircraft to or from the overseas bases comma department or defense commands will be classified as confidential.

2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army Air Force, and the commanding officers of outlying bases.

SHERMAN MILES.

Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio of cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time of transports, and the Navy has protested this.

Drafting Section: C. I. P.
Drafting Officer: Hugh D. Wise, Jr.
G-2 File Number:

Paraphrase of an outgoing
X Radiogram
Cablegram

Secret
X Confidential
Restricted

No. 128 Sent 9-13-41 LW
Date: September 13, 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Present strength of Corps of Intelligence Police in your department is requested by radio.

Mailed G/2 W. D. G. S. Sep. 13, 1941.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2) GENERAL STAFF

9-13-41

From: To:
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Chief Clerk
Record Section
Translation Section
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
LIAISON BRANCH
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
C. I. P.
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-1
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-3
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-4
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WPD
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH, DCofS
BUDGET & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
W. D. MAP COLLECTION

For:
Necessary action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
As a matter of primary interest
Previous correspondence
Note and return
Information
Mail
File
Noted

G2/CI
WAT

Sent #114, 9/10/41
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Following men reported to be crew members of Army transports and Nazi agents Joseph Ryan present Cleveland due Honolulu September twenty first and Wilhelm Brandeis President Coolidge due Honolulu September thirteenth.
MILES.

Drafting Section: Administrative
G2/I
Drafting Officer: MWP
G-2 File number: MWP

Paraphrase of an outgoing

Secret xx

Radiogram xx

Confidential

Cablegram

Restricted

No. 75-Sent Aug. 29-41

Date: August 29, 1941.

To: G-2 Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory Hawaii.

Colonel Field of the British Army will pass through Honolulu aboard the Klip Fontein about September fifth. Desire you meet him personally and hold full and free discussion on all intelligence matters.

Record Section copy

AUGUST 18, 1941.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General:

Subject: Radiogram

The Secretary of War directs that a radiogram, substantially as follows, be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Reurad fifteenth requesting War Department Maps Eastern Europe comma these maps not produced and are sending you mail necessary sheets International Map of World together with other miscellaneous map coverage period

SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Received Aug. 19, 1941. Misc. Div. A. G. O.

Action taken: Radio to CG Haw Dept. 8-19-41. GHB

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 336.3 Japan (7-9-41) MC Received at the War Department

74 WTJ AE 124P

July 10, 1941 7:34 A. M.

From: Manila

To: TAG

No. 1337, July 9th.

Further remarks for G-2 reference our radio one three zero one are that Mexico Maru small Philippine-Japan run freighter due Manila July 25th has been cancelled and commandeered. Kokkai Maru ten thousand ton on New York-Philippine run due Manila about August first has also been cancelled and commandeered. Ganges Maru now enroute to Manila not yet affected. Signed O'Rear

GRUNERT.

[Paraphrase]

AG 600.12 (7-1-41) MC-D

EHB/sm—1712

To: CG, Hawaiian Dept.

From: TAG

JULY 9, 1941

Consideration being given projects for Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and Hawaiian Air Depot from FY 1942 funds by Chief of Air Corps. The Quartermaster General has been directed to expend \$104,202 from available funds for anti-sabotage protection. Correspondence now en route advising you of action. Above Reurad thirty one seventy three.

Copy For: Chief of the Air Corps

The Quartermaster General

A. C. of S., G-2

Chief of Engineers

[Radiogram]

74WTJ AE

JULY 30, 1941
3:44 AM

From: Hawaii
To: War Department
No. 3419, July 29th.

For A C of S G-2 reliable information concerning Japanese forces in Manchuria as follows. Ten divisions of a total strength of two hundred forty two thousand men. These are the eight divisions which are given in latest British military intelligence order of battle; with the twelfth and twenty fifth repeat twelfth and twenty fifth in addition. Eight Frontier Garrison units of a total strength about twenty two thousand six hundred. Six independent garrisons units of total strength about thirty eight thousand. Total strength approximately three hundred thousand repeat three hundred thousand. The weapon equipment of Four Regiment Divisions is given as seven thousand six hundred eighty six rifles, five hundred seventy six trench mortars and infantry support guns. Three hundred ninety six heavy and light machine guns. Ninety two field guns and howitzers. Same source reports that German accounts in South America steadily being transferred to Japanese custody. It is freely predicted Germany will ask Japan to blockade Vladivostok to prevent essential supplies reaching Russia.

SHORT.

[Cablegram]

LAS
WUWA 3July 29, 1941.
8:33AM

From: Tokyo
To: MILID
No. 508, July 29th.

After period during which no reservations from Japan in any direction procurable NYK today confirmed reservation *Nitta* sailing August 7th arriving Honolulu about August 15th. Since restriction travel south and west may be unduly prolonged strongly recommend Pape avail himself this opportunity and that clipper reservation Honolulu Singapore be arranged. Request prompt reply as reservations in great demand.

CRESWELL.

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 380.3 (6-26-41) MC
~159 WTJ
AE
616P

Received at the War Department June 28, 1941, 2:00 PM.

From: Manila.
To: TAG.
No. 1236, June 26th.

Twenty five thousand Japanese Troops received parachute training in China and Japan of this number fifteen hundred in Canton Army according to British report evaluation questionable. Three Japanese convoys last reported headed south believed to have gone to Pescadores and Formosa. Typhoon reported east Manila lends credibility to above. For G-2. Signed OREAR.

GRUNERT.

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 380.3 (6-25-41) MC

21 WTJ

AE

620P

Received at the War Department, June 26, 1941, 8:00 AM.

From: Manila

To: TAG

No. 1225, June 25th.

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications, land troops, and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-Kienowhs.

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Singtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow; Nanchang-Haochow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed Orear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

2WVY

519P

BVC

JUNE 6, 1941.

1030Z

From: Tokyo.

To: The Adjutant General.

No. 482, June 6, 1941.

Investigations among Japanese Russian and others nationals fails to reveal any information either positive or negative regarding your number 492. Efforts will be continued.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

(JTP)

152WTJ

MAY 3, 1941.

9:22AM

From: Tokyo.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Tokyo No. 467, May 2, 1941.

Under the provisions of Article 20 Tripartite pact military missions known to have left Japan for Germany and Italy though no first hand information this office relative arrival Japan similar missions from those countries. At present no move discernible which might be considered preparatory to military action as provided by Article three although frequent rumors refer Japanese strength Formosa Hainan Indo-China greater than normal under China war conditions and held in readiness move against Dutch East Indies Singapore. Increase of Japanese Naval and Air force Saigon likewise rumored. This office not in position to confirm or refute such reports. No unusual mission movements observed

Japan distinguishable from normal movements connected operations China although such moves would be carefully hidden and difficult to follow after leaving Japan. Attention is invited to recent State Department dispatch concerning transit

(Sheet Two Tokyo, No. 467, May 2, 1941)

of German aircraft, artillery and other military supplies via Trans-Siberian railway to Japan.

Instead of daily report required by your No. 505 suggest immediate report any information obtained since without change present international political and military situation many such reports will be negative.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

14 WTJ ae

MAY 3, 1941.
9:22 AM

From: Manila.

To: Asst. Chief of Staff.

No. 915, May 3, 1941.

Telegraphic summary of report of Singapore conference sent by radio to British Ambassador Washington by conference chairman. If urgent suggest you consult that summary. Copy of report with my comments going forward by clipper naval courier to Washington scheduled to leave May eighth.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

LW

104 WTJ

From: Manila.

To: The Adjutant General.

Manila No. 881. April 26th.

APRIL 26, 1941.
7:11 AM

Reliably informed German Ambassador to Japan has requested that Japanese shipping lines facilitate the evacuation of German Nationals from Philippines. For G-2. And that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha office in Manila has been so advised. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

(RRR)

53-WVY

From: Manila, P. I.

To: The Adjutant General.

No. 662 March 21st.

For G-2

MARCH 21, 1941.
6:06 PM

Exaggerated account of visit of Japanese fishing boat to Itbayat Island on March 12 apparently has been given press distribution. Actually fishing boat *Dichi Maru* anchored at Mauyen Itbayat Island took on supplies of cocoanuts and fruit and some stores and departed. Carried Japanese flag engraved on both sides and was equipped with radio apparatus, fishing nets, and one life boat. This incident is normal and is without importance. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

BFS

22 WVY

From: Tokyo via Manila

To: MILID

Number 459. March 13th.

MARCH 13, 1941.
3:42 PM

Japanese in position to know definitely states parachute training of infantry and engineers taking place for the past year. No information as to number and location.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

(MWW)

63-WTJ

From: Tokyo, Japan

To: MILID, Washington, D. C.

Number 457, March 7th. Files 425 PM.

MARCH 8, 1941.

10:07 PM

Colonel Takeo Iwakuro who sailed on *S. S. Tatsuta Maru* for the United States March 6th is adviser to Admiral Nomura and liaison between Admiral Nomura and Army. As such will occupy important position Japanese Embassy. Suggest Martin meet him San Francisco. See Embassy Number 330 February 27.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

BFS

3WVY

From: Tokyo

To: MILID

Number 453, February 25th.

FEBRUARY 24, 1941.

9:59 AM

Reference your 496 the three Japanese translators and one Formosan messenger employed by this office are doing translation that can not be done adequately by American personnel. Although we known they report to police when *hostile* affairs of office so organized that they can report nothing of any consequence. Miss Ishigami an American citizen handles routine reports and correspondence only with Miss McMahon writing all confidential matters.

Recommend that present setup remain unchanged.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

WE

72 WTJ

338

From: Manila.

To: G-2.

Number 512, February 13th.

FEBRUARY 14, 1941.

6:04 AM

Netherlands Consul reports concerning two vessels Java China Japan line as follows: For G dash two signed Orear. The *Tjitjalenka* sailed from Manila zero seven zero zero February thirteen but was ordered to return to Manila shortly thereafter; the *Tjibesar* now enroute from Japan has been ordered to put into Manila for further instructions. No explanation available as yet.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

WE

89 WTJ

213 PH

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

7:04 AM

From Manila

To: MILID

Number 41, February 5th.

British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang discussing news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat tenth. Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message for G dash two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed to be armed and no difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody when desired. Evaluation of data low.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

(MWW)
44-WTJJANUARY 5, 1941.
8:05 PMFrom: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
Number 2041, January 4th. Filed 2:47 PM.

ATTENTION G-2. Following information was given out by official British sources and was obtained from Captain Thomas V. Hill, Master ARMS AORANGI. Description of three raiders operating in Pacific is as follows:

TOKYO MARU EX KULMERLAND, Japanese markings, 7300 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel amidships, two masts, three single Samson posts one between bridge and foremast one directly abaft passenger accommodation one abaft the mainmast, crows next extreme head foremast, slightly raked stem, cruiser stern, one seaplane carried.

MANYO MARU, Japanese marking, 5000 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel amidships very close to bridge, two masts with foremast abaft well deck with seaplane derrick one set of Samson posts immediately before bridge, Maier form bow, cruiser stern, one seaplane.

Probably MARVIK, Norwegian MARKINGS, 6000 tons, one large funnel amidships close to bridge, narrow bridge to heavy mast, foremast well aft and single Samson post forward of foremast, one Samson post abaft mainmast, black hull,

(Sheet 2, No. 2041 from Ft. Shafter, T. H.)

white band, straight stem, counter stern, raised forecastle, high after deck house, one seaplane.

In almost every attack of U boats on shipping a night it has subsequently transpired that light were being shown, it is believed darkening of merchant ships is improving but it is reported that light torches are sometimes used on upper decks.

HERRON.

[Radiogram]

(RRR)
31-WTJJANUARY 4TH 1941.
354 AMFrom: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: G-2.
No. 2039, Jany 3rd.

Reurad 584 second January. *Sagami Maru* arrived Honolulu 21st December departed for Hilo 23rd December enroute to Lima Peru. 490 cases small arms ammunition, one pounder ammunition and fuses all destined for Peru. Now shown on manifest and discovered by U. S. customs. Next boat *Nita Maru* due fourth January. This steamer and future ships will be watched report being made any further shipments this nature. Signed Marston.

HERRON.

EXHIBIT No. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

[1] Rec'd—G-2 Jan 29, 1942

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 Dec. 1941.

In reply refer to: 350.05 (G-2)

Subject: Report on Internal Subversive Activities for the Month of December 1941

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference paragraph 6a, CONFIDENTIAL letter, AG 350.05 (8-5-40), M-B-M, dated 17 August 1940, the following items are submitted:

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING ALL POSTS, FIELDS, AND DISTRICTS

Period: 15 November 1941 to 15 December 1941

Individual and special cases

The abnormal conditions which have prevailed in this Department since 7 December 1941 have made inadvisable, for the time being, continuing investigation of minor routine cases, other more pressing matters having been given priority. Only cases of more active character, such as have been listed in previous reports with an asterisk to denote their importance continue under active investigation at present. It is anticipated, however, that the summary for next month, January 1942, will be in its usual complete form.

Situation summary

PROPAGANDA: Japanese radio broadcasts, presumably originating in Japan, give highly exaggerated accounts of Japanese success, together with violent anti-American propaganda. No local stations are permitted to broadcast in Japanese (or in any other foreign language). Except for these broadcasts there has been no attempt at enemy propaganda. Gossip and loose talk among local residents of all nationalities, both service personnel and civilian, were common immediately after the raid of 7 December, but have subsided to a reasonable volume and are decreasing. No instance has been verified of deliberate spreading of rumors as enemy propaganda.

SUSPICIOUS CASES almost without number have been reported and investigated, with results largely negative. Among service personnel, the unanimous report of all S-2's has been that even those individuals in the past most suspected of subversive tendencies have proved intensely loyal when put to the test of actual war conditions.

Estimate of the situation

[2] No attempt can be made in this summary to cover other than the internal situation, as only preliminary investigations have been made of most of the aliens in detention, and the labor of checking reports of alleged subversive actions continues, with little positive result, on a 24 hour daily basis. In general it may be said, however, that the morale of the civilian populace is very high, and that labor disputes and other disturbing factors have disappeared in the general effort to effect a united front.

Within the various Army establishments morale is at the highest level. However, in anticipation of the probable "let-down" incident to the lessening of the initial excitement, the C. S. System is being completely reorganized and enlarged so as to cover effectively all of the newly arriving units as well as those already established in the Department.

Kendall J. Fielder

KENDALL J. FIELDER

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.

A. C. of S., G-2

EXHIBIT No. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EXACT COPY~~

ACTION COPY

AG 380.3 (12-28-40) M

From: Grunert, Manila, P. I.

DECEMBER 28, 1940.

To: TAG

Priority For G-2

Netherlands Consul sources: Japan attacks January 15 against Netherlands Indies with light Naval force and transports against New Guinea simultaneously with Naval force and transports against Java. Evaluation of plan high. Evaluation of date doubtful.

United Press sources: Two German vessels have been outfitted Shanghai with Japan guns as raiders, three German vessels being outfitted at Tsingtao and two at Canton. All German vessels in Japan controlled ports are to be outfitted as raiders before January 15. Signed, O'Rear.

EXHIBIT No. 8

[1]

RSU/tes

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS AREA

UNITED STATES ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC RELATIONS, CIVIL DEFENSE

SEVENTH FLOOR, STANDARD OIL BUILDING

Baltimore, Maryland, December 18, 1941

In reply refer to File: III-7764

SECRET

Subject: Reports of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.

[Stamped:] Secret. Date 12/18/41. HQ. 3RD C. A. Initial, PLT.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

War Department

Washington, D. C.

Attention Lt. Col. W. A. Holbrook, Jr.

1. This office is in receipt of a report, information of undetermined reliability, source usually reliable, which is quoted as follows:

"Three weeks ago SENATOR GILLET at Washington warned officials what was going to happen. Stated that Japan would declare war on United States Dec. 19. Also told of an attack on Hawaii. No attention paid to assertions and Dec. 9 held conference with some of the leading officials of New York City, State of New Jersey, Jersey City and two congressmen from Washington who flew back for this conference. Conference was for purpose of possibly setting up an Individual Intelligence Unit because they are disgusted with the actions of G-2 in some cases and as far as O. N. I. is concerned they are so disgusted against this group that they do not know what to do about it. At Washington Dec. 9, one of the highest officials of the British Government got in communication with the same country's officials at New York and in substance here is the story—the Japanese Business Group at Honolulu had invited practically all the officers at Pearl Harbor to a big celebration and dinner on Saturday evening. A vast number of the Naval officers were reported to have been so drunk that they had to be taken to their quarters. He also stated that the damages suffered by the United States Government at Honolulu and on the sea were far greater than the total damages that England suffered the first year of the war on the sea. Am positive that SENATOR GILLET has received a lot of his information from WYTHE WILLIAMS, who has retired from the air and is now preparing several books. Remember that WILLIAMS is a pal and confidant of ATTORNEY GENERAL BIDDLE and still the F. B. I. is reported to be afraid of WILLIAMS and the material that he sends out. WILLIAMS is smart. He has a staff here in New York that

172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

includes the ex-Chief of Police of Berlin (Note, G-2 III C. A. : Believed to be one GRZYSINSKI, who has lectured against Nazism in New York) and other good men." Destroyed by 84 Dec. 29, 1941.

2. However much or little truth there may be in this report, the possibility is not overlooked by this office that there may be an attempt to make political capital at the expense of military and naval morale.

3. No other distribution of this report whatsoever has been or will be made from this office. No action is contemplated except at the request of the War Department.

4. The original report, quoted above, was dated December 10th. The capitalization of names of persons was done by this office. The source was a Pittsburgh source which has been discussed with General Miles.

Philip L. Thurber,
PHILIP L. THURBER,
Colonel G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2.

EXHIBIT No. 9

SECRET

This message was addressed to CG., Hawaii, and relayed to War Dept. by signals Hawaii with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This message also contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Dept. CS WDMC Will paraphrase and repeat back to Honolulu

/S/ B. F. SMITH
Code Section WDMC

12-8-41

EXHIBIT No. 10

SECRET

0-4-C

Exact copy of radiogram received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941.
7:58 P. M.

P 23 WT J

From: Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu,
To: War Department & C. G. Hawaiian Department

NUMBER 24. DECEMBER 6th.

Based on Dutch intelligence report unconfirmed here of Naval movements from Pelau objective Manado and or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 and suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keopang. So ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance Buka and northwest passage Australian army reinforcements Ambon Keopang subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by government eight am Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Keopang not now considered necessary. Eleven am chief of air corps desired proceed with all aircraft forward movements Manila informed.

MERLESMITH.

EXHIBIT No. 11

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2

Washington, December 6, 1941.

G-2/CI
JFP

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook:

Word has just been received from O. N. I. by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

James F. Perry,
JAMES F. PERRY,
1st Lt., Military Intelligence,
Evaluation Subsection.

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

FIELD DIVISION

National Defense Operations Section

~~From:~~ To: G. E. Sterling, Chief.

Date: 12/4

[Hand written:] Major Guest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to ~~Bratton~~ Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054. Home Tel. Glebe 1129. D. C. & Laurel advised.

Route in Order Indicated:

Chief Engineer	☐	Mr. Webster	☐
Mr. Terrell	☐	Mr. Cruse	☐
Secretary	☐	Mr. Turner	☐
Mr. Reynolds	☐	Mr. Mason	☐
Mr. Cureton	☐	Mr. Loucks	☐
Mr. Ring	☐	Miss Wiltshire	☐
-----	☐	-----	☐

Remarks:

[Hand written:] Until Saturday night.

Give one copy of the following to For Carter and destroy all papers and forget ~~colon~~

Group one is east wind rain group two is north wind "X" cloudy and group three is west wind. clear stop groups will be repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast.

EXHIBIT No. 12

DEC. 4, 1941.

Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:

Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports.

About 2200GMT 12/4/41 JVW3:

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm.

(End of program followed by music)

DE

Dec. 5, 1941.

Mr. STERLING: At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW3 2130G

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south.

(The above was repeated three times)

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then;

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation—evidently cutoff in Tokyo)

Remarks by Carter:

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

FINI

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton:

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

FINI

DE

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 580.81 (12-1-41) MC

EHB/sm—1712

15 WTJ

0-4-C

1/1130P

Received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941, 411 p. m.

From: Manila, P. I.

To: Adjutant General

No. 1046 First

Replying your radio of November twenty eight and your radio six four seven on same subject all practical steps within the limits of the facilities of this command are being taken to protect all air and ground installations.

MACARTHUR.

[Copy]

Batavia

Dated December 4, 1941

Rec'd 9:19 a. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same rec following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North Russia, three Nichi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE.

Give one copy of the following to For Carter and destroy all pages and forge eelen

Groups one is east rain group two is north wind wi|nd clou|dy and group x three is west|wind clear stop groups will be repe|at|ed twice in' middle and at end of broadcast.

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

FIELD DIVISION

National Defense Operations Section

To: G. E. Sterling, Chief.

Date: 6/12/4

[Hand written:] Major quest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should do tonight ~~Bratten~~ Lt Col. C. C. Dusenbury Phone War Dept 2054 Home Tel Glebe 1129 DE & Laurel advised

Route in Order Indicated:

Chief Engineer	☐	Mr. Webster	☐
Mr. Terrell	☐	Mr. Cruse	☐
Secretary	☐	Mr. Turner	☐
Mr. Reynolds	☐	Mr. Mason	☐
Mr. Cureton	☐	Mr. Loucks	☐
Mr. Ring	☐	Miss Wiltshire	☐
-----	☐	-----	☐

Remarks:

[Hand written:] Until Saturday night

DEC. 4, 1941.

Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:

Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports.

About 2200GMT 12/4/41 JVW3:

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm.

(End of program followed by music.)

DE

DEC. 5, 1941.

Mr. STERLING:

At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW3 2130G

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south.

(The above was repeated three times.)

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then:

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation—evidently cutoff in Tokyo)

Remarks by Carter:

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

FINI

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton:

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenbury in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

FINI

DE

For action OPNAV RRRRR

From ALUSNA Batavia
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by Purdy

031030 CR0222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept: Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Distribution:

War Dept.-----ACTION. FILES: CNO-----200P-----20A-----
Record Copy:-----20G-----X Show OPDO-----

EXHIBIT No. 13

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

I. B. 150

BRIEF PERIODIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, DECEMBER 1, 1941—MARCH 31, 1942

Record Section

G2/1
TJB

[1] I. B. 150 NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.

I. General.

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942.

2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that

a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redistribution of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

[2] b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategic offensive. We have only a means of strategic maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

[3] II. *Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.*

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay of reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sealanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:

	Losses (British, Allied, and Neutral)			
	Total		Monthly Average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months).....	628	2,755,242	105	459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ months).....	285	1,000,990	63	222,442

[4] During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. *Eastern Theater.* By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.

Continue the siege of Leningrad.

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.

Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.

Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

[5] The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere

has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. *Middle Eastern Theater.* In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

[6] Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

a. Attack Siberia.

b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.

[7] c. Occupy Thailand.

d. Through Thailand, attack

(1) Burma and the Burma Road,

(2) Malaya.

e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.

f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and

(1) Attack Singapore

(a) directly, by sea;

(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.

(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.

g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.

(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the East Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within [9] a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

[10] III. *Morale.*

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and the decline in Axis morale.

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the Failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all,

by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

Military Situation

Moral Reaction

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Superiority of strength.
Possession of initiative.
Unbroken success. | 1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success. |
| 2. Approximate equality in strength.
Initiative doubtful.
Ultimate success still in balance. | 2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success. |
| 3. Inferiority in strength.
Strategic initiative lost.
Ultimate success doubtful. | 3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting prevent defeat. |

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the out [11] come, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Undersecretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
Chief of the Army Air Forces
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
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G. H. Q.
Chief of the Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Coordinator of Information
General Embick.
Record Section
I. B. File
dya

[Hand written:] Copies checked in red delivered by an officer—other copies sent out by Miss Finch & Miss Carrick.

EXHIBIT No. 14

SECRET

[Paraphrase of a SECRET RADIOGRAM]

G2/CI
FMH

Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941.

From: Fort Shafter, November 29, 1941. No. 986.

To: TAG

With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military reservations such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants this headquarters by confidential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor of the territory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67 which provides that the Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force Commanders of the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or prevent invasion, lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with the above stated Authority on 20 June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal demand in writing on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing such suitable protection as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and violence of a lawless nature in connection therewith, being done in the territory against vital structures and installations. Suitable military protection in accordance with the above request is now being given important civilian installations and structures. Upon the suggestion of this headquarters, in connection with the above, the county and city of Honolulu enacted, an ordinance on 30 June 1941 permitting the Hawaiian Dept. Commanding General to restrict the use of and travel upon or to close within the county or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is necessary in the interest of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus given has yet been necessary. Cordial relations exist and have been maintained and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve the FBI and all other Federal and Territorial Officials.

In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November 28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War Department (Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30-45) and Military establishments which include equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a subversive nature are being taken.

SHORT.

EXHIBIT No. 15

SECRET

(Copy)

WPD 4544-13

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General (through secretary, General Staff):
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be dispatched by cable, radio or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain

to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

L. T. GEBOW,
Brigadier General
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

EXHIBIT No. 16

PRIORITY—

From: War Department,
Bureau: G-2 sm/mis

T. E. Roderick,
T. E. RODERICK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G-2

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense Command
Hawaiian Department

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform commanding
general and chief of staff only end

MILES.

Sent no. 473 to Hawaii, 11/27
Sent no. 562 to Panama, 11/27
Sent no. 66 to 1st. CA, 11/27

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public
service.

T. E. Roderick,
T. E. RODERICK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G-2.

Sent no. 191 to 2nd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 48 to 3rd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 72 to 4th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 49 to 5th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 54 to 6th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 45 to 7th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 75 to 8th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 367 to 9th CA, 11/27

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.

Cable recorded in M. L. D.
Exact Copy made for Gen. Miles 1-28-42. 380.

EXHIBIT No. 17

[Paraphrase]

G-2
SM/td

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

G-2's All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense Command
Hawaiian Department.

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin
stop This message to be deciphered only by G-2.

MILES

[PRIORITY—SECRET]

Drafting Section : G-2
Drafting Officer : SM
G-2 File Number :

[Paraphrase of an outgoing Secret Cablegram]

#66 Sent out Nov. 27, 1941.
Date : November 27, 1941.

To: All Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department,
First Corps Area

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop

MILES.

#66 to 1st CA
191 to 2nd CA
48 to 3rd CA
72 to 4th CA
49 to 5th CA
54 to 6th CA
45 to 7th CA
75 to 8th CA
367 to 9th CA
#473 to Hawaii
562 to Panama

EXHIBIT No. 18

SECRET

[Radiogram]

(RRR)
56-WTJ

NOVEMBER 14, 1940.
312 AM

From : Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjustment General.
November 14th.
For G-2

Following received reliable sources "Reliably reported Japanese evacuating troops and air forces middle Yantze including Hangkow. Washington report states concentration transports Haiphong Taiping and Formosa." Taiping referred to probably on Pearl River. Informant believes this presages initiation new plans and not result Chinese pressure. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

EXHIBIT No. 19

CONFIDENTIAL

CIB
Maj. David G. Erskin

No. 381 sent Nov. 12, 1941.
To: G-2, Hawaiian Department.

Requests you be prepared to check with FBI and render them every assistance. FBI field office Honolulu is being advised to check with MID and ONI concerning custodial detention list in order to ascertain that all points are covered.

MILES.

EXHIBIT No. 20

SECRET

83 WTJ
616-P

0-4-C

[RADIOGRAM]

OCTOBER 29, 1941.
731 AM

From: Manila, P. I.

To: MILID

No. 700, October 28th.

Three Japanese aircraft carriers including one latest type comma two armed merchant vessels of unknown size suitable for transports and one aircraft tender are now at Takao Formosa. Commander in chief combined naval and air forces has been ordered to Takao G-2. Comment report concerning commander in chief may signify beginning of assembling of an expeditionary force.

EVANS.

EXHIBIT No. 21

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, October 28, 1941.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE ORIENT

Dated August 26, 1941.

1. "Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

S. C.

[Handwritten:]

Summary of Inf. 11/3/41

Distribution:

All C. A.'s F. B. I.

All Dept.'s O. N. I.

Alaska State

File

P. M. S.

EXHIBIT No. 22

SECRET

[Radio]

R. A. Oct. 27, 1941

4 WTJ

4 WTJ

OCT. 27, 1941.
1055 PM

From: Manila, Philippine Islands.

To: Milid, Washington.

54 Twenty Seventh.

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in western Pacific is reported by British sources two aircraft carriers have been operating among

mandated islands, of which Kaga repeat Kaga still present following planes reported based there: Palau repeat Palau, eight flying boats, Saipan repeat Saipan, eight fighters, six heavy bombers; Truk repeat Truk, six fighters, six heavy bombers; Jalu repeat Jalu, eight flying boats, twelve flight planes; Wotje repeat Wotje, eight flying boats.

BRINK.

CONFIDENTIAL

[Radiogram]

LAS
3 WTJ
518P

JULY 28, 1941.
10:36 PM

From: Manila
To: Milid
No. 1485, July 26th.

British intelligence Singapore reports existence in Middle East of enemy connected organization there for supply of semiannual passports to so called refugees paren potential fifth columnists paren enroute from Middle East to South American stop One identified member of this organization Schwarzstein reported now enroute Far East stop Information suggests all passports for South and Central American countries issued nationals of occupied territories be regarded with suspicion stop Uncertain extent South and Central American governments may be involved.

O'REAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

[Radiogram]

LAS
30 WTJ
715P

JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 505, July 26th.

Mobilization mentioned in my radio 498 and 500 still going on under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions all kinds on movements additional foreigners to the Continent also foreigners restricted as far south as Formosa and as far north as Korea and Manchukuo. Size of mobilization cannot be estimated but it is one of the largest single drafts since initial mobilization for China war. Some reports of troop movements away from Japan but nothing available to number preponderance moving in any single direction.

CRESWELL.

SECRET

[Radiogram]

LAS
29 WTJ
8P

JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 507, July 26th.

On basis of statements made by heretofore reliable contact, it is thought likely, should Japanese occupation French Indo China be extended, occupying forces will include one specially selected pursuit wing of approximately 80 to 90 planes now being organized Formosa.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

LAS
82 WTJ
248P

JULY 23, 1941.
3:21 PM

From: Manila.
To: Milid.
No. 1456 July 22nd.

United Press states Lomei news Tokyo claims following from reliable French source quote as result of secret agreement between British, Chinese and De Gualliets the Chingking forces are massing for attack on northern Indo China stop Simultaneously the British will attack south Indo China using natives stop Whether Indo China govt will participate is not known unquote stop This office estimates above as build up for Japanese movement into Indo China stop We are of opinion that new Japanese cabinet is war minded and capable of action.

O'REAR.

[Radiogram]

LAS
150 WTJ
1210P

JULY 23, 1941.
11:32 PM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 504, July 21st.

Recently imposed restrictions of indefinite duration on land, water, and air travel in Japan reduces available services southward to NYK Transpacific liner. Application has been made for reservations through to Manila on first possibility namely Yawata sailing Yokohama August 14th Shanghai August 19 arriving Manila August 21 without touching Hongkong. Company states that reservations cannot be confirmed for several days. If it is desired that Pape carry digest on Japanese vessel he requests specific authority therefor. If not, suggest that assistant naval attaché in Shanghai be requested to forward digest to Manila by first available safe hand and if it does not arrive before Pape leaves he be authorized to pick up Manila copy of digest. Only other alternative is for Pape to go to Shanghai first available transportation and to proceed thence by whatever combination of clippers and non Japanese shipping will put him soonest in Singapore. Schedule of British and Dutch lines are not available to their agents in Japan. Assist naval attaché in Shanghai has been requested to secure and forward pertinent information if possible. No detailed schedule can be reported until transportation to Shanghai is secured and possibly until after arrival there.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

AEL
8 WVV
743P

JULY 14, 1941.
1:36 PM

From: Tokyo
To: Assis Chief of Staff G-2
No 500, July 14.

Now evident that mobilization mentioned our number 498 taking place on considerable scale and under unusual conditions as to secrecy. It has been determined that some of the newly mobilized men are being sent to Manchuria, but as yet unable to determine how many or whether any are being sent southern destination. Although Tokyo is alive with rumors as to purpose this mobilization there is no conclusive indication so far available.

CRESWELL.

188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Radiogram]

67-WTJ

July 12, 1941,
1032AM

From: Tokyo.

To: MILID.

No. 498, July 12th.

Considerable talk and some evidence of unusual recruiting extent and purpose not clearly determined but thought to be precautionary as for the time being governments attitude not considered as one tending towards positive commitments.

CRESWELL.

WPD 4544

July 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General:

Subject: Secret Radiogram

1. The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram, as follows be sent to the:

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command

Commanding General, Philippine Department

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

Commanding General, Fourth Army

For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end

II. That a copy of the above radiogram be furnished to the Chief of the Army Air Force.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

ks

COPY/ml

(Original paper filed under ~~Caribbean Defense~~ Panama Command.

[Radiogram]

AEL

85 WTJ

451

JUNE 29, 1941.
7:43 AM

From: Tokyo.

To: The Assis Chief of Staff G-2.

No. 493, June 27

War Office states that cannot grant attachment regiment Japan proper Dickey Verback present time but may be able to arrange in future. At same time mentioned possibility arrange those officers Korea provided suitable exchange in one of our possessions no specific possession requested but Philippines mentioned as examples. Request statement policy regarding arrange our possessions in general and reciprocity for Korea in particular. In my opinion under present conditions Korea is not adequate trade any of our possessions and arrange in any other Japanese possessions would be severely circumscribed. Suggest I continue efforts obtain arrange Japan proper. See my letter June 9 to Harris, Chief Liaison Section in June 13 pouch.

CRESWELL.

G-2(WEC)
Ralph G. Smith

Sent to all listed destination * * * WE
May 29, 1941 * * *

MAY 28, 1941.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, First Corps Area, Third Corps area, Fourth Corps Area, Fifth Corps area, Sixth Corps area, Seventh Corps Area, Eighth Corps area, Ninth Corps Area, Panama Canal Department, Puerto Rican Department, Hawaiian Department, Philippine Department and Alaskan Department.

Communist Party order recently issued directs all Communist Party members of National Maritime Union to remain on board ship until further notice period. Highly reliable British source reports nation-wide sabotage may be expected commencing especially on Pacific Coast commencing over May thirtieth weekend on all defense projects including shipping facilities period.

MILES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
April 3, 1941.

AG 220.482(4-3-41)E

COMMANDING GENERAL
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, TH.

Issue orders detailing on temporary duty the necessary number of armed non-commissioned officers of the Air Corps but not less than 6 for the purpose of providing adequate and continuous guard from Hawaiian Department to destination for airplanes and parts being shipped on the *Steel Mariner* scheduled to sail to Philippine Department from Hawaiian Department April 5, 1941, and directing that upon completion of such duty soldiers return to proper stations in Hawaiian Department on first available army transport payment of monetary allowances * * * authorized while traveling on SS *Steel Mariner* a chartered vessel * * *

ADAMS.

Copy for A. C. of S., G-2. In connection with your disposition form dated April 3, 1941.

AGO 004.5 (5-13-41) MB-G
The AGO
AGMX-G
EAH

MAY 13, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Schofield Barracks, TH.

In reply city AGMX period. War Department authority granted you to permit representative of Pan Pacific Press Association to make photographs of unrestricted training activities and general views of post at your station for forthcoming articles *Colliers Magazine* period. All photographs to be made under your supervision and to be reviewed by War Department prior to publication.

ADAMS.

Copy for: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Major Corderman).

G-2
Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

G-2/272-82
No. 740 Sent April 18, 1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
Hawaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

Naval Intelligence on March 21 received from unknown source partially illegible copy combat estimate of Fiji Islands dated December 1940 signed by Captain John W. Coulter present address University of Hawaii period. Investigate authenticity and why G-2 did not receive copy this valuable report.

MILES.

190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Radiogram]

MARCH 29, 1941.
8:32 AM(JTP)
39WTJFrom: Ft. Shafter.
To: The Adjutant General.

FORT SHAFTER, No. 2492, March 28, 1941.

For G-2. Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, Ija passed through Honolulu 15th aboard *Tatsuta Maru* enroute Washington, D. C. Nippu Jiji of Honolulu reported, "Colonel Iwakuro was formerly head of military affairs section of Military Affairs Bureau which is probably the most important office in the army. He is so influential that there is no one in army circles who does not know him. We do not know what mission this colonel is on but in view of the times the visit of so important an army personage is worth our attention."

SHORT.

EXHIBIT No. 23

[Hand written:] Copy of Capt. Safford's digest, with missing numbers supplied:
1 copy to Safford.
1 copy to Corderman.

[1] *Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor*

MARCH 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Mar. 13	A	15306	Hsinking #58	Foreign Propaganda Conference.
#Mar. 13	N 1472	15351	Tokyo 216	Japanese-Russian Cooperation.
#Mar. 13	A 1479	15330	Tokyo 222	Get the Russians to accept the Ribbentrop proposal.
Mar. 14	A	{ 15341	}Hsinking #59	Propaganda towards the South Seas.
Mar. 18	A 1540	{ 15342		
		15425	Tokyo 126	Put Terazaki in charge of information and propaganda.
#Mar. 18	A	15421	Tokyo 276	Southern Advance.
#Mar. 19	A 1572	15455	Moscow #5	German-Soviet Relations: change in.
*Mar. 21	A	{ 15550	}Tokyo #40	Trade-agreement between Japan and USSR.
		15555		
**Mar. 22	A			SIS Memorandum predicting German attack on Russia. (Memo not available.) Given to State Dept.
#Mar. 22	A 1654	15621	Tokyo #81	Secure intelligences by bribe.
#Mar. 25	N 1662	15656	Tokyo 286	Dinner with Admiral Raeder.
*Mar. 29	A 1748	15749	Berlin 308	Germany plans to attack Russia. It is necessary for Japan to attack Singapore.

APRIL 1941

#Apr. 3	A 1806	15900	}Berlin #56	German preparations for war with Russia.
#Apr. 4	A 1826	15936		Military campaign in the lowlands.
#Apr. 3	N 1820	15945		Typical Honolulu Spy Report.
#Apr. 5	N 1842	15976		"As a result of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, Japan is at last free to use force in this area (South-west Pacific)."
*Apr. 18	N 2006	16409	Wash. 230	"Our Southward Move would be halted."
#Apr. 19	N 2099	16455	Tokyo 171	"It is truly a marvelous thing that our relations with Moscow have been adjusted."
[#Apr. 29	A 2251	16741	Wash. 253	Early intentions of Germany to attack Russia.
*Apr. 30	N		GZ-32	

***Most important.
**Very important.
*Important.
Unmarked—Normal.
#Supplementary.

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

[2]

MAY 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#May 9	N 2452	17089	Tokyo 202.....	"I am most anxious to see the United States discontinue its policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek."
#May 13	A 2509	17161	Tokyo 396.....	"Advise the President to counsel Chiang Kai-shek to respond to Japanese peace overtures."
#May 13	N 2513	17263	Tokyo 216.....	Transmit #217 to the Secretary of State without delay. (Precedent for Tokyo #901 & 902, 6 Dec. 1941.)
#May 13	NQ2514	17264	Tokyo 217.....	The U. S. Govt. agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek to enter into direct negotiations with Japan.
#May 15	N 2549	17272	Wash. 299.....	Japan has absolutely no aggressive ambitions in the southern area.(?).
#May 16	N 2562	17305	Tokyo 230.....	Our request that the United States stay out of the war.
#May 21	N 2619	17423	Wash. 320.....	Japanese southward expansion.
**May 22	N 2643	17473	Berlin 569.....	"Our dreams of southward expansion . . ."
				"To further bolster the spirit of the Tripartite Pact."
May 26	A 2675	17536	Tokyo 440.....	Wire real intentions of the German Govt.

JUNE 1941

#June 3	A 2791	17741	Rome.....	The German Govt. has recently completed all preparations for attacking Soviet Russia.
#June 14	N ----	----	GZ-1.....	German Plans to attack Russia.
#June 16	N ----	----	GZ-9.....	Crisis in German-Soviet relations.
#June 16	N ----	----	GZ-10.....	Japanese-United States negotiations.
#June 17	N ----	----	GZ-15.....	German-Soviet crisis. Prediction of surprise German attack.
#June 27	N ----	----	GZ-26.....	Japanese attitude toward Soviet-German crisis. "It will be well for the Imperial Govt. to assume a very prudent attitude in respect to this German-Soviet war."

[3]

JULY 1941

#July 7	A ----	----	I. B. 1-155.....	"The Jap Govt.—do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the USSR." (JD 3461)
#July 9	A ----	{ 19126 19127 19128	I. B. 1-157.....	{ Plans for utilizing American negroes for espionage and sabotage. (JD 3460)
#July 9	N 3515	19197	Wash. 463.....	"If we are definitely determined to make a military stroke southward."
#July 10	A ----	----	I. B. 1-158.....	Comments and paraphrase of JD 3515. [Note: MID missed the point completely.]
*July 24	N ----	----	-----	Memo to Naval Aide to the President re withdrawal of Jap merchant vessels from the Atlantic Ocean.

AUGUST 1941

*Aug. 4	N ----	----	GZ-1.....	Jap Decisions at Imperial Conference, July 2, 1941—to break British-American encirclement and arm for all-out war.
#Aug. 9	N ----	----	GZ-4.....	Preparations for the southward advance shall be reinforced.
#Aug. 10	N ----	----	GZ-5.....	The belief of Ambassador Oshima is discounted by the Tokyo Government belief that the war will continue into next year, with the Russians holding in Siberia.
#Aug. 16	N ----	----	GZ-9.....	Nomura's estimate of U. S. Policy. (U. S. is determined to take drastic action to counter further attempts at Japanese expansion.)
*Aug. 28	N 4814	21575	Berlin 1066.....	The German-Soviet war as described by Marshal Keitel (Germany conquering Russia).

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Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

[4]

SEPTEMBER 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Sept. 4	A 4920	{ 21784 21785	Rome 556.....	{ Essential to carry out boldly at this time our policy of southward advance.
#Sept. 4	A 4940	{ 21790 21786	Tokyo 528.....	{ U. S.-Japan Negotiations—See JD; 4941.
*Sept. 4	A 4941	{ 21786 to 21788	Tokyo 529.....	{ Japanese Draft Proposal of Sept. 6, 1941. (Japan demands conditions that the U. S. cannot possibly agree to.)
#Sept. 19	N 5234	22377	Shanghai 808.....	"Japan's war preparations against the Soviet."
*Sept. 22	A 5360	22550	Tokyo 590.....	Basic terms of peace between Japan and China. (Jap troops in China & Recognition of Manchukuo.)
#Sept. 23	A 5381	22588	Berlin 1161.....	I repeatedly requested—our Government's real national policy.
**Sept. 26	N 5438	22748	Tokyo 595.....	Japanese Proposal of Sept. 25, 1941 (submitted to State Dept. on Sept. 27, 1941). (Amplifies the Note of Sept. 6th (JD 4941) and attempts to force the U. S. to relinquish its position. It is apparent that the negotiations are getting nowhere and that the Japanese believe that the U. S. will back down or resort to appeasement if they put up a determined front.)
#Sept. 26	A 5441	22753	Tokyo 597.....	Nomura is bawled-out.
#Sept. 27	A 5464	22787	Wash. 852.....	Nomura apologizes.
Sept. 30	A 5510	22870	Tokyo 614.....	This whole matter concerns the China Incident and the South Seas Question.

[5]

OCTOBER 1941

*Oct. 2	A 5598	22987	Wash. 881.....	Interview with Adm. Stark. "The Admiral stated that if the United States fights a two-ocean war she will have to defend herself in the Pacific."
#Oct. 3	N 5593	23034	Wash. 869.....	Relations of Terasaki (First Sec'y) and Schmitt (spy).
#Oct. 6	A 5640	23114	Wash. 901.....	Nomura sounds a warning against further aggression.
#Oct. 7	N 5650	23162	Wash. 880.....	Nomura advises caution: "After Japan has had time to evaluate the results let her determine her course."
#Oct. 7	N 5661	23166	Wash. 894.....	Nomura submits his humble opinion: "The only remaining problem is that concerning the evacuating of our troops (from China)."
#Oct. 8	A 5693	23220	Tokyo 647.....	The internal situation here—would not permit further delay.
Oct. 9	A 5696	23260	Tokyo #83.....	Area designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
Oct. 10	N 5730	23312	Honolulu #41.....	Dock & Mooring designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
#Oct. 10	N 5738	23318	Harbin 129.....	Promise of American aid to Russia.
#Oct. 13	N 5779	23421	Tokyo 658.....	"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis."
#Oct. 13	N		GZ-9.....	Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).
*Oct. 15	N 5838	23513	Berlin 1237.....	Ambassador Oshima urges Japan attack Russia—"at the time of the fall of Moscow"—and adds "It is absolutely essential for us to make sure of the resources and markets of the south."
*Oct. 16	N		GZ-10.....	Kramer's Memo to CNO with paraphrase of JD #5838.
#Oct. 16	A 5854	23570	Wash. 943.....	{ Interview with Adm. Turner. (Withdrawal of Jap troops from China.
#Oct. 15	A 5854	23516	Berlin 1236.....	{ Protest on Dornel editorial.
#Oct. 16	N 5888	23622	Rome 661.....	Evacuation of Japanese merchants from Europe.
Oct. 17	N 5898	23629	Tokyo 671.....	German pressure on Japan.
#Oct. 17	A 5901	23631	Rome 664.....	"My (Paulucci's) personal opinion is that Japan should strike at the Soviet Union immediately."
#Oct. 18	N 5919	23677	Tokyo 682.....	Resignation of Jap cabinet.
Oct. 18	N 5923	23677	Wash. 959.....	Conversation between Terazaki and Adm. Turner.
Oct. 20	A 5941	23715	Wash.....	Nomura submits his resignation. "I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence deceiving [6] other people . . . As a man of honor this is the only way open to me." (This is why Kurosu was sent.)
Oct. 23	A 6017	23859	Wash. 989.....	"The Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attache some secret advice. Is this the future policy of the Government?"
Oct. 27	A 6084	23996	Shanghai 361.....	"At the time of a Japanese advance to the North."
Oct. 28	A 6116	24046	Mex. City 422.....	Sec'y Knox's statement that there would be imminent action in the Far East.
Oct. 26	N 6118	24070	Tokyo 674.....	Japanese nationals evacuating the N. E. I.
*Oct. 28	N 6138	24125	Wash. 1004.....	Talk with Adm. Pratt—"Stark cannot be said to be a 'strong' individual, Admiral Pratt said."
Oct. 30	6175	24192		

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

[7]

NOVEMBER 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
Nov. 1	N 6204	24249	Hsinking 697.....	Border clash. "Let the matter be forgotten.
Nov. 4	N 6238	24322	Tokyo 343.....	Japanese nationals evacuating the Philippine.
*Nov. 4	A 6248	24330	Tokyo 725.....	Counter proposals will be given in #726 & 727. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort. The success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan.
*Nov. 4	A 6249	24334 to 24337	Tokyo 726.....	Proposal "A"—Submitted in Part to State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How hard have we fought in China for four years. What tremendous sacrifices have we made. They must know this . . . In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise."
Nov. 4	A 6250	24338	Tokyo 727.....	Proposal "B"—Never submitted. "A last effort to prevent something happening."
#Nov. 4	A 6251	24339	Tokyo 730.....	"Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by clipper on the 7th. He is carrying no additional instructions (!)"
**Nov. 5	N 6254	24373	Tokyo 736.....	It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. (Of utmost secrecy.)
#Nov. 5	N 6275	24386	Tokyo 734.....	Ambassador Kurusu left the 5th for (Shanghai(?)).
#Nov. 6	A 6302	24439	Tokyo 739.....	We are sending Ambassador Kurusu to show our Empire's sincerity. . . To make it sound good we are telling the public. . . Both the Army and the Navy are pleased. (Note: See JD #6017.)
Nov. 7	N 6320	24479	Wash. 1040.....	There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it.
Nov. 8	N 6335	24533	Manila 722.....	Spy report on U. S. aircraft in the Philippines and analysis. (Note: This is why we did not worry too much over Japanese espionage.)
[8]				
Nov. 12	N			"Dissemination to White House." (This memorandum in Kramer's handwriting records reasons for giving original translations to Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull) after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to that time Memoranda forwarding Paraphrases of important messages had been furnished.)
*Nov. 12	N 6415	24373	Tokyo 762.....	The United States is still not full aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The date set in message #736 is a definite deadline. The situation is nearing a climax . . . time is indeed becoming short.
#Nov. 12	N 6416	24654	Tokyo 763.....	Germany putting pressure on Japan to get tough with the U. S.
Nov. 17	A 6540	24853	Hsinking #1.....	Umetsu to Kurusu (Nov. 6, 1941).
*Nov. 17	A 6541	24854	Hsinking #2 (Appended to #1).	Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It would be impossible for us to fight the Soviet Union unless something unforeseen happens. The Kwantung military command is restraining the forces there from any rash action. The Soviet is also endeavoring not to antagonize our country.)
*Nov. 17	A 6542	24856	Hsinking #3 (Appended to #1).	Estimate of the Russo-German War. (The foundations of the Stalin regime are very firmly fixed. The outlook for any early close to hostilities in Europe is fading.)
**Nov. 17 & 22.	A 6553	24877 24857 & 25139	Wash. 1090.....	Nomura's swan song (Nov. 14, 1941). (The policy of the American Govt. in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part, either southward or northward. They are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare. It is not their intention to repeat the Munich Conference. The apex of German victories has been passed. The United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China: This war will be long, and whoever can hold out till the end will be the victors. I would like to caution patience for one or two months to get a clear view of the world situation. This would be the best plan.
[9]				
Nov. 17	A 6638	24878	Tokyo.....	Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. There will be no change.)

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

NOVEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
*Nov. 22	A 6710	25138	Tokyo 812.....	There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if the signing can be completed by the 29th, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Nov. 24	N 6731	25171	Tokyo 969.....	We would welcome peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.
#Nov. 24	A 6737	25174	Wash. 1148.....	Continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.
*Nov. 24	A 6744	25178	Tokyo 823.....	The time limit set in my #812 is in Tokyo time. (See JD #6710.)
Nov. 26	A 6801	25322	Tokyo 2319.....	Should negotiations collapse . . . we will completely destroy British and American power in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions. (Circular to China Net—Nov. 14, 1941.)
#Nov. 26	A 6841	25344	Tokyo 836.....	Telephone Code (see JD 6890).
Nov. 26	N 6850	25392	Tokyo 2354.....	Winds Code—Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-J19).
*Nov. 28	N 6875	25432	Tokyo 2353.....	Winds Code—Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-J19).
			Appended to JD 6875..	(Singapore version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Foote) version of the Winds Code. Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain. Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind Cloudy. Japan-British=West Wind Clear (including N. E. I.).
Nov. 28	N 6890	25443		Washington-Tokyo Telephone Conversation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-2334 E. S. T.)—The south, southward matter. A crisis does appear imminent. Regarding negotiations—do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand and the Army is championing at the bit. [Note: This was the only telephone conversation of any importance.] (See JD 6841.)
#Nov. 26	A 6891	25435	} Wash. 1180	Our failure and humiliation are complete.
[10]	6896	25436		
#Nov. 28	A 6892	25437	Wash 1181.....	It is better to wire urgent news than to phone it. The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
*Nov. 28	A 6898	25445	Tokyo 844.....	
Nov. 28	N 6899	25446	Tokyo 843.....	Tokyo Broadcast Schedule.
#Nov. 29	N 6908	25476	Wash 1197.....	Ref. Tokyo 843, recommends change in Broadcast Schedule—Nov. 27, 1941. (See JD 6899.)
Nov. 30	N 6921	25496	Tokyo 857.....	Make one more attempt. Please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

[11]

DECEMBER 1941

#Dec. 1	N 6939	25545	Tokyo 2436.....	Destroying codes with chemicals.
*Dec. 1	N 6942	25556	Berlin 1393.....	Ribbentrop said, "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity." "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the U. S. Germany, of course, would join the war immediately." Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret.
**Dec. 1	A 6943	{ 25552 25553	} Tokyo 985.....	The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured—broken. Say <i>very secretly</i> to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. Will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is. (Nov. 30, 1941.) [Note: Coded message forwarded by Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014, or 010027. Also forwarded from London as Admiralty #104 and #105. Admiralty 011530 advised "Tokyo to Berlin #985 of immediate interest to].

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

DECEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF												
*Dec. 1	A 6944	{ 25554 25555 }	Tokyo 986.....	The Imperial Govt. can no longer continue negotiations with the U. S. The proposal presented by the U. S. on the 26th contains one insulting clause. It is clearly a trick. <i>The U. S. has decided to regard Japan as an enemy.</i> (Nov 30, 1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16 as CYROF 010001, 010014, or 010029.]												
Dec. 2	A 6974	25572	Hsinking 781.....	In the event that war breaks out with England and the U. S.—Persons to be interned: (a) British nationals, 339; (b) American citizens, 81; (d) Nationals of the Soviet observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of.												
#Dec. 2	N 6981	25604	Rome 768.....	Japanese language broadcasts to Europe. (Nov. 29, 1941.)												
#Dec. 2	A 6982	25571	Rio 482.....	At present we can hear only the 6:30 p. m. JVJ transmission to the U. S. (Nov. 30, 1941.)												
*Dec. 1	N 6983	25605	Tokyo 865.....	To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that the negotiations are continuing. The above is for only your information. (GY Log #6428.)												
**Dec. 1	N 6984	25606	Tokyo 2444.....	The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. (GY Log #6432.)												
*Dec. 2	N 6985	25609	Tokyo 2409.....	Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-J19). For later additions see:												
				<table><tr><th>JD#</th><th>SIS#</th><th>OTHER#</th></tr><tr><td>7122</td><td>25830</td><td>Tokyo 2432. Tokyo 2433. Tokyo 2450. Tokyo 2431.</td></tr><tr><td>7214</td><td>25943</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7360</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	7122	25830	Tokyo 2432. Tokyo 2433. Tokyo 2450. Tokyo 2431.	7214	25943		7360		
JD#	SIS#	OTHER#														
7122	25830	Tokyo 2432. Tokyo 2433. Tokyo 2450. Tokyo 2431.														
7214	25943															
7360																
Dec. 3	N 6991	25644	Tokyo 111.....	Make your "ships in harbor" report irregular but twice a week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19.)												
**Dec. 4	N 7001			JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to be the (missing) translation of the Winds Message.												
#Dec. 3	N 7012	25656	Berlin 1396.....	Note from German Ambassador concerning what is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war. (Dec. 1, 1941.)												
*Dec. 3	A 7017	25640	Tokyo 867.....	Washington burn all codes except one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and "L" (LA). Stop using the code machine and destroy it completely. When you have finished this, wire back "HARUNA." Destroy all messages files and other secret documents. (Dec. 2, 1941.)												
#Dec. 4	A 7029	25694	Tokyo 114..... or 111.	Investigate fleet bases in Hawaii reservation. (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)												
#Dec. 5	A 7063	25773	Tokyo 113.....	Report ships in Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941-J19.)												
#Dec. 5	A 7064	25772	Honolulu 224.....	Unimportant spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941-I.												
[13]																
#Dec. 5	N 7080	25781	Tokyo 842.....	The United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. (Nov. 27, 1941.)												
*Dec. 5	N 7086	25823	Tokyo 122.....	In the future report even when there are no (ship) movements. (Nov. 29, 1941-J19.)												
#Dec. 5	N 7091	25787	Tokyo 2443.....	London discontinue use of code machine and dispose of it immediately. Wire "SETUJU." (Dec. 1, 1941.)												
**Dec. 4	N 7092	25783	Tokyo 893.....	Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note: Intercepted by Army at Fort Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy in late afternoon of Dec. 3, 1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]												

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Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

DECEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Dec. 6	A 7111	25817	Honolulu 222.....	Spy report on Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941—J19.)
#Dec. 5	N 7122	25830	Rio 329.....	Tokyo Circular 2432—Additions to Hidden Word Code. (Dec. 2, 1941—J19.) (See JD #6985.)
Dec. 6	A 7125	25837	Bern.....	Tokyo Circular #2447. Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America and the South Seas, and to all our officials in British and Netherlands territory to burn all telegraphic codes except one copy of "Oite" and "L". (Dec. 2—J19.)
Dec. 6	N 7136	25836	Wash. 1268.....	We have completed destruction of codes but since negotiations are still continuing I request to delay the destruction of one code machine. (Dec. 5th.)
Dec. 6	A 7142	25835	Tokyo 897.....	Destroy one "B" code machine and use the other for the time being. [Note: #897 was the first Tokyo to Washington serial sent on Dec. 6, 1941. We intercepted #897-912 solid.]
			Tokyo 898.....	See JD #7199.
			Tokyo 899.....	See JD #7170.
#Dec. 6	A		Tokyo 900.....	Doemi praises KATO for good reporting.
[14]				
**Dec. 6	A		Tokyo 901.....	See JD #7149.
**Dec. 6	N 7143	25843	Tokyo 902.....	Japanese Declaration of War. (Parts 1-13.) (See GY Log #6619, 66 20, etc.)
(1-13)				Japanese Declaration of War. (Part 14.) (Very important.) (See GY Log #6649.)
**Dec. 7	N 7143	25843	Tokyo 902.....	Re my #902—Be most cautious in preserving secrecy. [Note: This was received before #902—See GY Log #6618.]
*Dec. 6	A 7144	25844	Tokyo 904.....	Re my #902—Submit our reply to the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th <i>your time</i> . (Urgent—Very important.) (See GY Log #6648.)
**Dec. 7	A 7145	25850	Tokyo 907.....	Deepest thanks to both you ambassadors. (Urgent.)
#Dec. 7	A 7146	25853	Tokyo 908.....	After deciphering Part 14 of my 902 and also 907, 908, and 909, destroy at once the remaining cipher machine. (Extremely Urgent)
*Dec. 7	A 7147	25854	Tokyo 910.....	Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations. (In Hidden Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)
**Dec. 7	N 7148	25856	Tokyo 2494.....	Re my 844 (JD 6898). The Govt. has deliberated on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the U. S. contained in my separate message #902, in <i>English</i> . This message is very long—in 14 parts. Keep it secret for the time being. I will wire you in a separate message the time of presenting this memorandum to the U. S. Present it to the Americans <i>just as soon</i> as you receive instructions. [Note: #901 was intercepted before #904 and #902. See GY Log #6612.]
**Dec. 6	A 7149	25838	Tokyo 901.....	According to AP & UP reports the President has wired a personal message to His Majesty the Emperor. Please wire me the facts. (Urgent.)
#Dec. 7	A 7150	25857	Tokyo 905.....	I heartily thank IGUCHI and YUKI. (Urgent.)
#Dec. 7	A 7151	25858	Tokyo 909.....	
[15]				
Dec. 9	A 7214	25943	Tokyo 2450.....	Supplement to Hidden Word Code (Dec. 2—J19). [Note: Com 16's #51462 advised "Singapore attaches great importance to Tokyo Circulars 2433 and 2450." Circular 2450 was requested by OpNav #61665 and was forwarded by Com 16 GY-ROF #79339, #79415, & #71257 (?). See GY Log #6665-6669.]
#Dec. 8	A 7257	25998	Tokyo/Extra.....	PAK2 message dated Dec. 6th. Of no importance, except to show <i>solid interception</i> of Tokyo-Washington messages on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941.
#Dec. 9	N		Tokyo 912.....	Same as #911 but in PAK2 (Dec. 7th) [Note: #912 was the last Tokyo-Washington serial sent. Our file of Tokyo-Washington serials sent on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941, is <i>complete</i> .]
*Dec. 10	N 7280	26029	Honolulu 252.....	The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers. Four ships of the Honolulu class were in dock. (Dec. 5th—PAK2.) [Note: Army intercept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.]

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

DECEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
*Dec. 10	N 7294	26053	Honolulu 241.....	The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. (Dec. 1—J19.) [Note: Army intercept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.]
#Dec. 11	N 7299	26047	Wash. 1278.....	Re your #910 we will commence the demolition (of the code machine) and destruction by fire. [Note: Last Purple message sent by Washington (Dec. 7th).]
#Dec. 12	A 7330	26103	Cant. 512.....	The Army has completed all preparations to move immediately on Thai. (Dec. 2—J19.) [Note: Place of interception not known.]
Dec. 11	N 7335	26108	Pek. 625.....	Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America (Dec. 5th). [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H. Received Dec. 10, 1941—see GY Log #6749.]
[16]				
			903.....	See entry after JD #7205.
			906.....	See JD #7183.
			911.....	See JD #7205.
			912.....	See Entry after JD #7257.
#Dec. 7...	A 7157	25859	Tokyo 118.....	Honolulu retain codes so long as the local situation permits. (Nov. 28—J19.)
#Dec. 8...	A 7158	25880	Tokyo 119.....	Report entrance and departure of capital ships. (Nov. 28—J19.)
#Dec. 8...	A 7164	25879	Tokyo 2445.....	Burn all codes with exception of one copy of "Oite" and "L". Wire "HARUNA." Burn all secret documents. Be especially careful not to arouse suspicion. (To Habana.) (Dec. 2—J19.)
#Dec. 7...	A 7170	25868	Tokyo 899.....	Anti-U. S. Propaganda.
#Dec. 7...	A 7171	25851	Tokyo/Extra.....	Correction to #902.
#Dec. 7...	A 7175	25845	Wash/Extra.....	Requests correction to #902. [Note: This is why Nomura was late.]
#Dec. 7...	A 7176	25846	Wash. 1272.....	Japanese attempts to influence the American Govt. (Dec. 6th.)
*Dec. 8...	A 7178	25877	Honolulu 253.....	There is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a <i>surprise</i> attack against these places. (Dec. 6th—PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.]
*Dec. 8...	A 7179	25874	Honolulu 254.....	It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th—PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.]
#Dec. 7...	A 7183	25852	Tokyo 906.....	Minister SAKAMOTO return to his post at once. (Urgent.)
**Dec. 7...	A 7184	25866	Budapest 104.....	On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th. (LA.)
#Dec. 8...	A 7199	25896	Tokyo 898.....	Send Terasaki to his post immediately. (Urgent. (Dec. 6th.)
#Dec. 8...	N 7205	25923	Tokyo 911.....	Minor correction to #902. (Dec. 7th.)
#Dec. 8...	A		Tokyo 903.....	Washington send #1286 to Brazil. (LA.)
#Dec. 8...	A 7212	25928	Honolulu 238.....	Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28—J19.)
[17]				
#Dec. 11	N 7338	26109	Wash. 1276.....	Please wire the December operating expenses for all offices today. (Dec. 7—LA)
#Dec. 11	N 7360	26144	Rio. 328.....	Tokyo Circular #2431—Nov 29th. Additions to Hidden Word Code. (Dec. 2—J19) (See JD #6985) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va.]
#Dec. 12	A 7369	26214 27136	Hsinking.....	Prospective use of the Kwantung Army and recommendation against attacking Russia. (Dec. 4th) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H.]
*Dec. 11	N 7370	26145	Hono. 245.....	Spy method of communication by signals: KGMB Want Ads. (Dec. 3—PAK2). [Note: Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va. Translated in the rough by Mrs. Edgers, 1:00 p. m. on Dec. 6, 1941. Seen by Lt. Cdr. Kramer about 3:00 p. m. Typed smooth and distributed on Dec. 11th.]
#Dec. 11	A 7377	26142	Tokyo 909.....	When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities Manchukuo will not participate. (Dec. 4th) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, TH]
*Dec. 12	A 7381	26158	Tokyo 128.....	Honolulu wire immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to the 4th. (Dec. 6—PAK2) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H.]

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

DECEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
**Dec. 15	N 7489	26308	Tokyo 2556.....	Explanation of circumstances attending Nomura's presentation of Japanese Declaration of War to the U. S. Govt: "We really supposed that the negotiations had been broken off first, and the shooting had taken place after this. . . . The President's speech was trying to hide the fact that the United States had been taken by surprise and failed in the first step." (Dec. 11-J19) [Forwarded from Bainbridge Island by teletype.]
#Dec. 14	A 7479	26294	Rio 379.....	Tokyo Circular #2570:—The Imperial Naval Air Force damaged three battleships and sank three in the Battle of Hawaii. Those sunk were the Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arizona. (Dec. 14—Plan Language.)
#Dec. 16	A 7511	26351 26352	}Hono. 234.....	Spy report on maneuvers of U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Nov. 24—J19) [Note: Intercepted by Army at San Francisco.]
[18]				
#Dec. 19	A 7590	26479	Tokyo #4.....	War News Circular #4. The following report based on what the attacking forces witnessed during the battle as well as photographic observations after the battle, show that we had completely destroyed the United States Pacific Fleet and the American Air Forces in the Hawaiian region. (Detailed losses reported were very accurate.) (Dec. 18—Plain Language)
#Dec. 26	N 7848	26881	Pek. 616.....	If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. . . . It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China Incident (Dated Dec. 3, 1941.) [Note: Intercepted at Corregidor, Dec. 7, 1941. Forwarded by Com 16 GYROF # -7- and received Dec. 8, 1941. GY Log #6707.]
**Dec. 30	A 8007	27065	Tokyo 123.....	To Honolulu: In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H. Reason for long delay not known, but apparently some one fumbled the ball. Note on translation says: "This message was received here Dec. 23."]

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EXHIBIT No. 24

SECRET

[1] SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

Explanatory Notes.

The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to Japan's war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military Attachés and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and ending 7 December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue of which follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Documents, Volumes I-XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the documents to indicate sections pertinent to the subject.

Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from which the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first Far Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to

specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of contents of the documentary file.

The following abbreviations have been used:

MA Military Attaché or Assistant Military Attaché
MO Military Observer

Expressions such as "Tokyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports are included from Military Attachés or Assistant Military Attachés on duty at embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and Netherlands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained.

[2] *Japan's War Potential and Intentions*

1937

FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instruments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reservists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Manchoukuo; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) replenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in the interest of national defense.

FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy" and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concurrence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private gathering, said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for overseas development."

FE 16 In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at first appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic. FE 18 Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the FE 24 Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a FE 26 general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925.

FE 29 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members FE 31 of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. Special volunteer officers and reservists of all ranks and grades called into active service were to serve until relieved from active service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in 1938, the term was extended to 1939.

FE 30 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meeting physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had FE 36 950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquarters FE 40 was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on two previous occasions had this headquarters been established: in 1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904, following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

FE 23 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,-117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or 45 per cent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted to Yen 5,483,364,279.

FE 20 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor-

- ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Compared with the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities.
- FE 13 Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of the Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7
- FE 17 August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on 9 September. The Cabinet Planning Board was reorganized to plan for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.
- FE 20 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly stated on 17 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as the immediate and potential enemy.
- FE 22 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat
- FE 34 "Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of restitution. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.
- FE 32
- FE 41

JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

[4]

1938

- FE 42 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs of the Far East."
- FE 56 The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand,"
- FE 57 and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan"
- FE 58 really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
- FE 57 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure," and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other."
- FE 58 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; . . . make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; . . . guide other Powers to take the same attitude."
- FE 62 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March
- FE 65 laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war-
- FE 66 time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law,
- FE 68 which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it
- FE 69 would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended
- FE 78 the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance
- FE 87 of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the end of the China incident was remote and
- FE 62

- the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict." Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that "only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the
- FE 66
- FE 86 MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.
- FE 59 With the extension of military operations in China during 1938 the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. On 28 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000 Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of military training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA
- FE 44 in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two
- FE 78 years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry,
- FE 60 regardless of preconscription training, was necessary because of the need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army, subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program 400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism and military training.
- FE 45
- FE 78
- FE 61 In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordination with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo
- FE 67 reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing fields in Japanese villages.
- FE 63 Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army
- FE 64 during 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen
- FE 23 2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against supplemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38).
- FE 67 In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6] front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in Tokyo reported on 14 May: "The response of the people appears to be all that could be desired. . . . With stoic determination the people have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant" that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident in accordance with the "Imperial Principle."
- FE 75
- FE 74 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron

strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.

FE 67 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the
FE 71 Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous
FE 72 reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially
FE 73 singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways
FE 76 in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's
FE 77 apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island.
FE 84

FE 85 The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that
FE 76 "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek."

FE 67 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other.
FE 71 pressure against French, English, and American interests in
FE 84 Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid
FE 67 to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military advisers from China in July.

[7]

FE 72 Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of
FE 77 continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent
FE 78 border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July
FE 81 and August.

FE 79 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September,
FE 80 the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the point of war.

FE 84 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

FE 86 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments, probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with Japan's aims."

FE 59 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having
FE 76 overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the
FE 85 end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic
FE 58 gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the
FE 71 Japanese military machine, the semi-official North China Development Company and Central China Development Company placed
FE 75 their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and
FE 72 transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil.

[8]

1939

FE 91 The occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on 13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) It provided an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China; (2) It made possible a naval blockade of South China; (3) It brought French and British holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) It threatened Manila with encirclement; and (5) It added a second "Formosa" to Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite

FE 93

of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the supply routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of U. S. foreign policy": "These developments [i. e., United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hongkong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China.

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On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legislative measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing. Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937.

On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self-sufficiency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13 billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of dependence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be considerably reduced.

[9]

FE 102

On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the War Department a tactical study made by an Army officer under his command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army, were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechanization, and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their military organization and tactical operation.

In the light of these improvements, the report concluded:

"The division which started the China Incident will not be the division of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accoutrements, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics. But it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and arrives at the destination on time and with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practical and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."

- FE 103 The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported that the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155,345, which was 68.35 per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.
- FE 104 Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [10] and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide (1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental regulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers.
- FE 105 In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military aviation toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 per cent.
- FE 106
- FE 110 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12 years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.
- FE 111 On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the Japanese and British over control of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as acute, particularly in Tientsin.
- FE 113 On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to 1961 from 1093; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1800.
- FE 74
- FE 115 The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese dominance in Asia.
- FE 116 The MA in China, in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000 additional men in Manchoukuo.
- FE 120 The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes in conscription regulations, the estimated strength of the standing army will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men.
- FE 122 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken aback by the announcement on 28 July of the American abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that the [11] United States Government was abandoning the isolationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being deterred, according to the MA, from exploiting an opportunity to push the hardpressed British only because of apprehension of Russia.
- On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a settlement of the China war shall have been realized."
- FE 124 Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric power at a necessary level.

- FE 129 The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Department a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European embroglio to secure as many plums as possible. . . . Japan is reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in that direction. . . . Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to bear and easily lop off this rich prize."
- FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an impending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we may take against Japan."
- FE 133. Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that [12] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European struggle develop into a world war through participation by the United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world war."
- FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" and that, although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."
- FE 138 The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which they were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or circumstances."
- [13] 1940
- FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."
- FE 141 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty
FE 142 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination of the Netherlands Indies.
- FE 144 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wel regime in Occupied China.

- FE 146 The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a deal with England and France whereby those nations would not oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neutrality in the European war.
- FE 147 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese demand for the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."
- FE 149 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new large-scale campaigns were not expected in China.

[14]

- FE 148 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concentrations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan
- FE 150 were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June
- FE 151 stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furor" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.
- FE 152 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."
- FE 153 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered; a total of 4565 officers, 1350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service, including 5950 pilots; and a total of 238 air combat squadrons, composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval Air
- FE 156 Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.
- FE 154 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the situation is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hong-kong and the French Indo-China border.
- FE 155 Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.
- FE 158 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of Indo-China."

[15]

- FE 159 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action

if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.

FE 160 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her traditional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the United States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan and China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.

FE 161 On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact
FE 162 could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her south-
FE 163 ern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.
FE 164

FE 165 Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Man-
choukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA
in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength
of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.

FE 166 The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Jap-
anese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were
probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16]
combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis
which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in
attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel.
Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 men under arms, of whom
1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939.
This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting
machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western
armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required
to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over an
opponent."

FE 167 Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's
FE 168 evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that
Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China.

FE 168 The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to
the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan,
observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via
Lingayen Gulf."

FE 169 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's
mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was
probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government
was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements"
and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program
for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

[17]

1941

FE 170 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty
of Amity, the Tokyo MA on 11 January called attention to the
progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases
for operations against Malaya and Singapore.

- FE 174 In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect would be closure of many sources of information. The MA
- FE 172 China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the
- FE 173 United States that she would tolerate no interference in developing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.
- FE 175 On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies depended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England.
- FE 177 The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the
- FE 178 disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but predicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in maintaining signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.
- FE 179 On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries.
- FE 180 Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Headquarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in the use of mechanized equipment.
- FE 181 Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and that these forces "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo,
- FE 184 21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18] an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion if the United States should become involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese
- FE 182 Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941-42, the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
- FE 185 On 29 May Chungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.
- FE 186 On 3 June Tokyo wrote: " * * * two new Inspectorates have been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Communications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms of military activity above the places which they have heretofore occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the
- FE 187 yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached
- FE 188 to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and supplies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Government at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong, direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the trade negotiations at Batavia.
- FE 194
- FE 189 The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move without a 50-50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on 5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and 1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them."
- FE 190 Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports conveyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast travelling southward, and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 trans-
- FE 192

ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

[19]

FE 193 Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians.

FE 195 On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evident that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but unable to determine number or whether any being sent south."

FE 197 Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving southward from Formosa on 12 July.

FE 199 Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases.

FE 201 On 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If the French refuse, regardless of British or United States interference, the bases will be taken forcibly."

FE 203 London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases.

FE 204 On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mobilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all directions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward a final break with America.

FE 206 Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases.

FE 208 Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases, and on 31 July Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."

FE 209

[20]

FE 211 Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August, placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August when mobilization would be complete.

FE 212 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army (FE 153) airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010); a total of 3600 officers, 1600 cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1350 cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900 pilots (1940—3100 pilots); and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army Air Corps (1940—114 combat air squadrons).

FE 213 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in

slight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.

FE 218 Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over international concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai by surprise.

FE 219 Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal number in reserve.

FE 224 In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Russian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48 divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions), with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Uncalled reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service troops. Artillery was believed to be insufficient. The total potential strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions.

[21]

FE 222 On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control measures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also
FE 223 reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions), located overseas.

FE 226 On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to our own in every respect."

FE 229 On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobilization which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now in Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign observers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000, it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90 per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time were known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or Korea.

FE 230 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.

FE 231 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated, according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable" policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war.

FE 239 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports on the Pearl River.

FE 240 The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future."

FE 242 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, Tokyo concluded on 20 October: "If the rumored increase goes above the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt as to the intention behind it."

[22]

FE 243 Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an unusual

procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo-China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a weakened Russia.

FE 245 London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 86,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chungking on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November.

FE 247 A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.

FE 249 Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists, the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at Bandoeng on 30 October.

FE 248 On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.

FE 262 The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus avoiding violence. The Singapore British, however, were reported by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya.

FE 254 The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack Netherlands Indies.

[23]

FE 256 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.

FE 258 The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; that Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; that unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; and that the occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the risk of a general war.

FE 264 The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activities over Malaya were reported.

FE 260
FE 268 The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2.

FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*

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MID 336. (11-3-41) Alaska

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)—MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from the Orient: 11/3/41. FMH

MID 336. (11-3X41) Phil Dept. Dept.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)—MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from the Orient: dtd. FMH

MID 336. (11-3-41) PR Dept.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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